icg thailands deep divide

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BRIDGING THAILANDS DEEP DIVIDE

Asia Report N192 5 July 2010

Embargoed till midnight onSunday/Monday July 4/5


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1II. THE ROAD TO VIOLENT CONFRONTATION......................................................... 2

A. FROM THAKSIN TO THE RED SHIRT RALLY IN 2010 .....................................................................2B. 10APRIL AND RACHAPRASONG OPERATION ................................................................................3C. AFTER THE CRACKDOWN .............................................................................................................6

III.FAILED NEGOTIATIONS.............................................................................................. 8IV.THE ESTABLISHMENT............................................................................................... 10

A. THE PRIVY COUNCIL..................................................................................................................10B. THE MILITARY...........................................................................................................................10C. THE JUDICIARY ..........................................................................................................................12D.

THE YELLOW SHIRTS.................................................................................................................13

V. THE RED SHIRTS.......................................................................................................... 14

A. THE UDDS LEADERS AND MEMBERS .......................................................................................14B. SEH DAENG AND THE MEN IN BLACK.....................................................................................15C. THAKSINS ROLE .......................................................................................................................17

VI.BUILDING A NEW POLITICAL CONSENSUS........................................................ 19A. ACCOUNTABILITY......................................................................................................................19B. REVERSING TERRORISM CHARGES AND REPEALING THE EMERGENCY LAW...............................21C. HOLDING A PEACEFUL ELECTION...............................................................................................22D.

RECONCILIATION AND LONG-TERM REFORM .............................................................................24

VII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 25APPENDICES

A. MAP OF THAILAND ..........................................................................................................................00

B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................00

C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2007.........................................................00

D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................00


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The protracted struggle between the royalist establish-ment and those allied with ousted Prime Minister ThaksinShinawatra has left Thailand deeply polarised. It sparkedthe most violent political confrontations in recent times,killing people, injuring nearly 2,000 and inflicting deep

wounds on the national psyche. The government of Ab-hisit Vejjajivas unilateral offer of a road map to na-tional reconciliation will lead nowhere without the par-ticipation of its opposition, including his deposed prede-cessor. A credible investigation of the violence, enduringlegal reforms, and properly addressing societal inequitiescannot succeed without the Thaksin-aligned Red Shirtmovement. This cannot happen if its leaders are detained,marginalised, or on the run. Fresh elections that are

peaceful, fair, and accepted by all sides will be the firsttest to see if the country is back on track or has lost itsway. Thailand should lift the emergency decree imposedover large swathes of the country or risk further damag-ing its democracy, hindering much needed reconciliation,and sowing the seeds of future deadly conflict.

Thai politics changed significantly when Thaksin, a for-mer policeman and telecom tycoon, won successive elec-tion landslides in 2001 and 2005. His popularity rapidlyrose among the poor who benefited from his populist

programs, such as low-cost health care. At the same time,his increasingly autocratic and corrupt rule angered theurban middle classes. Conservative elites also feared that

his growing popularity would challenge their dominance.These establishment forces revolving around the KingsPrivy Council, the military and the judiciary were sup-

ported on the streets by Yellow Shirt protestors. To-gether they worked to remove Thaksin from politics anderode his influence. In early 2006, Thaksins governmentwas first challenged by mass demonstrations by the Peo-

ples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and subsequentlyousted by a military coup. While in self-imposed exileabroad, his party was disbanded by a court ruling in May2007. A proxy party took power later that year, only to bealso banned by the courts. Under military pressure and

without a fresh poll, a new Democrat Party coalition ledby Prime Minister Abhisit took office.

Despite losing power in such an unconstitutional manner,Thaksin was never a spent force. His supporters ralliedaround the United Front of Democracy Against Dictator-ship (UDD) that soon became a movement larger thanany one person. Led by a divided leadership of members

of parliament, banned politicians and even popular radiohosts, the Red Shirts drew support from the urban andrural poor. They formed a pivotal force that ralliedagainst the military-installed government and the estab-lishment-backed Abhisit administration. After a courtordered the seizure of Thaksins assets in late February,the UDD again took to the streets demanding an election.Their occupation of Rachaprasong intersection in Bang-koks business heart and storming of the parliament ulti-mately saw a state of emergency declared in the capitaland its vicinities on 7 April, allowing authorities to bandemonstrations, shut down media, and detain suspectswithout charge. The draconian law, which grants officialsimmunity from prosecution, was later extended to cover24 provinces by 19 May one third of the country. Twomajor clashes in April and May and a few other violentincidents killed 90 before the streets were cleared in a hailof military gunfire.

In the wake of the crackdown, a triumphant governmentsees that it has restored order to the streets, but it under-estimates the deeper divisions this response has created.More than a road map to national reconciliation is

needed; a new political consensus should be built with theequal involvement of all sides. Heated rhetoric needs tobe toned down, including abandoning the use of the termterrorist to brand Thaksin and Red Shirt leaders. Fortheir part, opposition figures should publicly renounceviolence, reject armed elements, and urge their supportersto follow this lead. Those committed to peaceful protestshould be given their rights back so they can again be-come politically active. Past and future criminal behav-iour should be prosecuted in an even-handed manner.

In the long run, Thailand needs to think deeply about

much broader political reforms of its system of govern-ment, including the role of the monarch and military.Wealth needs to be shared, justice delivered equitably,and power decentralised. The recent violence needs to be


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Bridging Thailands Deep Divide embargoed till midnight on Sunday/Monday July 4/5

Crisis Group Asia Report N192 Page ii

investigated fully as part of a reconciliation process thatwill allow new elections as soon as possible, with the

polls being the beginning and not the end of the process.This new government, with the legitimacy of a freshmandate and if accepted by all sides, would be the one tomove forward with any agreed reform agenda. To get

there, the current administration needs to turn away fromauthoritarianism and choose open, inclusive and democ-ratic means to solve the nations problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Thailand:

1. Immediately lift the emergency decree imposed inBangkok and the other 23 provinces.

2. Conduct a thorough, transparent, and independent

inquiry into the violence of April-May 2010. If theinquiry continues to lack credibility, consider enlist-ing international assistance to boost confidence in the

process.

3. Abandon the use of terrorism provisions against RedShirt leaders accused of offences as part of the pro-tests, including former Prime Minister Thaksin; in-stead use other sections of the Criminal ProceduresCode covering offences such as assault, arson, or il-legal possession of weapons.

4. Apply the law without bias so that criminal charges

against disorderly, disruptive, or violent politicaldemonstrations in recent years are pursued withequal vigour, whatever their political affiliation.

5. End sweeping bans on Red Shirt media outlets,community radio stations and websites and expeditethe enactment of a law to establish an independentcommission to regulate broadcast media so as to pre-vent the use of media for incitement to violence orhate speech.

6. Recognise that Thailands long-term political stabil-ity requires talking with Thaksin rather than continu-ing to demonise him.

7. Introduce amnesties to allow 220 banned politiciansto run in elections and reinforce the role of parlia-ment in settling political disputes.

8. Allow international monitoring of the next electionsto enhance the credibility of the polls.

9. Conduct fundamental security sector reform with anemphasis on providing necessary training and ade-quate remuneration so that the police can be maderesponsible for internal security, including riot con-

trol and overseeing demonstrations, with the armysrole restricted to external defence.

10. Improve social services and economic support in away that empowers and meets the needs of the poorand improves livelihoods so as to lessen socio-economic disparities.

To the Red Shirt leaders:

11. Ensure your followers strictly adhere to non-violentprinciples in all their future activities.

12. Reject the presence of armed elements in your ranksand condemn any violent acts, even if they areclaimed to be for the purpose of protecting support-ers.

13. If political restrictions are lifted, participate in goodfaith in the investigation into the violence, nationalreconciliation efforts, law reform efforts, and plan-ning for future elections.

To Thaksin Shinawatra:

14. Encourage your supporters to work towards a peace-ful election and explore an acceptable formula foryour return to Thailand as part of national reconcilia-tion efforts.

To all political parties, the UDD and the PAD:

15. Sign a pact to keep election campaigns peaceful, re-strain supporters, and ensure the outcome is re-

spected.16. Work towards a peaceful national election by toning

down confrontational rhetoric and agreeing to ac-ceptable behaviour for campaigning, and pledgingnot to obstruct campaigning.

Bangkok/Brussels, 5 July 2010


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I. INTRODUCTION

The most violent political clashes between the govern-ment and demonstrators in modern Thai history erupted

between 10 April and 19 May after weeks of protests onthe streets of Bangkok.1 While this recent chapter of thecountrys tumultuous politics ultimately ended in a gov-

ernment crackdown, conflict between conservative elitesand the allies of a populist politician is far from over. Onone side is the unelected establishment the palace, themilitary, the judiciary and the network around them, andtheir yellow-shirted supporters. On the other is a policecolonel-turned-businessman-turned-politician, ThaksinShinawatra, who has challenged the old order with hisred-shirted supporters drawn from the rural and urban

poor. Neither side is united and each has its own counter-intuitive allies. With the conservative royalist establish-ment stand some members of the urban middle class, an-

gered by Thaksins corruption, cronyism and humanrights abuses. With the populist Thaksin are some mem-bers of the military and much of the police. Thai society,institutions, even families are often dangerously divideddown the middle.

As this report was researched, the protests and crackdowntook place, and then a state of severe emergency wasdeclared in Bangkok and 23 other provinces, curtailing

political rights.2 Dozens of radio stations, websites, a ca-ble television station and print media that the governmentperceives to be affiliated with the Red Shirts were shut

down. The leaders of the movement, including Thaksin,

1See Crisis Group Asia Report N82, Thailand: Calming thePolitical Turmoil, 22 September 2008. The death toll between10 April and 19 May 2010 exceeds those of the three previous

political crises: the student-led uprising in 1973, the massacreof left-leaning activists in 1976 and the pro-democracy demon-strations against military-backed government in 1992. Based onofficial records, there were 77 people killed in 1973, 43 in 1976and 44 in 1992. Actual death tolls of these incidents are be-lieved to be higher.2Under the emergency decree, the government may declare astate of emergency or a state of severe emergency. Thelatter is used when the situation is perceived to be more seriousand authorities are granted additional powers, such as detentionof suspects without charge for up to 30 days.

were charged with terrorism a crime punishable bydeath. Others not in detention went into hiding, loweredtheir profile, and refrained from making public com-ments. Communities thought twice about holding publicmeetings.

The government has used mainstream media to controlpublic opinion and build legitimacy for violent suppres-

sion. Intimidation campaigns were waged via the internetagainst individuals sympathetic to the Red Shirts causesand international media, which was accused of pro-RedShirt bias. This combination skewed public debate andrestricted freedom of expression in Thailand. Under suchcircumstances, people were careful of who they spoke to,what they said, and were often reluctant to go on-the-record.

This report examines the factors that led to the violentconfrontation in the capital, analyses why negotiationsfailed, and suggests what might be done as the country

looks to the future. It is based on extensive interviews,review of documentary materials as well as reports fromthe domestic and international media. While much of Cri-sis Groups previous work on Thailand has focused onthe conflict in the predominantly Malay-Muslim South,this report concentrates on national politics. During thistime, the violent ethno-nationalist insurgency in thesouthernmost provinces has received less attention fromthe government but has continued unabated.


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Crisis Group Asia Report N192, 5 July 2010 Page 2

II. THE ROAD TO VIOLENTCONFRONTATION

The downward spiral toward violence began when apopulist politician who posed a threat to the old ordercame to power. Thaksin won handily in two elections andserved as prime minister between 2001 and 2006. His

popularity among the rural and urban poor was seen bythe elites as a threat to their political influence. Mean-while, the urban middle class criticised his autocratic rule.Ousted by a military coup in September 2006 while over-seas, Thaksin has since remained in self-imposed exile,mostly in London and later Dubai. He was subsequentlyconvicted in absentia on corruption charges and faces atwo-year prison term if he returns. Although his party wasdisbanded, he still wields influence through proxy parties

and other allies.

A. FROM THAKSIN TO THE RED SHIRT RALLYIN 2010

Thaksin led his Thai Rak Thai Party to a landslide win inthe 2001 elections. He implemented populist programs,including universal health care, micro-credit schemes anda debt moratorium for farmers. This won him followersamong the poor and marginalised, many of them in the

North and North East of the country. At the same time,

many in the urban middle class criticised him for corrup-tion, abuse of power, cronyism and human rights abuses.Thaksins friend-turned-foe Sondhi Limthongkul, a mediamogul, spearheaded a movement to bring him down. Asthis loose anti-Thaksin movement gained momentum, thePeoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) was formed.

PAD adopted the slogan We are fighting for the Kingas well as yellow shirts to symbolise their political alle-giance. Yellow T-shirts were in fashion for the first timein 2006 as people wore them to join the 60 th anniversaryof the revered King Bhumibol Adulyadejs accession to

the throne. (In the Buddhist tradition, yellow is the colourfor Monday, the day he was born.) PAD demonstrationsagainst Thaksin accelerated after his family sold its sharesin telecom conglomerate Shin Corporation to SingaporesTemasek Holdings in January 2006. Thaksin was accusedof abusing his position to enrich his business empire andof tax evasion.

Confident of his popularity with voters, Thaksin dis-solved the parliament in February 2006 and called a snapelection. The April 2006 election was boycotted by themain political parties leading to an inconclusive result.

The King advised the judges of the Constitutional Courtand Administrative Court to use their authority to break

the political impasse. The court annulled the elections anda new poll was scheduled for October 2006.

Fearing another Thaksin victory, the royalist establish-ment pushed the military to stage a coup to depose him.Anti-coup activists and Thaksins supporters united under

the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship(UDD) fought against the military-installed governmentof Surayud Chulanont, a member of the Privy Council the kings advisory body who had temporarily left this

post to take the premiership. The UDD accused PrivyCouncil president Prem Tinsulanond of mastermindingthe coup.3

The establishment moved to weaken Thaksins powerfurther. The Constitutional Court ruled in May 2007 todisband the Thai Rak Thai party for violating political

party laws. The ruling banned 111 executive party mem-

bers, including Thaksin, from running in elections for fiveyears. Despite a military propaganda campaign againstThaksin in his strongholds in the North and North East,the People Power Party (PPP), acting as a proxy, won thefirst post-coup election in December 2007 and took

power.

2008 was turbulent with the PPP-led government facingconstant challenges from the Yellow Shirts. Prime Minis-ter Samak Sundaravej was removed in September after acourt ruled him guilty of conflict of interest after taking

payments for hosting a TV cooking show. In December,

the PAD seized Bangkoks two main airports to forceSamaks successor, Somchai Wongsawat, to step down.At the height of the PAD protest, the Constitutional Courtordered the dissolution of the PPP and two other medium-sized parties on charges of violating election laws, bring-ing down the Somchai government. The court ruling

barred 109 executive members of the three dissolved par-ties from running in elections for five years. The military

pressured smaller parties and a faction in the disbandedPPP to join a new coalition led by the opposition Democ-rat Party. Abhisit Vejjajiva, the Democrat Party leaderwho was born in England and educated at Eton and Ox-ford, became prime minister. The disbanded PPP wasreplaced by the Puea Thai Party, yet another Thaksin

proxy, which leads the opposition.

The establishment-backed government of Abhisit was, inturn, challenged by the Red Shirts. In April 2009, RedShirt demonstrators broke through the lines of securityforces to storm the ASEAN summit in the beachside town

3According to the constitution, the King has the sole right toappoint up to eighteen Privy Council members, who advisehim. See Section IV.A.


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of Pattaya, forcing its cancellation.4 It was a historic lowfor the ten-member organisation and a gross breach ofdiplomatic protocol. After reassuring delegates at middaythat the meeting would go ahead, Abhisit abandoned hisguests as protestors closed in and some 30 minutes later

participants were told their safety could no longer be

guaranteed. The Vietnamese prime minister was said tohave been particularly upset by his evacuation from a ho-tel rooftop. 5

Shortly after, Red Shirt rallies in Bangkok turned violentas several groups clashed with the military in the streets.Two people were killed, some 120 people injured, andseveral public buses were set on fire.6 The Red Shirts be-came rioters in many peoples eyes. Realising their tac-tical mistake, they voluntarily dispersed.

B. 10APRIL AND RACHAPRASONGOPERATION

In February 2010, the situation deteriorated further afterthe Supreme Court for Criminal Cases of Political PostHolders ordered the seizure of 46 billion baht ($1.4 bil-lion) of Thaksins assets.7 The Red Shirts staged a sit-inin Bangkok, occupying roughly 2km of the streets nearGovernment House. The area is commonly used for po-litical rallies. They demanded dissolution of the parlia-ment. 8 The atmosphere was initially peaceful and festiveas the Red Shirts paraded around Bangkok in lorries,

pick-up trucks, motorcycles and on foot. Supportersgreeted them by waving red flags or pieces of red clothfrom pavements and buildings along the roads.

Tensions escalated after the Red Shirts occupiedRachaprasong intersection in the commercial heart ofBangkok on 3 April, forcing upscale shopping malls andfive-star hotels to shut down.9 On 7 April, a group of RedShirt protesters, led by Arisman Phongruangrong,

4Summit collapses, state of emergency declared, BangkokPost, 11 April 2009.5 Crisis Group interview, senior ASEAN member state foreignministry official, 7 May 2010.6Centre of city rocked by skirmishes, The Bangkok Post, 14April 2009 and Two shot to death in melee, The BangkokPost, 14 April 2009. The government claimed that the twoBangkok residents were killed in a fight with the Red Shirtsand not by the military.7The court ruled that the former prime minister concealed hisassets while in office and abused his power for personal gain.8The government imposed the Internal Security Act in Bang-kok and nearby provinces ahead of the rally, enabling the mili-tary to oversee demonstrations. The law allows the authoritiesto impose curfews, declare areas off-limits, and control weap-ons possession and electronic devides as well as use of roadsand vehicles.9Were not moving, The Bangkok Post, 4 July 2010.

stormed the parliament, forcing parliamentarians to aban-don their session. They searched for Suthep Thaugsuban,deputy prime minister for security affairs, who escapedtogether with other cabinet members by climbing a ladderover the back fence before being taken away by a militaryhelicopter.10 In response to the chaos, the government

declared a state of emergency in the capital, banningdemonstrations.

With the draconian law imposed, the government beganto take harsher steps, beginning what it called an opera-tion to take back the area on 10 April. While it pledgedto strictly follow standard riot control measures, live am-munition was used during chaotic night time clashes. Ac-counts of the violence remain disputed. It is clear thattroops were attacked by grenades and fired on by uniden-tified armed groups, with five soldiers killed, including acommander, Col. Romklao Thuwatham.11 21 civilians

were shot dead and autopsy results show most were killedby high-velocity rounds.12 More than 860 were injured,350 of whom were soldiers.13

While soldiers were filmed pointing their rifles directly atthe protesters, it remains unclear who fired at them.14Mysterious armed assailants, some of whom wore black,were captured on camera. BBC video footage shows a

black-clad gunman carrying an assault rifle walkingamong the Red Shirts, while other footage posted onYouTube shows a group of armed men sitting behindshields opening fire at troops.15 Reuterstelevision cam-eraman Hiro Muramoto, who was shot dead on the scene,filmed grenades striking the troops and soldiers dragging

10Protesters storm parliament, The Bangkok Post, 8 July2010.11See King-Oua Laohong, Proud legacy of slain army herorecalled, The Bangkok Post, 12 April 2010. Many of the gre-nade attacks during the demonstration were fired from M-79grenade launchers. While often referred to in the Thai press asM-79 grenades, the M-79 is a U.S.-made grenade launcher

that uses 40x46-mm grenades.12Vichan Piewnum of Ramathibodhi Hospital, a forensic teammember, said the autopsies showed the wounds were caused by

bullets from high velocity guns. See Victims on both sides hitby high velocity bullets, doctors say, The Nation, 27 April2010.13Information from Erawan Emergency Center, the BangkokMetropolitan Authoritys official centre recording casualtiesrelating to the Red Shirt rallies.www.ems.bangkok.go.th:80/radmob.html.14See Mehdi Chebil Exclusive FRANCE 24 footage showssoldiers firing directly at protesters 11 April 2010.www.france24.com/en/20100411-exclusive-france-24-footage-shows-soldiers-firing-directly-protesters.15See video clips BBC: Guy with AK-47 atwww.youtube.com/watch?v=vBLQYR9CRO0&NR=1 andUnidentified Forces, Guys with AK-47 atwww.youtube.com/watch?v=OHNrn9btDWA.


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away the blood-soaked bodies of their comrades.16 Therank-and-file Red Shirts saw the men in black as rescu-ers but claim they had no idea who they were.17

The government used the presence of these men inblack during the 10 April incident to claim that there

were terrorists among the demonstrators.18

It alsoadopted a harder line and accused the Red Shirts of in-tending to overthrow the monarchy. The lse majest law,which carries a severe penalty of up to fifteen years in

prison, has often been used in Thailand to discredit oppo-nents and suppress political dissent. The military-dominated Centre for the Resolution of Emergency Situa-tions (CRES), set up by the government to oversee secu-rity operations under the state of emergency, released achart showing an anti-monarchy network linking variousindividuals related to the Red Shirts and the Puea ThaiParty, with Thaksin at the centre.19

For the military, the 10 April incident was humiliatingand led them to tighten their guard. The grenades thataccurately struck a group of commanders who blendedinto the troops on the street raised speculation that it wasa target killing. So-called watermelon soldiers greenon the outside and red inside were suspected of helpingidentify the targets. (See Section IV.B on divisions withinthe military)

After the 10 April incident, the Red Shirts abandonedtheir original protest site near Government House and

gradually built a fortified encampment in Bangkoks business heart. From its centre, a stage set up atRachaprasong intersection, the camp spread out in across: spanning 2.2 kilometres from north to south and1.8 kilometres from east to west. Fearing an attack by thesecurity forces, protesters stacked up old tires bound to-gether by sharpened bamboo poles to build walls aroundthe perimetre. Tensions rose when counter-Red Shirtforces, dubbed multi-colour shirts, rallied on nearbySilom Road to show their opposition to the Red Shirtsand shout obscenities. On 22 April, five grenades hit thearea where counter-Red Shirt protesters were gathered, as

16Nick Macfie, Reuters TV cameramans chilling last pictureshow, Reuters, 12 April 2010.17Crisis Group interviews, Red Shirt followers, Bangkok, 13April 2010.18Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said in his televised an-nouncement on 12 April 2010. See Government aims to sepa-rate those committing terrorist acts from amongst innocentdemonstrators, while working towards political solution,www.capothai.org/capothai/government-aims-to-separate-those-committing-terrorist-acts-from-amongst-innocent-demonstrators-for-web-and-pr.19A copy of the anti-monarchy network chart released by theCRES is available athttp://us.asiancorrespondent.com/bangkok-pundit-

blog/conspiracy-against-the-monarchy.

well as a nearby elevated train station platform, killingone and injuring some 80 people. The governmentclaimed that grenades were fired from an area next to theRed Shirt camp but the protest leaders denied any in-volvement.20

On 29 April Red Shirt guards raided Chulalongkorn Hos-pital next to their protest site, claiming that soldiers werehiding inside buildings in its compound. The raid, led bya Thaksin-allied politician Phayap Panket, drew severe

public criticism and greatly tainted their image. The hos-pital evacuated all patients in the following days.21 RedShirt leaders apologised for the raid, saying the UDDleadership did not consent to Phayaps plan.22

Amid the growing prospect of a crackdown, Prime Minis-ter Abhisit made a televised announcement on 3 May. Heoffered to hold the election early, on 14 November, and

outlined a five-point roadmap to national reconcilia-tion: upholding the monarchy, resolving socio-economicinjustice, ensuring an impartial media, conducting an in-dependent investigation into violent incidents, and under-taking political reform.23 Red Shirt leaders initially wel-comed the plan. But internal differences over how orwhether to end the protest dragged on for a week withoutany conclusion. The sticking point was a minor issueabout whether Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaug-suban should turn himself into the police or Departmentof Special Investigation (DSI) to face questioning for hisresponsibility for the 10 April military operation.24 Thegovernment believed the Red Shirts were insincere aboutending the protest. It believed the moderates had lost con-trol of the movement to Thaksin and the hardliners, who

20Bomb terror grips Silom, The Bangkok Post, 23 April2010. Suthep Thaugsuban said in a televised announcement afew hours after the grenade attacks that the government be-lieved it was fired from behind King Rama VI Monument, thearea occupied by the Red Shirts.21See an independent inquiry into the raid of ChulalongkornHospital: Hospital staff upholds international medical ethics

during unrest in Bangkok, Physicians for Human Rights, May2010. The paper also noted that hospital staff were harassed bythe Red Shirts who wielded knives and sharpened bamboostaves. They inspected vehicles, including ambulances withacutely ill patients that were arriving at the hospital, claimingsoldiers could hide weapons in the vehicles.22 . , (), 30 2553. [Wengapologises for Red Shirts raid on Chulalongkorn Hospital,Post Today (online), 30 April 2010].23See a full transcript in Thai at the official website of Thaigovernment.http://media.thaigov.go.th/pageconfig/viewcontent/viewcontent1.asp?pageid=471&directory=1779&contents=44386.24On 11 May, Suthep reported to the DSI to hear complaintsfiled against him by relatives of the 10 April victims. However,the Red Shirts said they would not disperse until Suthep waschargedby the police. Irked PM says rally ends today, The

Bangkok Post, 12 May 2010.


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had rejected the deal.25 On 12 May, Abhisit withdrew theoffer of an early election.26

The government renewed pressure on demonstrators toleave their fortified protest site in Bangkoks businessdistrict. Then on 13 May, Maj. Gen. Khattiya Sawasdipol,

a renegade senior military officer better known as SehDaeng who had been helping oversee security aroundthe camp, was shot dead.27 His assassination was an omi-nous warning to other Red Shirt leaders.

The 14-19 May operation to take back Rachaprasongsparked intense confrontations between the military andRed Shirt supporters just outside the perimetre of protestsite. The military declared some areas as live firezones. Under its rules of engagement, use of live ammu-nition was allowed for warning shots in the air, for self-defence, and when confronting people with weapons.28

Snipers were deployed in surrounding structures to pro-vide cover for troops on the ground.29 The military encir-cled the site and erected sandbags and barricades, whilethe Red Shirts stacked up old tiresas their defence and

burned some to create poor visibility for soldiers on theother side.

The government claimed that troops needed to use livebullets because there were terrorists among demonstra-tors, while human rights advocates alleged that the use offorce against protesters was disproportionate to the threatthey posed.30 Journalists and observers on the ground said

25Crisis Group interviews, Democrat Party parliamentarians,May 2010.26No elections on Nov 14, Abhisit confirms, The Nation, 14May 2010.27Seh Daeng was officially disowned by the UDD leadershipon 17 March but he continued to make appearances at the dem-onstration site. The renegade general was treated as a celebrity

by Red Shirt followers and regularly interviewed by the media.His actions were tolerated by the UDD leaders. See a detaileddiscussion about him in Section V.B.28English translation of the CRES press briefing, 14 May 2010.(www.capothai.org/capothai/security-operations-aimed-at-

pressuring-protesters-to-leave-ratchaprasong.)29Col. Sansern Kaewkamnerd, the CRESs spokesman, admit-ted the presence of snipers in a televised announcement on 16May after a video was released showing two soldiers armedwith M16 assault rifles inside an unfinished building. The onecarrying a rifle with a scope fires shots, while the other shoutsAlready fellalready fell. Sansern explained that the soldierfired after clearly seeing a man holding a grenade approach thetroops. See Red Shirt Killed by Royal Thai Army Sniper,www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWLghLXoQUY.30The CRES spokesman Col. Sansern Kaewkamnerd defendedthe use of live bullets, saying the authorities met with attacks

by some individuals armed with weapons coming from the pro-testers area. See English translation of the CRES press brief-ing, 14 May 2010, at. www.capothai.org/capothai/security-operations-aimed-at-pressuring-protesters-to-leave-

that protestors generally fought with bare hands or withslingshots and homemade firecrackers. A Crisis Groupresearcher witnessed one incident where army soldiersfired several live rounds at a group of unarmed protesters,which included women and children, in response to a RedShirt protester launching a non-lethal firecracker at a

helicopter. In another account, a foreign journalist saw ared-shirted protestor armed with a slingshot shot by themilitary; others who were clearly unarmed were shot aswell.31 The government, however, claimed armed assail-ants fired more than 100 grenades at army troops duringthe six-day confrontation.32 The CRES released figuresshowing the numbers and kinds of weapons found at RedShirt protest sites.33 Some of these are thought to have

been those taken from government troops and army vehi-cles during the chaotic night of 10 April.34

At least 54 people died, including two soldiers, and some

470 people were injured. The most notorious incidentoccurred on the evening of 19 May at PathumwanaramBuddhist temple, designated as a weapon-free zone.35 Sixcivilians were shot dead, including one rescue worker andtwo volunteer nurses. Soldiers were photographed stand-

ratchaprasong. Amnesty International issued a statement on 17May, calling on Thai soldiers to stop firing live ammunitioninto the areas where anti-government protesters gathered, asthey were not likely to present any danger. Thailand: Militarymust halt reckless use of lethal force, press release, AmnestyInternational, 17 May 2010. Human Rights Watch issued astatement calling on military forces to revoke live fire zonesthat might be used to justify the unlawful use of lethal force.Thailand: Revoke Live Fire Zones in Bangkok, press re-lease, Human Rights Watch, 15 May 2010.31Read an account of a shooting incident on 15 May at Sam-liem Din Daeng by Nick Nostitz, Nick Nostitz in the KillingZone, at http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/.32As explained by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to parlia-ment during a no-confidence debate broadcast on state-runChannel 11 on 1 June 2010. Abhisit said that the government

believed that Lumpini Park, adjacent to the Red Shirts en-campment, was used to fire grenades.33Col. Sansern, the CRES spokesman, told a press conferencethat weapons seized from the Red Shirts between 22 April and21 May 2010 included an M79 grenade launcher, four M16rifles, seven AK47 rifles, four pistols, 39 hand grenades, 215Molotov cocktails, 89 big firecrackers, and 298 improvisedexplosive devices/other types of explosive. See , , 22 2553 [Believed Red Shirts SmuggledWeapons (across border), Post Today, 22 May 2010].34Crisis Group interview, Chaturon Chaisaeng, former actingleader of the now-defunct Thai Rak Thai Party, Bangkok, 26May 2010.35A few days ahead of the crackdown, a civil society group led

by Gothom Arya, Director of Mahidol Universitys ResearchCentre on Peace Building, asked Wat Pathumwanaram Tem-

ples abbot for permission to let protestors take shelter in thecompound. The temple was declared a weapon-free zone andhundreds of Red Shirts sought refuge there before and duringthe crackdown.


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ing on an elevated train track in front of the temple andpointing rifles downward.36 The government said troopswere not ordered to go near the temple. Soldiers operatingon the ground said they only entered the area to followsuspected arsonists but did not shoot the victims.37 PrimeMinister Abhisit said the incident should not have hap-

pened and said the autopsies showed that bullets wereunlikely to have been fired from above.38

Following the crackdown on 19 May, 36 buildings, in-cluding the shopping mall Central World Plaza; the StockExchange of Thailand; and several commercial bankswere set on fire. It remains unclear if the Red Shirts wereresponsible for all of them.39 The violence in Bangkoksparked anger among Red Shirts in the countryside,

prompting the torching of governors offices in fournorth-eastern provinces.40

The conflicting accounts of virtually every incident dur-ing this period underscore the need for a thorough andimpartial fact-finding commission to determine whathappened and to hold those responsible on all sides forthe violence.

C. AFTER THE CRACKDOWN

The crackdown has deepened the divide and hardenedattitudes on both sides.41 Red Shirt supporters went homeempty-handed and grieving the violent deaths of dozens

of comrades. The UDD leaders either surrendered to thepolice or fled. At the same time as the government an-

36See the cover of , 30, 1554, 2832553. [Matichon Sutsapda, vol. 30, no. 1554, 28 May -3 June2010].37See Wassana Nanuam, Let the truth be known: what hap-

pened at the temple, The Bangkok Post, 10 June 2010.38As explained by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to parlia-ment during a no-confidence debate broadcast on state-runChannel 11 on 1 June 2010.39Bangkok branch attacked, bomb materials found, TheBangkok Post, 24 May 2010.40Governors offices were torched in Khon Kaen, Ubon Racha-thani, Udon Thani and Mukdaharn. The interior ministry trans-ferred the governors of the four provinces out of the area forfailing to stop the arson. A senior government official in UdonThani said I am not too upset about the arson. We can replace

buildings but not the people that would have been killed hadthe police intervened [to forcibly stop the arsonists]. CrisisGroup interview, a senior government official, 30 May 2010.Police commanders in the four provinces were also recalled toBangkok.41Fearing revenge attacks, the government imposed a curfew inBangkok and 23 provinces in the Central, North and north-eastern regions for ten nights after the 19 May crackdown. Noserious violent incidents occurred during that time, althoughthere was a shooting at a branch of Bangkok Bank in Bangkokat night, which broke a window pane.

nounced that it would go ahead with a plan for reconcilia-tion, Red Shirts continued to be arrested, provoking wide-spread fear. Many local leaders are keeping a low profileor have gone into hiding.42 Abhisit is now vague on a datefor the election, saying the earliest it will be held is theend of 2010.43 The governments term ends in December

2011. One member of the Election Commission of Thai-land even reportedly suggested that if a peaceful electioncould not be held, the constitution should be amended toincrease the term of the present House of Representativesto ten years.44

With the emergency decree imposed in 24 provinces, ba-sic rights of expression and peaceful assembly are re-stricted and media controlled. The law grants the authori-ties immunity from civil, criminal and disciplinary penal-ties, giving them extensive powers with few safeguardsagainst abuse. Authorities are allowed to detain suspects

without charge for up to 30 days or summon those sus-pected of being involved in Red Shirt activities for ques-tioning.45 Under normal legal procedures, police are re-quired to place charges and seek a court warrant beforemaking an arrest. A senior army officer in the North Eastsaid that hundreds of letters had been sent to Red Shirtsrequesting them to come for a talk.46 The CRES hasshut down media outlets deemed to be Red Shirt propa-ganda tools, such as magazines, cable TV channels andcommunity radio stations, without any proof they were

42Crisis Group interviews, Red Shirt leaders, Khon Kaen, 29and 30 May 2010, and Crisis Group telephone interview, aca-demic, Ubon Rachathani, 30 May 2010.43Election unlikely before years end, The Bangkok Post, 30May 2010. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya said that parliamentmight be dissolved around the middle of next year. CrisisGroup interview, Kasit Piromya, foreign minister, 28 June2010.44Mongkol Bangprapa, EC organises for rough election, The

Bangkok Post, 10 June 2010.45The state of emergency was initially declared in Bangkokand nearby provinces on 7 April and the government an-nounced additional areas for imposing the law for three times.By 19 May 2010, the law covered a total of 24 provinces,which include six in the Central region (Bangkok, Nonthaburi,Samut Prakan, Pathumthani, Nakon Pathom, Ayutthaya andChonburi), five in the North (Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Lampang,

Nakhon Sawan and Nan), and twelve in the North East (KhonKaen, Udon Thani, Chaiyaphum, Nakorn Rachasima, Si SaKet, Ubon Rachathani, Nongbua Lamphu, Maha Sarakham,Roi-et, Sakhon Nakhon, Kalasin and Mukdahan). A similaremergency law, enacted under the Thaksin government, has

been imposed on the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yalaand Narathiwat since 2005. The predominantly Malay Muslimregion has been wracked by an insurgency that has claimedmore than 4,000 lives.46Crisis Group interview, senior army officer, Nakhon Ratcha-sima, 27 May 2010.


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connected to or had incited any violence.47 More than2,200 websites deemed to support the Red Shirts have

been blocked.48

The authorities have also used the additional powersgranted by the emergency law to scrutinise and ban fi-

nancial transactions of those believed to be the RedShirts main financiers. The CRES has already bannedtransactions of some 120 individuals and about twentycompanies, including Thaksins family members, mem-

bers of Puea Thai Party and other Red Shirt leaders.49 TheAnti-Money Laundering Organisation (AMLO) later an-nounced that it had tracked movement of funds totalling150 billion baht ($4.6 billion), which could be used toincite chaos and violence. Some 83 individuals and com-

panies are suspected to be involved.50 The list compiledby AMLO was published in various Thai media on 21June.51 On its own, it proves little, resembles a smear

campaign, and has raised questions about its arbitrari-ness.52

The governments use of the emergency law goes beyondwhat is necessary to restore order and appears to haveonly hardened the Red Shirts resolve. Restrictions onfreedom of expression and assembly could force someRed Shirts underground; others say they are waiting forthe restrictions to be eased before opening a new chapterin their struggle.53

A key question is whether the movement will turn vio-

lent. One Red Shirt leader in Khon Kaen told CrisisGroup that violence is not a matter of if but when.54Some, including Thaksin, initially speculated that the Red

47The CRES issued an order on 24 May 2010 banning fourpublications perceived to be connected to the Red Shirts: Voiceof Taksin, Truth Today, Thai Red News, and Wiwatha (de-

bate). See CRES bans 4 publications connected with red

shirts, The Bangkok Post, 27 May 2010.48 -, , 15 2553. [In-siders say shutting down websites wrong method, numbers of

banned websites jump, Thai Rath, 15 June 2010].49See CRES Order no. 49/2553 dated 16 May, 58/2553 dated18 May and 61/2553 dated 20 May 2010.50 80 , (), 14 2553. [DSI to considerfreezing 10 billion-baht funds used to incite violence; 80 sus-

pects involved including famous names withdrawing 100,000baht from ATM,Matichon (online), 14 June 2010.]51 The Blacklist, The Nation, 19 June 2010.52How did people get on the red shirt funding list?, BangkokPundit (http://us.asiancorrespondent.com/), 21 June 2010.53Crisis Group interviews, Red Shirt leaders, Khon Kaen, 29-30 May 2010.54Crisis Group interview, Red Shirt leader, Khon Kaen, 30May 2010.

Shirts might become guerrillas.55 As a preventive meas-ure, the CRES since early May has ordered local authori-ties to confiscate shotguns issued by the government tovillage defence volunteers for fear that they would fallinto Red Shirt hands. In the North East, some 40,000shotguns have been taken back.56

Recent violence in Bangkok and other provinces maylead the government to extend the emergency decree on 7July, when it will be up for renewal.57 On 22 June, a

bomb exploded near the headquarters of BhumjaithaiParty, damaging cars and injuring one of the bombers,26-year-old Anek Singkhunthod. According to police,there were six alleged culprits in the attack. Five poundsof TNT concealed in a cooking gas tank was placed in a

pushcart and wheeled to an area close to the party head-quarters. The remote control failed to trigger the bomband it later exploded when Anek touched it. Another

bomb in a cooking gas tank was abandoned in the bushes.Two suspects reportedly confessed to police, saying theywere motivated by their frustration with the governmentsdouble standard treatment of the Red Shirts and thecrackdown. They said they had acted on their own initia-tive.58

On 25 June a small homemade bomb consisting of a wa-ter pipe filled with gunpowder was found near a tele-

phone booth in the north-eastern province of UdonThani.59 On 27 June, two rocket-propelled grenades werefired into an empty oil depot with a capacity of five mil-lion litres in a military unit in Nonthaburi province, adja-cent to Bangkok. The explosion caused some damage tothe tank, which had not been in use.60 It is unclear if the

55See Mark MacKinnon, Fugitive former Thai leader warns offurther violence, Globe and Mail, 26 May 2010. Thaksin saidresentful people will become guerrillas.56Crisis Group interview, senior army officer, Nakhon Ratcha-sima, 27 May 2010.57 By law, the state of emergency needs to be renewed everythree months by the cabinet.58-, (), 252553. [Kamphon and Detphonarrested for bombing near Bhumjaithai Party; revealing a ladyname Or involved; claiming they acted out of anger at govtscrackdown on Red Shirts,Matichon (online), 25 June 2010.];Blast hits near Bhumjaithai HQ, The Bangkok Post, 23 June2010. Bhumjaithai Party may have been targeted because oneof its influential members is Newin Chidchob, a banned politi-cian who broke away from Thaksin and led a group of parlia-mentarians from the disbanded PPP to join the Democrat-ledcoalition government in December 2008.59Police find bombs in Bangkok, Udon Thani, The BangkokPost, 25 June 2010.60Disuse army oil depot attacked, The Bangkok Post(online),28 June 2010. A similar incident took place on 21 April 2010.A rocket propelled grenade was fired into an oil tank at the fuelterminal of Thai Petroleum Pipeline public company inPrathum Thani province, adjacent to Bangkok. The grenade


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homemade bomb and oil depot attack are related to theRed Shirts. The bombing at Bhumjaithai Party headquar-ters suggests rank-and-file Red Shirts might take mattersinto their own hands and stage violent attacks againstgovernment targets.

created a hole in the tank used for storing 22 million litres of jetfuel. The leaking fuel caught on fire, but was quickly put out.Failed sabotage attempt at fuel terminal forces urgent boost insecurity, The Nation, 22 April 2010.

III.FAILED NEGOTIATIONS

Several efforts to get the government and the UDD tonegotiate a political settlement were made through vari-ous channels, up to the very last moment before the gov-ernment decided to send troops into the Red Shirts forti-fied camp. All failed to stop the violence.

The government appointed Kobsak Sabhavasu, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister, to liaise with the RedShirts as they began their protests in early March.61 Thefirst third-party group that offered to facilitate negotia-tions between the government and the UDD was the Na-tional Human Rights Commission (NHRC).62 The gov-ernment welcomed its offer on 18 March but the UDDimmediately turned it down. Thaksin accused the NHRCof being partisan because it held a joint press conferencewith Abhisit at a military installation the 11th infantrydivision headquarters.63 The first round of televised talksfacilitated by the King Prajadhipok Institute, a democracy

promotion centre founded by an act of the Thai parlia-ment, took place on 28 March and were inconclusive.64The UDD called for the government to dissolve parlia-ment within fifteen days of an agreement. Another roundof talks was held the following day. Abhisit offered tostep down within nine months, cutting his term short byabout a year. The UDD turned him down. 65

The situation intensified after 10 April. With the emer-gence of the men in black, the government took a toughline on the Red Shirts, claiming there were terroristsamong them. Talks were held behind the scenes on atimeline for dissolution of parliament and bail for the

61Crisis Group interview, an academic close to the prime min-ister, 12 March 2010.62, (www.pm.go.th/blog/13418), 18

2553. [PM ready to negotiate with law-abiding demonstrators,Secretariat of the Prime Minister, 18 March 2010.]63, , 192553. [Thaksin

phones to thank Tom Dandi for being on Red Shirts stage,Kom Chad Luek, 19 March 2010.]64. , , 29 2553. [First negotiationfailed, second round begins today, Abhisit talked to UDD butcant agree on house dissolution, talk is pushed by army, KhaoSod Daily, 29 March 2010]. The government was represented

by Prime Minister Abhisit, his secretary-general Kobsak Sab-havasu, and the Democrat Partys deputy secretary-generalChamni Sakdiset, while those from the Red Shirts were theUDDs president Veera Musikaphong, Jatuporn Phromphanand Weng Tojirakan.65, , 30 2553. [Negotiationfailed, Red mobilised to oust Abhisit, Khao Sod Daily, 30March 2010].


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UDD leaders facing criminal charges.66 In late April,Kobsak announced that he was ending his role as media-tor.67 Bangkok Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra, in talkswith the UDD leaders to manage space around the protestsite, was briefly appointed intermediary. He said Abhisitofficially asked him to hold talks on 23 April but less

than 24 hours later told him to stop for unspecified rea-sons.68 The Red Shirts then extended their deadline fordissolution of the government from fifteen days to 30.69Abhisit refused, explaining that the timeframe needed totake into consideration not only the views of the RedShirts but also the majority of Thais.70 Other civil societygroups were trying in vain to get talks restarted, as acrackdown seemed imminent. On 30 April, Crisis Groupwarned that the countrys polarisation demanded immedi-ate assistance from neutral figures from outside the coun-try.71

The prime ministers 3 May announcement of a road-map to national reconciliation renewed hope that thedemonstration could end peacefully. As mentioned, theUDD accepted it in principle but internal differences overhow or whether to end the protest led the government toaccuse the Red Shirts of delaying tactics. Abhisit with-drew the offer on 12 May.72 The troops began the opera-tion to take back Rachaprosong area on the followingday. A group of senators led by retired general LertratRattanawanit launched the last bid at mediation on 18May. After Lertrat talked to the UDD leaders at the pro-test site, they agreed to a 6pm ceasefire and to renewtalks. Abhisit said he told the senators that it would notwork as long as the Red Shirts continued to fire gre-nades.73

66Crisis Group interviews, civil society groups informed aboutthe talks, April-May 2010.67 ., , 242553.[Kobsakadmits PM changes mediator with UDD, Post Today, 24 April2010].68Haseenah Koyakutty, Revelations of a Thai crisis media-tor, Asia Times Online, 29 April 2010. Sukhumbhand wasreported to have met with Thaksin in mid-April in Brunei, dur-ing which he lobbied for the return of his diplomatic passportand access to the hundreds of millions of dollars not confis-cated by the Supreme Court ruling. The talks were organised bya Swedish parliamentarian. Shawn W Crispin, Abhisits de-mocratic choice, Asia Times Online, 12 June 2010.69Crisis Group interview, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Bangkokgovernor, Bangkok, 4 May 2010.70Thailand PM rejects protesters offer, BBC, 24 April 2010.71International Crisis Group, Crisis Risk Alert: Thailand, 30April 2010.72No elections on Nov 14, Abhisit confirms, The Nation, 14May 2010.73Abhisit Vejjajiva, Briefing on the Current Political Situationfor Members of the Diplomatic Corps and Foreign Chambers ofCommerce, 29 May 2010.

Negotiations failed largely because of lack of trust andgenuine will on both sides. Disunity among the RedShirts was also to blame. The government offer of the 14

November election date was reasonable and should have been acceptable for the Red Shirts. The opportunitypassed because of internal disagreements. Among the Red

Shirts, emotions ran high after months of demonstrations,and years of bitter struggle, heightened by the death oftheir comrades. Many did not trust the governments

promise and wanted immediate dissolution of the parlia-ment. Moderate leaders had a difficult time convincingtheir followers, who feared government suppressionshould they return home, to accept the offer.74 The gov-ernment should not have so quickly dismissed the sena-tors attempt to foster talks and rushed to clear the dem-onstrators. More concerted efforts to find a non-violentsolution and greater patience could have prevented thedivisive bloodshed that eventually transpired.

74Crisis Group interviews, Jaran Dittha-aphichai and WengTojirakan, UDD leaders, 13 May 2010.


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IV.THE ESTABLISHMENT

At the core of the political turmoil is a power strugglebetween the royalist establishment and Thaksin. There arefour groups that have played pivotal roles in defendingthe establishment. The Privy Council, an advisory councilto the king; the military, which sees itself as guardian ofthe nation; the judiciary, which since 2006 has been issu-ing verdicts that have sought to erode Thaksins influ-ence; and the Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD),

popularly called the Yellow Shirts, a largely royalistmovement.

A. THE PRIVY COUNCIL

The eighteen-member Privy Council, and particularly its

president, Prem Tinsulanond, has become a symbol forThaksin and the Red Shirts of the power network thatthey seek to change. Noted scholar Duncan McCargo ar-gues that the 89-year-old Prem, an army commander andformer prime minister (1980-88), wields enormous influ-ence in Thai politics at the centre of a network monar-chy whereby the King exercises his political willthrough proxies, such as privy councillors and trustedmilitary figures. Since the 1980s, the King has been theultimate arbiter of political decisions in times of crisisand the primary source of national legitimacy. He alsoacts as a commentator and helps set the national agenda.75

Tensions arose when Thaksin sought systematically todisplace the palace power network. The palace fought

back.76 In June 2006, Thaksin alleged that a charismaticindividual was trying to use extra-constitutional powerto pressure him to establish an interim government andamend the constitution before having new polls.77 He re-sisted and the September 2006 coup appeared to be theresult of that. Three years later, striking back at the estab-lishment from his exile abroad, Thaksin told thousands ofhis Red Shirt supporters rallying in Bangkok via a video-link that the person he referred to was Prem.78

Although Prem has denied being behind the 2006 coup,the fact that a trusted member of the Privy Council, Sura-

75Duncan McCargo, Network monarchy and legitimacy, ThePacific Review 18, no.4 (December 2005), pp. 499-519.76As explained by McCargo, ibid, p. 500.77 , , 302549.[Thaksinaccused charismatic person causes chaos for the country,Krungthep Thurakit, 30 June 2006].78., (), 28 2552. [Thaksin accuses Prem of

being charismatic person outside Constitution, damaging hisboss reputation; blaming Surayud for masterminding coup,suggesting clear the deck,Matichon (online), 28 March 2009].

yud Chulanont, became interim prime minister indicatestacit royal endorsement. Journalist Paul Handley, authorof the banned bookThe King Never Smiles, suggests thata fundamental driver of the coup was the issue of royalsuccession.79 The establishment feared Thaksin wouldretain his influence during the transition period from King

Bhumibol to his designated heir, Crown Prince Maha Va-jiralongkorn. If Thaksins power grew, he could influencechanges in the palaces network. Handley argued that the2006 coup, as with previous ones, was about ensuringthe solidarity and strength of the royal-military alliance inthe face of potential challenges.80

Thaksin has been accused of being disloyal to the monar-chy and wanting a republic, an accusation he denies.81 Hereturns the charge, arguing that Prems political manoeu-vring has damaged the monarchy which is supposed to beabove politics.82

B. THE MILITARY

The conflict has polarised the army, traditionally a guard-ian of the throne, from its most senior officers to its basicconscripts. Thaksin alienated many in the elite, particu-larly Prem who previously influenced the selection of topcommanders, by favouring his former classmates over

palace-supported candidates for promotion. Those ap-pointees were in turn resentful after his ouster, when theywere replaced with officers trusted by the coup leaders.83

79See Paul M. Handley, The King Never Smiles (New Haven,London, 2006)). The book, written by a former Bangkok-basedcorrespondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, is a criti-cal and controversial biography of the revered King BhumibolAdulyadej. Thai authorities deem it inappropriate for sale in thecountry.80Paul Handley, What the Thai coup was really about, AsiaSentinel, 6 November 2006.www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=v

iew&id=249&Itemid=31. Thongchai Winichakul, a noted his-torian at University of Wisconsin-Madison, called the 2006coup a royalist coup. See Thongchai Winichakul, TopplingDemocracy,Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (Febru-ary 2008), p. 30.81Richard Lloyd Parry, Thaksin Shinawatra: the full tran-script of his interview with The Times, The Times (online),9 November 2009. The interview was controversial and theThai authorities blocked access to the webpage.82Thaksin made the charge in the same video link mentionedabove. See ., (), 282552 [Thaksin accusedPrem of being charismatic person outside Constitution, damag-ing his boss reputation; blaming Surayud for mastermindingcoup, suggesting clear the deck,Matichon (online), 28 March2009].83Crisis Group interview, retired army general, Bangkok, 25May 2010.


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In October 2007, Gen. Anupong Paochinda, the First Re-gion commander who took part in the 2006 coup, was

promoted to army commander-in-chief.84 Some fearedthat Thaksin allies in the army, dissatisfied with their un-

just removal, might try to stage a coup. Anupong hasrepeatedly denied the possibility, and put trusted men as

battalion commanders in the forces normally used in acoup to make sure that they would not mobilise troopsagainst him. Although the pro-Thaksin soldiers might not

be capable of overturning the dominant clique, signs ofinternal rift were evident. During the two-month demon-strations, Red Shirt leaders claimed that watermelonsoldiers who support the Red Shirts cause leakednews to them about government operations. Within therank-and-file, many soldiers from lower class and rural

backgrounds were sympathetic to the Red Shirts. In theNorth and North East, the movements heartland, theyimplemented their orders slowly, giving protestors some

breathing room without actively supporting them.85

Observers and some in the army believe that water-melon army officers might be involved in the grenadeattacks during the 10 April incident. The troops operatingin the area where commanders were struck by grenadeswere from the 2nd Infantry Division, aka Bhurapha Pha-yak (Eastern Tigers), based in the eastern province of Pra-

jinburi. In recent years, senior army officers from thisdivision, including Anupong, have occupied the top posts.This has caused resentment among their peers from otherunits particularly those from the Bangkok-based 1st In-fantry Division, aka Wong Thewan (Clan of Angels) who had previously been key candidates for top positions.Some senior army officers affiliated with Wong Thewanare close to Thaksin and would be candidates for top

posts in the army should Thaksin-aligned politicianscome back to power. Some analysts see the 10 April inci-dent as part of the larger internal rivalry betweenBhurapha Phayak and Wong Thewan.86

Appointment of a new army commander to replace Gen.Anupong, who is scheduled to retire in September 2010,

will be key in ensuring the armys support for the estab-lishment. When the Abhisit government was consideringan early election date, the timing of the military reshuffleand the annual budget were important considerations. Thegovernment wanted to stay in power at least until the end

84Although one of Thaksins former classmates, Anupong, aformer commander of the 21st Infantry Regiment (The QueensGuard), was never seen as being a supporter.85Crisis Group interview, senior army officer, Nakhon Ratcha-sima, 27 May 2010.86Crisis Group interviews, senior army officer, 14 April 2010;senior journalist on military affairs, 29 June 2010; 10 , , 30, 1549, 23 - 29 2553.[Behind the Attacks on Eastern Tigers, Matichon Sutsapda,vol. 30, no. 1549, 23 29 April 2010].

of September to oversee the annual military promotion process. Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha, the armys deputycommander, is the establishments preferred choice. Ifappointed, Prayut could hold the post until he retires in2014. Prayut is another Bhurapha Phayak, who spent sev-eral years in his military career in the 21st Infantry Regi-

ment (The Queens Guard) of the 2nd Infantry Division.87

Since becoming a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thai-land has undergone eighteen attempted or successfulcoups. The militarys role in politics had been in declinefollowing the 1992 May uprising that overthrew a mili-tary-backed government, and many thought the days ofmilitary coups were over. Thaksins removal in 2006 al-lowed the military to make a comeback and its politicalinfluence has significantly expanded since.

The relationship between the military and police has dete-

riorated as both institutions have been politicised by thecolour-coded conflict. The Abhisit government deployedtroops to oversee demonstrations because it did not trustthe police, who were seen as largely sympathetic to theRed Shirts. The government accused police of quietlydefying its orders.88 A senior government official de-scribed how the government could not order anyone

because the police would act like a state unto itself.89Some police were labelled tomatoes, signifying red.Many police recall with bitterness an operation on 7 Oc-tober 2008 when they were ordered by the Thaksin-alliedgovernment of Somchai Wongsawat to provide securityaround the parliament where the Yellow Shirts weredemonstrating. Day-long clashes resulted in two deathsand some 400 people injured. Police were widely con-demned for hurting innocent people and five senior policeofficers are facing criminal charges for supervising theoperation.90

87Crisis Group interview, retired army general, Bangkok, 25May 2010.88In the North East, police have provided assistance to the RedShirts, ranging from providing transportations and protectionfor UDD leaders to moving supplies and people to the Bangkok

protest site, to teaching them how to avoid army checkpoints.Some police saw the Red Shirt movement as a way to bringabout changes in their own low-paid organisation rife with

bribery and corruption. They want promotions based on meri-tocracy and not personal connections. Crisis Group interviews,

police officers and Red Shirt demonstrators, Bangkok andNakhon Rachasima, May-June 2010.89Crisis Group interview, a senior government official, Bang-kok, 28 June 2010.90The National Counter Corruption Commission broughtcriminal charges against five senior police officers, includingthe national police chief Gen. Patcharawat Wongsuwan, fortheir supervision of the operation. The Prime Minister SomchaiWongsawat and Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchai-


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C. THE JUDICIARY

The exercise of judicial power and the apparently selec-tive use of prosecutions have contributed to the effort todismantle Thaksins political power. The use of judicial

power to influence political changes during this conflict

has been unprecedented. Court rulings relating to Thaksinand his allies have led the Red Shirts to accuse the judici-ary of applying a double standard. As noted, judicialintervention in the political process began in May 2006,following the Kings advice to judges to use their author-ity to resolve the crisis. Since then:

The Constitutional Court and Administrative Courtannulled the April 2006 elections.

The Constitutional Court in May 2007 ordered thedissolution of Thaksins Thai Rak Thai party for vio-

lating the political party law.91

The Constitutional Court removed Prime MinisterSamak from power in September 2008 for conflict ofinterest after he accepted payments for hosting a TVcookery show while in office.

The Supreme Court for Criminal Cases of PoliticalPost Holders ordered Thaksin imprisoned for twoyears for conflict of interest in a land deal case in Oc-tober 2008.92

The Constitutional Court dissolved Thaksin-allied

People Power Party in December 2008 for committingelectoral fraud.

The Supreme Court for Criminal Cases of PoliticalPost Holders ruled in February 2010 that Thaksinabused his authority for personal enrichment and or-dered the seizure of 46 billion baht ($1.4 billion) outof 76.6 billion ($2.3 billion) frozen assets.93

While some welcome these rulings as judicial activism(thulakarnwipat) necessary to resolve the political crisis,others warn that these cases distorted fundamental legal

yudh were also charged. See NACC hits Somchai and Cha-valit with criminal suits, The Bangkok Post, 17 March 2009.91The Thai Rak Thai executive members hired small parties torun in the April 2006 elections to circumvent the 20 per centquorum required in a constituency where a candidate was notcontested.92On 21 October 2008, the Supreme Courts Criminal Divisionfor Political Office Holders sentenced Thaksin to two years in

prison. He was found guilty of abusing his authority while inoffice by facilitating a 2003 Rachadaphisek land deal for histhen wife Potjaman, to buy a 772-million-baht plot ($23 mil-lion) of land from the state. See Thaksin gets 2 years jail,The Nation, 22 October 2008.93Court to seize $1.4B from former Thai PM, CNN, 26 Feb-ruary 2010.

principles. The judiciarys role in recent years risks un-dermining its impartiality and credibility in the long term.A group of five legal experts from Bangkoks prestigiousThammasat University, led by Worajet Phakhirat, havecriticised the rulings related to Thaksin.

Regarding the 2006 elections, Worajet argued that therewas no serious breach of election regulations warrantingthe nullification. The courts ruled that the elections wereconducted too hastily and the positioning of polling

booths violated the principle of confidential voting.94 Wo-rajet called the 2007 ruling to disband the Thai Rak Thai

party a coup tat in the disguise of a court ruling. Heargued that coup leaders chose to disband Thaksins party

by constitutional means rather than exercise their directpowers so as to make it seem more legitimate. Worajetalso disagreed that all executive members should be heldresponsible for the violation of electoral laws by some

party members; nor should the party have been dissolved.He has made similar points regarding the 2008 court rul-ings that dissolved the People Power Party and two other

parties.95

As for Samaks removal, Worajet argued that the primeministers acceptance of a payment for hosting a televi-sion cooking show did not make him an employee ofthe company. There was also no evidence that such an actcaused any conflict of interest with his position.96

Two cases relating to the ruling Democrat Partys alleged

electoral irregularities, which could potentially see it disbanded, will likely be before the Constitutional Courtsoon and will be indicative of whether election laws are

being equally applied to all political parties. 97 Apart from

94, (: 2552), 1314. [Worajet Phak-hirat,Lighting Fire in the Wind(Bangkok,: 2009), pp. 13-14.]95Ibid, pp. 187-195, 281-291. Announcement of the Councilfor Democratic Reform No. 27, article 3 (the body of coupleaders established after the coup), dated 21 September 2006,stated that executive members of a disbanded party shall have

their right to run in elections revoked for five years. The courtdelivered a verdict in May 2007 to ban the Thai Rak Thai partyin a case relating to the April 2006 elections and its executivemembers were penalised. The order was applied retrospec-tively. Worajet has criticised the decision to apply the orderretroactively, arguing it violates legal principles.96Worajet Phakhirat, Lighting Fire in the Wind, op. cit., pp.296-303. For another critical scholarly work by a differentmember of the group of legal experts, see , (: 2552) [Piyabut Saengkanokkul,Under the Kings Prerogatives, Democracy and Judiciary(Bangkok: 2009)].97The Election Commission has recommended that the Democ-rat Party be dissolved for committing electoral fraud in twoseparate cases. One is the alleged misuse of 29 million baht in

public funds ($897,800) provided by the Election Commissionfor election campaigns, and the other is irregularities related to258 million baht donation ($7.9 million) from the TPI Polene,


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cases related to Thaksin and his allied parties, rank-and-file Red Shirts believe that the justice system is workingagainst them and applying a double standard. In par-ticular, they cite the long delay in prosecuting YellowShirts who seized the airports in December 2008. WhileYellow Shirt leaders have not been charged, Red Shirt

leaders were quickly detained and charged with terror-ism for their occupation of Rachaprasong area.98

D. THE YELLOW SHIRTS

The Peoples Alliance for Democracy, popularly calledthe Yellow Shirts, was formed in 2006 as a royalist-liberal alliance. While the conservative elites feared thatThaksins growing influence was threatening their power,the urban middle classes were concerned about his cor-rupt and autocratic rule. The PAD has gradually become a

potent conservative royalist force. While battling the pro-Thaksin government in 2008, the PAD proposed an ideaof new politics, with parliament containing 70 per centappointees and only 30 per cent elected representatives.The proposal, though later dropped, reflected the PADsweak faith in representative democracy and its preferencefor a system of virtuous rule by unelected traditional el-ites.

After the 10 April events, the Yellow Shirts called for thegovernment to take decisive measures to protect thenation and the monarchy, presenting themselves again as

defenders of the throne. They threatened to take action inseven days if the government failed to enforce the lawsand deal with terrorist acts associated with the Thaksinregime.99 The PADs demand came as thousands of pro-government supporters, dubbed multi-colour shirts,were rallying against the Red Shirts on Bangkok streets.Some alleged that the multi-colour shirts were YellowShirts in disguise. The show of strength by both groups atthe height of the Red Shirt protest raised concerns thatserious civil strife could erupt.

In June 2009, the PAD turned its loose network of mass

support into an organised political party called New

whose owner Prachai Liewphairat is a staunch opponent ofThaksin. See Democrats under fire after ruling, The BangkokPost, 13 April 2010.98The police summoned 36 Yellow Shirt leaders to hear thecharges in July 2009 but so far it has not sought arrest warrantsfrom the court. The police has delayed its request for arrestwarrants for several times. ..., (), 26 2553. [Police chiefhold off on arrest warrants on PAD for terrorism and airportseizure, claims need for reconsideration by legal section,

Matichon (online), 26 May 2010.]99The PADs statement, Be ready to assume the duty to pro-tect the nation and the monarchy, dated 18 April 2010, isavailable atManager(online)(www.manager.co.th).

Politics. The partys secretary-general Suriyasai Katasilasaid that the PAD and the party were like water and fish,with the latter needing the former to survive. He expectsthe new party to be small, with between twenty and 30seats in the future parliament.100

Despite having its own party, the PAD continues to be apotent force in extra-parliamentary politics. Sondhi Lim-thongkul, the New Politics Partys head and the most

prominent Yellow Shirts leader, resigned from the partysleadership in May 2010 and pledged to fully resume hisrole in the PAD. After his resignation, the ultra-royalistSondhi, speaking on his ASTV cable channel, attackedthe Democrat Party and the military for being too lenienttowards the Red Shirts and for failing to defend the re-vered monarchy. He called for Abhisit to step back from

politics for three years and return the power to the Kingand have a new government formed to undertake the

process of political and social reform.101

100Crisis Group interview, Suriyasai Katasila, the New PoliticsPartys secretary-general, Bangkok, 27 May 2010.101... -., (), 14 2553 [ Sondhi resigned from NewsPolitics Partys leader, proposed a revolution to bring peopletogether to reform country,Manager(online), 14 May 2010].Sondhi said that he kept his promise to step down after assist-ing the party during the initial stage, adding that the laws gov-erning political parties and his role as the partys head prohib-ited him from speaking his mind.


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V. THE RED SHIRTS

The UDD is a diverse network of groups that have beendrawn into the movement as much by their political andeconomic aspirations as by their admiration for Thaksin.Its leadership is far from united, and the moderate and thehard-line camps have had heated internal conflicts. Therelationship of the "men in black" with the larger move-ment remains unclear, though the government claims theyare allies. Regardless of their affiliation, the appearanceof armed men among Red Shirt ranks, perceived by someRed Shirts to be helpful, has been detrimental to themovement and made possible a tough government re-sponse.

A. THE UDDS LEADERS AND MEMBERS

The United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship wasformed in 2007 as an alliance of the anti-coup and pro-Thaksin forces. There are various personalities involvedin the UDDs campaigns, ranging from Thaksin-allied

politicians, pro-democracy activists, labour union activ-ists, ex-communists, community radio announcers, andsoldiers. The Red Shirts frame their movement as a strug-gle between ammart(aristocratic elite) and prai (com-moner). The majority of Red Shirt supporters are urbanand rural poor, who have been at the margin of economicdevelopment. The gap between the rich and the poor inThailand is large but poor Thais are facing relative ratherthan abject poverty. Average household income in Bang-kok is five times higher than that of Mae Hong Son, thecountrys poorest province in the North where the aver-age household income is 7,245 baht ($221) per month.The North East has the highest incidence of poverty in thecountry.102 Thaksins populist policies, such as low-costhealth care and micro-credit, addressed day-to-day needsin way no government had before.

Since the 2006 coup, hundreds of Red Shirt groups haveemerged in the North and North East, loosely organisedthrough the patronage network of Thaksin-supported po-litical parties as well as other social networks. In ruralareas, community radio is used to educate the Red Shirtsas well as mobilise them. Several of the movementsleaders in the provinces are radio announcers. KhwanchaiPhraiphana, a radio host in the north-eastern province ofUdon Thani, became one of the most prominent UDDleaders. The government alleges that radio programs haveincited the Red Shirts to rise up against the so-called am-mart. These local stations are hard to monitor and it is

102See United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Thai-land Human Development Report 2009: Human Security, To-day and Tomorrow (Bangkok, 2010), p. 123.

unclear whether they have just used their broadcasts togalvanise support for legitimate political activities orwhether they have ever incited violence. Whatever thecontent, these networks have allowed the Red Shirts toquickly and effectively mobilise their supporters to joindemonstrations.

In September 2009, the movement adopted new tactics. Itopenly launched a UDD political school to educate itsfollowers to support its objectives.103 Nisit Sinthuphrai, aUDD leader and former executive member of the dis-

banded PPP, was the director of the UDD politicalschool.104 Training sessions lasting one or two days wereconducted in several provinces in the centre, North and

North East. Teachers were UDD leaders who focusedtheir lessons on democracy, organising techniques, non-violent struggle, team work and political analysis.105 Atleast 16,700 activists attended these training sessions.106

103The first two-day training of the UDD political school (inThai, rongrean pathibatngan nor por cho daeng thang pang-din) was conducted on 12-13 September 2009 and attended bysome 1,200 Red Shirt followers in Bangkok and nearby prov-inces. , :.,, 19 25 2552. [Jaran Dittha-aphichai, Road todemocracy: UDD school to produce red teachers,Lokwanni-wansuk Weekly Magazine, 19-15 September 2009].104 Nisit surrendered to the police after the 19 May crackdownand is under detention.105, :.,, 1925 2552. [Jaran Dittha-aphichai, Road to de-mocracy: UDD school to produce red teachers,Lokwanniwan-suk Weekly Magazine, 19-15 September 2009]. For example,

Natthawut Saikuea taught democracy, Dr Waeng Tojirakanmobilisation and network building, Wiphuthalaeng Pat-thanaphumthai aristocratic regime, Wisa Khanthap non-violentstruggle for democracy, Jaran Dittha-aphichai teamwork andscience, and Adisorn Phaengket, Woraphon Phrommikabut andJatuporn Phromphan political analysis. Wisa is a left-leaning

poet and singer who was among the young activists that joinedthe democracy movement in the 1970s, popularly known as the

October generation. Adisorn Paengkaet, Waeng Tojirakanand Jaran Dittha-aphichai are also from the October genera-tion. Adisorn is a veteran politician, who was banned from

politics for five years along with other Thai Rak Thai politi-cians. Waeng is a medical doctor by profession and a veterandemocracy activist. Jaran previously taught social science atRangsit University and is a former NHRC commissioner; hewas forced to resign in 2007 after he joined the UDD protests.Woraphon Phrommikabut is a former dean of Thammasat Uni-versitys Faculty of Sociology and Anthropology, while Wi-

phuthalaeng Patthanaphumthai was a leader of anti-coup groupcalled kon wansao mai-ao phadetkan (Saturday People AgainstDictatorship), which later joined the UDD.106Crisis Group interview, a Puea Thai parliamentarian, Chai-yaphum, 28 May 2010. Also see , , 112553. [Jatuporn ignored governments pres-sure, insisted to continue protest, Komchadluek, 11 May2010].


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The UDD leadership is far from united and at times itsdisagreements have broken into heated public argumentsin the media. The Samkler(trio) Veera Musikaphong,Jatuporn Phromphan and Natthawut Saikuea hasdominated the UDD campaigns from the outset. Veera isa veteran politician who was among the 111 Thai Rak

Thai executive members banned from politics for fiveyears; Jatuporn is a Puea Thai parliamentarian; and Nat-thawut a former spokesman of Samak government. Thetrio themselves could not agree on how to respond to thegovernment offer of a roadmap to reconciliation in earlyMay: Veera and Nattawut were in favour of it, whileJatuporn was opposed.107 In March, these moderates wereseverely criticised by the more hard-line camp, namelyrenegade general Seh Daeng, and Daeng Siam (RedSiam) led by ex-communist Surachai Danwathananu-sorn.108

Authorities suspected that Seh Daeng was involved inseveral grenade attacks against government-related tar-gets that took place in and around Bangkok during RedShirt rallies. They saw Red Siams campaign as having anexplicit republican tone. Seh Daengs violent image andRed Siams radical tone became liabilities for the UDD,which had already been accused of attempting to over-throw the monarchy. Veera publicly disowned both, stat-ing that their strategy was not in line with the UDDsnon-violent principles.109

Red Siam disagreed strongly with the trio about campaignstrategies. Surachai criticised them for having made sev-eral strategic mistakes that had led to failure. He arguedthat Red Siam did not promote a republican system butrather a democratic one, in which the monarchy plays afigurehead role and is not involved in politics. He calledthe reform path pursued by the trio a failure and saidthe Red Shirts had to pursue a revolutionary path.110

With the violent crackdown at Rachaprasong, they areunlikely to continue leading the Red Shirts. All face ter-rorism charges. Veera and Natthawut are in detention,while Jatuporn has been granted bail. Others said to besecond-tier UDD leaders have also been arrested or fled

107Crisis Group interviews, Red Shirt leaders and informedacademics, May 2010.108The formal leader of Red Siam is Jakkrapob Penkair.Jakkrapob, a former TV presenter and minister in the Samakgovernment, was one of the original leaders of the UDD duringits struggle in 2006-2007. He went into exile after facing alsemajest charge in 2008.109Veera made the announcement at Phan Fa bridge, 17 March2010. The transcript of his speech is available atwww.voicetv.co.th.110Interview with Surachai Danwatthananusorn on the Intelli-gence program by Jom Phetpradap, 30March 2010, availableat www.voicetv.co.th/content/10519/.

and face similar terrorism charges. Arisman Phongruan-grong, a pop singer-turned-politician who joined a Thak-sin-supported party, and Suphorn Atthawong (aka RamboIsan), who has been associated with Thaksin-supported

parties, are on the run. The radio host Khwanchai is indetention. The DSI has filed terrorism charges against at

least 53 Red Shirt leaders, including Thaksin.111 The of-fence is punishable by death. Now on the defensive, localRed Shirt leaders are keeping a low profile as they fearfurther arrests.112

It is extremely difficult for the Red Shirts to carry out any political activity while the emergency law remains inforce in Bangkok and 23 other provinces, about one thirdof the country.Any political gathering of more than five

people is banned and some Red Shirts were rounded upfor staging small rallies. The government has not givenany clear indication of when it will lift the emergency

law, which is up for renewal on 7 July. Red Siam leaderSurachai said that his group would launch a new strug-gle as soon as the law is revoked.113 It is unclear howmuch

icg thailands deep divide

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