CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, 2002 –

2013

ANTONY MBURU

R67/42741/2011

A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE IN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (SECURITY STUDIES) TO THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS), UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

SEPTEMBER 2014DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for examination to any other University.

Signed……………………………………… Date …………………………..

Antony Mburu

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

Signed…………………………………….. Date …………………………….

Dr. Ibrahim Farah

iiDEDICATION

To my mother Elizabeth Wanjiku and brother Francis Kamau for their patience, encouragement and understanding. And to my sponsor‟s, SOS Children‟s Home Village Nairobi for their financial support in sponsoring my education for the four‟s that I have been in campus.

iiiACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The completion of this work has been possible due to the continued support and encouragement that I have received from my friends and my classmates. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies for giving me an opportunity to acquire new skills and broadening my understanding.

I would like to thank Dr. Farah my supervisor for his patience and personal assistance in providing direction and guidance throughout the course of the study.

ivABSTRACT

The study seeks to contribute to the debate concerning conflict webs in the Horn of Africa from 2002-2013. The Horn of Africa sub-region region has been prone to continues violent conflicts which have their roots in the colonial era and the cold war period. The overall objective of the

study is to access the impact of conflicts webs in the Horn of Africa, the causes of the conflict, the actors, issues and process of mitigating the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The study identified the regional security complex theory as the suitable theory in explaining the conflict dynamic in the Horn of Africa security complex. The theory asserts that regions are structurally open to intervention from global and regional hegemons. According to new regionalist scholar‟s regional subsystems are not closed as the global system, therefore they suffer from an overlay. Furthermore they argue that geographic proximity causes security dilemma because state are more concerned or threatened by their neighbors than countries that are far away. On the contrary the theory asserts that local intense security issues create an intense environment between member states which has in turn led to spillover of conflict. The theory also asserts that Regional organizations facilitate joint repression rather than integration which has been the case in the Horn of Africa region where member states have used Intergovernmental Authority on Development to further their interest. Furthermore the study discusses the key issue and actors who are involved in the Horn of Africa region conflict webs. Correspondingly the study discusses that the intergovernmental Authority on Trade and Development seeks to attain favorable regional political environment in which regional security can thrive. In addition the study observes that the shared interests and problems among member states continue to exacerbate conflict in the region, therefore undermining efforts put in place by Intergovernmental Authority on Trade and Development. In the same way the study therefore establishes that any solution or efforts to promote peace and security in the region must incorporate all the key actors that seek to benefit from the conflict and those who will benefit after the conflict.

vLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU Africa Union

CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

CPA Comprehensive peace agreement

HOA Horn of Africa

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

PSC Africa Union Peace and Security Council

RSC Regional security complex

TFG Transitional federal government

UIC Union of Islamic Courts

USA United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

viTABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ii

DEDICATION iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv

ABSTRACT v

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSvi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Introduction 1

1.1 Background 3

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 5

1.3 Objective of the Study 6

1.4 Literature Review 6

1.5 Literature Gap 10

1.6 Justification of the Study 11

1.8 Hypotheses 14

1.9 Research Methodology 14

1.10 Chapter Outline 15

CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

2.0 Introduction 16

2.1Colonial Legacy 16

2.2 Arming the Horn of Africa during the Cold War 19

2.3 The Horn of Africa and Cold War Politics as Source of Insecurity 21

2.4 Proxy Wars in the Horn of Africa 22

2.5 Conclusion 23

CHAPTER THREE: CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: ACTORS,

CAUSES AND PROCESSES OF MANAGEMENT

3.0 Introduction 25

3.1 An Over View of Conflict in the Horn of Africa 25

vii3.2 Actors 27

3.2.1 Member States 27

3.2.2 International Community 28

3.3 Causes of Conflict 29

3.3.1 Frontiers and Borderland Disputes 29

3.4 IGAD and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa 30

3.5 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism of the IGAD 31

3.6 The IGAD – AU Relations in Conflict Resolution 33

3.7 Cooperation and Interference 33

3.8 Conclusion 34

CHAPTER FOUR: CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL

ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction 36

4.1Emerging Issues 37

4.2 Multidimensionality of Conflict in Horn of Africa 37

4.3 War Economy in the Horn of Africa 39

4.4 Complexity of Regional Security in the Horn of Africa 41

4.5 The Effectiveness of IGAD‟s Contribution to Peace and Security 42

4.6 Conclusion 44

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Summary 46

5.1. Key Findings 47

5.2. Recommendations 48

BIBLIOGRAPHY 49

viiiCHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Introduction

The Horn of Africa is a region of geographic strategic importance, with interest coming from both surrounding and external entities.1 Correspondingly Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, border two crucial sea routes that is the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These waterways are currently regaining importance in international maritime trade now that number of Middle Eastern, Asian countries and the Russian Federation are trying to open new markets in Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War.2

In addition the Horn of Africa region is also emerging as a potentially lucrative market for Asian electronic technology; member states continue to discover oil and globalization has boosted international trade. These factors have combined to make the Horn of Africa an important region in the international economic arena of the twenty-first century. Furthermore South Sudan is promising to be potential major producer of oil, at the same time the country has significant water reserves and agricultural capacity that could make it a meaningful contributor to regional development once it attains internal stability.3 Ethiopia on the other hand has enormous water reserves and human resource which can be utilize to contributor to regional prosperity, should its internal problems be resolved.

The study asserts that most comparative analysis of the Horn of Africa conflict system have majorly focused on the importance of the geography and territorial boundaries in understanding

1Lionel Cliffe , Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Published by: Taylor & Francis, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, Complex Political Emergencies Ltd. Feb 1999 pg. 89-111

2 John g Nyuot Yoh, peace processes and conflict resolution in the horn of Africa, African Security Review 2009, 12:3, 83-93,

3 ibid

1

the conflict the Horn of Africa of the region.4 On the contrary the region has experienced complex conflicts stretching decades and involving numerous parties aiming to advance and eventually achieve own national interest.

Furthermore the study attempts to examine the dynamics of the present and past situation in the Horn of Africa, therefore the study will look at role played by global actors such as the USA and USSR in their quest for global domination during the cold war and post cold war era, and their role in exacerbating the violence.5 In addition the study notes that issues such as oil, pastoral wars, and support of insurgent armed groups by regional states, terrorism and irredentist actions of Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to destabilize the region.

As a result the purpose of the study is to sketch out the main features of regional security relations that characterized the cold war and post cold war era. After setting out the analytical framework the study will identify the major emerging security threats that face the region as well as their consequences to regional security. The study will also shed light to the fact that IGAD member states continue to fuel conflict in the region despite ceasefire talks being in progress, the study also notes that regional security has been achieved in situations where regional powers have combined their effort to come up with a collective measures or rather solutions to address the insecurities.

4 Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers, the Structure of International Security. Published by Cambridge University Press 2003 pg 40-65.

5 Fred Halliday, US policy in the Horn of Africa: aboulia or proxy intervention?, Review of African Political Economy 1977 pg 8-32

2

1.1 Background

The Horn of Africa region consist of eight States, which constitute of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Uganda and Somalia. The region has been prone to violent conflicts which have in turn undermined peace and security in the region. The prolonged conflicts in the region have created pessimism among the citizens as they have witnessed undemocratic leaders turn promising peace opportunities into another protracted conflict.6

According to Fukuki and Markakis the Horn of Africa conflict are intertwined into three types of conflicts. They assert that the number of domestic conflict that exists within the internal boundaries of the member States has indeed increased; furthermore they note that the intrastate conflicts have political connotations. Secondly they note that interstate conflicts are rooted to the colonial period have been the major catalyst that has exacerbated the conflict. And thirdly is that regional clashes have been fuelled by international actors due to lack of good governance or member states supporting various proxy wars in the region.7

The eight geographically located states are members of Inter Governmental Authority on Trade and Development (IGAD), which is mandated to deal with issues of promoting peace and security. However if Somaliland which has declared autonomy from the rest of Somalia, achieves international recognition as an independent state the number of countries in the region will increase to nine.8 Additionally kidane notes that the Horn of Africa region has experienced four major inter-state wars with not less than three violent conflicts in the post-independence era which have undermined peace and security.

6 Iyob R. Re-configuring identities: clash of Visions in the horn of Africa 1991-1999. Bern: the Swiss Peace Foundation.

7Fukui,K, Markakis J. Ethnicity and conflict in the Horn of Africa, Athens Ohio University Press 1994

8Kidane Mengisteab, critical factors in the horn of Africa‟s raging conflicts, published by nordiskaafrikainstitutet, Uppsala discussion paper no 67 2011.

3

Moreover Samatar notes that the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and the Sudan Civil war are classical examples of wars which have completely undermined and characterized regional security dynamics in the Horn of Africa.9 He further notes that occurrence of these wars cannot be fully explained in terms of their contextual factors alone, since effective domestic and regional governance by the postcolonial state could have managed them without resort to violence.

On the other hand Negash and Tronvoll argue that the Ethiopian-Eritrea war and the endless civil war in Somalia continue to undermine and complicate issues of peace and security in the Horn of Africa region.10 As a result the wars in these countries have led to spill-over effects to relatively stable States like Kenya and Djibouti, both in terms of influx of refugees and proliferations of small arms light weapons. Correspondingly Cliffe notes that the formation of tribal and clan militia in Somalia has indeed exacerbated insecurity situation in most of the Horn of Africa

states, which in turn forced Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia.11

9Samatar, A.I. and W. Machaka, “Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Regional Approach”, inIn Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region. Heinrich Boll Foundation Nairobi 2006, pg 26–55.

10Negash,TTronvoll K. Brothers at War: Making sense of the Ethiopian Eritrean war, published by Lawrenceville: red sea press 2000.

11Cliffe, L.andP.While, “Conflict Management and Resolution in the Horn of Africa”, in Mwaura, C. and S. Schmeidl (eds), Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press 2002.

41.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The Horn of Africa has been Prone to violent conflicts since the colonial and post-colonial period. The continuous reoccurrence of violence and the inter-links of the conflicts in the region is the major focus of this study. The study also notes that the problem on insecurity in the Horn of Africa has not been given the attention it deserves and that the major efforts which have been taken have not resolved the issue if conflict. Furthermore the study notes older unresolved conflicts in the region have been reinvested into the emerging security threats in the region. However in addressing the problems of protracted conflict in the Horn of Africa, regional actors as well as the international community have failed to address the main root causes which are embedded in colonial legacy and the structural deficiencies in governance.

When compared to other regional security complexes in African regions the Horn of Africa conflict system is considered to be the most volatile region. Furthermore the region continues to deteriorate with different actors fighting for their interest to be secured. Consequently an all inclusive premeditated intervention by IGAD and regional member has not had any success in resolving the continuous violence in the region because of the diversity and complexity of the nature of conflicts in the region. In this regard the study seeks to analyze the Horn of Africa as a conflict prone region, and also seeks to explore the protracted conflict situation despite the

diverse conflict management efforts in this relatively volatile region. The study seeks to assess the reason why no bidding solution is yet to be reached becomes the premier concern of this study, considering the enormous efforts and measures put in place by IGAD and member states to resolving the violence.

51.3 Objective of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to critically assess the webs of conflict in the Horn of Africa

sub-region. More specifically, the study aims to:

i) Provide an overview of conflict webs in the Horn of Africa sub-region;

ii) Analyze the actors, issues and processes of managing conflict in the Horn of Africa sub region;

iii) Explore measures taken to promote peace and security in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

1.4 Literature Review

A lot has been written about the conflict in Horn of Africa sub-region. This section focuses on the various debates by different scholars regarding the conflict in the Horn of Africa. In this review the study will explore the literature on protracted conflict in the Horn of Africa.

The African continent has been depicted as a dark continent which continues to suffer from security dilemmas. Three main schools of thought are utilized in this study. A focus through the realist school of thought provides a view or rather an understanding of interstate suspicion, which is identified by military buildup as the main cause of war and interstate rivalry in the Horn of Africa; this was the case during the Ogaden war of 1976.12 A focus through the liberal school of thought provides a synopsis of a continent with minimal success in regional and sub-regional cooperation in the sphere of peace security. Lastly, a focus through the human security school of

12John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, the Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International

Relations: published by Oxford University Press 2005, 5th edition

6

thought identifies a region that is characterized by poverty, unemployment, violation of human rights, famine displacement of people, poor health facilities and a region faced with environmental degradation.13 The three schools of thought establish an entry point into understanding the conflict and level of insecurity in the Horn of Africa.

A historical context of the existing conflict is used to explain the complex conflict within the region. Ali Mazrui states that one of the root causes of war in Africa lies in the white man‟s legacy comparison of pre-colonial and post-colonial wars. A seed of post-colonial war lies in the sociological and political mess created by colonial rulers in Africa.14 The colonial rulers destroyed old methods of conflict resolution instilled in the African traditional institutions, without creating subsystems that would work for the indigenous people. Looking at Somali as a casing point, Said Barre replaced the council of elders with his own handpicked chiefs who were only answerable to him. Consequently any conflict within the community ended up in the police post or chiefs camp. As a result this made clans resort to the use of force as a result of the deprivation of avenues of dispute resolution.15

In a position paper entitled conflict and peace management in the Horn of Africa, Makumi Mwagiru highlights the meaning of Horn of Africa Conflict system. He argues that the internationalized character of the conflict system in the Horn of Africa has led to a far reaching implication of the entire geographical landscape of the Horn of Africa. According to Mwagiru, the notion that numbers of conflict in the region are purely internal is a sound beginning point for analysis and managing conflict. He goes further to argue that any particular conflict should be

13 Ibid

14Mazrui Ali, conflict in Africa: an overview, edited by Pumphery and Schwartz- Barcott, armed conflict in Africa, published by Baltimore Maryland Scare crow press 2003

15Mohammed A, Humanitarian intervention in Africa: A retrospective study of Somalia,, In contemporary Security in Africa Vol 1, No 1, published in April 2012 pp: 44-62

7

analyzed and managed in the context of the conflict system to which they belong. This approach gives useful pointer to the wider cause of conflict and eventually to a suitable management approach that can be adopted.16

The study therefore notes that core conflict systems have been between Sudan and Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. However the current epicenter is in South Sudan and Somali conflict systems, therefore the management and transformation of the conflict system in the Horn of Africa need to be centered on both Somali and South Sudan Conflict. According to Alan, the conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia have reached unprecedented levels. For instance, the Somali crisis has fragmented the country into

unconventional political units, each under the control of a warlord.17

Kidame argues that the prospect of peace between peace and security Ethiopia and Eritrea is difficult to assess but its potential impact on the overall stability of the Horn of Africa region is very significant. The Eritrean- Ethiopian conflict that lasted from 1969 to 1991 completely destabilized the region, which led to a relapse into conflict between the two states in 1998 to 2000. He also argues that at the center of the recent conflict is the question of Eritrea identity which has been a contested issue between the two states. He goes further to note that according to the Ethiopian historians, Eritrea was part of Ethiopia years before the Italian colonization and therefore it ought to remain as part of the country‟s territory. On the other hand, contrary to what

Ethiopian historians claim, the Eritreans claim that it developed a unified and separate political

16MakumiMwagiru, conflict and peace management in the Horn of Africa: theoretical and practical perspectives , international resource group conference, Mombassa Kenya from November 6-9, 1996 (revised in 1998) pg 4

17Mohammed A, Humanitarian intervention in Africa: A retrospective study of Somalia, In contemporary Security in Africa Vol 1, No 1, published in April 2012 pp: 44-62

8

entity during the Italian colonial period; therefore the bone of contention between the states is what has led to increased animosity between the two neighbors.18

According to Vasquez, neighboring states fight because of their territorial proximity and high interaction. He further acknowledges that the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute of 1998-2000 is a practical example of why states go to war. He reiterates that the two countries that share common borders are bound to wage war against each other; hence this was the case between Ethiopia and Eritrea when they collided over the issue of who owns the Badame village. Among other things, border dispute of 1998 demonstrated that Eritrean claims of nationhood remained unacceptable to Ethiopian nationalist who still consider Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopia.19

Gamst argues that Ethiopia has been an imperialist state that has periodically expand its territory. He argues that from 1855 to 1990 Ethiopia has pursued an expansionist policy which enabled it to increase in size. He goes on further to note that in the Horn of Africa disputes are likely to escalate into wars as compared to other regions. Kornprobst concurs with Gamst argument as he argues that during the 1988 border dispute, Eritrea claimed that Ethiopia wanted to re- occupy Eritrea, and therefore it justified its military engagement with Ethiopia as an act of defending its sovereignty. Ethiopia on the other hand argued that Eritrea invaded its sovereign territory and justified its military confrontation as self defense and as an issue of preserving its territorial integrity.20

18Falola Toying and Raphael ChijiokeNjoku, war and peace in Africa, Carolina academic press 2009.

19John Vasquez, why do neighbors fight? Proximity, interaction and territoriality, journal of peace research isuue no 33August 1995

20Fredrick Gamst, conflict in the Horn of Africa in peace and war, cultural perspectivesed Foster Mary, Roberts A. Rubinstein, new Brunswick and oxford transaction books 1986, pp 137.

9

According to Abdoulaye, the secessionist and irredentist threats that the African continent has faced since independence continue to destabilize the continent, for example one could highlight the impact in the region of the 1993 Eritrean secession from Ethiopia. He argues that the external powers can also be blamed for their interference in African politics. The ideological war between the West and the East bloc has exacerbated tensions within the region, as political elites who refused to comply were either suppressed directly or support for opposition and rebel movements became rampart after independence of the African states.21

1.5 Literature Gap

All these literature documents have discussed and analyzed the critical causes and issues that exacerbate conflict in the Horn of Africa, and the impact of conflict on peace and security in the Horn of Africa region. However most of the scholars have focused their debate on the importance of geographic proximity, on amity and enmity in understanding the Horn of Africa security complex. Therefore proximity has been their central pillar of the argument for analysis on the distinct Horn of Africa region which is prone to continuous insecurities. As a result they have failed to recognize that in the 21st century, advancement in technology has reduced the proximity or distance between to state, that is distance is longer an issue. For these reason, the study affirms that geographic location as noted by Buzan and Ole weaver fails to give an explanation as to whether states which are not geographically proximate can be part of a certain regional security complex and conflicts continue to reemerge in the region.

Moreover in order to understand the dynamism and multiplicity of players in the Horn of Africa, the study identifies that the gap lies between looking at the diversity of issues that characterize the region and the inclusion of other states which are not geographically located as part of the

21Markus Kornpobst, the management of border disputes in Africa sub-system. Comparing west Africa and Horn of Africa. Journal of the mider African studies 40, number 3 (2002) 369-394.

10

Horn of Africa security complex. The multidimensionality of issue has indeed expanded the region in terms of the actors and the issue that continue to threaten regional security.

1.6 Justification of the Study

The study and explanation of the web of conflicts in the Horn of Africa has mainly focused on

the governance of geographically located states within the region seems to represent significant gaps in the study. Issues such ethnic violence, fight over scarce resources, tribal wars have been the main issues that have characterized the regional insecurity dilemmas. However the study focuses on the importance of issues that inform the regional security dynamics. According to Lake, a region is defined in terms of the security threats it faces and the issues that characterize the security dynamics in the region. He further argues that due to advancement in technology, geography is no longer the main issue that defines a complex. The phenomenon of regional openness invites both global and continental powers to be part of the increasingly insecurity in the Horn of Africa.22 The study appreciate the fact that to imagine a peaceful and stable Horn of Africa is to think of a different political order, perhaps in the form of a loose confederation that transcends the inherited colonial borders that separated communities a long border lines.

The study notes that the security gaps are not only occasioned by the lack of a comprehensive regional security defense policy, rather by the diverse issues which characterize the region which has an international implication.

The study further seeks to contribute to the existing theory of knowledge by bringing forth the idea that IGAD as regional institutions needs to adopt a more comprehensive regional security framework such as the one adopted the European Union (EU). The study also notes that there is

22 Robert E. Kell, Security Theory in the "New Regionalism"': International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association

11

need for the Horn of Africa States to adopt a common foreign policy and security framework that will go well with their interest in order to reduce interference from global powers and other regional hegemons.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Regional security complex theory enabled the study to analyze and explain occurrence of conflict webs in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore the Regional security complex theory centers on patterns of amity and enmity among member states in the Horn of Africa sub system, which in turn results to the region been dependent on the actions and interpretations of the intentions of the member states. Buzan notes that most states in a regional security complex worry more about their immediate neighbors than distance states, in the case of the Horn of Africa region this has been the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Ethiopia and Somalia. The intertwined conflicts in the Horn of Africa region demonstrate characteristics of a regional security complex (RSC) that is a collection of states whose main security concerns are tied together that their national securities objectives cannot be practically considered apart from one another.

The main element in a RSC is its security relationships and the elements of interdependence that concern security. According to Buzan, a region refers to a set of countries connected by geography and share one of or more common arts such as the level of development, culture and political institution. Furthermore, Buzan argues that security dilemmas are sharper among proximate states with shared history of interaction, and that states are more concerned about

threats posed by their neighboring states than distant states.23

23Buzan Barry, people state and fear: an agenda for international system to international security in the post-cold war era, 2nd edition, boulder and lynnrienner publishers 1991 pg186-221

12

Since security is a relational phenomenon, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the regional pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded; hence the Horn of Africa region can be defined as a region of interlocking pattern of securitization.

According to Lake and Morgan they disregard geographical proximity and historical linkage as the main contributors of insecurity in the region. Lake argues that states form regional security complexes around the Africa continent share security externalities between member states.24 He defines a regional system as a collection of states influenced by at least more than one trans-border or a series of local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area. If the local externality presents a genuine or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in other states, then a regional security complex is established in that location.25

His definition of what constitute a regional security complex, Lake explains that the use of proxy wars by member states in the Horn of Africa especially by Eritrea and Ethiopia has completely undermined the peace and security in the region.

While geographical location is not necessarily a contributing factor to membership of a country into a certain regional security complex. Lake argues that the location of a particular security complex is where the security relationships or consequence exist of states action take center stage. He further argues that the membership into the security complex is determined by the level and frequency with which States participate in a particular security complex. Therefore any conflict that takes place within a particular regional security complex and pose a threat, or is viewed by members as having considerable relevance and significant externality qualifies to be

24 David A. Lake, „Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach‟, in Patrick Morgan and David A. Lake (eds), Regional Orders – Building Security in a New World, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p.31.

25 ibid

13

part of that security complex. Therefore the regional security theories illustrate the difference between intra-state conflict and regional conflict. Furthermore the porous borders in the region make this approach especially relevant in understanding hostilities in the Horn of Africa sub region.26

1.8 Hypotheses

The study will test the following hypotheses:

The increased overlay of the region has impacted negatively on peace and security in the Horn of Africa region

Member states security initiatives can impact positively on the peace and security in the region

Building resilience mechanism in the Horn of Africa will enhance member states capacity to mitigate conflict.

1.9 Research Methodology

The study utilized both primary and secondary data collection as the main methods of data analysis. The study concerning webs of conflict in the Horn of Africa is a challenge because of the diversity and multiplicity of actors. Therefore the study combined different sources and methods of data collection. Indeed, the methodology used a combination of primary and secondary sources due to the lack of varied sources, consequently focusing on the history of conflict in the Horn of Africa and the forty five (45) plus years of war as well as the current situation of insecurity in the region. However due to time and resource constrains the study

26 Ibid lake and Morgan

14

utilized the epistemology of both interpretive and constructivism to guide the qualitative method of research.

Gathering data through primary sources came from official IGAD documents but also from the existing literature on the approaches of understanding conflict in the Horn of Africa, the study also took into consideration the view of regional states, scholars from different institutions, the press in member state countries and also the views of international Organizations such as the United Nations and the African Union.

The study also used secondary sources of data, derived from previous interviews done by scholars and researches on key decision makers. Therefore these in turn broaden the study explanation to the root cause of conflict in the Horn of Africa. By merging the answers retrieved from interview and the literature available, it enabled the study to construct a reality and simultaneously creating an interpretation of the situation. The interview helped in understanding and challenging the theories of contested Geopolitics, diplomatic relations and peace resolution led by IGAD.

1.10 Chapter Outline

The study is structured into five (5) chapters as follows;

Chapter One introduces the study.

Chapter Two cover‟s the overview of conflict in the Horn of Africa region.

Chapter Three is the case study.

Chapter Four is the critical analysis of the emerging issues in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter Five outline the conclusion, key findings and recommendations of the study.

15CHAPTER TWO

CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: OVERVIEW

2.0 Introduction

Chapter one introduced the issues that are discussed in this paper. The chapter provides a synopsis of the problem statement that the study is discussing, its objectives, and justification of the study, hypotheses and the theoretical framework that informs the study. The chapter also gave a comprehensive literature review of various key debates on the conflict in the Horn of Africa, as well as identifying the literature gap of the study.

The chapter focuses on an overview of historical events in the Horn of Africa by dealing specifically with the colonial legacy and superpower rivalry during the cold war in causing and exacerbating conflict in the Horn of Africa region.

2.1 Colonial Legacy

The study observes that colonial legacy has had a major impact in destabilizing the Horn of Africa region.27 Hansen argues that during colonization the British controlled the Somali hinterland, which they in turn named it the British Somaliland. He further argues that the French also had their own area around Djibouti which was under their jurisdiction, which was referred as the French Somaliland, while the Italians on the other hand controlled the area along the Red Sea Coast extending to the Tagrayan highlands, which was referred as the Italian Somaliland.28

Hansen further states Ethiopia victory over Italy in 1896 in the battle of Adowa led to the

27Daniel Kendie, towards north east African cooperation, resolving Ethiopia and Somalia disputes. Northeast African Studies, Volume 10, Number 2, 3 (New Series), pp. 67-109.Published by Michigan State University Press 200328 ibid

16

demarcation of major international boundaries in the Horn, and as a result it led to the separation of the Somalia territory between the French, the British and the Italian Somaliland.29

Samatar elaborates further that colonialism led to the division of various ethnic groups long State boundaries which resulted into fragmentation and disruption of social and cultural ties between communities. He argues that the fragmentation of the Somalia people has led to the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict over the Ogaden region.30 He illustrates further by arguing that in the case of the Horn of Africa colonial boundaries that were not properly demarcated have led to intense conflicts in the region, such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war which continue to be a thorn in attainment of peace and security in the region.

Kidane Mengisteab notes that border problem is likely to arise between north and South Sudan. Although the British kept South Sudan apart from the north for most of the colonial period, the boundaries between the two remain unclear and are likely to cause insecurity in the region. He notes that border conflicts are mostly between inter-state or intra- states which have serious implications for state-identity and inter-identity relations, as they entail various hardships for border communities, especially when their loyalty to their community is questioned.31

Mutibwa takes the debate further and argues that the uneven development among regions and ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa have further exacerbated the conflicts in the region. He argues that one of the key objectives of colonialism was the extraction of resources in regions rich with mineral, which led to the marginalization of certain regions.32 Mutibwa points out that in Kenya for instance the British ascertained central region and the Rift Valley region as the

29Hansen, E.Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development London: Zed Books, 1987

30Samatar, A.I. and W. Machaka, 2006, “Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Regional Approach”, in Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation: 26–55.

31KidaneMengisteab, Critical factors in the Horn of Africa ‟Raging conflicts, NordiskaAfrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2011. Discussion paper 67 pg 20-39

32Mutibwa, P.The Buganda Factor in Ugandan Politics. Kampala: Fountain Publisher 2008.

17

main profitable areas, while the Western and Northeastern regions where marginalized because they were viewed as unprofitable. Moreover years after decolonization these regions that were marginalized remained marginalized, and in turn they have become centers for conflict and insecurity in the Horn of Africa.

For instance the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia has been mainly due to the Ogaden region. Ethiopia has argued that region is part and parcel of its territory due to the fact that the region was given to it by the colonial masters and that the region was under Ethiopia jurisdiction in the first place.33. On the other hand the Somalia Republic was created in 1960 after the merging of former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Therefore the Somalia government argues that the region should be part of Somali due to the shared cultural values between the two nations. Since its independence Somali national policy has aimed at uniting all the lands in the region that had Somalis in order to form the Greater Somalia.34

The unresolved questions of the Ethiopian-Somali border provided the Somali politicians with some ground on which to challenge Addis Abba‟s control over the Ogaden35. In fact just six months after Somali‟s independence, there were military clashes between Somali and Ethiopia which erupted into a full scale war in 1964. However, Somalia was defeated but not restrained because the government in Somalia carried on causing instability in Ethiopia. Furthermore Somalia discovered that it could defeat Ethiopia on its own, therefore the Somalia government opted to look for allies in order to liberate Ogaden from Ethiopia.36

33 Benjamin Rivlin, The United Nations and the Italian Colonies, United Nations Action, Case Histories, no. 1 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).

34 E. Amos J. Peaslee, ed., “Constitution of the Somali Republic,” in Constitutions of Nations, vol. 1, Africa, 3rd ed., rev. (The Hague, Netherlands: MartinusNijhoff, 1965).

36ibid

182.2 Arming the Horn of Africa during the Cold War

During the cold war conflicts in the HOA were characterized by super power rivalry between the Soviet Union (East bloc) and the United States (western bloc) who funded and armed various regimes in order to advance their own interest. According to Caroline and Wilkin the Horn of Africa depicted the hegemonic stability theory, in which the superpower hegemons deepened or rather exacerbated political stability.37 They argue that political leaders in the region were able to the play-off external actors against each other in order to attract huge sums of military and economic aid for their regime survival. The persistence of internal and inter-state conflicts increased the dependence of the countries of the Horn of Africa on the superpowers for military aid, which in turn led to exerted political leverage over them.38 The search for outside resources to maintain domestic power structures was central to the foreign policy of the great majority states in the region. Jeffrey argues that the United States under President Roosevelt became the chief supplier of arms to the Ethiopian regime, whereas Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for arms in order to counter the Ethiopian arms.39

However Jeffrey points out that both Moscow and Washington were interested in Ethiopia because of its strategic geographical location, its favorable climatic condition, physical size,

population and its affluent rich history. He further points out that over the past four decades the USA and the USSR (Soviet Union) played great power arms patrons owing to their vast capability and willingness to provide vast quantities of sophisticated military hardware to their respective allies. As a result both Ethiopia and Somalia increased their military hardware

37Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (ed.) Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience. London.

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1999 38 Ibid

39Jeffrey Alan Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1991,pp 80.

19

considerably with the United States increasing it‟s funding to Ethiopia to about $ 185 million worth of military assistance, with the Soviet Union retaliating by arming Somalia to its core.40

Medane Tadese notes that the end of the cold war ushered in a new era of cooperation in order to manage and resolve conflicts that were a distinguishing factor during the cold war period. He notes that there were positive progress towards a peaceful transition to democratic governance in many Horn of Africa countries, with Kenya and Ethiopia playing a key role in managing the conflicts in the region.41However in spite of the earlier progress the wars in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia intensified and peace initiatives that were set to take center stage wavered into thin air.

In a nutshell intra state conflicts emerged as a serious problem for the Horn of Africa as at 1990's. It become increasingly evident that the end of the cold war or bipolarity would not contributed to peace and security in the region because of militarization and availability of arms that was present during the cold war period. Without a doubt the end of the cold war created a power vacuum which led to political instability, deconstruction of the State institutions in Somalia and cessation of Eritrea embedded the region into violent conflicts.42 On the contrary Cliffe argues that the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime of General Omer El-Bestir came to power in Sudan through a military coup in 1989, while a civil war broke out in Djibouti between the Issa and the Afar opposition continued to characterize the region as a conflict infected region.43

40 ibid

41MedhaneTadese, Turning conflicts to cooperation in the Horn of Africa, friedrich–ebert-stiftung Addis Ababa, 2004 p9 33-105

42 Ibid

43Lionel Cliff, Regional dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa, Third World Quarterly1999 pg89-111

202.3 The Horn of Africa and Cold War Politics as Source of Insecurity

The Cold War exacerbated the crisis in the region, because the United States and USSR sought to spread their own ideology and stamp their influence in the region. Regional leaders also took advantage of the Cold War to shift alliances and entrench their authoritarian rule.44 Furthermore Adam Curle argued that the cold war planted a seed of violence in the region, hence plaguing the region into virulent conflicts. According to Jaine coercive political negotiations in the context of the prevailing superpower rivalry were the main mechanisms and strategies that were used to manage and resolve conflicts during the cold war.45Leatherman and Väyrynen concur with Adam and they further suggested that the involvement of collective security organizations and other third parties was possible only in conflicts in which the great powers did not have a direct involvement or in which they had shared interests.46

Mark Katz further suggests that the USA and USSR employed their cold war strategies without considering the implications of their strategies on the local communities.47Touval on the other hand notes that the core interest of the USA involvement in mediation efforts during the cold war was mainly aimed at ensuring that the Soviet Union did not utilize conflict situation to further their influence in the region.48 He points out that this was the scenario in the Horn of Africa, as both Somalia and Sudan were inclined to one or the other superpower.

44Tim Murithi. Inter-governmental Authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan and Somalia, African Security2009, 2:2-3, pp136-157,

45Adam Curle, “Peacemaking: The Middle Way,” Bridges: Quaker International Affairs Report 92, no. 3 (1992): 2.

46Jaine Leatherman and RaimoVayrynen, “Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution: Directions of Collaborative Research Policy,” Cooperation and Conflict 30, no.1 (1995): 55.

47Mark Katz, “The Future of Superpower Conflict Resolution in the Third World,” in Soviet-American Conflict Resolution in the Third World, ed. Mark Katz (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991)

48SaadiaTouval, “The Superpowers As Mediators,” in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1992), 233.

21

In the case of Somalia which was ruled by Said Barre from independence, Touval noted that Said Barre shifted his allegiance from the USSR to the United States and then back to the USSR as he sort which great power best suited in interest.49

Mark Katz suggested that due to the perceived strategic interest of the Horn of Africa to the United States and the USSR, they played a coercive role behind the scenes either in perpetuating or attempting to resolve regional conflict without much consideration for the affected

communities. Katz observes that “although the superpowers did not cause the many conflicts in the region, their involvement however exacerbated them.50 The aftermath of the cold war had significant effect on in promoting peace and security in the Horn of Africa region. Conflict become more internal, with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sponsoring of proxy wars in the region by region by member states and international actors continued to hinder peace initiatives from materializing.

2.4 Proxy Wars in the Horn of Africa

The border stalemate and the underlying problem of fragile governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea are intrinsically linked to conflicts in the Horn of Africa and. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have demonstrated the capacity and willingness to use proxy forces to undermine the other.51 The use proxy wars in the Horn of Africa region can be traced backed to the cold war era, which resulted to destabilization of peace in the horn of African. Young concur with John that the border stalemate, fragility of governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea has enabled the two governments to

49Touval Ibid50Katz, “The Future of Superpower Conflict Resolution in the Third World,” 170.51 John g Nyuot Yoh, peace processes and conflict resolution in the horn of Africa, African Security Review 2009, 12:3, 83-93,

22

sponsor proxy wars in order to underestimate each other government.52 He argues that the Eritrea has funded and armed insurgents such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden

National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Ethiopian People‟s Patriotic Front (EPPF) which operate within Ethiopian territory. On the other hand Ethiopia has responded by supporting opposition movements in Eritrea.

In addition to supporting each other‟s insurgents and opposition movements, both Ethiopia and

Eritrea have competed against each other by supporting rival parties in neighboring states. Terrence notes that Ethiopia had been a major ally of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia by providing support, while on the other hand Eritrea provided assistance to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).53

As is the case with domestic politics in both Asmara and Addis Ababa, conflict in Somalia has its own dynamics and is not predominantly a sideshow in the Ethiopia- Eritrea rivalry. Ending the Ethiopia-Eritrea proxy war is not sufficient to resolve the challenges of instability within Somalia or the Horn of Africa region. However, the larger regional insecurities are complicated and made more difficult to settle by the continuous support by Asmara and Addis Ababa to various factions, motivated in part by the dynamics of their proxy war.

2.5 Conclusion

Decolonization in the Horn of Africa was a prolonged affair. Ethiopia was colonized only briefly by Italy during the Second World War. It was a rare case of an African state having a long standing indigenous state tradition as an empire. Sudan gained its independence in 1956 and Somalia in 1960. Eritrea gained its independence in 1993 after a long civil war with Ethiopia,

52Young, J. (2006), „Eastern Sudan: caught in a web of external interests‟, Review of African Political Economy2006, 33, (109), pp. 594–600

53Terrence Lyons, The Political Economy 2006, 36:120, 167-180

23

and the small territory of Djibouti attained independent in 1977 remains under strong French influence.

Therefore the historical factor of colonialism has played a major role in exacerbating conflict in the Horn of Africa. The fragmentation of the Somalia community due to poor demarcation of borders has a major contributing factor conflict in the region. In addition the cold War confrontation between the USA and USSR had significant impact on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, where it precipitated regional crisis, thereby effectively destroying the conditions necessary for transnational initiatives. On the other hand the removal of the Cold War‟s overlay on regional affairs did not solve the problem; rather it exacerbated the situation in the region.

Furthermore most of the period leading up to the early 1990s was characterized by the following security interactions between the member states in the Horn of Africa. They included the linked civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over ownership of the Ogaden region. Interwoven with these was a much older tradition of conflict between sedentary highland Christian agriculturalists and nomadic lowland Muslim pastoralists. The post cold war insecurities distinguished the Horn of Africa region to exhibit the characteristics of a pre-security complex by having many elements of strong bilateral security interdependence, but the member states failed to link the security environment at that time into an integrated pattern.

24CHAPTER THREE

CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: ACTORS, CAUSES AND PROCESSES

OF MANAGEMENT

3.0 Introduction

Chapter two gave an overview of the study. The overview indulged in looking at historical events that have caused conflict in the Horn of Africa. The chapter highlighted that colonial legacy and super power rivalry during the cold war as the major causes of conflict. Furthermore the chapter also provided an insight into the effect of arms proliferation and proxy war and their distinguished role in exacerbating the conflict.

The chapter will look into the case study of the Horn of Africa as a region prone to conflict. The complexity of the nature of conflict in the Horn of Africa is mainly due to the interplay between actors involved and issues considered to be the causes of conflict in this region. Issues affecting the Horn of Africa region remain unresolved due to various actors who take part in the conflict. Although member states have tried to cooperate with each other in order to address the issues of insecurity, their efforts have been futile, because rather than resolving the disputes their efforts have exacerbated the conflicts in the region. The chapter additionally explores into detail the role of IGAD in initiating, implementing and mitigating conflict in the region.

3.1 An Overview of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

As started in chapter two of this study, the Horn of Africa sub-region has been Africa‟s most problematic area for a long time. Internal conflicts have been the most chronic and characterizing phenomena in most of the countries of the Horn. For instance the proxy wars between Ethiopia

25

and Eritrea, the protracted conflict in Sudan, and the total disintegrations of Somalia are some of the extreme manifestations of the problems that the region has faced.54

Mwaura and Kiplagat argue that Horn of Africa as a region has been embroiled into endless wars for more than forty years and represents one of the most complicated and difficult conflict systems in Africa. The region has been the site for several armed conflicts (both intra and inters-state), severe environmental degradation, and general livelihood of insecurity.55 Without a doubt Cliffe asserts that the Horn of Africa has become a common place for violent conflict which has in turn resulted into disruption of the member States in Horn of Africa region.56 He further observes that the Horn has been faced with the same uncertainty of contested territory and boarders inherited form European colonial rule, which have inevitably resulted into the problems

of State making and nation building.57

In general, Healy contextualizes the common features of conflicts in the Horn of Africa.58 She argues that the first feature of conflict in the Horn of Africa is its prevalence. To be precise she argues that there have been consistently high levels of violent conflict throughout the region for the better part of the last century and before. Healy notes that conflicts in the Horn of Africa region have occurred at every level, namely within the internal boundaries of the State, between member States, among proxies and between armies at the center and in the periphery. As a result the tension has created habits and continues cycles of war, including reliance on the use of force

54Mesfin Woldemariam. The Horn of Africa: Conflict and Poverty. Commercial Printing Press, 1999 pp 154-155

55Ciru mwaura, Gunter Baechler andd bethuel kiplagat , Early warning and conflict management in the Horn of Africa. Asmara the red sea press 2002 pp 32

56Lionel Cliffe. Regional Dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Third World Quarterly, 1991 pp 32-40 57 ibid58Sally Healy. Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa.London. Inter-Africa Group, 2008

26

to attain political objectives.59 Moreover another common feature according to Healy has been the issue of poor governance in the region due to lack of democratic accountability. Furthermore the history of regime change through violent rather than peaceful means has been made possible by the toughened culture of militarism.60 While conflict takes different forms according to local circumstances and traditions, armed rebellions are always high among the options for dealing with political grievances.

3.2 Actors

3.2.1 Member States

Apart from the internal conflicts in the region, the Horn of Africa States are faced by inter-state conflicts that have had greater impact in the exacerbating violence in the region. Each state in the Horn of Africa region has played a role either directly or indirectly in exacerbating the conflict in neighboring states by supporting or funding some of the conflicts. For example Ethiopia has indeed backed rebel groups in Sudan and Somalia, while Sudan and Somalia have retaliated by backing the rebels in Ethiopia. Furthermore the attitudes of the neighboring countries as well as of regional and international organizations towards the emerging and competing political entities in various parts of Somalia seem to be primarily driven by their need to protect their respective interests. Moreover it appears that some of the regional actors deliberately want to interfere in domestic affairs in Somalia by taking specific positions with regard to the recognition or non-recognition of one or the other political interest.61

Ethiopia has been directly been involved all the major conflicts in the Horn of Africa region due to the fact that it shares borders with virtually every state in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore

59 ibid

60 ibid

61Anonymous, Government recognition in Somalia and regional political stability in the Horn of Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies2002,, pp 247-272

27

Ethiopia continues to sponsor various proxy wars in Somalia and Eritrea.62 On the other hand the phenomenon of militarizing peace processes has been part of a regional culture in which member states regularly use to project their military power beyond their own borders. As a consequence regional states create a difficult environment in which to build and premise regional configure mechanism for regional peace and security. Therefore it is clear that unstable neighbors cause instability in the region and as such more direct measures need to be taken by regional states to prevent prevalence of conflict.

3.2.2 International Community

The United States and Soviet Union extended their cold war politics to the Horn of Africa region. The competition for hegemonic rule resulted to militarization and acquisition of weapons by the member States in the Horn of Africa. The amount of money invested by Horn of Africa states in militarization and acquisition of weapons during the Cold war surpassed the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product used for development, health and education of member states. Other states like France, Germany, Cuba, Israel and Iran supplied weapons to Horn of Africa states, with Cuba Supporting Somalia with arms during the Ogaden War. On the other hand the Soviet Union provided Weapons worth $1 billion per year in arming Somalia.63 Similarly Sudan spent about $1 million a day to finance its war with South Sudan‟s SPLA.64

This negativity in terms of funding and militarization of the region has in turn contributed to the complexity and worsening of the situation. Currently there is a strong presence of the United

62Markakis, J. The Somali in Ethiopia, Review of African Political Economy1996, pp. 567- 570. Khalief, M and Doornbos, M. The Somali Region in Ethiopia: A Neglected Human Rights Tragedy, Review of African PoliticalEconomy912002, pp. 73-94.63Paul D. Williams et al, Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace in The horn of Africa: what role for the United

States? Published Woodrow Wilson international centre for scholars, in December 2011 in Washington Dc 64 Ibid

28

States region, because of its involvement in fighting terrorism, while China continues to sell arms to the two Sudan‟s therefore exacerbating the conflicts. On the other hand the European Union continue to fund the early warning efforts of IGAD, at the same time Japan has set a military base in Djibouti in order to ensure Maritime security. Whilst the Arab league and Middle East states are heavily involved in the funding and arming of different sate and non-state actors in the region.65 The study also points out that due to the regional proximity with the Middle East and its shared cultural background with North African states, countries such as Yemen, Libya and Egypt have been involved in the conflict, therefore intensifying the conflicts in the region.

3.3 Causes of the Conflict

3.3.1 Frontiers and Borderland Disputes

The region‟s border line and territory have been and continue to be the source of conflict in the Horn of Africa region. The principal conflicts with precise focus on territory and border lines were fought between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-78) and Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000).66

The problem of territoriality was exacerbated by the impact of colonialism, which left the Horn with several ill-defined political borders that split apart people with shared ethnic identities or forced different ethnicities and cultural affiliations to live in the same sovereign state. A big part of the boundary headaches that has faced Ethiopia for example stem from the fact that the Italian and British colonial masters never clearly demarcated the border lines.

65 Ibid

66 Lionel Cliffe, Roy Love & Kjetil Tronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political Economy 2009 pg 151-163,

29

Conversely the continuing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea persists to be a major impediment to peace and security in the Horn of Africa.67 In retrospect it was undoubtedly a miscalculation not to physically demarcate the border line between the two countries in the immediate aftermath of Eritrea‟s independence when relations between the two nations were strong and cordial. As a result of the growing animosity the Algiers Agreement has been put to the side lines and the conflict has become much more than just an issue of border demarcation; it has shifted to encompass matters of national pride and personal honor for both regimes and, to a lesser extent their populations.68 Therefore it has become seemingly difficult to engineer a settlement while both regimes maintain their current hard line stance.

3.4 IGAD and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa

IGAD and its member states have constituted forums for the civil society, community based organization, and important Non Governmental organizations to participate in promoting peace efforts in Somalia and Sudan. In this regard IGAD has created permanent secretaries to both Sudan and Somalia in order to foster peacemaking initiatives. Furthermore it has also enlisted the aid of the international community to these efforts including the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) consisting of twenty countries, the UN, the World Bank, and EU have been to assist and support the two peace processes.69

On the other hand the main focus of IGAD has been on capacity building and awareness

creation, and on the Early Warning of conflicts. In September 2002, the prominent mission in

67Cliffe, Love and Tronvoll, Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, pp.153.

68 ibid

69Bizusew Mersha. Sub-Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case ofIGAD‟s Mediation Role in the Sudan. Addis Ababa University, 2004.

30

this regard was the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).70

3.5 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism of the IGAD

The issue of peace and security has been the major priority in the Horn of Africa region, in order to harmonize and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. IGAD in one of its priority area has a conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism for the Horn of Africa so as to ensure that peace and security agendas are adequately addressed.71

In addition peace and security in the Horn of Africa was prioritized after revitalization of IGAD in 199 in order to have broader mechanism and mandate in dealing with conflict. Since its revitalization IGAD has authorized and outlined its peace and security strategy in 2003 summit and consequently launched its implementation in 2010. Additionally the formation of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWARN) has been identified within the peace and security as a key institution in dealing with conflict prevention, management and Resolution.72

In this mechanism, only member states which have ratified this protocol are entitled to participate in the activities.73 The Mechanisms functions include; Promoting the exchange of information and collaboration among member states of IGAD on conflict early warning and response, gather, process and analyze information about conflicts; establish network of cooperation in early warning and response among member states; Create, manage and

70 Apuuli, KP. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development‟s (IGAD) Confl ict Early Warning and Response

Mechanism (CEWARN): a ray of hope in conflict prevention? In AG Nhema (ed), The quest for peace in Africa: transformations, democracy and public policy. Addis Ababa: International Books with OSSREA, 2004.

71 Francis, D. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems. UK: Ashgate Publishing 2006. .

72Howard Adelman. Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. Asmara. The Red Sea Press, 2002.

73Colin Legum. The Horn of Africa Prospects for Political Transformation. Conflict Studies 254. London : 1992

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disseminate data bases of information on conflict on early warning within region; Develop close cooperation among in-state early warning and response mechanism in the member states; Establish collaborative relationships, including information sharing with similar international and sub-regional mechanism in Africa; Communicate such information and analysis to decision makers.74

In regards to the CEWARN protocol Member States are expected to cooperate and collaborate with one another in terms of information dissemination. Furthermore CEWARN provides technical assistance to the member states after getting approval from the executive secretary. The mechanism also promotes between inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations following the approval of the Council of Ministers of IGAD.75

Furthermore, the resources of the mechanism emanates from the contribution of member states, grants, donations and contribution from other sources that is approved by the Assembly of Head of States and Government of IGAD on the advice of the Council of Ministers of IGAD.76 In co-ordination with the chief executive officer of IGAD, the mechanism has the powers to ask and receive grants and donations that are related to the performances of its functions. Regarding disputes settlement of the protocol, it states member states will resolve their disputes peacefully. However if member states are not able to do so, the dispute shall be referred to the Heads of state and Government of IGAD.

74 Woodward P. Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: I. B. Tauris 2003.

75 Mwaura, C. and Schmeidl, S. Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa, New York: Red Sea Press 2002

76 ibid

323.6 The IGAD – Africa Union Relations in Conflict Resolution

Relationship between any entities can be defined in terms of co-existence, cooperation, competition, or conflicts. IGAD has established liaison office to the AU, mainly to work together with the Departments of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, and Economic Affairs.77 IGAD, through its liaison office in Addis Ababa attends the meetings of AU Peace and Security Council. In the meetings, the office gives information about the common positions of IGAD, subsequently the liaison office services contact between the two organizations. On numerous occupations the resolutions of IGAD have been adopted by the AU, in order to promote policy harmonization.78

However, in order to institutionalize the relations between IGAD and AU, IGAD has signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU and other Regional Economic Communities in order

to coordinate peace and security activities. Additionally, IGAD and the AU had shown significant level of coordination in dealing with the conflict in Somalia and Sudan.

3.7 Cooperation and Interference

IGAD Member States, in particular Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya have exerted substantial

efforts in dealing with the lengthened conflict in Somalia as well as the rest of the region.79 The member states also showed their commitment when they agreed to organize a peace keeping mission in Somalia in 2005. The member states have also shown the willingness and readiness to amend the mandate of IGAD in order to permit the sending of troops into member states

77 P. Godfrey Okoth, „Conflict resolution in Africa: the role of the OAU and the AU‟, in Z. Nhema and P. Tiyambe Zeleza, eds, The resolution of African conflicts: the management of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction Oxford: James Currey, 2008.

78 ibid

79 Menkhaus, K.. „Somalia: a Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare‟, Enough Strategy Paper 8. Washington DC: Enough 2008

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territory. But the main problem for their cooperation has been and continues to be the sensitive issue of the principle of sovereignty and lack of interference in internal affairs of another state.

Actually the interference by IGAD member states into the internal affairs of another member state has led to regional instability, in the sense that it has exacerbated hostility and worsened the rivalry among the competing states.80 In addition the following period of conflict highlights how regional member states have interfered with internal issues of other member states. The conflict in Djibouti (1990) between the ethnic community of Afar and Issa over the control of the state power was exacerbated by the interference of Somalia and Eritrea.81 Furthermore during the Sudan civil war in 1993-2005, the civil war was characterized interference from member states. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda were exacerbated the conflict by supporting their perceived allies, Uganda and Eritrea supported SPLM/A forces while Ethiopia supported the Khartoum government.82

3.8 Conclusion

All the above factors show point to that the fact the region has a chance of deciding whether to co-operate or choose not to. Most importantly IGAD member states can decide whether to pursue a culture of peace by focusing their energy, time, and resources to solve the prolonged and protracted conflict that has promoted a culture of violence in the region. Furthermore the member states can embrace the principle of collectivism and deal with sensitive issue such as border issues and non- interference in internal affairs of other states collectively.

80 Negash T. and Tronvoll, K. Brothers at War: Making sense of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War. Oxford: James Currey 2000

81 Woodward P. Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: I. B. Tauris 2003

82 Prendergast J. and Mozersky J. „Love Thy Neighbour: Regional Intervention in Sudan‟s Civil War‟, Harvard International Review 26, 2004 at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1220

34

Member state the rivalry and confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea has further weakened IGAD. Additionally the absence of any meaningful role by IGAD in dealing with the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is indicative of the fact that the organization measures are less effective when its powerful members are in open conflict. In a situation where there is no effective lead country, security and military platforms risk being undermined by geopolitical competition. On other hand member states should support collective security approach in the region by abandoning the rigid oriented state centric approaches. Through collectivism IGAD countries would focus on addressing the common vulnerabilities by transforming borderlands and territory which are currently a contributory cause of conflicts in the region.

35CHAPTER FOUR

CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

Chapter three discussed the case study. It analyzed the impact of the actors and the key issues that cause insecurity in the Horn of Africa region, the chapter also sought to assess the role of IGAD and its effect in promoting peace and security.

The Horn of Africa region has been prone to violent that have completely destabilized the region into webs of conflict which continue to fed off each other. This means that resolving conflict in the region is impossible due to the complex nature of the issues and multiplicity of actors involved in the web of conflict. However management efforts have been prescribed accordingly, drawing their rationale to from the effect of multidimensional nature of the conflict.

Moreover most of the peace initiatives that have been enforced by regional member states in conjunction with outside interaction and IGAD‟S peace and security framework have partly resolved the issues of insecurity. Hence older conflicts which were left unresolved have been reintegrated with the new emerging issue, which has in turn increased the complexity of diffusing or rather transforming the region into a peaceful region.

This chapter therefore seeks to assess the effectiveness of IGAD in promoting peace and security in the Horn of Africa and also asses the multidimensionality and complex nature of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The chapter also analyzes whether the emergence of war economies and its effect on exacerbating conflict in the Horn of Africa region.

364.1 Emerging Issues

4.2 Multidimensionality of Conflict in Horn of Africa

Lionel Cliffe argues that the older conflicts in the Horn of Africa that were left unresolved continue to cause insecurity. Furthermore the older conflicts have been integrated together with the new patterns and dimension of conflict in the region.83 He further notes that the relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia is becoming more laden but not yet violent, in turn impacting negatively on most of their neighbors. Somalia on the other hand is marked by more polarized confrontation than the multiplicity of clan and other militia fighting suggests, and has been the scene of direct intervention from Ethiopia with the assistance of the USA.

According to Tadese Eritrea on its part has been involved in skirmishes with Djibouti since 2008.84 In one of the three major cleavages in Sudan, Darfur continues to be involved in open fighting with rebel groups. As a result of fighting too many wars in different fronts, Tadese notes that it is therefore difficult to predict how Eritrea‟s ongoing conflict with Djibouti and Ethiopia‟s pull-out from Somalia will influence the dynamics of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict as well as the regional security. On the other hand the war Darfur between the government and rebel forces has been overshadowed by the on going conflict in South Sudan, which has in turn led the two conflicts feeding of each other.

Roy Love argues that the impact of Eritrea-Ethiopia confrontation has signaled the foundation of new emerging security threats, which are influenced by older threats which have been left resolved or the ones that were overtaken my new threats. He argues that the future of peace and

83Lionel Cliffe , Roy Love &KjetilTronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political Economy 2009, 36:120, 151-163

84Tadesse, M. The Djibouti- Eritrea conflict. IAG Briefing, October, Addis Ababa: Inter Africa Group 2008.

37

security in Somaliland and has been affected by the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006.85 In addition he argues that the repercussion of the confrontation between the UIC, the Ethiopia forces and the Transitional Federal Government led to the spread of bombings in the latter part of 2008 into Puntland in the north-east and Somaliland to the north-west.86 These normally peaceful areas now faced the threat of wider expansion of the escalating violence in Somalia, fuelled by outside intervention. On the other hand Bradbury argues that the accomplishment of Somaliland can offer a casing point as to how the Horn of Africa region conflicts can the transformed.87 He notes that the region constitutes an exemplar of the other dimension of conflict in the Horn and search for peace that is indigenous in order to counter the dismissive pessimism about the inevitability of violent conflict in the Horn.88

According to Tronvoll many relations that can be traced through the meshed conflict system in the Horn of African region have their roots in the Sudan conflict. The country has been faced with multiplicity of vicious conflicts ever since it attained its independence. He further notes that

these conflicts ought to have been given close attention in order to stop them from reoccurring in the future. However tronvoll notes that the CPA agreement of 2005 between North and South Sudan led to a dramatic culmination of the conflict which was conducted under the auspice of Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Similarly Tronvoll and Cliffe note that even thought the peace has been held, unresolved issues such as border demarcation and allocation of oil revenues have led to regression into conflict between the two Sudan. There have also been controversies about the border line between the two states, revenue allocation from the oil-rich

85Lionel Cliffe , Roy Love &KjetilTronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political

Economy 2009, 36:120, 151-163 86 ibid87Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey 2008.88Ibid

38

area of Abyei and future status of three territories technically in the North have led to new conflicts in the region.89

In general peace remains unrealized because some of the contentious issues that were highlighted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have not been addressed adequately. On the other due to the emerging conflict in South Sudan and the divisions in Darfur the older conflict issues will reemerge thus causing the region to relapse into conflict.

4.3 War Economy in the Horn of Africa

Another major issue that complicates peace initiatives in the Horn of Africa is the issues of war economy in Somalia and Sudan. In Somalia for instance the imposition of arms embargo could not stop the distribution of arms by combatants in Somalia. Furthermore the existence of shadow and combative war economies has turned Somalia into breeding ground where money laundering, proliferation of small arms and light weapon, and all sorts of illegal trade continue to sustain the warlords in the country. All this can only thrive in a chaotic state not where there is law and order and because of the lots of money involved the kingpins would do all that is within their means to maintain the status quo. This war economy most likely go beyond Somalia borders and that‟s why no one has ever been arrested for the illegal business that may be funding the internal war.

War economy equally applies to protracted conflict Sudan. Before the signing of the CPA, oil revenues where used to fund the war in the country. Berouk further notes that Uganda proximity to oil fields in the upper Nile states has caused tension with Sudan regarding Uganda‟s intention

89Lionel Cliffe , Roy Love &KjetilTronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political Economy 2009, 36:120, 151-163

39

in the region. The Khartoum government has been concerned with the possibility that Uganda might arm the Sudan Revolutionary Front, an armed group opposing the Sudan government. Therefore Omar Al- Bashir support of Kiir‟s government is a symbol that Sudan might has reverted its long standing tactic of supporting the opposition forces.90

In addition Solomon Dersso notes that the escalation of tension between Sudan and South Sudan in 2012 was a result of the oil resources in the oil province of Abyei.91 He notes that the escalation of violence commenced when South Sudan occupying Heglig begun to shut down the pipeline which supplied the Khartoum government with oil. Therefore oil was used as catalyst that resulted to a relapse into conflict between the two Sudan countries.92

Pantuliano adds to the debate by arguing that the war economy constituted an important part of the Misseriyya livelihood system for nearly two decades. Although it is difficult to assess the number of Misseriyya youth in the Popular Defense Force (PDF) and the economic gains they attained from the oil fields. She points that the majority of the youths from the region that controlled the oil fields in the region participated in illegal trade such as trade in weapons, smuggling and looting of animals and goods. However with the signing of the CPA agreement in 2005 led to the dismantlement of the PDF although militiamen were not disarmed or helped to re-enter civilian life. As a result she notes that PDF youth can reenter the conflict because of the gains they were receiving from the informal economy.93

90BeroukMesfin,The crisis in South Sudan: a game of regional chess Institute of Security Studies, published on the 26 May 201491Dr Solomon A. Dersso, H.E Mohamed Fathi Edress and Dr. Jide Okeke. Annual Review of the Peace and Security

Council 2012/1013.published by the Institute for Security Studies Pretoria, South Africa 2013 92Ibid

93 Sara Pantuliano. Oil, land and conflict: the decline of Misseriyya pastoralism in Sudan , Review of African Political Economy2010, 37:123, 7-23,

404.4 Complexity of Regional Security in the Horn of Africa

Healy argues that conflicts in the Horn are characterized by several inter-related issues: identity politics; religion; state formation and disintegration; intervention and use of proxies; alignment with global agendas; and resource issues.94 Support for dissident groups from neighboring states is a typical characteristic of inter-state relations in the Horn: Sudan and Chad support rebels on either side of their borders; Eritrea supports groups in Darfur, Ethiopia, Somalia and eastern Sudan; Ethiopia supports groups in Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. These links exemplify the mutual mistrust that characterizes inter-state relations. Questions of identity, ethnic or otherwise, feature prominently in most conflicts in the region. Ethnic linkages have been crucial in determining alliances in the Horn, as rebel groups have often invoked these sentiments to gain support from neighboring governments.

Sarjoh Bah further notes that the current state of interaction emerges from complex interrelations between the global hegemons, the Africa union mission in the Horn of Africa region. The level of influence varies depending on the situation. Bah notes that the United States, China, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt have played critical key roles in exacerbating as well as resolving the conflict in Sudan, furthermore he notes that the United States and South Africa have influenced the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia.95 Similarly he notes that the larger security framework in the Horn of Africa region has been shaped the USA strategy. For instance USA political engagement was a key factor during the singing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

In addition Bah notes that the mix of US policy perspectives and motivations in the region are broad ranging from concern of stability and fragility of the states in the region, to role played by

94 Ibid Healy

95 A. Sarjoh Bah. The Broader Horn of Africa: Peacekeeping in a Strategic Vacuum, International Peacekeeping 2009, pp16:4,

41

religious and human rights groups. For instance, USA based Christian groups provided crucial material and political support to the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement (SPLM) during its two-decade battle with the northern Islamist government.96 Therefore in a broader conceptualization, the conflict in the Horn of Africa are complex in such a way that conflict in one state poses grave danger to the security and stability of other states. No state in the area can expect to isolate itself from the political crisis in another state.

4.5 The Effectiveness of IGAD’s Contribution to Peace and Security

According to Francis the signing of the Sudan and Somali peace agreements in quick progression in 2004 snd 2005 formed an impression that IGAD was proving to upto the task in deaaling with issues of conflict resolution.97 The sighnig of the two IGAD settlements within three months was a remarkable accomplishment especially when taking into consideration that both addressed the long and prolonged conflicts that had undermined previous attempts in resloving the two conflicts.98

Khadiagala notes that the origin of the two led IGAD peace intiatives in Somalia and Sudan were political initiatives conceived and executed by IGAD member States.99 He futher points out that the lead regional mediators were interested parties which did no trust IGAD capability in leading the mediation talks. Indeed, at the point when the Sudan process began in 1993 the organisation had no remit to work on peace and security issues and had yet to develop its conflict resolution mandate.100

96 ibid

97 D. J. Francis, Uniting Africa: building regional peace and security systems. Aldershot: Ashgate, 200698 ibid

99 G. L. Khadiagala, Meddlers or mediators? African intervention in civil conflict in Eastern Africa Leiden: Brill, 2007

100 ibid

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He further notes that when the peace talks commerced, the talks required organisational and logistical effort which were beyong IGAD‟S capacity. On the other hand Healy points out that the Kenya had to take the lead and the focal point in handling the Sudan Somalia peace process. She motes that Kenya provided the two chief mediators, with General Sumbeiwyo leading the Sudan mediation team and on the other hand Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat led the Somali process.101 The importance of Kenya to the success of the two peace processes was not confined to its provision of diplomatic and organisational capacity, rather it was confined on its ability to maintain political neutrality.

Notwithstanding its institutional weakness and lack of authority over member States, IGAD Secretariat was able successfully institutionalised donor support through the IPF. The willingness of external donors to carry the financial burden of the peace process was both a blessing as well as a burden.102 The extent of their involvement generated frictions over the ownership of the process and the imposition of the condition that the on deadline for the parties to agree were to tied to willingness of the external donors in financing the agreements. Sumbeiywo observes that this especially the case in the Sudan peace negotiations.103 Young adds that the strong involvement of the US, UK and Norway was also been blamed for maintaining an exclusionary top-down process approach to the Sudanese peace process. In the Somali case, US involvement was much less apparent and there was less demands over what the Western donors expected from the process even though they were willing to finace the peace agreement.104

101 S. Healy, Lost opportunities in the Horn of Africa: how conflicts connect and peace agreements unravel, Chatham House report London: Chatham House, 2008

102 IGAD, „Lessons learnt from the Sudan and Somalia peace processes‟, brief report of the Mombasa workshop, 9–11 July 2007.

103 Gen. L. Sumbeiywo, „The mediator‟s perspective in peace by piece‟, in M. Simmons and P. Dixon, eds, Conciliation Resources, Accord 18 (London: Conciliation Resources, 2006).104 Ibid young

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As well as drawing in support from the West, IGAD‟s nominal ownership of the peace process

helped to secure the exclusion of secondary actors from outside the region, principally Egypt, Libya and Yemen organized a few rounds of negotiations when the parties were in a stalemate. All of these countries have clearly identified and acknowledged their interests in the Horn of Africa, but IGAD‟s collective intent was to establish a monopoly over the peace process in the region. However Francis emphasizes that it is noteworthy that new initiatives invariably arose in the Arab world whenever IGAD peace processes stalled.105 IGAD‟s peace-making activities helped to secure legitimacy for the organisation and build a wider international acceptance of IGAD as the only appropriate forum for tackling conflict in the Horn. In order to maintain this primacy, IGAD needs to secure one of two things: either actual success in conflict resolution (as in Sudan); or the ability to align its peacemaking activity with the interests of powerful external actors (as it was the case in the Somalia peace process).

Consequently IGADs inability to prevent or resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 or to deal with violent conflict in Darfur and rumbling conflicts in Northern Uganda and Eastern Ethiopia demonstrates that a lot needs to be done in order to make the organization is more effective.

4.6 Conclusion

In the eigtheen years since IGAD added peace and security to its mandate there has been no significant reduction in the level of conflict in the Horn of Africa. The region still lacks the most basic regional security framework.106 IGAD member states continue to defy the old fashioned inter-state rules of respect for territorial sovereignty and non-interference in each other‟s affairs, and continue to a pose as a threat to their neighbours. At the present there are few signs of

105 Ibid Francis, Uniting Africa.

106 Khadiagala, Eastern Africa.

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moving towards a collective security arrangements or genuinely endorsing institutional processes of regional consultation and decision making. All this could point to the conclusion that IGAD is paralysed.

However eighteen years is a relatively short time in which to judge the efficacy of new approaches to peace and security, more so after a century of regional conflict. IGAD‟S peace processes in Sudan and Somalia have proved that member states can come up with measure to resolve the insecurity dielema.107 The two agreements are important achievements and milestones in the era of IGAD‟s expanded mandate, and provide relatively rare examples of regional mediation in internal conflicts within the region.

The existence of IGAD nonetheless brings a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management in the Horn of Africa. This is a forum that tresses on the importance of regional collectivity between members but also looks at the role other interested parties beyond the region play in promoting or exacerbating the situation. The new ingredient is the internationally conferred legitimacy that IGAD possesses to address conflict within the region. The acknowledgment that national security interests are intimately connected across the region implies that however imperfect and compromised, IGAD‟s regional peace and security activities will remain in place

and gain incrementally in importance. If IGAD is to consolidate its role, its institutions including the Secretariat, will eventually need to be strengthened so that it can assert some autonomy.

107 Ibid Sally Healy

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Summary

Chapter one was an introduction to the study which provide a synopsis of the subject matter. It gave an historical overview of the conflict webs in the horn of Africa, the problem statement and the objectives that inform the study. It also gave a literature review of the previous debates about the conflict in the Horn of Africa, which covered three types of theories as the major entry points into understanding the Horn of Africa conflict system. The realism school of thought argued that the conflict in the horn of Africa is due to interstate suspicion which led to security dilemma. The liberal school of thoughts assumed that the lack of co-operation between the region member states is the major cause of conflict. Furthermore the theory acknowledges the role of IGAD in mitigating conflicts in the region. The justification of the study, theoretical framework, hypotheses, research methodology and chapter outline were also covered in the chapter. The chapter provides a framework for the study to establish the link between the two variables and identify how they affect each other.

Chapter was an overview of the study which sought to look at the effect of colonization and superpower rivalry during the cold war period. The chapter highlighted the effect of territory borders that were drawn the colonial governments in exacerbating conflict in the Horn of Africa region. Chapter three was the case study and it dwelt on the issues and actors that cause intensified conflict in the Horn of Africa. The chapter also looked at the processes that were employed by IGAD in mitigating conflict in the region.

46

Chapter four provide a critical analysis into the emerging issues in the Horn of Africa. The main issues that were discussed were the multidimensionality nature of conflict and effectiveness of IGAD in promoting peace and security.

5.1. Key finding

From the findings and key debate, the study asserts that the Horn will continue to be prone to conflict because of member states interference and lack of proper peace mechanism. The multiplicity of actors and issues in the Horn of Africa will continue to significant influence on how the region moves forward in terms of dealing with conflicts. Furthermore the study established that the political fate of each state in the Horn of Africa region will continue to be inextricably intertwined with that of their neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been able to completely or partially insulate itself from the problems of the other states no matter how distant, the complexity of the issues and finally no matter how strong or weak they can be able to project their power.

On the other hand the overlay in the system will continue to allow global hegemons and regional powers from other region to intervene and advance their foreign policy in region. These reaffirms that the USA in particular will continue to be a dominate player in the Horn of Africa conflict system due to its strategy of fighting terrorism. Similarly china will continue to advance its interest in securing oil resources in the region; therefore it will continue to be part of the problem rather than the solution. Furthermore the study also found out that the unresolved conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia over the ogaden region will carry on causing insecurity unless member states with the help of IGAD cab come up with lasting solution to the never ending conflicts in the region

475.2. Recommendations

Unfortunately, there has not been much effort towards structural and institutional transformation in the region. Therefore the region continues to be prone to violent conflicts, the study therefore recommends that for the foreseeable future more research needs to focus on the structural conflicts that continue to prevalent in the region. On the other hand there is also need to carryout in depth research on the role of external support in strengthening or weakening IGAD‟S institutional capacity in mitigating conflicts in the region.

The study notes that there has also not been much research undertaken into how the state can reconcile the fragmented communities in the region and incoherent institutional system within the member state countries. Another area where research needs to be done, it‟s on the effect of war economies in the Horn of Africa region. That is how the interests of various parties can be addressed in order to adopt formal economies.

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