icc kenya request for authorisation pursuant art15

7/28/2019 ICC Kenya Request for Authorisation Pursuant Art15

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No.ICC 01/09 1/42 26November2009

Original:English No.:ICC01/09

Date:26November2009

PRETRIALCHAMBERII

Before:

JudgeEkaterina

Trendafilova,

Presiding

Judge

JudgeHansPeterKaul

JudgeCunoTarfusser

SITUATIONINTHEREPUBLICOFKENYA

PublicDocument

RequestforauthorisationofaninvestigationpursuanttoArticle15

Source: OfficeoftheProsecutor

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Documenttobenotifiedinaccordancewithregulation31oftheRegulationsoftheCourtto:TheOfficeoftheProsecutor CounselfortheDefence

LegalRepresentativesoftheVictims LegalRepresentativesoftheApplicants

UnrepresentedVictims UnrepresentedApplicants

(Participation/Reparation)

TheOfficeofPublicCounselfor

Victims

TheOfficeofPublicCounselforthe

Defence

StatesRepresentatives

REGISTRY

AmicusCuriae

Registrar

MsSilvanaArbia

DeputyRegistrar

DefenceSupportSection

VictimsandWitnessesUnit DetentionSection

VictimsParticipationandReparations

Section

Other

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I.Introduction

The Prosecutor hereby requests authorization from the PreTrial Chamber to

proceedwithaninvestigationintothesituationintheRepublicofKenyainrelation

to thepostelectionviolenceof20072008,pursuant toArticle15(3)of theRome

Statute.

For the purpose of this application, the Prosecutor has relied on a selected

number of reliable andpublicly available reports on alleged crimes committed

duringthepostelectionviolenceinKenya,inparticularthereportspublishedby:

the Commission of Inquiry into PostElection Violence; the Kenyan National

CommissiononHumanRights (KNCHR); theOfficeof theHighCommissioner

forHumanRights;UNICEF,UNFPA,UNIFEMandChristianChildrensFund;

theUNSpecialRapporteuronextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutions;the

OscarFoundation;theFederationofWomenLawyers(FIDAK);CentreforRights

EducationandAwareness(CREAW),HumanRightsWatch;andtheInternational

Crisis Group. To date, the Prosecutor has received 30 communications from

individuals, groups and others regarding information on crimes within the

jurisdiction of theCourt in relation to the situation in the Republic of Kenya

pursuanttoArticle15(2)oftheStatute.

The Prosecutor submits that there is a reasonablebasis tobelieve that crimes

against humanitywithin thejurisdiction of the Courtwere committed in the

contextofthepostelectionviolenceof20072008,inparticularcrimesofmurder,

rape and other forms of sexual violence, deportation or forcible transfer of

populationandotherinhumaneacts.Duetotheabsenceofnationalproceedings

relating to thosebearing thegreatest responsibility for these crimes,and in the

lightof thegravityof theactscommitted, theProsecutorsubmits that thecases

thatwould arise from its investigation of the situationwouldbe admissible.

Furthermore,basedontheavailableinformation,theProsecutorhasnoreasonto

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believethattheopeningofaninvestigationintothesituationwouldnotbeinthe

interestsofjustice.

PursuanttoRegulation49oftheRegulationsofCourt,theApplicationincludes1)

astatementoffactsindicatingthelocationofthecrimes,timeperiod,andtothe

extentpossible,thepersonsinvolved,2)theDeclarationoftheProsecutor(Annex

1E),3)achronologyofrelevantevents (Annex1C),4)amap that illustrates the

relevant locations (Annex 1B), 5) an explanatoryglossary of relevantnamesof

persons,locationsandinstitutions(Annex1D)and6)pursuanttoRule50,public

noticetothevictimsdated23November2009(Annex1F).

II.ProceduralHistory

1. Byletterof5November2009,theProsecutornotifiedthePresidentoftheCourt,inaccordancewithRegulation45oftheRegulationsoftheCourtofhisintention

to submit a request for the authorisation of an investigation into the situation

pursuanttoArticle15(3)oftheRomeStatute.

2. On6November2009, thePresidencyof theCourtassigned the situation in theRepublicofKenyatoPreTrialChamberII.

III.Background

3. Thesituation intheRepublicofKenyahasbeenunderpreliminaryexaminationsince the violence erupted in the context of national elections held on 27

December2007.

4. On 30 December 2007, the closely contested presidential elections in Kenyaresulted inadeclarationby theElectoralCommissionofKenya that incumbent

PresidentMwaiKibakiofthePartyofNationalUnity(PNU)wasreelectedover

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themainoppositioncandidateRailaOdingaoftheOrangeDemocraticMovement

(ODM).Thistriggeredaseriesofviolentdemonstrations,andtargetedattacksin

severallocationswithinKenya.1

5. On5February2008,theProsecutorissuedapublicstatementrecallingthatKenyaisaStatePartytotheRomeStatute,andthattheOfficewillcarefullyconsiderall

information relating to alleged crimeswithin itsjurisdiction committed on the

territory of States Parties or by nationals of States Parties, regardless of the

individualsorgroupallegedtohavecommittedthecrime.2

6. On28February2008,internationalmediationeffortsledbyKofiAnnan,ChairoftheAfricanUnionPanelofEminentAfricanPersonalities,resultedinthesigning

of a powersharing agreement between Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila

OdingaasPrimeMinister.Theagreement,alsoestablishedthreecommissions:(1)

theCommissionof InquiryonPostElectionViolence; (2) theTruth,Justiceand

ReconciliationCommission;and(3)theIndependentReviewCommissiononthe

GeneralElectionsheldinKenyaon27December2007.3

7. By lettersdated 6March 2008, actingpursuant toArticle 15(2), theProsecutorrequested additional information from selected sources for the purpose of

analysingtheseriousnessoftheinformationreceived,namely:theGovernmentof

Kenya, theKenyaHumanRightsCommission, theKenyaNationalCommission

onHumanRights (KNCHR), and theoppositionparty, theOrangeDemocratic

Movement(ODM).

1HumanRightsWatch(HRW),FromBallotstoBullets,March2008,KENOTP00010248toKENOTP00010330,p.4(Annex

3); InternationalCrisisGroup (ICG), Kenya inCrisis,21 February 2008,KENOTP00011076 toKENOTP00011114,p. 1

(Annex6).2OTPStatementinrelationtoeventsinKenya,05February2008(Annex13)3AgreementonthePrinciplesofPartnershipoftheCoalitionGovernment(Annex21),andTheNationalAccordand

ReconciliationAct2008,(Annex22).

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8. On26August2008,inresponsetoitsrequest,theProsecutionreceivedacopyofthereportfromtheKNCHRentitled,OntheBrinkofthePrecipice:aHumanRights

AccountofKenyasPost2007ElectionViolence.4

9. On 15October 2008 theCommissionof Inquiry into thePostElectionViolence(CIPEV) also known as theWaki Commission, named after its chairJustice

PhilipWakiofKenyasCourtofAppeal publisheditsFinalReport.5TheReport

recommended thesettingupofaspecial tribunal toseekaccountabilityagainst

personsbearingthegreatestresponsibilityforcrimes,particularlycrimesagainst

humanity, relating to the 2007 General Elections in Kenya. Short of the

establishment of such a Special Tribunal, theWaki commission recommended

forwardingtotheProsecutoroftheICCthelist,placedunderthecustodyofthe

PanelofEminentAfricanPersonalities, containingnamesof those suspected to

bearthegreatestresponsibilityforthesecrimesandtorequesttheProsecutorto

analyze the seriousnessof this informationwith aview toproceedingwith an

investigationandpossibleprosecution.6

10.On 16December 2008,PresidentKibaki andPrimeMinisterOdinga agreed toimplement the recommendations of theWaki Commission and specifically to

prepare and submit a Bill to the National Assembly to establish the Special

Tribunaltoseekaccountabilityagainstpersonsbearingthegreatestresponsibility

for crimes, particularly crimes against humanity, relating to the 2007 General

ElectionsinKenya.7

4KenyanNationalCommissiononHumanRights(KNCHR),Onthebrinkoftheprecipice:aHumanRightsaccountof

Kenyaspost2007electionviolence,15Aug08,KENOTP00010002toKENOTP00010245(Annex4).5CommissionofInquiryintoPostElectionViolence(CIPEV),FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKEN

OTP00010892(Annex5)6CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,pp.472473(Annex5)7KenyaStateHouseStatement,SpecialTribunaltobesetup,17December2008,(Annex25).

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11.On 11 February 2009, the Prosecutor publicly reaffirmed that the situation inKenyawasbeingmonitoredbyhisOffice.8

12.On12February2009, theKenyanParliamentdidnotadopttheConstitutionofKenya (Amendment)Bill2009whichwasnecessary toensure that theSpecial

TribunalwouldbeinaccordancewiththeConstitution.9SincetheConstitutional

AmendmentBillwasnotadopted,theBillestablishingtheSpecialTribunalwas

notdiscussedfurther.10

13.On3031March2009,theOfficeoftheProsecutorattendedameetingconvenedin Genevaby the KofiAnnan Foundation on the KenyaNationalDialogue and

Reconciliation and held consultations with various officials and civil society

representativesfromKenyaaboutthepossibilityofcreatingthetribunalreferred

tobytheWakiCommission.

14.On 3July2009, at the seatof theCourt, theProsecutormetwith adelegationfromtheGovernmentofKenyacomposedofHon.MutulaKilonzo,Ministerof

JusticeandConstitutional Affairs,Hon.JamesOrengo,MinisterofLands;Hon.

AmosWako; Hon.William Cheptumo, AssistantMinister of Justice; Amb.

Amina Mohamed, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice and

Constitutional Affairs; Mr. Miguna Miguna, Prime Ministers adviser on

Coalition Affairs; and H.E. Ruthie Rono, the Kenyan Ambassador to the

Netherlands. The Prosecutor reiterated that his Office was conducting a

preliminary examination of the situation inKenya and that crimes allegedly

committedafterthe2007electionsmayfallwithin thejurisdictionof theICC.

TheProsecutorand the representativesof theKenyanauthoritiesagreed that

impunitywas not an option.Themeeting resulted inAgreedMinutes stating

8OTPKenyaFactsheet,ICCProsecutorreaffirmsthatthesituationinKenyaismonitoredbyhisoffice,11February2009

(Annex14).9TheConstitutionofKenya(Amendment)Bill2009,28January2009.StateHouse, ParliamentrejectsalocalSpecialTribunal ,

12February2009(Annex26).10SpecialTribunalforKenyaBill,2009,28January2009(Annex24).

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that theKenyan delegation agreed to provide the Prosecutor,by the end of

September 2009, with a report on the current status of investigations and

prosecutions arising out of postelection violence; information onmeasures

put in place to ensure the safety of victims andwitnesses; information on

modalities for conducting national investigations and prosecutions of those

responsible for the 2007violence through a special tribunal or otherjudicial

mechanism adopted by the Kenyan Parliament. In the alternative, the

Government of Kenya was to refer the situation to the Prosecutor in

accordancewithArticle14oftheRomeStatute.11

15.On9July2009,theAfricanUnionPanelofEminentAfricanPersonalities,chairedbyKofiAnnan,announceditssubmissiontotheProsecutorofasealedenvelope

containing a list of persons allegedly implicated and supporting materials

previouslyentrustedtoMr.AnnanbytheWakiCommissiononthepostelection

violence.12On16July2009,Prosecutorreceivedthesealedenvelopeandsixboxes

containingdocumentsandsupportingmaterialcompiledbytheCommission.The

Prosecutoropenedthesealedenvelope,examineditscontentandresealedit.13

16.On14July2009,theProsecutionreceivedfromtheKenyanGovernmentcopiesofthefollowingtworeports:(i)ReporttotheHon.AttorneyGeneralbytheTeamonthe

Review of Post Election Violence related in Western, Nyanza, Central, Rift Valley,

Eastern, Coast andNairobi Provinces, February 2009; and (ii) StatusReport on the

OperationalizationoftheWitnessProtectionProgramme.14

17.On 26August 2009, theConstitution ofKenya (Amendment) (No. 3)Bill 2009aimingattheestablishmentofaspecialtribunalwasgazetted,enablingthebillto

11AgreedMinutesofMeetingof3July2009betweentheICCProsecutorandtheDelegationoftheKenyanGovernment(Annex

15).12OTPPressRelease,ICCProsecutorreceivesSealedEnvelopefromKofiAnnanonPostElectionViolenceinKenya,9July

2009(Annex16).OTPPressRelease,WakiCommissionlistofnamesinthehandsofICCProsecutor,16July2009(Annex17).13OTPPressRelease,WakiCommissionlistofnamesinthehandsofICCProsecutor,16July2009(Annex17).OTPPress

Release,ICCProsecutorreceivesmaterialonPostElectionViolenceinKenya,16July2009(Annex18).14OTPPressRelease,ICCProsecutorreceivesmaterialonPostElectionViolenceinKenya,16July2009(Annex18).

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be formally debated in Parliament.15 It was initiated by Gitobu Imanyara,

Member of Parliament, and is based on the premise that those bearing the

greatestresponsibilityforcrimescommittedduringthepostelectionviolencewill

beprosecutedbytheICCandthe lowerlevelperpetratorswillbeprosecutedat

theSpecialTribunalforKenya.16

18.On18September2009,theProsecutorheldaroundtablediscussionattheseatoftheCourtwithrepresentativesfromKenyancivilsociety.17

19.On9October2009,inaccordancewiththeJulyreunion,theProsecutorrequestedameetingwiththeKenyanauthoritiestoinformthemaboutthenextstepsthathe

wasgoingtotake.

20.On27October2009,theProsecutorsentalettertoKenyanauthoritiesexplainingthatthepreliminaryexaminationof thecrimescommitted inthecontextofpost

election violence in Kenya has revealed that acts constituting crimes against

humanitymighthavebeencommitted,thattherearenorelevantnationaljudicial

enquiries and the gravity threshold establishedby the Statute is reached. The

letterexplainedthatthereweretwooptionsforinitiatinganinvestigation,namely

a referral from the Kenyan Government or an independent decision of the

Prosecutor to request authorization from the PreTrial Chamber to start an

investigation.18

21.On5November2009,theProsecutormetwithPresidentMwaiKibakiandPrimeMinisterRailaOdinga inNairobi. TheProsecutor informed them that sinceall

the statutory criteria are fulfilled itwas hisduty to open an investigation and

requestedthecooperationoftheKenyanationalauthoritieswiththeCourt. The

Prosecutor recalled the complementary roles of the ICC and the national

15ConstitutionofKenya(Amendment)(No.3)Bill2009,24August2009(Annex27).16ConstitutionofKenya(Amendment)(No.3)Bill2009,24August2009,pp.12(Annex27)17OTPPressRelease,ICCProsecutor:KenyaCanBeanExampletotheWorld,18September2009(Annex19).18TheOfficeoftheProsecutorcanprovideacopyofthislettertotheChamber.

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authorities incombating impunity.Inajointpressconferencethesameday,the

Prosecutorannouncedhis intention torequestauthorization toproceedwithan

investigation into the situation of the Republic of Kenya.19 The President and

PrimeMinisterissuedajointstatementbywhichtheyrecalledtheirconstructive

meeting with the Prosecutor. The Government noted that it remains fully

committedtodischargeitsresponsibilityinaccordancewiththeRomeStatuteto

establish a localjudicialmechanism to dealwith the perpetrators of the post

electionviolence,andthatitremainscommittedtocooperatewiththeICCwithin

theframeworkoftheRomeStatuteandtheKenyanInternationalCrimesAct.20

22.On two successive occasions in November 2009, the bill drafted by GitobuImanyara couldnotbedebated in theKenyanParliamentdue to the lack of a

quorum.21

IV.EvaluationofInformation

23.TheProsecutionhasevaluatedtheinformationavailable,hasdeterminedthattheinformationreceived isreliable,andhasconcluded that it indicates thatserious

crimes were committed. This Application identifies the information, cites its

sourcesandattachesasannexesthepertinentdocuments.

24.For the purpose of this Application the Prosecution provides the followingsummaryofthemainfindingsofthesereports.

CommissionofInquiryintoPostElectionViolence(CIPEV)

25.TheCommissionofEnquiryintoPostElectionViolence(CIPEV) alsoknownastheWakiCommissionafterthenameofitsChair,JudgePhilipWaki,judgeof

KenyasCourt ofAppeal was setup in accordancewith theKenyaNational

19KenyanauthoritiescommittedtocooperateasICCProsecutorinformsthemthatinDecemberhewillrequestICCJudgesto

openaninvestigationintopostelectionviolence(06Nov09)(Annex20).20StatementbyHEthePresidentandtheRightHonorablePrimeMinister,5November2009(Annex28).21TheStandard, MPssnubImanyaraBilldebate,yetagain ,19Nov09(Annex32)

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Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord of February 28, 2008, negotiatedby Kofi

AnnanandthePanelofEminentAfricanPersonalities.

26.TheCommissionwascomposedof two internationalmembersandoneKenyancitizen, selectedby the Panel or EminentAfrican Personalities in consultation

withPNU andODM and appointedby thePresident. TheCIPEVwas anon

judicialbodymandatedto(i)investigatethefactsandcircumstancessurrounding

theviolencebetween28December2007and28February2008,(ii)investigatethe

conductofStatesecurityagencies in theirhandlingof itand(iii) torecommend

measureswithregardtobringingtojusticethosepersonsresponsibleforcriminal

acts.TheCommissionwassetupon23May2007andtookanoathofofficeon3

June2008.TheCommissionhadan initialmandateof threemonthswhichwas

extended for an additional onemonth and finally an additional twoweeks to

draftthereport.Becauseofthelimitedextensiongranted,theCommissionlacked

thetimetoexaminealltheareaswhereallegationsofcrimeemerged.

27.TheCIPEVinterviewedgovernmentofficials,representativesofthemainpoliticalparties, security agents, NGOs, representatives of religious and faith based

organisations,regionalpoliticalactorsandordinarycitizensinpublicandclosed

hearings.TheFinalreportoftheCIPEVwaspublishedon15October2008.

28.The Report comprises 5 Parts. Part I of the Report is an introduction whichdiscussesthehistoricalcontextoftheviolence.PartIIisanarrationoftheviolence

provincebyprovince.PartIIIdealswithfourcrosscuttingissues:sexualviolence,

internallydisplacedpersons,themediaandthenatureandimpactoftheviolence.

Part IVdealswith acts andomissions of state security agencies and impunity.

PartVcontainsrecommendationsmadewithaviewto thepreventionoffuture

reoccurrenceoflargescaleviolence;theinvestigationofallegedperpetrators;and

howtotacklethecultureofimpunity.

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KenyanNationalCommissiononHumanRights (KNCHR),On thebrinkof

the precipice: a Human Rights account of Kenyas post2007 election

violence(15August2008)

29.The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) is anindependent

national

human

rights

institution

established

by

the

governmentof Kenya throughanActof Parliamentin2002. Themandate

of theKNCHR is toenhance thepromotionandprotectionofhuman rights in

Kenya.KNCHRwasaccreditedby theInternationalCoordinatingCommitteeof

NationalHumanRightsInstitutions,whichisbasedinGenevaattheOfficeofthe

HighCommissionerforHumanRights,asaCategoryAinstitution.

30.BetweenFebruaryandJune2008,KNCHRteamscomprisingcommissionersandstaff undertook over 36 missions to more than 136 constituencies across the

country, selected in order to ensure a representative geographic spread across

thoseareasofthecountrythatwereaffectedbythepostelectionviolence.During

this period, 1,102 statements from Kenyans of all ethnicities were gathered,

including farmers, IDPs, public officials, security personnel, religious and

political leaders, elders, etc. The second phase of thework of the commission

consistedintheanalysisoftheinformationgathered.

31.Thereportof theKNCHRon the investigationof thepostelectionviolencewasreleasedonthe15thofAugust2008.Thereportcompriseseightchaptersdevoted

respectively to : themethodology used during the investigation; background

informationabout thepostelectionviolence;howviolenceoccurred in themain

theatresofconflict,namely theCentral,Coast,Nairobi,CentralRift,SouthRift,

NorthRift,Nyanza,andWesternregions;ananalysisofthenationaltrendsand

patterns of postelection violence; the responsibility of those who planned,

organised,financedandexecutedtheviolenceunderdomesticand international

law; the applicable human rights standards and their implications for the

violence;conclusionsandrecommendations.

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Officeof theHighCommissionerforHumanRights (OHCHR), Reportfrom

OHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya (628February2008)

32.Between6and28February2008, theUNOfficeof theHighCommissioner forHumanRights(OHCHR)dispatchedafactfindingcommissionthatinvestigated

allegationsofhuman rightsviolationsTheensuing Report fromOHCHRFact

finding Mission to Kenya, 628 February 2008 provides an analysis on the

context, thepatterns aswell as a list of human rightsviolations.TheOHCHR

Missionconductedonsitevisitstotheaffectedareasandmetwithawiderange

ofactorsintheGovernment,amongtheopposition,andmetwithvictims,human

rightsdefendersaswellasthediplomaticcommunity.TheOHCHRMissionalso

analysed underlying civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights issues

andformulatedrecommendationsonpossibleaccountabilitymechanisms.

Office for theCoordination ofHumanitarianAffairs (OCHA)Humanitarian

reportupdates

33.In response to the postelectoral violence in Kenya, the UN Office for theCoordination

of

Humanitarian

Affairs

(OCHA)

has

expanded

the

staff

in

their

Kenya offices and has produced a series of publicly available humanitarian

updatesentitledHumanitarianReportupdatesforKenya.

34.TheProsecutionsapplicationrefersto4differentHumanitarianUpdatevolumescoveringtheperiodsbetween21and28January2008;11and15February2008;23

and

27

February

2008

and

8

to

30

October

2009.

UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM and Christian Childrens Fund, A Rapid

AssessmentofGenderBasedViolence(GBV)duringthepostelectionviolence

inKenya (JanFeb08)

35.Thereportconsists inan interagencygenderbasedviolenceassessmentcarriedoutinJanuaryandFebruary2008inselectedsitesintheNorthRiftValley,South

RiftValley, theCoastalRegion,Nairobi andCentral Province. The assessment

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examinedthenatureandscopeofsexualviolenceoccurringduringflight,aswell

as within the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and alternative

settlements.

Report of theUNSpecialRapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary

executions Missionto Kenya (26May09)

36.PhilipAlston,theUNSpecialRapporteuronextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutionsvisitedtheKenyanprovincesofNairobi,RiftValleyProvince(Nakuru,

Eldoret andKiambaa),WesternProvinceBungoma andKapsokwony),Nyanza

Province(Kisumu),andCentralProvince(Nyeri)from16to25February2009in

order to: ascertain the types and causes of extrajudicial killings; investigate

whether those responsible for such killings are held to account; and propose

constructivemeasurestoreducetheincidenceofkillingsandimpunity.Themain

focus was on extrajudicial killings by the police, violence in the Mt Elgon

District, and killings in the postelection period. The Special Rapporteur

concludedthoseresponsibleforthepostelectionviolence,includingthosepolice

responsibleforextrajudicialexecutions,andofficialswhoorganizedorinstigated

violence,remainimmunefromprosecution.

OscarFoundation(Oscar),EthnicityandaFailedDemocracy(February2008)

37.Oscar is anNGO registered inKenya.Most of their sources are fromjudicialorgans.ThereportentitledEthnicityandaFailedDemocracywaspublishedin

February2008andfocusesontheleaduptotheeruptionofpostelectionviolence

andthecrimescommitted inthatcontext.Thereport wasdraftedbyateamof

paralegals who collected the information from six Provinces in Kenya and

worked in collaborationwith the staff at theOscarFoundationFreeLegalAid

ClinicKenya(OFFLACK).

FederationofWomenLawyers(FIDAK),SubmissiontotheCIPEVonbehalf

oftheInterAgencyGenderBasedViolence(GBV)(11September2008)

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38.The Federation of Women Lawyers is a nongovernmental organization ofwomen lawyers and law students which focuses on discrimination against

women. It runs aid clinics and community action groups. FidaK presented a

submissiontoTheCommissionofInquiryonbehalfoftheInterAgencyGender

Based Violence (GBV) SubCluster, which coordinates gender based violence

prevention and response following the post election violence. It is chairedby

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and co/chaired by the national

CommissiononGenderandDevelopment.

39.The submission, which has beenmade public by the SubCluster, addressedsexualviolence ingeneral,includingconductthatmaybedeemedopportunistic

anddomesticviolence.Itnotonlyaddressessexualviolenceagainstwomenbut

also refers to sexual violence against men. It addresses general patterns of

violence, highlighting a few specific accounts from victims. The report also

addresses the consequences of sexual violence, the issues of domestic and

internationallawraised,anddrawsrecommendations.

CentreforRightsEducationandAwareness(CREAW),WomenPaidthePrice

(2008)

40.TheCentre forRights Education andAwareness (CREAW) is aKenyanNGOworking on womens rights, including raising awareness against sexual and

genderbasedviolence.

41.CREAWconductedastudybetweenthe lastweekofJanuary2008and25April2008 infiveareaswithIDPcamps(Nairobi,Naivasha,Nakuru,BurntForesand

Eldoret)andproducedadocumententitledWomenPaidthePrice.Amongstits

objectives,thestudysoughttounderstandthemaincausesandconsequencesof

sexual and genderbased violence during the post election violence, through a

combinedmethodology: a survey, case studies, indepths interviews and focus

groupdiscussionswithIDPsfromdifferentethnicgroups.Theinvestigationalso

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gatheredinformationfromtheNairobiWomensHospital(NWH),refugeecamps

inNairobiandothersources.Itaddressessexualviolencecommittedduringpost

electionviolence,butalsosexualviolenceinIDPcamps.

HumanRightsWatch,FromBallotstoBullets(March2008)

42.HumanRightsWatchproduced five reports /pressbriefs relating to thepostelectionviolence,principalamongwhichisthereportentitledBallotstoBullets

Organized PoliticalViolence andKenyasCrisis ofGovernance, datedMarch

2008. ThisreportisbasedontworesearchmissionstoKenyaduringJanuaryand

February2008.Researchersconductedover200interviewswithawidevarietyof

actors, includingvictims,witnesses,perpetrators,police,magistrates,diplomats,

Kenyan and international NGO staff, journalists, lawyers, businessmen, local

councillors,andmembersofparliamentacrossthecountry,fromallmajorethnic

groups, by phone and in person. Interviews were conducted in English and

Swahiliwithouttranslators.HumanRightsWatchalsoexaminedcourtrecordsin

Naivasha. Researchers visited the following areas: Nairobi, Kisumu, Kitale,

Eldoret,Naivasha,Nakuru,andMolo.

InternationalCrisisGroup(ICG),KenyainCrisis,(21Feb08)

43.The International Crisis Group is an institute that carries out analysis andprovides advice on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict to

governments and intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations, the

EuropeanUnionandtheWorldBank.

44.ICGhasproducedonereportonpostelectionviolenceinKenya,entitledKenyainCrisisdated21February2008.Thisreportprovidescontextualanalysisofthe

violence relaying the tensions thatexistbetweendifferentcommunitiesand the

surroundingcomplexitieswhichhave laid thebasisfor the interethnicviolence

toerupt. KenyainCrisisisbasedoninterviewswithawiderangeofsources,

including eyewitnesses, and members of the Electoral Commission of Kenya

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No.ICC 01/09 17/42 26November2009

(ECK), theKenyanRedCrossand theKenyanpolice,and includes information

concerning the indoctrinationandviolentrhetoric thatpreceded theeruptionof

violence.

V.Jurisdiction

45.Article 15 of the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor may initiateinvestigationsproprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the

jurisdictionoftheCourt.Pursuanttoparagraph3ofArticle15,iftheProsecutor

concludes that there is a reasonablebasis toproceedwith an investigation, he

shall submit to the PreTrial Chamber a request for authorization of an

investigation, togetherwith any supportingmaterial collected. Rule 48 of the

RulesofProcedureandEvidenceprovidesthatindeterminingwhetherthereisa

reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under Article 15(3), the

ProsecutorshallconsiderthefactorssetoutinArticle53,paragraph1(a)to(c).

46.Article 53(1)(a) provides that the Prosecutor shall consider whether theinformationavailabletotheProsecutorprovidesareasonablebasistobelievethat

acrimewithinthejurisdictionoftheCourthasbeenorisbeingcommitted.

47.ForacrimetofallwithintheCourtsjurisdiction:(i)thecrimemustbeoneofthecrimessetoutinArticle5oftheStatute(jurisdictionrationemateriae);(ii)thecrime

must havebeen committedwithin the timeframe specified inArticle 11 of the

Statute (jurisdiction ratione temporis); and (iii) the crimemust satisfyoneof the

twocriterialaiddowninArticle12oftheStatute.22

48.Withregardtothefirstcondition,asdemonstratedindetailedinSectionVIII,theinformationobtainedbytheProsecutorprovidesareasonablebasistobelievethat

ataminimumthefollowingconducthasbeencommittedaspartofawidespread

22ICC01/0501/0814tENG,para.12.

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or systematic attack directed against the civilian population inKenya:murder

constitutinga crime againsthumanityunderArticle7(1)(a)of theStatute; rape

andotherformsofsexualviolenceconstitutingacrimeagainsthumanityunder

Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute; deportation or forcible transfer of population

constituting a crime against humanityunderArticle 7(1)(d) of the Statute; and

other inhumaneactsconstitutingacrimeagainsthumanityunderArticle7(1)(k)

of the Statute. This is without prejudice to other possible crimes within the

jurisdiction of the Court which may be identified during the course of

investigations.

49.The alleged crimes committed at the end of 2007 and early 2008 are underjurisdiction ratione temporis, theRepublic ofKenya deposited its instrument of

accession to theStatuteon15March2005and theStatuteentered into force for

Kenyaon1June2005,inaccordancewithArticle126(1).

50.ThecrimesareallegedtohavebeencommittedonKenyanterritory.

VI.Admissibility

51.Article53(1)(b)providesthat indeterminingwhether there isareasonablebasisto proceed, the Prosecutor shall consider whether the case is or would be

admissibleunderArticle17.TheProsecutorhasconsideredadmissibilityatthis

stage taking into account the potential cases that would likely arise from an

investigationintothesituation.

52.With respect to the assessment of complementarity and ne bis in idem underArticle17(1)(a)(c),theAppealsChamberhasconfirmedthatthefirstquestionis

whether there are or have been any relevant national investigations or

prosecutions.Wherethereareorhavebeennonationalproceedings,i.e.thereis

domestic inactivity, the question of unwillingness or inability does not arise.

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Instead,therewillbeapresumptionofadmissibilityinrelationtoArticle53(1)(b),

subjecttoArticle17(1)(d).23

53.TheAgreementsignedbythePresidentandPrimeMinisteron16December2008demonstrates that Kenyas highest authorities consider necessary the

establishmentofa special tribunal inorder to conductnationalproceedingson

the post election violence. The Kenyan Parliament did not approve the Bill

presented in February 2009; there was no quorum to discuss the draft in

November 2009. Therefore, according to the Kenyan authorities, there are no

domestic prosecution for the crimes against humanity allegedly committed in

Kenya,noristhereanyprospectthattherewillbe.

54.The information available to the Prosecutor confirms that there have been alimited number of proceedings for less serious offences in connection to the

crimesallegedly committedduring thepostelectionviolence.According to the

ReporttotheHon.AttorneyGeneralbytheTeamontheReviewofPostElection

ViolenceRelatedCasesinWestern,Nyanza,Central,RiftValley,EasternEastand

NairobiProvinces,the156caseswereopened inrelation tominoroffencessuch

as malicious damage, theft, house breaking, bond to keep peace,

publishing false rumor, and other criminal offences, such as possession of

offensive weapon, robbery with violence or assaulting police officer.24

Among themostprominentcases, the fouraccusedof the socalledKIAMBAA

case,charged forarsoning theKiambaaChurch inwhich17 to35personswere

burntaliveon01January2008inEldoret,wereacquittedforlackofevidenceasa

resultofshoddypoliceinvestigations.25

23ICC01/0401/071497,para78.24ReporttotheHon.AttorneyGeneralbytheTeamontheReviewofPostElectionViolenceRelatedCasesinWestern,Nyanza,

Central,RiftValley,Eastern,Coast,CoastandNairobiProvinces,February09, pp.3033and3537(Annex29).25Republicv.StephenKiprotichLeting&3others{2009}eKLR,CriminalCase34of2008,Judgement,HighCourtofKenyaatNakuru,30April2009(Annex30).

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55.Because no national investigations or proceedings are pending against thosebearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes against humanity allegedly

committed, the Prosecutor submits that the cases that would arise from its

investigation of the situation would be currently admissible. Moreover, the

available informationdoesnot indicate theexistenceofnationalproceedings in

relation to the postelection violence in other States with jurisdiction.26 The

Prosecutorwill continue to assess the existence of national proceedings for as

longasthesituationremainsunderinvestigation,shouldtheChamberauthorise

theinvestigation.27

56.IntermsofthegravityofthecrimesunderArticle17(1)(d),assetoutmorefullyinsectionVIII,thescaleofthepostelectionviolenceresultedinareported1,133

to 1,220killingsof civilians,more thanninehundreddocumented actsof rape

and other forms of sexual violence,withmanymore unreported, the internal

displacementof350,000persons,and3,561reportedactscausingseriousinjury.28

In addition, the social and economic structures of the local communitieswere

largelyaffectedbythewidespreadlootingandwantondestructionofresidential

andcommercialareas.Crimeshavebeencommitted in sixoutofeightKenyan

regions, and particularly in the countrysmost populated areas, including the

capitalcityofNairobi,theRiftValley,andtheNyanzaandWesternprovinces.

57.Inmanycases, themultiplecrimeshadbeenorganizedandplannedwithin thecontextof awidespreadand systematicattackagainst selected segmentsof the

Kenyancivilianpopulation.Groups,andpersonsbelongingtothesegroups,have

been stigmatized and deliberately targeted on the basis of distinctive ethnic

feature and/or presumed political affiliations. Typically, the perpetrators

attacked,killedanddisplacedmembersofotherethnicitiesthatweretheminority

intheareas.

26SeeSectionXbelow,inrelationtotheprocessenvisagedunderArticle18.27Regulation29(4),RegulationsoftheOfficeoftheProsecutor.28FiguresdrawnfromCIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,pp.345351

(Annex5).

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58.Perpetratorsoftencrudelycutoffbodyparts,attackedcivilianswithanypossiblesharp pointed objects machetes, poisonous arrows,broken glass, etc. and

terrorisedthewholecommunitiesbyinstallingcheckpointsweretheperpetrators

selectedthevictimsbasedontheirethnicity,andhackedthemtodeath.There

were incidentsofburningofpeoplealive. Inaddition,occurrenceofgang rape

andgenitalmutilation,forcedcircumcisionandpenileamputationwasreported

during the period. There are also reports of familymemberswitnessing their

mothers, fathers, sisters,brothers, and little childrenbeing raped, killed, and

maimed.

59.Thecrimescommittedhadadevastatingimpactfirstandforemostonthevictims.Victimsofsexualviolence,whooftensufferedgravephysicalinjury,sufferfrom

enormouspsychologicaltrauma,mayhavebeen infectedwithHIV/AIDSand/or

other types of sexually transmissible diseases, are often abandoned by their

husbands and/or families and suffer from social stigma.Women and children

who lost familymembers andproperty, andwhohadbeen chased away from

theirhomesareahighlyvulnerablepopulation inneedofspecialattention.The

displacedpersons,whohavebeenforciblyevicted,havelostnotonlytheirhome

butmuchof theirveryexistence.Thecrimesfurtherhadan impacton the local

communities in terms of security, social structure, economy andpersistence of

impunity in the country. The economic activitieswere affectedby the forced

displacement,widespreadlootingandburningofhousesandbusinesspremises.

TheKenyanGrossDomesticProductgrowthratefellfrom7%in2007to1.7%in

2008.29

29CIAWorldFactBook,Kenya,11November2009(Annex34).

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VII.InterestsofJustice

60.Under Article 53(1), while the jurisdiction and admissibility are positiverequirements that must be satisfied, the interests of justice is a potential

countervailingconsiderationthatmayproduceareasonnottoproceed. Assuch,

theProsecutorisnotrequiredtoestablishthataninvestigationisintheinterests

ofjustice,but rather,whether there are specific circumstanceswhich provide

substantial reasons tobelieve it isnot in the interestsofjustice todo soat that

time.

61.Basedon theavailable information, theProsecutorhasnoreason tobelieve thattheopeningofaninvestigationintothesituationwouldnotbeintheinterestsof

justice.

VIII.CrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt

62.Pursuant to Regulation 49 of the Regulations of the Court, the Prosecutionprovides the following information setting out: (i) a reference to the crimes

believed tohavebeen committed and a statementof the factsbeing alleged to

provide the reasonablebasis tobelieve that thosecrimeshavebeencommitted;

and(ii)adeclarationwithreasonsthatthelistedcrimesfallwithinthejurisdiction

oftheCourt.

(i)Allegedcrimesandstatementoffacts

63.While the violence initially appeared to be spontaneous, triggered by theperceived riggingof the elections, the organised aspectof theviolencebecame

apparentasitemergedthatpoliticalleaders,businessmenandothershadenlisted

criminal elements and ordinarypeople to carry out attacks against specifically

targetedgroups.

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Murders64.According to theWakiReport, thepostelectionviolence resulted ina reported1,133deaths.30.Themajorityofkillingswerereportedlyduetoinjuriescausedby

arrows,machetesandtraditionalweaponsusedduringattacks/raidsonvillages,

followedby gun shotsmainly attributed to thepolice forces (405deaths), and

burning of people alive.31 The Kenyan Government officially acknowledged a

totalof1,220peoplekilled,including123bythepolice.32

65.ThehighestnumberofdeathsoccurredintheRiftValley,describedbytheWakiCommissionReportastheepicentreofpostelectionviolence(744),33followedby

theNyanzaprovince (134),Nairobi (125), theWesternProvince (98),Coast (27)

andtheCentralProvince(5).34Theinformationevaluatedindicatesthatthemost

violent attacks registered within the Rift Valley province took place in the

districtsofUasinGishuwhere230personswerekilled,Nakuruwith213persons

andTransNzoiawith104persons.35

Rapeandotherformsofsexualviolence66.SexualviolenceinitsmultitudeofformswasreportedalloverKenyaduringthepostelectionviolence36andmaybeconsideredashavingbeenwidespreadwhere

such postelection violence occurred,37 and alsowhere victims sought refuge.38

30ThisfindingoftheCIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.305(Annex5),isbasedoninformationprovidedbyhospitalsinfiveprovinces,namelyWestern,RiftValley,Nyanza,NairobiandCoast.Other

sourceshavecometosimilarestimates:morethan1,200accordingtoUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissioneron

HumanRights(OHCHR),ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.8(Annex7);atleast1,162personswerekilled.AccordingtoKNCHR,OntheBrinkofthePrecipice:

AHumanRightsAccountofKenyasPost 2007ElectionViolence,FinalReport,15August2008,KENOTP00010002toKEN

OTP00010245,p.3,para.5(Annex4).31CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.311(Annex5).32OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,p.11(Annex7).33CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.341(Annex5).34CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.306(Annex5).35CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.345346(Annex5)36FederationofWomenLawyers(FIDAK),SubmissionstoTheCommissionofInquiryintothePostElectionViolence(the

WakiCommision)byFIDA KonSexualandGenderBasedViolenceonbehalfoftheInterAgencyGenderBasedViolence

(GBV)SubCluster,11September2008,KENOTP00011516,page3(Annex8).37FIDAK,SubmissionstoTheCommissionofInquiryintothePostElectionViolence(theWakiCommision)byFIDA Kon

SexualandGenderBasedViolenceonbehalfoftheInterAgencyGenderBasedViolence(GBV)SubCluster,11September

2008,KENOTP00011516,page1(Annex8).KNCHR,OntheBrinkofthePrecipice:AHumanRightsAccountofKenyas

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TheChiefExecutiveOfficerofNairobiWomensHospital,whichprovides free

services to female and male victims of sexual violence, informed the Waki

Commission that his hospital was inundated with patients during the post

electionperiod39.TheHospitalreceived524casesofrapebetween27December

2007 and 31 March 2008. During that same period, partner hospitals of the

Nairobi Womens Hospital received 286 cases of sexual violence, and the

KenyattaNationalHospital responded toanother184 cases.40These figuresare

indicativeof the increase in sexualassaultsduring thepostelectionviolence. It

shouldbenoted that thereappears tohavebeenasignificantunderreporting in

theoccurrenceofsexualviolence.41Forexample,astudyamongvictimsofsexual

violence during the PostElection period revealed that 82% of the women

intervieweddidnotreporttheincidents.42

Deportationorforcibletransferofpopulation67.The information evaluated indicates that approximately 350,000 personsweredisplaced as a consequence ofpost electoralviolencewithin theboundaries of

Kenya.43 Although violent evictions have accompanied previous electoral

processes,theinternaldisplacementaftertheannouncementofthe2007elections

resultswasunprecedentedinthenumberofvictimsandthewidespreadnature.44

Post 2007ElectionViolence,FinalReport,15August2008,KENOTP00010002toKENOTP00010245,pp.34,para.8(Annex

4).38FIDAK,SubmissionstoTheCommissionofInquiryintothePostElectionViolence(theWakiCommision)byFIDA KonSexualandGenderBasedViolenceonbehalfoftheInterAgencyGenderBasedViolence(GBV)SubCluster,11September

2008,KENOTP00011516,page3(Annex8); UNFPA,UNICEF,UNIFEM,ChristianChildrensFund,ARapidAssessmentof

GenderBasedViolenceDuringthePostElectionViolenceinKenya,JanuaryFebruary2008,KENOTP00010973toKEN

OTP00011056, pp.78(Annex9) andCenterforRightsEducationandAwareness(CREA),WomenpaidthePrice,2008,KENOTP00011527,pp.24(Annex10).39CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.247(Annex5).40CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.248(Annex5).41CREA,WomenpaidthePrice,2008,KENOTP00011527,pp.3435(Annex10).42CREA,WomenpaidthePrice,2008,KENOTP00011527p.33(Annex10).UNFPA,UNICEF,UNIFEM,Christian

ChildrensFund,ARapidAssessmentofGenderBasedViolenceduringthePostElectionViolenceinKenya,January

February2008,KENOTP00010973toKENOTP00011056p.33(Annex9).43CIPEV, FinalReport, 16October2008,KENOTP00010364 toKENOTP00010892,p.272 (Annex 5).TheKenyanRed

Crossrecorded268,330IDPsinvariouscampsasof27February2008:OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMission

to Kenya 628 February 2008, KENOTP00011057 to KENOTP00011075, p.14 (Annex 7). 12, 000 refugees also fled to

Uganda:OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKEN

OTP00011075,p.14(Annex7).44CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,pp.271273(Annex5).

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Widespreadlootingandwantondestructionformedpartofthecoerciveelement

ofsuchdisplacement.45

68.Theinformationevaluatedbasedonstatementsofvictimsprovidesareasonablebasis to believe that the displacements were coercive. Threats, lootings and

burningofhouses,killingsandsexualviolencewereallusedtodisplacemembers

of specific ethnic groups. The FactFinding Mission of the OHCHR, which

occurredbetween6 28February2008,identifiedawaveofdisplacementsinthe

wakeofthepostelectionviolenceasaresultoftheattacksonprivatehomesand

businesses.46Themissionestablished thatavastmajorityof thesepeople left in

panic,takingverylittlewiththem,andwerereluctanttoreturntotheirhomes.47

Themissionalsosuggestedthatmanyoftheseattackswereorganizedbypolitical

and/ortraditionalleaderseagertosettlehistoricdisputesoverlandtitleandother

longheld grievances, with the aim of permanently displacing the targeted

communities.48

69.Displacementswerenotisolatedevents,butoccurredonawidespreadscale.49 Asof 27 February 2008, theKenyanRedCross estimated that therewere 268,330

personsinIDPcamps.TheyweredisplacedfromsixofKenyaseightprovinces,

whileasimilarnumberofdisplacedpersonswere living inhostcommunities.50

Mostof thedisplacedwerereportedly living insome200IDPcamps in theRift

45ThefactfindingmissionoftheUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightsreported42,000houses

andmanybusinessesweredestroyedand/orlooted.OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628

February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.12(Annex7). TheCIPEVreportconcludedthat117,216houses,businesses,vehiclesandfarmproduceweredestroyed.CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKEN

OTP00010892(Annex5).46OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.14(Annex7).47OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.14(Annex7).48OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.10(Annex7).49ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutions,A/HRC/11/2/Add. MissiontoKenya,26

May2009,KENOTP00010910toKENOTP00010972,p.59(Annex11).HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolence

andKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248toKENOTP00010330,pp.4353(Annex3).50OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.14(Annex7).

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Valley, Nyanza, Western, Coastal and Central provinces.51 The OHCHRs

findingsalso indicated thatsome12,000Kenyanswerereported tohavesought

refugeacrosstheborder,inUganda.52OCHAshumanitarianupdatecoveringthe

last week of January 2008, estimated that approximately 290,000 IDPs were

registeredincamps(basedoninformationfromKenyanRedCross).53

Otherinhumaneacts70.ThefindingsoftheWakiCommissionindicatethatatotalofatleast3,561personssuffered injuries as a result of thepostelection violence.Of those injured, the

majoritysufferedfrominjuriesinflictedbysharpobjectsorgunandarrowshots,54

while others included particularly brutal conduct such as traumatic

circumcisions.55

(a)Placesofallegedcommissionofthecrimes

71.Asan illustrationofthegeographicextentofthecrimes,themainaffectedareasof the postelection violence included: (i) the slum districts of Nairobi, in

particular the localitiesofKibera,Mathare,Korogocho,Huruna,Kariobangiand

Dandora; (ii)RiftValleyprovince, inparticular the localitiesofEldoret and its

surroundings,Naivasha andNakuru; and (iii)Western andNyanzaprovinces,

with a particular focus on the locality of Kisumu and the surrounding areas.

Annex1Bshowsamapgivingageneraloverviewofthedistributionofviolence

acrosstheregions.

(b)Timeperiodoftheallegedcommissionofthecrimes

51OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.14(Annex7).52OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.14(Annex7).53OCHA,KenyaHumanitarianUpdate,volume2,2128January08(Annex31).54CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.334(Annex5).55CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.336(Annex5).

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72.A firstwaveofviolence (29December200718January2008)concentratedonthedistrictsofMolo,TransNzoia,andUasinGishuintheNorthRift,.56 Further

south, Kedowa and other trading outposts near the town of Kericho were

affected.57Within thespaceofaweekdozensofcommunities in theRiftregion,

includingEldorettown,weredrivenaway.58

73.Organizedretaliatoryviolenceduringasecondwaveofviolence(2428January2008) hit predominantly the towns of Molo, Nakuru and Naivasha causing

furtherdeathsalthoughonalowerscalethanduringthefirstwaveofviolence.59

(c)Personsorgroupsinvolved

74.Theavailable informationrelatedtothemainallegedperpetrators indicatesthatmost offenceswere committedbygangs ofyoungmen armedwith traditional

weapons. Organized groups established roadblocks/check points; carried out

simultaneous raids and attacks on multiple neighbourhoods and towns; and

attacked and killingpeople from other tribesperceived aspolitical opponents,

allegedlywiththeinvolvementofpoliticiansandbusinessleaders.

75.BoththeKNCHRandtheWakiCommissionindicatethatpersons inpositionofpower appear to have been involved in the organization, enticement and/or

financing of violence targeting specific groups60. Political leaders of all sides,

particularly from PNU and ODM, allegedly recruited gangs of youths and

56OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.8(Annex7).ICG,KenyainCrisis,21February2008,KENOTP00011076toKENOTP00011114p.10(Annex

6);HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330,p.37(Annex3).57OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.8(Annex7);ICG,KenyainCrisis,21February2008,KENOTP00011076toKENOTP00011114 p.10(Annex

6).58HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330,p.39(Annex3).59HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330,p.43(Annex3).60TheKNCHRlistofallegedperpetratorsisannexedtotheirfinalreport:KNCHR,OntheBrinkofthePrecipice:AHuman

RightsAccountofKenyasPost 2007ElectionViolence,FinalReport,15August2008,KENOTP00010002toKENOTP0001

0245,pp.177238(Annex4);theWakilisthasnotbeenpublishedbuthandedovertotheICCProsecutoron9July2009.

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transported them to strategic points to unleash terror, killing and destroying

propertybelonging to communities aligned to the rival party. There are also

reported allegations concerning the security services and their response to the

violence.61

(ii) Legal characterisation and reasons that the listed crimes fall within the

jurisdictionoftheCourt

76.Forthereasonssetoutinthisapplication,theinformationcollectedbytheOfficeof the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against

humanitywithin thejurisdictionof theCourtwerecommitted in thecontextof

thepostelectionviolenceof20072008.

(a)Contextualelementsofcrimesagainsthumanity

77.The available information provides a reasonablebasis tobelieve thatmultiplecrimescommittedduringthepostelectionviolenceof20072008occurred inthe

context of a widespread and systematic attack against the Kenyan civilian

populationpursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizationalpolicy to

commitsuchactsonKenyan territory,within themeaningofArticle7(1)of the

Statute.

78.Pursuant to theProsecutorsprosecutorialpolicy, the focusof theProsecutionsinvestigative activities will be directed at the persons bearing the greatest

responsibility for themost serious crimes.62The available information indicates

that persons who incited and instigated the violence as well as those who

mobilisedanddirected theactivitiesof thedifferentorganizedgroups,with the

knowledge that thebehaviour of themembers of the groupswithwhich they

61CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,pp.417418(Annex5);Reportofthe

SpecialRapporteuronextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutions,A/HRC/11/2/Add.6,MissiontoKenya,26May2009,

KENOTP00010910toKENOTP00010972,pp.3436(Annex11).62Regulation34,RegulationsoftheOfficeoftheProsecutor.

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were associated during the course of the postelection violence was part a

widespreadorsystematicattackdirectedagainstthecivilianpopulationinKenya.

79.Aspreviously heldbyPreTrialChamber III, the reference to awidespread orsystematicattackhasbeeninterpretedasexcludingisolatedorrandomactsfrom

the concept of crimes against humanity. In this regard, the adjective

widespread refers to the largescalenatureof theattack and thenumberof

targeted persons, while the adjective systematic refers to the organised

natureoftheactsofviolenceandtheimprobabilityoftheirrandomoccurrence.

TheChamber,moreover, opined that the existence of a State or organisational

policy is an element from which the systematic nature of an attack may be

inferred.63

80.Basedontheavailableinformation,thereisareasonablebasistobelievethattheattacks directed against the civilian population in the Kenya were both

widespreadandsystematic.Theseattacksareallegedly tohavebeenconducted

primarilybymembers of organised groups associatedwith themain political

parties(PNUandODM).

81.According tofindingsof theWakiCommissionandKNCHRandothersources,thepostelectionviolencewerenotisolatedorrandomacts;theytookplaceona

largescaleandtargetedalargenumberofcivilianvictims.Asmentioned,within

two months, the postelection violence resulted in about 1,133 deaths, 3,561

personssufferedinjuriesthatmayconstituteotherinhumaneactscausingserious

injury,hundredsofrapes,andtheinternaldisplacementofapproximately350,000

persons.

63ICC01/0501/0814tENG,para.33.

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82.The violence impacted on up to 136 constituencies in six of Kenyas eightprovinces,andwasfeltbothinurbanandruralareas.64AstheWakiCommission

reports, It was by far the most deadly and most destructive violence ever

experienced inKenya.65 Themain theatres of violencewereNairobi, theRift

Valleyprovince(includingtheregionsofSouth,CentralandNorthRift),aswell

astheNyanzaandWesternprovinces.66

83.The available information further indicates that the attack against the civilianpopulationwasofasystematicnature.Inparticular,thereisareasonablebasisto

believe that members of the organised groups associated with members or

supportersofPNUandODMdeliberatelytargetedcivilianswhowereperceived

tobesympathetictotherivalgroup.HumanRightsWatch,forexample,gathered

informationindicatingthatlocalleadersandODMmobilizersarrangedfrequent

meetingsfollowingtheelectiontoorganize,directandfacilitatetheviolence.67

84.Initially, theviolenceappeared tobe spontaneousoutburstsofchaosgeneratedbyangrydemonstratorsclashingwithheavyhandedlawenforcementagents.As

time elapsed and the violence intensified, however, indications emerged

illustratingtheorganisednatureofsomeoftheviolence,leadingmanyobservers

toconcludethatattackswerelargelyplannedandpremeditatedorevolvedinto

wellorganizedandcoordinatedattacks.68

64KNCHR,OntheBrinkofthePrecipice:AHumanRightsAccountofKenyasPost 2007ElectionViolence,FinalReport,15

August2008,KENOTP00010002toKENOTP00010245,p.3,para.1(Annex4);CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,

KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.vii(Annex5).65CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.vii(Annex5).66KNCHR,OntheBrinkofthePrecipice:AHumanRightsAccountofKenyasPost 2007ElectionViolence,FinalReport,15

August2008,KENOTP00010002toKENOTP00010245,p.15(Annex4);SeeMap:PostelectionviolencehotspotsKenya,

Depha,January2008(Annex1B).67HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330,pp.3738(Annex3).68CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.viii(Annex5).Thesepatternswere

alsomentionedbytheOHCHRreportofthefactfindingmissionandcorroboratedbymediareports,aswellastheICGand

HRWreportsonthecrisis.SeeOHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,pp. 810(Annex7);ICG,KenyainCrisis,21February2008,KENOTP00011076to

KENOTP00011114pp.3536(Annex6);HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisof

Government,March2008,KENOTP00010248toKENOTP00010330p.4(Annex3).

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85.Examining the pattern of violence which erupted immediately following thecommunicationoftheelectoralresults,thisappearstohaveactedasasignalfor

organized groups to launch their attacks.69 Ordinary citizens allied to certain

communitieswere reportedly called onby local leaders and elders including

churchandgovernmentofficials tokill theirneighbours.70Forexample,around

Eldoret many politicians stoked ethnic tensions to mobilize political support

amongtheirethnicgroup.71

86.Civiliansweremobilisedintoorganisedgroupswhichtargetedactsofviolenceinawidespread and systematicmanner against the civilian populationbased on

ethnicityandpoliticalaffiliation.Inparticular,bonfireswerelitatroadblocks,as

gangsofyouthsstoppedallpassersby,demandingtheiridentificationdocuments

allegedly toknow theirethnicity,and in some caseshacking todeathall those

peopleperceivedtobepolitical/tribalopponents.72

87.In theRiftValley, from the outset, violence showed a clear pattern of attacksintentionally targeting perceived PNU supporters, rather than against

individually identified persons or in a randommanner. The attacks appear to

havebeenorchestrated,withaplantoforciblydisplacethetargetedcommunities

fromtheirlands.73

88.As indicia of organization, the Waki Commission notes that warnings weresometimes issued to the civilian populationprior the attacks; large number of

attackers were mobilized, often coming from outside the targeted area; the

69This isalsoconfirmedbyHRW reportwhichalleges that localeldersandODMorganizers inmany communitiesaround

Eldoret calledmeetingswhere they declared that electoral victory forKibakiwouldbe the signal for war against local

Kikuyu.SeeHRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP

00010248toKENOTP00010330,p.37(Annex3).70OscarFoundationReport,Ethnicityandafaileddemocracy,February2008,KENOTP00010331toKENOTP00010363

(Annex12).71HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330p.36(Annex3).72CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.42andp.55(Annex5);ICG,Kenya

inCrisis,21February2008,KENOTP00011076toKENOTP00011114,p.13(Annex6).73CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,pp.4345(Annex5).

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conduct of the attacks required logistical prearrangements; andmany of the

attacksweretargetedonlyagainstmembersofspecificgroupstotheexclusionof

others.74

89.Inflammatory radiobroadcastsaswellasallegedhate speech in theRiftValleyprovincealreadyduringtheelectoralcampaignarefurtherpossibleindicatorsof

organised attacks.75 Emails and text messages were also reportedly used to

disseminatehatemessagesagainstparticularcandidatesandothercommunities

before the elections.76 Ethnicallymotivated hate speech, inflammatory rhetoric

and incitementbymembers of the leading political parties, particularly at the

locallevel,werereportedlyarecurringfeatureofthepreelectioncampaign.77In

particular, reports indicate thatpolitical and spiritual leaders in theRiftValley

engaged in a process of indoctrination before the elections. The information

suggeststhattheseactivitieswerepartofastrategytoincitesubsequentviolence.

90.Such inflammatory statements continued after the elections, as leaflets quicklyappearedtellingmembersofopposingcommunitiestoleavepartsofRiftValley,

CoastandNyanza.78

91.Information on the systematic nature of the attacks include the reportedlyviolence in the Burnt Forest settlement south of Eldoret town, wheremilitia

simultaneouslyattackedandburned1320houses inwhich5,000persons lived.79

ICGreportsthatyouths involved in theattacks inEldoret(RiftValleyprovince)

74CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.347(Annex5).75SeeforexampleEldoretspopularKalenjinlanguageradioKASSFM,see:HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPolitical

ViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248toKENOTP00010330,p.36(Annex3);ICG,

KenyainCrisis, 21February2008,KENOTP00011076toKENOTP00011114,p.12(Annex6).SeealsoKNCHR,Onthe

BrinkofthePrecipice:AHumanRightsAccountofKenyasPost 2007ElectionViolence,FinalReport,15August2008,KEN

OTP00010002toKENOTP00010245p.4,para.16(Annex4).76OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.7(Annex7).77ICG,KenyainCrisis,21February2008,KENOTP00011076toKENOTP00011114,p.13(Annex6).78OscarFoundationReport,Ethnicityanda faileddemocracy,February2008,KENOTP00010331 toKENOTP00010363

(Annex12).79OHCHR,ReportfromtheOHCHRFactfindingMissiontoKenya628February2008,KENOTP00011057toKENOTP00011075,p.9(Annex7).

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weretransportedtothelocationsofattacksbylorriesandwereallegedlypaidto

carryout the raids; fundswereallegedlyprovidedbymembersof thepolitical

andbusinessestablishmentoftheNorthRift.80

92.CounterattackswereundertakenbyotherpartiessupportersmainlyinNakuruandNaivashaandpartsofwesternRiftValleyprovince.InthetownofNaivasha,

membersofmilitiawerereportedlypaidbylocalbusinessmentoattackcivilians,

being promised money for each kill.81 The attacks also led to deaths and

destructionofproperty.

(b) Acts constituting crimes against humanity committed in the context of a

widespreadorsystematicattack

93.Onthebasisoftheavailableinformation,andwithoutprejudicetootherpossiblecrimeswithin thejurisdictionof theCourtwhichmaybe identifiedduring the

courseofaninvestigation,theProsecutordeclaresthatthereisareasonablebasis

tobelieve thatduring thepostelectionperiod, includingbutnot limited to the

timeperiodbetween27December2007 to28February2008,ataminimum the

followingconducthasbeencommitted:

a. murder constituting a crime against humanity underArticle 7(1)(a) of theStatute;

b. rapeandotherformsofsexualviolenceconstitutingacrimeagainsthumanityunderArticle7(1)(g)oftheStatute;

c. forcible transfer ofpopulation constituting a crime againsthumanityunderArticle7(1)(d)oftheStatute;and

d. other inhumane acts causing serious injury constituting a crime againsthumanityunderArticle7(1)(k)oftheStatute.

80ICG,KenyainCrisis,21February2008,KENOTP00011076toKENOTP00011114p.11(Annex6).81HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment.March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330,pp.4648(Annex3).

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Murder94.Theavailableinformationindicatesthatmurdersfollowedthesamepatternoftheattacksastherestofthepostelectionviolence,notonlyintermsofthemannerin

whichtheywerecommitted,butalsointermsofthevictims,focussedmainlyon

members of the targeted ethnic/politically affiliated populations. The diverse

causesofdeaths included,according to theWakiCommission,deathbyburns,

arrow shots, blunt object, severe wounds, sharp pointed object, assault,

drowning,suffocation injury,stoning,shock,andhanging.Thisshowsnotonly

thevarietybutalsothebrutalityofmeansresortedtobytheassailants(28.2%of

deathswerecausedbysharppointedobjects,7.5%byburns).82

Rapeandotherformsofsexualviolence95.Sexualviolencewasusedaspartofthewidespreadandsystematicattackagainstthe civilian population. In general, sexual violence followed ethnic and/or

political lines.Victimswereoften toldby theiraggressors that theywerebeing

victimised as a punishment for their ethnicity or political affiliations. In some

cases, theperpetratorsproceeded torapevictimsevenwhen theyclaimed tobe

HIVpositive.83

96.The Prosecution has information of numerous incidents of sexual violenceincludingrapeofmenandwomen,sexualmutilationandother formsofsexual

violence.Medicalservices,andvictimaccounts,showthatgangrapesbygroups

ofmenwereprevalent.84

97.Instances of rapes and other acts of sexual violencewere committedwith oraccompaniedby physicalbrutality.85Women and childrens labia and vaginas

82CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.311(Annex5).83CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.349(Annex5).84 FIDAK,SubmissionstoTheCommissionofInquiryintothePostElectionViolence(theWakiCommision)byFIDA Kon

SexualandGenderBasedViolenceonbehalfoftheInterAgencyGenderBasedViolence(GBV)SubCluster,11September

2008,KENOTP00011516page3(Annex8);CREA,WomenpaidthePrice,2008,KENOTP00011527p.251(Annex8).85UNFPA,UNICEF,UNIFEM,ChristianChildrensFund,ARapidAssessmentofGenderBasedViolenceDuringthePost

ElectionViolenceinKenya,JanuaryFebruary2008,KENOTP00010973toKENOTP00011056, p.4(Annex9).

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were cut using sharp objects and bottles were stuffed into them. Attackers

amputated thepenises ofmen andboys, or subjected them to circumcision, in

somecasesusingcutglass.86Furthermore,childrenandspousesoftenwereforced

towitnesstheirpartners,parents,brothersandsistersbeingsexuallyviolated.87

98.Sexual violence committed during the postelection violencewas used to grabland. According to UNIFEM, [Sexual violence was]being used as a tool to

terrorize individuals and families and precipitate their expulsion from the

communities inwhich they live. [S]exual violence [was]being used as a fear

instilling tactic, inso faraswomenwere told theyand theirchildrenwouldbe

raped if they did not vacate their property within a designated timeframe.

Womenwere further threatened in the temporary shelters towhichmany fled;

thosewhoinitiallysoughtrefugeinhousesinTimboroa,intheNorthRiftValley,

forexample,weretoldifyoudontmove,wearegoingtorapethewomen.88

99.AsconcludedbytheWakiCommissionReport[i]nsomeareas,sexualviolencewas ameansused topressurepeople to leave theirhomes, to retaliate against

themforhavingvotedforthewrongcandidate,tribeorpartyandintandemwith

thattodominate,humiliateanddegradethemandtheircommunitiesintoapitof

powerlessness.89

Deportationorforcibletransferofpopulation100. Acts of deportation or forcible transfer of populationwere part of attacksagainstmembersof rivalethnicand/orpoliticalgroups,and followed thesame

patterns as other instances of postelection violence. Reports indicate that

organised groups associatedwith themain political parties (PNU and ODM)

86CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.348(Annex5).87CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,pp.348and244(Annex5).88UNFPA,UNICEF,UNIFEM,ChristianChildrensFund,ARapidAssessmentofGenderBasedViolenceDuringthePost

ElectionViolenceinKenya,JanuaryFebruary2008,KENOTP00010973toKENOTP00011056,p.4.andpp.3132(Annex

9).89CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,p.252(Annex5).

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were mobilised, directed, and in some instances paid, 90 to attack targeted

membersofrivalethnicand/orpoliticalgroups.91

Otherinhumaneacts101. 3,561peoplereportedlysuffered injuries inflictedbyorresultingfromsharppointed objects,blunt objects, soft tissue injury,gunshots, arrow shorts,burns,

andotherassaults.Althoughtheseinjuriesdidnotresultinfatalities,astheWaki

Commission indicated, a number were very serious and lifechanging.92

Depending on the circumstances, injuries resulting from targeted attacksmay

constitute attempted murder or rape or other forms of sexual violence,

persecution, or other inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing

seriousinjurytobodyortomentalorphysicalhealth.

IX.Authorisationtoproceed

102. The Prosecutor submits that the Court should proceed to authorise theinvestigation so long as it is satisfied that the Prosecutors Application and

supporting material reveal the existence of facts or information warranting

investigation. The standard at this stage of the proceedings relates to the

investigationofcrimesofrelevancetothesituationasawholeandtheexistence

of relevant information thatprovides a foundation to the request. It isnot the

opportunitytoproceedwiththeidentificationofindividualcriminalliability.

103. The expression reasonablebasis inArticle 15 indicates that a decision toauthorize the commencement of an investigation shallbemade pursuant to a

lowerstandard than theone required for the issuanceofawarrantofarrestor

90HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330,p.4546(Annex3).91HRW,BallotstoBullets.OrganizedPoliticalViolenceandKenyasCrisisofGovernment,March2008,KENOTP00010248

toKENOTP00010330,pp.3553(Annex3).92CIPEV,FinalReport,16October2008,KENOTP00010364toKENOTP00010892,pp.334336(Annex5).

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summons to appear.93 The test of reasonablebasis is the lowest found in the

RomeStatute,whichappliesfourescalatingtestsfortheprogressivephasesofthe

proceedings.94

104. ChambersoftheCourthaveobservedthattheinterpretationandapplicationof the expression reasonable grounds to believe may be guided by the

reasonable suspicion standard articulated inArticle 51(1)(c) of theEuropean

ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedomsontheright

to libertyfrom illegalarrestordetention,which,asinterpretedbytheEuropean

Court of Human Rights (ECHR), requires the existence of some facts or

informationwhichwouldsatisfyanobjectiveobserverthatthepersonconcerned

mayhavecommittedtheoffence.Similarly,Chambershavebeenguidedbythe

jurisprudenceof the InterAmericanCourtofHumanRights (IACHR)on the

fundamental right to liberty, as enshrined in Article 7 of the American

ConventiononHumanRights.95Ataminimum,therefore,thereasonablebasis

standardshouldbeconsideredasbelowthatofreasonablegroundstobelieve.

This would require the existence of some facts or information which would

satisfyanobjectiveobserverthatcrimeswiththejurisdictionoftheCourtappear

tohavebeencommitted,butwithoutidentificationofthepersonswhomayhave

committedsuchoffences.

93 M.Bergsmo andJ.Pejic, Article 15Prosecutor, inO.Triffterer (ed.),Commentary of theRomeStatute of the InternationalCriminalCourtObserversNotes,ArticlebyArticle,(SecondEdition2008), p.589. Seealso,H.Olsolo,TheTriggeringProcedure

oftheInternationalCriminalCourt,MartinusNijhoffPublishers,2005,p.61;M.W.ElZeidy,SomeRemarksontheQuestionoftheAdmissibilityof aCaseduringArrestWarrantProceedingsbefore the InternationalCriminalCourt,LeidenJournalof

InternationalLaw,19 (2006),p.746;.G.Turone,PowersandDutiesof theProsecutor, inA.Casseseetal. (eds.),TheRomeStatute of the InternationalCriminalCourt: aCommentary (2002),pp. 1152 and 1161;H.Friman, TheRulesofProcedure andEvidenceintheInvestigativeStage,inH.Fischeretal.(eds.),InternationalandNationalProsecutionofCrimesUnderInternationalLaw,BWV/BerlinerWissenschaftsVerlag(2004),p.193194.(Annex1A).94CompareArticles15and53(1)reasonablebasis;Article58(1)reasonablegrounds;Article61(7)referssubstantialgrounds;andArticle66(3)beyondreasonabledoubt.95ICC01/0501/0814tENG,para.24;ICC01/0401/068USCorr,para.12;ICC02/0501/093,para.32;ICC01/0402/0620Conf

Exp,para. 12; ICC02/0501/071Corr,para.28.SeeECtHR,Case ofOHarav.TheUnitedKingdom,Applicationno.37555/97,Judgment, 16October 2001,para. 34. See also, ECtHR, Fox,Campbell, andHartley v. TheUnitedKingdom,Application no.12244/86;12245/86;12383/86,Judgment,30August1990,para.32;ECtHR,K.F.v.Germany,Applicationno.144/1996/765/962, Judgment,27November1997,para.57;ECtHR,Labitav.Italy,Applicationno.26772/95,Judgment,6April2000,para.155;ECtHR,Berktayv.Turkey,Requten22493/93,Arrt,1erMars2000(judgmentonlyavailableinFrench),para.199;ECtHR,Erdagzv.Turkey,ApplicationNo.127/1996/945/746, Judgment,22October1997,para.51;ECtHR,Murrayv.UnitedKingdom,Application no. 14310/88, Judgment, 28October 1994, para. 51. on the distinctionbetween the applicability of different

thresholdsofproofdependingonthestageintheproceedingsseeECtHR,K.F.v.Germany,ApplicationNo.144/1996/765/962, Judgment,27November1997,para.57.(Annex1A).

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105. The textofArticle15 isbasedcloselyonaproposalsubmittedbyArgentinaandGermanyduringtheMarchApril1998PreparatoryCommitteesession.96The

discussion focussed on which was the appropriate expression97 and on an

evaluationofwhethertheinformationobtainedwassufficient[and]verifiable98

orclearlyunfoundedornotserious.99TheProsecution isnot required,at this

stage, topresentevidentiarymaterialcollectedbyothers,suchas testimoniesof

victimsandwitnesses.

106. TheProsecutorrespectfullysubmitsthatthereisareasonablebasistoproceedwithan investigationand that thecaseappears to fallwithin thejurisdictionof

theCourt,andthereforerequeststheChambertoauthorisethe investigation.To

thisend, theprocedureshouldbeexpeditiousandsummary innature,without

prejudicetosubsequentdeterminationsonquestionsoffactandlaw.100

107. Inparticular, theProsecutornotes thatArticle 15(4) of the Statuteprovides[i]fthePreTrialChamber,uponexaminationoftherequestandthesupporting

material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an

investigation,andthatthecaseappearstofallwithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt,

it shall authorize the commencement of the investigation,withoutprejudice to

96 Proposal submitted by Argentina and Germany for Article 46, Information submitted to the Prosecutor, U.N. Doc.A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.35,25March1998.(Annex 1A).97Delegationsdiscussedaboutwhether touse theexpressionreasonablebasisrather thansufficientbasis in theStatute.

Eventually,itwasagreedtoincorporatethewordingreasonablebasisinthefinalversionofArticle15.SeeReportoftheInterSessionalMeetingfrom 19 to 30January 1998 inZutphen,TheNetherlands,PreparatoryCommittee on theEstablishmentof anInternationalCriminalCourt,UNDoc.A/AC.249/1998/L.13,04February1998,p.86;ReportofthePreparatoryCommitteeon

the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Addendum, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/ADD.1, 14 April 1998, p. 37;

PreparatoryCommitteeontheEstablishmentofanInternationalCriminalCourt16March3April1998,A/AC.249/1998/CRP.11

lApril1998 p.1.(Annex 1A).98DraftReportofthePreparatoryCommittee,PreparatoryCommitteeontheEstablishmentofanInternationalCriminalCourt,

A/AC.249/L.15,23August1996,pp.45.SeealsoReportofthePreparatoryCommitteeontheEstablishmentofanInternational

CriminalCourtVolumeI(ProceedingsofthePreparatoryCommitteeduringMarchAprilandAugust1996)GeneralAssembly

OfficialRecords,FiftyfirstSessionSupplementNo.22(A/51/22),p.4950.(Annex 1A).99 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 415August 1997Working Group on

Complementarity and TriggerMechanism Rolling Text ForArticles 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25,A/AC.249/1997/WG.3/CRP.1, 13

August1997,p.7.(Annex 1A).100SeeJ.Holmes,Complementarity:NationalCourtsversustheICC,inA.Casseseetal.(eds.),TheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:aCommentary(2002),p.680.(Annex1A)

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subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and

admissibilityofacase(emphasisadded).101

108. InitsDecisionAdjourningtheHearingpursuanttoArticle61(7)(c)(ii),PreTrial Chamber III interpreted the word appears within the context of the

confirmation of charges stage of the proceedings and noted: [T]he notion of

appearance isused invariousprovisionsof theStatute,but lacksany statutory

definition.IntheEnglishlanguage,thewordappearmeanstogiveaspecified

impression102.Thus,thismeaningshouldbeborneinmindwhentheChamberis

calledupontodecideonthenatureandscopeofdeterminationrequiredandthe

mannerinwhichtoapproachtheevidenceunderArticle61(7)(c)(ii)oftheStatute.

Given thenatureof thepresentstageof theproceedings, theChamber isof the

opinion that the threshold required for a determination under subparagraph

(c)(ii)mustinevitablybe lowerthanthesubstantialgroundstobelievesetout

inthechapeauofArticle61(7)oftheStatute.103

109. PreTrialChamber III concluded that [a]pplying the appearance standardsetoutinArticle61(7)(c)(ii)oftheStatute,theChamberdeemsitunnecessaryto

engageinanindepthanalysisoftheevidenceinitspossessionforthepurposeof

this procedural decision. To this end, theChamber considers that reference to

specific evidence or arguments of the parties or participants is sufficient. This

ensures that theChamber is not engaged in a process of predetermination or

prejudgmentontheissuesatstake,whichinanyeventwouldberuleduponinits

decisiononthemerits.104

110. Because Article 15(4) does not require certainty, but simply that the caseappearstofallwithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt,thePreTrialChamberneed

101TheProsecutionobservesthatatthestageofpreliminaryexaminationpriortotheinitiationofaninvestigationthereisnot

yetacasestrictlyspeaking,butonlypotentialcasesthatmayarisefromaninvestigationintothesituationasawhole.102ICC01/0501/08388,04March2009,para.25103Ibid.,para.25.104Ibid.,para.40.

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notengageinanindepthanalysisoftheinformationpresentedforthepurposeof

this procedural decision. This ensures, moreover, that the Chamber will not

conclusivelypredetermineorprejudgequestionsofjurisdictionthatmayariseat

a laterstage intheproceedings.Accordingly,Article15(4)requiresthePreTrial

Chamber to conduct an examination of the request and the supporting

material.Absentanythingtosuggestthecontrary,theChambershouldconclude

thatthecaseappearstofallwithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt.105

111. The Prosecutor recalls that the object and purpose ofArticle 15within thecontextoftheStatute,asevidencedfromthedraftinghistoryandaplainreading

ofthetermsoftheprovisionwithintheircontext,indicatesthatitservesprimarily

as a filteringmechanism to distinguish those situations that should form the

subjectofinvestigationfromthosethatshouldnot.106

105M.BergsmoandJ.Pekic,Article15Prosecutor, inO.Triffterer (ed.),Commentary of theRomeStatute of the InternationalCriminalCourtObserversNotes,ArticlebyArticle,SecondEdition,C.H.Beck,HartandNomos,2008, pp..590 591.(Annex1A)106Thefiltering functionof thePreTrialChamberhasbeenpreviouslyrecognizedbyChambersof theCourtwithrespect,

interalia,totheconfirmationofcharges;ICC01/0501/08388,para.9.Similarly,commentatorshaveobservedthatthePreTrialChambersapplicationofthereasonablebasisstandardshouldprimarilybesteeredbytheunderlyingpurposeofparagraph4,

thatofprovidingajudicial filterwhichwillprotecttheCourt fromthedamagingeffectsoffrivolousorpoliticallymotivatedcharges.M. Bergsmo and J. Pekic, Article 15 Prosecutor, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary of the Rome Statute of theInternationalCriminalCourtObserversNotes,ArticlebyArticle,SecondEdition,C.H.Beck,HartandNomos,2008, p.591.Seealso,S.FernndezdeGurmendi,TheRoleof theProsecutor, inLee (ed.),The InternationalCriminalCourtTheMakingof theRomeStatuteIssues,Negotiations,andResults,KluwerLawInternationa,1999,p.187;M.Arsanjani,ReflectionsontheJurisdictionandTriggermechanismof theInternationalCriminalCourt, inH.A.M.vonHebeletal. (eds.),Reflectionsonthe InternationalCriminalCourt, T.M.C.AsserPress,1999,p.65. (Annex1A).While recognizing thedifferent standardsused inotherbodiesfunctioningwithdifferentgoalsandprocedures, theChambermaywish tohaveresort themanner inwhichsucha filtering

functionisappliedbytheEuropeanCommissionofHumanRights,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(Article35(3)ECHR)

andtheInterAmericanCourtofHumanRights(Article34IACHR)whenconsideringwhetheraparticularcommunicationor

petition is illfounded, frivolousorotherwise represents an abuseof the rightof application.TheEuropeanCommissionof

HumanRightshasdeclared anapplicationinadmissibleasbeingmanifestlyillfoundedonlywhenanexaminationofthefile

doesnotdiscloseaprimafacieviolation;DeBeckerv.Belgium,ApplicationNo.214/56,Judgement,9June1958;ECmmHR,Xv.TheFederalRepublicofGermany,ApplicationNo.3110/67,19July1968.SeealsoECmmHR,Xv.TheFederalRepublicofGermany,ApplicationNo.2699/65,1April1968;ECtHR,Martynetsv.Russia,Applicationno.29612/09,Firstsectiondecisionas to theadmissibility,5November2009,PartB;ECtHR,efkovv.Slovakia,Applicationno.6284/02,Judgment,3November2009,paras.9192;ECtHR,Petroffv.Finland,Applicationno.31021/06,Judgment,3November2009,paras.2728.(Annex1A)TheInterAmericanCommissionofHumanRightshasheld that itmust makeaprimafacieevaluation toexaminewhether thecomplaint states facts indicativeof an apparent orpotential violationof a right guaranteedby theConvention, andnot to

establishtheexistenceofaviolation.Thisexaminationisasummaryanalysisthatdoesnotimplyaprejudgingorpreliminary

opiniononthemerits.;IACommHR,SimoneAndrDinizv.Brazil,ReportN37/02,Petition12.001,Admissibility,9October2002,para.31.SeealsoIACommHR,RubenLuisGodoyv.Argentina,ReportN4/04,Petitio

icc kenya request for authorisation pursuant art15

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