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Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research Prepared for: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 540 Gaither Road Rockville, MD 20850 www.ahrq.gov Work for this paper was conducted under contract. Prepared by: Lawrence P. Casalino, M.D., Ph.D. Livingston Farrand Associate Professor of Public Health Chief, Division of Outcomes and Effectiveness Research Weill Cornell Medical College AHRQ Publication No. 14-0024-EF February 2014

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Page 1: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research

Prepared for:

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

540 Gaither Road

Rockville, MD 20850

www.ahrq.gov

Work for this paper was conducted under contract.

Prepared by:

Lawrence P. Casalino, M.D., Ph.D.

Livingston Farrand Associate Professor of Public Health

Chief, Division of Outcomes and Effectiveness Research

Weill Cornell Medical College

AHRQ Publication No. 14-0024-EF

February 2014

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This paper was prepared under contract with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

(AHRQ), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for presentation and discussion at a

meeting on “The Challenge and Promise of Delivery System Research,” held in Sterling, VA, on

February 16-17, 2011. The findings and conclusions in this paper are those of the author, who is

responsible for its content, and do not necessarily represent the views or recommendations of

AHRQ. No statement in this paper should be construed as an official position of AHRQ or the

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The author’s contact information follows:

Lawrence Casalino, 402 E. 67th Street, New York, NY 10065-6304, (646) 962-8044,

[email protected].

AHRQ appreciates citation as to source:

Suggested citation:

Casalino LP. Identifying key areas for delivery system research. Rockville, MD: Agency for

Healthcare Research and Quality; 2014. AHRQ Publication No. 14-0024-EF.

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Contents

Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................1 What Is Delivery System Research? ........................................................................................... 1 Conceptual Model ....................................................................................................................... 1 “Long List” of Delivery System Research Areas and Topics .................................................... 2 Criteria for Selecting Priority Areas for Delivery System Research .......................................... 2

Suggested Key Areas for Delivery System Research ................................................................. 2 AHRQ’s Recent ARRA Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Initiative ....................... 3

Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research .....................................................................4 Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 4 What Is Delivery System Research? ........................................................................................... 4

Conceptual Model ....................................................................................................................... 5 “Long List” of Delivery System Research Areas and Topics .................................................... 7

Criteria for Selecting Priority Areas for Delivery System Research .......................................... 7 Suggested Key Areas for Delivery System Research ................................................................. 8

AHRQ’S Recent ARRA Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Initiative .................... 13 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................15

References ......................................................................................................................................17 Appendix A: Priority Topics From Institute of Medicine Document ............................................19 Appendix B: Examples of Some Components of the Conceptual Model in Figure 1 ...................22

Appendix C: “Long List” of Delivery System Research Areas .....................................................24 Appendix D: Four Suggested Key Areas for Delivery System Research (With Illustrative

Studies) ......................................................................................................................................29

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Executive Summary

The health care reform law (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010) focuses on

two areas: (1) providing nearly all Americans with insurance and (2) delivery system reform.

The former has received the most media attention, but the latter is equally important. The

discoveries of basic scientific and clinical research do not help patients unless they are

effectively used in the delivery system.

The importance of delivery system research as a form of comparative effectiveness research (or

Patient-Centered Outcomes Research, as it is often called) has recently been emphasized by the

reports of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Comparative Effectiveness Research

Prioritization (see Appendix A) and by the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative

Effectiveness Research.

This paper addresses two broad questions: What do we need to know about the delivery system

to change it in ways that will benefit patients? Where should foundations and funding agencies

like the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) focus their efforts? This paper

suggests four key areas for delivery system research.

The paper begins by offering a definition of delivery system research and its relationship to

comparative effectiveness research. It then presents a simple conceptual model of a generic

delivery system organization, which it uses to provide a “long list” of potential delivery system

research topics organized into broad topic areas. It suggests criteria for selecting key areas and

proposes a short list of key areas for research, including some key questions in each area,

providing examples of completed research, and noting areas in which research is particularly

lacking. The paper concludes by locating AHRQ’s recent American Recovery and Reinvestment

Act (ARRA) Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Research grants within the analytic

scheme presented.

What Is Delivery System Research?

Delivery system research may be broadly defined as research that focuses on organizations

which provide health care and/or research on inter-relationships among these organizations.

Delivery system research may focus on the structure of these organizations; on the processes

they use to provide and improve medical care; and on relationships among organizations’

structures, the processes used, and the cost and quality of care provided. It may also focus on the

incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect

organizations’ structure, their care processes, and the outcomes of care generated by these

structures and processes. Incentives are based on measurement of performance, so research that

focuses on performance measures should also be considered to be delivery system research.

Conceptual Model

Figure 1 provides a simple model that can be used to think about an individual delivery system

organization or the interface between organizations. The model is based on the familiar structure-

process-outcomes relationships attributed to Donabedian. The model adds the critical factor of

the external incentives faced by the organization. These incentives have a very strong influence

on the structure adopted by the organization and on the processes it uses to provide and improve

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care. The model also adds organizational culture and leadership. Culture and leadership also

strongly influence the processes used to provide care and probably influence organizational

structure as well. The emergence of culture and leadership is not well understood, but both are

probably influenced by the external incentives the organization faces and by its structure.

Appendix B gives examples of important structures, external incentives, processes, and

outcomes.

“Long List” of Delivery System Research Areas and Topics

Appendix C presents a long list of research topics organized by the categories in the conceptual

model just discussed and also suggests sample research questions for each topic.

Criteria for Selecting Priority Areas for Delivery System Research

The fundamental criterion for selecting priority areas for delivery system research should be: will

this research help patients—either directly or by helping providers to provide better care? The

reports of the IOM and the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness

Research stress that the areas studied should have a major impact, either on the population as a

whole or on subgroups of patients; that research should include age groups ranging from infancy

to the elderly, as well as racial/ ethnic minority groups; and that research should seek to fill

important gaps in knowledge. This paper suggests three additional, more specific criteria.

First, it will be important to have research that focuses on areas of delivery system reform

emphasized by the health care reform law (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).1

These include new models of organization (Accountable Care Organizations, Patient-Centered

Medical Homes, Healthcare Innovation Zones), new models of paying for care (e.g., bundled

payments and pay for performance), and public reporting of provider performance.

Second, the paper suggests that the best way to improve the quality and to contain the cost of

health care—that is, to increase its value—may be to get physicians, hospitals, and other

providers into high-performing organizations and to give them incentives to continually improve

care for the population of patients for whom they are responsible. Hence, research should focus

on (1) identifying the types of organizations that are high performing; (2) identifying the types of

incentives that induce these organizations to continually improve care; and (3) identifying the

types of incentives likely to lead to the creation of more high-performing organizations and to

physicians and other providers becoming members of high-performing organizations.

Third, research should routinely evaluate both the intended and the unintended consequences of

the structure, process, or incentive being studied. It should seek to learn the effects on racial,

ethnic and socioeconomic disparities in care, as well as the effects on areas of care that are not

directly addressed by the structure, process, or incentive.

Suggested Key Areas for Delivery System Research

The paper suggests four key areas for delivery system research at the present time, working from

the premise that it is better to be specific and to be wrong than to be excessively general:

1. Analyses of the demographics of the delivery system—i.e., of each component of the

conceptual model—and relationships among the components of the model.

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2. Seeking ways to structure incentives so that they are likely to induce desirable change in

the demography of delivery system organizations (toward the types of organization that

research indicates provide better care) and to induce these organizations to continually try

to improve the value of the care they provide.

3. Seeking ways to improve the measurement of provider performance.

4. Analyses of interprovider/interorganizational processes for improving care.

AHRQ’s Recent ARRA Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Initiative

In February 2010, AHRQ used ARRA funds to issue two Requests for Applications (RFAs) to

support expanded delivery system research:

The Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Evaluation Grants (R01) sought

“rigorous comparative evaluations of alternative system designs, change strategies, and

interventions that have already been implemented in healthcare and are likely to improve

quality and other outcomes.”

The Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Demonstration Grants (R18) sought

“demonstrations of (1) broad strategies and/or specific interventions for improving care

by redesigning care delivery or (2) strategies and interventions for improving care by

redesigning payment.”

Through these two RFAs, AHRQ funded six evaluation grants and four demonstration grants.

From the point of view of this paper, the grants selected for funding are encouraging: four of the

six evaluation grants and all four of the demonstration grants arguably fall within the list of key

areas suggested in this paper.

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Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research

Overview

The health care reform law (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010) focuses on

two areas: (1) providing nearly all Americans with insurance and (2) delivery system reform.

The former has received the most media attention, but the latter is equally important. Congress

recognized that insuring more people will put more money into the health care system, and that

this will be like pouring water into a sieve unless the delivery system is reformed. But what do

we need to know about the delivery system to change it in ways that will benefit patients? Where

should foundations and funding agencies like the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

(AHRQ) focus their efforts?

In this paper I will suggest four key areas of focus for delivery system research. I will begin by

offering a definition of delivery system research and its relationship to comparative effectiveness

research. I will then present a simple conceptual model of a generic delivery system

organization, which will be useful in organizing a “long list” of potential delivery system

research topics into broad topic areas. I will then suggest criteria for selecting key areas and

propose a short list of key areas for research, including some key questions in each area. I will

provide citations for examples of research studies in each of the key areas and will highlight

areas in which there is a particular lack of research to date. I will conclude by locating AHRQ’s

recent American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Comparative Effectiveness Delivery

System Research grants within the analytic scheme presented.

What Is Delivery System Research?

There is no generally accepted definition of delivery system research. I suggest that delivery

system research may be broadly defined as research that focuses on organizations which provide

health care (such as medical groups, hospitals, long-term care facilities, and home health

agencies) and/or on inter-relationships among these organizations. Delivery system research

may focus on these organizations’ structures and on the processes they use to provide and

improve medical care, as well as on relationships among organizations’ structures, the processes

used, and the cost and quality of care the organizations provide. Delivery system research may

also focus on the incentives given to provider organizations by payors (Medicare, Medicaid, and

health insurance companies) and regulators and on how these incentives affect organizations’

structure, the care processes they use, and the outcomes of care generated by these structures and

processes. Incentives are based on measurement of performance, so research that focuses on

performance measures should also be considered to be delivery system research.

What is the relationship between delivery system research and comparative effectiveness

research (CER)—or, as it is now often called, Patient Centered Outcomes Research?

Traditionally, CER compares the effectiveness of drugs, devices, and medical or surgical

procedures—traditional CER clearly is not delivery system research, at least not according to the

definition suggested in this paper. The findings of traditional CER can only have an impact,

however, if they are used by the delivery system, so the delivery system should be a major

consumer of CER and a key to the effectiveness of CER.2 In addition, comparative effectiveness

research/Patient Centered Outcomes Research focused on the delivery system itself is very

important. It is likely that some organizational structures and processes lead to higher quality,

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lower cost care than others. Delivery system CER is needed to identify these structures and

processes (and the incentives that make these structures and processes more likely to be used).

The Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research listed “delivery

system strategies” as a critically important area in which there is a major lack of CER to date.3

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Comparative Effectiveness Research

Prioritization stated that delivery system-related research areas were the most commonly listed of

the 100 key priorities the Committee selected.4 However, the IOM definition of delivery system-

related research was much broader than the definition suggested in this paper—it included what I

would define as clinical research, for example, comparing robotic assistance surgery to

conventional surgery for common operations, such as prostatectomies. Nevertheless, at least 31

of the 100 IOM priority topics fit the definition of delivery system research suggested here (see

Appendix A). Twenty-seven of these 31 topics focus on one area of the conceptual model to be

presented in the next section of this paper: they focus on processes for improving care to

individuals or for improving care for an organization’s population of patients. Critically, the

IOM emphasized that when the [delivery system] design, intervention, or strategy under study

introduced changes that are directly relevant to policy decisions, a comparator may be the status

quo.

Conceptual Model

Figure 1 provides a simple model of a generic delivery system organization—it could be a

medical group, a hospital, a nursing home facility, etc. The model could also be used for the

interface between two delivery system organizations; e.g., what are the structure, culture,

external incentives, etc. of the interface between a medical group and a hospital in dealing with

inpatient-outpatient transitions? The model can also be used to think about structure-process-

outcome relationships for a particular organization or type of organization and/or for a specific

disease, such as congestive heart failure. Finally, the model could be used to think about a health

care market. For example, what is the structure of the market in McAllen, Texas? How might the

culture and leadership of the delivery system in the market be characterized? What processes of

care are prevalent in the market, and what are the outcomes of care in the market?

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Figure 1. Generic model of an organization and its external incentives

Note: Appendix B gives examples of important structures, external incentives, processes, and outcomes.

External incentives, such as the way the organization is paid (e.g., via fee for service or

capitation), antitrust regulation, and pay for performance (P4P) influence the structure that

organizations take. For example, global capitation (more accurately, capitation that approached

global capitation) in California in the late 1980s and 1990s led to the formation of very large,

multispecialty medical groups, to hospital employment of primary care physicians, and to the

growth of independent practice associations (IPAs).5-8

Structure no doubt is also influenced by

other factors not shown in the model, such as patient and physician preferences and inertia

(existing organizations may be slow to disappear or to change their structure, even when

incentives change). We have very little understanding of how and why some delivery system

organizations develop effective cultures and leadership and others do not, but culture and

leadership are likely to be influenced by an organization’s structure and the external incentives

that it faces.

An organization’s structure, culture, and leadership, as well as the external incentives that it

faces, shape the processes that the organization implements to provide and improve medical care.

For example, a large medical group with strong leadership, a culture of quality improvement, and

financial incentives to reduce avoidable hospital admissions (such incentives are currently rare

for physicians) is likely to create a nurse care manager program to help patients with congestive

heart failure. It is unlikely that such a program would be created by a hospital paid per admission

or by a small medical practice with limited resources, relatively few congestive heart failure

patients, and no financial incentive to reduce unnecessary admissions.

The model postulates that the processes an organization uses to provide and improve medical

care strongly influence outcomes—that is, the total cost of patient care, the quality of care that

patients receive, and patient experience. Processes affect outcomes both because of what

providers do (e.g., prescribe a medication appropriately) and through their effects on what

patients do (i.e., through their effects on patient engagement). Patient engagement is also likely

to be affected by the provider organization’s structure (e.g., are patients more engaged, generally

speaking, when cared for by large vs. small organizations?) and culture (arrow not drawn in the

model).

EXTERNAL INCENTIVES

CULTURE, LEADERSHIP

STRUCTURE PROCESSES OUTCOMES

PATIENT ENGAGEMENT

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Although all relevant arrows are not shown in the model, it is likely that the organization’s

structure, culture, and external incentives also influence outcomes directly and not just through

their impact on care processes. For example, the culture of some organizations may be that

physicians go the extra mile for patients—staying late to see a patient in the office, for example,

rather than sending the patient to the emergency department. Structure—for example, the size of

a medical group—may directly affect outcomes in many ways. For example, it may be that

patients, physicians, and staff know each other better in small practices than in large medical

groups, and that this mutual knowledge may lead to a patient with subtle signs (over the

telephone) of serious illness being seen by his/her physician quickly in a small practice, whereas

in a large group the patient might be triaged to an appointment a few days later or to a same day

appointment with a physician other than his or her usual physician.

“Long List” of Delivery System Research Areas and Topics

Appendix C presents a long list of research topics organized by the categories in the conceptual

model just discussed; it also suggests sample research questions for each topic. This list of topics

is intended to reasonably represent the range of topics that may be considered delivery system

research, but no doubt other topics could be added, as well as many additional research questions

for each topic.9 Each research area in the list can be studied in the context of: (1) a specific type

of delivery system organization; and/or (2) a specific disease or area of preventive care. For each

area, key questions are:

1. What are alternative forms of the thing in question (e.g., alternative medical group

structures or alternative forms of nurse care management for patients with chronic

illness)?

2. What are the demographics and geographic distribution of the alternative forms (i.e.,

What is the prevalence of each alternative? Where are these alternatives located? How if

at all is the prevalence changing?)?

3. What are the factors (e.g., external incentives, regulation) that affect the prevalence of the

alternative forms?

4. What are the effects, intended and unintended, of alternative forms on the outcomes of

care?

Criteria for Selecting Priority Areas for Delivery System Research

The fundamental criterion for selecting priority areas for delivery system research should be: will

this research help patients—either directly or by helping providers to provide better care?10

The

Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research and the IOM Committee

on Comparative Effectiveness Research Prioritization developed additional, somewhat more

specific criteria for selecting high-priority areas for comparative effectiveness research.3,4

The

IOM stressed that the medical conditions studied should have a major impact, either on the

population as a whole or on subgroups of patients; that research should include age groups

ranging from infancy to the elderly, as well as racial/ethnic minority groups; and that research

should seek to fill important gaps in knowledge. The Federal Coordinating Council criteria were

similar.

While useful, these criteria are quite broad. I suggest three additional criteria to complement the

IOM criteria for the purpose of suggesting key areas for delivery system research:

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First, it will be important to have research that focuses on areas of delivery system reform

emphasized by the health care reform law (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).1

These include new models of organization (Accountable Care Organizations, Patient-Centered

Medical Homes, Healthcare Innovation Zones), new models of paying for care (e.g., bundled

payments and pay for performance), and public reporting of provider performance.

Second, the best way to improve quality and contain the cost of health care—that is, to increase

the value of health care—may be to get physicians, hospitals, and other providers into high-

performing organizations and to give them incentives to continually improve care for the

population of patients for whom they are responsible.11,12

Thus, more research should focus on

(1) identifying the types of organizations that are high performing; (2) identifying the types of

incentives that induce these organizations to continually improve care; and (3) identifying the

types of incentives likely to lead to the creation of more high-performing organizations and to

physicians and other providers becoming members of high-performing organizations. Findings

on the types of organizations likely to provide better care could inform decisions about payment

and regulatory policies. Additionally, information on the types of organizations likely to provide

better care may help patients make better decisions about where to seek care and help physicians

and non-physician staff make better decisions about where to work. To the extent that

characteristics of high-performing organizations are easily observable—for example, if it turns

out that such organizations are large, integrate physicians and a hospital, and/or are

multispecialty—these characteristics can be used by patients and physicians to aid their

decisions.

The third and final criterion that this paper will suggest for priorities for delivery system research

is that this research should routinely evaluate both the intended and the unintended consequences

of the structure, process, or incentive being studied. For example, research should ask the

following types of questions: (1) What effects, if any, does the structure, process, or incentive

have on areas for care not directly related to it? For example, do large organizations score better

on typical measures of quality but not on areas of quality that are not typically measured (e.g.,

timely diagnosis)? Does attention to measured and rewarded areas of quality spill over into

improved quality in other areas, or does it lead to reduced quality in other areas? (2) What effects

does the structure, process, or incentive have on health care disparities?13

For example, do P4P

programs give more bonus money to providers located in economically advantaged areas, thus

increasing the resource gap between “rich” and “poor” providers? Do large medical groups

provide higher quality care but refuse to treat Medicaid patients?

Suggested Key Areas for Delivery System Research

Even with criteria as specific as those I have just suggested—and I recognize that very different

criteria could very plausibly be proposed—there is a lot of room for decisions in selecting key

areas for delivery system research. Additionally, as the medical care system changes over time,

key areas for study are likely to change as well. But I believe that, in suggesting these areas, it is

better to be specific and to be wrong than to be excessively general. Specific suggestions are

more likely to provoke useful (perhaps outraged) discussion. Below, I suggest four key areas for

delivery system research. These are:

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1. Analyses of the demographics of the delivery system—i.e., of each component of the

conceptual model—and relationships among the components of the model.

2. Seeking ways to structure incentives so that they are likely to induce desirable change in

the demography of delivery system organizations (toward the types of organizations that

research indicates provide better care) and to induce these organizations to continually try

to improve the value of the care they provide.

3. Seeking ways to improve the measurement of provider performance.

4. Analyses of interprovider/interorganizational processes for improving care.

Appendix D lists some important research (by no means a comprehensive list) done in each of

the four areas and their subareas and highlights subareas where there is a particular lack of

research to date. Clinical information technology is not listed as a key area for study, although

this is obviously an important area that will be intensively studied. If the arguments advanced in

this paper are correct, it would be helpful if much research on the implementation and effects of

clinical information technology focused on the key areas suggested in this paper.

Analyses of the demographics of the delivery system and relationships among the components of the model

It is not really possible to understand what is happening in U.S. health care and why it is

happening, or to formulate policies to change what is happening, without knowing the

demographics of the delivery system—that is, the prevalence of various kinds of organizations

and the structures these organizations take. But there is very little reliable information about the

demographics of the U.S. delivery system and very little funding by Federal agencies or

foundations to support obtaining this information. Knowing the demographics is an essential first

step, which would make it possible to study in a generalizable way the inter-relationships

outlined in the conceptual model between structure, incentives, processes, and outcomes. More

specifically, research should:

1. Provide definitive data on the demographics of the delivery system, for example:

a. What percentage of physicians work in medical groups of various sizes and specialty

types?

b. What percentage of physicians, by specialty, are employed by hospitals?

c. How many independent practice associations exist, and what are their characteristics?

d. What percentage of physicians work in practices that function as patient-centered

medical homes? What percentage are in organizations that could function as

accountable care organizations?

e. How many hospital-physician “integrated delivery systems” exist, and what are their

characteristics?

f. How can a “gold-standard,” frequently updated database of the population of U.S.

medical groups, including the physicians within the groups (necessary for using

Medicare claims data to study group performance) be created and maintained?

Lacking such a database, researchers have to invent the wheel—unsatisfactorily—

every time they want to study medical groups. A few private organizations try to

create such a database, but because they cannot compel physician cooperation, they

are unable to do so in a way that is adequate and updated, and in any case, their

databases are not publicly available. This database would be a public good. Assuming

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that it had the mandate and resources to do so, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid

Services (CMS) would be in the best position to supply this good. Ideally, CMS could

collect the information annually as a condition of physician and hospital participation

in Medicare.14

g. What are the demographics of other clinical staff—nurse practitioners, physician

assistants, RNs, LVNs, and medical assistants—in medical groups of various sizes

and specialty mixes?

2. Track change over time in the demographics of the delivery system, and attempt to

determine the relationship of these changes to changes in the external incentives given to

provider organizations, for example:

a. Is the percentage of physicians employed by hospitals changing? If so, why?

b. Are physicians more likely to be employed by hospitals (and/or by large medical

groups) in areas where P4P is prevalent?

3. Show the structure-process-outcome relationships among components of the model for

different forms of organization,15

for example:

a. Which types of medical groups perform better—small, medium, or large? Single

specialty or multispecialty? Hospital or MD owned?

b. Which type of organization performs better: independent practice associations (IPAs)

vs. large medical groups vs. integrated delivery systems vs. “accountable care

organizations”?

c. Do organizations that have more external incentives to improve performance use

more processes (e.g., nurse care managers) to improve performance, and do they

actually perform better?

We lack the most basic information about these questions. For example, it has been

assumed by many reformers for decades that large multispecialty medical groups—or,

better, integrated delivery systems—provide higher quality care at a lower cost. But there

is very little evidence for or against this hypothesis.16,17

Recently, there has been a small

amount of funding for research seeking to discover structure-process-outcome

relationships for different forms of organization, but it has not been sufficient to

adequately address these questions, and researchers are handicapped by lack of a gold

standard census of medical groups and integrated delivery systems.

4. Bring theoretical concepts, research methods, and substantive findings from fields outside

health service research to the study of the delivery system18

; for example, knowledge that

has been gained in other fields about organizational culture, about leadership, and about

change within organizations.9,19

Case studies of successful medical groups, hospitals, and

integrated systems suggest that leadership and culture are very important (leaders often

suggest that “culture eats strategy for lunch everyday”),20

but we know relatively little

about how to measure leadership or culture in health care,21,22

and there has been very

little research in health care into what types of leadership and culture exist, what their

effects are on the quality/ cost of care,23,24

and what factors influence the types of

leadership and culture that develop.

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Analyses of ways of structuring incentives so that they are likely to induce desirable change in the demography of delivery system organizations (toward the types of organization that research indicates provide better care) and to induce these organizations to continually try to improve the value of the care they provide

There are many ways in which incentives can be structured. A research literature is developing

on P4P and public reporting, but we are far from having definitive answers about the effects of

these incentives.25,26

Moreover, the incentives themselves and the context in which they are

offered keep changing. We have surprisingly little information about the effects of capitation or

of bundled payment, and even less about the effects of these payment methods when combined

with P4P and/or public reporting. There is also very little information about the effects of

regulations – e.g. anti-trust enforcement against physicians, hospitals, and health plans – on the

demography of delivery system organizations and on the processes these organizations use.

Research should:

1. Compare the effects of different payment methods – not only on the quality and costs of

care, but also on the demography of the delivery system and on the extent of

organizations’ efforts to improve care:

a. Capitation for most inpatient and outpatient services, plus public reporting and/or

quality bonuses

Real vs. virtual capitation (that is, prospectively giving the provider organization

the funds anticipated to be necessary to pay for medical services vs. the pay

“keeping score” and settling accounts with the provider organization at the end of

the year).

b. Fee-for-service payment (diagnosis related groups for hospitals) plus “shared

savings”27

plus quality bonuses.

c. Bundled/episode based payment:

For services that are primarily acute and inpatient, such as cardiac or orthopedic

surgery.

For services that are chronic and outpatient, such as a year of diabetes care.

2. Determine whether it is feasible and desirable to provide incentives at the individual

physician level, or whether these incentives should be given at the level of the provider

organization.28

3. Compare the effectiveness of:

a. P4P vs. public reporting vs. neither.

b. P4P ± public reporting vs. improvement collaboratives done without financial or

public reporting incentives.

Note that the observational data from research into changes in the delivery system (see

above) will yield some information of interest to these questions.

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4. Include inquiry into unintended consequences of incentives; for example, do P4P and/or

public reporting lead to:

a. Increased resource disparities between hospitals and medical groups in rich and poor

areas?

b. “Crowding out” of important unmeasured quality by measured quality?

c. Avoiding of high-risk patients by provider organizations?

d. Possibly undesirable changes in the demography of provider organizations (e.g.,

disappearance of small practices)?

5. Seek to learn more about the effects of regulations (e.g., antitrust enforcement against

physicians, hospitals, and health plans) on structure, process, and outcomes in the

delivery system.

6. Learn what it takes to gain private health insurance plan cooperation in creating useful

incentives.

Improving performance measurement

Performance measurement is critical for organizations that are trying to improve the value of the

care that they provide and for the use of incentives intended to reward organizations for

improving. However, reliably and validly measuring important areas of performance is not easy

in health care, and experience from other industries (e.g., education) shows that inadequate

performance measurement can lead to undesirable unintended consequences, particularly when

measurement is linked to incentives.29

In health care, quite a lot of effort, and some Federal

agency and foundation funding, has been and continues to be directed toward performance

measurement, but the drive to measure is so strong that problems with measurement—reliability,

validity, the possibility of unintended consequences, and the difficulty of measuring more rather

than less important things—are perhaps not always given the attention they deserve.30-33

It would

be very helpful to have more:

1. Careful thinking and research about what measures of important areas of value (quality

and cost) can effectively be used, at what levels of the delivery system (e.g., individual

physician, medical group, accountable care organization), given consideration of:

a. Statistical reliability.

b. Ability to change the delivery system to high-performing organizations that focus

continually on improving value (not just on improving scores on a limited number of

process measures).

c. Possible unintended consequences.

2. Research into the feasibility (e.g., in terms of cost) and effectiveness of using measures of

patient experience (e.g., the CAHPSi Clinician and Group Survey) as important

components of public reporting and pay for performance measures for providers.

3. Research into how electronic medical records can be used to better measure quality.

i CAHPS is the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems family of surveys available from AHRQ

at https://cahps.ahrq.gov/.

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Analyses of interprovider/interorganizational processes for improving care

Most research on processes to date has focused on processes that can be used to improve care

within an organization—for example, within a hospital or a medical practice—with the goal of

learning what processes are effective in improving quality and/or controlling costs (see Appendix

B for examples of such processes). While this goal appears self-evidently important—and is

important—it may not be as important as it might seem. First, the effectiveness of a process to

improve care depends very heavily on the way the process is implemented and on the context

within which it is implemented.19,34

Since both implementation and context vary greatly across

organizations, the results of any particular study on the effectiveness of a process may not be

very generalizable.

Second, most attempts to improve care include multiple processes/components, making it

difficult to learn which components are most important and amplifying the problems with lack of

generalizability caused by variations in implementation and in context across organizations.

Third, even if it could be shown that a specific process is likely to be effective across a broad

range of organizational contexts, few organizations will actually adopt this process unless they

have a business case—that is, adequate incentives—for doing so. So it will be important to learn

what types of organizations, with what types of incentives, are likely to implement processes to

improve the quality of care they provide. Very few studies to date provide this kind of

information.

Although intraorganizational processes are of course worthy of study, much more research

should focus on critical interorganizational or interprovider processes, such as transitions of care

across settings, particularly with the aim of reducing unnecessary readmissions to hospitals.

Recently, there has been an increase in interest in this type of research, which I believe should

continue receiving high priority. More specifically, research should focus on:

1. Improving transitions in care, not just from inpatient to outpatient, or between nursing

home and hospital, but also from outpatient to inpatient, as well as referrals from

physician to physician. I suggest that one strong sign that a health care system is

functioning well is that there is frequent phone communication between physicians about

specific patients—including patients who wind up not actually being referred. Anecdotal

evidence suggests that these conversations have become less frequent in recent years in

the United States.

2. Processes aimed at reducing readmissions.

3. Resource sharing to support implementation of value-improving processes among small

practices (e.g., small practices sharing a nurse care manager for patients with serious

chronic illnesses).

AHRQ’S Recent ARRA Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Initiative

AHRQ has funded an impressively large and diverse body of delivery system research. It would

be a major task to try to adequately categorize the types of research funded, but overall I believe

it would be accurate to say that the foci of this research and the gaps in it are consistent with the

points made so far in this paper; i.e., it has focused more on evaluating processes of care, and

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particularly on intraorganizational processes, than on other components of the conceptual model

presented in this paper or on the inter-relationships among them.

In February 2010, AHRQ used ARRA funds to issue a Request for Application (RFA) for

Comparative Effectiveness Delivery System Evaluation Grants (R01), seeking proposals for

“rigorous comparative evaluations of alternative system designs, change strategies, and

interventions that have already been implemented in healthcare and are likely to improve quality

and other outcomes.” The Agency also used ARRA funds to issue an RFA for Comparative

Effectiveness Delivery System Demonstration Grants (R18) seeking proposals “from

organizations to conduct demonstrations of (1) broad strategies and/or specific interventions for

improving care by redesigning care delivery, or (2) strategies and interventions for improving

care by redesigning payment.”

Through these two RFAs, AHRQ funded six evaluation grants and four demonstration grants.

From the point of view of this paper, the grants selected for funding are encouraging: four of the

six evaluation grants and all four of the demonstration grants arguably fall within the list of key

areas suggested in this paper. The others focus on studying processes of care—such as care

coordination—and devote less attention to the organizational context or to other elements of the

conceptual model. The following classification of these grants in terms of the model in Figure 1

necessarily omits mention of many other, distinctive contributions of the studies’ research plans,

designs, and methods.

Evaluation grants

Dowd, et al., sought to determine the association between the Medicare Physician Quality

Reporting Initiative (PQRI) and the performance of physicians overall, as well as by race,

ethnicity, and sex of the patient. This grant can be characterized as focused on the effects of

incentives on outcomes; however, it will provide limited information about the effects of

incentives on physician organizations or the processes physician organizations use. Interviews to

be conducted with physicians and CMS managers may provide some information about these

things.

Swigonski, et al., sought to determine the extent to which child health outcomes are associated

with pediatric practices’ scores on the Medical Home Index (created specifically for pediatric

practices) and the National Committee for Quality Assurance Physician Practice Connections-

Patient Centered Medical Home index. This grant can be characterized as studying forms of

measurement that may have the ability to change the delivery system toward high-performing

organizations. In addition, because it will include information about practice characteristics, it

addresses the question of which types of medical groups perform better. It has the potential to

analyze relationships among practice structure, medical home processes used, and outcomes.

Malouin, et al., examined the effectiveness in improving outcomes of payment vs. facilitated

support interventions from health insurance plans to medical homes. This grant can be

characterized as studying the key area of comparing different types of incentive/assistance to

each other.

Fischer, et al., evaluated the comparative effectiveness of different Medicaid policies for

containing the cost of cardiovascular drugs. I have categorized this as addressing the key area of

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the effects of incentives/policies, although the grant’s lack of focus on organizational context

does not fit well with the emphasis of the key areas.

The other two evaluation grants funded focus primarily on processes. Gilmer, et. al., examined

use of a comprehensive care model, with particular emphasis on providing housing for patients

with chronic severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia. Smith, et. al., evaluated the

effectiveness of the Virginia Coordinated Care program within the traditional safety net delivery

system.

Demonstration grants

Rodriguez, et al., compared the effectiveness of office-based panel management to management

by community health workers. This was primarily a study of care processes but included

analyses of organizational characteristics, such as readiness to change and structural capabilities.

Williams, et al., compared the effectiveness of a new bundled payment method (primarily for

inpatient care) to current payment methods in California, an objective that fits directly with one

of the key areas recommended for study in this paper.

Holtrop, et al., compared the effectiveness of disease management done through primary care

practices to disease management done by health plans with careful attention to the organizational

context. This grant fits into a key area because it evaluated the effectiveness of a process—

disease management—when used by different types of organization; in addition, it used

formative evaluation.

Magill, et al., studied primary care redesign within a system that had already implemented many

medical home features. This project evaluated: (1) the effects of a newly created care

management program for patients with severe chronic illnesses and (2) new efforts to better

manage transitions from one care setting to another. This program can be characterized as,

among other things, focused on the recommended key area of care transitions. It also engaged in

a number of formative evaluation activities.

Conclusion

The discoveries of basic scientific and clinical research have no impact on patients’ health unless

they are used effectively by the health care delivery system. During the past two decades, there

has been a good deal of research focused on the U.S. health care delivery system; this research

has been funded almost entirely by AHRQ and foundations. This paper presents a simple

conceptual model for thinking about the delivery system in terms of individual organizations or

of relations among organizations. The paper argues that research has been heavily focused on

intraorganizational processes; these are important, but not enough attention has been paid to

interorganizational processes and to other components of the model—structure,

culture/leadership, and incentives. These other components strongly influence the processes that

are used and how effective these processes are. Most of AHRQ’s recent ARRA grants for

comparative effectiveness research include attention to these other components, though for the

most part the focus remains on processes.

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Although a method rather than an area of research, “formative evaluation” will be very important

in the types of research advocated in this paper.35

A formative evaluation component should be

an important part of many—probably most—research projects. To evaluate the findings of a

project and to draw practical lessons from it, it will be critical for policymakers and leaders of

provider organizations to learn what was actually done, what barriers arose, what were ways of

overcoming these barriers, how did participants think that the program being evaluated could be

improved, etc. This means that researchers should be prepared to use (and funders to fund)

mixed methods: quantitative analysis of primary and/or secondary data sources as well as

interviews and surveys.

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Appendix A: Priority Topics From Institute of Medicine Document

Priority topics from the IOM Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research report that fit the definition of delivery system research suggested in this paper

The IOM listed 100 priority topics, with the first quartile having highest priority within this list

of 100, and the fourth quartile lowest priority. The order of listing within a quartile does not

indicate priority within the quartile.

Of the 31 topics in the list below, 27 focus on processes for improving care to individuals or to

populations of patients; that is, they focus on the process category of the conceptual model

presented in this paper. Only four topics (in italics below) focus on other categories included in

the conceptual model.

Note: The text of the topics has been taken from the IOM document verbatim and has not been

edited. The report is available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12648, accessed

January 8, 2014.

First Quartile

1. Compare the effectiveness of comprehensive care coordination programs, such as the

medical home, and usual care in managing children and adults with severe chronic disease,

especially in populations with known health disparities.

2. Compare the effectiveness of interventions (e.g., community-based multi-level interventions,

simple health education, usual care) to reduce health disparities in cardiovascular disease,

diabetes, cancer, musculoskeletal diseases, and birth outcomes.

3. Compare the effectiveness of literacy-sensitive disease management programs and usual care

in reducing disparities in children and adults with low literacy and chronic disease (e.g., heart

disease).

Second Quartile

4. Compare the effectiveness of the co-location model (psychological and primary care

practitioners practicing together) and usual care (identification by primary care practitioner

and referral to community-based mental health services) in identifying and treating social-

emotional and developmental disorders in children ages 0-3.

5. Compare the effectiveness of diverse models of comprehensive support services for infants

and their families following discharge from a neonatal intensive care unit.

6. Compare the effectiveness of shared decision making and usual care on decision outcomes

(treatment choice, knowledge, treatment-preference concordance, and decisional conflict) in

children and adults with chronic disease such as stable angina and asthma.

7. Compare the effectiveness of strategies for enhancing patients’ adherence to medication

regimens.

8. Compare the effectiveness of patient decision support tools on informing diagnostic and

treatment decisions (e.g., treatment choice, knowledge acquisition, treatment-preference

concordance, decisional conflict) for elective surgical and nonsurgical procedures—

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especially in patients with limited English-language proficiency, limited education, hearing

or visual impairments, or mental health problems.

9. Compare the effectiveness (including resource utilization, workforce needs, net health care

expenditures, and requirements for large-scale deployment) of new remote patient

monitoring and management technologies (e.g., telemedicine, Internet, remote sensing) and

usual care in managing chronic disease, especially in rural settings.

10. Compare the effectiveness of diverse models of transition support services for adults with

complex health care needs (e.g., the elderly, homeless, mentally challenged) after hospital

discharge.

11. Compare the effectiveness of accountable care systems and usual care on costs, processes of

care, and outcomes for geographically defined populations of patients with one or more

chronic diseases.

12. Compare the effectiveness of coordinated care (supported by reimbursement innovations)

and usual care in long-term and end-of-life care of the elderly.

13. Compare the effectiveness of pharmacologic treatment and behavioral interventions in

managing major depressive disorders in adolescents and adults in diverse treatment settings.

14. Compare the effectiveness of an integrated approach (combining counseling, environmental

mitigation, chronic disease management, and legal assistance) with a non-integrated episodic

care model in managing asthma in children.

15. Compare the effectiveness of birthing care in freestanding birth centers and usual care of

childbearing women at low and moderate risk.

Third Quartile

16. Compare the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of conventional medical management of

type 2 diabetes in adolescents and adults, versus conventional therapy plus intensive

educational programs or programs incorporating support groups and educational resources.

17. Compare the effectiveness of alternative redesign strategies—using decision support

capabilities, electronic health records, and personal health records—for increasing health

professionals’ compliance with evidence-based guidelines and patients’ adherence to

guideline-based regimens for chronic disease care.

18. Compare the effectiveness of different quality improvement strategies in disease prevention,

acute care, chronic disease care, and rehabilitation services for diverse populations of

children and adults.

19. Compare the effectiveness of formulary management practices and usual practices in

controlling hospital expenditures for products other than drugs including medical devices

(surgical hemostatic products, radiocontrast, interventional cardiology devices, and others).

20. Compare the effectiveness of comprehensive, coordinated care and usual care on objective

measures of clinical status, patient-reported outcomes, and costs of care for people with

multiple sclerosis.

21. Compare the effectiveness of different strategies to engage and retain patients in care and to

delineate barriers to care, especially for members of populations that experience health

disparities.

Fourth Quartile

22. Compare the effectiveness of different disease management strategies in improving the

adherence to and value of pharmacologic treatments for the elderly.

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23. Compare the effectiveness of care coordination with and without clinical decision supports

(e.g., electronic health records) in producing good health outcomes in chronically ill patients,

including children with special health care needs.

24. Compare the effectiveness of coordinated, physician-led, interdisciplinary care provided in

the patient’s residence and usual care in managing advanced chronic disease in community-

dwelling patients with significant functional impairments.

25. Compare the effectiveness of diagnostic imaging performed by non-radiologists and

radiologists.

26. Compare the effectiveness of different disease management strategies for activating patients

with chronic disease.

27. Compare the effectiveness of different delivery models (e.g., home blood pressure monitors,

utilization of pharmacists or other allied health providers) for controlling hypertension,

especially in racial minorities.

28. Compare the effectiveness of hospital-based palliative care and usual care on patient-reported

outcomes and cost.

29. Compare the effectiveness of different treatment approaches (e.g., integrating mental health

care and primary care, improving consumer self-care, a combination of integration and self-

care) in avoiding early mortality and comorbidity among people with serious and persistent

mental illness.

30. Compare the effectiveness of traditional training of primary care physicians in primary care

mental health and co-location systems of primary care and mental health care on outcomes

including depression, anxiety, physical symptoms, physical disability, prescription substance

use, mental and physical function, satisfaction with the provider, and cost.

31. Compare the effectiveness of different treatment strategies (e.g., psychotherapy,

antidepressants, combination treatment with case management) for depression after

myocardial infarction on medication adherence, cardiovascular events, hospitalization, and

death.

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Appendix B: Examples of Some Components of the Conceptual Model in Figure 1

Examples of Delivery System Structures

Organizational structures (e.g., of a medical group, independent practice association [IPA],

hospital):

o Size.

o Specialty mix.

o Ownership (e.g., owned by physicians vs. owned by a hospital; for profit vs. not for

profit).

o Whether the organization is a network or a single entity (e.g., an IPA vs. a medical group,

or a physician-hospital organization vs. a hospital and its employed physicians).

Market structures:

o Market concentration vs. fragmentation (e.g., among hospitals, health insurance plans, or

physicians).

Examples of External Incentives

Payment methods from payors (primarily commercial health insurance plans, Medicare,

Medicaid), for example:

o Fee for service.

o Capitation (full or partial).

o Bundled payments.

o Episode-based payments.

o Pay for performance.

Public reporting of performance.

Does negotiating leverage provide benefits to organizations that have it, e.g.:

o Is negotiating leverage between health insurance plans and provider organizations

important (e.g., can larger and/or more prestigious medical groups and hospitals negotiate

higher payment rates)?

Regulation—e.g.:

o Antitrust laws.

o Stark law.

o Civil monetary penalties.

Examples of Processes

Processes aimed at discrete events, such as a surgical procedure or the generation of a

prescription, for example:

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o Decision support.

o Surgical checklists.

o Electronic prescribing.

o Disease-specific care pathways.

o Innovative approaches to hospital discharge.

Processes aimed at improving care of an organization’s population of patients, for example:

o Creation and use of registries of patients with chronic illnesses.

o Care coordination—e.g., use of nurse care managers for patients with chronic illnesses.

o Use of alternative providers—e.g., of pharmacists for hypertension management.

o Programs intended to increase colon cancer screening.

Internal incentives (within the provider organization), for example:

o Basic internal payment method.

o Bonuses (e.g., internal pay for performance).

o Internal “public reporting” of individual physician performance.

Use of clinical information technology to support the other processes used by the

organization, for example:

o Electronic medical records.

o Patient portals.

o Communication among providers.

Other quality improvement processes.

Examples of Outcomes

Quality of care.

Cost of care.

Patient experience and patient reported outcomes.

Impact on disparities (socioeconomic and racial/ethnic).

It will be most desirable to measure outcomes for an organization’s population of patients, for

organizations large enough so that reliable measurement can be made of things like ambulatory

sensitive admissions, readmissions, emergency department visits, and total cost of care per

patient (risk adjusted).

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Appendix C: “Long List” of Delivery System Research Areas

This list is structured to correspond to the conceptual model suggested in the paper. It is intended

to be illustrative and reasonably, but certainly not completely, comprehensive.

Each research area in the list can be studied in the context of: (1) a specific type of delivery

system organization; and/or (2) a specific disease or area of preventive care.

Specific types of delivery system organizations include (this list is not intended to be

comprehensive):

Medical groups.

Community health centers.

Hospitals.

Specialty hospitals.

Integrated delivery systems (physicians + hospital(s) health plan …).

Accountable care organizations.

Long-term care facilities.

Rehabilitation facilities.

Home health care agencies.

Retail clinics.

For each area, key questions are:

1. What are alternative forms of the thing in question (e.g., alternative medical group

structures, or alternative forms of nurse care management for patients with chronic

illness)?

2. What are the demographics of the alternative forms (i.e., What is the prevalence of each

alternative? Where are these alternatives located? How if at all is the prevalence

changing?)?

3. What are the factors (e.g., external incentives, regulation) that affect the prevalence of the

alternative forms?

4. What are the effects, intended and unintended, of alternative forms on the outcomes of

care?

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mal

l m

edic

al p

ract

ices

/gro

ups

chan

gin

g?

Does

it

mat

ter?

Do l

arge

med

ical

gro

ups

pro

vid

e h

igher

qu

alit

y/l

ow

er c

ost

car

e th

an

smal

l or

med

ium

-siz

ed m

edic

al g

roups?

Spec

ialt

y o

r st

aff

mix

D

o m

ult

ispec

ialt

y m

edic

al g

roups

pro

vid

e hig

her

qual

ity/l

ow

er c

ost

car

e th

an s

ingle

spec

ialt

y g

roups?

Are

new

lar

ge

mu

ltis

pec

ialt

y o

r si

ngle

spec

ialt

y m

edic

al g

roups

bei

ng f

orm

ed? W

hat

are

the

fact

ors

pro

moti

ng o

r im

ped

ing g

roup f

orm

atio

n?

Ow

ner

ship

Is

ph

ysi

cian

em

plo

ym

ent

by h

osp

ital

s in

crea

sin

g? D

o h

osp

ital

-em

plo

yed

ph

ysi

cian

s

pro

vid

er h

igher

qu

alit

y/l

ow

er c

ost

car

e th

an p

hysi

cian

-ow

ned

med

ical

pra

ctic

es?

Net

work

or

“sin

gle

enti

ty”

Do i

nte

gra

ted d

eliv

ery s

yst

ems

pro

vid

e hig

her

qual

ity/l

ow

er c

ost

car

e? D

o l

arge

med

ical

gro

ups

pro

vid

e h

igher

qu

alit

y/l

ow

er c

ost

car

e th

an i

ndep

enden

t pra

ctic

e

asso

ciat

ions

(IP

As)

?

Pat

ient-

cente

red m

edic

al h

om

e T

o w

hat

ex

tent

are

pra

ctic

es t

hat

hav

e co

nst

itu

ted t

hem

selv

es a

s pat

ient-

cen

tere

d

med

ical

hom

es c

onti

nuin

g t

o f

unct

ion a

s m

edic

al h

om

es v

s. a

ban

donin

g t

he

effo

rt?

What

are

the

fact

ors

that

infl

uen

ce t

his

?

Acc

ounta

ble

car

e org

aniz

atio

n

What

typ

es o

f org

aniz

atio

ns

are

const

ituti

ng t

hem

selv

es a

s ac

counta

ble

car

e

org

aniz

atio

ns?

How

does

the

qual

ity/c

ost

of

care

var

y a

mon

g t

he

org

aniz

atio

nal

types

?

Cu

ltu

re

Type

of

cult

ure

H

ow

can

org

aniz

atio

nal

cult

ure

be

mea

sure

d i

n h

ealt

h c

are

del

iver

y o

rgan

izat

ions?

What

are

the

dis

tinct

typ

es o

f org

aniz

atio

nal

cult

ure

and t

hei

r p

reval

ence

? D

o s

om

e

types

res

ult

in h

igher

qual

ity/l

ow

er c

ost

car

e? W

hat

are

the

exte

rnal

and i

nte

rnal

fac

tors

that

pro

mote

par

ticu

lar

types

of

org

aniz

atio

nal

cult

ure

?

Lea

der

ship

Type

of

lead

ersh

ip

Anal

ogous

qu

esti

ons

as f

or

cult

ure

.

Page 30: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

26

Res

earch

Are

a

Sam

ple

Res

earc

h Q

ues

tion

s

Exte

rnal

Ince

nti

ves

Pay

men

t m

ethods

from

pay

ors

A

re p

aym

ents

to m

edic

al h

om

es s

uff

icie

nt

to g

ive

pra

ctic

es a

“busi

nes

s ca

se”

for

inves

ting i

n b

ecom

ing a

med

ical

hom

e? W

hat

are

the

effe

cts

of

cap

itat

ion p

aym

ent

plu

s a

bonus

for

qual

ity o

n p

rovid

er o

rgan

izat

ion p

erfo

rman

ce c

om

par

ed t

o t

he

effe

cts

of

fee-

for-

serv

ice

paym

ent

wit

h b

onuse

s fo

r q

ual

ity a

nd f

or

cost

sav

ings?

What

are

unin

tended

conse

quen

ces

of

pay f

or

per

form

ance

pro

gra

ms?

How

can

P4P

pro

gra

ms

be

des

ign

ed t

o m

inim

ize

unin

tended

conse

quen

ces,

such

as

incr

easi

ng r

esou

rce

dis

par

itie

s bet

wee

n p

rovid

er o

rgan

izat

ions

loca

ted

in a

dvan

taged

vs.

dis

adv

anta

ged

soci

oec

onom

ic a

reas

?

Publi

c re

port

ing o

f p

erfo

rman

ce

What

are

the

rela

tive

effe

cts

of

pay f

or

per

form

ance

and p

ubli

c re

po

rtin

g o

n t

he

qual

ity

and c

ost

of

care

pro

vid

ed b

y d

iffe

rent

types

of

pro

vid

er o

rgan

izat

ion? A

re b

oth

nec

essa

ry? W

hat

are

the

fact

ors

pro

moti

ng o

r im

ped

ing t

he

use

of

publi

c re

port

ing

info

rmat

ion b

y p

atie

nts

and b

y p

hysi

cian

s?

Neg

oti

atin

g l

ever

age

Gai

nin

g i

ncr

ease

d n

egoti

atin

g l

ever

age

can r

esult

in h

igher

paym

ents

fro

m h

ealt

h p

lans

for

pro

vid

er o

rgan

izat

ions.

To w

hat

ex

tent

do a

ttem

pts

to g

ain i

ncr

ease

d l

ever

age

affe

ct

the

stru

cture

of

pro

vid

er o

rgan

izat

ions?

What

are

the

effe

cts

of

incr

ease

d p

rovid

er

neg

oti

atin

g l

ever

age

on t

he

qual

ity a

nd c

ost

of

hea

lth c

are?

Reg

ula

tion

H

ow

do v

ario

us

regula

tions

affe

ct t

he

stru

cture

of

ph

ysi

cian

-hosp

ital

rel

atio

nsh

ips?

Do

IPA

s an

d p

hysi

cian

-hosp

ital

org

aniz

atio

ns

that

are

cli

nic

ally

inte

gra

ted p

rovid

e hig

her

qual

ity/l

ow

er c

ost

car

e th

an t

hose

that

are

not?

Mea

sure

men

t is

sues

C

an t

he

qual

ity a

nd c

ost

of

care

be

reli

ably

mea

sure

d f

or

indiv

idual

pri

mar

y c

are

ph

ysi

cian

s? F

or

ph

ysi

cian

s in

oth

er s

pec

ialt

ies?

How

lar

ge

must

a p

rovid

er

org

aniz

atio

n b

e fo

r re

liab

le m

easu

rem

ent

to b

e m

ade

of

import

ant

mea

sure

s of

qual

ity

and c

ost

(e.

g., a

mbula

tory

-sen

siti

ve

adm

issi

ons

are

likel

y m

ore

im

port

ant

than

pro

cess

mea

sure

s su

ch a

s dia

bet

ic r

etin

al e

xam

s; t

ota

l co

st o

f ca

re i

s li

kel

y m

ore

im

port

ant

than

atte

mpts

at

mea

suri

ng e

ffic

iency)?

How

can

ele

ctro

nic

med

ical

rec

ord

s be

use

d t

o

com

ple

men

t or

subst

itute

for

adm

inis

trat

ive

clai

ms

dat

a to

mak

e it

poss

ible

to m

easu

re

import

ant

area

s o

f qual

ity? H

ow

can

pat

ient

exper

ience

surv

eys

be

stru

cture

d t

o o

bta

in

info

rmat

ion a

bout

import

ant

area

s of

qual

ity?

Page 31: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

27

Res

earch

Are

a

Sam

ple

Res

earc

h Q

ues

tion

s

Pro

cess

es

Care

of

indiv

iduals

, fo

r ex

am

ple

:

Dis

ease

-sp

ecif

ic c

are

pat

hw

ays

Surg

ical

chec

kli

sts

Use

of

alte

rnat

ive

pro

vid

ers,

e.g

.,

phar

mac

ists

for

hyp

erte

nsi

on

man

agem

ent

How

pre

val

ent

is t

he

use

of

the

pro

cess

? W

hat

are

its

eff

ects

on t

he

qu

alit

y/c

ost

of

care

? W

hat

fac

tors

enco

ura

ge

or

dis

cou

rage

the

use

of

the

pro

cess

? A

re t

her

e

unin

tended

and u

ndes

irab

le c

onse

quen

ces

of

the

pro

cess

?

Innov

ativ

e ap

pro

ach

es t

o h

osp

ital

dis

char

ge

To w

hat

ex

tent

can d

isch

arge

pro

gra

ms

op

erat

ed b

y h

osp

ital

s, w

ithout

involv

emen

t of

outp

atie

nt

ph

ysi

cian

s, r

educe

rea

dm

issi

on r

ates

?

Pro

cess

es i

nte

nded

to i

mpro

ve

pat

ient

safe

ty—

for

exam

ple

, to

min

imiz

e fa

lls

in

the

hosp

ital

How

pre

val

ent

is t

he

use

of

the

pro

cess

? W

hat

are

its

eff

ects

on t

he

qu

alit

y/c

ost

of

care

? W

hat

fac

tors

enco

ura

ge

or

dis

cou

rage

the

use

of

the

pro

cess

? A

re t

her

e

unin

tended

and u

ndes

irab

le c

onse

quen

ces

of

the

pro

cess

?

Care

of

an o

rganiz

ati

on’s

popula

tion o

f

pati

ents

, fo

r ex

am

ple

:

Chro

nic

dis

ease

reg

istr

ies

Nurs

e ca

re m

anag

ers

for

pat

ien

ts

wit

h s

ever

e ch

ronic

ill

nes

s

Pro

gra

ms

inte

nded

to i

ncr

ease

colo

n c

ance

r sc

reen

ing

Use

of

mobil

e dev

ices

fo

r pat

ient

monit

ori

ng

How

pre

val

ent

is t

he

use

of

the

pro

cess

? W

hat

are

its

eff

ects

on t

he

qu

alit

y/c

ost

of

care

? W

hat

fac

tors

enco

ura

ge

or

dis

cou

rage

the

use

of

the

pro

cess

?

Use

of

clin

ical

info

rmati

on t

echnolo

gy,

for

exam

ple

:

Ele

ctro

nic

med

ical

rec

ord

s

Dec

isio

n s

upport

Ele

ctro

nic

pre

scri

bin

g

Com

munic

atio

n a

mong p

rovid

ers

Com

munic

atio

n w

ith p

atie

nts

What

are

the

effe

cts

of

the

pro

cess

on t

he

qual

ity/c

ost

of

care

? W

hat

fac

tors

enco

ura

ge

or

dis

coura

ge

the

use

of

the

pro

cess

? W

hat

, if

an

y,

unin

tended

conse

quen

ces

of

the

pro

cess

are

occ

urr

ing? H

ow

mig

ht

thes

e be

mit

igat

ed?

Page 32: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

28

Res

earch

Are

a

Sam

ple

Res

earc

h Q

ues

tion

s

Inte

rnal

ince

nti

ves

(wit

hin

the

pro

vider

org

aniz

ati

on),

for

exam

ple

:

Bas

e in

tern

al p

aym

ent

met

hod

Bonuse

s (i

nte

rnal

pay f

or

per

form

ance

)

What

ex

tern

al f

acto

rs (

e.g., p

aym

ent

met

hods

fro

m p

ayors

) dri

ve

org

aniz

atio

ns’

inte

rnal

ince

nti

ves

? W

hat

are

the

effe

cts

of

dif

fere

nt

inte

rnal

ince

nti

ves

on t

he

qual

ity/c

ost

of

care

?

Inte

rnal

“publi

c” r

epo

rtin

g o

f

indiv

idual

per

form

ance

to p

eers

Is i

nte

rnal

rep

ort

ing o

f in

div

idual

s’ p

erfo

rman

ce t

o p

eers

suff

icie

nt

to i

mpro

ve

per

form

ance

, o

r is

inte

rnal

pay f

or

per

form

ance

nee

ded

as

wel

l? W

hat

are

unin

tended

conse

quen

ces

of

inte

rnal

pay

for

per

form

ance

and i

nte

rnal

rep

ort

ing o

f in

div

idual

s’

per

form

ance

?

Pati

ent

En

gagem

ent

Types

of

pat

ient

engag

emen

t H

ow

can

types

of

pat

ient

engag

emen

t b

e ca

tego

rize

d? W

hat

are

the

effe

cts

of

dif

fere

nt

types

of

pat

ient

engag

emen

t on t

he

qual

ity/c

ost

s o

f ca

re?

Fac

tors

pro

moti

ng p

atie

nt

engag

emen

t W

hat

org

aniz

atio

nal

str

uct

ura

l, c

ult

ura

l, a

nd p

roce

ss f

acto

rs p

rom

ote

pat

ient

engag

emen

t?

Inte

r-R

elati

on

ship

s A

mon

g K

ey E

lem

ents

of

the

Con

cep

tual

Mod

el

H

ow

do t

he

par

ts o

f th

e co

nce

ptu

al m

odel

inte

ract

? F

or

exam

ple

, w

hat

org

aniz

atio

nal

stru

cture

s an

d c

ult

ure

s ar

e li

kel

y t

o r

esult

in t

he

use

of

bet

ter

pro

cess

es f

or

pro

vid

ing

care

and t

o r

esult

in b

ette

r outc

om

es? H

ow

do

ex

tern

al i

nce

nti

ves

aff

ect

org

aniz

atio

nal

stru

cture

s, c

ult

ure

s, a

nd p

roce

sses

?

Page 33: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

29

Ap

pe

nd

ix D

: F

ou

r S

ug

ge

ste

d K

ey A

rea

s f

or

De

live

ry S

ys

tem

Re

se

arc

h (

Wit

h Illu

str

ati

ve

Stu

die

s)

Note

: T

he

table

incl

udes

ref

eren

ces

to e

mpir

ical

art

icle

s or

revie

ws

of

empir

ical

art

icle

s an

d i

s in

tend

ed t

o p

rese

nt

exam

ple

s ra

ther

than

a c

om

pre

hen

sive

list

of

publi

cati

ons.

If

no r

efer

ence

s ar

e giv

en,

I h

ave

not

bee

n a

ble

to f

ind u

sefu

l em

pir

ical

art

icle

s fo

r th

at

topic

. H

ow

ever

, ev

en w

hen

ref

eren

ces

are

giv

en, th

e dat

a av

aila

ble

on t

he

topic

are

a ar

e in

all

cas

es f

ar f

rom

suff

icie

nt.

AH

RQ

’s

rece

nt

Am

eric

an R

eco

ver

y a

nd R

einv

estm

ent

Act

(A

RR

A)

Com

par

ativ

e E

ffec

tiven

ess

Res

earc

h D

eliv

ery S

yst

em R

esea

rch f

unded

pro

posa

ls a

re l

iste

d i

n i

tali

cs i

n t

he

“Res

earc

h S

tudie

s/A

RR

A G

rants

” co

lum

n.

The

gra

nte

e’s

nam

e li

nks

to a

des

crip

tio

n o

f th

e

rese

arch

.

Res

earch

Are

a

Res

earch

Stu

die

s/A

RR

A G

ran

ts

1. A

naly

ses

of

the

Dem

ogra

ph

ics

of

the

Del

iver

y S

yst

em

an

d R

elati

on

ship

s A

mon

g t

he

Co

mp

on

ents

of

the

Mod

el

Del

iver

y s

yst

em

dem

og

rap

hic

s, f

or

exam

ple

:

Per

centa

ge

of

ph

ysi

cian

s in

gro

ups

of

var

ious

size

s an

d s

pec

ialt

y t

ypes

Cunnin

gham

R. P

rofe

ssio

nal

ism

rec

onsi

der

ed:

physi

cian

paym

ent

in a

sm

all-

pra

ctic

e

envir

onm

ent.

Hea

lth A

ff (

Mil

lwood)

2004;2

3(6

):36

-47.

Hin

g E

, C

her

ry D

K, W

oodw

ell

DA

. N

atio

nal

Am

bula

tory

Med

ical

Car

e S

urv

ey:

20

04

sum

mar

y. A

dv D

ata

200

6 J

un 2

3;3

74:1

-33. A

vai

lab

le a

t:

htt

p:/

/ww

w.c

dc.

gov/n

chs/

dat

a/ad

/ad374.p

df.

Acc

esse

d J

anuar

y 9

, 2014.

Per

centa

ge

of

ph

ysi

cian

s, b

y s

pec

ialt

y,

emplo

yed

by h

osp

ital

s

Cas

alin

o L

P, N

ovem

ber

EA

, B

eren

son R

A,

et a

l. H

osp

ital

-ph

ysi

cian

rel

atio

ns:

tw

o

trac

ks

and t

he

dec

line

of

the

volu

nta

ry m

edic

al s

taff

model

. H

ealt

h A

ff (

Mil

lwood)

2008;2

7(5

):1305

-14.

Per

centa

ge

of

ph

ysi

cian

s in

pat

ient-

cente

red m

edic

al h

om

e p

ract

ices

Rit

tenhouse

DR

, C

asal

ino L

P, G

illi

es R

R,

et a

l. M

easu

rin

g t

he

med

ical

hom

e

infr

astr

uct

ure

in l

arge

med

ical

gro

ups.

Hea

lth A

ff (

Mil

lwood)

2008;2

7(5

):1246

-58.

Per

centa

ge

of

ph

ysi

cian

s in

org

aniz

atio

ns

that

could

funct

ion a

s ac

counta

ble

car

e

org

aniz

atio

ns

Num

ber

of

inte

gra

ted d

eliv

ery s

yst

ems

and

thei

r ch

arac

teri

stic

s

Gold

sta

ndar

d d

atab

ase

of

U.S

. ph

ysi

cian

org

aniz

atio

ns

Page 34: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

30

Res

earch

Are

a

Res

earch

Stu

die

s/A

RR

A G

ran

ts

An

aly

ses

of

the

Dem

og

rap

hic

s of

the

Del

iver

y S

yst

em

an

d R

elati

on

ship

s A

mon

g t

he

Co

mp

on

en

ts o

f th

e M

od

el

Ch

an

ge

over

tim

e in

del

iver

y s

yst

em

dem

ogra

ph

ics,

esp

ecia

lly i

n r

elati

on

to c

han

ges

in

exte

rnal

ince

nti

ves

, fo

r ex

am

ple

:

Is t

he

per

centa

ge

of

ph

ysi

cian

s em

plo

yed

by h

osp

ital

s ch

angin

g? I

f so

, w

hy?

Cas

alin

o L

P, N

ovem

ber

EA

, B

eren

son R

A,

et a

l. H

osp

ital

-ph

ysi

cian

rel

atio

ns:

tw

o

trac

ks

and t

he

dec

line

of

the

volu

nta

ry m

edic

al s

taff

mod

el.

Hea

lth A

ff (

Mil

lwood)

2008;2

7(5

):1305

-14.

Isaa

cs S

L, Je

llin

ek P

S, R

ay W

L. T

he

ind

epen

den

t ph

ysi

cian

— g

oin

g,

goin

g…

New

Engl

J M

ed 2

009;3

60(7

):655

-7.

Are

ph

ysi

cian

s m

ore

lik

ely t

o b

e em

plo

yed

by h

osp

ital

s (a

nd/o

r b

y l

arge

med

ical

gro

ups)

in a

reas

wher

e p

ay f

or

per

form

ance

(P4P

) is

pre

val

ent?

Str

uct

ure

-pro

cess

-ou

tcom

e re

lati

on

ship

s am

on

g c

om

pon

ents

of

the

con

cep

tual

mod

el f

or

dif

fere

nt

form

s of

org

an

iza

tion

, fo

r

exa

mp

le:

Whic

h t

yp

es o

f m

edic

al g

roup

s p

erfo

rm

bet

ter?

Solb

erg L

I, A

sche

SE

, P

awls

on L

G,

et a

l. P

ract

ice

syst

ems

are

asso

ciat

ed w

ith h

igh

-

qual

ity c

are

for

dia

bet

es.

Am

J M

anag

Car

e 2008;1

4(2

):85

-92.

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Sw

igonsk

i

Whic

h t

yp

es o

f org

aniz

atio

ns

per

form

bet

ter:

indep

enden

t p

ract

ice

asso

ciat

ions

(IP

As)

vs.

med

ical

gro

up

s of

var

ious

size

s

vs.

inte

gra

ted d

eliv

ery s

yst

ems

vs.

acco

unta

ble

car

e org

aniz

atio

ns?

Rit

tenhouse

DR

, C

asal

ino L

P, G

illi

es R

R,

et a

l. M

easu

rin

g t

he

med

ical

hom

e

infr

astr

uct

ure

in l

arge

med

ical

gro

ups.

Hea

lth A

ff (

Mil

lwood)

2008;2

7(5

):1246

-58.

Fri

edber

g M

W, C

olt

in K

L, P

ears

on S

D, et

al.

Do

es a

ffil

iati

on o

f ph

ysi

cian

gro

ups

wit

h

one

anoth

er p

roduce

hig

her

qual

ity p

rim

ary c

are?

J G

en I

nte

rn M

ed 2

007;2

2(1

0):

1385

-

92.

Meh

rotr

a A

, E

pst

ein A

M, R

ose

nth

al M

B. D

o s

elf-

iden

tifi

ed i

nte

gra

ted m

edic

al g

roups

pro

vid

e hig

her

qual

ity m

edic

al c

are

than

sel

f-id

enti

fied

IP

As?

Ann I

nte

rn M

ed

2006;1

45(1

1):

826

-33.

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31

Cas

alin

o L

, G

illi

es R

R, S

hort

ell

SM

, et

al.

Ex

tern

al i

nce

nti

ves

, in

form

atio

n

tech

nolo

gy,

and o

rgan

ized

pro

cess

es t

o i

mpro

ve

hea

lth c

are

qual

ity f

or

pat

ients

wit

h

chro

nic

dis

ease

s. J

AM

A 2

003;2

89(4

):434

-41.

Ker

r E

A, G

erzo

ff R

B, K

rein

SL

, et

al.

Dia

bet

es q

ual

ity c

are

in t

he

Vet

eran

s A

ffai

rs

hea

lth c

are

syst

em a

nd c

om

mer

cial

man

aged

car

e: t

he

TR

IAD

stu

dy.

Ann I

nte

rn M

ed

2004;1

41(4

):316

-8.

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Holt

rop

What

is

the

rela

tionsh

ip a

mong s

truct

ure

-

pro

cess

-outc

om

es?

Fri

edber

g M

W, C

olt

in K

L, S

afra

n D

G,

et a

l. A

sso

ciat

ion b

etw

een s

tru

ctura

l

capab

ilit

ies

of

pri

mar

y c

are

pra

ctic

es a

nd p

erfo

rman

ce o

n s

elec

ted q

ual

ity m

easu

res.

Ann I

nte

rn M

ed 2

009;1

51

(7):

456-6

3.

Hea

rld L

R, A

lex

ander

JA

, F

rase

r I,

et

al. R

evie

w:

how

do h

osp

ital

org

aniz

atio

nal

stru

cture

and p

roce

sses

aff

ect

qu

alit

y o

f ca

re? A

cri

tica

l re

vie

w o

f re

sear

ch m

ethods.

Med

Car

e R

es R

ev 2

008;6

5(3

):259

-99.

Sto

lzm

ann K

L, M

eter

ko M

, S

hw

artz

M, et

al.

Acc

ounti

ng f

or

var

iati

on i

n t

echnic

al

qual

ity a

nd p

atie

nt

sati

sfac

tio

n:

the

contr

ibuti

on o

f pat

ient,

pro

vid

er, te

am,

and m

edic

al

cente

r. M

ed C

are

2010;4

8(8

):678

-82.

Lan

don B

E,

Norm

and S

LT

, M

eara

E,

et a

l. T

he

rela

tionsh

ip b

etw

een m

edic

al p

ract

ice

char

acte

rist

ics

and q

ual

ity o

f ca

re f

or

card

iov

ascu

lar

dis

ease

. M

ed C

are

Res

Rev

2008;6

5(2

):167

-86.

Dam

ber

g C

L, S

hort

ell

SM

, R

aube

K, et

al.

Rel

atio

nsh

ip b

etw

een q

ual

ity i

mpro

vem

ent

pro

cess

es a

nd c

linic

al p

erfo

rman

ce.

Am

J M

anag

Car

e 2010;1

6(8

):601

-6.

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Sw

igonsk

i

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32

Do o

rgan

izat

ions

that

hav

e m

ore

ex

tern

al

ince

nti

ves

to i

mpro

ve

per

form

ance

use

more

pro

cess

es t

o d

o s

o, an

d d

o t

hey

actu

ally

per

form

bet

ter?

Cas

alin

o L

, G

illi

es R

R, S

hort

ell

SM

, et

al.

Ex

tern

al i

nce

nti

ves

, in

form

atio

n

tech

nolo

gy,

and o

rgan

ized

pro

cess

es t

o i

mpro

ve

hea

lth c

are

qual

ity f

or

pat

ients

wit

h

chro

nic

dis

ease

s. J

AM

A 2

003;2

89(4

):434

-41.

Short

ell

SM

, G

illi

es R

, S

iddiq

ue

J, e

t al

. Im

pro

vin

g c

hro

nic

ill

nes

s ca

re:

a lo

ngit

udin

al

stud

y o

f la

rge

ph

ysi

cian

org

aniz

atio

ns.

Med

Car

e 2009;4

7(9

):932

-9.

Conra

d D

A, P

erry

L. Q

ual

ity-b

ased

fin

anci

al i

nce

nti

ves

in h

ealt

h c

are:

can

we

impro

ve

qual

ity b

y p

ayin

g f

or

it? A

nnu R

ev P

ubli

c H

ealt

h 2

009;3

0:3

57-7

1.

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Dow

d (

only

fo

r in

div

idual

ph

ysi

cian

s)

Bri

ng t

heo

reti

cal

con

cep

ts, re

search

met

hod

s, a

nd

su

bst

an

tive

fin

din

gs

from

fie

lds

ou

tsid

e h

ealt

h s

ervic

e res

earch

to t

he

stu

dy o

f th

e d

eliv

ery s

yst

em, fo

r ex

am

ple

, k

now

led

ge

that

has

bee

n g

ain

ed i

n o

ther

fie

lds

ab

ou

t org

an

izati

on

al

cult

ure

, ab

ou

t

lead

ersh

ip, an

d a

bou

t ch

an

ge

wit

hin

org

an

izati

on

s.

Lea

der

ship

Cult

ure

Chan

ge

wit

hin

org

aniz

atio

ns

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Rodri

guez

2.

How

Ca

n I

nce

nti

ves

an

d P

ub

lic

an

d P

rivate

Poli

cies

Be

Str

uct

ure

d T

o I

nd

uce

Ch

an

ge

in t

he

Dem

og

rap

hy o

f D

eliv

ery

Syst

em

Org

an

izati

on

s (T

ow

ard

th

e T

yp

es o

f O

rgan

izati

on

s T

hat

Res

earc

h I

nd

icate

s P

rovid

e B

ette

r C

are

) an

d T

o I

nd

uce

Th

ese

Org

an

izati

on

s T

o C

on

tin

uall

y T

ry T

o I

mp

rove

the

Valu

e of

the

Care

Th

ey P

rov

ide?

Com

par

e th

e ef

fect

s of

dif

fere

nt

paym

ent

met

hods—

not

only

on t

he

qual

ity a

nd

cost

s

of

care

, but

also

on t

he

dem

ogra

ph

y o

f th

e

del

iver

y s

yst

em a

nd o

n t

he

exte

nt

of

org

aniz

atio

ns’

eff

ort

s to

im

pro

ve

care

, fo

r

exam

ple

:

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Fis

cher

Cap

itat

ion p

lus

publi

c re

port

ing

and/o

r qual

ity b

onuse

s

Page 37: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

33

Dia

gnosi

s re

late

d g

roups

plu

s

“shar

ed s

avin

gs”

plu

s q

ual

ity

bon

use

s

Bundle

d p

aym

ent

for

serv

ices

that

are

pri

mar

ily i

npat

ient

Com

mit

tee

on R

esea

rch.

Bundle

d p

aym

ent:

AH

A r

esea

rch s

ynth

esis

rep

ort

. C

hic

ago,

IL:

Am

eric

an H

osp

ital

Ass

oci

atio

n;

2010.

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Wil

liam

s

Bundle

d p

aym

ent

for

serv

ices

that

are

pri

mar

ily o

utp

atie

nt

Det

erm

ine

wh

eth

er i

t is

fea

sib

le a

nd

des

irab

le t

o p

rovid

e in

cen

tives

at

the

ind

ivid

ual

ph

ysi

cian

lev

el, or

wh

eth

er t

hes

e

ince

nti

ves

sh

ou

ld b

e giv

en a

t th

e le

vel

of

the

provid

er o

rgan

izati

on

Com

par

e th

e ef

fect

iven

ess

of

P4P

vs.

publi

c re

po

rtin

g v

s. i

mpro

vem

ent

coll

abora

tiv

es w

ith

out

P4P

or

publi

c

report

ing v

s. u

sual

car

e

Lin

den

auer

PK

, R

emus

D, R

om

an S

, et

al.

Pu

bli

c re

port

ing a

nd p

ay f

or

per

form

ance

in

hosp

ital

qual

ity i

mpro

vem

ent.

New

En

gl

J M

ed 2

007;3

56(5

):486

-96.

AR

RA

Gra

nt:

Dow

d;

Malo

uin

Incl

ud

e in

qu

iry i

nto

un

inte

nd

ed c

on

seq

uen

ces

of

ince

nti

ves

, fo

r ex

am

ple

, d

o P

4P

an

d/o

r p

ub

lic

rep

ort

ing l

ead

to:

Incr

ease

d r

esourc

e dis

par

itie

s bet

wee

n

hosp

ital

s an

d m

edic

al g

roups

in r

ich a

nd

poor

area

s

Wer

ner

RM

, G

old

man

LE

, D

udle

y R

A. C

om

par

ison o

f ch

ange

in q

ual

ity o

f ca

re

bet

wee

n s

afet

y-n

et a

nd n

on

-saf

ety-n

et h

osp

ital

s. J

AM

A 2

008;2

99(1

8):

218

0-7

.

Blu

stei

n J

, B

ord

en W

B,

Val

enti

ne

M. H

osp

ital

per

form

ance

, th

e lo

cal

econ

om

y, an

d

the

loca

l w

ork

forc

e: f

indin

gs

from

a U

.S.

nat

ional

longit

udin

al s

tud

y. P

LoS

Med

icin

e

2010 J

une;

7(6

): e

1000297.

Publi

shed

onli

ne

2010 J

une

29.

doi:

10.1

371/j

ourn

al.p

med

.1000297

.

Dora

n T

, F

ull

wood C

, K

onto

npan

teli

s E

, et

al.

Eff

ect

of

finan

cial

ince

nti

ves

on

ineq

ual

itie

s in

the

del

iver

y o

f p

rim

ary c

linic

al c

are

in e

ngla

nd:

anal

ysi

s of

clin

ical

acti

vit

y i

ndic

ators

for

the

qual

ity a

nd o

utc

om

es f

ram

ework

. L

ance

t

2008;3

72(9

640):

728

-36.

“Cro

wdin

g o

ut”

of

import

ant

unm

easu

red

qual

ity b

y m

easu

red q

ual

ity

Cam

pbel

l S

M, R

eeves

D, K

onto

npan

teli

s E

, et

al.

Eff

ects

of

pay f

or

per

form

ance

on

the

qual

ity o

f p

rim

ary c

are

in E

ngla

nd.

New

En

gl

J M

ed 2

009;3

61(4

):368

-78.

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34

Avoid

ing o

f hig

h-r

isk p

atie

nts

by p

rovid

er

org

aniz

atio

ns

Wer

ner

RM

, A

sch D

A, P

ols

ky D

. R

acia

l pro

fili

ng:

the

unin

tended

conse

qu

ence

s of

coro

nar

y a

rter

y b

ypas

s gra

ft r

eport

car

ds.

Cir

cula

tion

2005;1

11(1

0):

1257

-63.

Dora

n T

, F

ull

wood C

, R

eeves

D,

et a

l. E

xcl

usi

on o

f pat

ients

fro

m p

ay-f

or-

per

form

ance

targ

ets

by E

ngli

sh p

hysi

cian

s. N

ew E

ngl

J M

ed 2

008;3

59(3

):274

-84.

Poss

ibly

undes

irab

le c

han

ges

in t

he

dem

ogra

ph

y o

f p

rovid

er o

rgan

izat

ions

(e.g

.,

dis

appea

rance

of

smal

l pra

ctic

es)

See

k t

o l

earn

more

ab

ou

t th

e ef

fect

s of

regu

lati

on

s (e

.g., a

nti

tru

st e

nfo

rcem

ent

again

st p

hysi

cian

s, h

osp

itals

, an

d h

ealt

h p

lan

s)

on

str

uct

ure

, p

roces

s, a

nd

ou

tcom

es i

n t

he

del

iver

y s

yst

em

What

are

th

e ef

fect

s of

the

Fed

eral

Tra

de

Com

mis

sion

anti

trust

guid

elin

es f

or

ph

ysi

cian

s on t

he

org

aniz

atio

n o

f ph

ysi

cian

pra

ctic

e an

d o

n p

hysi

cian

-hosp

ital

rela

tio

ns?

3. M

easu

rem

ent

of

Per

form

an

ce

Care

ful

thin

kin

g a

nd

res

earc

h a

bou

t w

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mea

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s of

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ort

an

t area

s of

valu

e (q

uali

ty a

nd

cost

) ca

n e

ffec

tivel

y b

e u

sed

,

giv

en c

on

sid

erati

on

s of:

Sta

tist

ical

rel

iabil

ity

Adam

s JL

, M

ehro

tra

A,

Thom

as J

W,

et a

l. P

hysi

cian

cost

pro

fili

ng -

rel

iabil

ity a

nd

risk

of

mis

clas

sifi

cati

on. N

ew E

ngl

J M

ed 2

010;3

62:1

014

-21.

Nyw

eide

DJ,

Wee

ks

WB

, G

ott

lieb

DJ,

et

al. R

elat

ionsh

ip o

f pri

mar

y c

are

ph

ysi

cian

’s

pat

ient

case

load

wit

h m

easu

rem

ent

of

qu

alit

y a

nd c

ost

per

form

ance

. JA

MA

2009;3

02(2

2):

2444

-50.

Abil

ity t

o c

han

ge

the

del

iver

y

syst

em t

o h

igh

-per

form

ing

org

aniz

atio

ns

that

focu

s co

nti

nual

ly

on i

mpro

vin

g v

alue

(not

just

on

impro

vin

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core

s on a

lim

ited

num

ber

of

pro

cess

mea

sure

s)

AR

RA

GR

AN

T:

Sw

igonsk

i

Page 39: Identifying Key Areas for Delivery System Research...incentives given to provider organizations by payors and on how these incentives affect organizations’ structure, their care

35

Poss

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unin

tended

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Res

earc

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usi

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exper

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stim

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val

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A g

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are

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how

ele

ctro

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reco

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can b

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d t

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ette

r m

easu

re

qual

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4. A

naly

ses

of

Inte

rpro

vid

er/I

nte

rorg

an

izati

on

al

Pro

cess

es f

or

Imp

rov

ing C

are

Impro

vin

g t

ransi

tions

in c

are,

not

just

fro

m

inpat

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to o

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nt,

or

bet

wee

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urs

ing

hom

e an

d h

osp

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also

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m o

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and r

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to

ph

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AR

RA

GR

AN

T:

Magil

l

Pro

cess

es a

imed

at

reduci

ng r

eadm

issi

ons

Mor

V, B

esdin

e R

W. P

oli

cy o

pti

ons

to i

mpro

ve

dis

char

ge

pla

nnin

g a

nd r

educe

rehosp

ital

izat

ion. JA

MA

2011;3

05(3

):302

-3.

Res

ourc

e sh

arin

g t

o s

upport

imple

men

tati

on o

f val

ue-

impro

vin

g

pro

cess

es a

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l pra

ctic

es