ideology and science: some preliminary reflections

Ideology and Science: Some Preliminary ReflectionsAuthor(s): R. P. MossSource: Area, Vol. 10, No. 5 (1978), pp. 371-377Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20001398 .

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Ideology and science: some preliminary reflections R. P. Moss, University of Birmingham

Summary. Geographers are being asked to revise radically some basic assumptions about the nature of their discipline. A view of some of the major issues that underpin the debate is occasioned by the recent publication of Ideology, science and human geography, by Derek Gregory.

Geography is currently faced with another revolution. Geographers are being

asked to revise radically the assumptions and presuppositions implicit in the

quantitative revolution and to replace them with others which are more ' rele

vant ', more ' critical ' and thus, so it is asserted, more suitable to the problems

of geographical study, especially in its human aspects. It is suggested that

human geography is so intimately bound up with value judgements, both in

theory and practice, that the search for objectivity and for universal laws is

totally inappropriate. Some of these arguments are based on explicit Marxist

presuppositions; others, however, spring from a realization of the complexities of human volition and decision, and from the fact that human society is appar

ently in a perpetual state of change. It is thus perhaps appropriate to present a

personal view of some of the major issues that underpin the main debate.

These will be examined under four headings: first, the nature of science; secondly, the role of theory and the relations between theory and practice;

thirdly, the tenability of an historicist position; and fourthly, the fundamental ontological question of the nature of truth.

This examination is occasioned by the publication of Ideology, science and human geography by Derek Gregory, which forms the latest, and in many ways

a highly perceptive contribution to the debate. Gregory writes as an enthusiast

who is fully committed to his philosophical and methodological position, and also as a scholar who has clearly read widely and deeply in those philosophers

and logicians whose ideas impinge most acutely upon the nature and practice

of geographical inquiry. In the intellectual milieu of this book the four sets of

issues set out above are raised most urgently.

Before considering these issues, it is relevant to query the basic arguments on

which the supposed need for change is based. The importance of value judge

ments is not denied, but it is not sufficient merely to expose the ' myth of a

value-free human geography'. In a certain sense the activity of natural science

is also conspicuously value-ridden, even though it makes extremely plausible

claims to approach objectivity. What is in fact needed is a detailed philosophical

and methodological analysis of the various ways in which the term 'value

judgement' is used in our rational discourse, and of the role that the various

modes distinguished play in social and natural scientific thinking and practice.

This Pahl (1968), in his article which in part deals with these issues, conspicu

ously fails to provide. It has, however, been attempted in outline, and in a

different philosophical context, more recently (Moss, 1978). In relation to the

issues at stake in the current debate such an analysis is quite crucial.

Furthermore, it may be questioned whether the mere fact of the manifest

371



372 Ideology and science

change in human society is in itself a sufficient reason for rejecting outright the

method of natural science in its possible application in social science. Natural scientists too are accustomed to dealing with situations and phenomena which are in a state of constant flux, or in a process of continual development and

change. Indeed, it is precisely this situation that occasions the critical significance to modern physics of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, which is in fact primarily concerned with problems of observation but has so often been mis

applied in the realm of philosophical discourse. However, important as these questions are, it is with the four sets of issues referred to at the outset that the

present discussion is mainly concerned.

The nature of science

In the first place the debate seems to be bedevilled by a confusion in the use

of the word' science '. It is often used to denote the totality of human knowledge irrespective of the differing methods employed in its discovery, and irrespective of the varying degrees of credibility which the differing aspects of that knowledge warrant. It is significant that the current controversy occurs at a point in the history of social science at which a particular set of ideas concerning the nature

and method of natural science have been enthusiastically embraced as a solution to its problems. This situation strongly resembles that relating to the optimistic philosophies of human society which arose out of the Enlightenment and which were based upon a new faith in the power of human rationality occasioned by the notable explanatory successes of the methods of physical science and cos

mology. Thus Gregory is probably justified in seeing the quantitative revolution as the ultimate outcome of this trend in human thought. Whether the lack of

success of such attempts in the past implies some fundamental incompatibility between natural and social science is, however, quite another question which

will be considered again later. In such a situation, however, it is not surprising that controversy should exist, for there is no a priori reason to suppose that the

phenomena of social science are necessarily amenable to the methods of natural

science. Furthermore, we are entitled to ask what reasons may be given for

relying upon the conclusions and generalizations of both natural and social

science, and indeed any other kind of science. In the case of natural science,

convincing answers to this question have been given by Nagel (1961), Braithwaite

(1968), Popper (1968) and others. In the case of social and historical science, similar thorough and detailed methodological analyses are still awaited.

It thus appears that until our ideas are clarified as to what is meant by the

term ' science' the debate cannot be carried to a satisfactory conclusion. A

detailed methodological analysis, exposing the patterns of thought involved, and

specifying the criteria normative in relation to validity and invalidity, is also a

necessary prerequisite for fruitful discussion of the points at issue. Furthermore, those who would take a broad view of science and include both social and

natural science have to come to terms with both. For example, it is not sufficient

to treat natural science largely as a sociological phenomenon, as Harvey (1973)

does, and to relegate it and its significant conclusions to the category of 'status

quo theory'. Apart from the generally acknowledged significance of its con

clusions and generalizations, its impact on philosophy, indeed upon the totality of human thought, has been immense. Furthermore, if natural science is affected

by value judgements in much the same way as social science, then it is clearly advantageous to attempt to explain both why natural science has been so



Ideology and science 373

conspicuously successful in achieving coherent and usable explanations, and why there should be such strong similarities between the explanations and con clusions reached in natural science irrespective of the ideological and socio logical milieu in which it is practised. It was this conspicuous success which led initially to the unsuccessful eighteenth century attempt to apply the methods of natural science to the state of man in society. The fact that it was unsuccessful does not necessarily invalidate the attempt, for it is possible to argue that it failed not because the methods were inapplicable, but because the essential characteristics of the method were misconstrued, science being interpreted in an inductive rather than a deductive mould (Moss, 1970).

Furthermore, confusion as to the meaning and context of science leads to a dangerous confusion between philosophy and science. Harvey (1973) has asserted that, by subsuming philosophy and science under a single method,

Marx got rid of philosophy. However, until the meaning and rationality of philosophy and of science are detailed and analysed, it is equally plausible to conclude that by so treating them Marx got rid of science. On initial comparison of the modes of thought of philosophy and science, there appear to be significant differences between the forms of argument, the uses of evidence and the

methodological relations. The question at issue concerning explanation then resolves itself into deciding whether the proposed new methods of reflexive and critical explanation are fundamentally scientific, in the restrictive sense, or philosophical, in their concepts, criteria and rationality. The necessities for the former appear to be a rigorous formal theoretical structure, closely tied by explicit logic to a set of critical empirical references (Moss, 1970; 1977). It is this structural pattern which characterizes much of natural science, and it may be argued that much that is called science in the more general sense does not warrant the credibility accorded the more developed natural sciences.

The problem of theory

The role of theory is crucial in the structural pattern of science, but the word ' theory ' is unfortunately surrounded by equivocation in its more general usage. It is used by some to include all those concepts and other mental constructs

which we bring to bear upon the world of our experience, but in natural science it denotes a logically coherent body of ideas which has been rigorously tested against particular critical empirical situations by rigorous experimentation and observation. Clearly, these two uses are in no sense synonymous, and a great deal of the criticism which is legitimately levelled at theory of the first kind on ideological grounds is fully justified, but such criticisms do not apply in the same way to theory in the more limited and rigorous sense.

This raises the key issue for any discipline that forms a part of legitimate human knowledge. This is the necessity to specify clearly and rigorously the links which exist between the ideas which are advanced and the facts or instances of the phenomena which they purport to explain. In this the significance of deductive strategies needs to be emphasized and the fundamental importance of evidence contrary to the validity of any generalization needs to be strongly asserted. An attempt to face this issue by those who argue for the new revolution in geography and social science would be welcomed. Reflexive and critical explanation are said to be grounded in reality, or to depend upon the relation between theory and praxis, or to be verified through practice in the process of change. These ideas lack substance until there is a precise reconstruction of




what they mean and imply in methodological terms, in relation to specified strategies and tactics of investigation and normative criteria of validity. Clearly, not all human ideas are in any specified sense valid, and operational criteria are required by means of which we may distinguish the valid from the invalid. Only in this way can theory be explicitly criticized and assessed.

In answer to these points it is frequently asserted that an appeal is being made to wider criteria of rationality that embrace the scientific criteria, so clearly specified in the case of natural science, as a special case. It is also argued that the whole debate takes place in a wider context than that specified by natural science, and thus at a level which is more fundamental and basic. To this it may be replied: first, that even if this be admitted, the specification of the necessary criteria is not thereby excused; secondly, that there is an implicit assumption in the argument that there are more basic laws than those of natural science to be discovered and these laws are of an historicist kind; and thirdly, that if agreement cannot be reached on the framework within which an argument is to be conducted, then there is little possibility of fruitful and rational discussion.

The historicist perspective The problem of the relation between historical and scientific explanations is therefore raised. As thinkers committed to a belief in human progress by the operation of historical laws, Marx and his modern disciplines stand fully in the historicist idealist tradition represented by Herder, Fichte, Hegel and others (Passmore, 1970). Substantial analyses of historical method have been done by

Nagel (1961), and Popper (1961) who has developed a significant argument to demonstrate that there are no historical laws which are distinct and different from the general laws of science established in contemporary observational and experimental situations. Furthermore, Flew (1970) has shown how plausible it is to examine historical sequences and then to perceive distinct tendencies, to elevate these sequences and tendencies to trends, and then to further elevate the trends to the status of immutable laws.

However, it may be argued that the processes of history may be best under stood by a combination of two distinct approaches. First, by clearly establishing the detailed sequences and coincidences of events, and, secondly, by interpreting them in terms of contemporary understanding of demonstrably analogous situations. This is the form of the argument in relation to biological evolution and historical geology. If such arguments are valid, then it is clear that studying events and phenomena in a historical perspective is an extension of scientific understanding in its more limited sense and is dependent upon it. Arguments based solely upon the basis of historical sequences thus can never be con clusive in and of themselves, and trends can never become laws and predictors of the future.

It is important to point out that historical study is in fact and by common consent an idiographic exercise. Thus, it is logically impossible for the particular conclusions and generalizations reached on the basis of the study of specific situations and sequences in the past to be applied to other situations more or less remote in space or time, except by the weakest of analogies, although it

might be argued that a great deal of geographical writing in the past has sought to do this. If in fact historical study cannot provide a sufficient basis for universal statements or for prediction and prescription, then, if such study is to be made




the basis of a general understanding, it is likely that the fundamental ontological underpinnings of the search for universals and predictive success will be called in question.

The fundamental ontological question In this debate, however, the contrary views are most often treated solely in

methodological or epistemological terms. It may be suggested that underlying the whole debate are fundamental ontological questions concerning the nature of truth itself. To those who advocate a new direction for geography and social science following the philosophical tradition of Marx and Engels, and ultimately also of Hegel, truth is seen in a different perspective. For the theists, deists and even the rationalist positivists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as for many modern scientists, truth is an absolute which is, at least in principle, normative in its application to the processes and conclusions of human intel lectual questioning and investigation. Thus science, at least in a general sense,

may be seen as progressing towards truth which is an absolute to be aimed for, even though, on some views at least, it can never be completely within human grasp. Hegel and his intellectual disciples replaced this absolute standard and goal with a dialectical concept which sees truth merely in relative terms as a consequence of the synthesis of opposites in a constantly changing milieu. Thus truth becomes an ephemeral relativity and almost a mere mental construct.

This involves a number of profound issues which it is not possible to consider here, but it is relevant to make two observations. First, if the new relative concept of truth is itself valid then it must apply to both natural and social science, since the ontological question underpins both; it is easier to see its plausibility in the case of social science, despite the attempt by Engels (1954) to demonstrate the operation of dialectics in nature. Secondly, it is interesting to note that Kuhn (whose interpretation of the history and development of science has found considerable support amongst geographers), with special reference to his concept of revolutions in science, has recently moved away from the notion of truth as an absolute (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 205-6). For him, natural science in its progress by paradigm change now represents improvement of puzzle-solving characteristics, rather than an approach to some fundamental ontological concept of truth. This suggests that there is real historical, epistemological, and ontological coherence in the views of the advocates of revolutionary change in geography. It is clear that this issue, if it is real, is quite fundamental and if geographers are to follow the path of the new revolution, then it is imperative that they see and consider well the issues that are involved in such a decision.

The foregoing observations are not intended to deny the sociological signifi cance of science as a human activity, but it is necessary to assert that this is not its sole, perhaps not even its dominant, characteristic. Nor is it intended to deny that social science and natural science have different problems, but merely to assert that both must be explicit in setting out their criteria of validity, the

methodological strategies involved in their practices, and the relations of ideas to the facts and phenomena that they purport to explain. Furthermore, it is not intended to assert a static view of human society or that truth with respect to it

may change with time. What is argued is that there must be fundamental standards of validity and that there is a truth to be sought in every situation and that it is an absolute which provides the norm which the practitioners of science seek to attain.




Ideology, science and human geography These issues, and no doubt others, seem to be implicit in much current debate. It is to Gregory's credit that his book has stimulated reflection on some of the deeper underpinnings of the presuppositions upon which the practice of geo graphy is built, and the volume is a well-argued presentation which raises many other significant issues which are important in the debate. His critique of positiv ism is perceptive and fair, though it might be argued that he is less than just to

Popper and ought to have paid more attention to the methodological discussion of Braithwaite.

Furthermore, it might be suggested that a large number of geographers and social scientists who practice ' positivist ' method would reject the total positivist view of Comte, and perhaps also the critical rationalism of Popper. Some will not have considered these implications at all, and it is to be hoped that a book such as this will stimulate critical evaluation; but others may well have developed their own ontologies and epistemologies, based for example upon Christian assumptions, or upon forms of rationalism other than that represented by Comte or Popper. The issues raised may not be quite so simple in practice as they are represented by Gregory.

In the parts of the book concerned with reflexive explanation and committed explanation, Gregory's task is more difficult, and some will no doubt feel that this part of the book is less successful. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that it is far easier to write a critique than it is to present a coherent positive argument for a particular philosophical viewpoint. This is particularly so when the attempt to present an argument is based upon a prior commitment to a

world view which embraces the whole man, including not only his reason, but his emotions and total personality. Nevertheless, this is a task which Gregory tackles in a scholarly and stimulating way. The reader could, however, be for given the impression that one of the difficulties in the way of positivism is precisely the fact that it demands no such conviction when posed in its rationalist

mould, and that it is thus constitutionally unable to respond in a total sense to the fundamental problems of society. But it does not necessarily follow that the only response then possible is the one advocated in the book. It might be argued that positivist method might be included in another world view that demands a similar total commitment. Furthermore, it is perhaps difficult to escape the impression that total commitment that does not distinguish between the different rationalities present in human discourse, and perhaps in the human constitution itself, is a positive disadvantage in the rational discussion of the problems of society.

Gregory's insistence upon the importance of facing up to these problems of the relationship between science and society is important, and his answer is immediately plausible and well-argued, but whether or not it is the only accept able solution remains to be demonstrated by further discussion and argument concerning the issues raised. His final plea for a new regional geography is perceptive and significant, and his second book, on this topic, will be awaited with interest and eager anticipation by those who will be stimulated by Ideology, science and human geography. It will fulfil a most valuable purpose in geography, in social science in particular and science in general if it induces practising

geographers to examine in a clear and critical manner the presuppositions and assumptions that are inherent in all our intellectual and experimental activity. It will prove even more valuable if it convinces geographers that they cannot




pursue their study divorced from the pressing problems that confront society

today.

References Braithwaite, R. B. (1968) Scientific explanation: a study of the function of theory, probability

and law in science (London) Engels, F. (1954) The dialectics of nature (Moscow) Flew, A. G. N. (1970) Evolutionary ethics (London) Gregory, D. (1978) Ideology, science and human geography (London) Harvey, D. (1973) Social justice and the city (London) Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd edn., Chicago) Moss, R. P. (1970) 'Authority and charisma: criteria of validity in geographical method.

I. Inductivism and deductive method ', S. Afr. geogr. J. 52, 13-28 Moss, R. P. (1977) 'Deductive strategies in geographical generalization', Prog. Phys. Geogr.

1, 23-39 Moss, R. P. (1978) 'Scientific method in geographical study', unpubl. paper presented to the

First British-Soviet Geographical Seminar, London Nagel, E. (1961) The structure of science (London) Pahl, R. E. (1967) 'Sociological models in geography', in Chorley, R. J. and Haggett, P.

(eds) Models in geography (London) 217-42 Passmore, J. (1970) The perfectibility of man (London) Popper, K. R. (1961) The poverty of historicism (London) Popper, K. R. (1968) The logic of scientific discovery (London)

Vintila Mihailescu 1890-1978: an appreciation

With the death of Vintila Mihailescu Romanian geography has lost its leadingexponent. He combined the role of elder statesman, loved and respected by colleagues throughout Romania, with a most intensive research activity. In most countries where geography has been growing as an organized discipline throughout the twentieth century the age of the father figure is long passed and it is most remarkable that in Romania, where geography has been fully established in both schools and universities, there was not only a man with the character and ability to play this role, by popular acclaim, but one who could maintain such eminence to the advanced age of 88.1

Studying at Bucharest University under Simion Mehedinti, Mihdilescu followed leading researchers such as George Valsan and Constantin Bratescu in preparing a

major regional treatise2 but evidently found most satisfaction in writing for various systematic branches of the subject. His work in physical geography was perhaps most significant for the investigation of relations between climate and relief.3 Of greatest importance was his contribution to urban geography. His first paper, on Bucharest,4 led to broad methodological discussions,5 while valuable case studies, exploring new themes, were contributed by colleagues such as Victor Tufescu, Nicolae Radulescu and Tiberiu Morariu (all of whom continue to share Mihailescu's formidable capacities for productivity in retirement). Thus a substantial base was created for the develop

ment of urban geography in the post-war period. Younger workers have now extended the frontiers he explored but he continued to make general assessments6 and some initiatives remain refreshingly original in the Romanian context.'

Much of his working life was spent in the University of Bucharest. His student years were followed by the appointment as assistant to Mehedinti in 1919 leading ultimately to the chair of physical geography in 1936. In 1944, however, his idea of an independent research institute of geography was taken up by the government of the day and



ideology and science: some preliminary reflections

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