ignatiev in constantinople.ii-1

Ignatyev at Constantinople: IIAuthor(s): B. H. SumnerReviewed work(s):Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 11, No. 33 (Apr., 1933), pp. 556-571Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4202817 .Accessed: 23/08/2012 16:13

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IGNATYEV AT CONSTANTINOPLE

II.

IT is no wonder that Ignatyev painted a gloomy picture of Russia's position following on her grave defeat at the Paris Conference over Greece in January and February I869. The Balkan Christians were bitterly divided among themselves. The Turks were elated over their suppression of Crete and their humiliation of Greece. Their confidence and energy were increased and their pride flattered by the visits of the Emperor Franz Joseph and Empress Eugenie.1 With unaccustomed vigour they pushed on their reform plans, army reorganisation, and naval building, turning their faces to the west, counting on the steady support of England, and above all looking to Napoleon III. To Russia they were frankly hostile. (Iz., I9I4, iv, 76-82.)*

One serious loss they sustained, Fuad Pasha dying at Nice after a short illness in February I869; a loss particularly to Ali Pasha, despite their rivalry and certain differences in their views. Ali had become Grand Vizier, with Fuad as Reis Effendi, in January I867- a duumvirate admirably fitted to throw dust, in the shape of pseudo- liberal reforms, in the eyes of Western Europe (Iz., 1914, iii, 98). At the same time Ignatyev recognised that they were remarkable men. Between them they controlled Turkish policy. Looking back, perhaps for once with a certain triumphant detachment, he described Ali as a serious statesman; as, despite his European externals, in essentials a Turk and hostile to the Christians. Fuad he thought more of a cosmopolitan than a Turk, without prejudices, superficial, many-sided, adaptable. Ali, though less brilliant, had the deeper qualities; Fuad, initiative, energy, suppleness and presence of mind; no one knew better than he how to cover up the errors of his Government and to support Turkish prestige before Europe. In his attitude towards Russia he varied, but was not hostile in his last years. On Fuad's death Ali was faced with a solitary

* NOTE.-The following abbreviations are used: Iz. for Izvestiya rninisterstra inostrannykh del: I. V. for Istorichesky Vestnik, I914, vol. I35.

1 Ignatyev was characteristically alarmed that the Empress's visit would bring demands on behalf of the Catholics and an increase of Latin influence; see his letter to Archimandrite Antonin Kapustin, head of the Russian Church Mission in Jerusalem, a very active and ambitious cleric and a close ally of Ignatyev, in A. A. Dmitrievsky, Graf N.P. Ignatyev kak tserkovno-politichesky deyatel'na pravoslavnom vostoke (St. Petersburg, 1909), P. 70.

556

IGNATYEV AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 557

struggle against his numerous opponents, but he succeeded in concentrating all power in his own hands and removing from Con- stantinople his two most dangerous rivals, Midhat and Namik Pashas. The leaders of the Old Turkish party, Mehemet Rushdi (the Grand Vizier before Ali), Riza, Kibrizli, lost all influence. The Ministry was composed solely of Ali's adherents, he himself combining the posts of Grand Vizier and Reis Effendi. He held on grimly until his death, in September I87I (Iz., I9I4, iv, 89-90.)

By When the year I870 had brought decisive change. Ignatyev, as has been seen, had long hoped for the Franco-Prussian War, which he had regarded as inevitable. But, for him, it came too late and was over too soon. The days of I867 when the Russian Foreign Office seemed not to have set its face definitely against the idea of a general conflagration in the Balkans were past, and the revision of the I856 treaty was now to be effected only by peaceful means (Iz., I9I4, iv, 96).

The Turks, however, were greatly alarmed when the war broke out, that it would extend to the east if it were not quickly finished, and the Roumanians shared their fears that Russia would take the opportunity to fall upon Turkey.2 The news of French defeats was all the more serious for the Turks in that the Balkan Christians were convinced that a French victory would worsen their position and therefore ardently hoped for the success of Prussia, if possible after a protracted struggle which would give Russia the opportunity to fulfil her historic mission. They firmly believed that there was an alliance between Russia and Prussia for simultaneous action in the east and west. The rapid collapse of France caused an equally rapid change of attitude on the part of the Turkish Government, which promptly tried to draw close to Prussia and nervously to

2 For Roumanian nervousness as to a Russian stroke and their inquiries at Vienna as to the Austrian attitude see N. lorga, Correspondance diplomatique roumaine sous le roi Charles Ier, nos. I50, 154, 156. The Roumanians were deeply committed in negotiations with the Turks for joint military resistance to the Russians, though they do not seem to have actually con- cluded an agreement with Constantinople; see the controversy as to this between E. Adamov and N. lorga in Le monde slave, 1928, no. I, p. 94; no. 4, pp. 142-5. Rumours were also spread from Constantinople of a Turco-Greek alliance, E. Driault and M. Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece de i821 d nos jours, vol. 3, p. 334. According to Prince Gregory Trubetskoy " Les pr6liminaires de la conference de Londres " in Revue d'histoire diplomatique, I909, vol. 23, p. 127, the Turks proceeded to a partial mobilisation, called up 50,000 reservists, and hastily placed munitions orders abroad. Trubetskoy apparently bases these statements on information from Ignatyev's despatches. Prokesch-Osten in Deutsche Revue, April I88o, p. 13, confirms the fact of Turkish military and naval preparations.

558 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.

maintain good relations with Russia. They were particularly anxious lest the mission of Thiers to St. Petersburg, late in Septem- ber, might lead to concessions at their expense, and later lest the war might be ended by a Conference at which Russia would demand the revision of the Treaty of Paris (Iz., I914, iv, 9I-5).3

She did, of course, demand a revision of the treaty, but not in quite such an alarming form as the Turks had feared. The first move came from Ignatyev. From the outbreak of the war he pressed St. Petersburg to act; then, having failed to extract the instrrictions he desired, he took the initiative himself and informed Ali Pasha personally that Russia must have back the Bessarabian districts ceded in i856 and must no longer be saddled with the ignominious clauses limiting her naval strength in the Black Sea. At the same time he maintained that there was no intention of invalidating the collective guarantee of the Ottoman Empire or of attacking the principle of the integrity of the empire. Ali did not appear to raise great difficulties as to Bessarabia, provided that Turkey kept the delta of the Danube and that the international regime for the Danube were continued, but he was extremely reserved as regards any alteration of the naval clauses and was fixedly opposed to any opening of the Straits. He gave the impression that negotiations might have some chance of success and that he was desirous on general grounds of a rapprochement with Russia, but that his prin- cipal object was to gain time and to remain on good terms with England.4

Ignatyev obviously realised that this bid of his to initiate a great diplomatic success on his own ground at Constantinople

3 This review of Ignatyev corresponds very closely with the extracts from his despatches during July, August and September quoted by Prince Gregory Trubetskoy in " Les pr6liminaires de la conference de Londres " in Revue d'histoire diplomatique, igog vol. 23, pp. I24-36.

4 Text of Ignatyev's despatch of i6 August recounting his conversation with Ali in Trubetskoy, ib., pp. 27I-77. Ignatyev's version of this in Iz., I914, iv, 98-I02, iS substantially the same, though it implies that Ignatyev initiated discussions rather than that he merely had one conversation. There is, naturally, no mention in Iz. of Ignatyev's repudiation by Gorchakov and of the ensuing bitterness. The very brief mention in I. V., p. 70, adds nothing. Ignatyev ascribes Gorchakov's subsequent instructions to him not to touch the subject as due to his jealousy of the initiative having been taken from him. He does not suggest in any way that his demarche was intended merely to force his Foreign Office to seize the favourable moment for a coup, and not in reality to win a victory for himself. For doubts as to how far the credit ascribed by Gorchakov to himself for the declaration of 3I October is justified see Kurt Rheindorf, Die Schwarze-Meer (Pontus)-Frage I856-i87I (Berlin, 1925), pp. 8I-3, 153, 158-59.


would be extremely distasteful to Gorchakov, and he attempted to palliate his ddmarche by suitable generalities and by emphasis on its having been made " d'une maniere purement academique et person- nelle, en ayant soin de depouiller mes paroles de tout caractere officiel." Gorchakov's first reply, in a personal letter, showed obvious annoyance: the bulk of it was of a general character; only in the closing paragraphs did he refer to Ignatyev's ddmarche, underlining the non-committal attitude of Ali Pasha and, with obviou5 relish, pointing out that the conversation provided very slight grounds for hopeful negotiations.5 To this Ignatyev protested, " qu'il n'est jamais entre dans sa pensee que cette abolition peut se consommer sur le terrain local . . . J'ai uniquement eu a coeur de faciliter par des efforts locaux, une tache que le cabinet imperial n'a jamais cesse de considerer comme l'une des plus importantes devolues 'a ses soins . . . 6

This barbed verbiage did not, of course, soothe Gorchakov, and before receiving it he was angrily disturbed by circumstantial rumours, mainly originating from Vienna and Budapest, that Ignatyev was preparing for the abrogation of the Treaty of Paris.7 He wrote again to his unruly subordinate, on I3 September: " Ce que vous avez dit au grand vizier etait parfaitement juste en principe, mais je crois que la choix du confident etait moins heureux. Nous ne pouvions pas supposer qu'Aali Pacha s'abstiendrait d'en faire part aux Cabinets sur l'appui desquels il croyait pouvoir compter ou dont il etait certain d'exciter les defiances . ... J'eprouve quelques regrets que l'eveil ait ete donne localement et vous le dis avec ma franchise habituelle. Ce n'est pas 'a Constan- tinople, ni avec le concours de la Turquie que nous pouvons esperer l'abolition du traite de i856."8 Two days later Gorchakov informed Ignatyev that the Turkish charge d'affaires had insisted on seeing him in person and had officially broached the question of Ignatyev's overture; and that he had whittled it away as being " une conversation strictement academique" and had declared positively that Ignatyev had acted without instructions from St. Petersburg. "Vous connaissez dej"a, mon cher Ignatieff," the letter went on, "mon opinion sur l'opportunite' de cette causerie, qui a fait en

5 Text in Trubetskoy, ib., pp. 279-82. S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. I51, gives its date 28 August.

6 Despatch no. 228, 14 September: long extract from the text in Trubet- skoy, ib., p. 283.

7 Trubetskoy, ib., pp. 284-5; Goriainow, ib., pp. 149, I52.

8 Extract from the text in Trubetskoy, ib., pp. 285-6.


Europe beaucoup plus de bruit que nous n'eussions desire et qu'il ne nous est profitable."9

Upon this, early in October, Ignatyev left Constantinople on leave, nominally for family reasons, in order to explain in St. Peters- burg the false position in which he had been placed (I. V., 70). Gor- chakov was only too ready to have him absent from Constantinople, but not at all anxious to have him present in St. Peterburg. An accident delayed him and he reached the capital too late (Iz., I9I4, iv, ioi). On 3I October, Gorchakov had despatched his circular declaring that Russia no longer considered herself bound by the I856 treaty as regards her sovereign rights in the Black Sea, that she denounced the special Russo-Turkish convention regarding naval limitation, and that she recognised the full rights of the Sultan in respect to the Black Sea in conformity with Russia's reassuming her full rights.10

With the issue of this circular any doubts as to the Chancellor concentrating negotiations in the hands of himself, and Brunnov in London, were removed. Ignatyev was in the background. The Turks, pressed by Bismarck, unsupported by an uncertain Austria, could only wait for stiff action from England. This proved not to be pushed to extremes. Gladstone himself had always disapproved of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, and it was the form, rather than the content, of the Russian declaration to which he took strong objection. Brunnov, despite his alarms, was right in his prediction that the British Government would prefer to negotiate rather than fight, unless it were over-ridden by irresistible pressure of public opinion.1'

In fact, the Turks seemed to have expected that the Russian declaration would have been more drastic and would have attempted

9 Extract from Gorchakov's letter, 15 September, in Trubetskoy, ib., p. 286.

10 The text of the circular is in Martens' Nouveau recueil gdn6ral de traitds vol. I8, pp. 269-73. The fullest account of the whole question, including

the London Conference, is in S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 144-302. Trubetskoy covers a much smaller ground, using the same documents, but gives full texts or much longer extracts. There is important German material in Die Grosse Politik, vol. 2, pp. 3-23, and in Kurt Rheindorf, Die Schwarze-Meer (Pontus)-Frage I856-71. See also the article of A. F. Meyendorff on the question of the Russian guarantee of neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War and the quid pro quo from Prussia in Sbornik statei posvyashchennykh P. N. Milyukovu (Prague, I929), pp. 497-5I12. The text of the protocols of the London Conference, and of the I87I Treaty, are in Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de 1'empire ottoman, vol. 3, pp. 301-37. "I Lettre particuliere of Brunnov to Gorchakov, I4 November; text given in Trubetskoy, ib., pp. 368-71.

IGNATYEV AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 56I

to lay down the principle of opening the Straits.12 It caused, indeed, an immense impression in Constantinople, and de Staal, the charg6 d'affaires, was awkwardly placed by the late arrival of the official text of the declaration and of his instructions, but Ignatyev, when he returned to his post just before 23 November, found Ali Pasha mainly preoccupied with the question of form and not inclined to stir up immediate complications.13 It appears that the Turks, in their nervousness that the scope of a Conference might become so enlarged as to open up the whole Treaty of Paris, would have pre- ferred a direct agreement with Russia, but in view of the British attitude they agreed to a Conference, with the express request that it should deal only with the articles of the treaty denounced by Russia'4-a limitation that Bismarck was most anxious to assure.

The Conference duly met in London, and on I3 March, i87I, was signed the treaty which relieved Russia of " the indefinite pressure of so humiliating a yoke."15 She was untrammelled by any neutralisation of the Black Sea and free to build as she pleased, although, in fact, during the next eight years she did hardly anything to construct a Black Sea fleet. In effect the content of her unilateral declaration of 3I October had been accepted. One novelty which had cau-sed highly involved searchings for a formula appeared in the treaty: the Sultan was to have the right of opening the Straits in time of peace to war vessels of friendly and allied powers if he considered it necessary for the safeguarding of the Treaty of Paris. The other stipulations of that treaty and its annexes were solemnly re-confirmed by the signatories. Gorchakov could undoubtedly plume himself on a great diplomatic success.

For Ignatyev, though he claimed that the treaty represented what he had attempted to concert in August alone with Ali (Iz., I9I4, v, I37), it was not enough; nothing had been said of Bess-

12 Trubetskoy, ib., pp. 381-2, 385, quoting from de Staal to Gorchakov 15 November, and Ignatyev to Gorchakov 23 November. De Staal received the circular and his instructions I5 November. Gorchakov was, in fact, keeping the principle of the opening of the Straits as a final card to play if British opposition were pushed to extremes; only Brunnov was originally informed of this and he was instructed to use it in the last resort if he thought it necessary; Goriainow, ib., pp. I64, 2I8.

13 Ignatyev's despatch no. 286, 23 November: text in Trubetskoy, ib., p. 385.

14 Ignatyev's despatches, nos. 29I and 295 secret, 29 November and 6 December, reporting information from Keyserling, the Prussian Minister: cited in Trubetskoy, ib., p. 394; Iz., I914, v, 131-34, quoting from despatch of 6 December and from the Turkish instructions for the conference.

15 Stratford de Redcliffe, The Eastern Question, p. 15, in a reprinted letter to The Times of i6 May, I876.


arabia,1" and Russia had expressly bound herself to the remainder of the Treaty of Paris; what he urged should have been done was to set about quietly building cruisers in the Black Sea and to come to a direct agreement with Turkey (I.V., 71). His real objection was that it was not he who had rid Russia of humiliating conditions.

In one essential respect, however, it is difficult to see that the outcome did not satisfy his own requirements. He had written: "II serait, en effet, tres important que l'Angleterre ne put pas se prevaloir d'avoir sauve la Turquie d'un pretendu danger, en nous faisant reculer."17 And Russia had not withdrawn. He had expressed his general attitude in the following terms: " Si les preten- tions britanniques prevalent, l'Occident conservera la haute main en Orient, la France venant se joindre a l'Angleterre et a l'Autriche apr's la paix. Si c'est nous qui l'emportons, ce sera au contraire un indice pour les Turcs qu'il est de leur inter6t de s'entendre directe- ment avec la Russie et de ne plus trop compter sur l'Occident. ''8 Russia had, in fact, gained the day, and her position at Constan- tinople in I87I was very different from what it had been at the close of the last London Conference two years before. For this she had not only herself to thank: the collapse of France had transformed the situation.

The Franco-Prussian War and the London Conference's acceptance of the Russian fait accomnpli ushered in a new -period on the Bosphorus. France was now, of course, politically effaced, and Ignatyev proceeded to build up for himself a predominating position based upon excellent personal relations with the Sultan.

His task was the easier in that the death of Ali Pasha in Septem- ber I87I removed the strongest single figure among the leading Turks and was followed by a long series of rapid changes and intrigue, during which there were no fewer than six different Grand Viziers in two and a half years, with still more frequent changes among the provincial governors; the Sultan, nervously suspicious as to his own power and popularity, appearing to be deliberately lowering the importance of the Grand Vizirate'9 (Iz., I9I5, i, I45-6).

16 According to Prokesch-Osten, Deutsche Revue, April i88o, p. I5, Bess- arabia had originally figured in Gorchakov's proposals for the declaration, but had been omitted owing to Prussian desires. He does not state whence he derived this information.

17 Ignatyev's despatch, no. 286, 23 November; in Trubetskoy, ib., p. 385. 18 Ignatyev's despatch, no. 295, secret, 6 December; in Trubetskoy, ib.,

p. 383. 19 The following were the Grand Viziers, and Ignatyev's comments upon

them as given in Iz., 19I5, i, 146-57. Ignatyev does not suggest the best explanation of the Sultan's chaotic behaviour, viz., that he was not sane.

[Continued on next page


The increase of Abdul Aziz's power and particularly his squandering of the finances were powerful factors in the growth of the Young Turk constitutionalists, led by Ignatyev's enemy, Midhat Pasha, who aimed at replacing the Sultan's centralisation by their own. But Midhat's day was not yet come. It was Ignatyev's star that first rose, and he did not have much difficulty in killing a curious project, concocted by Midhat and mainly by Halil Sherif, to reinforce the military strength of Turkey by a reorganisation in imitation of the new German Empire, whereby the tributary States would become again effectively linked to Constantinople (Iz., I9I5, i, I70-2)Y2

(i) Mahmud Nedim Pasha: Old Turk; pro-Russian; he had no personal dislike of the Christians, and appointed them to important posts; very popular among the Orthodox, especially the Bulgars and the Armenians. His attempts at economy and unwise severity against some of his main enemies brought about his downfall.

(ii) Midhat Pasha: from 31 July, I872; Young Turk; immediate reaction from Mahmud's regime; large expenditure planned for railways, army, admin- istrative and educational reforms. Ignatyev did his best to undermine his relations with the Sultan, since his foreign policy was pro-British and anti- Russian. The Reis Effendi was Halil Sherif Pasha, who became a bitter personal enemy of Ignatyev and dangerous opponent in his foreign policy. (Halil Sherif was a rich Egyptian, who had lived long in Paris and had a thickish veneer of European civilisation; while Reis Effendi he married Ismail's niece, the beautiful Nasli Hanum, for long a notorious centre of intrigue in Constantinople, Radowitz, Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen .

vol. I, p. 240.) (iii) Mahmud Rushdi: an upright, capable man, halfway between the

Old and the Young Turks. Halil (who remained Reis Effendi), Midhat and Mustafa Fazil were planning a " constitutional ministry" which would bind the Sultan's hands and prejudice the position of the Christians and fling Turkey into the arms of the West. Ignatyev's revelations and intrigues with the Sultan frustrated their plan.

(iv) Essad Pasha: I4 February, I873; for fifty-eight days only; had been Seraskier; a young officer, rapidly risen; quite incompetent for the post of Grand Vizier. The Sultan took a good deal of his work into his own hands, but quickly became bored with it. The one good thing Essad did was to turn Halil Sherif out of the Porte.

(v) Mahmud Rushdi Shirvanidze: had been Minister of Finance, and continued to incline towards England, though on good personal terms with Ignatyev. The new Reis Effendi, Rashid Pasha, was pro-Russian. Intrigues and finance caused yet another change.

(vi) Hussein Avni Pasha: I7 February, 1874; he kept his previous post as Seraskier, and had always previously occupied nothing but military posts; previously pro-French, now appeared to believe in Germany; had always been personally on excellent terms with Ignatyev; energetic, brusque and a fanatical patriot. He quickly quarrelled with Rashid and replaced him at the Porte by Aarifi Pasha, a well-intentioned nullity.

20 The scheme was regarded by the Roumanians as owing much to the influence of Andrfassy, and was indignantly repudiated by them as a fatal blow at the political existence of Roumania; it was more cautiously disapproved of by Belgrade, see N. lorga, Correspondance diplomatique roumaine sous le roi Charles ler, nos. 227-30, 232-5, 237-9, under date November- December I872.


This borrowing from Germany by the Young Turks was symptomatic. Ignatyev notes, in discussing the general position of Germany at Constantinople between I870 and I874, that the Turks turned to Germany thinking her the one disinterested power, the Young Turks and Halil Sherif especially harbouring the idea of Germany and Austria combining with them against the Slavs and Russia. This idea was, however, weakened by the evident continued closeness of the German and Russian courts and the excellent relations maintained between Ignatyev amd the German Minister Keudell, which were in no way impaired by serious difficulties which arose over the anti-Russian intrigues of Alten and Kalisch, the German consuls at Jerusalem and Rushchuk.21 Keudell supported Ignatyev against them, and Alten was removed from Jerusalem. Keudell himself left in I873, and though his successor, Eichemann, was pro-Turkish and in close relations with the Austrians his stay was very brief, and Werther, who followed him, caused Ignatyev no difficulties (Iz., I9I5, i, I58-60).

Although Ignatyev had so far little to complain of in the attitude of Germany he was encouraged by his opposition to the shackles of the Dreikaiserbiindnis to look ahead-far ahead-with a prophetic warning as to the possible dangers of the great military and economic power on the Spree. " Il serait 'a desirer que les interets materiels de l'Allemagne ne soient pas trop engages en Orient, ainsi que le voudraient les turcs dans l'espoir d'obtenir par ce moyen la protec- tion efficace de cette Puissance. Les commandes si considerables de canons Krupp faites dernierement par la Porte, la presence des instructeurs prussiens dans l'armene ottomane, l'augmentation considerables (sic) du nombre des ingenieurs allemands employes a la construction des chemins de fer-sont deja autant de liens qui attachaient la Turquie a l'Empire Germanique et que ce dernier pouvait exploiter le jour oiu il voudrait exercer un role actif en Turquie. Vu les dispositions du Sultan, des dignitaires de la Porte et meme des populations il serait facile a l'Allemagne d'acquerir en Turquie une influence preponderante contre laquelle il nous serait beaucoup plus difficile de lutter qu'avec celle des autres puissances occidentales" (Iz., I9I5, i, I60).

On the Austrians at Constantinople Ignatyev-in I874-is 21 Bismarck at the time of his I873 visit to St. Petersburg with the Emperor

was anxious to impress upon Stremoukhov that strict instructions had been given to the German Consuls in the Orient not to meddle with political affairs; report of Stremoukhov to Gorchakov, 6 May, I873; text in Russko-Germanskie otnoshenia (Moscow, I922), pp. I4-I6, reprinted from Krasny Arkhiv, vol. I.


comparatively mild. He complains sharply of the influence of Magyar anti-Slav intrigues, and of Ludolph, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, for several years Consul-General at Warsaw, young and active; but he was replaced by Zichy (a cipher in the diplomatic world who rapidly fell completely into Ignatyev's hands), and relations were smooth enough in Constantinople (Iz., I9I5, i, I60-3).

Ignatyev's full bitterness is reserved for England, and especially for Elliot: "homme bilieux et passione . . . Appartenant 'a l'ecole palmerstonienne, il s'attaque systematiquement a notre influence legitime en intervenant dans des affaires ou l'inter&t anglais n'est nullement engage, comme par exemple, dans la question greco-bulgare, dans les affaires du Mont Athos." After vain efforts to direct secretly the Bulgars through his consuls at Adrianople and Salonika, Elliot turned to exploiting the Greeks against Russia (Iz., I9I5, i, I63). The English railway schemes in Anatolia also aroused Ignatyev's determined opposition. He heartily disliked Turkey having any railways at all ;22 and most of all he feared them in Asiatic Turkey under English control, with projected routes to Erzerum and Van threatening Transcaucasia, with political and strategical advantages that would accrue to England, with economic rivalry from a developed Anatolia, the harvest of which would be ready a month earlier than the Russian harvest (Iz., I9I5, iv, 234-6).

Hardly less violent than his attacks on the English are his diatribes against the Greeks and " la grande idee." The Athenian Government was accused of working against Russia on every occa- sion, and he signalled out the special hostility of the Synod at Athens and the Greek Minister at Constantinople, a violent Russo- phobe who sponged for the support of England and Germany.23

22 The Sultan's European tour in I867 had inspired him and Fuad with a vivid idea of the importance of railways for Turkey, and there followed a period of feverish railway projecting. Ignatyev opposed, with much skill, all such plans. " Je ne me suis jamais fait illusion quant a l'avenir et aux consequences de l'etablissement des voies ferrees en Turquie. J'ai fait mon possible pour enrayer la marche de cette entreprise, en appelant par tous les moyens en mon pouvoir l'attention des hommes d']Rtat turcs sur les dangers politiques et financiers, que son execution preparerait 'a l'independence de l'Empire Ottoman, en la livrant a l'exploitation de l'Occident." (Iz., I915,

iv, 231.) 23 In fact the Coumoundouros Ministry appears to have tried to keep on

good terms with Russia. It resigned in October I871. Bulgaris who succeeded as Prime Minister in January 1872 was actively anti-Russian, and he appointed as charge d'affaires at Constantinople, in place of Rhazis who was regarded as closely bound to Ignatyev, Kalergis, who, like his successor as Minister, Simos, was determined to combat Russian influence. E. Driault and M. Lh6ritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece de I82I a nos jOlUrs, vol. 3, pp. 346-52, 357.


In the eyes of the Greeks (and the same might have been said of the Bulgars and their Church): " . . . l'Eglise Orthodoxe nIest qu'un drapeau politique et un moyen d'action . . . L'idee nationale subsiste seule et utilise tous les 6l6ments subversifs qui existent en Turquie." Among such subversive elements Ignatyev detected freemasonry, the modern equivalent for the Greeks of their out-of- date hetairiai (Iz., I915, i, i64-6).

Ignatyev's struggle with the Greeks was, of course, primarily over the furiously contested Bulgarian Exarchate, which came into being during the three heated years I870, I87I, and I872 and left a permanent mark in many quarters against Ignatyev as the creator of an artificial, Pan-Slav-manipulated, Bulgar nationality. In fact, Ignatyev was neither the creator of Bulgarian nationalism nor the initiator of the struggle for a Bulgarian Church independent of the Patriarchate. The origins of both go back to the generation before the Crimean War. After i856 Russian educational and cultural propaganda increased steadily, thanks to the advocacy of the Moscow Pan-Slavs, to official support, and to the continued energy of the Bulgar colony in Odessa, while the Church struggle was resumed in i858.24 Thus, when Ignatyev arrived in Constantinople he found

24 There is a very informing article by N. Bobcev on the Slavophil movement in Russia and the rise of Bulgarian nationalism in Proslava na osvo- boditelnata voina I877-I878g. (Sofia, I929), pp. 156-244. In the same anniversary number V. N. Zlatarsky and Y. Trifonov have articles on the attitude of Alexander II and Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow to the Bul- garian Church question (pp. 131-I43, and I44-I55). But none of these deals with Ignatyev. He treats the extremely complicated question of the Bul- garian Exarchate in Iz., 1914, i, I24, iii, 'IO-I', vi, I56-63; 1915, ii, I73-87. It is passed over in I. V. I can only very briefly refer here to some of his points. Ignatyev also has a good deal to say in Iz. on the other religious quarrels of the time, e.g. the Armenian Churches and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. On Ignatyev and the latter, see also A. A. Dmitrievsky, Graf N.P. Ignatyev kalk tserkovno-politichesky deyatel' na pravoslavnom vostoke. I am omitting these questions in this article.

There is a very useful and full account of Bulgarian nationalism and of the Church question in Alois Hajek, Bulgarien unter der Tilrkenherrschaft, with much reference to Russian influence, though not to that of Ignatyev himself. C. Jiricek, Das Fiirstenthum Bulgarien (Prague, I89I), pp. 30I-15, gives a good brief outline of I856-76. A detailed and important account of the struggle for a Bulgarian Church is supplied by T. St. Burmov in his Blgayo-Grtskata tserkovna rasprya (Sofia, I902). Burmov had been educated at Moscow University, and during the fight for the Exarchate was one of the leading Constantinople moderates among the Bulgarian nationalists, in close touch with the Russian Embassy. His book is, however, conspicuously silent as to the part played by Ignatyev and as to Russian influence in general. Much more information on Ignatyev is given in V. Teplov, Greko-Bolgarsky tserkovny

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Greek-Bulgar relations already bitter and entangled. The use of Bulgarian in church services, Bulgarian bishops for Bulgarian dioceses, the territorial extent of these dioceses, the degree of depen- dence upon the Patriarch, the organisation and functions of a Bulgarian synod, the financial claims of Constantinople upon the Bulgars, and, less directly involved, the composition and powers of the Patriarch's Synod-these were the essential questions round which the struggle swayed.

Ignatyev's own account represents him as trying to exercise a moderating influence and to effect a compromise, and it is certainly true that the extremist Bulgars, led by Chomakov, P. R. Slaveikov, and Dragan Tsankov, maintained in public a continuous and violent hostility to Ignatyev and the Russophil moderates among the Bulgars-the chorbadjis, " the old party," who disbelieved in the possibility of building up Bulgar nationalism on the basis of a violent break with the Greeks.25 And it was the Bulgarian extremists who finally won the day. Ignatyev worked hard to secure the election of his candidate, Gregorios VI, as Patriarch in I867, and he thoroughly

vopros po neizdannym istochnikam (St. Petersburg, I889). This was com- pleted in i88i at Buyuk Dere and, although there is no statement as to what Teplov's unprinted sources were, it seems clear that they must have been largely drawn from the Russian Embassy, in which he had served.

No information is contained either in Ignatyev's memoirs or in his I874 memorandum on the question of the Pan-Slav activities in Bulgaria and else- where of his consular agents and the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee. These were exposed in explicit detail in the incriminating documents, said to have been stolen from the Russian Embassy in Vienna, published by the Turks at the beginning of I877 and including ostensibly genuine correspondence of Ignatyev mainly in i872 (G. Giacometti, Les responsabilitds; English translation by Edgar Whittaker, Russia's work in Turkey). Indispensable material is contained in the two bulky volumes of the private papers of Naiden Gerov, the Bulgarian nationalist leader and Russian consul at Philippopolis, Iz arkhivata na Naiden Gerov (Sofia, i9I I, I914), and in Gerov's official correspondence, Dokumenty Za Blgarskata istoriya (Sofia, I93I; vol. i), which goes only as far as the end of I870.

25 For the opposition of the Bulgar extremists in Constantinople to their own moderates, the chorbadjis, and to Ignatyev, see particularly Simeon Radev, Stroitelite svremenna Blgariya (Sofia, i9ii), vol. i, pp. viii-xiii (based mainly on the extremist contemporary Press), and 90-92. Ignatyev describes them thus: " Malheureusement, le parti avance parmi les Bulgares, qui n'a aucune conviction religieuse et aucun principe, vise a perpetuer la rupture avec la Grande ]-glise et songe meme parfois i l'union avec Rome, qui lui semble utile au point de vue politique et nationale." Roman Catholicism in Turkey was one of Ignatyev's bugbears. There had been a notable Uniat movement among the Bulgars in I86o-i, and some threatened revival of it in I869-70, perhaps with the deliberate intention of frightening Ignatyev and the Russians into supporting extreme Bulgar claims.


approved, though not very hopefully, the far-reaching concessions wrhich Gregorios proceeded to offer.26

In the following year he strongly criticised the much more drastic proposals which the Bulgarian extremists extracted from Ali Pasha (substantially they amounted to a first draft of the I870 firman), though it is symptomatic that the Patriarch suspected him of being really responsible for them.27 He did, however, urge on St. Petersburg-without success-the acceptance of the Oecumenical Council proposed by Gregorios in December i868; but from I869 onwards Gregorios became more and more unaccommodating and correspondingly alienated from the Russian Embassy.

It is, however, by no means certain that the firman of March I870, which precipitated the final crisis, did not go much farther than Ignatyev either expected or desired.2Y The Turks had naturally been making the most of the tortuous zigzags of Russian policy to discredit Ignatyev in the eyes of Bulgars and Greeks alike. Finally, under Ali Pasha's direction, and in fear of the Cretan rebellion giving birth to some kind of alliance among the Christians of the Balkans, they came of themselves to grant the Bulgars far more than the Russian Embassy was urging. Chomakov, the Russophobe Bulgarian extremist, who was an influential official in the Turkish administration, succeeded in his arguments that the best safeguard against Russian influence on the Bulgars was for the Turks themselves to promote the setting up of a Bulgarian Exarchate within which a healthily anti-Russian national Bulgarian feeling could be developed.29

The firman of I870 provided for the setting up of a " Bulgarian Exarchate" (the first official use of the word Bulgarian for five centuries), the constitution of which was to be settled by subsequent regulations, but which was to be in effective independence of the Patriarch, and was to include all dioceses with a purely Bulgarian

26 " Je batis de mes mains," said Gregorios to Ignatyev, " un pont a l'independance politique des Bulgares." Extract from despatch of Ignatyev, no. 128, I4 May, I867, quoted by Prince Gregory Trubetskoy in his article on the Bulgarian schism in Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 1907, vol. 2I, p. 176. His proposals involved the setting up of an Exarchate to include Bulgaria north of the Balkans and the Nish region, but to be dependent on the Patri- archate. For Russian support of these proposals see also T. St. Burmov, Blgaro-Grtskata tserkovna rasprya, pp. 350, 353.

27 Trubetskoy in Revue d'histoire diplomatique, vol. 2I, pp. I81-3. 28 Trubetskoy, ib., pp. 396-7, represents that Ignatyev did not know how

far-reaching the firman was, and when it was published had to make the best he could of it. Cf. E. Haumant, " Les origines de la lutte pour la Macedoine (I855-I872)," in Le Monde Slave, October I926, pp. 57-8.

29 S. Radev, Stroitelite na svremenna Blgariya, vol. I, p. 92.


population and in addition any other districts two-thirds or more of whose inhabitants so desired.-" The dioceses included in the territorial minimum of the Exarchate were enumerated in the firman. It meant that at the least the Exarchate would cover almost the whole of Bulgaria north of the Balkan range, including the Sofia and Nish regions, and in addition parts of the upper Struma valley and of the dioceses of Philippopolis and Slivno. The two-thirds provision obviously would entail a bitter intensification of the struggles between the Bulgars and Greeks, particularly over the westward extension of the Exarchate in Macedonia. The whole made almost certain an entire break between the two peoples.

Ignatyev's immediate reaction to the firman was to expatiate to Gorchakov on the Porte having now admitted the principle of nationality which it had previously denied, and to sum up gratula- torily: " il etait permis de considerer l'issue que la question venait de prendre comme un couronnement heureux de cinq annees d'efforts de notre part."31 But it does not appear that Ignatyev had been working for any such drastic rupture with the Greeks as was involved by the firman. It is evident from his own official account put together four years later that his official policy was to attempt to secure a compromise to the advantage of the Bulgars which would not entirely alienate the Greeks. " L'exarchat, mEme dans sa forme la plus restrainte, offrait un noyau national qu'on serait libre de developper ulterieurement." (Iz., I9I4, vi, I59.) In writing of the effect of the firman he thus descnrbed his aims: " Ma principale preoccupation dans la question, qui se debattait, a toujours ete de procurer aux bulgares, sans rompre avec les grecs, un corps national en les preservant des efforts de la propagande catholique et protes- tante et en les conservant aussi a l'orthodoxie et a notre influence" (Iz., I9I4, vi, I6I; my italics).

There is no doubt that this was the official Russian policy and that Ignatyev devoted the most ingenious efforts towards attaining it. It remains questionable, however, even allowing for the continued violence of the extremist Bulgarian Press against him, whether the popular belief was not unfounded that he himself finally desired to see created the nucleus for a Bulgaria even at the cost of breaking with the Greeks, if such a rupture was unavoidable. The firman

30 The French text of the firman of Ix March, I870, is in Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman, vol. 3, pp. 293-5.

31 Despatch no. 63, 22 March, 1870, quoted in Trubetskoy, ib., p. 397. Gorchakov had the foggiest ideas as to what had happened and seems to have believed that the firman meant that the whole question would be quietly settled; ib., p. 398.

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made this almost certain. Ignatyev was not a man for whom the Orthodox Church meant any deep religious experience or mystical communion. He viewed the struggle purely from a political aspect. The breaking away of the Bulgars from the Oecumenical Patriarch and the defiant setting up of a national opposition Church could hardly fail to lead to a schism, to further internecine struggles among the Eastern Churches and to a general lowering of the prestige of Orthodoxy which would not be at all to Russian interests. Ignat- yev's aim was to prevent these consequences by some agreed settle- ment between Bulgars and Greeks. After I870 that involved substantial acceptance of the firman by the Greeks-an exceedingly difficult if not impossible task, especially for a man so suspect as Ignatyev. As the possibility of any success receded so he began to tip the scales more decisively in favour of the Bulgarian extremists.

Overjoyed with the firman the Bulgars proceeded to set about the organisation of their Church. The Patriarch Gregorios insistently revived his proposal for an Oecumenical Council; it was again, in effect, vetoed by the Russian Holy Synod. This time Ignatyev had lent him no support. Gregorios resigned (I87I), and Ignatyev secured the election of a reputed moderate Anthim VI. He proved, from Ignatyev's account, to be but a broken reed. With the assis- tance of the Russian Embassy, he began by negotiating with the Bulgars on the battleground of the dioceses and the two-thirds provision of the firman. Ignatyev claimed that twenty-three bishoprics, including Veles and Ochrida, were allowed to the Bulgars, but he could not prevent this concession leaking out prematurely, and the extremists on either side carried the day.32 Feeling ran to fever pitch in Constantinople. Incidents were multiplied. In February I872 the Bulgars elected one of their bishops as Exarch, Anthim I, educated at Moscow and Kharkov,33 and the candidate of

32 V. Teplov, Greko-Bolgarsky tserkovny vopros po neizdannym istochniki- kam, pp. 98-IOO, gives the list and agrees with Ignatyev's statement and his general account. Burmov, Blgaro-Grtskata tserkovna rasprya, pp. 524-6, is in substantial agreement, except that he does not mention Russian influence. Ignatyev claimed that he subsequently prevailed upon the Turks themselves to deal with the question of the mixed dioceses, and that he succeeded in securing for the Bulgars those of Ochrida and Skoplje, both of course, far in " Macedonia," and both included in the Bulgaria of the I876-7 Constantinople Conference and of San Stefano. Mahmud Nedim, who was Grand Vizier from September i871 to June I872, was very favourably inchned to the Bulgars and was at the same time closely linked with Ignatyev. There is a full account in Burmov of these negotiations between the Bulgars and the Turks, but without reference to Ignatyev.

33 Russky Vestnik, i88i, vol. 151, p. 314, in an article by A. Muromtseva on Anthim.

IGNATYEV AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 57I

Ignatyev. In April this appointment was confirmed by the Sultan. The Greeks retaliated by holding a Church council, which in Septem- ber, according to Ignatyev's description, after dubious and unruly proceedings declared the Bulgars schismatic, stigmatised as heretical the doctrine of philetism, and launched major excommunication against the Exarch and the Bulgarian bishops by name and against all those in communion with them. The rupture was complete. " Long live the schism," shouted the Greek crowds in the streets of Constantinople, " We won't be absorbed by the Slavs; we won't let our children be bulgarised."

With the Exarchate and the schism modern Bulgaria was born, and she owed much undoubtedly to Ignatyev and the Pan-Slavs. Unable to prevent the Greeks from unyielding opposition, Ignatyev now stood out undisguisedly as the main protagonist of the new current in Russian foreign policy, which thought primarily in terms of Slavdom and no longer in those of Orthodoxy. Russia, as the champion of the Orthodox, was pitted mainly against Turkey. Russia, as the champion of the Slavs, was pitted equally against the Habs- burg empire-now the dual monarchy, a stronger power than Turkey. Ignatyev necessarily was to find in Andrassy his most redoubtable opponent unless, indeed, that claim should be reserved for his own superior and his own Foreign Office. Gorchakov, personally disliking and increasingly jealous of Ignatyev, had embarked with enthusiasm in i872 on his policy of rapprochement with Andrassy. If Russia and Austria were to go hand-in-hand together in the Balkans, where was there place for Ignatyev? His only chance of success was to wean the Tsar from Gorchakov and his policy of tying Russia's hands by working in agreement with Austria-Hungary. He was to fight hard for the capture of Alexander, but in the end he failed.

Meanwhile, in I874, he occupied without dispute the first position among the diplomats on the Bosphorus. Brilliantly aided by his seductive wife; himself combining great physical energy, unabashed self-confidence, ingratiating charm, jocular brusqueness, and un- appeased talent for intrigue; supplied with a fantastic medley of agents and informers: Ignatyev, with ten years' experience of Turkey behind him and in the closest relations with Abdul Aziz, could feel that he was deservedly styled " le vice-Sultan."

Balliol College, Oxford. B. H. SUMNER.

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