icrat tutorial - uas challenges and opportunities in civil ......5/26/2010 5 • wide variety of uas...

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U d Ai ft S t (UAS)Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Challenges and Opportunities

in Civil Airspace

Andrew Lacher – UAS Integration Lead

Case Number: 10-2265© 2010 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

May 2010

Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this paper are those of authors and The MITRE Corporation and should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation. Case Number 10-2265

• What is an UAS?

• UAS Applications

Outline

• UAS Applications

• How are UAS different?Break

• Airspace Integration ChallengesBreak

• Research Opportunities


Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited2

• Research Opportunities

2

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Unmanned Aircraft SystemsUnmanned Aircraft Systems


NASA Photo

What is anUnmanned Aircraft System (UAS)?

Beyond Line of SightAircraft

Line of Sight

G d C t l

CommunicationsExploitation

andUsers

Launch & Recovery



Ground Control System (GCS)

Also called: Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Drone, Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), Uninhabited Aircraft, Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle Images: US Military Services

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Why are these aircraft different?


www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/media/Gallery/UAS.htm

5

RQ-4



Photos: US Military

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US Department of DefenseUAS Groups

UAS Category

Maximum Weight (lbs)

Ops Alt (ft)

Speed (KIAS)

Current/Future Representative UAS

WASP III, FCS Class I, TACMAV RQ 14A/B BUSTER

•Hand LaunchedRaven

Group 1 0-20 <1200 AGL

<250

TACMAV, RQ-14A/B, BUSTER, BATCAM, RQ-11B/C, FPASS, RQ-16A, Pointer, Aqua/Terra Puma

Group 2 21-55 <3500 AGLAECV, VCUAS, ScanEagle, Silver Fox, Aerosonde

Group 3 <1320 RQ-7B, RQ-15, STUAS, XPV-1, XPV-2

•Short Duration (<1 hr)•Mostly Line-of-sight (LOS)•Auto flight stabilized

•Unique Launch & Recovery systems•Several Hours 1 day•Beyond LOS•Waypoint-to-waypoint•Auto Recovery

•Unique Launch systems•Runway Landing•Several Hours

Raven

ScanEagle

T-Hawk

Shadow



< FL180

XPV 2

Group 4

>1320 n/a

MQ-5B, MQ-8B, MQ-1A/B/C, A-160, RQ-8B

Group 5 ≥ FL180 MQ-9A, RQ-4, RQ-4N, Global Observer, N-UCAS

•Sized like a manned aircraft•Includes turbo jets•Long Endurance•Larger Payloads

•Beyond LOS

•Sized like a manned aircraft•USAF: Remote Split Ops•Long Endurance - >12 hrs•Autonomy varies

Predator/Warrior Firescout

Global Hawk / BAMS Reaper/Pred ‘B’

Images: US Military Services

Predator Remote Split Operations

Ku Satellite

Nellis AFB In Theater

PPSL

GCS

LOSOnly

Fiber Optics



Mission Control Element

Ops Ctr

y

Launch & Recovery Element

Predator VideoNetwork

Image courtesy the 57th Operations Group

PPSL – Predator Primary Satellite LinkLOS – Line of SiteGCS – Ground Control Station

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• Wide variety of UAS

– Size, Performance, Mission, Degree of Autonomy

Some Observations

• All UAS are not the same we can’t think about them as a single group no one size fits all solution

• “Unmanned” is a misnomer

– Human operators are directly involved – e.g., remote pilots

– In some cases in large numbers

• UAS are not necessarily cheaper to operate than manned



• UAS are not necessarily cheaper to operate than manned

• Will continue to have challenges with human factors

UAS Applications


Image: US Navy

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Historical Retrospective



FAA Video

• Organizations operating or planning to operate UAS in the CONUS– DoD: USN, USA, USAF, USMC, SOCOM– DHS: CBP Air & Marine, CBP Border Patrol, USCG

The Operational Need: Civil Airspace Access

Main

, ,– NASA/NOAA/USDA/Academic– UAS Manufacturers – Law Enforcement / Public Safety– Commercial (starting with small UAS)

• UAS Missions (public interest)– Military Training

• Pilot Training (take-offs, landings)• Coordination with Ground Forces

Military/Intelligence Operations



– Military/Intelligence Operations– Border Patrol / Homeland Security Surveillance– Emergency / Disaster Response– Law Enforcement / First Responders/Security– Scientific Research– System Development

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D t i l d ll

UAS are Transforming Today’s Military

Dull, Dangerous, & Dirty Missions

Applications• Battlespace Awareness

– Bomb Damage Assessment– Reconnaissance

Signals Intelligence Does not include small hand-launched UAS

(e.g., Raven)

– Signals Intelligence– Chem/Bio Reconnaissance– Counter Deception– Digital Mapping– Covert Sensor Insertion

• Command and Control– Battle Management– Communications Relay

• Force Application– Precision Targeting– Weaponization/Strike

• Force Protection– Integrated Base Defense

collaboration



collaboration– Convoy Over watch

Dallas Brooks, OUSD/AT&L, Unmanned Warfare, FAA UAS Conference, San Diego, CA February 25, 2010

StatusCurrent UAS ActivitiesFuture UAS Activities

Grand Forks AFB

Ft DrumCamp Ripley

Ft Lewis

Arlington, OR

S / WR GH / P

SSEPortland

W / R

McChord (W,R)W / R

Limestone HillsW / R

Mt WashingtonW / R

UAS Operational ActivitiesCurrent and Projected

In 2009, the JUAS COE reported that by 2013

• Order-of-magnitude increase in locations

• Operations

In 2009, the JUAS COE reported that by 2013

• Order-of-magnitude increase in locations

• Operations Image Source: USAF

Beale AFB

El MirageMCAS Cherry Point

NAS Pax River

Creech AFB

Syracuse

Ft. Drum

NAS Pt Mugu

Ft Knox

Ft BraggVictorville

Camp Ripley

LagunaSimi

Blackstone

Lakehurst

Indiantown

Eustis

Pinon

Ord

Moffett

Irwin

Santa Fe

A.P,Hill

Ft CarsonFt Riley

Ft Campbell

Dugway

29 PalmsS

Reaper

SP

SW / R

SGH Spyder

GH / BRMAXSW / R S

Vigilante

S

SP / Reaper

RgMAV

P / Reaper

A160R

R/War/Pu

RMAX

RMAX

W

Camp Roberts

H

W,R

H / SCamp Williams

W / R

Lake OneidaRascal

Camp AtterburyT

Kenova

Patriot

LouisvilleW/R

W/R

War/R/Pu/S

USAFAV3 / SE

R

– 77% will be Small UAS (Group 1)

– 91% will need access to Class E & G airspace

– 77% will be Small UAS (Group 1)

– 91% will need access to Class E & G airspace



PalmdaleHolloman AFB

Cannon AFB

Sigonella AB, Italy

Andersen AFB, Guam

NAS Pt. Mugu

Huachuca

Robert Gray

Wright

Benning

Ft Polk

Wainwright

Redstone

Wheeler AAF

Camp Shelby

Cochise

Ft Bliss

Hondo

Greely

Evens

Woodworth

Ft Worth

Longhorn

Okeechobee

Robbins AFB

Ft Hood

Germany

29 Palms

Kaneohe Bay

Ladd AAF

Allen AAF

War / R

Bryant AHP

R

H

R

S

PS

S

H

R

P / Reaper

RGH

S / RGH / B

GHS

R

S

S

S

S

Camp Pendleton

P / Reaper

War

H

W / R S

StennisW/R/Pu

Choctaw

Hurlburt Eglin

Camp Blanding

W/R

W/R/Pu/S

W/R

W/R

Homestead

Key WestW/R W/R

Camp BullisW/R

HS / R

ArmyNavyMarines

SOCOM

Air Force

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Military Not the Only Ones Using UAS

USCG Photohttp://www.uscg.mil/comdt/blog/2009/12/maritime-predator-acceptance-ceremony.asp

Scripps Institution of Oceanography, UC San Diego Photowww.nsf.gov

Lacher PhotoLacher Photo



NASA Photowww.nasa.gov

Law Enforcement Application



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UAS Operational Deployment Vision

NORTHERN REGION

GRAND FORKS

GREAT LAKES

NORTHWEST

Main Ops Needs

San Diego

Riverside

Detroit

AMOC

AGILE SUPPORT FORNATIONAL EVENTS


Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited17 13

SSB-WCorpus Christi

Miami

SIERRAVISTA

MARITIMESOUTHWEST

SOUTHEAST REGIONSOUTHWEST REGION

Sustained ISR presenceon borders and coastlines

Agile UAS capabilityfor National response 17

• Scientific– Natural hazards research/monitoring– Environmental monitoring/ mapping– In-situ atmospheric monitoring

Potential Commercial / Scientific Applications

In situ atmospheric monitoring– Wildlife observation– Technology experimentation

• Commercial– Surveying/mapping/imaging– Aerial photography / Surveys– Agricultural application– Crop monitoring – Motion picture– High altitude imaging– Communications relay– Utility/Pipeline patrol

T ffi it i

http://www.draganfly.com

Created w/ Photoshop



– Traffic monitoring– News/media– Aerial advertising – Fish spotting– Cargo– Infrastructure Protection

Business Case will Start with Small UAS

Yamaha RMAX• Available commercially• Designed for agriculture spraying• Flies autonomously • Automatic stabilization• 1000s operating in Japan

• ~$86k Agriculture Modelhttp://blogs.nasa.gov

http://ti.arc.nasa.gov

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Civil Application Example



Video: Courtesy of Insitu and University of Alaska

Another Civil Application Example



Video: Courtesy of Insitu and University of Alaska

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• There is no pilot on-board– Situation awareness

How are UAS Different Than Legacy Aircraft?

– Command and control latenciesIstockphoto.com

• Can be smaller

MITRE Photo

• Not necessarily designed and constructed to aviation



USAF Photo

• Flight Performance and Mission Profiles

standardsNASA Photo

Break


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Airspace IntegrationFlight in Non-Segregated Airspace


“The development and use of unmanned aircraft systems is the next great step forward in the

evolution of aviation” – Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, July 13, 2006.


Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited24 Photo: www.army.mil

“…unmanned aircraft systems are not ready for seamless or routine use yet in civilian airspace.” –Randy Babbitt, Federal Aviation Administrator, November 18, 2009.

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Golden Age of Aviation



After WWI we had the Golden Age of

Aviation

Aviation Transformed Military in WWI

http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/photos/

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What Happens When They Come Home?


Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited26 U.S. Army photo26

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UAS regularly operate in civil airspace

Ri k iti t d h th t ll

The Vision

• Risks are mitigated such that overall system safety is not degraded

• Traffic flows are undisrupted



Airspace Classes

• Each class of airspace has different requirements and different operating procedures

• Class A, B, C, & D require contact w/ ATC• Aircraft in Class A, B, & C are transponding



MITRE Image

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Balancing National Needs

National Security & H l d D f

Public Safety and Access AiHomeland Defense

Needs• Military Training &

Readiness– Train like you fight

• Emergency Response• Domestic-based Missions

to Airspace

• Mid-air Collision Risks• Vehicle Reliability Posing

Risks to Those on the Ground

• Airspace Deconfliction



Image: US District Court – Eastern District of MS

• Border Patrol• Law Enforcement …

• Airspace DeconflictionReducing Airspace Access– TFRs not a scalable solution

• Air commerce and airspace efficiency

Integration Challenges

Lack of See-and-Avoid Capability

Pilot

Line of Sight

Beyond Line of Sight

Command & Control Integration• Coping mechanisms for vulnerabilities• Air Traffic Management

System Reliability

Mechanical Flight Control

Fly-by-Wire



Air Traffic Control Pilot

System Reliability(Airworthiness)

Crew Qualifications & Training

Fly-by-Wireless

Images from US Military

MITRE Photo

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18,000

~ Class A (controlled)

Class E (uncontrolled)

FL600

Class E

Class G 1,200/700

18,000



FL600

Class E (transponder required)

TFR (current)•COA required•3x/wk; 5 day notice


I: Transition

III: Class A or Oceanic Ops

IV: Transit

Airspace Access Scenarios

Class C

10NM

10,000Class E(no transponder required)

•3x/wk; 5 day notice•Talking/Squawking

4,100 AGL

Segregated Airspace

Class C

10NM

18,000


( )

FL600



4,000 AGL

Class D

18,000



FL600

Class E

II: Terminal Ops



Segregated Airspace

10NM

10,000Class E

(no transponder required)

Class B/C/DClass G

800~1200

10NM



4,000 AGL

Segregated Airspace

Class C/D

V: sUAS Line-of-sight

• Airspace access controls– Segregated airspace– Positive Control Airspace – Class A (all aircraft are cooperative –

“Integration” Today [USA]

p ( ptalking & squawking)

– Temporary Flight Restrictions– Low Density Airspace

• Provide “see and avoid” equivalent – Chase plane – Ground Observers

• Treat like any other aircraft

• Public Aircraft• Experimentals



y• Telephone connection between GCS and ATC supervisor• Limits on distance from base and/or segregated airspace• One UAS per center during emergencies• Unpopulated areas

No Commercial Operations

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Segregated Airspace [USA]



MITRE Image

UAS Access to Civil Airspace

Challenges

OperationalNeeds

Organizations &Missions

UAS•Capabilities (aircraft, Control station)

Civil Airspace•Technologies•Policies

AirspaceAccessScenarios

AccessMethods



)•Procedures

SystemsEngineering

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A Real World Example

• DHS Customs & Border Protection (CBP)

“Predator B” & Cessna 172

Protection (CBP)– Border Patrol

– RQ-9 (“Predator B”)

– Grand Forks AFB, ND

RQ‐9 (Predator B)Speed: 240 kts max



Speed: 240 kts max.Altitude: Up to 50K ft.Range: 2,800 NMEndurance: 30+ hours max.LOS Link Distance: 150 NMMax Gross Weight: 10,500 lbs.AMOC: Riverside, CA BLOS: Ku‐band satellite

Photo: CBP

DHS CBP Air & Marine Northern Border Patrol Mission – Predator ‘B’

Operational Issue Mitigation

“See and Avoid” Mitigations for Transitioning thru uncontrolled airspace

•Temporary Flight Restriction•Daylight – VFR Only

Disruptions to Command & • Operational Procedures

Operational Issue Mitigation

“See and Avoid” Mitigations for Transitioning thru uncontrolled airspace

•Temporary Flight Restriction•Daylight – VFR Only

Disruptions to Command & • Operational Procedures



Control Link and other Flight Contingencies

• Limit range • Operate in low density airspace

•Other Issues:System ReliabilityAll Wx Capability (icing, cross winds)Cold Durability

Control Link and other Flight Contingencies

• Limit range• Operate in low density airspace

•Other Issues:System ReliabilityAll Wx Capability (icing, cross winds)Cold Durability

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UAS Are Transforming Pilots



How does this Impact the Pilot?



Photo: US Department of Defense

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NTSB Investigation of CBP Predator Crash

25 April 2006 Nogales, AZ Photo: NTSB Report

ThrottleField of view

• GCS lock-up coupled with Pilot error causes CBP Predator to crash after engine was starved



Condition lever Speed lever

Iris control

view

Focus

Functionality as Sensor Operator WSFunctionality as Pilot WS

gof fuel

• No injuries• NTSB Investigation

– 5 Recommendations for FAA– 17 Recommendations for CBP

Photo: NTSB Report

Image: NTSB

Crash Site

Departure Airport & Ground Control Station (GCS)

TFR Boundary



Southern US Border TFR

Route of Flight

40

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What About Small UAS?

www.nasa.gov

www.noaa.gov

www.navair.navy.mil

Lacher Photo



www.nasa.gov

www.navair.navy.mil

www.nasa.gov

Existing Guidance–AC91-57(circa 1981)

• Covers “model” aircraft– Intended only for recreation or competition– Effective in conjunction with Academy of Model

Aeronautics (AMA) Safety Code( ) y

• No enforcement - no regulatory basis • “Encourages voluntary compliance”

– ≤ 400 feet – Advise ATC if within 3 miles of airport– “Full scale” aircraft have right-of-way

• Does not limit weight and speed• Misapplied to small UAS



FAA Clarified Policy (2/13/07)– UAS Ops two paths: COA or

experimental– AC 91-57 only for hobbyist– Commitment to explore small UAS

regulations

Photo: USAF

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Does This Make Anyone Nervous?



How About This?



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Or Maybe This?



Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) Analysis

72–73 MHz902–928 MHz2400–2483.5 MHz5725–5850 MHz

• Objective – Predict RFI & Quantify Outages– Focus on Small UAS

• FY07 – Preliminary AnalysisIdentified substantial risk of lost C2 uplinks above populated areas from unlicensed emitters



– Identified substantial risk of lost C2 uplinks above populated areas from unlicensed emitters

– Developed UASAT Tool to predict RFI caused by licensed emitters

• FY08: Extend Analysis– Extended to additional bands

– Used UASAT to predict licensed-emitter effects– Estimated potential extent and duration of link outages in urban & suburban areas

• FY09: Continued to Extend Analysis– Included 5725–5850 MHz band and examined licensed-emitter effects in all 4 bands– Focused on Select US cities

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Small UAS ARC – Layered Approach for Ensuring Safety

People & Property on the Surface

Aircraft & Other Airborne Objects

Reduce Encounters

Keep Separated

• Altitude limits• Airspace class limits• Fly-away protection / C2 link

robustness• Away from airports• Crew training

• VMC/Day/VLOS• ATC Notifications• Visual Observer• Comm monitoring

• VMC/Day/VLOS• Telemetry• Proximity to people/property• Crew training

• Take-off/Landing areas• Population density considerations• Access controls• Buffer zones• Crew training

• System design/testing

• Crew training• Telemetry


Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited47 Acceptable Level of Risk

Avoid Collisions

Minimize Impact

• Visual Observer• Performance requirements• Visibility (Paint, strobe,

transponder)• Crew training

• Physical size• Frangibility• Airspeed limits

• Visual Observer• Crew training• System Design/testing

• Physical size• Frangibility• Airspeed limits

Break


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Airspace IntegrationResearch Challenges


Research Questions1. Air Traffic Management Implications – What is the impact on air traffic management of routine UAS

operations in sectors of varying complexity?

2. Implications for NextGen Concepts – How should the NAS evolve in the future towards NextGen to best accommodate UAS capabilities and unique airspace integration requirements?

3. Mitigations for the Lack of See and Avoid – What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?

4. Standardized Lost Link and other Contingency Procedures – What are the appropriate standardized procedures for lost link and other flight contingencies and how can their safety effectiveness be demonstrated?

5. Implications of Autonomy – What are acceptable levels of autonomy for operations in the NAS?

6. Training and Pilot Qualifications – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS pilots and other required crew members?

7. Equipment Certification – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS equipment including aircraft, avionics, ground control stations, launch/recovery, and communications equipment?



8. Command and Control Link – What are the communications system performance requirements (e.g., range, integrity, availability, latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link?

9. Airspace Security – What are the airspace security implications of UAS?

10. Safety Risk Assessment – How should safety risk assessment methodologies and criteria be customized for UAS operations?

11. Flight in Non-Traditional Regimes – Can the FAA establish new safety and operational requirements for flight in non-traditional regimes (e.g., under bridges, urban canyons, in close proximity to buildings, below tree line)?

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Relative Priority - Notional

Pilot Qual.

& TrainingSystem

SecurityConcepts for

Flight New Regimesst)

ATM

Integration

NextGen

ConceptsLost Link

Procedures

Autonomy

Certification

Standards

C2 Link

Spectrum & Stds

Safety Assessment

Methods

Flight New Regimes

egree of D

ifficulty (m

ost to leas



Sense & Avoid

y

De

Urgency (most to least)

Urgency: The pressing necessity of when and or what pace this research is conducted. Research from which results are needed immediately would thus be the most urgent.Degree of Difficulty: The relative complexity and risk associated with the research (not implementation or policy adoption). This should capture the technical risks associated with development efforts, the breadth of the unknowns, and the interaction of technical, operational, and policy issues. The greater the degree of difficulty the more the research would be dependent upon fundamental breakthrough for success. [based upon Mankins, John, Research & Development Degree of Difficulty (R&D3) - A White Paper, NASA Office of Space Flight - Advanced Projects Office, March 10, 1998]

What is the impact on air traffic management of routine UAS operations in sectors of varying complexity?• What is the impact on controller workload? – Should the sector

it b dj t d?

1. Air Traffic Management Implications

capacity be adjusted? • Should ATM Procedures be revised to account for different aircraft

performance characteristics, potential for control latency, non-point-to-point flight plans, potential for lost link, and wake vortex vulnerabilities?

• What is the impact of command and control latency? – What command and control latency can be expected for various UAS?

• What is the impact of lost link on air traffic controller workload? • What are the implications for NAS systems including ERAM, conflict

probe, conflict alert, air-to-ground data communications, NOTAM S t d th N tG i it h f h f t



System, and the NextGen voice switch from such factors as contingency flight plans, lost C2 link vs. lost voice communications, non-point-to-point flight paths, and varying flight performance?

• What are the impacts on legacy traffic flows?• Are there implications for airspace design including the potential for

new airspace categories, vertical off-sets for UAS, and new route structures?

• Are there additional controller training requirements due to UAS?

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Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited53MITRE Image

One Perspective



Senior Airman Frank Gilman, 332nd Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron, air traffic controller - U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth

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How should the NAS evolve in the future towards NextGen to best accommodate UAS

2. Implications forNextGen Concepts

capabilities and unique airspace integration requirements?• How could the NextGen concepts [including

Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO), Enhanced Visual Operations, Separation Management, and Performance based Navigation (PBN)] enable



Performance-based Navigation (PBN)] enable routine integration of UAS into the NAS?

• What modifications of these concepts are needed to account for some of the differences in UAS vs. manned aircraft?

What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?

3. Mitigations for the Lack of See and Avoid

mitigate the lack of see and avoid?



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See and Avoid vs.Sense and Avoid

Cooperative Traffic

Big Sky

Cooperative Traffic[Talking & Squawking]

Non-Cooperative Traffic

Airspace Structure Airspace StructureProcedural Separation Assurance

Air Traffic Control Self-Separation

Tactical Separation Assurance

d A

void



Risk of Collision

TCASSee & Avoid

See & AvoidCollision Avoidance

Sen

se a

n• Self-Separation Reduce probability of a collision by remaining “well clear”

Sense and Avoid system function where the UAS maneuvers within a sufficient timeframe to prevent activation of a collision avoidance maneuver while conforming to accepted air traffic separation standards. Any UAS maneuvers will be in accordance with regulations and procedures.

FAA/DoDSense and Avoid Workshop

• Collision Avoidance Last ditch effort to prevent collision

Sense and avoid system function where the UAS takes appropriate action to prevent an intruder from penetrating the collision volume. Action is expected to be initiated within a relatively short time horizon before closest point of approach.The collision avoidance function engages when all other modes of separation fail.

Self Separation

ATC Separation Services Sense and Avoid

Combination of Self-Separation and Collision Avoidance



Collision Avoidance Threshold

Collision Volume

pThreshold

Threat

Intruder

200

ft

“Wel

l Cle

ar”

1,000 ft

3 – 5 nm

Means of compliance with 14 CFR Part §91.111 and §91.11350

0 ft

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• Must function in:– Visual- and Instrument- Metrological Conditions – Night/Day/Twilight

Challenges for See and Avoid Mitigations

Night/Day/Twilight– With targets

• Masked in ground clutter• Of varying sizes, dimensions, relative speeds• In the air and on the ground• In the airport pattern• Non-transponding and transponding

– Range sufficient to avoid collisions• Avoid airborne & ground targets as well as terrain



• Fuse data from multiple sensors (e.g., TCAS/Mode A/C/S, ADS-B, Radar, Electro-optic, etc.)

• Sensors/processing equipment are likely to create SWAP2and cost issues

• Maneuver and return to course as expected• Making the safety case

• MITRE believes technology readiness precludes operational

What about an Aircraft-based Sense and Avoid Solution?

p puse in the next 5 years

• Based upon – Experience with TCAS

– Technology R&D

– Involvement with RTCA SC-203

• Working with community to align



Working with community to align towards a nearer term alternative

Ground-based Sense & Avoid

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Ground-Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) –Alternative Means of Compliance

Class E/G Airspace

ManeuverCommand

Non-cooperative Aircraft•Not talking w/ ATC•No transponder



“The task of the observer is to provide the pilot of the UAS with instructions to steer the UA clear of any potential collision with other traffic.”

– FAA AIR-160 – Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01

Pilot GCS

Traffic Situation Awareness

Observer

Today:Visual

Observer

Future:GBSAA

• Surveillance: How well does radar system detect non-cooperative targets?

The Safety Questions for GBSAA

p g

• Traffic: What is the operational environment?

• Operational Concept: What operational procedures and decision support capabilities mitigate the risks?



• Hazards/Risks: What are the hazards and their likelihood and effect What are the risks?

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See and Avoid – Integration Alternatives

When Approach Costs Development Risks StakeholderImpact

Small UAS Line-of-sight Regulations

+2 yrs Establish regulations & certification standards for aircraft and crew that would enable small UAS (<25 kgs)

Low Low Regulations & standards Safety case

LowGlass G users may encounter small UASRegulations

to operate for commercial purposes

Ground-based Sense & Avoid(GBSAA)Dedicated Sensor

1-2 yrs Deploy dedicated 3D air surveillance radars to enable UAS flight crews to monitor traffic

Medium Medium Installation of radar Operational concept Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Highly dependent on C2 link

LowUAS operators need to remain well-within surveillance range

GBSAARepurposedSensors

2-3 yrs Operate within coverage of existing ground sensors (e.g., ASR-9/11) which will enable UAS flight crews to monitor traffic

Medium Medium Radar post processing accuracy Operational concept Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Highly dependent on C2 link

LowBroader surveillance area

Airborne-based Sense & Avoid(ABSAA)Cooperative

10+ yrs Airborne equipment receives signals from cooperative aircraft (ADS-B). Traffic situation info sent to UAS pilot or used by automation on board the UAS to autonomously

High High Avoidance algorithm development and

validation Policy requiring equipage in specific

i

High Reduces access

for legacy airspace users unless

i t l



Coope at e on-board the UAS to autonomously sense and avoid

airspace Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Dependent upon C2 link or

autonomous software

appropriately equipped

Technology could be extended to manned aviation

ABSAANon-cooperative

12+ yrs Airborne equipment uses non-cooperative sensor technologies to locate other aircraft and hazards. Situation info sent to UAS pilot or used by automation on-board the UAS to autonomously sense and avoid

Very High High Requires the development of new non-

cooperative sensor technology which is able to be certified for the purpose of Sense and avoidance

Decision-support system & display Safety Case – Dependent upon C2 link or

autonomous software

LowTechnology could be extended to manned aviation

Trade-offs: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Sense and Avoidance

Non-Cooperative( t di )

Cooperative( t di ADS B)

Independent of equipageAccuracy and integrity knownSimplifies algorithms Reduces development and certification risks

(e.g., non-transponding)(e.g., transponding, ADS-B)

Requires a policy d i i



Clipart ETC is copyright © 2003 by the University of South Florida

decision

Would it be more effective to equip all aircraft with ADS-B “Out” than to develop certifiable non-cooperative collision avoidance?

Image: Department of Health and Human Services

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33

Collision Avoidance – ApproachTrade-offs

• Pros ■Pros

Non-Cooperative(e.g., non-transponding)

Cooperative(e.g., transponding ADS-B)

– Independent of target aircraft equipage–More analogous to human “seeing”

• Cons–Accuracy/Integrity still in question–Physical limitations to detecting

targets/obstacles–Some technologies cannot detect

targets in all conditions (e.g., night, bad weather)

–Suite of sensors likely to be needed–No available solutions or standards

–Standardized aviation solution–Available, proven technology that is

relatively simple–Accuracy and integrity known–Simplifies collision detection and traffic

avoidance algorithms (FAR 91.113)–Reduces development and certification

risks

■Cons–Depends upon critical mass of aircraft

equipping with ADS-B OUTN t d t d til 2020



–False/missed detection rate is critical to effectiveness

–Weight, power and cost of aggregate solution unknown

–Significantly more complex than TCAS

■ Not mandated until 2020

–SWAP & cost issues w/ existing ADS-B IN systems

–ADS-B is not certified for collision avoidance

Would it be more effective to equip all aircraft with ADS-B OUT than to develop certifiable non-cooperative collision avoidance?

UAT Beacon Radio – ADS-B for VFR Ops

• Designed for small UAS• Size: 2”x 5”

• Wgt: 9.6oz (6oz board only)

• Pwr: 3W

• Internal GPS (or use ship’s)• Internal pressure sensor• Performance: >20 nmi @ 7W• Architectures

• Tx-only for surveillance by others only

• Tx/Rx to assess situation and maneuver

A i t f ll UAS ti i

UBR-TVR (Patent Pending)



• Appropriate for small UAS operating in low-altitude airspace with GA

• First UAS flight with ADS-B, Aug 2007• Other NAS Applications

– Non-powered, VFR aircraft

– Recoverable launch vehicles

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Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Proven Technology



MITRE’s UAT Team was recipient of FAA’s 2008 Excellence in Aviation Research Award and the AIAA Dr. John Ruth Digital Avionics Award

UAT Beacon Radio (UBR-TVR)Technical Specifications

Physical Specifications:Width: 2.9”Length: 5.38”Height: 1.2”Weight: 9.6ozTemperature: -20C to 40C

GPS Antenna

UATAntenna

External ConnectivityCompact Data Connector- RS-232- RS-422- USB- 1 pulse/sec- Transmit Suppression

GPS ReceiverFrequency: 1575.42 MHzUpdate rate: 1 Hz

AntennasUAT Dipole AntennaSupports external Antenna

UBR-TVR Situational Awareness Display

BatteryRecharger

Port

Compact Data Connector

PowerSwitch



SpectrumFrequency: 978 MHzBandwidth: 1.04167 Msymbols/secModulation: CPFSKPower: 38.5 dBm

Update rate: 1 HzPPS: +/- 1 usTTFF (Cold) : 40s typ.

Power Specifications:Li Ion Battery (rechargeable): 6.8 WhApprox. 5 hours of TX/RX (20 deg C)External Power: 9-40V inputCurrent: 300mA

Supports external AntennaVSWR 1.1:2GPS Patch Active AntennaPort outputs 3.3V

Awareness Display

Approved for public release 09-4131

Patent Pending

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35

Flight Demonstration of Cooperative Autonomous SAA on sUAS

Demonstrate Cooperative (ADS-B based) Autonomous (lost link/no link) Separation Assurance for small, lightweight (under 55 lb)

Use existing MITRE expertise and capabilities in lightweight, compact ADS-B systems (UBR) , avoidance

l ith (TCAS C fli t P b, g g ( )

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Natural ‘bird-like’ maneuvers

algorithms (TCAS; Conflict Probe; A3S), and UAS integration/operations

to support lab and flight demos



CollisionAvoidance

Self-Separation

Leverage required ADS-B equipage mandated for Class B (plus Mode C Veil) and Class C

Airspace

Maneuver early in manned aircraft/UAS encounter to avoid

imminent collision risk situations from developing

What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?• What is the effectiveness of visual observers?

3. Mitigations for the Lack ofSee and Avoid

• What is the effectiveness of visual observers?• What are the performance requirements for sense and avoid

including self-separation and collision avoidance?• What are the trade-offs among cost and policy of various

alternatives?• What is an appropriate extensible concept of operation for

Ground-Based Sense and Avoid? – How can a safety case be made?

• What are the appropriate Airborne-based Sense and Avoid



pp p(ABSAA) technologies, operational concepts? – How can a safety case be made?

• What are the trade-offs among cost, effectiveness, implementation time, and policy implications between cooperative (e.g., ADS-B) vs non-cooperative ABSAA alternatives?

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What are the appropriate standardized procedures for lost link and other flight

4. Standardized Lost Link and other Contingency Procedures

p gcontingencies and how can their safety effectiveness be demonstrated?• How should procedures for UAS lost link differ from a loss

of ATC communications?

• What are the implications for ATM procedures?

• Are their new technologies to enhance the situation



gawareness of controllers and other pilots to the intent of the UAS?

• Mitigate the impact of PIC unable to control aircraft Autonomous

Challenges for C2 Integration –What does it mean to fly-by-wireless?

operations– Procedures

– Technologies

• Integration with ATM and existing traffic flows– UAS-specific aircraft separation criteria



– Standardized lost link and contingency procedures

– Mechanism to communicate intent

– Controller work load and implications for traffic flows ATM procedures

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C2 Challenges –Integration Alternatives

When Approach Costs Development Risks Impact on Stakeholders

Standardized Lost Link & Contingency

2 yrs Procedures for all UAS platforms to follow during lost link and other flight contingencies including in flight

Medium Low Validation of procedures

SW D l t

MediumLegacy users may be

t d t l th fProcedures contingencies including in-flight emergencies (e.g., engine failure, fire)

SW Development Certification

vectored to clear a path for a UAS following a contingency

UAS-specific ATM procedures & separation criteria

2 yrs Specific ATM procedures tailored to unique UAS operational characteristics.

Medium Medium Validation of procedures Changes in NAS systems

MediumChanges to controller functions

Link Robustness 2-4 yrs Work with International Telecommunications Union to protect specific frequencies for UAS C2 links

Low Low Low risk – process in place;

needs time and money

HighThere is a demand for spectrum for aviation and other industry applications.

Autonomous Operations

5-15+ yrs

In addition to robust software architectures for autonomous UAS operations (i.e., with limited pilot interaction) some promising

High High Certification Integrity monitoring without

h i t ti

LowThere is a big public perception and acceptance h dl t



interaction) some promising technologies include: Mechanism to communicate intent

(voice or data) Machine-to-machine negotiation Auto-take-off and landing Auto emergency management Auto flight path management

human intervention hurdle to overcome

NextGen Operational Concepts

15+ yrs Integration into future ATM framework . Most promising concepts are associated with Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) and Equivalent Visual Operations (EVO)

Medium –High

High Exactly how UAS will fit into

emerging NextGen concepts is unclear

Unknown

What are acceptable levels of autonomy for operations in the NAS?

5. Implications of Autonomy

p• What criteria and standards should the FAA

establish for civil certification of autonomous software where a human is no longer able to monitor and is unable to intervene?



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38

So Far, Most Robots are Teleoperated

ISR

Sensing

Operator

Teleoperation


Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited75 75

Mobility

Courtesy of Dr. Richard Weatherly, MITRE Director Army Robotics Research

The Future is Autonomy

ISR

Sensing

PerceptionMobility

Situational

Awareness

Autonomy



ReasoningCommandandControl

5/26/2010

39

Degrees of Autonomy –Architecture Trade-offs

(1) Human does the whole job, turning over to the computer to implement

Ro

le o

f H

um

an

Ro

le o

f A

uto

ma

tio

n

(2) Computer helps by determining the options

(3) Computer helps to determine options & suggests one, human need not follow

(4) Computer selects action and human may or may not do it

(5) Computer selects action and implements it if human approves

(6) Computer selects action, informs human in plenty of time to stop it

(7) Computer does whole job and necessarily tells human what it did

(8) Computer does whole job and tells human what it did only if human explicitly asks

(9) Computer does whole job and decides what the human should be told



(9) Computer does whole job and decides what the human should be told

(10) Computer does the whole job if it decides it should be done, and if so, tells human, if it decides that the human should be told

Thomas Sheridan and William Verplank¸ Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Prepared for the Office of Naval Research, July 1978.

Perception Exercise

How many “f”s are in the sentence below?

FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-

SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-

IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE

EXPERIENCE OF MANY YEARS

FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-

SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-

IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE

EXPERIENCE OF MANY YEARS



OF STUDY.

7OF STUDY.

5/26/2010

40

• What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS pilots and

6. Training and Pilot Qualifications

other required crew members?



• What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS equipment

7. Equipment Certification

including aircraft, avionics, ground control stations, launch/recovery, and communications equipment?



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What are the communications system performance requirements (e.g., range, integrity, availability, latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link?

8. Command and Control Link

latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link? • What are the bandwidth requirements?• What range of protected spectrum is needed? • What are appropriate frequency bands? • What redundancy is required? • What are the up-link and down-link security/encryption

requirements? • What interference rejection capability is needed?

What are the acceptable latenc req irements for ario s



• What are the acceptable latency requirements for various phases of flight?

• What are the acceptable C2 link integrity and reliability?• What are the natural atmospheric impacts on link latency,

integrity and reliability?

Links Between Control Station and Unmanned Aircraft

UNMANNEDAIRCRAFT (UA)

CONTROL



CONTROLSTATION

(CS) Color key:

Safety-related

Mission-related

Images: US Military

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Pilot/UA CNPC Information Flows

Control Downlink (Non-Payload Telemetry)

Control Uplink (Telecommands)

Pilot (CS)

UA

Navaid Setting Changes

Navaid Display Data

ATC Voice Relay

ATS Data Relay

Non-Payload Target Data



Airborne Weather Radar Data

Video Downlink (for Safety)

Color Key: Command & Control; ATC Relay; Sense & Avoid Data

Estimated Throughput of a Single UA

Opera-tionalPhase

Relative Phase

Duration (Percent-

age of Total)

Mode

Non-Payload Communications Throughput (Bits per Second)

Command & Control ATC Relay Sense & Avoid Data

Control NavaidsATC

Voice Relay

ATS Data Relay

Target Data

Airborne Wx Radar

Data

Non-Payload Video

UL DL UL DL UL+DL UL DL DL DL DL

Pre-Flight 4 M 183 5 0 0 4800 113 173 9120 0 0

Terminal (Departure)

8M 2386 5715 669 836 4800 49 59 9120 27771 270000

A 775 912 141 186 4800 49 59 9120 27771 270000

En Route 76M 1201 2356 669 836 4800 23 28 9120 3968 270000

A 289 532 141 186 4800 23 28 9120 3968 270000

Terminal (Arrival)

11M 4606 7615 669 1140 4800 16 32 9120 27771 270000

A 1246 1277 141 234 4800 16 32 9120 27771 270000



A 1246 1277 141 234 4800 16 32 9120 27771 270000

Post-Flight 1 M 1 2 0 0 4800 15 22 0 0 0

Weighted Average of Flight Phases

M 1695 3248 669 871 4800 24 31 9120 8729 270000

A 441 650 141 192 4800 24 31 9120 8729 270000

Overall Average : 0.8A+0.2M 692 1170 247 328 4800 24 31 9120 8729 270000

UL = Uplink, DL = Downlink, M = Manual Operation, A = Automatic Operation

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Aggregate CC Bandwidth Analysis

• Began with detailed analysis of CC throughput for single UA-- Each large UA assumed fully equipped for all CC traffic-- Less equipage assumed for medium and small UA

UA TypeWeight

(Pounds)

Altitude (Feet AGL)

Maximum Number Simultaneously Aloft in CONUS

Large > 4,400 30,000 341

Medium 55 4 400 18 000 1 515

• Then analyzed number of RF channels needed to serve all UA in 2030 deployment scenario developed by SC-203 CC Product Team:



Medium 55 – 4,400 18,000 1,515

Small < 55 1,000 6,257

• Resulting estimates of nationwide bandwidth requirements:

34 MHz for terrestrial LOS comm links56 MHz for SATCOM links

Leading Candidate Bands for Protected Spectrum

Band ProjectedUAS Use

Incumbents Remarks

960–1164 Terrestrial DME TACAN • Crowded but gaps exist960 1164 MHz

Terrestrial DME, TACAN,TCAS, SSR, JTIDS, UAT

Crowded, but gaps exist• Airborne cosite issues• Good propagation

1545–1656.5 MHz

SATCOM Globalstar, Inmarsat, Iridium

• Existing safety allocation• Incumbents could serve UAS

5030–5091 MHz

Terrestrial,SATCOM

MLS • Currently little used• Europeans might revive MLS• Large free-space path losses



10-31 GHz (selected subsets)

Geosyn-chronous SATCOM

Other geosyn-chronous SAT-COM systems

• Much bandwidth available• Substantial latencies• Very large path losses

86

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What are the airspace security implications of UAS?

9. Airspace Security

• What standards should be required for physical security (e.g., GCS access protection)?

• How can we assess the potential threat of civil UAS operations?



How should safety risk assessment methodologies and criteria be customized

10. Safety Risk Assessment

gfor UAS operations?• Should the risk classification for unmanned

aircraft be reassessed?

• Can a standard that uses lethality based upon kinetic energy (especially as it relates to small UAS) be established?



UAS) be established?

• Can the FAA establish an approach that uses comparative risk assessment to examine risk trade-offs between unmanned flight risk vs. risks associated with similar flight carrying a human?

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45

A Routine Puma Landing



Rob Strain, MITRE

Can the FAA establish new safety and operational requirements for flight in non-traditional regimes

11. Flight in Non-Traditional Regimes

(e.g., under bridges, urban canyons, in close proximity to buildings, below tree line)?



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Small UAS – New Missions – New Airspace

Small UAS can fly in places where no one flies– Between buildings (urban canyons)

U d b id (i ti )– Under bridges (inspection)

– Inside buildings

– Below tree line

– Underneath / near power cables

Istockphoto.com



When is this no longer “navigable airspace”?Would a risk-based approach shift the regulatory paradigm?

Photo: USGSPhoto: NPSPhoto: US DOE Photo: NPS

Research Questions1. Air Traffic Management Implications – What is the impact on air traffic management of routine UAS

operations in sectors of varying complexity?

2. Implications for NextGen Concepts – How should the NAS evolve in the future towards NextGen to best accommodate UAS capabilities and unique airspace integration requirements?

3. Mitigations for the Lack of See and Avoid – What are some alternatives that can safely mitigate the lack of see and avoid?

4. Standardized Lost Link and other Contingency Procedures – What are the appropriate standardized procedures for lost link and other flight contingencies and how can their safety effectiveness be demonstrated?

5. Implications of Autonomy – What are acceptable levels of autonomy for operations in the NAS?

6. Training and Pilot Qualifications – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS pilots and other required crew members?

7. Equipment Certification – What criteria and standards should the FAA establish for civil certification of UAS equipment including aircraft, avionics, ground control stations, launch/recovery, and communications equipment?



8. Command and Control Link – What are the communications system performance requirements (e.g., range, integrity, availability, latency) of the Command and Control (C2) link?

9. Airspace Security – What are the airspace security implications of UAS?

10. Safety Risk Assessment – How should safety risk assessment methodologies and criteria be customized for UAS operations?

11. Flight in Non-Traditional Regimes – Can the FAA establish new safety and operational requirements for flight in non-traditional regimes (e.g., under bridges, urban canyons, in close proximity to buildings, below tree line)?

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47

• A number of integration challenges exists – The most daunting– Lack of an On-board Capability to See and Avoid– Coping Mechanism for Link Vulnerability and ATM Integration

Summary and Conclusion

• Implications for – Technology – Operating procedures– Policy/regulations

• Research Opportunities Exist• Alternatives need to be considered

– Can’t treat all UAS the sameGBSAA viable near term alternative



– GBSAA viable near-term alternative– Explore cooperative Sense & Avoidance alternatives

• Community should develop a UAS Airspace Integration Roadmap – Align efforts – Coordinate research and implementation efforts– Examine trade-offs among alternatives – Justify additional resources to match complexity of the issue

Conclusion I

Thank YouThank You


Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited94www.arcent.Army.mil (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Michael Larson)

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