i^a t u otgret - nato...barops ba-re inprsr*«. bwro ban also bow consldarsble progrwe in pluanlng...
TRANSCRIPT
- > m s ^ H M O SEGHET ' P ^ h ^ r " JMBC 10 » o n <B aj.ro OOMURD nam
IUy 1952- »53 f ^ t ^ ' V - k CwtaMd M l w t e « f IB f f t sq r I M w t ü l ef U l i * « -
•f IMLLHL BlWft (lt<T
i. SS f i i cl^r** 1. Dwn Ma b i n a steady intranasal in the I l I w t i T n t n l the o w M l u
«ad Uw btdMp of f n t M far tki security of Haatarn Ampl i Hlg seilte an
increasing naasnre ef confldaaca. I f our HUD efforts are eentinttd on a
proper scale, Uu ability te acooepUjh assign*! «Issloiio auecea«fully, loclud-
int the defease ef Hsateni Esrspe I f that Bbculd beouae accessary,Bin be
attained within the oeit few yean. Ibls possibility ecnaa directly f m tho
set Ions taken by tbe VAlD Banmaaota and frae the graat and continuing efforts ef
their peoplea te « U m strength and security. I t represents «a Invreasli^
Asternnt ta war and Justifleatioa for sober optiaien. St lU far fren ear «sal»,
we bave progressed far indeed fron tba defenseless ooiwiitiea whioh me «or start-
ing peisrt. «aregrtbslos, there a i « s t i l l nqy gape la eur def « s e aystis MdLsih
nut be UUad without delay.
B. T *™»T«it.
t , Ieethsen Earapa s t i l l leaks tba stalan fareea required te oepe sncoase"
fully Mlth an Initial fu l l suie Seviat attack. Ttw natisa* in this area wi l l
have te recette «eternal eeeiatanoe sod this Olrroa= tance la etatwgOated in
ear plana. Bewsrett a tfcareegh isiei—siit of the alteat lea Anrlag the past year
IndlBiitea that In spite ef the greift ef fort» ta date, t h e » are s t i l l rirtaVs
Military neesares which the saliOQS UieseeIree oetûd tek* idiich would substantially
lnsreaae tha ability te defend the vital earth OMk.
3. The greatest I q m r a n t In eegsnlned def ana ira etrtngth bas taken plan*
In Caatrsl Gnnpe where tue years ng»* Utere were literally no preapects ef
•ithhaldlng er wtthata^ii« a Sevlet attack i f sue aheald teas. Tmbv u
this area? we can envisage successful defense « M i l the feres eeeble future provided
that greater air proper ttnelr ef feri le nade te
others, es the prsawtt s)«« esta of bfUd-ap el efforts, laglstlc
I A t u otGRET DE
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• 0 HKTO SÊGRE? ud adt rtfHtiwm, DH m r d U U r t o U M C w M Smgitirt Boctbm Strop* «a ««11, a d i be greatly Hui i l by *ha aarly y HU oHMt af the AmpMiiDifnH TrMtrudtba raaoltii* addition of m Oonwi wntrtboti» to «ellaotin dafM»».
A. Ia 3 Mlli uu I a n f y t a w the land f » n n ar* ateadily j i f w d i t
and gradually appraachlne a k K - I a r aaooaeeffcl dafaose, tb*r* la a t l l l »
•f aappart troepa. Ptograw a i l ! dapoad Ursalr «pan the tw l l iMl l ty * I « f t lp-
M t and upon tba Mj>l»y I t *ff*cti*<>lj-. Powerful
nanal f*roo* coold aafca a contributlan of tba' greateat -raina, but the Air r*re*0
bara aa in Qth or xreaa, ara at i l l danfaMealy i lm l .
5. m tba Kadttomaoaaa, WltMa Mblcb 11« tba critical l i f e Uoaa «tilth :
tba faroaa and paaplaa of the SanUnrn flask and alao link EMrapa with tba Klddla
Kart and beyond, tba altaafcUa of Xll lM QimiiiiI Eorapa haa l i v r a i
•einly aa ths r*onlt of tba d^Oqwat of tha banal f»r*M.
4. Tha foll<*rint Mjar faotora In aar dofantivo etrsvth ara » f law*« IrLeOy
bals*. Th«ç iaolnda, Planning, taad Organiaatloo ud Facilitlae, — " I * jwmmpp r IiHMiim, W B m MtyiTiwim avt r m niiw^
fr^/oX Oi^- V ^ V M ^ I ^ k ' flfJWJ h UftfM7 ^îU^ /l-Le-H*^ L./s. ,
7« Pbaa of ta» Usée bora ban kapt «orrai* awl fltad-bl*. Iba fLiat, m,
Mirgaaor plan, la daalgaed td aaka baat «a* of tho aiaad atrMgth new amdlaUa
to AUiad jIpnaH Barop* in tha eaao of attack. A eeoond plan, a IMC nNta *r
laiji Ii Monta plan, haa boat dtaa ip with Mpbaaia ginn to proridljig broad
guidance for national eopport and MllJtMT aid pragma. A apodal effort haa W M
•ado to datomliie tha effect of new waapaoa and operational toqhnlqoao en i.aijilie
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O MrtO StGRH TTTfl-" ""I-rTflTTT «wu»
¢, lo the esMwid structure ef AlUei PiiMtuI Xraeipe two lerelej»eals hare
l q m n d tba «rgte&stftloti ef ear Ilsfsass • Bf Aeceet 1952, the nesos fer owri ls i t -
]a| tba forcée of Qreeee and Turfcoy with Uioee of the ratender of V osMani MH
affected. Headquarter» Alllad Lvd Ftrcee Southeastern Xoxepa1 with Usetsawt
Sansrel MUlard G. l(7Mi, U .3. A w , Iu ö IMiind, wore established I s Indr directly
SSbordtniite to Amiral Csraiy , r « M I tin Js Chief, Allied Panee Semtbem Berope,
IIM second aodlficetlen reaoved a lone-standing difficulty, that ef tba epsratlanal
oentrel of the Itoal Parses la Uit Mediterranean, In Pscatbar 1952, AdaljMl4 the
Ekii Msentbattta ef BotMn, Rsyal Ka 7 , Msa appointed CisndiT Is-CMef, A l l M
Faraea1 Madltanesaant with iiiatisul over Britain's Hadlttxreneaa fleet eod certain
Htcral Fcrcee ef Prance, Gretes, fbrk^ and Itjaly I s tba Heditarranaen area. Tbp
Qnitad Statae Sixth Plaet1 whose Blasien is larsslr ths support of the lend Ibreee1
mutin as a « a r t ef AAdcal Gamer's mniniil Tbers now exista a oSMand Straeten
te ootttrel our united ferme along a WXXWsdls front extending froa northern aerwty
to the Cauoans. Though »cns nedifiectlone aay be aeceeeaxr tins to tine te
keep this structure oeqilately satisfactory, i t * basic snuadneee has ilrssdy bsM both
dMOnatrated daring eaanaei i it/Vlthin the Snprtaa Alllfd Cfii i i i l i tod with other
KAIO Coaasnds and ftrcee. A reorganisation ef the c—anrii of the Csotar ia son
being plinned with » view te increasing their t f f ectlvnaeee.
Internatienal headquarters have baea I q M T d in al l arase. Ibtdv staff,
generously contributed br the MUD Katlcn1 have incrsssed In effeetlvsnses end are
spliadid enaplss of lntemstleal cooperation.
IWPtnBJT Tif ff» TOIffiB 9. The gemth of lend lbrcee dtrihg this Tser1 whlla net satisfactory, has bean
encouraging, Ibsre-roMdsa, bswevsr, a great need te tddsit greater tndadag ef
reeerve foroea. Althen^) ths lack of proper training facilities and areas has JIvew Staubt VJk^Jxj- J
hsngMved the effective training of reeerVae1 good leadership>oan de a s * te offset A
ttile defldeney. Tariona national fensee have organised additional school» f*r
Jitil si and til ooilieianed officers, aid study periods A r easier officers. HsIiM
IsatiM aid training wnrcieee bave been oondectid Mlth ancewgsing roeslts. Prsb
Itna Is training both active and reserve farcse, Uke nwt of ear large jrablM*,
are beendng nsre clearly defined, awl ante MUQnatleaB are re^Matlag and us lag
training tdsaicnt orgtolsM » Bâ*PKXsiQi|^a|ana er* asw operating In the DE
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O . NATO SEO,IET M b n 1 I o h f t m r t i i m o l Portugal* Isotbor ijqpertant dmûnwnt Mltbtn
ths l u t BMith las bom the oot i ) iH»l—it « f ataaie IadsetrUrtiM courses Isr
Inr I U ^ IiiMnJiirs sad Otsrf C f f ln rs . n s oourooo, «hieb or* designed t s
scqpsiat Sfflesrs « I th the we o f stoadn weapons in tsetloal ottnstlMS, w l l i
ooablo UIO n t l i t s r j staffs t e imnoliior the *t11 * T " " * of « M « warfare in
ttis defenie of Vsstsm Btrep i . H u n ronilni s need fbr o i l countries to m<
SMtl ne ooootestIy tbodr training end aebillsstioa egrstons, ADd to lnsare that
tbBT ere erteqnsts te Iroflds1 la the Une rocjoirod, forces esff icUntly n l l p
trained ts parfois thai* datu*.
BWWBKffFCBOBa
10, the Lckltiol onphaals idiifh bed boon gina to the creation * f f ront l ine
* — f TtTlltTfl •*" * g — * ' t ^ a - f of operational raoorroo end safely trseps,
Titol-to a- soiioyu any-la-tba Hold. In en international nwol, ths innlfl Ws of th* ova rail OQpport of forcoo - logistics pwblaaa - ar* nor* then UanAlly ca^xli-satsd, bo cans* esch setion Is raoponelbla for tba support of I ts sen ftrm.
Frea en operational point of Tioir1 this snvnfeaatfc results in s lack of üni -U U V Ih Ihe oopply systw. In an kttwpt t * Mke the ayot«» lass rigid, SBUSt
in Xiy 1952, bogan to study tha M i probloa of a workabla auppl itM far on International faros. In October of that year, after dL iamia i with the netlooa
conaanod, thay subnittsd to the StondlBg Oraup opodfio p r é f e t ! » «tiich, i f adopted,
Should riaajy the sain faAlta In the ergwLsStieu of oar awpply. BA saroly
pro Ting oar supply organisation doee ant nil» good the prooonfc lack; of «(«rational ouf f lo lnt
stecke. Iha natloce or* a l l a g l e t Uist tbay aheold hold et*sla/' for. eoYoral
•oaths, a port.od baaed oo on estlasts of ths tine nicaasaiy to cany out re sajply
la woitlna. Kalnly ter financial roasow, Iwwsrer, tbodr steaks bare not bent
built ^p to the waled lerol .
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0 NATO ùEChET
I i . Dw antstauUi« deficiencies ID K V M S 2 wers la tactical Air
FMOMk Tbero woo a abort PjjO « f airoraft, « f n o « , ot « q f l f and
« f f i r t , a gogollnUo lnaraaaa Auint U * F*ar in tba Tftirr of MriMt
Ilratftl Minij- U i t n l M under tba D* 3. MtnbI OoTonaa Aaaiatanaa
PHfMa l i&lcb bas ainos bottirié onr position. Kot only Iim tba matin i a '
of iïfbot aircraft Inaraasalf t i t their cesbat o^ t tU i t j bss I v n s r i i
Ths inerssss in pilota and tetihslnlimi far than* aircraft , tsgsthsr nitfc aircraft control, warning ud reporting systena, baa boon eneoorefUg. Cibr Mtwark of airfialda bss bean enlarged and aade sors e f f i o i ent . Onr serions
*x*rd*a* ShidI p*e*d difficult pr OblMO In coordination and «(intuitImn dawonot rated ths ability of Mticnal fsrooa aaslfliad to SUttI to work to-
gether aa s tua. In mpylj and in the dmlojanb of the iyitia têr divtribiUif
A M I we IIRO lnprorod onr status w e r a year. U n t U a l n t f sur AIE power in
atill tadv tba weakest link In onr dafaiwe. Oar abilltlas to ap«rat* ear
air forces and ta jrorvid* effective warning of air attack are axtrMoIy
Ualtsdt fbe ineraaas of onr air power a i t receive A r greater attention I y
tbo KAID nations until s botter balança Is SChieTod.
ff tfftT, ngfpn 12> the for«*! OTalLablo I n the area of AUisd OaMand Baraps capable «f '
sIielim ^ir4-ttM nine and -air threats to Tital lima of niMUliiol Iai »re
inadéquat*. Beficiawiss also ailst In aosbers of aati enbaatine oeoorta.
13. Ihs offorta and Sqiwi of the progTMQ for hulldtng oigsal < tlona ban higii to bear fralt. Although ths nsjorlty of these preiset* nrs aa yst Iaawplata1 the potautial unrtlne un i l l ml ims of AUlad rinnt ' Barops ba-re Inprsr*«. Bwro ban also bow consldarsble progrwe in pluanlng
and in standardisation of el^a^ pnesdurs. Inspdtssf n largs portion of tbs fUl raqairoawts i iwiliii to ha nat*
H M u btu 14. In the field of Laglntiosf pmgrws Inge far behind that «bit* 1« the
Trrt-nil I Ccrtstn Tory InportMt Usas of imimni nation or* odthor DE
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0 13B03S 019N J v M w M or naa w l i l m t . Ikla deflOlnscy IJ ^ i t l m l i r l j trae In the
northern area. A l i t « ! asod la far a sore flexible orsrall UQD Loglstloel
and SnpfOy Orgsniaatloa. SKAFE hat alraadn dram ap propnesls tor tUa
OB tbo otbar band, pro grass on tba third part o f tbo Infraatriietnra
Prosna bee bow seed. Kar* than half of the 125 air f ie ld» approved bne been
oonplated t e the paint «hero thqr eonld be Baed In an a m n f f i and eoostruetlcn
le pre caiding well en a l l bet a fen of the ranalndar. Onr fini OO^Mnleatle«a
net is befiiMlng te tabs fem*
The fourth part of the Infraetraetnre progrsa was aPvroyed by the
CenoU in Deeabsr 1952, bet only one-half O f l t m i financed at that tins» X
Additional airfields, hoatkpsrtsrs, - f f - i i « iiannli s.lliiisi, jet f ee l storage
tasks and distribution pipeline* to alrflelde ware anons that portion et the
pregraa which was agreed on. Ibs rmalnrlor, flnsnoed in April 1953,
inolxkded additional airfields and t t an such aa naial buss, radar Inat al l at ipse,
radU-osTigatienal aide, and training Imtallations. In aprll 1953, the
CMndl also apprend the financing of a Isog-range infrastructure progrm
fer 19St, 1955, end 1956, covering the additional HUO Military Installation
departure frca jreilous yeer-ty-year « - ^ - i approval retrsisati a long step
forward. I t Mill «nabi* « s ta i r r e r e greatly ths pluming for coostiwetlea
t r placing I t on a f i n lMg-nnge basis.
15. Praasnt stndy of force requirweots reflect ns» tsihninil derelopnaota end
the ^iliijaiiid of atonic weapesa baa not yet progressed to a stag* warranting a
c or« lttaian as to ahether these deralspnmts asy lead t e a reâsetlse In oonrentlonal
reqidrsaaAe although i t le already clear that the »ew weapons, ores new, |iswel fs l l f
reinforce the oapehllltlee of eonnatlenal ferme. I t la ' - ' • » ' - [ " r clear that^
through sut the torses sabls future, ooaeentioaal « is »«a aMh greater than tbeee
whilh exist today, w i l l be re t i red both to halt « l » 1 e f f w l w art to begin
Mjor oosater of fmeiree.
a« JDiu JT77, ai h b* I HSlT ni rii mis ItMMtdnn duriag thda ttrse-yaer peeled. Ibls far-sighted
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° H M O SCfttt 0
X&. Itaring ttl« T**r, Allied CMwnd Qiroç* bu developed offset!** sorting
reistionaldpe «ud eMrdlatUd planning with other nilitaiy IMIII Ii of MIO.
Xffiwtlm eoepewtiea hu hew e»tehlleb*d with the Ulled C e w d itlastle, , fcj WK V^lZtftl*^ tturtrt ê ^ C r u , — « _ IWCJ
the (fcaanel COnnltt oo^ I n the field of sir ud (iOeetrenies there btf hew j f c ] ^
sloe* IlalMn ultk agonelM of tho StenUsg Oiwpi The reorganisation .of the
d i U l a hodloe wtaioh g n « n the MoMt Htlentls Treat|- QtgwLtKtlsn hw on-
tribnted inportantly to ths S f f l dwt mridng of SRftFS. Penunmt RepftMte
tiTM, prsBldsd onr by lord T w y , eod eerred by sn lntercstleesl Staff, nan
nsst IBdtly in Paris, so tbet authoritati-re d tU in i guidance is permanently
aTailable te SHAPE« SIUK kss werksd in clos* cooperation tilth the civilian
staff of JUIO in ths JhwabL Bovlwr.
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HI B Jl g tS Of i à.y J
toril 1953 a, paragraph 5. f i r s t
»
Host of the Soviet muai e f f o r t had been dewfcêd to suîXErioea and a±ct03>
in the uae of -which they were beoomirig nor» and. more accomplished.
Jfa te 2. paxaqragita first sentence.. In the face of this threat of -vast a i l i t a i y night, the fATO nations, one«
-uncertain divided, were united in their determination to preserve the
pe&œ by building the forces neccs&ary f o r defence*
Paffe a f te r *of varions tyy*as" •
â These forces neire in Vtrying degrees of readiness, "but well-tjai j ieû
elements of a covering f o r c^ rare already in service«,^ Of this force, a
considerable portion iras being transferred from occupytion to defence dutlea*
RphItwI -Qiese forces the various nations w r e training reserves rfiici; could 1
brought into aotion in from three to thirty days in the event of an attach,
ftithcugh the trained active forces allocated to op oonnaad were of a v e r j Mgh
order, they were insuff laient to irithstand a determined Jtuselan ati*ok» f Ihe
fflfeough major wealmess, howrer , lay in the status of land reserw forces* Â \
the H&W) nations had in general set up conscription periods suff ic ient fco
provide minimum reserve strength, the Iactc of experienced OfficeI tS and KCOS
and the shortage of f a c i l i t i e s and equipment f o r training handicapped their
e f for ts , leaving a préparions defensive situation in Western £urope.
There had he en a considerable increase in I-JUtO a i r forces during the
previous year, w£ the total active a i r strength m e telow the adnitama needed Y • /
f o r air- defenoe and grcttnd suppôt* Arauigensnts f o r cooperation with the DS
Strategic Air Oonmnd, the KEr Bogfcer CofibAnd, and 'rbval Faroe« in the Atlantic had teen completed, do that these powerful aims «ère added to cur potential
strength.
U Considerable progress had been made in increasing our naval foroes,
especially mine-layers said mine-sweeper«,
Idk The TiJtro nations had striven to develop tfee forces mcded^ but KKny had.
to start from the bottom; E&ny w r e s t i l l suffering f fOm the detestation. of
the l&st raj*» But mere numbers in soldiers, guns or air^craft are useless
unless f i t t e d into a system ishich includes food and pay f o r the soldiers, TfifllTjr J *
airamition f o r the guns, and a i r - f i e l d « and radar f o r the a i rcra f t » ïhe v
log ie t io probloDs of my comnand are sore than umol ly ecrollcated 1 DE
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3 APRIL 1953
SSOHgg U*
1 * The Trwsty for the formation of a Sirope^n Hfereuse Ctrii^ujiity ms
bo^ng atgncd on the dep of my arri-gal» Siis treaty has been under Td^paraticn
f o r MüembAt Or^r1 a year, ami i t s si^iature opened the way toworda a merger of
wmtliwntal forœs wîj Ich uld iurtrove S i A ^ a overall effectiveness And, at
the sen)» time, *3ti a contribution frcci Seatern Geiiaany* H>e roaj-ect of on
early Qeitnan ocntrihotr.an was particularIy £ratifyiii£. Tb« Lislxm Sloroe goal*
had, of neœsôlty^ resulted in & cc«r-rowiae Ijetwsea ni l itary requirements and
the «ccatcsdo and financial capabilities of the IL TO nationsm 33« resulting
short f a i l Oa the isiUteiy requirements emphasized our need for eny additional
source« of defense retenti el , such as thit that ^osteirt Gemsny vould Tir .ng
into the Bmropem Hefetiae Coerami ty« 1 therefore welcomed the aàvent of the
ZDC slrae i t would strengthen the ^ahole edifice of Allied Ocutcad Eupoj« tjy
bringing in adiliti r t X pdHtmy potential4 lighten proporti^na ,ely the burden
of the cost of this defense; permit 1US to concilier a fbrnagd strategy es fex to
the East es possible; end concurrently realize iamaaeO. effectiveness thasxigi
SteqtttarfLLaeftion end consolidation of the defense efforts of 11» continental
n&tions*
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Ô • Aittlgsig byJ&aragT*ph of ÉepQrt CP
air»" Kafr 19¾ - Jfenr IffiS Steaft of ^ Maty 1 53
1 # Fliea the l i a i t « of Haport4
2, ReaiSOri for Beport»
3* Purport à ud outline of Hep ort»
2t, TwynrtwIToe of tel l ing the NATO peoples the facts of the military «Ituaticai
Quote f r o » Eisenhower Report on necessity f o r Ioiowledge of tiie dangers of the Ttforld situation*
6, Claeeifiea reports export this genarai one. 7» Responsibilities of QonnBnfi greater than i t s present capacity*
8. Honesty and ob£ectivy of wri.1 itary esti»tea» 9* Spiritual values and youth, necessity for conserving e&roe*
IC« Introduqticsi to the situation a year ago,
11» Hy Mssiooj (a) In Aar, defense of KlXOfs territories (b) In peace - develcçœnt of forces capable of martins
mdssioTu
12* (a) Ibe threat as i * exists» 4
(b) Soviet forces - an^r3 a i r force, ZSrty
13« (a) The 1ÎA.10 "balance sheet AjBjSCtS
("b) Exlatirig forces of W4T0 capablâ of denying unopposed conquest to the Soviet«
(a ) » Connend structure
(d) Supporting units only Juat beginning
(e ) Jtorale
( f ) program on plane for- creation of additional units
(g ) Récognition of neoeasity for dafanee
14* l i ab i l i t i e s (a) Soviets stronger
(b) All ied land aud nayy ne&ker than Soviets
(o) Iteficieiaiy of a i r force»
(d) Headgfuartex-s and signals incapable of fxQl oonfcrol (e) Lack of logist ical seaport and ammunition
( f ) Shortage of specialists
(¢) Fxe-re qui site steps to Lisbon goals not taken
15* An ^vnnation of the changes.
16, Perettthetioal rant ion e t inproved reporting and evaluation syaten»
17* Fottiation of Headqfaartera Al l ied IäqI Forces SoutheaLatern Europe «ri l . All ied Forces Mediterranean ^JrM
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Ö O
- 2 -
(a ) Defioiercy of a i r forces
(¾) Iraining of active reserve land forces (c) Support of amed forces ' (d) Qceipllcations of logist ics problems
(e) Progress on the third slice of infrastructure program (f) .Approval of fourth slioe of infrastructure program (g) JtATO reorganisation
16, lfilch has been acconplished
19* TThat has been changed of pover»ratio
20* Contiiming disparity of military potential - tbe true criterion»
21, tr„S,S.B* strength - Iandp a ir , navy, satell ites
22, Conjecture about ohanfte of policy since Stalir.1 a death
23, Quote from KATO ccanunique of 25 <April 1953 to illustrate truth of para.,22
24, Military appraisal that the Soviets oould win ncti; Al l ied Oonmnd Surope cr i t i ca l ly weak. de need more forces plus good morale,
23, Sunnary - a Soviet attack could, destroy us. Be-survey of militaxy retirements*
26, Requirements re-survoyed; KATO goals approved.
27* Requote April 1953 oonmunique
" F T O G I T M G f o r 1 9 5 3 FILM Prograas for 195V provisional Increase in forces, training, infrastructure".
28, Fride in achievement,
29* Inproved morale,
30+(a) But there must be no let-qp nog,
(b) 1lWo security - only a beginning*,
31+ northern Europe.
32, Central Burcpe,
33* Southern Europe*
General measures.
35* -Aii1 trea&ie&se*, 36, Logistical -weaknesses.
57* Peficiencies correct ible*
38* I f corrected, -w could within two or -three years defend Western Borcpe,
35* I f not corrected, d e c i s i s de^oat posaibl*.
AiycnaiaJ., of the effectg of cjiangeg
Areas of n&jor deficienajes. tasks ahead and conclusion
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40» ITwfl for unity»
Vi. Ho l e ve l l i i * o f f .
4£* ' We uwst not loss mo—frtvia.
45#(a) Critically rak, tt±Mt
(b) Trri m^1 I n t fU «hört «od decisive,
(c ) We must bave the aeamn .
(d) Ve oust have wtraiiig,-(e ) There mist be high morale - flgairy
(¾ Defieietieies oorrectible - a^la*
(g) Tljutly action necessary * again*
(h) i f deflcieneie» uncorrected - again,
¢1) First steps «a cllirib to plateau - afpiiw (j) Nb levelling off - quote from Eisenhoser* (lc) Uottentu» - again*
44» I believe I have a fine staff ,
45« Keoessity for publication of Feportt
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NATO SECRET ° . S f c p î Â - — -ZTS. A i l w w 5 3 '
SUBJ BCT: Rmpozt CA U U D « M O » BJIIDFES KAY 1952 - MAY 1?53.
IO t Bm «e*tb ,
ras
1. IMa (U)MTt OMeau OCHttIH BRtCfS aille* 30 1952,
UM AATS I T U A W SAPRNM Allt»d C P W I R I W
2T HM civil antboritiaa of HIOD N T L O » ilwulil N O T T N paclodioaiUr
from tba Militai? ri—wida»» i t a tbtgr lum « i f o U n l * profeaaiooal
MUtuy «m—«rut of tba g i n n t and prosp«atiT® " f M 1 1 < y for dis-
durfliig tbtfr uaiffwd dafanas Wiynntw 1 ) t tw»
3. Ibs (mpoM of tM* JUiportf tba a »Cond Mnntliic I tw SapraN
HaadvuxUra AUM Fcma SU«P*T 1* t « proTide RU& au i m i i i a t , Jt
Imrlndaa a br±«f n a u f of tb* aituatlon « la j u r w ] aa of
tb* atudfta lAldi bière a&nas o K a m d j ab tpprtiml of til«Ir affecta ttpoa
tb* OâptbLLlty of tbia Comt i for Oarxring ont ita aaaignad data«a* « t u t a i )
a wwmi of ita lUitvj laniiti —il»i «ni an indication of UM arasa of
ailatiag aajor deficlanclaa. UM Report ia puiposalr oombad lu aroiadiat
g«n*r<a tans for obviou* sacnxltjr raaaona* Prasiaa flgaroa M yeaaut
•took» of I^iiil11 Mil, on faal toT aircraft, tank* «04 trusta, and on tba
sff*ot£naa*a ef oar radar to ( l i * aa U a d r warning of o t qu lH HaiJ air
Stiaolc1 « M n u l r abooM not te aads ymblio. A l l aattara at M M u o « IK
this IUpsri ter* bon inciladed in i - l n r l f m raport» aad* to prop «g
aotkorlty. Sur t m teai oovsrad in adaqaata dutail and oquo iM hf 4»
i^jTOprilta ;
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o KATO SECRET 0
BotnithrtjndiDg this uoqaeaticmod nsed Ibr withholding oaçtaln
t m jhUImUm , I Htab to « q t e t in « t tbo Ontwt of this
Bqpiiirt tit* i q m t u n , la fast I M l l n a tba crucial importance, of aaHng
Imnm tu (Mr KHTO paoplaa -tba M l » fact» of tha - ' " » " y situation la
<4ileh tbqr > n n ilnply m » « i w L In no otbar «ay- ean Uwy ba nonrincad
« t tu» M d for tha haaflT h i r ta i tb«r a n u M to carry. U unewilawd,
tlMsr Mnnot bo «œoctod to «ufqpqrt N/UD peegrww, en'iba at t i l « aealo
aaaantlal to oollactiTa floeurity. j X concur idiola haartwUy with mr f N -
daoooaor, OcoataX Etaemhemr, aba a jaar a ^ cpwatlctied Hkj1 thara m1mhI j ba
*oanftalMi In tba stnda of » t i i f »— of oar M pwplM aa to tba basic « l a »
of on* I R F N M J F Q G R A A 1 tha naoasaity for i t , W D tba ursant I I M I I I I for
Uwlr « «a Indbrtdoal a f f t r ta* ' llCtoeo tha tn th lo UnMratood1" ba atatad,
•me* tho critical, dacgara pro« i t . In tha w r U situation axa raaUy known,
tharo mil l ba Xaaa oc^tLaottugr «öcarning nur present aUl ta i r situation
and tba t m l t t off acta of dalap v U l bo oloarljr aawu*
5. I t baa baai v «ouatant conviction alnoa I auaiMil iiimiiiiI that
pools ondarstandin^ la iadiapaoaabl© to progrua twnda tba H l r i f r
• H i t aiy aaourltj för MhKii MTO haa b a « oataMlabad. Xo eraafca tUa
mil l M IiialTin UIC and tba national mthorittaa Mat |ii Mml tha Caeta of
our aaaarity altnation throng a oocrdJUatad «ad nrtalnad InfomttLon
pro*r*a. I hava ftfaVioualy aoMttad rarrwanrtationi ooncarolng auch
aotlofu
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O NATO SECRET 0
6. Un Mtttfc for MQntlou to the anr v&Jor pgnfal—a tacaiaiarsd
in tb* «Hart to t i l l Mowo glvaa i i n to Mrloin political, aconoadc,
financial aid social dllXLeattlea to »bleb I aa aoutaly allr». Xat —rJj
»olatlona » a t ta f«md i f tha basic Objeetlma *hlob b rag * UtD Ist»
being are to bo reasonably attaiivhl* within tba nsar fttnre.
7. Iha aaaosaanAa attcb M l w oofiatltut« a military aatlaata« Iu
preparing I t , I bava dram b*i*U7 i v n tba advice and aaafetonia of tba
offlcar* aaalgnad to talc ri Maiiil of all aaa-ricaa, »ad iua all tba
e«BKtilaa in i i i ia i i i i la tbia uaamd, Uxv ara nan of higfc prlTwiplaJ^"
integrity, and dwonatrated professional ooapatoea, in afcoa tbair aatufcrla*
MV Iiava real pMda and oonfldanoa. Ibis report la based on Mwir Iwaett .and
SbJaotits onalyai* and raflaats tbo rigid standard* of austere socman ooo^
Blatant with aoocptabla afflclaocy «bleh ara onr an—cm aljt« Ihaae
•an ara deadly aware of Uia Haata of Haan Ufa, of «ptrifcwQ. Talnes, ana of
Material traasurae «bleb past wars bava entailed; thegr «ta dedicated to tba
«ffort to fore*ft*U tba eataatropbio daatructlaa iAlote futur« «ara oooU bring»
IBK ALTOMC« M KU MB
8. I t o o now to tba situation of a Ttir ag», tba tin* at Mbich tka
flttt Annual Soport of the Sqpma Allied CoaMBdar Barop* va* IaaowU Ito
•Ultanr MiHdtai BItrvatad to tha Barqpaan Alliad r i i i n l than aa now VMI
Ä MK I* â t f e l ÏTOLL* IBTITEB B B B E B LIBTISTI«»-
Thla adjalat was not qaaHilad In althar apace or Uaie. Z twaanotMnlr to
defaod cartaio part» of tba Mit» laropaaa area «a) tbair people*. Kor aa* tba
-3WATfl RFRRFT DE
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M T O SECRET responsibility ottif to bocnw» affective in aon Mina jsar nkn Maos
. be availahl*. Tbo task was to a*f«nd a l l , at «17 Uao1 U war ehaaU
b. in Bmifirn 1t ImiVir *
SÎ I M Ä ä ä Ä ä Ä ÜB "arfcl— ^ f l r i l " I f required« Bot the underlyinE and
fin iili—rt «1 (Upon na the pnaanation of peaee through Uta datai 1 »at
effort oi potential aggreasora of strong, tul iwtl coatoat-rmfr fereea,
eapabl* of challenging Iairwatai t or at laaat of rendering ita aaccaea
doubtful. Already, the great progress that bad baai Bade In tba builA-up
rroa tb* «quoted and alaoat doflntaoXMS condition which odated in XWO at
tbo tine of tba C w i J i t attack so South Koraa had aada a aajor oontrlbutioa
toward m » and*
9* Iba nwt basic considaration, giving concrete iHwioloie to tho
taste Involrad in eoompUahlag tha aaalgned rtwlon, was tha amay throat —
ita natu« and aagdturte, Ibora «ara two particular pointa to bo atraaaad
In this ssoaaetion. First, oar task as M l i t u r am waa to oonoacn oui—
aalvaa with tb* anaav oapabiJlti«*» Military planning and i a n f «na»)-lw>a
oouU not bo baa ad «poo apccolatlva w t t x ta ) of a potaitUl aggreoaor'a
tantlona. I f Um sdaaion assigned to Utia OGMasnytaa to ba dlsoharg*d, onr
fore** had to ba prepared to aaat 10 aecraaaor1* foroea aa thaj actually
«xi at art «id Mold ba bnmrfit Into Iwttlar «a bad to recta» with Militaiy
realities. Ha » o l d not ialr cm attaapts to fattwm tba Kiiid* of tbo aaa In
tba KrwaHn nor to follow tbslr f r e t p ^ reversal* of tactic*. Sound, I t waa
naoaaaai7 to react effectively to Sorlat actions KLtkia liwtevar period of
warning «dght ba provided. Of all U M basic " T B f f i T F n n i r DE
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O WTO SECHEf responsibility oolj to toooM effective In MM ltttun J W «tan MOM
I b» enllahl*. the t a * mo to dehnt a l l , at w ttaa, i f war ttanld
. QffactlT^ .
, Bnt the underlying aad
Anl iaaitd pnrposa n s UM ireseration of poses Uroagb the determt
effect co potential aggressors of strong, ba IanrsJ ooaliat-nadr Iorcaaf
eapebl* of t laaai i tat aggresaion, or at laaat of rendering ita awoeeas
dotbtful. ilraaftjr» tha Kiwat ymgraai that had beaa Mide la the NHIit-ap
rrcm the azpoead and alaoot Oafenaelaea oondltioo Wrinh «dated in 19J6 at
the tin* of the Fnn i i e t attack on Saoth Koiaa bad nada a MJor contribaticii
Umtri this «ad*
9. The no t heal« conaldara&ioa, giving ennorate iHawi ia» to the
tasks l im lm l in acc<wpliflhjjag the m l g a d Hlaaien, «aa the w v threat —
ita natvr* and Mgniinde, Ihoro nan t«o particular points to be stressed
in this oonnoetitsi, Pirat, our task aa Mlitarr n > na to otoaena tmr~
aalfaa with UM «ns«ar capabilities. KUitarr planritig and reooaewodatiene
sadd not be baaed open agaàflittTO eat Iaat ea of a pot ail lai aggressors In-
tentions« I f tba ana ItiMil to this ooawn^aea to be discharged* our
forças had to bo prepared to Mat an aggrasaor** forças aa th«r T j t - j 1 I r
azlstsd and eoald be teoutfit into battle. Na had to ri aken with aUitair
rselltls*. Ha ootid not rsly on attests to fattx* ths niridl o f tbe MB I s
the KiaJlii aar to felldw tbalr fraqoanfc rerarealj of taotloa. Sooood, i t KM
naoeeaarr to raaot effectively to Sodat actions tdthin idmleiao period of
warning IiigM ba prorided. Of a l l ths bMic i DE
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° NATO SECRET ° mm* COtId I a n aura devastating efrect in this area than that « t 3MBHHSK.
B » Upt r tUM of mim- OAFiMLIÖ and of HMS as two factors « f M b M n U l
aigri ff Tirv^ coula scans*]? bo U i n w i M a
]D. The Soviet Uoc bad o n r 6 s U l l m am undar u n , roughly It 1 / 2
• H i l m belongU* to ths sorts« Utaion i t s e l f . DM VSU wanted 175 Uao
div is ion. Satallite strength was growing. Tba Sovltft air f o e « tetalr-
od Jnet over 30,000 Aront line aircraft, with a large aircraft reserve,
Iba Kav included aore than 300 aotaaiinee, lnalnding a umber of the laitaat
type. Iha Soviet forces were capable of rapid expansion in esse of war*
Trained reserve Maniniiiai aid rescue* of eqnifwit were laasrtlately available.
Soaa 30 divlalooe were Isoafted in eesafded Eorope1 of *tdeh the 32 in Xrtt
Osnungr ocuatitixtsd an ever present threat to our forces« Ibo OOflbet
effeotivsnees of the ground Aveeo wee rated M«h and thadr s y l p n * good —
in soma types superior. Tbe ccabat efficiency of Uie air force, «bi le
rated below WTO standards, was llçrovin«, particularly Mitb the raplao—act
of pistoiwtype with atfsra Jet aircraft. Ibe Sovlet1S well-known disregard
for thstr cam cainaltieo further lnoreaoad their offensive CIFJdUtT l
11* Ihc balança ah*at of KMO eecurity in Vestem Bonpa1 aa I evaluated
I t lo H^ 1952, showed aajor assets and aajor . l lahmUea. Tba «ülitaiy
assets, audi as the aanltlfils ilaaant« of cioMSMt atmctara and IeadsrAlpt
plana and directives, orgaaiaed ttiabat m i t * , and provision for tbadr support,
bad already Ingjia to give the basin fbr hope of fUtqr* n w r t t y «
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° "ÄTO SECRET ° 12» In conorate tana of ooAat units In being, the divlsione,
air sqnadraUB> and eeAatant vassals* 11» datons* O n i vâriitth thon Wrtmt r1
had already b*ocm sufficient to deny unopposed eonvisst to tba Soviets,
although there OOILU bai* bean no serious claim of capability to hold a
pvsdstamlaed line i f tbo Soviets bad lanuHhsd a full-seals offensiv».
The ' U M Coaiand provided ouamnd and control aa chine ry for coorditutod
eaplctjmat of mich units a* sera available, to -On fa l l Dtaamre of their
Halted napaMHty. An Initial structure bad bean brought Into being and
aas staadilr being strengthened.
13. A start, but only a start, bad been mde in -Hi* provision of
SVRHtrting eloBonrts for the OaWMt unit«. Tbseo inducted tbs lcglafrtwa
i rpp™*" " " " , depots snd airfields, eodxit support wi ts , and a l l tbs rast
of ths m Y 1 ^ supporting aatabliabsent neoded to give nodem fighting
forcfta s AQabtliIjf for amtainsd ooMwt.
Iiu Si »orals snd in th* deteiwl nattai to gain the military strength
needed for security, the alliance bad already demmetratod its essential
soundness. In the aU-daportmt ela—it of leadership, rapid progress
v«s being aad* through growing raperisno* in tbs handling of unit* in
ths f ie ld, through th* integration of Hvsrae Eatioaal alenenta, through
the training of additional Jtmior leaders and through the infuaieu of
OOMmi Ob1JectiTws and doctrines at a l l levnla of eowand*
(IfA Tn nrnrirf
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° N M O SECRET 15« VndarlTing all -Oieaa Xaotcrat there Iikd bean truly i 11—rktbla procréas
In the basic decisions on national and international policies, and in plans
and pragmas for ths creation of additional units, for the Iqtroiaaont and
expansion of support elsamts, and for the acre of foe tiro eocrdiaatloo and
9*lay»tent of existing forças. Ihsrv «ai a reoognttleo, basic to a l l these
efftrts, of the necessity for a ooaoon dafsnas to mat a ccram peril.
16. Igslnst these assets were ranged grave liabilities. In Iby 1952,
security in Vbstom Europe «as s t i l l heavily cmrahadasad by tbo ensnuos
IirqandemiDe of coabat-resdy Soviet Mlitair pomr poised behiCbd/Éh«
Iron Curtain. Pnrtherrars there sere grave deficiencies in Ul led
praparsdosss to Met a Soviat attack bad i t ctne. Iba total fighting
strength of the Allies fczaed but a asall fraction of the Soviet Faroes
daployod In forward areas, land forces and naval strength assisted to
Allied Caiand Eorcpa aar« entirely insufficient.
IT. The inadequacy of the Air Ktrces vas particularly aonto. Ifany
units wore deployed in exposed areas east of tbo Shins, with no prepared
»-daplojttent sites. Coaaand, control and warning *xmngen»nts were
^ngnantaiy In ths extreoe. A large mmber of onr aircraft war« of
obaolesceât piffton-en^ine type.
If). the principal subordinate uuwamiU were st i l l in a femotive state*
The headquarters Woald not have been equal to the denutda of active operations.
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0 "'1ATO ScCREr ° Signal auawiaü r iitions, although steadily Iteming through n w a lnftaatno-
turo JirrfTgTanffj m » ssriouslj inadéquat* fur continued a f l t eUn aoutrol of the
figtvHng elenente,
• Part iot t lar is tbs status et soppwtijig eleaorrta, tha deficiencies
«cold baie weighed heavily against affsctivMsss in coWiat. Ststtks of
anataiitlun wore mttmwily lew, logistical and Hintananoa systens lnedoqsata,
and ro-wpply plans and assignante of reflwnadtdlities aer* a tm nn&er
dlacnaalon and proving extreaely difficult* 8cpply lines ran parallel to
the ITont and aero operationally unbalanced*
20« ShortagOB of specialists, career personnel, and siperieneed laaders
nrs setsrs In many unite and wold have had a substantial adverse affect
on ooidiat operation«, Ifiwgr reserve alenenta lacked the degrés of organisation
and training required for ooobat. FlmUy, although expansion goals and inarlt-
aenta for 1952 had been undertaken at Iiabon, i t aas increasingly <W«rant
that the requisite 3tape In auming, training, and e<iid{gilng asre not being
-Udcan in fu l l end on tine.
IKATO SXPET
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NATO SEI
Mt 1*« » **«
SU-Wsw
rad laths
Ik* abjacttM^li*-
JKomm dffisftbar i t * t »
abbat Mlltair IUUiTN^MMy W VlthU UM MID MnsMN It 1* « Mr to
is tun «f Iial1 Ms1 «ad sir far«**/ «ad
to Ufbar » ntbsrlty
It la w
tbslr wqalred W k t aad t* rapirt tbat asat
"" ""*"< " x - 1 — " — *-*-
IarUMir arty ta taka aU aaasana wLtkda v pawsr lsaat* »»Hint tba M-
nalriasst» af dataaa, aad ta aafca «paalfls I luawiuJilliai ta M^ar
authority 1* aattara as tba lallil ap of fsrtM, Masaaad stnetara.
MtabUttawU1 alrflslds aad attorfta ftdlttlMi »
aafem IgtIta elvi! Satbantttaa1 fe the-M^i
tbair «Ua rsspaaslbilitles aad aatbsrlty.ta " ' K r
/
toahst sstaat tb*M
filth tba aid Sf »or asWrdlaats n—aitara, I
awl* at tba Mlitair capability far
fwea* «ad sappartlaf »stsbllstasat* tha «M l
raparto als* lattsato »adlataMa sad
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*. 0 MATO SECRET 0
i t th* -pik* U m Wpn i f « tflthe mm * f «tot la actually pr»rided,
; a Mcb «tat* ef i j i n t t i l m « M i i n l thna^
aAeiafat aa ta Mat eaarialtlM af « n a « I t r m U and Aa t an ef
reaeawea a i l l ( I n aa j l— military ratarm.
22. OartM tba Mvt jaar MOb bM baaa law ta InoraaM aw
Oeteue finaa aM ta aake tbM MI* attaatii*.
Seatet IrataMlltyt «m pregtoaa la Mt^a«ffinl«»t ta give m preapeet
Ijif attaefcad, We are at i l l tar Mart ef tba a l a lM requlra-
SSf&tflfll
lack MHiMMaar n ^ l j aad « w a r t . Int a eeriea et
aetlMi bare beeaV akaa «Mob bare a IrMgtbaued ear CaMaad *tnotaret
ear eparatieaial plaae n t i i aa t l na , and lall ) lnaraaaad
air, eod m a l faroae. fccMjoatiaai la naore detail et MJer
23. Qr AagMt ljgit|the tare«« et Greece and Tarkaj^iaea Seasdtoated-J ^
«Ith tbaae et tha rMaladir af mf u I I A âwnkiMrter» Allied Uad ftreee
Saotbeaatarn fcarepe, with Liiataaaat Oaaaral Millard ft. I ^ n l O^. Ir^f,
la mu il «er« eaUWiabed m Xatfr directly nftiriliM.>i ta ldairal Canoy1
11 IIMaIII In rblTf. AUlaA Vacraa SewUim Darepa. Ik DeeMbetr 1952 AMMl
the KarlHaMttattM at Bon«, IeTal fer, «aa appointa« FiMinIii In Thlif
Allied Fbreea MdUarraMant with M M r i anr bitaln'a KedHeeranean Rlaat
aad Mrtelh anal feroaa et Ikaaoat Qraeeet Tarkar and Italy ia Uia Madi-
tarraniaa area, lbs IMtad States Sixth Aaat t «Ith a strittet A m ailaalM, -10-
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2k. At Lisfc«a la Iatntrr 1?52 Oa Mtlaea had sat f w
tba «rat ttaa, ma feels far tha balld-ap af «air fareas la 19» aad
tsatatlva (w i s far 1 » } «ad 1954. Ia tba joer 1952 ended, tba («als la
tataa af aajar v i t a «ara appraxlaataljr art far ilr VarMaf Kml IMaw1
aad far active flàtt-aUaatth AnV dlvlsiat». Ist far tha in? fsroM i
•«tad ta Mtar SaAat faUaidj* D-Oay klat bate* ths aad «f th* first aaatb af
• V tietiutlcs, tha (asls an » aaly partially Brtf ^ a i j a W a s l IirbM i
• I n af Mlts wsald a*t bars b**a ready far caabet at tba tiaa Mated. '
Batlac tb* last « a b * Math* praçpaas taaard th* mirtlait af Ihm (eel*iaS
te^ta _ UtJ
ma^atMy* Thi aailisal tha MMaai th* atraagta af Mdta « • iwroaal,
L aa>r I t M af «al tralala« advaaead. la attl-
abar *f »sa Mita Ma a HMTa a* Msnrtbalaaa1 far a l l
servisse tbare are etlll aajw defieiaaelM la Stppaart Mita. Ia lagiatlaal
istatillabaaats and la staofca af 1 U « aad atbar « w l l i a . I m i d add
IWi Mlbsl IR»11 J at tUs peiat, that ear repartlaf aad avajaatlag systea bas
1 MMlilaratly atreattbaaes tbra»ag»iart tbla perlad. I k i a p r t i i a n definitive IafeeaatlM af actaal r Mrtl Lj IM tta XscanSr M jaaslbls. Baa
WoV » is^peeelhls t* evalaate uadUt affective Mlta «Ith aa
We a a bave s aatb Mra reliable Iwwflilg».of Juit -J l -
. . •• . . --
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H T O SECRET
A ] «ar ago th« outstanding de£itl*atcr a u in the taotloal sir
forcea. That* i n a ahortage of aircraft, af ere**, af nqplr and apport.
A considerahl* increase M n g tba year In tba —**— of scatiet aircraft,
asinlr Aon U l i K i M under tba V A HatnaT Dafanoo Aaaiataneo ProgrM,
baa since battent oar position» Sot onür have tha nahm» of ocabet a i r -
craft Inormssd, but Uialr ooabat capability baa l^uovad, Ibe lnoreaaa in
tba IIIIIIIII of pilots end technicians for theea aircraft, together Kith MM»
layrov—int in aircraft oofitrol, naming and reporting agmtMs, ban b e «
«awanragiMg* Onr Mtnorlc of airfields baa bsM enlarged and Mda nor*
ef f ic ient. Qar Tarioua ezardaoa vbloh poaad di f f icul t H»MM in oa>
Wl i i a l lM and naMwrt Ostiem daaBustrvted tba ability of national foroaa
aseigned to SBKFS to work together M a teasu In Mliplrj and In th* dov*>
IqasA of th* ajwtmi for distributing fhalyte bar* iaçrored oar statu»
over the peat year. Metwtbelaoat our air power is still todagr tbs waskMt
Uct UiA in our defense. In spite of our progress, sur air foroaa aaaaat adequately
A
cany out their tasks» 9» inorasM of air power Mst raoaive tor greater
SttaiAlMi Ir th* KUD natioaa.
36. During the past year great effort* bam bean Mda to inprOM train-
lW of regal** forcée Md «I the saae U M to a obi era better training and
aotdlisefcice pro cedar** for reserve fbrc«*, oa «boa ao Moh of our defensive
strength depend*. Lack of paopar training fad Htie* and m a baa hampered Ud«
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H T O F 5 : J effort, but sMd lndenhip can do Kdi te offset th^defldmcy« Accord-
ingly* 9Ura he* strongly 'Mlilieel »ml Uie need for Ieedtadhip at a l l
echelon* • Tationa national force* hate organised additional schools for
JanLor and non-rrvnl aslrxied officers, and at**ty periods fbr MAor officers.
HobiUsatloo and training exarcisee have bean conducted vitb Miooaraglag
reenlta. Prohlav in training both active and roaarra forces, like Most
of our large jsnliliii. are mnr beoamlng acre dearly defined, and KW IUTO
nations ara reqnoetlng and nalng training and advisory Missions organised
tgr SHAFB. Such Mlaeione are near operating in the Kethsrlsndaf Laxnabcarg and
Portugal. Another lnportaait davelopaent has bean tbe recant cat ahll Sfta « t
of atoaio indoctrination courses for NiIO i i annulai a sod statt Offlcara4
Iha courses, iU«h are designed to acquaint officers with tha use of aioari-C
veapona in tactloal Sjtnatlooaf « i l l enable HUD aUi tuy staffs to mnalilTr
tbe j tHiiatlnnfl of aUalo warfare in tbo defense of Meatarn Europe. Kith
al l this, there la s t i l l an urgent neod for a l l ooutala to in aiaialna
critically tbadr aobiHtation ay at lam and to insure that thay ara adequate
to Iraividef In tba tiae required, foroee sufficiently ««Untrained to perfon
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> u * I
S IiJKCTl
*tf *** %
1. IMs Aepart concerns AliT O {PK JCfD rUPQTCtJtoeg 30 Bw- 1952,
the du te I bee um Stiprene Allied Gönnender Europe*
2* Die pijrposa of this Teportf the second cnan*ttzi£ f ro » Sopreiw
ffeadqj artera Allied Powers Knropej is to profite an assessment of the
current atv* prospective capablll*v for <ti*char«tn£ Assrtgned defence
responsibilities. *t induces a brief stüh»-' of th« Mtcation orte
jear sgoj ao tfXaninatji, on of xhe changed -which have since occurrftdj
an appraisal of their ef fect« upon Uœ eapatrUit" of Command for
OArrylng out i ts assisted defense «iasionj a resurve* of ita military
requiref«Dt5; and an indication of the areas of existing naior defi^
elendes. Ybe Repor- is -urposei^ coucned in soKuwhst general tftnse
for security reasons* pr^ci^e fiacres on present stocks of Smunltionj
on JMel foT aircraft, tanks and truefea, Aiid on the fcffectivetieaa of
our radar to jive ua tinelv naming of svxprise entity air attack,
obviously should not be nade public. All mattere of substance in this
Report luve be*n included in classified report» previously Made to
proper authority. Jhe r hfive been covered in adequate detail and
supported by appropriate reconften&rtione *
7« tJotMithstandlnt this imou&stioned need for withholding certain
information fron publication, X wish to emphasis at t*e outset of
this Report the importance, in fact 1 believe the crucial itfl ort*ne<#
of Uttkiug known to our 'JAiYi peoples t^e facte of the rdlatarv
situation i«i utile* Chev are so deeply co ncerned. In no other w»' c«n
ttaçr be convinced of tJie neert for toe heavy burrfeas Uiev are aelc d to
carrw. Tl VnQonvincedj thc cannot ba t&pected to support "AT)
^ 3: N A l O E E S T E O S D u u r ^ ^
// H ¢4-, S'JPSESf- B JionftAHKRS AU-ETD POfcEBS EnTIPE * - ^ w y T
Farls, Franc» "/"l ' 7 HiJT 195?
Report on ALlIED CWiAMH ElHOPEj War 1952 - HaT 1953 The Standing Group -
K A a o RESTRICTED DE
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J t n * '• KAlO KESÖäCIEÜ J
prograss, even on the «iaino* settle essential to collective security.
ULth an unshakable belief it) our concept or tieawcracyj I concur whole-»
h«arfcedly with >7 predecessor. General Si sen bower, who a irear ago
questioned why there should be "confusion in the minds of millions
of our own peoples as to the basic *»iias of our defense Iprograuj the
neoe&sitv Tor I t , and the urgent denand fo r their own individual
e f for t * . 0 nQnce the truth is understood^" he stated, llOnce the crit ical
dangers present in the world situation are really known, there w i l l be
less complacency concerning our present military situation and the
harmful e f f ec t « of delay wi l l be clearly seen."
£» I t has been nr* constant conviction sJn'6 I assumed cojoiand
that public understanding is indispensable to progress towards the
niEtiKua military security for which flAf} has been, established* Ib
create this understanding Htït~i and the national authorities must present
Uie facts of our seevrit™- sitiation through a coordinated and sustained
information program» I have prerioaslv submitted recommendations
concerning such action.
QKCRAL 5> The search f o r solutions to the many major problems encountered
in the e f f o r t to become secure gives rise to serious pol i t ica l , economic,
financial and social dirf ictdtlee to irfilch I acutely alive» Yet
early solutions must be found I f the basic objectives which brought NAT"»
Into being are to be reasonably attainable within the near future*
6* The assessments which Iollow constitute a military estinâte.
In. preparing i t , X have drawn l^avily upon tte advice and assistance
of the of f icers assigned to this Co**»aiid» Of al l services, and fron
e l l the countries represented In this cennand, they are pen of h l f V
principled integrity,, and demonstrated professional competence* in
whom their countries Dtav have real prl^e and confidence » this report
i s baard on their hoiwst and objective analyst and reflects the rigid
standards of austere econonv consistent with nlnUmm acceptable
2
M V D RbSiKICrEÜ
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H i f L 8EÙXSICTED
eff iciency which are our coimon aim, ihese sen are deeply aware of the
wa*te"of human l i f e » of spiritual vaines, and. of material treasures
«hich past -Hars have entailed; tlwv are Etedicated to tfce e f f o r t to
forestall tlie catastrophic destruction which future wars could bring*
TTK 51T ATlOfl IH HAÏ 1952
7. I tui7i now to the situation of a vear ago, the tine at which
the f i r s t Annual Repcrt of the Suprene Allied Cocnan^er Surope was
issued- The ndlitsry mission entrust d to the European AUiad Conaand
then as new was;
a. In war to defend SATOtS Ruroj>ean tegtjjwyies«
Diis mission was not Q u a l i f i e d in either space or tine. T t was not
nierelv to defend certain parts of the KATD European area and their
peoples* Sor was the responsibility only'to become effective in aoi*;
future ^ear when means might be available, Jlte task was to defead a l l ,
at any time, i f war should occur»
b» In pgacetiiae to develop an integrated, effective fore»
capable of accomplish!^ the wartime mission i f required, I1Ut the
underlying and Tvndamentel purpose was the preservation oi peace through
tbe deterrent e i feet on potential aggressors of s*roog, balanced
cowfeat-ready forces, capable of challenging »egression, or at least of
rendering its success doubtful. Already the Creat progress that had
been Jiade in the build-up from tbe exposed a,it* almost, defenseless
condition vtiic i existed in 1950 at the time of the Cosuiun st attack on
Soitfth Korea had made a ma;for contribution toward this erkL
fhe next basic consideration, ^ivirç concrete dimensions to
the tasks involved in accomplishing the assigned nissio , was the en sur-
threat - i ts nature and magnitxjde. there «era two particular points
to be stressed ITI this connection. First, our task as military men
was to concern ourselves with the enemy capabilities, hi l i tary planning
and recotmeridations covld not be baaed upon specvJLatlve estimates of a
potential aggressor's intentions. I f tha ttiûsion assigned to this command
3
NATO EESmOTEÜ
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O N j v r , ^ T S I C T E D ^
vas to be discharged, ovr forcis Jiad to oe prepared to nest an aggres-»
forces as tbef actual I t existed and co- Id be brought into battle«.
Ue had to reckon with Ai l l tar v realities, 'fc ootid not rely Qti attempts
to fathom the minds of the men in the KreiOdmnor to follow their fre-
quent reversals of tactics* Second, I t was ntcessary to react ef fective-
ly to Soviet actions within whatever period of warning might be provided«
Of a l l the basic principles of war, none o u i " have no re devastating
ef fect in this area than that of slRPffiSS, The importai© of «n4v
CAP/BILIfY and of TIME as two factors of f>„ndanental significance could
scarcely be exaggerated,
9» Tht Soviet bloc had over 5V million ran ivsder aims, roughly
4¾ million beloirçin, to the Soviet - Jiion i tse l f . Ihe tTSSR mounted 175
I i i « divisions. Satellite strength was growing, fhc Soviet air force
totaled twer 20,COO front-lire aircraft, with a large aircraft
reserve » fhe îaw included »ore than 300 submarines, including a
nuinbir of the latest t 'pe, Jhp Sovitt forces were capable of rapid
expansion in case of war, trained reserve manpower and reserves of
equipment wore ôUBrttdiately available, Some 30 divisions were located
In occupied Europe, of whdch the 7.2 in East tierminçr constituted an
ever present threat» to our forces. The combat effectiveness of tfre
..round forces was rated higi and tâtdr equipment good - in some tvpee
superior-« fto cocibat efficience of the air force, tdiile rated below
standards, vas improving^ particularly with the replacement of
piston-type with aodern Jet aircraft» Tht Soviets1 well-known disregard
for their own casualties fürtet r incrc-as-.d Uieir offensive CAPABÎ1TTY,
10* Te balance~abeet of NAi" övciritv in Western Europe, as I evaluated it in ha 1952, showed mai or assets sad major liabilities« fjfe ailitarv assets« such as the multiple elements of coxniand structure and leadership, plans and dJr-.ct vea* organised combat vnits, and provision for their support, liftd aire ad-' beg- n to rIve the basis for hope of fi.ture sec rity,
4
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11* In concrete terns of combat units in being, the divisions*
a i r squadrons, and combatant vessels > the defense force which then
existed had already- become suf f ic ient to deny unopposed conquest to the
Soviets, although there could have been no serious claim of capability to
hold a predetermined l i t t i f tile Soviets had launched a ful l -scale
offensive. Tfas Al l ied Coiamand provided coucaand and control machinery
f o r coordinated employment of such units as vers available j to the f u l l
measure of their limited oa,jabilitv, An in i t i a l structure had been
brought into being and was steadily being strengthened»
12« A start , but only a start , had been made In the provision of
supporting elements for th^ combat units* These included the log is t ica l
organisations, depots and a i r f i e lds , combat support units, an4 a l l the
rest of the complex suprtorfclns establishment needed to Rjve mof*em
fighting forces a capability /or sustained combat,
13* Inmorale n**4 irt the determination to gain the Htilltarv strength
needed for security, the alliartce Lvd alreadv demonstrated i t s essential
soundness. In the all-important element of leadership* rapid progress
was being made through growing experience in the handling of units m
the f i e l d , through the integration of diverse national elements, throu h
the training of additional junior leaders, and t i rougi the infusion of
common objectives and doctrines at a l l levels of command,
L i . Vtu'erlying a l l these factors, i-ber* had been truly remarkable
progress m the b a s i c decisions on national and international pol ic ies,
and in plans and programs for the creation of additional units, for tha
improvement and expansion of support elements, and f o r the more e f f ec t i ve
coordination and evploroent of existing forces, j-'liere a récogni-
tion, basic to a l l these e f f o r t s , of the necessity for a common defenae
to meet a cowmon peri l*
15- Against these assets were ranged grave l i a b i l i t i e s . In Ha*
19£2J security i n Western Europe WHS s t i l l heavily overshadowed b* the
enormous prapoaderanc e of combat« réadv Soviet BUi tarr power poised behind 5
MATO F - ^ i c r r E l C s l
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Cl «axü resïricîku
tlie Iroa Curtain. Furthermore thfere were grave deficiencies in /Hied
p r e p a r e r s « to meet a Soviet attacK had i t come, fhs total f ighting
strength of tlje, a l l i es romtd but a snail fraction o* the -3«vitt
forces deployed in forward areas, Land forccs and naval strength
assigned to All ied Coimanri Europe were entirely- insuff ic ient,
16, The inadecueer" oi the* Air iorces was particularly a c t s , JJarry
units were deployed in xposed areas esst o the Rhine» wit no prepared
re-deployment s i tes, Comsapiv*, control sjid warning arrangeants were
fragmentary in the extreré, A large number of our a ircraf t were of
obsolescent piston*« ngl ne type
17, The principal subordinate commands were s t i l l in a formative
state. The It adquarters woild not hfve bee-i ecjral to tîie demands of
active operations, S lna l comrmnii ations were seriously inadequate for
continued o f f ec t i ve control of the limiting t l e g i t s .
I f , Particularly in th» status of supporting ^iejnentsj the de f i -
ciencies world have weighed heavily ngainst effectiveness in combat.
Stocks of ammunition were ^xtrcntely low, lop.^st^ca3 H1JVh maintenance
systems inadeoiate, and re-supply plans and assignants of responsi-
b i l i t i e s were s t i l l under discussion ftnd proving «ctrcsiwlv -di f f icult .
Supplv lines ran parallel to thti front and were opi. rational Iv unbalanced,
19» Shortages of srcc ie l is ts , career personnel, experienced
leaders we e severe in manv n i^g ^ J 1 wocld have had a substantial
adt&rsc effec-t on combat operations, res^r'-o cleme rts lacked the
degree of organization and training ixouired f o r Combatj Finai lv j
although expansion gonls and coflfftitsients for 1952 had been undertaken
at Lisbon, it w^s increasingly apparent that the requisite steps in »anrfing, training, an** cnidppint were not bein,: taken in f u l l and on tirna*
C JEJG33, HAT 1932 & MAV 1953
20, a* Before tvminfc to an ox^nination of tiw changes which have
occurred in thf past « ta r , T should I i^e . to *»a*<. clear the main factors
which have guided mc during itv yu.ar of command, rt*, overall objectives
6
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N A Ï O Rföl-SICTED
I have already tüacuased, but th^y cannot be staUd too often, "Ühev
are, fj-rst^ to attain sufficient strength to deter potential'ag;?r s sors
fr<n breaking Uie peace, and second, to defend ourselves successfully
i f the peace i s hïgïwu.» fo&ûtte r with tUe threat,. ttese are tha true
deteimlaents of Jtdlitary reoiircrtwnts. b. Within the UATO structure i t i<* »v dutv LO assess thtse
requirements in tersia of land^ sea, and air forces a*d thc-tr required
support, and to re » r t that assessntnt to higher authority with adequate
supporting detai l . Tt is ny farther dvtv to take a l l Measures within
np power toward meeting the requirements of deffeose» and to nfcfita specific
rtcoMKondaVOtts to h* *her authority in such matters as tlte build-up of
forces, command struct 1^, s i^^rt inf j establish!* nts3 air f ie lds fnd
oUwr fac i l i t i es ,
c. I t then devolves upon the c i v i l authorities, with tftcir
wider rbsL>onsii>illtiiis and within Lhcir ultiivite authority to determine
to what extent taese re<r irements ssïd rVCOM^^d Ations can an < wi l l oe
met and on «hat time schedule*
d. Uith the aii* of ny s»bordiïiAtô cornianders, T titer. prepare;
and svbMit periodic assessments of tTtc military capability for defense
based on the Militär- forcoa and supporting establishments vh* civil
£overnr»nta have ur ertaVrn to provide, thi so reports ilse indicate
predictable -d actual deficiencies» At V\* ssit tine we are nakinr
the most of what is actttnlly provided, throüg'i maintaining a hirh state
of operational readiness and through a^visin^ as to whet composition of
armed strength amd what use t rte* roes will give maximum nilttary return.
21* During tbo past vtar much has bfe a done to increase our defense
forces ?nd to Mfikc tafcm more effective* Measured against tho Soviot
capability* our progress is insufficient to *ive us prospect oi success*
if attacked, Ve are s t ' l l far short o? the ÄLIÜIIIUHI requirements. Ve
lack essential supple art support. But a series of actions have been
taken which have strengthen«! our cosnand structure t augrc^nt d our
7
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A e r
operational plans and directives, aad materially increased our lanrt, air»
and naval forces, ^xpniiwtion in oorc detail of m.^or tangos follows.
22. Ly August 1952 arrangements Ior coordinating the operations
of the forces of Grcec^ nnd Jurkn- with thosv of toe reinaindfcr of ^y
COtVi nd had been established, ^adquarters Allivd Land Forces South-
eastern Europe, with Lieutenant J^nei-ftl tfiUard Q. ttyman, Amy j
in command, were established in Isnir directly subordinate to Aditnral
Orney, cOMfiaDdern- C hit f , Allied Forces Southern Europa, in December
1952 Admiral the Earl nountbatt^n of dum*, Roval »aw, was appointed
Comriender-in-Chicf Allied Forces -fcidit^rrancari. In Kerch 1953 he took
over his Allied (I1IAi1O) Coraiiand which in wartime would include units
of thu British Keditferrz4JU art r i t e t plus naval for eu» from othtr KAIO
nations, Ifct PniUd states S1Xti- Pl tet j with a striking force Wiasionj
remains assigned to the Corniaudsr-in-Chi^f, Allied Forces Southern
Europe, Thro there now exists a comwtad structure to control ow
united forces along a 4000-rIIq front tixtending from northern Norway
to Uie Caucasus,
2?, At Lisbon in FtbriiirT 1952 thv nations hac1 sot for the selves,
for the f i r s t time firm goals for build-op of tfcoir torct s in 1952
and tentative goals for 195? awS 1954, As tho year 1952 ended, the goals
in terms of major vnits were approximately » e t for idr Force», Maval
F c ces, and for active full-strength t\nay divisions, v . t for the Army
forces designated to &ntvr combat following D-Davj but b fore the end of
the f i r s t month of any hosti l i t ies, the goals were only partially t ,
A considerable number of units would not have been reatfv for combat at
the tine needed, during the last twelve noJttiis progress t-ward the
f v I f i lit of tho su goals lies been stead"-, ihroi^ghout the command the
strength of units ivs increased, additional Iiat4Or items of equipment have
been provided md training a^vci.ccd, Ii* afMH^o^ a substantial number
Itevelopnent of Comaand Svructyre
buildup of1 FOIXCB
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of ne» UOiia have liaen argaiiaed. Sevarttwlees, far a l l services there
src s t i l l Major deficiencies in sugport units, in logistical establiih-
iwnts md in stocke of ammunition and otter supplies, 1 would add
parenthetically at thla poirit that our reporting and evaluating eyoteit
bas been considerably strengthened throughout this p«riod. Ve can
provide more definitive information of actual conditions then formerly
was porelKLe, thus i t is now ixœsible to evaluate ctunbat-effectlve
units vith jnudt greati r confidence. We now have a much HOT? reliable
knowledge of Just where «a stand.
24. A Jear ago the outstanding deficient™- vas In the tactical air
forces. There vas a shortage of aircraft, of crews, « f supply and
support. A considerable increase during the year in tho number of
eonbat aircraft, nsinly from deliveries wider the D.S. Hutual Defaiee
Assistance rrogran, has since bettered our position. Not only have the
nunibers of coirfcat aircraft increased, but their combat capability baa
inp roved. Be increase in the muster of pilots and technicians for Uiese
aircraft, together with sone snail Improvement in aircraft control,
naming and reporting Syatons, have bten encouraging, Ottr network of
airfioldrt h*a been enlarged end ȉde more eff icient, o f various
exercises uhich posed-difficult problerto in coordination and comoni~
cations demonstrated the ability of national foroee assigned to SHAPE
to nort together as a te an. In supply, and in the development of the
Bysteafor distributing fuel, w have Improved our status wer the past
year* Nevertheless, our air power is s t i l l today the weakest link in
ottr dofense. In spite our progress, our air forces could not adequately
carry oat their tasks. The increase of air power must receive far greater
attention by -die NA'iO nations,
35. During the past year great efforts have been made to improve trainJjig of regular forces and at the sane tine to achieve better training and mobilization procednres for reserveforoes, on Whcct so
MttCb of oar defensive strength depends. Lack of proptr training
faci l i t ies and areas tes hampered this e f fort , but good leadership
9
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^ f l A T O SEHl-glGTËtP^'
can dp Auch to of fset -the deficiency-« Accordingly, SHAPS has strongly
^enphasired the Tieed for leadership at a l l echelon a, Various national
forces ha»e organized additional schools for junior and pan^corodaeloned
of f icers, and study periods f o r senior officers* Wohiliaation and
training exercises have been conducted wit* encouraging results«
fro bleus in training both active and reserve forces, like most of oxer.
large probiere, are no» becoming more clearly defined, wd some NATO
nations are requesting and using training and advisory missions
organised by SHAPE. Svch missions aïe now operating in the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and Portugal. Another important development has been the
recent establishment of atcoic indoctrination courses for key KAJO
comunders and staff o f f icers. Tho raises. Which are designed to
acquaint of f icers with the -use of atofcic Htraports in tret1 cal situations,
wi l l enable N A T O military staf fs to consider the ijtplicaV ous of atonic
warfare in the defense of Western Btirope. With a l l thia, there la
s t i l l an urgent need for a l l countries to re-examtae crit ical ly their
»obili iation systems and to insure that they are adequate to provide,
in the time required, forces sufficiently wall-trained to perfor® their
duties*
Support of Armgd Forces
2b, Ibe growth of land forces during the past year, while not
satisfactory, has been encouraging, Tliis situation, however, i s not
true of the arrangements for the supply and support of those forças,
The in i t ia l emphasis which had been given to the creation of front-line
troops resulted in a grave shortage of the operational reserves» of
certain critical supplies» and of service troops without which a modern
amy cannot maintain i tse l f e f fect ively in the f i e ld .
27, Xn an international cotwand, the pro öle» of providing the
overall logistic aupport is imufiually complicated, because each nation
is responsible for tha support of i t s own forces* This arrangement
results in a lack of f l ex ib i l i t é in the supply ays tea* In an attempt
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^ N A T O K l ^ E H C I E p ^
to make the svsten Itss I l girl, SHiPSin ic tob r 1952, after discussion
with the nations concerned, submitted to tha standing Oroup specific
proposals idjich, i f adopted, should in tins remedy the nain faults In
the Organization of our supply, eut nerelr improving our supply or-
ganisation does not make good the present lack of operational reserve
stocks. The nations are al l agreed that they should hold stocks suf-
.ficient for several months, a period based on an estimate of tbe tine
to begin the replenishment of stocks in Europe after tiie outbreak of
mr. Mainly for financial reasons, however, their stocks have not tuen
built up to tte needed li-vel.
28. On the othtr hand, progress has been ®»d on the third part
of the program of infrastructure that is , of fixed military installa-
tions including airfields, signal ooraomnlcptiong, anr< command head-
quarters. Horc tian half of the 125 airfields approved have been
completed to the point where they could be used in an energencv, Jiil
construction Is nroceedin? WQil on al l but a few oi the reminder.
Our fixed communications net is beginning to take fora,
29. fhc fourth part of the infrastructure program was approved bv
the Ocuncil In December 1952, but only about one-half of i t was Hnanced
at that tine, .additional airfields, headquarters, signale comuniea-
tions, Jet-fuel storage tanks and distribution pipelines to airfields
were 3hong that portion of the program which was agreed on. fhe
remainder, financed in April 1953, Included additional airfields and
items such as naval bases, radar installations, radi O- n a v jga"d- n n?-l aids,
and training installations. In April 1952, the Council also approved
the HnanoinglOf a long-range infrastructure program for 1954, 1955
and 1956, covering the additional HAn militant installations reouired
to be built during this three-year period, this far-si^ited departure
f ro » previous year-by-T=ar financial approval represents a long step
forward. I t wi l l enable us to improve greatly t l » planning for
construction tf placing i t on a f i r » lenç-rarçe basis.
11
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^ à f t X'O RKbTaCIKI
it JÛ. The organisation of ths civilian bodies of IfATp has been
e <v A r w K ' '-S progressively strengthened daring the post ^ i r ns a Testat of ths ^Sj
. creation of the position of SsorttarY Oenernl x a focal poiftt of dvJOian a s f o t ^ pMff #v iHmuet ' ^ytMULie-I
JnOrtanimp., Uwdsi' lull I m « a r k of building a rare cohasive structural
Tcf North Atlantic Council, since the
decision in eea-ly 1952 that .it -faction In PtrDawnt session through
the appointment of Permanent Reproaentativesj has provided increasingly
firm top-level direction to NiurOt on a continuous basis* tihder Lord Iaisay,
the International Staff has been developed to assist and advise in
the discharge of complex civi l ian responsibilities, ths résultâtes
been to delineate l » th those and the military iesponsibïlities no™
nic.-irly, to fac i l i tate policy decisions, to strengthen defense produc-
in„i»pä to Provlde1^iore effeçtl1
W tion. (Ll '
accepted goals
civilian guidance and direction available on a j»ntanent basis. The
political aspects of NATO nil ltaiy exercises* the assessments of the
security threat, the administrative and budgetary supervision of MTD
airf ield and other infrastructure- programs, aid ttie comploi tasks of
sotting annual goals tor the build-up of Jflllitarv foraes are matters
on wtuch this type of guidance has been received.
• The HATO Annual Revlev
31. In Mie IULTO Annual ReviBW during 1952, the Council and Iiie
International Staff teve had a most important ro i » . Within HAiQ
theIw has been tho responsibility for determining Wie luvel of
defetnse e f for t f o r each country. In their work they have had available
a stateaent of overall reauireinïnts in the European area reported br
Ey Ccwsoand, together ULth iw detailed recommandations CS to the OXpO-
s* t.ion of military- programs and the balance of air, ground and naval
Corcei. Tteir woifc «as confined in the decisions of the Miniaterlel •
Session of the Council in April 1953, which act up f î r n force goals f o r
1953 and provisional goals for 1954 for any, air, and navy units,
12
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Tte Europe aa_Itefenge Coiwmnity
32. Punng WJ year of coimand I have followed closely the plana for the European Defense Coeeumity, The beIacivIta which the early ratifi-cation of the Treaty would have brought to our efforts and to European unity Included the contribution or Vest Gonnany, which i consider indispensable to our defense systenu SHAFB ht* naitttadncd constant liaison with the interim Conxdttee of the Europban Defense Coraumlty And has observed and assisted in Its planning. Its plans are workable and sufficiently advanced to avoid delav in developing a Gemon contribution »
Shift of national Baphaais 33» throughout many of the HATO nations the growth of defensive
power tas reduced the sense of fear end urgency nder which ther lived in the preceding twelve months. Nations are beginning to change their planned Piilitary programs from rapid rear»aifccnt to a longer-tern polity, Aithotigh this change mav be dictated hv the economic situation, 1* aust not forget that any roal slackening of the defense effort nay itself open the way to aggression.
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' * Q o W A i U RfcSTRIClliD
mffiuaa. OP M E B M B O I B T » amtas 3fr» Hn<b then hoe been added to the defense structure as I t existed
a year ago» Mioh that i s tiigfcly encouraging hes been acoompl lsheft » I f we
nfilntaiD InoiisiLtiaBt e w di je et Ivee can he attained within the near future and
within the economic capabilities of Kftl1Ot Tet while the situation has altered *
during this past year, the significance of this change should be sought In the
extent to which the power ratio of Soviet offensive capability to IUTft defensive
strength has changed for œ against usv
35- Horeovert we are interested, not in the nere relative alteration in
thie power ratio» but in the regaining disparity of military potential* Hiia
i s the only trus criterion by which to measure our military risk and therefore
to gauge the Magnitude and urgency of the further efforts required, let Ua
examine the Soviet potential«
36« During ttbj past twelve months the USSR has systematically strengthened
Its aimed forces and those of i ts European satell ites. Qie highly jfeohajiized
group of Soviet Smies stationed in Beat Gernany has been kept at a high level
of training} i ts equipment has been Increased end Its vehicles modernized* Many
Rosslan air squadrons have been re-equipped with jet aircraft* A huge program
of a ir f ie ld construction haa been nearly completed throughout Eastern Europe«
Ihe Soviet naval ship-building program Is continuing steadily and now Includes
construction of new inproved ocean patrol sublimities* Hhe Military strength
of the Satellite countries has been increased considerably* Since January l$*i2,
vhen these fortes nunfcered approximate!y 1,000,000 men organized into £5
divisions, they hove Increased to vor« than 1*300,000 mm organized into 70-odd
divisions» this total does not count East Germany, where various units of the
police have been converted into tha nucleus of a German sunny which now numbers
about 100,000« East Qermany is also foiudug an a ir force and a naval ?orce.
Ibe foregoing sumary relates to the strengthening of Soviet conventional forces*
I t ittist not be forgotten, however* th&t Soviet e f for t In the atomic f ie ld has
also continued*
37* Ihese are the facte about the increasing strength of the Soviet bloc*
Since Stalln1S death there has been much conjecture about pss lb le changes of
policy by the rulers of the Soviet Union. Ihcse ere setters beyond my purview*
NATO u^oi lRICit iD
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On Warwrw1 a' soldier I cannot affoftd to deal with conjecture* I fee l I t my
doty to stalte that I know of DO facts whldi vouià lead a » to conclude that tha
Jtilitary danger f i x * the East has lessened« Ihia view coincides with tha
o f f i c i a l ccaounique issued by the North Atlantio Council at tbe conclusion
or ils Ministériel MHaiwif ^ April 1 -Ae GottBftil found, that ihera had not yet Iin fact bees any change in th«
I futtdaiaental threat to the security * free peoples* The most striking OTidsnee of this continuing. threat is the huge and. constantly strengtiiened military force aaintained by those nations vhoae policies have been responsible far the present tension, and who are s t i l l promoting aggreasive war in several parts of Ü» world*
An appraisal of the pre&ent power ratio goes far beyond tha solitary
f i e ld » ' I t embraced every aspect cf our polit ioal, ecoDoaii^ financial «od
social aystens* All but the military aspects acre beyond both ny coopatence and
responsibility« Ifet within the str ict ly military f ie ld» Z find the disparity
between our available forces and these wbich the Soviet ruler* could bring
against us ao great as to warrant no other conclusion than that a fu l l acale
Soviet attack within the ©ear future, would flirt. Allied Cotmand Europe crit ical ly
weak to accomplish ita present mission- Ihe potential aggressor retains the
initiative* He can exercise his offensive capability at Willt and choose the t ira,
place, weight, and direction of attack* Tto allow the IUTD nations to maintain
their statua as free nations, we should have Ibe swans which can be coomittad
to action within a short tine and which can give us the capability of
withstanding an init ial attack and gaining tine to gather our strength* To do
otherwise, we would risk needlessly heavy sacrifice of l i f o and great loss of
cr it ical equlpaeatl Va need not only the physical means but the driving force
<f dynamic leadership sustained by a high morale -throughout the civi l ian
population as v e i l as erong our fighting forces*
SB-SOBTOf CP HILITi iRY FffifltnMMQTTS
39* Concurrently with the developments clt£d, the military requirement*
of All ied OoDKisd Europe have been re-surveyed and submitted to the North
Atlantic Military Omit tee « H ^ i g K th» Council's action on the 1552 Annual
Review, completed in April 1953« agreed goals for NATO nations far future years 15
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have Men approved.
40. tbe resUlta aro beat stated in the wwâ» or tbe Cnmcil's final ccwnlyie et <5 April 1953'
Qie Council agreed on short and long-term program f o r NATO. TYioy established a f i n i a i i i t a ry program fo r 1553 and a provisional prog ran f o r 19!Hl> ! » addition to the forces which Gresoa and Turlisr a » oontributing, there wi l l be a notable increase in tbe siae of tbe forees assigned to NIbTO Mtproc COMGCDdera end a con.ilOorablo improvement in their ef fectiveness. TralDlnc la being greatly improved at a l l levais .
3ho seriee of larçe scale maneuvers held during the last VXor baa apprecioblj raised tho stpndaqad of cooperation of tke forces of the member countries; unite are being betten equipped and the organization of support foreea ia developing. Ibe KUO military authorities consider that the attainment of the farce goals In 1953, and tbe «uiblneâ Influence of Hieae TOTious factors, w i l l add materially to the defensive strength ft NATO during 1*53.
Agrement was reached sot only en the n n m financing ef the second Vart ($167,600,000) of the fourth s l i ce t t tbe infrastructure pmgrau (the f i r s t part to the amount er about $2¾.000,OOO having been settled at a BiDiatsrial Booting in Decenber), bat also on a cost-sharing formula which would sever future progrena to be submitted by tbe supreme comsnders for tha three-year period beginning in 1954, involving expenditure of up to $700,000,000, subject to the approval of parliaments. Ibese p r e l u m w i l l include a wide range of projects euch aa a ir f ie lds , telecommunications, naval besaa end port f a c i l i t i e s , pipelines and radar installations. The a l l i t a r r authorities of MTO now hsve a financial planning f igure to which tfiey can work for over three years* In Qduitien, an improved system is ready to put into operation to ensure closer financial supervision over the expenditure of conaon infrastructure funds*
JBiEiS OF WtJQB ggyiCp^Ç^BS, ffff ?AS8B AHEAD. AMD COHCLOSIOMS
41. Mnu, in Hojr 1952» the JthTO nations, Miicih were almast defenseless In 1550, can be Justifiably proud in looking et their increased strength. Tbay
can be buoyed up by their accomplishments, not Wlgbed down by their feara.
Ibe Xeault should be an improvement in the morale of their peoples. Their
aeriouaness of purpose and their strength of wi l l should have been made clear
to the world.
42. l e t pride in achievement mut not blind us to the magnitude of Uie
tasks ahead, nor hide our trus military position today* nie achievements
daring the past year have been conslAcreble, Hiey re f lect great credit on
the fourteen DATO nations, but Uie e f f o r t s of the last two years could a l l be
ViSted were va to relax now. There ere s t i l l many gaps In our defense syaten
which JikiSt be f i l l e d without delay i f our how land 0 ere to have that reasonable
mninna o f security whieh i t has been NATO's primery purpose to achieve.
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¢- t
Wy predeoesaor reported In Hay 1552i "There is no rso l security yet
achieved in Puropc; there is only 1 beginning*" KbowleOfie of the military
situation today g i n s no grounds for believing Uiat this security has been
achieved, that the beginning, onde a year ago, «has now cane so near to a
successful ending Uiat our e f for ts can be relaxed*
44. Aortharn Barop» s t i l l Ij
magnitude of Sbviet offensive capabilities in Hortliem Europ^dnd tha apeoial
- - «ri treasures taken by the bâtions of
The f a l l e f f o r t of the nations in that area w i l l have
to be exerted, ^ n their e f f o r ts « i l l ^ u l r e T e i y
substantial Orteraal ^ i c h i a ^ntesplated ^
plans.
cuccgMf Liily with jnajor att ck«l Ihe netL eitjSfel ass afanee, an^ftis^
I Â & É wi l l have t o % K * * w J
plaa3. I îbe continuing
• can be found. Hhet is raauired I f l ^ e continued w i l l and e f f o r t to jsotwert
this potential into reality* I f auch e f f o r t is forth cooing, and especially i f
an early QertiHiL cart ribu Lioji ia provided* we can look forward to tha day in
the near future, when i f attacked we could oonduct a successful defense in
that ores.
Likewise in Southern Europe, the land forces tre steadily improving \
and a successful défense sppeera attainable in the foreseeable future. Ihare /
continues to exist a serious Iaok of support troops. Ihis weakness mist be
remedied, Foverful naval forces could make Q contribution of the greatest
value, trat the a i r forces here, ee in other areas« are s t i l l dangerously short.
47. Mherp are Jnany measures that apply generally throughout the whole
Western European area* Active lend forces joust be further increased* Iliose
already in being mist be bettor trained and baoked by jumper enppvt troops,
at present leaking* Hie aysteia Cf training and aob i l l z i i ç our rtsexre fCiroea 17
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° n O o NATO RESTKlCrfiLî
43 > Pty predecessor reported In Hay TJ352* vIhere is no real security yet
achAered in Rirope ; there is only a beginning*• Knowledge of the ni l i tsry
S I T U A T I O N TODAY gives DO grounds for believing that thie sacux
achieved» that the beginning» dûAb a year ago, »has tow cccoa sc
successful ending that our ef forts can be relaxed*
Northern Europe s t i l l
successfully with a^uajor att. ek-1 Th© 'netl
COtlt
Ataealtude of Soviet offensive capabilities in Northern lurope^ond tbe special
requirements for coordinating the military measures taken by tha hâtions of
that area with the contributions of other MAff> partners to defenpe^create a
problem of unusual complexity and di f f iculty- The pattern of solution through
collective nation le being gradually clarified* Jurtber off or by G11 con-
cerned are» however, required*
45* In Central Burope1 we bars mads material progress. I t i s clecr that %
the basic eiooents of strength to attain a capability for defense of that area
can be found« Vhat la required le the continued will and e f f o r t to ponvert
this potential into reality* I f such ef fort i s forthcoming* end «specially i f
an early Gsmen coitritoutlon is provided, we can look fœwerd to the day in
the near future, when i f attacked we could conduct a successful defense in
that area»
46« Likewise In Southern Europe, the lend forces tre steadily Improving
and a successful defence appears attainable in the foreseeable future» lhare /
continues to exist a serious lack of support troops* Ihis weakness WWt be
remedied* Powerful naval forces could make a contritutlcai of the greatest
value, but 1Sie air forces beret as in otfcer areas, are s t i l l dangerously Short
47* Tbare are many measures that apply generally throughout the vholo
Vsstem Suropean area* Active land forces must be further increased» IkoSe
already in being must be better trained and backed by proper supper t troopa,
at present licking« Ihe ays ten <? training and oobillfcicg our réserve forces 17
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. *• . T »
e • O0. OD ^ATO ms. liiClW
MX&t insure that they are ready to face a professional enemy- on e<3ual terns*
Qie naval fa? oes Miat receive the escort vessels and minesweepers «bi«h wil l
be vital for defense against a potential enemy strong in submarines sod nine-
laying' capability»
fcfk Oitr greatest wealnees, however« is in the air . For the next year, at
least, higher priority- should be given to the air forces, Not only do we Iaek
the VAimter of modern aircraft indispensable for our defensive tasks, but in sons
countries, the development <f en affective air warniiog and control eystem is
only Just beginning»
Jt9» tDo establish a workable supply ay a tad tbe nations should plan to meet
the requirements for their forces botb fron hotna production and through negotiation
with other governments. Hatiopal stocks» particularly of «munition, should
be increased from their present low id vet*
30* Ute deficiencies I have noted are correctiole, provided IStat timely
action is taken anà sustained* If tbia is done» this corneal could be capable*
within the near future, of ef fectively defending West rr» Surope against full-*
scale Soviet aggression* Zf these deficiencies remain substantially uncorrected*
these requirements substantially unfulfilled* then Allied Conraand Europe wi l l
continue to be crit ical ly weak in i ts capability <f acocnipiiahiog ita present
mission; the NATO nations tf Europe wi l l remain exposed to tbe peril of decisive
military defeat with a l l ita oatsstrapbio conséquences to then and to Western
civilisation, 31* Our present di f f icult ies would be lessened -ttrougfr greater unity of
e f fort* Zn tha economic f ield, this would help solve the problems ct military
supply and equipment* Ih the polit ical f i e ld , i t would fac i l i tate our efforts
to mobilise e l l our available « i l i tu ry resources* <
Jj2» In four years the Noftb Atlantic lDccaty Organization has demonstrated
that free nation?, working earnestly together, can achieve collective security»
Vs have beccoe seriooaly aware of the heavy sacrifices demanded to sm nation»
for defense* Tcday ve are far from the plateau of security» we have merely gained
the foothi l l* leading to that plateau* A levelling off no*, when ve are far below
»«"i*""'» force requirements, may return our fiiropean peoples to that grin feel ing
of military v&akness and fu t i l i t y of e f f o r t , only recently l e f t behind*. 16
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* ' ^n Oo. TO HESTRtCTED
53. During tha last two ye&rs we bave overcome the natural t&ertia .which
bsaats a l l human endeavors* We have imparted to the huge eod ccnpllcated
•achIrtrjr « f defense a acnentum « f incalculable power, the résulta of faith and
growing strength« Ve suât not lose that wuKatui>+ Se do so would be to nulli fy
«11 CUR labor « A D sacrifices* tc repudiate PUT P R I N C I P L E S , and to perpetuate
our peril* Were tha ncm ntunt ones lost, ths efforta to restore itwouH be many
times thee* ve hate do far made*
^be most precious assets of our nations are their spiritual values
and their youth« Ihe m&t ascred Obligations of governments are to nurture and
preserve thoee Talnest and to assure that those lives sball not be hazarded
through failure to recognize the depth the threat ranged against ua*
55* Jfr his "Piret Annual Report« Supreme Allied Cosnander Europe*,
General et the AID; Dwight D* Eisenhower «rote t ' In a world whtre powerful
fer ces ere working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and
dignity of Ifiea1 we cannot for one «oient delay our advance toward security«"
The powerful forcée tc which he referred were those controlled and directed
by the £realin* "übe Soviet Amy, • ha wrote, "casts its shadow over the length
and breadth et Surope. *
56« The Morth Atlantic Council finds that this threat remains without
fundaiental change. In the light et these considerations, there cetmct ba»
therefor*» any valid a i l ltary reason to R a t i f y a le veiling-off cf e f fort
until we have progressed st least well beyend the goals ntv set for 1954«
57* Vitb these conclusions, I believe a j l my Commanders-in-Chief and tha
senior maribers rf tbe splendid, international staff of Allied Comand Xurope will,
ba found to concur* I vidi to record that these off icers are men of integrity,
loyalty, professional competent» and devotion to duty unsurpassed by any eanparsible
grcup i t has been my gocd fcrtame to knew* In ay nearly forty years in the ai l l tary
service of tba United States, which has been enriched by the privilege of heavy
responsibilities and by association with the oAlitary le aders of Bany nations*
19
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O O ' • ' M A i U
59+ Jbia*à in devotion to tbe cause of peace and tba security of AU prlMt ootrrln«<d of the eint and the urgency of our Individual effort», M nov to SQfttfltn the iBCBMituB that baa brought ue thus far iM&i&t&lD e faith In the value* we strive to defend*
IK
3 Knolosurss
MammuMwii n»»nTh rpfgcfr Staadtae Qraup 21 • 9 SO Llalaon OTflwr Rirls 6 1 MS) Prune« lo 12 KMl W 31 Saorstarr of Hafen» Ws 15
\An7 I rilimrw ' H. B. WDOKAr
Qenanl, United States). Supreoa Allied Contenaar Europa '
I zo $ f O REbTRICfED ^g
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION WOftTK A-TLflM-T I1C COUMC I1L
NiTIONAL HINISTEftS
PEftHtKtKT ItEfRESENTATIIfES
SECRETARY SENERftL
INTERNAT!OMAL STAFF
(f*(IS)
NATIONAL PELEttATIOHS
REPRESENTATIVES * STAFF
HlLITARY COMMITTEE *
MILITARY STANDING REPRESENTATIVES GROUP
COMMITTEE FR-UK-US
(VAtHlNeTClN) (WiS)II HOTON)
NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE (PAItlS)
M I L I T A R Y A G E N C Y F O R
S T A N D A R D H A T I O H
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CHAtUiL t OMMITTEE SEL1 FS, NETH, IIK
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE-
(PAt IS)
StIPREHE ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
(NetFOLK)
soES iner in ihn KttNtNtNT session.
CAKADA-UNITEO STATES RE6I<0HAL.RLANNING OROUF
(WtlNINCTDN)
I» APtlI, Iftty
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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED CDHNJtNDEIt
FN N»«TOOMERY UK
SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER EUROPE.
SENTFLAL R IDQWAV
CHIEF OF STAFF SEN ««»ENTRER Ut
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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT
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NAVAL DEPUTY ADH LEMON*IEI FA
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If,:;; '
M - I D R^i1SicrrED ^ - " '^p'\
STOSEtS IBADtAHIERS AILKD FOHEitS ECHftfB Pari s, - Franc«
9A (fay* rfi
r « V rHay 1953
St-BJECT: Report on ALLIED CWCttND EUROPE* toy 1952 - H*? 1953 jIOt The Standing Group
FiRPOSg " I
This Eeport concerns ALLI 'D COWJtro UROPE 30 Ha^ 1952,
the date I became Suprene Allied Comnsinder "Europe Tp A T
The purpose of this fIeportiI the second emanating f r o « Suprene
Hftâdqj art ers Allied Powers Europe, Is to provide an assessjnent of the
current air* prospective capability for discharging assigned defense
responsibilities. Tt includes a brief Eiaaar*' of Uie situation one
year agoj an examination of the changes Which have since occurred;
an appraisal of their ef fects upon the capabïlit- of tnis Oomand for
carrying out i t s a s s i e d defence »i$$ionj a resurvev of i t s « i l i t a i v
requirements; and a» indication of the areas of existing ma 1or defi-
ciencies, The Keport i s ^urpoaelv couched in sorevhat general tems
for security reasons« Precise figures on present slocks of ammunition,
on fuel for aircraft* tanks and trucks, and on the effectiveness of
our radar to give us tfrielv training of surprise eneny air attack,
obviously should not be «ade public. Al l matters of substance in this
Report have been included in classified reports previously »ade to
proper authority, ïhev have been covered in adequate detail and
supported bv appropriate recommendations •
Hctvithstandinf this unowstioned need for withholding certain
information froto publication, I wish to enphasize at the outset of
this Report^ the importance, in fact I believe the crucial im-ortanqe,
of making known to our ^AitO peoples the main facts of the ai l i tarv
situation in Mhidu thev are so daeplv cfnc^rned» In no other w can
they be convinced of Ute neeti for the ha Wv bürden* thev are asted to
carïy. ï f vjïconvinced, thev cannot "be expected to support
M iO K&TKICm)
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^NATD KESÏRICTEû Q
prtfgtv&j even on the ndrdaroan scale e&seatial to oollectiW security.
With an Unshakable belief in our concept or democracy I concur whole-heartedly v i t h pgr predecessor, General JSisenhowerj 1Who & year ago
questioned vfy there should be "confusion in the ninds of Taillions of our own peoples ôs to the baste «ins of our defense prOgramj the
ne case itV for it, and the urgent demand for their own individual
efforts,." "Once the truth le understood,11 he stated, "once the crit ical
dangers present in the no rid situation are really Icnotmj there wi l l be
Xesa complacency concerning our present jailitaiy situation and the
baiwftJl effects of delay >411 he clearly seen."
à* I t has been nr* constant conviction since I assumed coanand
that public understanding is indispensable to progress towards the
SiifiiMm military securitv for which NAn has been established. To
create this understanding HAfO and the national authorities must present
the facts of our security situation through a coordinated aod sustained
information progra». I have previously su twitted reoonnrendations
concerning such action*
GEMEEtAL
The search for solutions to the jßehy major problems encountered
in Oie e f fort to become secure give« rise to serious political, economic
financial aftd social dif f iculties to Khich I an acutely alive. Yet
early solutions must be found i f the basic objectives which brought mm
into being are to be reasonati/ attainable within the near future*
6, The asseasnents which follow constitute a nilltarv estimate,
in preparing i t , I have drawn heavily upon the advice and assistance
of the officers assigned to this Coeoiand, ûf al l services, and fron
al l the countries represented in this cctmand, they are nen of high-
principled integrity* «cid defeoiastratad professional competence, in
who» their countries aay have real pride and confidence, TMd report
is based on their honest and objective analysis and reflects the rigid
standards of austere econoaip- consistent with minimum acceptable
2
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• ri '' ' , 1 " V - ' ' _ , ^ M & ^ M C T E D : O
Kl . * f f ide i tcy which are Omi cottnon «in, lhese »en are deeply aware of the \
VMte of bman I i f e j of spiritual values* and of m te r ia l treasures
which past wars bave entailed; tfaey are dedicate** to the e f f o r t to
forestall the catastrophic destruction which future ware cctold bring.
' TJg SI T AfIOH IK >ïAT 195^
b ?» I tum pew to the situation of a vear ago, the tire at which
the f i r s t Avmal Eeport of the Quprmte Allied Commander ISurope was
issued. Tha Military mission entrust d to tte European Allied Cowoia&d
then as now wast
a. In war to defend NATO's-European territories.
'üils nission was not qualified in either space or t iro, I t vas not
verelv to defend certain parts of the NATO European area and their
peoples, Har was the responsibility only to become effective in SOUK;
future year when aeans might ce available. übe task was to defend a l l ,
at any tine, i f war should occur.
b. In peaqatime to develop an integrated,, effective force
capable of accomplishing the wartine mission i f required, $ut the
underlying and fundamental purpose vas the preservation of peace through
the deterrent e f f ec t on potential aggressors of Strongj balanced
C0Bhat-j«ady forces, capable of challenging aggression, or at least of
rendering i ts success doubtful, Alread the great progress that had
been uade in the build-up from the exposed a.iii alnost defenseless
condition whici agisted in 1950 at the time of the Conccunjst attack on
South Korea had Aade a Xia4Ior contribution toward this end.
?» ihe next basic consideration, ivine concrete dipensions to
1 the tasks involved In accomplishing the assigned miesio. > vas the enemr*
threat - its nature and magnitude. Ihere vera two particular points
to be stressed in this connection. First, cur task as military men
was to concern ourselves with tte eneny capabilities. 1Ü.litary planning
«ni YteoftiMietidationfl could not be based upon speculative estimates of a
potential aggressor's Intentions* I f the mission assigned to this conand
NATO RESTRICTED
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L ' ê "
( feix <*HrSICTED O
w&Q to b& dig charged » our forci a had to oe prepared to «öet an aggres-
SortS forces as they actually existed and ccn>Id be bsnugbt into battle*
Wô had to reckon with TBilitarir rea l i t i es . Ve could not re ly on attempts
to fathom the ntinds of the men in the Kretalin nor to follow their f r e -
quent reversals of tactics. Socotii, i t was n&oessarv to re«ct effective-»
Iy to Soviet actions within wbatever period o f warning Jaight be provided.
Of a l l Uie basic principles of wer, hone c?uL'< have More devastating
e f f e c t in ^Üiis area than that of SCRPRISS. Tte importance of en^y
CAPABILITY ar.d of TIME as t t * factors of fundamental significance could
scarcely be exaggerated,
9. The Soviet bloc had over 5½ Ai l l ion nan under arms* roughly
million bel 01¾¾ in -, to the Soviet m i on i t s e l f . The ''SSR n»imted 1?5
I i i » divisions. Satel l i te strength was growing, rtn. Soviet air force
totaled ^ust over SOvOOD front-line aircraft , with a large a ircra f t
reserve. Xhe Javy included more than 300 submarines, i nc i t i ng a
nunbtr of the latest t-pe. Jbc Soviet forces were capable of rapid
expansion in o&se of viar, Craired reserve nnnpewer and reserves of
equipment were immediately available, dome 30 divisions ye re located
in occupiod Europe, of which tl&s Z2 in East Gernany constituted an
ever present threat to our forces* £he combat effectiveness of the
.round forces was rated higi and thoir aquipHent good - in sone tvpee
superior. ihe ooubat eff iciency of tße air force, vhi le rated below
JJJHTO standards, was iinprovlns, particularly with the replacement of
pis toji-type with modern let aircraft . Tte Soviets' well-known disregard
for their own casualties furttur increased their offensive CAPABHTTY.
10« balance-sheet of NAf* SociIritir in Western Europe, as X
evaluated i t in Mair 1922* showed «a i or assets and DtallIor l i ab i l i t i e s ,
the n i i i ta rv assets3 such as the multiple «Zements of command structure
end leadership, plana and directives, organised eo»bat unit», and
provision for their support, already begun to r i-ve the basis fo r
hope of future ritjy.
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0 H A T O VTnmcmED 0
U* In concrete tern» of combat units in belüg» tiie divisions t
air squadrons, and combatant vessels, the defense force which then
existed had alread* become sufficient to deny unopposed conquest to the ,
Soviets* although there could hare been no serious claim of capability to
hold a predetermined line i f the Soviets had launched a full-scale
offensive. The Allied Comand provided coasoand and control machinery
for coordinated employment of such units as vere available, to the f u l l
measure of their limited CalJabildtv, An init ia l structure had been
brought into being and was steadily being strengthened.
12* A start, but only a start, had been made in the provision of
supporting elements for the collât xylite, these included the logist ical
organisations» depots end air f ie lds, con bat support units* anH a l l the
rest of the complex supporting establishment needed to ßive modern
fighting forces a capability S or sustained combat»
13. In »orale r.zv* in the determination to gain the milltar*' strength
needed for security, the a l l i a g e had already demonstrated i t s essentia
soundness. In tlte all-important element of leadership* rapid progress
vas being nade through growing experience Iia the handling of units in t
the f ie ld* through the integration of diverse national elements,, throu h
the training of addition?! junior leaders* and thxougi Ihe infusion of
Qomtan ob.Vct? ves and doctrines at a l l levels of command,
14« UIK ier lying a l l these factors* there had been truly remarkable
progress in the basic decisions on national and international policies,
and In plans and programs for the creation of additional units* for the
improvement and expansion of support elements, and for the more ef fect ive
coordination and employment of existing forces, thtfre a recogni-
tion* basic to a l l these e f for ts , of the necessity for a common defense
to meet a coratton peril»
15. Against these assets were ranged grave liabilities. In Hanr 19$2* sacurity in Hestern Furope vas still heavily overshadowed bv the eoomous preponderance of combAt-readv Soviet military- power poised behind
5
WAio EaaKJCna)
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O O NATO RKSTRïCDiL)
Iron Curtain. Ftzrthcrmore there were grave deficiencies in All ied
prepare dxwss to meet a Soviet attack tod i t come, fhe total f ighting
strength of tta A l l ies jorimd but a snail fraction o^ the Soviet
Forces deployed in forward areas. Land forccs and naval strength
assigned to All ied Confi an Europe were entirely insuff ic ient,
16» The inadequacy of the 4ir forces was particularly ac^te* ftanv
units were deployed in orpcsed areas east 01 the Rhine, wit Jw prepared
re-deployment sites* Company control and uarn^nj? arrangements were
fragnentarv in the • A large nuwber of our a ircraf t were of
obsolescent piston-engine type
17* The principal slsbordinatb commands were s t i l l in a foroativb
state« IV hc sdquarters woi Id not h*ve bütu equal to the demands of
active operations. SirJtal communit étions were seriously inadequate for
continued e f f ec t i ve control of the l imiting olcmur.ts»
I f . Particularly in th% status of supporting ulenents, the de f i -
ciencies VOOld have weighed heavily Against effectiveness in combat.
Stocks of wrounition vor* txtrcitcly- Iou-, log ist ica l fir^ maintenance
systems inodeovsate, end re-supply plans and assigraints of responsi-
b i l i t i e s were s t i l l under discussion m l provins octrciwilv ^ f f i c u l t ,
Supplv l ints ran paral le l to tho front ant1 were opt-rationallv luibalaneed.
19. Shortages of s o c i a l i s t s , career personnel, ATd experienced
leaders we e severe in manv -ni^s p.u* would have had a & bstantial
adverse elfc>ct on combat operations. reser^ d e int its lacked the
degree of organization and training required f o r combat» P ina ï l » ,
although expansion ¢0^1^ and commitments for 19$2 had been undertaken
at Lisbon, i t w-*s increasingly apparent that the requisite steps in
warning, training, and equipping, were not bein.? taken in f u l l and on t in » .
C ATOSSt MAY tO Î1AJ 1953
20» a. Before t1 mint to an examination of th« changes which have
occurred in the past vt ^r, T should like to mafa. clear the main factors
which have guided ra during nv ytar of command. i'hj overall objectives
6
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O KESTKlCTßD O
I have already discussed* but they cannot be "stated too often, Thev
are* f i r s t , to attain sufficient strength to deter potential aggr.ssors
from breaking the peace* and second* to defend ourselves successfully
i f the peace is broken. Together with the threat* those are the true
determinants of Military retirements*
b. Within the HATO sts^cture i t i s nrv dutv to assess ttese
requirements in terms of land* sea* and air forces and th&^r required
support* and to rejsort that assessfent to highor authority with adequate
siqDporting detai l , Tt is trr farther dity to take a l l measures within
njy power toward sieetinfc the reouireagents of deftriae} and to make specific
reccmmeadati cns to h^ber authority in such matters as the build-up of
forces* command structure* supporting establisïrc-nts* airfields end
other faci l i t ies*
c. I t then devolves Upon the c iv i l authorities, with tfioir
wider ruSfJOneibiliti^s and within their ultimate authority to deteiwine
to what estent these requirements and recoim<iendations can and w i l l œ
met and on what time sc «d\Q.e*
d. tftth the aid of mr subordinate oonmanders > then prepare
and s limit periodic assessments of tho military capability for defense
based ou the militari forces and supporting establishments ohe c i v i l
governments have undertaken to provide« Thtso reports also indicate
predictable ai.d actual deficiencies. At t:ie sank, time w are making
the nost of what is actually provjdod, through malnvaining a hi?h state
of ope in tri « « i l readiness end thron g'l ar vi si 7¾ es to jUhat cowgrosition of
armed strength and what use <f resources wi l l give maximum military return,
21, During the past yiar mach has be .1 done to increase our defense
forces «nd to make then more effoctivo. Measured against the Soviet
capability, our progress is insufficient to give us prospect oi access*
i f attacked, Ve are s t ' l l far short of the minimum requirements. We
lack essentiel supply anj support. B^t a series of actions have been
taken which have strengthened our command Structurtr augmented our
7
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operational plans and directives, and materially- increased our land, air,
aid naval -forges« "1Xanina tlon in more detail of m ^ r changes follows«
Development of Coaimand S ruo
22, Uy August 1952 emmgemcnts for coorrtinatj1½ the. operations
of the forces of Grccc- arid ïurker uith thosu of be remainder of my
con* JaJid lisd teen established. Headquarters Allied land l^oroes South-
eastern Europe, with Lieutenant Jtneral Willard G4 tyman, 7.S. Army-,
in coimand, were established in Iimir directly subordinate to Adnrral
Carney, Commander «in-Chief, Alliod Forcos Southern Europe, in Deocnber
1952 Admiral the Earl Jloimthatten of iAjrma, Royal New j was appointed
Commandc-r-tin-Chief Allied Forces .Soditorranoan« In Haroh 1953 he took
over his Allied (MIti) Cownand vhich in wartime would include units
of the iirltish Mediterrm. an 4 I t e t plus naval forces front othtr NATO
nations* Hx. United states S4Xtl1 Fit et , with a striking force mission,
romains assigned to the Corrandcr-in-Chivf, Allied Forces Southern
Europe, Thus there now exists a contend structure to control our
united force a along a 4000-Tdle iront ^tending from northern Norway
to the Caucasus. *
build-up of Forces
23. -At Lisbon in February 1952 thu nations had set for the selves,
for the I i rst time, firm goals for tte build-up of their forces in 1952
and tentative goals for 1955 and 1954. As tho year 1952 ended, the goals
in terms of major units were approximately- t for Air Forces* Maval
F rces, and for active full-strength Army divisions. Yct for the Army
forces designated to entvLr combat following ID-Hav, but b fore the end of
the f i r s t month of any hosti l i t ies, tho goals were only partially wet,
A considerable number of units would not have bten readv for combat at
the tine needed, During the last twelve nontiis progress toward the
felfi l joaat of thesu goals h?a been stead-", fhrougtout the c?mand t l »
strength of units Ivs increased, additional ma or items of equipment have
been provided and training arivcucod. In addition, a substantial number
8
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o f ne« units I m « baen organistd. Howrthslees, for a l l ssnriees «iura
are » U l i amjor deficiencies in support Wi i ts j i n l og is t i ca l estataieb-
rant» Wd in Stocks of anmurittlan and « t lur supplies, r would ;vJd
parerrtha t l ca l l y at Ulla point that oar reporting and evaluating aya ten
has tuen KJialderably strengthened throughout this period. Wa can
provide «ore d é f i n i t l w Information of actual conditions than formerly
va» possible. Thus i t In Atm possiblo to ev(0.uate oombat-effeoti-re
units with muck great- r confidence. Ws now have o much n r e re l iable
knowled^j of just Ae re He stand.
2A. i. ysBT ago the outstanding deficiancv »as in the tact ica l a i r
forces. T f e v a s a shortage of a i rcra f t , of Crevsj of supply « id
support, t. oonoiderable increase during the yoal- in the number of
combat a i rcra f t , naioly from del iver ies under the U.S. Mutual Defense
Assistance Program, has since bettered our p » i t i o n . Hot only hare the
numbers of contint a i rcraf t increased, but their tombât capability baa
Improved. The Increase in the number of p i lo ts and technicians f o r these
aircraft , Iogeth lT with some snail improvement in a ircraf t control,
warning and reporting ayatems, have t> en encouraging. Ovr network of
a i r f i e ld* has heen enlarged and nade more e f f i c i en t . Dur various
exercises rtiich posed d i f f i c u l t problems in e w MB nation and conmuni-
catloBfl daionstrated the abi l i ty of national forces assigned to SHAPE
to work together as a teas. In supply, and in the development of the
orstea f o r distributing fue l , be have improved our status orer the part
year. KeverUieless, our air power i s s t i l l today the tfeakast link in
our defense. In spite -J our progress, our air forces could not adequately
carry oat their tasks* The increase of air paver must receive f a r greater
attention % tbe HATO nations.
25, BurlTf the past ^ a r great e f for ts have been made to inprove training of ivigular forces and at the same IdjK to achieve better graining and n jb i l t ia t ion procedures for reserve forces , on whwi »
auch of oitt defensive strength depends. Lack of propir training
f » c i I i t l e s std areas has tangieret) thla e f f o r t , but good leadership
9
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can do itucih to of fset the deficiency. Accordingly, SHAFS has strongly
emphasised the need for leadership at a l l echelons. Variolas national
forces have organised additional schools for junior and jro-ccmwissioned
of f icers , and study periods for senior off icers, Kobilization and
training exercises have been conducted Witi encouraging results»
Problems in training both active and reserve forcés, like »oat of our
large problems, are now becoming more dearly defined, and scwe HATO
nations are requesting and using training and advisory missions
organised by SHAPE, Such missions are now operating in the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and or tu gal. Anotter important development has been the
recent establishment of atctfic indoctrination ocurses for key EfATQ
ocmronders and staff officers* Thd courses, which are designed to
acquaint off icers with the use of atomic weapons in t^ct'oal situations,
wi l l enable NATO military staffs to consider the implicat'ons of atomic
warfare in the defense of Ifestern Europe» Vith a l l this, there is
s t i l l an urgent nsed for a l l countries to re-ex«iius cr it ical ly their
joobilization systems and to insure that they are adequate to provide,
in the tin» required, forces SuffioientIy well-trained to perform their
duties,
Support of Armed Forces
26* die growth of land forces during the past year, while not
satisfactory, has been encouraging* fhis situation, however, is not
true of the arrangements for the simply and support of those forces.
The in i t ia l eïrçhasis which had been given to the çreatâon of front-line
troops resulted in a grave shortage of the operational reserves, of
certain crit ical supplies, and of service troops without which a modem
army cannot maintain i tse l f e f fect ive ly in the field*
27. In an international oomand, the problem of providing the
overall logist ic support i s unusually conplicated, because each nation
is responsible for the support of i t s own forças* fhis arrangèrent
results in a lack of f l ex ib i l i t y In the supply system* In an Attempt
10
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* - O ' i B ^ . i s s s ä ä d S o
to na)» the system less r igid, SRAPSin ^ctolxT 1952, after discussion
« I th the nations concerned, submitted to the Standing Group specif ic
proposals vhicht i f adopted,- should in time remedy the nain Caxlts in
the organisation of -our supply. But merely improving our supply or-I
ganisstion does not good Uie present lack of operational reserve
stocks» The nations are a l l agreed; that they should hold stocks suf-
f icient for several months, a period based on an estimate of the time
to begin the replenishment of stocks in Europe after the outbreak of cv
war. Hainly for financial reasons, however, their stocks have not toen
built up to the needed l^vel,
26* On the other hand, progress Ms been &>od on the third part
of the program of infrastructuref that is , of fixed military installa»
tjons including air f ie lds, signal coramunic étions, &nd command head-
quarters. Kore turn half of ths 125 airfields approved have been
completed to the point tfiere they could be used in an emergenev, and
construction is nroceedin? well on s l l but a few of the remainder.
Our fixod ecauMvrf cations net is beginning to take form,
29» ho fourth part of the infrastructure program was approved bv
the Couacil ^tt Deoember 1952, but only about one-half of i t was financed
at that tinte» Additional air f ie lds, headquarters, signals communica-
tions, jet- fusl storage tanks and distribution pipelines to airf ields
1Here anong that portion of the program »hieb vas agreed on, fhs
remainder, financed in -April 1953, included additional airf ields and
items sxich as na^al bases, radar inst&ll&tions, radio-navigational aids,
and training installations. In Jkprll 1953» the Coincil also approved
the finaacing of a long-range infrastructure program for 1954, 1955
' and 1956, c o w i n g the additioBül WATO unitary installations reouired
to be built dttriog this three-year period. • This far-sighted departure
from previous ytar-by-year financial approval represents a long step
Xorward. I t w i l l enable us to inprove greatly tins planning for
construction hy placing i t on a £irh long-range basis,
11
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0 M I O R Î ^MCI 'HU ^
30. The organization of the civilian bodies of if/.TO has been
progressively BtrsRgthered duriBg the past year ns a result or tlia
creatt on of the position of SMrstarjr General as a focal point ,of civilian
leadership. ÎInder lord IEiiay, the Mork of building a mere cohesive
structure has gone forward. Vht. Hcrtii Atlantic Council, since the
decision In early 1952 that i t function in pujoanent session through
the appointant of PeineiKtit Represeirvtetivesj has provided increasingly
firm top-level direction to HAW, on a continuous basis. îsider Lord Isiaay,
the Xnternatinnal Staff has been developed to assist and advi3S in
Uie discharge of conplex civi l ian responsibilities. Tλ result has
been to delineate both Uwae and the military responsibilities mora
clonrivy to fac i l i tate policy decisions, to strenffthen defense pro-tue-
t&cn, and to provide mre effective review of ptrfoniianoe in tfteet Uig
accepted goals, the nilitarv echiion of MiTO no« has authoritative
civilian guidance end direction available oil a pc raanent basis, The
polit ical aspects of UT1O Military exercises, the asees&nente cf the
security threat; the administrative and budgetary supervision of HATO
airf ield and otter infrastructure program- frid the conplt.x tasks of
setting annual goals for the Vniild-up of U i l i Uirv forces are satters
on ville h this type of guidance has bean received.
£ ThB MTO Jtnnual Itovleit
31. In Mfa KiTO Annual Revfcn during 1952, the Council and the
International Staff have had a »ast important role. Mithin KAfO
Uieirs has been t:u responsibility for determining the lc vol of
defense e f for t for each country. In their work thev have had available
a GtateAent of overall roauiren£nts in the Ettropean aTea reported by
iiy OOHMand, together «Ith rcv detailed ItMamendations as to the conpo-
Bition of Military programs and the balance of a i r , ground anS naval
fcrces, Their wortc vas confirmed in the «tecisions of the Ministerial
Session of Ute Council in Jpril 1953, which set up firm force goals f o r
1953 and provisional goals - 1954 for nrrçv, air, and navy units,
12
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O Q N A l O SESii=KJfED
togettior vith appropriate recoroondatiens on N/JO défense production,
The Europe an Defense Commnity
32„ During ay year of c o m m a n d j here follcwed closely the plwtf
forttte European Dafenae community* The benefits which the aarIy r a t i f i -
cation of the Treaty wov-Id have brought to our e f forts and to European
unity included the contribution of West Gcmany, which 1 consider
indispensable to our defense system, SiiAFE hae aaintairfc-d constant
liaison with the interim Committee of tho European Defense Community
and has observed and assisted in i te planning» I t s plans axe workable
and sufficiently advanced to avoid de lav in d&valopins a German
contribution.
Shift of Hational Siiphesis
33« fhroughenat rany of the N/iTO nations the growth of defensive
power has reduced the sense of fear and urgt-nc? vnder which they lived
in the preceding twelve months* Satioris art beginning to change their
planned military programs fron rapid raaraamcnt to a longer*tem
policy. Although this change ma" be dictated tr> the economic situation,
we Dust not forget that anv real slackening the defense e f for t may
itSOLf open the way to aggression.
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O O WAi O KKSTRICÏliD
ÀPEBiT.gft. np TH8 BMBCCS OT QttHaB?
31(. Nuob Uten haa been added to the defense structure as I t existed
a year ego. Hieli that i s highly enoouraging has been accoiglished. K we
JMintaln mcaentum. our d> Jectives «en lie attained vitbin the rear future and
Hitbln the ecoccoie capabilities ( f KiTO. Yet while -Oie situation bas altered
during this past year, the s lgtilflcenoe of this change should he sought In the
extent to which the power ratio of Soviet Cffensive capability to HkTe defensive
StreagQi haa «hanged for tr against us.
£ . Koreorer, we are Interested, not In the «ere relat ive alteration in
this pwer ratio, but in the reaainine disparity of military potential. This
is the OBlr true criterion by Wiitb to measure our military risk and therefore
to sense the magnitu&e and urgency of the further e f forts required. Let us
exsttine the Soviet potential.
36. airing the past twelve months the 0S3R has systematically strengthened
i ts armed forces end those of i ts Biropean sate l l i tes . !Die highly mechanized
grcup of Storiet amies stationed Id East Gernaany has been kept et a high level
of training; i ts equipment haa been* Increased and i t s vehicles modernized. Jfeny
Jhtsslaid air squadrons have been re-equipped with jot aircraft* A huge pragma
of a i r f i e ld construction has been nearly completed throughout Eastern Europe.
Ihn Soviet naval ship-building progran is continuing steadily and now includes
construction of nev iiqirovad ocean patrol sabmarihes* the military strength
or the Satel l i te countries has been increased considerably. Since Jenuery 1952,
when these fortes mnfcered approximately 1,000,000 men organized into 65
divisions, they have increased to More than 1,300,000 men organized Into 70-odd
divisions. 3his total does DOt GCttnt Seet Germany, where various uni ta of the
police have been converted into tha nucleus of a Guxiian aruy which now nunfcera
about 100,000. Xast Cfermany is also forming an air force and a naval force,
His foregoing sumery relstea to the strengthening of Soviet conventional for oca.
I t must not be forgotten, however, tht,t Soviet e f f o r t is the atomic f i e l d has
also continued.
37* 3heee aire the facts about Hie inereeslng strength of the Soviet bloc.
Since Stalin tS death there has been nuch conjecture about possible changes of
policy by the rulers of the Soviet Onion. Ihese ore nctters beyond my purview.
N A T C ^ 1 K i k l T O C n S t )
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' ' • " OA LU RESTRICTED ^ Mprecnrer, aa a soldier I cannot afford to deal with conjecture» ï fee1 i t ny
duty to state that I tatfw of DO facta which vould lead ne to conclude jUiet tft*
• i l i tary danger fret» the East has lessened» this Tiev coincides with the
o f f i c i a l cramai que isaied by the Hortfa Atlantic Council at the conclusion
of i t s MiQisteriBl session, 25 April 19531
Qie Council foand that there had not yet lo fact been any change in the fundamental threat to the security tf free peoples* Hie mat striking evidence of this continuing threat la the huge and constantly strengthened military force ftaintalned by those nations whose policies have been responsible for the prêtent tension» and who are s t i l l promoting aggressive var in several parts of tto world*
36* An appraisal of the present power ratio goes f e r beyond the nil ltary
f i e l d . I t eobracee every aspect (if our polit ical, economic, financial «cid
social systems* All hut the military aspects are beyond both my cc*g>eteh«e and
responsibility* Tet within the str ict ly military f ie ld« I fina the disparity
between oar available forces and thee & which the Soviet rulers could bring
egainst us SO great as to warrant no other conclusion than that a FULL scale
Soviet attack within tfca near future vould find. Allied Coamand Europe critically
veak to accomplish i ts present mission* Ibe potential aggressor retains the
initiative* EIe can exercise his offensiv« capability et wi l i , end choose tto tine,
plaoe, weight, end direction of attack* Uo allow the NATO nations to maintain
their status as free nations, we should hare the means vhioh can be oenmitted
to fiction vitbin a short tine and which can give ns the capability of
withstanding an init ia l attack end gaining tinte to gather cor strength* To do
Otherwise» we vould risk needlessly heany sacrifice of l i f e end great loss of
crit ical equipment- Ve need not only the physical means but the driving force
d dynamic leadership sustained by a high «orale throughout the civilian
population as well as among Our fighting forces*
RE-3CRVRV OF KDLIThBY IttQUIKaBMB
39* Concurrently vitfa the developments cited, iXhe military requirements
cf Allied GcmtAia Europe have been re-surveyed and submitted to the North
Atlantic Military Coanittee* Through the Council's action on tbe 1952 Annual
Jteview, completed in April 1953» ^reed goals for HAtO »ations fer future years 15
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Jurve bcôTi appr ov Wl.
*0, Tto re oui ta are beat stated in the word a of the Council ' o f inal
ccnunlçpie of 25 April 1953'
A e Council agreed on abort and long-term programs f o r NAÏO. Tliey established a finm unitary Brogrem fo r 1953 and a provisional program for 1954* I b addition to the feroea which (Greece and Turkey are contributing» there «111 be a notable increase in the sise of the force» assigned to NUO sufmw COMmenders and a considerable improvement in their effectiveness. Training is being greatly improved at al l levels*
The series of large scale maneuvers held during the lest year has anveeiehly reiaea the standard of cooperation of the forces cf thn member osuntrteaI units are being better equipped and the organization of support forces Is developing, me NATO military authorities consider that the atteignent of the fprce goals In i953< end the oeablned influence of these various feat ore, wi l l add Materially to the defensive strength Cf IttTO during 1953*
agreement was reached not only on the M I I H financing cf the second part (¢167,600.000) of the fourth Slloe cf the infrastructure program (ths f i r s t part to the encunt of about $2¾.OOO ,000 having been settled at a minlatwrial meeting in Deeeihber). but also on a ccst-sbaring formula which would cover future progrcms ta be submitted by the supreme comenders for the three-jeer period beginning in 15(54., involving expenditure of up to $700,000,000, subject to the approval of p&lianenta. These progr&as wil l include a vide ruige of projects sucb as airf ields, teleocnounicatlcsis, naval basds and port fac i l i t ies , pipelines and radar installations. Ihe military authorities cf JttTO now bave a financial planning figure to which they can work for ever three yeefs. In addition, en improved ayatem i s ready to put into operation to ensure closer financial supervision over Hke expenditure of eomon lhfraatruoturs funds.
J K M 3 or M U O B cerrcisnciES. mt TASKS M K A D . A I P O C H C U I B I M B
41* Jlov, In HEiy 1$53* the NATO nations« which were defensela&e in
I1SOt ectti be justifiably- proud in looking at their increased strength« Tbay
oan bfc buoyad up by their aeecnpliahBenta, ^et weighed dovn by their fear*«
ISte result should be an i i^rorasot In the morale of their peoples. Their
seriousness of purpose and their strength of wi l l should bore been nade clear
to the world«
42* Yat pride in eehierenant must not blind ua to tha Stignltude of the
tasks aka&d* nor hide our true military position today. Ibe achievenents
during the past year have been considerable« Ibey ref lect great «redit on
-the fourteen HATO nation*« but tfea « i f ort» cf the la«-t -bio yeara eould e l l b*
wasted were we to relax now« lbere are « t i l l nerny gups In our defense syst*»
whicli Aist be f i l l ed without delay i f our hoa» leads are to have that reasonable
™4WinCim of security Vhioh i t haa been HA O1 s prirary purpose to achieve«
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O O W A l O R E S T R I C T E D
43« Hy predecessor reported in Mey 1952; Ihere is no real security yet
achieved in Äiropei there l e only a beeibDlng.* Xhowladge of the military
Oltuatioo today gives no grounds for believing that this security has been
achieved, that the beginning* node n year ago, has new ocme so near to n
successful ending that our efforts oon be relaxed*
IiV Northern Sarope s t i l l lucks the mi Dlmm forces required to cope
successfully with a major attack* Ibe actions in thet area wi l l have to receive
sxternel aseistenée, and this i s contempla ted in our plans« Ibe continuing
Magnitude of Soviet offensive capabilities in Korthem Europe and the special
requirements for coordinating the mi i tv ry assurée tajcen "by the hâtions of
thnt area with the contributions of other NATO portners to defence create a
problem of unusual eoôçdexity and diff iculty* Tha pattern of solution through kMit^
oollectlva action i s being gradually clarified* further e f forts by e l l con-
« m e d are, however, required* y^^^'- j t l^d * - a
45* Xn Central Europer we bf-ve made material progress* I t i s dear that
the basic el^nents of strength to attain a capability for defense of that acres
can be found* Whet is required is the continued will end e f f o r t to convert
this potentiell into reality. I f suoh e f for t i s forth coining, «ud especially I f
an early Geman cottribution is provided» we can look forward to the day in
the naer future, when i f attacked we could conduct s successful defense in
that eres»
Iihevise in Southern Europe 1 the land forces t.re steadily improving
snd a successful defense appeers attainable in the foreseeable future* Ihere \
continues to exist a serious lack of support troops. Ibie weakness must be
remedied* Foverful naval forces could make a contribution of the greatest
value, but the air forces here, as in other areas,, are s t i l l dangerously short*
J)7* Ibers are many aeasnres that apply generally throughout the iAole
Western European area* Active lend forces mat be further Increased* Those
already in being EUat be better trained end baetad by proper support troops,
at present l&cking* Tbe system tf training and mobilising our reserve forces IT , *
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O O NA TO sex. r i o t e d
nuât insure that they era ready to face a professional eneroy on equal terns*-
Ttko navel f<roes mist receive the escort vessel* end ainesweepers Miith wil l
be vital fcr defense against e potential enemy strong in submarines and mine-
laying capability»
JjC* Our greatest weakness, however, la in the air« For tha next Taert at
le&st> higher prior i ty should he given to the air forces« Hot only do we lack
the number of modern aircraft indispenseble for our defensive tasks, but in acne
countries, the development cf an effective air vanning and control system is
only Just beginning*
Tt» eetablish a workable supply syatesi the natioea should plan to naet
the requlremanta for their forced both frcm he®e production eod through negotiation
vltb other governments* National Ctockat particularly of «munition, should
be increased from their present l*w level «
50» Ihe deficiencies 1 have noted ore correotible, provided that tioaly
action Is takes, and austeinad* Zf tills i s dona, this oo rottend could be oapsble,
within the near future, cf e f fect ively defending Veatern Europe against fu l l -
scale Soviet aggression, I f these deficiencies remain substantially uncorrected»
these requireivents substantially unfulfi l led, then Alliad Ooumand Europe wi l l
continue to be crit ical ly weak ill i t s capability <f accompliahing i ts present
mission; the NATO nations cf Etxrope wil l regain exposed to the peril of decisive
military defeat with all I ts catastrophic consequences to tbam and to Vaatarn
eivili«atiûn » ,
51- Clir present di f f icult ies would be lessened through greater unity of
e f f o r t « In the economic f ie ld, this would help solve the problems cf military
supply and equipment* In tha polit ical f ie ld, i t would fac i l i tate our efforts
to mobilise al l cur available military resources.
52* Ia four years tfce ^farth Atlantic Treaty Organisation has denonstrated
that free nation?» working earnestly together« can achieve collective security*
Vb bare b e « « * seriously aware of the heavy sacrifices demanded to am nations
for defense* Today we are far from the plateaii of security« Ve have merely gained
the foothi l l « lauding to that plateau, A levelling off now, when we ere far Ge1Iov
niDlmm força requirements, may return our European people« to that grin feeling
of military weakness and fu t i l i t y of e f fo r t , only recently l e f t behind*
N A Ï O E K b l ' ß l C T i i D
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53* Surittg the Xfiat two yet»ra ve have overcome the Detural inertia which
besets a l l human endeavors, Ve have inserted to the bug« complicated
aadileery of defense a momentum ef incalculable power* the results of faith and
growing strength* Ve mst not lese that nennen tun*» Tfc do so vould be to nulli fy
a l l c4ir labor and sacrifices, to repudiate cur principles* and to perpetuate
enr peril* Vere the narontum once Iost1 the e f forts to restore it^ouJd be many
tines these we have so far made*
5h* Ihe most precious assets of our nations are their spiritual values
and their youth* The nest sacred obligations of goiernnants are to nurture and
preserve those values, and te assure thfet those Mves shall net be hazarded
through failure to reeogni&e the depth rf the threat ranged against us*
55» In his ^Finst Annual Bsportr StipreiDe Allied Oomnander Europe*»
General cf the wmy Dwigbt P« Eisenhower wrc-te* vIn e world where powerful
forces are tcrfcing tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual l iberty, and
dignity of mom, we cannot for one montent delay our advance toward security»*
Ihe powerful forces te which he referred v^re these controlled and directed
by the Kremlin* aIhe Soviet Anny # * he wrote, "casts its shadow over the length
and breadth of Europe."
3he North Atlantic Council finds that this threat remains without
fundamental change. In the light tf these consIderatioasi there oanoct he,
therefore» any valid military reason to justi fy a le Til l ing-off of effot-t
until ve have progressed at least ve i l beyond the goals now set for 195½ *
57* Vith these conclusion*, I believe e31 my Goaaanders~ln-Ghief end the
senior members cf the splendid international staff cf Allied Command Sircpe wi l l
he found to concur. I wisb to recfcrt that these off icers are men of integrity,
loyalty, professional oenpetence aT£ devotion to outy unsurpassed by any eonparafele
graxp i t bad been nty goc-d for orty £>ear& in the military
responsibilities end by aesociatiop with the military tenders of memy notions*
service of the United States, the privilege of heavy
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O O w A i u wsmciwf
9>. Joiasd in devotion to tha cause of pence end the nesurIty of al l 1
prlro, comlueed of tin aim end the sreeaoy of our iidlvidual efforts. we I
now to sustain the noaentiM tbet has brought us tbne' far eaflr ft- » l u t e i n o
faith In the values ve strive to defend.
/ V ^Mm i a i A n r I i^ïnwiHi '
M. B. «IDOWAT Oncral. JJnltod StateaV
, _ , Suprew Allied Ctmandar1Sirdpa ' 3 Enelosuraa
MffffiIffiJiqg s SagUrt grand! Standing Qroup Su 9 30 UaiSMi Officer Ifcrle 6 1 MCO France 10 12 MX) ü£ 31 Seeretary of Defeinse [IS 15
£0
Uh IU RKbTJSICIfiD
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O O I1HIBD HUPT
P R A F T
FQST JWHttAli REHBI ÛP GPigUL RHHStAT
L HATOHg OP TOE BBPOBT
3h» Serene Commander*® report for the Plrst Tear - 30 Shy 1$52
to 25 Uay 1953* addressed to the Standing Ib1Oiqpt but actually issued as a
public statoieat »
2# Hanned. length - about f i v e thousand words, f i f t een minutes reading
time*
5* The report should re f lect General Itidgfcay'e reputation and character
as a military nan and should give the basic facts of the situation in Allied
Ootttand Birope f r * » his pcriAt of t i e * . In keeping with what jmmj he the «rfenal
situation* the tone of the report should draw strongly to tfce attention of the
HAiO nations Just where they stand as far as Allied CtroandJEttrcFpe is concerned*
KATD es a jXhole would be dealt with only jWhere necessary to explain activit ies
of All ied Ocensnd Biropea
5« SPQgBSflEP OOTLmS PQB THB KBPCBT
The contents of the report could f a l l roughly into three msift parts« After
an introdnctiffiL the f i r » t part would survey the heritage of General BLseuhpffBr1S
coDRtaxid and tho second would review activit ies of the year* Ihe Uiird part wvuld
point out what we mist yet do. The conclu s icct would contain SAOETffi1 a stmmarlzed
views*
X JLNTHCDPQEKg
JL Bittier to be keyed to the most recent important Oesisifln or Mt iT i ty
of General Ridgiray or SHAFR es a nhole* or
B4 ft> -tie in with Qeivrel entrance into ^xds 27 Kay 1952 almost
at the TOJ hoar that the Surapesa Sefanae Qcnunity treaty was IwinE signed at
the Quai d'Orcay "by the six defense »inistera. Then a lead into -
H *A year aap I found"
( Ib is seotien rfiould br ie f ly surrey SHitK «hen General RLdgBsjr took coBand).
A. i.- Soviet*» thongi gaining U t t l * in nwbera, « o n Raining in
qaality and in development of Satell ite forces.
B, A adnoere desire bad been ereatea in a l l HAtO netioua to develop forces
needed to pronerra jieaoe. Elans bad been Bade f g t the wpia boüä-flp of air
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O O 6 O 1
D B A P g — 2 - D B A P r
forces in terns of divisions* a i rcra f t , and naval c ra f t , and installations tfwr
th«® (infrastructure)* (This section deals with Ilie Lisbon Goals),
D* A ftfBctioaing ccanani structure established, but one s t i l l to incorporate
teo jkev KASD nations and Jfediternmeen forces. i
I I I nIMriiig this year* (
Cfhls section w i l l deal with the na£or of Sûpr«aô Al l ied
Caaxncpd Europe under General Mdgtfay's ooamaiA to 29 Ifey 1955 and w i l l also
contain setae o r i t i ea l sn&Iysia of the* aeccnpllshxieatt I t w i l l also stress BEÄFE's
drive to obtain fulf i lment of basic irLnAmm requirements and to carry cut OffectiTC
ecoaoiaicsl planning and operation, and i t w i l l give the reasons f o r th is drive) ,
A* Katicns h&re ctae to look at their growing Hteagth with pride and <
Satisfastiont to regard their aoocnplisiiBaits »ore than their fears* This i s a
healthy aign*
B. There has been a growth In our forces of which ire can be proud* ïhis ^
growth i s less than we had hoped f o r , but i t I s s t i l l enough to pemit us to wager
that an menj attack *ra14 uot meet with success* (This section riiould g ire general ^
f igures on Hw forces up to 1 Hay 1952, and also scne general dèsoripidcit of our
log is t ics situation)*
1, Thie growth* however, has be«® f e lpwSby the realisation that ^ \ *
pottbat forces without proper baûkLng would not be saccesafal and that « a need a ^ L
(ro»taîloïdng o f ) our build-up plane to insure balanced forces, (HELE seoti<** should J jj
deal both with the prbbl«ma of suff ic ient reserve ground Faroes end a i r forces $ Jf •
. j&tv/i^y**^- ' are «t i i ft ing fthelr « f f o r t f j fron strong rapid buiLl-ups to longer-rajoge defensiv« Cf*
(ifert the report Etight attaopt to give «one ctf* the apparent reasons f o r
this change and to warri againit-a slackening of e f f o r t , Soate nrwnnf aigbt also
be nadc on the e f fect : oSfumr weapqng force bal ldHq» and national e f f o r t s ) •
C, SEUFS enl ITAZO hsvu bê«n d m i l p i f i g *ore e f f e c t i v e organisations to sake
the 'best use of our resources*
1, a KATO Seoretury*^ènerti: has1 frees eatabliabe&p
2* A process of -Iififc bean tq> and followed*
3. A ccmoand stmottnfc^&s^JiSnestafcllshsd l a the south-CM t and
ÄbSiterrsoean,
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O O
D B A F g . - 3 - P R A P T
4* Bxocelfles here been oonduotd to give practice to our e f f o r ts it*
coopératif» with outside ccsnanas» stub es Strstegio M r Ocoaaendj Bcaiber Oo—oend,
^O tAHT f OTÄNOOM.
I f *Yet much gwi ins to he done*
A» Ifaticoa nust centime individually to devete the® selves to building
defense in such a wer as t o increase the col lective defense*
Bfl The forces created mist be real forces, not paper; forces which would
he e f f ec t i ve with loss of l i f e * Tbey nust here;
1, Oontitnied grc&rth and training to the l i a i t of the naticsttl
capability in quantity as iauch as IJI quality*
2« An international aysten f o r l og is t i c support, yet to be agreed
oü*
3* Infrastrooture*
J t The support end oontimal e f f o r t of every c i t izen*
V OOKCIflSICff
In f a i r j^ars BASSO has proved that ^e can achieve co l lect ive security* This
security can be maintained only by the w«Jdttns> e f f o r t of each nation within i t s
eooncMio l t i i i ta, We hove not yet reached a period Titiwe we can relax* (The
OoItelu sloa should, contain General R i ^ n p j f * personal Ti ew, in sumtary f o r » , o f
the present status and the future needs and possibi l i t ies of the Supreme Al l ied
Goaaand)*
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D TFJFCT TOKXWL I M I S O V ^ M A S W -W 4«* .
B R A F t B R A .? T PIBST AJKDiL BBPCBT CP AHffiMiEi BIDOWjtT 7 fr-uvtX ) TS"?
1 OF «
1. Tbs s t r i a e Ccnaander1B » p o r t ftar the äfcevt Tear - 30 Ihr 1952
to 29 Mqr 1953» BJJraaaea to the Standing Grcopt bot actually isouflä as a
{•dials s tatuent .
FlaImed length - aboat f i r e thousand aoids, f i f t e e n « i m t e s reading
The report should r e f l e c t Qtnersl Riagwaj-'a reputation and character
as a H i l i tMy nan and should jçive the basic roots of the situation in ja i l ed
CaiMQQd Europe f ï tm his point of viev/. Di keeping with Tftint may be -Uie aatual
situation, th* tone of the report should draw Btronely to the attention of the
IUIO nations just ^iere they stand as f a r as A l l i ed Ödland Birope i s eowetned.
ITATO as a whole would be dealt with cmly TTlvere neceasaiy to escgdain aotiwltiea
of Al l ied Ocmand B m p e .
B, StKCtaTHl OUtIJHE JOB THE KMfCttl'
the CCBtents of the report could f a l l roughly into three parts. After
an introduction the f i r s t port wool! Snrrey the heritage of Qaieral rüSffnJwwer1S
cacttenl and the second would revietr act iv i t i es o? IAie year« TTie third part
would point out ibat ve KUBt j*tt do» rhe conclusion would contain SACBHH1*
I IIHHOPOPTKir
A* Bitter to be keyed to Uie Host recent important decision or act iv i ty
of General Ridsway or SHHfES aa a whole. er
»1 Te Ma in Wjth vCwwal UMawnyVj itrimnn i n t « rsrin B7 tor 19&
IihiI I r i l l Ilm I I I I ' T hmmr Iihnit thn Harfipfium TTiiiT11MH niwronitr T ~ ' * r h j l I C
IiTnHad ni Ilm Ijaai il i ^ H J IIJ fiTu iiiiB J • Tiinwï ni M i • I »I LL. Then a lead into -
XI "A year ago 1 found"
(This section should br i e f l y murrey SHAm when General Ridgway took
JU Sie Smiets t though gaining l i t t l e in umbers, were gaining in
(fllAÜty and in development of Sate l l i t e forces.
B. A sincere desire had been created in a l l NATO nations to develop'
forces needed to preserve peaee. Plans had been nade f o r the rapid of
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: o « P H A f T - 2 -
force* i s t e n * of. divisions, a i rcra f t , and naval c ra f t , and installations f o r
thm (infrastructure). (This Motion dsalt with TTis Usbon Goals).
C . A f u n c t i o n i n g s t r u c t u r e O t a b l i a i M d j b e t o n e " t i n t o i n c o r p o r a t e
two near NATO tuitions and Hsditarranean fOi*ces.
m IKnring this Tear*
(This section w i l l deal viJtb the aajor accoqi lUlwi i ts of Suprvos All ied
C q w t d Earope under General KWgwv ' » oeonnd up to 29 Haj 1953 an4 w i l l also
contain sows e r i t l oa l analysis of that acooeplistaunt. I t w i l l also stress SHAPE'»
drive to obtain fu LfiiUwnt o f basic ttüiim» requirements and to carry out e f f ec t i ve
e o a n e n l c n l p l a n t i n g and O p c r s t i o n t a n d i t n i l g i v e t h e r e a s o n s f o r U n i s d r i v a ) . a
*i
JL Nations have cone to look at their grating strength with pride and ^
satisfaction, to regard their accosflislnsnts more than their fears. Tili» l a a ^
Sealtlv sign. ^
B. Tbere has been a growth in our forces of which we oan be proud. Tblt ^
growth i s less than we bad hoped for i but i t I s s t i l l « n i g h to peroit us to vager
that an enemy attack would not meet Kith success. (This section should give general J figures on Uie forces up to 1 Hsy 1952, and also sons general description of our ^
logist lss situation). , t-<-i . 'r a t « ¢ -1 . This growth, however, has i > w n s t i i w t t / M ia s i i M s i H • • U m U T f - 1 Y
• " ^ T * i ' ' — r b a c k i n g b e - s u e c s o e f t i l ^ i t d - n u u l a t
U . s l h * f t h,, ( ^ j l t 4 I- y Tellimiag i f mir build-up plans to insure ^b1 anr^A forces. (This section should
A deal both with the jsehleos o f Sitfficient reaerrv ground fbrcea and a i r forces ^
? together with the need f o r mors e f feot ive training and SObillzation procedures. )
2 * G r o w t h h a * a l a s b e e n s l o w e d b y l o s s o f f e a r o r « e m u l s i o n . A H a t i x n s
K u ' [ f * ( *-
are shift ing their • eMwie^frtpi strong rapid build-ttps to longer-range defensiv«
(Here the report night attempt to giTO scne of the apparent reasons for
?
t h i s c h a n g e a n d t o v a r a a g a i n s t a s l a c k e n i n g o f e f f o r t . S o a e COHKHit s i g h t a l s o
t i e n a d e o n t h e e f f e c t o f n e w w e a p o n s on f o r c e b u i l d - u p s a n d n a t i o n a l ' e f f o r t s ) .
C . S B t r a a n d K U D b a v e b e e n d e v e l o p i n g M o r e e f f e o t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n * t o stake
U i e b e s t u s e o f s u r r e s o u r c e s .
1 . A HA IO S e e m t a i x ^ e n e n l . h a s b e o n e s t a b l i s h e d .
2 . A p r o c e s s o f A n n a a l B e v i e M h a s b e a n s e t up a n d f o l l o w e d .
3 . A I I M s t r u c t u r e has b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h a s c o t b - e a s t a n d
H e d l t e r r a D a a n .
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Btoroisem hors been Ocndttcted to give proctiee to oar e f for ts In y
Oooperntion KitJl Oatside c m i i l s , auob as Strntvgia M r Ill i i mill. Boaher C o w d 1 '
SACLAN7, cmmooL
U *Yot noch rataina to be d<mo"
A. BatdMM muât continu» individually to derote theaa elves to btdUlng
aaxiBn defense in sooK a. nay aa to increase Sw collective defense.
Bt The foroea oreetad mat be real foroofl, not paper; forties Idtfah avoid
ï>e effeotive -Kith ninimm loss of l i f e * Thfljf must hsvQ;
2« Qontlrtwa growth «aid training to th« l i a i t of tto* national
OHjpiiMUty in ^iaaitity as «tob « s i » g ja l l ty .
ta. i i t i i a r t i i i i t « y a W for logistic support* y*t to be agreed A
03L*
3* Infrastructure«
The aqpport and ecntiuxal ef fort cf ewry cit izen.
V iXWaaagy
In four ^Mrs FJlIPO tu« proved that ©en «chiôrô csülecüv* aeoörity.
This aQOttrlty om be Maintained ody tor the Mirhma e f for t of eaofa nation mithin
i t » HfiiiiiMin linita* W« hare not yvt yeacliod a period nbere w om reiLaoc* ( iht
concise! OP «hould oentain Tfcidgwayt & perasrfcl v i « « , in gamfcry îbm, erf
tttt JffMQlt statue and the ftoture Mede and possibil it ies of the Suppooe JU1Ued
OcnaQd) *
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m w u . , - f , t :
1 -TVfuor » 5 5
WBlECTt Hspart an MJJTO COMWD EnRGfSf K v - H v 1 * 0 .
M I Tha Horth A t l n t U Qcmell
TETOF I Staidlqc Oronp
Ihts Baport m e a n s ALLISD COKtnD BSBOtV aine* 30 Hay- 1$5S>
tha date I b e e « SopnM A l l M C a u d t r Xwnps.
i t The d r U aat&orltlea o f JMO nations Ibntld recelYa periodically
f r o the l U l t u j r C o w d a n d n thajr bue* appointed* a profeasi onil
Nllltaqr U H i M i t of t i e u mi ant and proepoctlve Ctpabilltjr tor dis*
«herging their aaalgned defense re spmslblll t i M •
3. the ptnpeea of thle Btpcrtt the seecxid enunatlng froa Sppiviia
HaadqnarteM Allied TnMra Bnrevef I s te irovids «Mh an Iraaanant. I t
IiMladN a brief Mnat r of th* slt*atlixi cne year ags| ai examination of
tha abaisse ttdeh Ima elnee uocuwd) a w n l n l of their effects upon
the capability of tide Coatm) for carrying ont I t * assigned defense nlaelcsi|
a re survey of i t s ni l l ta iy ieunli Maniaj and at Indicatif» of tbt areas of
existing u i e r dstteiacwia*» Qia Bapcrt in purposely couebcd in i w H a t
general tanas for obvloee eeourlty realms. Fredss figure« en present
stooksMis tg Maatt laa f an fuel fur aircraft, tanks a d Irceksf aid on U s
sffttttlvMeM of oar radar to gi t* ns tieely naming of sorpiiM eneey air
attack, e to iaulr StowM net be asim publie. A l l natters of saltans* in
this Bsport hsvs been Iwrtirtsd In rlatelfled »porta p m l o M l r Mda te prtper
aatterMr. Say been eotssed in adequate detail and sivported Iy
• 1 . M A T n k H IHPT à DE
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, Ott- UwScrp
« « • • v a SDBABDIt let ter of TnnealUal, Animal Itaport
ÏOt Soeratary Standine Group Hortt litUiitlo.3ra>tr Orgpidzitlon Ibe Pentagon Wuliituctant 'S* 0*
BefVOM SHAPE Uaasaee SB 2?HA, there are lnolosad
hnmdth f in » adtanea copieO of BACBOR1S Haport on Alltod
Oonand Bum;», M f — U v WÖ3« Addltlouil copies
wi l l ho fumishort j w t » arriva «n S June. M n U d MfdM
cf the report w i l l la ftirnlsbad yoc sa soon as they at*
available.
TO» n s SSRtBHK ALLIED CKfCttHEKft EDSOtEEi
loe l i 5 Cym of Annal Rpt
a , k, a t » Colonel, DS Antr Senetaiy
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