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VOLUME 5 NUMBER 3 JULY 1995

COMMUNITY POLICING Elements And Effects

Gary W Cordner Eastern Kentucky University

In little more than a decade community policing has evolved from a few foot patrol experiments to a comprehensive organizational strategy guiding modem police departments I It is now seen almost universal y as the most effective method available for improving police-community relations Proposhynents also believe that it will ultimately prove to be an effective crime control strategy Indicative of its stature in the 1990s community policing is required of the 100000 new police officers funded by the Crime Bill passed in 1994 by the US Congress

Four complicating factors have made it extremely difficult to determine the effectiveness of community policing howshyever

bull Programmatic complexity - There exists no single definition of community policing nor any mandatory set of program elements Police agencies around the country (and around the world) have implemented a wide array of organizational and operational innovashytions under the label community policing Because community policing is not one consistent thing it is difficult to say whether it works

bull Multiple effects - The number of intended and uninshytended effects that might accrue to community policshying is considerable Community policing might affect crime fear of crime disorder community relations andor police officer attitudes to mention just a few plausible impacts The existence of these multiple effects as opposed to a single bottom-line criterion severely reduces the likelihood of a simple yes or no answer to the question Does community policing work

bull Variation in program scope -The scope of community policing projects has varied from single-officer assignshyments to department-wide efforts Some of the most positive results have come from projects that involved only a few specialist officers small special units or narrowly defined target areas The generalizability of these positive results to full-scale department-wide implementation is problematic

bull Research design limitations- Despite heroic efforts by police officials and researchers most community poshy

lieing studies have had serious research design limitashytions These include lack of control groups failure to randomize treatments and a tendency to measure only short-term effects Consequently the findingsofmany community policing studies do not have as much credibility as we might hope

These complicating factors are offered not as excuses but rather to sensitize the reader to the very real difficulty of producing reliable knowledge about the effects of commushynity policing Additionally they identify priority issues that such agencies as the National Institute of Justice and the Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services have adshydressed and are continuing to address

What is Community Policing

Community policing remains many things to many people A common refrain among proponents is Community policing is a philosophy not a program An equally common refrain among police officers is Just tell me exactly what you want me to do differently Some critics echoing concerns similar to those expressed by police officers argue that if community policing is nothing more than a philosophy it is but an empty shell (Goldstein 1987)

It would be easy to list several dozen common elements of community policing starting with foot patrol and mountain bikes and ending with the police as organizers of and advocates for the poor and dispossessed Instead it may be more helpful to identify three major dimensions of commushynity policing and the most common developments occurring within each The three are

The Philosophical Dimension The Strategic Dimension

bull The Programmatic Dimension

The PMlosophical Dimension

Many of its most thoughtful and forceful advocates emphashysize that community policing is a new philosophy of policing perhaps constituting even a paradigm shift away from professhy

copy 1995 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences ISSN 1061-1517 Published by Alpha Enterprises Post Office Box 326 Richmond Kentucky 40476 (606) 623-0792

sional-model policing The philosophical dimension inshycludes the central ideas and beliefs underlying community policing TIlree of the most important of these are described below

Broad Police Function Community policing embraces a broad view of the police function rather than a naIrow focus on crime fighting or law enforcement (Kelling and Moore 1988) Historical evidence is often cited to show that the police function was originally quite broad and varied and that it only narrowed in recent decades perhaps due to the influence of the professional model and popular media repshyresentations of police work Social science data is also frequently cited to show that police officers actually spend relatively little of their time dealing with serious offenders or investigating violent crimes

This broader view of the police function recognizes the kinds of non-enforcement tasks that police already perform and seeks to give them greater status and legitimacy These include order maintenance social service and general assisshytance duties They may also include greater responsibilities in protecting and enhancing the lives of those who are most vulnerable-juveniles the elderly minorities the poor the disabled the homeless (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990 xiv)

Citizen Input Community policing takes the view that in a free society citizens should have open access to police organizations and input to police policies and decisions Access and input through elected officials is considered necessary but not sufficient Individual neighborhoods and communities should have the opportunity to influence how they are policed and legitimate interest groups in the commushynity should be able to discuss their views and concerns directly with police officials

Mechanisms for achieving greater Citizen input are varied f Some police agencies use systematic and periodic commushyi nity surveys to elicit citizen input (Bureau of Justice Assisshyj tance 1994a) Others rely on open forums town meetings

radio and television call-in programs and similar methods i open to all residents Some police officials meet regularly with citizen advisory boards ministry alliances minority I group representatives business leaders and other formal groups These techniques have been used by police chief II

I

executives district commanders and ordinary patrolofficshyers they can be focused as widely as the entire jurisdiction or

I as narrowly as a beat or a single neighborhood

1

I

r

The techniques used to achieve citizen input should be less important than the end result Community policing emphashysizes that police departments should seek and carefully consider citizen input when making policies and decisions that affect the community Any other alternative would be unthinkable in an agency that is part of a government of the

bull I people for the people and by the people

Neighborhood Variation Community policing supports differential enforcement and tailored policing based on local norms and values An argument is made that the criminal law is a very blunt instrument and that police officers inevitably

I Police Forum2

f

exercise wide discretion when making enforcement decishysions Presently individual officers make arrest and other decisions based on a combination of legal bureaucratic and idiosyncratic criteria while the police department maintains the myth of full or at least uniform enforcement (Goldstein 1977) Under community policing officers are asked to consider the will of the community when deciding which laws to enforce under what circumstances and police execushytives are asked to tolerate and even encourage such differenshytial policing

Such differential or tailored policing primarily affects police handling of minor criminal offenses local ordinance violashytions and public disorder Some kinds of behavior proshyscribed by state and local law and some levels of noise and disorder may be seen as less bothersome in some neighborshyhoods than in others Similarly some police methods including such aggressive tactics as roadblocks and more prevention-oriented programs such as landlord training may coincide with norms and values in some neighborhoods but not others

Even the strongest advocates of community policing recogshynize that a balance must be reached between differential neighborhood-level policing and uniform juriSdiction-wide policing Some crimes are so serious and some laws are so important that localized toleration in their policing would not be acceptable Additionally many aspects of police behavior are governed by constitutional statutory and case law it would not be proper for police to act illegally or unconstitushytionally just because they had community support for such behavior Police executives also have a professional duty to run their agencies in ways that produce effective efficient and ethical police behavior this responsibility sometimes conflicts with citizens preferences and desires

Striking a healthy and satisfactory balance between competshying interests has always been one of the central concerns of policing and police administration Community policing simply argues that neighborhood-level norms and values should be added to the mix of legal professional and orgashynizational considerations that influences decision-making about policies programs and resources at the executive level as well as enforcement-level decisions on the street

The StraJegic Dimension

The strategic dimension of community policing includes the key operational concepts that translate philosophy into acshytion These strategic concepts are the links between the broad ideas and beliefs that underlie community policing and the specific programs and practices by which it is implemented

Geographic Focus Community policing strategy emphashysizes the geographic basis of asignment and responsibility by shifting the fundamental unit of patrol accountability from time of day to place That is ralher than holding patrol officers supervisors and shift commanders responsible for wide areas but only during their eight or ten hour shifts community policing seeks to establish 24-hour responsibility for smaller areas

Ofcourse no single officer works 24 hours aday seven days a week week in and week out Community policing usually deals with this limitation in one or a combination of three ways (1) community police officers assigned to neigbborshyhoods may be specialists with most call-handling relegated to a more traditional patrol unit (2) each individual patrol officer may be held responsible for long-term problem solvshying in an assigned neighborhood even though she handJes calls in a much larger area and of necessity many of the calls in the assigned area are handled by other officers or (3) small teams of officers share both call-handling and problem solvshying responsibility in a beat-sized area

A key ingredient of this geographic focus however it is implemented is permanency of assignment Community policing recommends that patrol officers be assigned to the same areas for extended periods of time to increase their familiarity with the community and the communitys familshyiarity with them Ideally this familiarity will build trust confidence and cooperation on both sides of the policeshycitizen interaction Also officers will simply become more knowledgeable about the community and its residents aiding early intervention and timely problem identification and avoiding conflict based on misperception or misunderstandshying

It is important to recognize that most police departments have long used geography as the basis for daily patrol assignment Many of these departments however assign patrol officers to different beats from one day to the next creating little continuity or permanency Moreover even in police agenshycies with fairly steady beat assignments patrol officers are only held accountable for handling their calls and maintainshying order (keeping things quiet) during their shift The citizens question Who in the police department is responshysible for my area my neighborhood can then only truthshyfully be answered the chief or in large departments the precinct commander Neither patrol officers nor the two or three levels of management above them can be held accountshyable for dealing with long-term problems in any specific locations in the entire community Thus a crucial component of community policing strategy is to create some degree of geographic accountability at all levels in the police organizashytion but particularly at the level of the patrol officer who delivers basic police services and is in a position to identify and solve neighborhood problems

Prevention Focus Community policing strategy also emshyphasizes a more proactive and preventive orientation in contrast to the reactive focus that has characterized much of policing under the professional model This proactive preshyventive orientation takes several forms One is simply to encourage better use of police officers time In many police departments patrol officers time not committed to handling calls is either spent simply waiting for the next call or randomly driving around Under community policing this substantial resource of free patrol time is devoted to directed enforcement activities specific crime prevention efforts problem solving community engagement citizen interacshytion or similar kinds of activities

Another aspect of the preventive focus overlaps with the

substantive focus of community policing and with problemshyoriented operations Officers are encouraged to look beyond the individual incidents that they encounter as calls for service and reported crimes in order to discover underlying problems and conditions (Eck and Spelman 1987) If they can discover such underlying conditions and do something to improve them officers can prevent the future recurrence of incidents and calls While immediate response to in-progress emergencies and after-the-fact investigation of crimes will always remain important functions of policing community policing seeks to elevate before-the-fact prevention and problem-solving to comparable status

Closely related to this line of thinking but deserving of specific mention is the desire to enhance the status of crime prevention within police organizations Most police departshyments devote the vast majority of lheirpersonnel to patrol and investigations primarily for the purposes of rapid response and follow-up investigation after something has happened Granted some prevention of crime through the visibility omnipresence and deterrence created by patrolling rapid response and investigating is expected but the weight of research over the past two decades has greatly diminished these expectations (Kelling Pate Dieckman and Brown 1974 Greenwood and Petersilia 1975 Spelman and Brown 1982) Despite these lowered expectations however police departments still typically devote only a few officers specifishycally to crime prevention programming and do lillie to encourage patrol officers to engage in any kinds of crime prevention activity beyond routine riding around

Moreover within both informal and formal police cultures crime solving and criminal apprehension are usually more highly valued than crime prevention An individual officer is more likely to be commended for arresting a bank robber than for initiating actions that prevent such robberies Detectives usually enjoy higher status than uniformed officers (espeshycially in the eyes of the public) whereas within many police agencies crime prevention officers are seen as public relashytions functionaries kiddie cops or worse To many police officers crime prevention work is simply not real police work

The preeminence ofreactive crime fighting within police and popular cultures is understandable given the dramatic nature of emergencies crimes and investigations Much of police work is about responding to trouble and fixing it about the contest between good and evil Responding to emergencies and fighting crime have heroic elements that naturally appeal to both police officers and citizens Given the choice though almost all citizens would prefer not being victimized in the nrst place to being dramatically rescued to having the police successfully track down their assailant or to having the police recover their stolen property Most citizens would agree that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure This is not to suggest that police should turn their backs on reactive handling of crimes and emergencies but only that before-the-fact prevention should be given greater considershyation

A final element of community policings preventive focus takes more ofa social welfare orientation parlicularly toward

July 1995 3

I f

I

j juveniles An argument is made that police officers by1 serving as mentors and role models and by providing educashytional recreational and even counseling services can affect peoples behavior in positive ways that ultimately lead to reductions in crime and disorder In essence police are asked to support and augment the efforts of families churches bull schools and other social service agencies This kind of police i

~ activity is seen as particularly necessary by some in order to offset the deficiencies and correct the failures of these other I social institutions in modem America

f J Substantive Focus The third key element of community l policing strategy is a more careful and deliberate focus on

substantive problems in the community (Goldstein 1990) This substantive focus stands in contrast to three interrelated tendencies of professional model policing (1) a tendency to regard law enforcement as the end of policing rather than as one of several means available to police officers (2) a tendency to focus more attention on the process of policing than on substantive problems and outcomes and (3) a tenshydency to focus more attention on administrative issues within police organizations than on substantive problems in the community

Confusion in modem policing over the role of law enforceshyment reflects a common organizational pathology called goal displacement by which over time favored methods come to be seen as ends in themselves To overcome this confusion community policing emphasizes that in our society the law is but a means to the greater ends of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness The particular ends of policing tie in to these societal goals and relate to the protection oflife and property the maintenance of public order and the protection of indishyvidual rights One of the primary tools given to police for accomplishing these ends is the law and its enforcementshyuse of this tool has no great value in its own right however except as it contributes to protection of life and property maintenance of order and protection of rights

This distinction between means and ends has very significant practical implications It reminds us for example that the best policedepartrnentisnol necessarily the one that enforces the law the most but rather the one that provides the best protection and order Similarly the best officers are not necessarily those who make the most arrests and issue the most tickets but rather the ones who are most successful in controlling crime maintaining order and improving traffic safety in their assigned areas

The distinction between means and ends also directs attenshytion to the other means besides law enforcement that are available to police officers The simple recognition that law enforcement is but one of several methods available to police officers then leads to the realization that effectiveness in policing requires choosing in each instance that method which maximizes attainment of police goals and objectives and adherence to important police values This conception of policing not simply as law enforcement but rather as decision making has important implications for the selection training

bull supervision and evaluation of police officers

Thinking of policing as involving choosing the most effecshy

live method for handling a situation or solving a problem also points out the need to focus greater attention on substance rather than process That is the body of policing knowledge that has been most highly developed and transmitted through formal education and training emphasizes the processes of call handling reporting mediating enforcing and investishygating and largely ignores both information about substanshytive problems (cg domestic violence drug abuse fear of crime) and information about what works best in handling such problems To be effective decision makers however police officers need information about substantive problems and about what works as well as skills to assist them in diagnosing and analyzing situations and selecting the most appropriate responses

Police administrators similarly need to shift the focus of their attention Under the professional model the preeminent concern of police executives was seen as overseeing the efficient operation of the police department Attention was directed inward toward the workings of the police organizashytion itself As a consequence of this focus police manageshyment training and education came to be dominated by considshyeration of the processes of administration with near total disregard for either the work performed by police officers or the substantive problems that police departments are exshypected to address Without denigrating the importance of efficient administration community policing emphasizes that the primary focus of police executives should be on the accomplishment of the police mission This requires that police executives spend more time looking outward toward the substantive problems in the community and that they worry as much about effectiveness as about efficiency

The Programmatic Dimension

The programmatic dimension of community policing ultishymately translates ideas philosophies and strategies into concrete programs tactics and behaviors Even those who insist that community policing is a philosophy not a proshygram must concede that unless comm unity policing eventushyally leads to some action Some new or different behavior it is all rhetoric and no reality (Greene and Mastrofski 1988) Indeed many commentators have taken the view that comshymunity policing is little more than a new police marketing strategy that has left the core elements of the police role untouched (see eg Klockars 1988 Manning 1988 Weatheritt 1988)

Reoriented Police Operations An essential programmatic feature of community policing is a reorientation of police operations that entails less reliance on random motorized patrol immediate response to all calls for service and followshyup investigations by detectives Studies over the past two decades have convincingly demonstrated the limitations of these traditional police practices and have suggested some promising alternatives

Many police departments today have increased their use of foot patrol directed patrol door-to-door policing and other alternatives to traditional motorized patrol (Cordner and Trojanowicz 1992) Generally these alternatives seek more targeted tactical effectiveness more attention to minor of-

Police Forum4

fenses and incivilities a greater feIt presence of police andor more police-citizen contact Other police departments have simply reduced their commitment to any form of conshytinuous patrolling preferring instead to have their patrol officers engage in problem solving crime prevention and similar activities when not handling calls and emergencies

Many police agencies have also adopted differential reshysponses to calls for service (McEwen Connors and Cohen 1986) Rather than attempting to immediately dispatch a sworn officer in response to each and every notification of a crime disturbance or other situation these departments vary their responses depending upon the circumstances Some crime reports may be taken over the telephone some service requests may be referred to other government agencies and some sworn officer responses may be delayed A particularly interesting alternative is to ask complainants to go in person to a nearby police mini-station or storefront office where an officer a civilian employee or even avolunteer takes a report or provides other in-person assistance Use of differential responses helps departments cope with the sometimes overshywhelming burden of 9-1-1 calls and frees up patrol officer time for other acti vities such as patrolling problem solving and crime prevention

Traditional criminal investigation has also been reexamined in recent years (Eck 1992) Some departments have deshyspecialized the activity reducing the size of the detective unit and making patrol officers more responsible for follOW-Up investigations Many have also eliminated the practice of conducting an extensive follow-up investigation of every reported crime focusing instead on the more serious offenses and on more solvable cases Investigative attention has also been expanded to include a focus on offenders as well as on offenses especially in the form of repeat offender units that target high-frequency serious offenders A few departshyments have taken the additional step of trying to get detec~ tives to expand their case-by-case orientation to include problem solving and crime prevention In this approach a burglary detective would be as concerned with reducing burglaries through problem solving and crime prevention as she was with solving particular burglary cases

Not all contemporary alternatives to motorized patrol rapid response and criminal investigation are closely allied with community policing Those specific operational alternashytivesand those usesofthe freed-up time of patrol officers and detectives that are consistent with the philosophical and strategic foundations of community policing should be disshytinguished from those that conform to other philosophies and strategies of policing (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988)

Problem Solving Supporters of community policing are convinced that the very nature of police work must be altered from its present incident-by-incident case-by-case orientashytion to one that is more problem-oriented (Goldstein 1990) Certainly incidents must stilI be handled and cases must still be investigated Whenever possible however attention should be directed toward underlying problems and condishy

bull tions Following the medical analogy policing should adshydress causes as well as symptoms and should adopt the

epidemiological public health approach as much as the indishyvidual doctors clinical approach

This problem solving approach should be characterized by several important features (1) it should be the standard operating method of policing not an occasional special project (2) it should be practiced by personnel throughout the ranks not just by specialists or managers (3) it should be empirical in the sense that decisions are made on the basis of information that is gathered systematically (4) it should involve whenever possible collaboration between police and other agencies and institutions and (5) it should incorposhyrate whenever possible community input and participation so that it is the communitys problems that are addressed (not just the police departments) and so that the community shares in the responsibility for its own protection

The problem solving process consists of four steps (l) careful identification of the problem (2) careful analysis of the problem (3) a search for altemative solutions to the problem and (4) implementation and assessment of a reshysponse to the problem Community input can be incorporated within any or all of the steps in the process Identification analysis and assessment should rely on infornlation from multiple sources A variety of alternative solutions should be considered including but not limited to traditional enforceshyment methods Typically the most effective solutions are those that combine several different responses including some that draw on more than just the police departments authority and resources

A crucial characteristic of the problem-oriented approach is that it seeks tailored solutions to specific community probshylems Arrests and law enforcement are not abandonedshyrather an effort is made in each situation to determine which alternati ve responses best fit the problem Use of the criminal law is always considered as are civil law enforcement mediation community mobilization referral collaboration alteration of the physical environment public education and a host of other possibilities The common sense notion of choosing the tool that best fits the problem instead of simply grabbing the most convenient or familiar tool in the tool box lies close to the heart of the problem solving method

Community Engagement Participation of the community in its own protection is one of the central elements of commushynity policing (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994c) This participation can run the gamut from watching neighbors homes to reporting drug dealers to patrolling the streets It can involve participation in problem identification and probshylem solving efforts in crime prevention programs in neighshyborhood revitalization and in youth-oriented educational and recreational programs Citizens may act individually or in groups they may collaborate with the police and they may even join the police department by donating their time as police department volunteers reserves or auxiliaries

Under community policing police agencies are expected not only to cooperate with citizens and communities but to actively solicit input and participation (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994b) Theexactnature of this participation can

July 1995 5

and should vary from community to community and from situation to situation in keeping with the problem-oriented approach As a general rule though police should avoid claiming that they alone can handle crime drug or disorder problems and they should encourage individual citizens and community groups to shoulder some responsibility for dealshying with such problems

Police have sometimes found it necessary to engage in community organizing as a means of accomplishing any degree of citizen participation in problem solving or crime prevention In disorganized and transient neighborhoods residents are often so distressed fearful and suspicious of each other (or just so unfamiliar with their neighbors) that police have literally had to set about creating a sense of community where none previously existed As difficult as this kind of community organizing can be and as far from the conventional police role as this may seem these are often the very communities that most need both enhanced police protection and a greater degree of citizen involvement in crime prevention order maintenance and general watchfulshyness over public spaces

One vexing aspect of community organizing and community engagement results from the pluralistic nature of our society Differing and often conflicting interests are found in many communities and they are sometimes represented by comshypeting interest groups Thus the elders in a community may want the police to crack down on juveniles while the youths themselves complain of few opportunities for recreation or entertainment Tenants may seek police help in organizing a rent strike while landlords want police assistance in screenshying or managing the same tenants Finding common interests around which to rally entire communities or just identifying common interests on which to base police practices can be very challenging and at times impossible

It is important to recognize that this inherent feature of pluralistic communities does notarise because of community policing Police have long been caught in the middle between the interests of adults and juveniles landlords and tenants and similar groups Sometimes the law has provided a convenient reference point for handling such conflicts but just as often police have had to mediate arbitrate or just take the side of the party with the best case Moreover when the law has offered a solution it has frequently been a temporary or unpopular one and one that still resulted in the police taking sides protestations of were just enforcing the law notwithstanding

Fortunately nearly all citizens want to be safe from violence want their property protected and want some level of ordershyliness in their neighborhoods Officers can usually find enough consensus in communities upon which to base coopshyerative efforts aimed at improving safety and public order Sometimes apparently deep conflicts between individuals or groups recede when attention is focused on how best to solve specific neighborhood problems It would be naive to expect overwhelming community consensus in every situation but bull it is equally mistaken to think that conflict is so endemic that widespread community support and participation cannot be achieved in many circumstances

What Do We Know

Despite the programmatic and evaluation complexities disshycussed earlier we do have a substantial amount of informashytion from empirical studies of community policing Table I summarizes the preponderance of the evidence on the effects of community policing based 011 a review of over 60 such studies (recent reviews have also been completed by Normandeau 1993 Bennett 1994 Leighton 1994 and Skogan 1994)

TABLE L PrtpondtJWtlaquo of lbc EIIampnce oa CoounWlity Pobcina

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The first thing to note in Table 1 is that two-thirds of the 21 cells-all those in the top two rows-are labelled unshyknown Nearly all of the evaluations conducted to-date have focused on the programmatic dimension of community poshylicing (the bottom row of the table) leaving us with little or no infonnation on the effects of philosophical and strategic changes This gap in community policing research is unshydoubtedly caused by a combination of two factors (1) most community policing efforts at leas until recently have been limited programmatic and street-level initiatives rather than large-scale strategic or organizational-change initiatives and (2) evaluation of narrowly-focused programmatic initiatives is much easier and more feasible than evaluation of philoshysophical and organization-wide change

The most useful way to summarize the evidence on the effects of community policing is to scan the bottom row of Table 1

Crime

The evidence is mixed Only a few studies have used experimental designs and victimization surveys to test the effects of community policing on crime many others have relied on simple before-after comparisons of reported crime or single-item victimization questions drawn from commushynity surveys Overall a slight majority of the studies have detected crime decreases giving reason for optimism but evaluation design limitations prevent us from drawing any authoritative conclusions

Fear ofCrime

Again the evidence is mixed but it leans more heavily in the positive direction A number of studies have employed community surveys to make before-after comparisons of fear

Police Forum6

and related perceptions some with experimental designs Fear has typically been measured using a variety of survey items lending the studies more credibility The now widelyshyaccepted view that community policing helps reduce levels of fear of crime and increases perceptions of safety seems reasonably well-founded although some efforts have failed to accomplish fear reductions

Disorder

The impact of community policing on disorder minor crime incivilities and signs of crime has not been subjected to careful testing as frequently as its impact on crime and fear The available evidence suggests though that community policing and especially foot patrol and problem solving helps reduce levels of disorder lending partial support to the broken windows thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982)

CaNs for Service

Community policing might reduce calls for service in several ways problem solving might address underlying issues that generate calls collaboration might increase call referrals to other government agencies foot patrols and mini-stations might receive citizen requests directly thus heading off calls to central dispatch and workload management might find alternative responses for some types of calls Although the ability of the last approach (workload management) to reduce the volume of calls dispatched to sworn units for immediate response has clearly been demonstrated (McEwen et al 1986) the rest of the evidence on the effects of community policing on calls for service is mixed Several studies have found positive effects but several others have not

Community Relations

The vast majority of the studies ~at have looked at the impact of community policing on citizens attitudes toward the police have uncovered positive effects Clearly citizens generally appreciate mini-stations in their neighborhoods foot patrols problem-solving efforts and other forms of community policing

Police Officer Attitudes

A clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officers job satisfaction perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects Officers involved in community policing especially if they are volunteers or members of special units typically thrive on theirnew duties and responsibilities What is somewhat less certain however is (1) whether these effects will survive the long term and (2) whether these benefits are as universal when all officers are required to engage in community policing Whenever comshymunity policing is practiced only by specialists as has generally been the case until recently in most departments one condition that is nearly universal is conflict between the

bull specialists and other members of the agency frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad

Police Officer Behavior

Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that foot patrol problem solving permanent assignment mini-stations and other features ofcommunity potic ing lead to changes in some police officers behavior but these behavioral effects have only been lightly documented thus far Evidence also sugshygests that many officers resist changing their behavior out of opposition to the philosophical underpinnings of community policing doubts that community policing really works or just plain habit

Conclusion

A great deal of energy has been invested since 1980 in determining the nature of community policing and its effects These efforts have paid off to the extent that the scope and variation of community policing is much better understood today and some of its effects have been fairly well docushymented Since community policing has evolved significantly during this period however some of its elements have been more carefully evaluated than others In addition programshymatic complexity multiple effectlt variations in scope and research design limitations have hampered many of the community policing evaluations conducted thus far Nevershytheless the programmatic elements of community policing do seem to produce several beneficial outcomes for citizens and officers and have the potential to impact crime and disorder Whether the more philosophical and strategic elements of community policing will become firmly rooted and whether they will ultimately have beneficial effects is yet to be seen

Note

1 Preparation ofthis chapter was supported in part under award 94-IJ-CX-0006 from the National Institute of Justice US Department of Justice Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice

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__ 1994b Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Rural Commushynities A Program Planning Guide Washington OC author

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July 1995 7

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McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

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Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

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Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

sional-model policing The philosophical dimension inshycludes the central ideas and beliefs underlying community policing TIlree of the most important of these are described below

Broad Police Function Community policing embraces a broad view of the police function rather than a naIrow focus on crime fighting or law enforcement (Kelling and Moore 1988) Historical evidence is often cited to show that the police function was originally quite broad and varied and that it only narrowed in recent decades perhaps due to the influence of the professional model and popular media repshyresentations of police work Social science data is also frequently cited to show that police officers actually spend relatively little of their time dealing with serious offenders or investigating violent crimes

This broader view of the police function recognizes the kinds of non-enforcement tasks that police already perform and seeks to give them greater status and legitimacy These include order maintenance social service and general assisshytance duties They may also include greater responsibilities in protecting and enhancing the lives of those who are most vulnerable-juveniles the elderly minorities the poor the disabled the homeless (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990 xiv)

Citizen Input Community policing takes the view that in a free society citizens should have open access to police organizations and input to police policies and decisions Access and input through elected officials is considered necessary but not sufficient Individual neighborhoods and communities should have the opportunity to influence how they are policed and legitimate interest groups in the commushynity should be able to discuss their views and concerns directly with police officials

Mechanisms for achieving greater Citizen input are varied f Some police agencies use systematic and periodic commushyi nity surveys to elicit citizen input (Bureau of Justice Assisshyj tance 1994a) Others rely on open forums town meetings

radio and television call-in programs and similar methods i open to all residents Some police officials meet regularly with citizen advisory boards ministry alliances minority I group representatives business leaders and other formal groups These techniques have been used by police chief II

I

executives district commanders and ordinary patrolofficshyers they can be focused as widely as the entire jurisdiction or

I as narrowly as a beat or a single neighborhood

1

I

r

The techniques used to achieve citizen input should be less important than the end result Community policing emphashysizes that police departments should seek and carefully consider citizen input when making policies and decisions that affect the community Any other alternative would be unthinkable in an agency that is part of a government of the

bull I people for the people and by the people

Neighborhood Variation Community policing supports differential enforcement and tailored policing based on local norms and values An argument is made that the criminal law is a very blunt instrument and that police officers inevitably

I Police Forum2

f

exercise wide discretion when making enforcement decishysions Presently individual officers make arrest and other decisions based on a combination of legal bureaucratic and idiosyncratic criteria while the police department maintains the myth of full or at least uniform enforcement (Goldstein 1977) Under community policing officers are asked to consider the will of the community when deciding which laws to enforce under what circumstances and police execushytives are asked to tolerate and even encourage such differenshytial policing

Such differential or tailored policing primarily affects police handling of minor criminal offenses local ordinance violashytions and public disorder Some kinds of behavior proshyscribed by state and local law and some levels of noise and disorder may be seen as less bothersome in some neighborshyhoods than in others Similarly some police methods including such aggressive tactics as roadblocks and more prevention-oriented programs such as landlord training may coincide with norms and values in some neighborhoods but not others

Even the strongest advocates of community policing recogshynize that a balance must be reached between differential neighborhood-level policing and uniform juriSdiction-wide policing Some crimes are so serious and some laws are so important that localized toleration in their policing would not be acceptable Additionally many aspects of police behavior are governed by constitutional statutory and case law it would not be proper for police to act illegally or unconstitushytionally just because they had community support for such behavior Police executives also have a professional duty to run their agencies in ways that produce effective efficient and ethical police behavior this responsibility sometimes conflicts with citizens preferences and desires

Striking a healthy and satisfactory balance between competshying interests has always been one of the central concerns of policing and police administration Community policing simply argues that neighborhood-level norms and values should be added to the mix of legal professional and orgashynizational considerations that influences decision-making about policies programs and resources at the executive level as well as enforcement-level decisions on the street

The StraJegic Dimension

The strategic dimension of community policing includes the key operational concepts that translate philosophy into acshytion These strategic concepts are the links between the broad ideas and beliefs that underlie community policing and the specific programs and practices by which it is implemented

Geographic Focus Community policing strategy emphashysizes the geographic basis of asignment and responsibility by shifting the fundamental unit of patrol accountability from time of day to place That is ralher than holding patrol officers supervisors and shift commanders responsible for wide areas but only during their eight or ten hour shifts community policing seeks to establish 24-hour responsibility for smaller areas

Ofcourse no single officer works 24 hours aday seven days a week week in and week out Community policing usually deals with this limitation in one or a combination of three ways (1) community police officers assigned to neigbborshyhoods may be specialists with most call-handling relegated to a more traditional patrol unit (2) each individual patrol officer may be held responsible for long-term problem solvshying in an assigned neighborhood even though she handJes calls in a much larger area and of necessity many of the calls in the assigned area are handled by other officers or (3) small teams of officers share both call-handling and problem solvshying responsibility in a beat-sized area

A key ingredient of this geographic focus however it is implemented is permanency of assignment Community policing recommends that patrol officers be assigned to the same areas for extended periods of time to increase their familiarity with the community and the communitys familshyiarity with them Ideally this familiarity will build trust confidence and cooperation on both sides of the policeshycitizen interaction Also officers will simply become more knowledgeable about the community and its residents aiding early intervention and timely problem identification and avoiding conflict based on misperception or misunderstandshying

It is important to recognize that most police departments have long used geography as the basis for daily patrol assignment Many of these departments however assign patrol officers to different beats from one day to the next creating little continuity or permanency Moreover even in police agenshycies with fairly steady beat assignments patrol officers are only held accountable for handling their calls and maintainshying order (keeping things quiet) during their shift The citizens question Who in the police department is responshysible for my area my neighborhood can then only truthshyfully be answered the chief or in large departments the precinct commander Neither patrol officers nor the two or three levels of management above them can be held accountshyable for dealing with long-term problems in any specific locations in the entire community Thus a crucial component of community policing strategy is to create some degree of geographic accountability at all levels in the police organizashytion but particularly at the level of the patrol officer who delivers basic police services and is in a position to identify and solve neighborhood problems

Prevention Focus Community policing strategy also emshyphasizes a more proactive and preventive orientation in contrast to the reactive focus that has characterized much of policing under the professional model This proactive preshyventive orientation takes several forms One is simply to encourage better use of police officers time In many police departments patrol officers time not committed to handling calls is either spent simply waiting for the next call or randomly driving around Under community policing this substantial resource of free patrol time is devoted to directed enforcement activities specific crime prevention efforts problem solving community engagement citizen interacshytion or similar kinds of activities

Another aspect of the preventive focus overlaps with the

substantive focus of community policing and with problemshyoriented operations Officers are encouraged to look beyond the individual incidents that they encounter as calls for service and reported crimes in order to discover underlying problems and conditions (Eck and Spelman 1987) If they can discover such underlying conditions and do something to improve them officers can prevent the future recurrence of incidents and calls While immediate response to in-progress emergencies and after-the-fact investigation of crimes will always remain important functions of policing community policing seeks to elevate before-the-fact prevention and problem-solving to comparable status

Closely related to this line of thinking but deserving of specific mention is the desire to enhance the status of crime prevention within police organizations Most police departshyments devote the vast majority of lheirpersonnel to patrol and investigations primarily for the purposes of rapid response and follow-up investigation after something has happened Granted some prevention of crime through the visibility omnipresence and deterrence created by patrolling rapid response and investigating is expected but the weight of research over the past two decades has greatly diminished these expectations (Kelling Pate Dieckman and Brown 1974 Greenwood and Petersilia 1975 Spelman and Brown 1982) Despite these lowered expectations however police departments still typically devote only a few officers specifishycally to crime prevention programming and do lillie to encourage patrol officers to engage in any kinds of crime prevention activity beyond routine riding around

Moreover within both informal and formal police cultures crime solving and criminal apprehension are usually more highly valued than crime prevention An individual officer is more likely to be commended for arresting a bank robber than for initiating actions that prevent such robberies Detectives usually enjoy higher status than uniformed officers (espeshycially in the eyes of the public) whereas within many police agencies crime prevention officers are seen as public relashytions functionaries kiddie cops or worse To many police officers crime prevention work is simply not real police work

The preeminence ofreactive crime fighting within police and popular cultures is understandable given the dramatic nature of emergencies crimes and investigations Much of police work is about responding to trouble and fixing it about the contest between good and evil Responding to emergencies and fighting crime have heroic elements that naturally appeal to both police officers and citizens Given the choice though almost all citizens would prefer not being victimized in the nrst place to being dramatically rescued to having the police successfully track down their assailant or to having the police recover their stolen property Most citizens would agree that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure This is not to suggest that police should turn their backs on reactive handling of crimes and emergencies but only that before-the-fact prevention should be given greater considershyation

A final element of community policings preventive focus takes more ofa social welfare orientation parlicularly toward

July 1995 3

I f

I

j juveniles An argument is made that police officers by1 serving as mentors and role models and by providing educashytional recreational and even counseling services can affect peoples behavior in positive ways that ultimately lead to reductions in crime and disorder In essence police are asked to support and augment the efforts of families churches bull schools and other social service agencies This kind of police i

~ activity is seen as particularly necessary by some in order to offset the deficiencies and correct the failures of these other I social institutions in modem America

f J Substantive Focus The third key element of community l policing strategy is a more careful and deliberate focus on

substantive problems in the community (Goldstein 1990) This substantive focus stands in contrast to three interrelated tendencies of professional model policing (1) a tendency to regard law enforcement as the end of policing rather than as one of several means available to police officers (2) a tendency to focus more attention on the process of policing than on substantive problems and outcomes and (3) a tenshydency to focus more attention on administrative issues within police organizations than on substantive problems in the community

Confusion in modem policing over the role of law enforceshyment reflects a common organizational pathology called goal displacement by which over time favored methods come to be seen as ends in themselves To overcome this confusion community policing emphasizes that in our society the law is but a means to the greater ends of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness The particular ends of policing tie in to these societal goals and relate to the protection oflife and property the maintenance of public order and the protection of indishyvidual rights One of the primary tools given to police for accomplishing these ends is the law and its enforcementshyuse of this tool has no great value in its own right however except as it contributes to protection of life and property maintenance of order and protection of rights

This distinction between means and ends has very significant practical implications It reminds us for example that the best policedepartrnentisnol necessarily the one that enforces the law the most but rather the one that provides the best protection and order Similarly the best officers are not necessarily those who make the most arrests and issue the most tickets but rather the ones who are most successful in controlling crime maintaining order and improving traffic safety in their assigned areas

The distinction between means and ends also directs attenshytion to the other means besides law enforcement that are available to police officers The simple recognition that law enforcement is but one of several methods available to police officers then leads to the realization that effectiveness in policing requires choosing in each instance that method which maximizes attainment of police goals and objectives and adherence to important police values This conception of policing not simply as law enforcement but rather as decision making has important implications for the selection training

bull supervision and evaluation of police officers

Thinking of policing as involving choosing the most effecshy

live method for handling a situation or solving a problem also points out the need to focus greater attention on substance rather than process That is the body of policing knowledge that has been most highly developed and transmitted through formal education and training emphasizes the processes of call handling reporting mediating enforcing and investishygating and largely ignores both information about substanshytive problems (cg domestic violence drug abuse fear of crime) and information about what works best in handling such problems To be effective decision makers however police officers need information about substantive problems and about what works as well as skills to assist them in diagnosing and analyzing situations and selecting the most appropriate responses

Police administrators similarly need to shift the focus of their attention Under the professional model the preeminent concern of police executives was seen as overseeing the efficient operation of the police department Attention was directed inward toward the workings of the police organizashytion itself As a consequence of this focus police manageshyment training and education came to be dominated by considshyeration of the processes of administration with near total disregard for either the work performed by police officers or the substantive problems that police departments are exshypected to address Without denigrating the importance of efficient administration community policing emphasizes that the primary focus of police executives should be on the accomplishment of the police mission This requires that police executives spend more time looking outward toward the substantive problems in the community and that they worry as much about effectiveness as about efficiency

The Programmatic Dimension

The programmatic dimension of community policing ultishymately translates ideas philosophies and strategies into concrete programs tactics and behaviors Even those who insist that community policing is a philosophy not a proshygram must concede that unless comm unity policing eventushyally leads to some action Some new or different behavior it is all rhetoric and no reality (Greene and Mastrofski 1988) Indeed many commentators have taken the view that comshymunity policing is little more than a new police marketing strategy that has left the core elements of the police role untouched (see eg Klockars 1988 Manning 1988 Weatheritt 1988)

Reoriented Police Operations An essential programmatic feature of community policing is a reorientation of police operations that entails less reliance on random motorized patrol immediate response to all calls for service and followshyup investigations by detectives Studies over the past two decades have convincingly demonstrated the limitations of these traditional police practices and have suggested some promising alternatives

Many police departments today have increased their use of foot patrol directed patrol door-to-door policing and other alternatives to traditional motorized patrol (Cordner and Trojanowicz 1992) Generally these alternatives seek more targeted tactical effectiveness more attention to minor of-

Police Forum4

fenses and incivilities a greater feIt presence of police andor more police-citizen contact Other police departments have simply reduced their commitment to any form of conshytinuous patrolling preferring instead to have their patrol officers engage in problem solving crime prevention and similar activities when not handling calls and emergencies

Many police agencies have also adopted differential reshysponses to calls for service (McEwen Connors and Cohen 1986) Rather than attempting to immediately dispatch a sworn officer in response to each and every notification of a crime disturbance or other situation these departments vary their responses depending upon the circumstances Some crime reports may be taken over the telephone some service requests may be referred to other government agencies and some sworn officer responses may be delayed A particularly interesting alternative is to ask complainants to go in person to a nearby police mini-station or storefront office where an officer a civilian employee or even avolunteer takes a report or provides other in-person assistance Use of differential responses helps departments cope with the sometimes overshywhelming burden of 9-1-1 calls and frees up patrol officer time for other acti vities such as patrolling problem solving and crime prevention

Traditional criminal investigation has also been reexamined in recent years (Eck 1992) Some departments have deshyspecialized the activity reducing the size of the detective unit and making patrol officers more responsible for follOW-Up investigations Many have also eliminated the practice of conducting an extensive follow-up investigation of every reported crime focusing instead on the more serious offenses and on more solvable cases Investigative attention has also been expanded to include a focus on offenders as well as on offenses especially in the form of repeat offender units that target high-frequency serious offenders A few departshyments have taken the additional step of trying to get detec~ tives to expand their case-by-case orientation to include problem solving and crime prevention In this approach a burglary detective would be as concerned with reducing burglaries through problem solving and crime prevention as she was with solving particular burglary cases

Not all contemporary alternatives to motorized patrol rapid response and criminal investigation are closely allied with community policing Those specific operational alternashytivesand those usesofthe freed-up time of patrol officers and detectives that are consistent with the philosophical and strategic foundations of community policing should be disshytinguished from those that conform to other philosophies and strategies of policing (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988)

Problem Solving Supporters of community policing are convinced that the very nature of police work must be altered from its present incident-by-incident case-by-case orientashytion to one that is more problem-oriented (Goldstein 1990) Certainly incidents must stilI be handled and cases must still be investigated Whenever possible however attention should be directed toward underlying problems and condishy

bull tions Following the medical analogy policing should adshydress causes as well as symptoms and should adopt the

epidemiological public health approach as much as the indishyvidual doctors clinical approach

This problem solving approach should be characterized by several important features (1) it should be the standard operating method of policing not an occasional special project (2) it should be practiced by personnel throughout the ranks not just by specialists or managers (3) it should be empirical in the sense that decisions are made on the basis of information that is gathered systematically (4) it should involve whenever possible collaboration between police and other agencies and institutions and (5) it should incorposhyrate whenever possible community input and participation so that it is the communitys problems that are addressed (not just the police departments) and so that the community shares in the responsibility for its own protection

The problem solving process consists of four steps (l) careful identification of the problem (2) careful analysis of the problem (3) a search for altemative solutions to the problem and (4) implementation and assessment of a reshysponse to the problem Community input can be incorporated within any or all of the steps in the process Identification analysis and assessment should rely on infornlation from multiple sources A variety of alternative solutions should be considered including but not limited to traditional enforceshyment methods Typically the most effective solutions are those that combine several different responses including some that draw on more than just the police departments authority and resources

A crucial characteristic of the problem-oriented approach is that it seeks tailored solutions to specific community probshylems Arrests and law enforcement are not abandonedshyrather an effort is made in each situation to determine which alternati ve responses best fit the problem Use of the criminal law is always considered as are civil law enforcement mediation community mobilization referral collaboration alteration of the physical environment public education and a host of other possibilities The common sense notion of choosing the tool that best fits the problem instead of simply grabbing the most convenient or familiar tool in the tool box lies close to the heart of the problem solving method

Community Engagement Participation of the community in its own protection is one of the central elements of commushynity policing (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994c) This participation can run the gamut from watching neighbors homes to reporting drug dealers to patrolling the streets It can involve participation in problem identification and probshylem solving efforts in crime prevention programs in neighshyborhood revitalization and in youth-oriented educational and recreational programs Citizens may act individually or in groups they may collaborate with the police and they may even join the police department by donating their time as police department volunteers reserves or auxiliaries

Under community policing police agencies are expected not only to cooperate with citizens and communities but to actively solicit input and participation (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994b) Theexactnature of this participation can

July 1995 5

and should vary from community to community and from situation to situation in keeping with the problem-oriented approach As a general rule though police should avoid claiming that they alone can handle crime drug or disorder problems and they should encourage individual citizens and community groups to shoulder some responsibility for dealshying with such problems

Police have sometimes found it necessary to engage in community organizing as a means of accomplishing any degree of citizen participation in problem solving or crime prevention In disorganized and transient neighborhoods residents are often so distressed fearful and suspicious of each other (or just so unfamiliar with their neighbors) that police have literally had to set about creating a sense of community where none previously existed As difficult as this kind of community organizing can be and as far from the conventional police role as this may seem these are often the very communities that most need both enhanced police protection and a greater degree of citizen involvement in crime prevention order maintenance and general watchfulshyness over public spaces

One vexing aspect of community organizing and community engagement results from the pluralistic nature of our society Differing and often conflicting interests are found in many communities and they are sometimes represented by comshypeting interest groups Thus the elders in a community may want the police to crack down on juveniles while the youths themselves complain of few opportunities for recreation or entertainment Tenants may seek police help in organizing a rent strike while landlords want police assistance in screenshying or managing the same tenants Finding common interests around which to rally entire communities or just identifying common interests on which to base police practices can be very challenging and at times impossible

It is important to recognize that this inherent feature of pluralistic communities does notarise because of community policing Police have long been caught in the middle between the interests of adults and juveniles landlords and tenants and similar groups Sometimes the law has provided a convenient reference point for handling such conflicts but just as often police have had to mediate arbitrate or just take the side of the party with the best case Moreover when the law has offered a solution it has frequently been a temporary or unpopular one and one that still resulted in the police taking sides protestations of were just enforcing the law notwithstanding

Fortunately nearly all citizens want to be safe from violence want their property protected and want some level of ordershyliness in their neighborhoods Officers can usually find enough consensus in communities upon which to base coopshyerative efforts aimed at improving safety and public order Sometimes apparently deep conflicts between individuals or groups recede when attention is focused on how best to solve specific neighborhood problems It would be naive to expect overwhelming community consensus in every situation but bull it is equally mistaken to think that conflict is so endemic that widespread community support and participation cannot be achieved in many circumstances

What Do We Know

Despite the programmatic and evaluation complexities disshycussed earlier we do have a substantial amount of informashytion from empirical studies of community policing Table I summarizes the preponderance of the evidence on the effects of community policing based 011 a review of over 60 such studies (recent reviews have also been completed by Normandeau 1993 Bennett 1994 Leighton 1994 and Skogan 1994)

TABLE L PrtpondtJWtlaquo of lbc EIIampnce oa CoounWlity Pobcina

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umd POS bull poWw df ~fd effedI) NHi MJ~ dffldl MIX tnWIoddJlaquolJ UNK ~ (compklCly CIt ~hatly utUskd)

The first thing to note in Table 1 is that two-thirds of the 21 cells-all those in the top two rows-are labelled unshyknown Nearly all of the evaluations conducted to-date have focused on the programmatic dimension of community poshylicing (the bottom row of the table) leaving us with little or no infonnation on the effects of philosophical and strategic changes This gap in community policing research is unshydoubtedly caused by a combination of two factors (1) most community policing efforts at leas until recently have been limited programmatic and street-level initiatives rather than large-scale strategic or organizational-change initiatives and (2) evaluation of narrowly-focused programmatic initiatives is much easier and more feasible than evaluation of philoshysophical and organization-wide change

The most useful way to summarize the evidence on the effects of community policing is to scan the bottom row of Table 1

Crime

The evidence is mixed Only a few studies have used experimental designs and victimization surveys to test the effects of community policing on crime many others have relied on simple before-after comparisons of reported crime or single-item victimization questions drawn from commushynity surveys Overall a slight majority of the studies have detected crime decreases giving reason for optimism but evaluation design limitations prevent us from drawing any authoritative conclusions

Fear ofCrime

Again the evidence is mixed but it leans more heavily in the positive direction A number of studies have employed community surveys to make before-after comparisons of fear

Police Forum6

and related perceptions some with experimental designs Fear has typically been measured using a variety of survey items lending the studies more credibility The now widelyshyaccepted view that community policing helps reduce levels of fear of crime and increases perceptions of safety seems reasonably well-founded although some efforts have failed to accomplish fear reductions

Disorder

The impact of community policing on disorder minor crime incivilities and signs of crime has not been subjected to careful testing as frequently as its impact on crime and fear The available evidence suggests though that community policing and especially foot patrol and problem solving helps reduce levels of disorder lending partial support to the broken windows thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982)

CaNs for Service

Community policing might reduce calls for service in several ways problem solving might address underlying issues that generate calls collaboration might increase call referrals to other government agencies foot patrols and mini-stations might receive citizen requests directly thus heading off calls to central dispatch and workload management might find alternative responses for some types of calls Although the ability of the last approach (workload management) to reduce the volume of calls dispatched to sworn units for immediate response has clearly been demonstrated (McEwen et al 1986) the rest of the evidence on the effects of community policing on calls for service is mixed Several studies have found positive effects but several others have not

Community Relations

The vast majority of the studies ~at have looked at the impact of community policing on citizens attitudes toward the police have uncovered positive effects Clearly citizens generally appreciate mini-stations in their neighborhoods foot patrols problem-solving efforts and other forms of community policing

Police Officer Attitudes

A clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officers job satisfaction perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects Officers involved in community policing especially if they are volunteers or members of special units typically thrive on theirnew duties and responsibilities What is somewhat less certain however is (1) whether these effects will survive the long term and (2) whether these benefits are as universal when all officers are required to engage in community policing Whenever comshymunity policing is practiced only by specialists as has generally been the case until recently in most departments one condition that is nearly universal is conflict between the

bull specialists and other members of the agency frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad

Police Officer Behavior

Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that foot patrol problem solving permanent assignment mini-stations and other features ofcommunity potic ing lead to changes in some police officers behavior but these behavioral effects have only been lightly documented thus far Evidence also sugshygests that many officers resist changing their behavior out of opposition to the philosophical underpinnings of community policing doubts that community policing really works or just plain habit

Conclusion

A great deal of energy has been invested since 1980 in determining the nature of community policing and its effects These efforts have paid off to the extent that the scope and variation of community policing is much better understood today and some of its effects have been fairly well docushymented Since community policing has evolved significantly during this period however some of its elements have been more carefully evaluated than others In addition programshymatic complexity multiple effectlt variations in scope and research design limitations have hampered many of the community policing evaluations conducted thus far Nevershytheless the programmatic elements of community policing do seem to produce several beneficial outcomes for citizens and officers and have the potential to impact crime and disorder Whether the more philosophical and strategic elements of community policing will become firmly rooted and whether they will ultimately have beneficial effects is yet to be seen

Note

1 Preparation ofthis chapter was supported in part under award 94-IJ-CX-0006 from the National Institute of Justice US Department of Justice Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice

References

Bennett Trevor 1994 Community Policing on the Ground Deshyvelopments in Britain In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testing the Promises Thoushysand Oaks CA Sage pp 224-246

Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994a A Police Guide t() Surveying Citizens and Their Environment Washington OC author

__ 1994b Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Rural Commushynities A Program Planning Guide Washington OC author

__ 1994c Understanding Community Policing A Framework for Action Washington OC author

Cordner Gary W and Robert C Trojanowicz 1992 Patrol in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Poicing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinshynati OH Anderson pp 3-18

Eck John E 1992 Criminal Investigation in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Policing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinnati OH Anderson pp 19-34

July 1995 7

and William Spelman 1987 Problem Solving ProblemshyOriented Policing in Newport News Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Goldstein Hennan 1977 Policing A Free Society Cambridge MA Ballinger

__ 1987 Toward Community-Oriented Policing Potential Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions Crime amp Deshylinquency 25 236-258

__ 1990 Problem-Oriented Policing New York McGrawshyHill

Greene Jack R and Stephen D Mastrofski eds 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger

Greenwood Peter W and Joan Pelersilia 1975 The Criminal InvestigaJion Process Volume I Summary and Implications Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation

Kelling George L Tony Pate Duane Dieckman and Charles E Brown 1974 The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment A Summary Report Washington DC Police Foundation

Kelling George L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy ofPolicing Perspectives on Policing No4 Washingshyton DC National Institute of Justice

Klockars Carl B 1988_ The Rhetoric ofCommunity Policing In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 239-258

Leighton Barry N 1994 Community Policing in Canada An Overview of Experience and Evaluations In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 209-223

Manning Peter K 1988 Community Policing as a Drama of Control In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski cds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp2746

McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

Moore Mark H and Robert C Trojanowicz 1988 Corporate Strategies for Policing Perspectives on Policing No6 Washshyington DC National Institute of Justice

Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

Ofcourse no single officer works 24 hours aday seven days a week week in and week out Community policing usually deals with this limitation in one or a combination of three ways (1) community police officers assigned to neigbborshyhoods may be specialists with most call-handling relegated to a more traditional patrol unit (2) each individual patrol officer may be held responsible for long-term problem solvshying in an assigned neighborhood even though she handJes calls in a much larger area and of necessity many of the calls in the assigned area are handled by other officers or (3) small teams of officers share both call-handling and problem solvshying responsibility in a beat-sized area

A key ingredient of this geographic focus however it is implemented is permanency of assignment Community policing recommends that patrol officers be assigned to the same areas for extended periods of time to increase their familiarity with the community and the communitys familshyiarity with them Ideally this familiarity will build trust confidence and cooperation on both sides of the policeshycitizen interaction Also officers will simply become more knowledgeable about the community and its residents aiding early intervention and timely problem identification and avoiding conflict based on misperception or misunderstandshying

It is important to recognize that most police departments have long used geography as the basis for daily patrol assignment Many of these departments however assign patrol officers to different beats from one day to the next creating little continuity or permanency Moreover even in police agenshycies with fairly steady beat assignments patrol officers are only held accountable for handling their calls and maintainshying order (keeping things quiet) during their shift The citizens question Who in the police department is responshysible for my area my neighborhood can then only truthshyfully be answered the chief or in large departments the precinct commander Neither patrol officers nor the two or three levels of management above them can be held accountshyable for dealing with long-term problems in any specific locations in the entire community Thus a crucial component of community policing strategy is to create some degree of geographic accountability at all levels in the police organizashytion but particularly at the level of the patrol officer who delivers basic police services and is in a position to identify and solve neighborhood problems

Prevention Focus Community policing strategy also emshyphasizes a more proactive and preventive orientation in contrast to the reactive focus that has characterized much of policing under the professional model This proactive preshyventive orientation takes several forms One is simply to encourage better use of police officers time In many police departments patrol officers time not committed to handling calls is either spent simply waiting for the next call or randomly driving around Under community policing this substantial resource of free patrol time is devoted to directed enforcement activities specific crime prevention efforts problem solving community engagement citizen interacshytion or similar kinds of activities

Another aspect of the preventive focus overlaps with the

substantive focus of community policing and with problemshyoriented operations Officers are encouraged to look beyond the individual incidents that they encounter as calls for service and reported crimes in order to discover underlying problems and conditions (Eck and Spelman 1987) If they can discover such underlying conditions and do something to improve them officers can prevent the future recurrence of incidents and calls While immediate response to in-progress emergencies and after-the-fact investigation of crimes will always remain important functions of policing community policing seeks to elevate before-the-fact prevention and problem-solving to comparable status

Closely related to this line of thinking but deserving of specific mention is the desire to enhance the status of crime prevention within police organizations Most police departshyments devote the vast majority of lheirpersonnel to patrol and investigations primarily for the purposes of rapid response and follow-up investigation after something has happened Granted some prevention of crime through the visibility omnipresence and deterrence created by patrolling rapid response and investigating is expected but the weight of research over the past two decades has greatly diminished these expectations (Kelling Pate Dieckman and Brown 1974 Greenwood and Petersilia 1975 Spelman and Brown 1982) Despite these lowered expectations however police departments still typically devote only a few officers specifishycally to crime prevention programming and do lillie to encourage patrol officers to engage in any kinds of crime prevention activity beyond routine riding around

Moreover within both informal and formal police cultures crime solving and criminal apprehension are usually more highly valued than crime prevention An individual officer is more likely to be commended for arresting a bank robber than for initiating actions that prevent such robberies Detectives usually enjoy higher status than uniformed officers (espeshycially in the eyes of the public) whereas within many police agencies crime prevention officers are seen as public relashytions functionaries kiddie cops or worse To many police officers crime prevention work is simply not real police work

The preeminence ofreactive crime fighting within police and popular cultures is understandable given the dramatic nature of emergencies crimes and investigations Much of police work is about responding to trouble and fixing it about the contest between good and evil Responding to emergencies and fighting crime have heroic elements that naturally appeal to both police officers and citizens Given the choice though almost all citizens would prefer not being victimized in the nrst place to being dramatically rescued to having the police successfully track down their assailant or to having the police recover their stolen property Most citizens would agree that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure This is not to suggest that police should turn their backs on reactive handling of crimes and emergencies but only that before-the-fact prevention should be given greater considershyation

A final element of community policings preventive focus takes more ofa social welfare orientation parlicularly toward

July 1995 3

I f

I

j juveniles An argument is made that police officers by1 serving as mentors and role models and by providing educashytional recreational and even counseling services can affect peoples behavior in positive ways that ultimately lead to reductions in crime and disorder In essence police are asked to support and augment the efforts of families churches bull schools and other social service agencies This kind of police i

~ activity is seen as particularly necessary by some in order to offset the deficiencies and correct the failures of these other I social institutions in modem America

f J Substantive Focus The third key element of community l policing strategy is a more careful and deliberate focus on

substantive problems in the community (Goldstein 1990) This substantive focus stands in contrast to three interrelated tendencies of professional model policing (1) a tendency to regard law enforcement as the end of policing rather than as one of several means available to police officers (2) a tendency to focus more attention on the process of policing than on substantive problems and outcomes and (3) a tenshydency to focus more attention on administrative issues within police organizations than on substantive problems in the community

Confusion in modem policing over the role of law enforceshyment reflects a common organizational pathology called goal displacement by which over time favored methods come to be seen as ends in themselves To overcome this confusion community policing emphasizes that in our society the law is but a means to the greater ends of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness The particular ends of policing tie in to these societal goals and relate to the protection oflife and property the maintenance of public order and the protection of indishyvidual rights One of the primary tools given to police for accomplishing these ends is the law and its enforcementshyuse of this tool has no great value in its own right however except as it contributes to protection of life and property maintenance of order and protection of rights

This distinction between means and ends has very significant practical implications It reminds us for example that the best policedepartrnentisnol necessarily the one that enforces the law the most but rather the one that provides the best protection and order Similarly the best officers are not necessarily those who make the most arrests and issue the most tickets but rather the ones who are most successful in controlling crime maintaining order and improving traffic safety in their assigned areas

The distinction between means and ends also directs attenshytion to the other means besides law enforcement that are available to police officers The simple recognition that law enforcement is but one of several methods available to police officers then leads to the realization that effectiveness in policing requires choosing in each instance that method which maximizes attainment of police goals and objectives and adherence to important police values This conception of policing not simply as law enforcement but rather as decision making has important implications for the selection training

bull supervision and evaluation of police officers

Thinking of policing as involving choosing the most effecshy

live method for handling a situation or solving a problem also points out the need to focus greater attention on substance rather than process That is the body of policing knowledge that has been most highly developed and transmitted through formal education and training emphasizes the processes of call handling reporting mediating enforcing and investishygating and largely ignores both information about substanshytive problems (cg domestic violence drug abuse fear of crime) and information about what works best in handling such problems To be effective decision makers however police officers need information about substantive problems and about what works as well as skills to assist them in diagnosing and analyzing situations and selecting the most appropriate responses

Police administrators similarly need to shift the focus of their attention Under the professional model the preeminent concern of police executives was seen as overseeing the efficient operation of the police department Attention was directed inward toward the workings of the police organizashytion itself As a consequence of this focus police manageshyment training and education came to be dominated by considshyeration of the processes of administration with near total disregard for either the work performed by police officers or the substantive problems that police departments are exshypected to address Without denigrating the importance of efficient administration community policing emphasizes that the primary focus of police executives should be on the accomplishment of the police mission This requires that police executives spend more time looking outward toward the substantive problems in the community and that they worry as much about effectiveness as about efficiency

The Programmatic Dimension

The programmatic dimension of community policing ultishymately translates ideas philosophies and strategies into concrete programs tactics and behaviors Even those who insist that community policing is a philosophy not a proshygram must concede that unless comm unity policing eventushyally leads to some action Some new or different behavior it is all rhetoric and no reality (Greene and Mastrofski 1988) Indeed many commentators have taken the view that comshymunity policing is little more than a new police marketing strategy that has left the core elements of the police role untouched (see eg Klockars 1988 Manning 1988 Weatheritt 1988)

Reoriented Police Operations An essential programmatic feature of community policing is a reorientation of police operations that entails less reliance on random motorized patrol immediate response to all calls for service and followshyup investigations by detectives Studies over the past two decades have convincingly demonstrated the limitations of these traditional police practices and have suggested some promising alternatives

Many police departments today have increased their use of foot patrol directed patrol door-to-door policing and other alternatives to traditional motorized patrol (Cordner and Trojanowicz 1992) Generally these alternatives seek more targeted tactical effectiveness more attention to minor of-

Police Forum4

fenses and incivilities a greater feIt presence of police andor more police-citizen contact Other police departments have simply reduced their commitment to any form of conshytinuous patrolling preferring instead to have their patrol officers engage in problem solving crime prevention and similar activities when not handling calls and emergencies

Many police agencies have also adopted differential reshysponses to calls for service (McEwen Connors and Cohen 1986) Rather than attempting to immediately dispatch a sworn officer in response to each and every notification of a crime disturbance or other situation these departments vary their responses depending upon the circumstances Some crime reports may be taken over the telephone some service requests may be referred to other government agencies and some sworn officer responses may be delayed A particularly interesting alternative is to ask complainants to go in person to a nearby police mini-station or storefront office where an officer a civilian employee or even avolunteer takes a report or provides other in-person assistance Use of differential responses helps departments cope with the sometimes overshywhelming burden of 9-1-1 calls and frees up patrol officer time for other acti vities such as patrolling problem solving and crime prevention

Traditional criminal investigation has also been reexamined in recent years (Eck 1992) Some departments have deshyspecialized the activity reducing the size of the detective unit and making patrol officers more responsible for follOW-Up investigations Many have also eliminated the practice of conducting an extensive follow-up investigation of every reported crime focusing instead on the more serious offenses and on more solvable cases Investigative attention has also been expanded to include a focus on offenders as well as on offenses especially in the form of repeat offender units that target high-frequency serious offenders A few departshyments have taken the additional step of trying to get detec~ tives to expand their case-by-case orientation to include problem solving and crime prevention In this approach a burglary detective would be as concerned with reducing burglaries through problem solving and crime prevention as she was with solving particular burglary cases

Not all contemporary alternatives to motorized patrol rapid response and criminal investigation are closely allied with community policing Those specific operational alternashytivesand those usesofthe freed-up time of patrol officers and detectives that are consistent with the philosophical and strategic foundations of community policing should be disshytinguished from those that conform to other philosophies and strategies of policing (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988)

Problem Solving Supporters of community policing are convinced that the very nature of police work must be altered from its present incident-by-incident case-by-case orientashytion to one that is more problem-oriented (Goldstein 1990) Certainly incidents must stilI be handled and cases must still be investigated Whenever possible however attention should be directed toward underlying problems and condishy

bull tions Following the medical analogy policing should adshydress causes as well as symptoms and should adopt the

epidemiological public health approach as much as the indishyvidual doctors clinical approach

This problem solving approach should be characterized by several important features (1) it should be the standard operating method of policing not an occasional special project (2) it should be practiced by personnel throughout the ranks not just by specialists or managers (3) it should be empirical in the sense that decisions are made on the basis of information that is gathered systematically (4) it should involve whenever possible collaboration between police and other agencies and institutions and (5) it should incorposhyrate whenever possible community input and participation so that it is the communitys problems that are addressed (not just the police departments) and so that the community shares in the responsibility for its own protection

The problem solving process consists of four steps (l) careful identification of the problem (2) careful analysis of the problem (3) a search for altemative solutions to the problem and (4) implementation and assessment of a reshysponse to the problem Community input can be incorporated within any or all of the steps in the process Identification analysis and assessment should rely on infornlation from multiple sources A variety of alternative solutions should be considered including but not limited to traditional enforceshyment methods Typically the most effective solutions are those that combine several different responses including some that draw on more than just the police departments authority and resources

A crucial characteristic of the problem-oriented approach is that it seeks tailored solutions to specific community probshylems Arrests and law enforcement are not abandonedshyrather an effort is made in each situation to determine which alternati ve responses best fit the problem Use of the criminal law is always considered as are civil law enforcement mediation community mobilization referral collaboration alteration of the physical environment public education and a host of other possibilities The common sense notion of choosing the tool that best fits the problem instead of simply grabbing the most convenient or familiar tool in the tool box lies close to the heart of the problem solving method

Community Engagement Participation of the community in its own protection is one of the central elements of commushynity policing (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994c) This participation can run the gamut from watching neighbors homes to reporting drug dealers to patrolling the streets It can involve participation in problem identification and probshylem solving efforts in crime prevention programs in neighshyborhood revitalization and in youth-oriented educational and recreational programs Citizens may act individually or in groups they may collaborate with the police and they may even join the police department by donating their time as police department volunteers reserves or auxiliaries

Under community policing police agencies are expected not only to cooperate with citizens and communities but to actively solicit input and participation (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994b) Theexactnature of this participation can

July 1995 5

and should vary from community to community and from situation to situation in keeping with the problem-oriented approach As a general rule though police should avoid claiming that they alone can handle crime drug or disorder problems and they should encourage individual citizens and community groups to shoulder some responsibility for dealshying with such problems

Police have sometimes found it necessary to engage in community organizing as a means of accomplishing any degree of citizen participation in problem solving or crime prevention In disorganized and transient neighborhoods residents are often so distressed fearful and suspicious of each other (or just so unfamiliar with their neighbors) that police have literally had to set about creating a sense of community where none previously existed As difficult as this kind of community organizing can be and as far from the conventional police role as this may seem these are often the very communities that most need both enhanced police protection and a greater degree of citizen involvement in crime prevention order maintenance and general watchfulshyness over public spaces

One vexing aspect of community organizing and community engagement results from the pluralistic nature of our society Differing and often conflicting interests are found in many communities and they are sometimes represented by comshypeting interest groups Thus the elders in a community may want the police to crack down on juveniles while the youths themselves complain of few opportunities for recreation or entertainment Tenants may seek police help in organizing a rent strike while landlords want police assistance in screenshying or managing the same tenants Finding common interests around which to rally entire communities or just identifying common interests on which to base police practices can be very challenging and at times impossible

It is important to recognize that this inherent feature of pluralistic communities does notarise because of community policing Police have long been caught in the middle between the interests of adults and juveniles landlords and tenants and similar groups Sometimes the law has provided a convenient reference point for handling such conflicts but just as often police have had to mediate arbitrate or just take the side of the party with the best case Moreover when the law has offered a solution it has frequently been a temporary or unpopular one and one that still resulted in the police taking sides protestations of were just enforcing the law notwithstanding

Fortunately nearly all citizens want to be safe from violence want their property protected and want some level of ordershyliness in their neighborhoods Officers can usually find enough consensus in communities upon which to base coopshyerative efforts aimed at improving safety and public order Sometimes apparently deep conflicts between individuals or groups recede when attention is focused on how best to solve specific neighborhood problems It would be naive to expect overwhelming community consensus in every situation but bull it is equally mistaken to think that conflict is so endemic that widespread community support and participation cannot be achieved in many circumstances

What Do We Know

Despite the programmatic and evaluation complexities disshycussed earlier we do have a substantial amount of informashytion from empirical studies of community policing Table I summarizes the preponderance of the evidence on the effects of community policing based 011 a review of over 60 such studies (recent reviews have also been completed by Normandeau 1993 Bennett 1994 Leighton 1994 and Skogan 1994)

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The first thing to note in Table 1 is that two-thirds of the 21 cells-all those in the top two rows-are labelled unshyknown Nearly all of the evaluations conducted to-date have focused on the programmatic dimension of community poshylicing (the bottom row of the table) leaving us with little or no infonnation on the effects of philosophical and strategic changes This gap in community policing research is unshydoubtedly caused by a combination of two factors (1) most community policing efforts at leas until recently have been limited programmatic and street-level initiatives rather than large-scale strategic or organizational-change initiatives and (2) evaluation of narrowly-focused programmatic initiatives is much easier and more feasible than evaluation of philoshysophical and organization-wide change

The most useful way to summarize the evidence on the effects of community policing is to scan the bottom row of Table 1

Crime

The evidence is mixed Only a few studies have used experimental designs and victimization surveys to test the effects of community policing on crime many others have relied on simple before-after comparisons of reported crime or single-item victimization questions drawn from commushynity surveys Overall a slight majority of the studies have detected crime decreases giving reason for optimism but evaluation design limitations prevent us from drawing any authoritative conclusions

Fear ofCrime

Again the evidence is mixed but it leans more heavily in the positive direction A number of studies have employed community surveys to make before-after comparisons of fear

Police Forum6

and related perceptions some with experimental designs Fear has typically been measured using a variety of survey items lending the studies more credibility The now widelyshyaccepted view that community policing helps reduce levels of fear of crime and increases perceptions of safety seems reasonably well-founded although some efforts have failed to accomplish fear reductions

Disorder

The impact of community policing on disorder minor crime incivilities and signs of crime has not been subjected to careful testing as frequently as its impact on crime and fear The available evidence suggests though that community policing and especially foot patrol and problem solving helps reduce levels of disorder lending partial support to the broken windows thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982)

CaNs for Service

Community policing might reduce calls for service in several ways problem solving might address underlying issues that generate calls collaboration might increase call referrals to other government agencies foot patrols and mini-stations might receive citizen requests directly thus heading off calls to central dispatch and workload management might find alternative responses for some types of calls Although the ability of the last approach (workload management) to reduce the volume of calls dispatched to sworn units for immediate response has clearly been demonstrated (McEwen et al 1986) the rest of the evidence on the effects of community policing on calls for service is mixed Several studies have found positive effects but several others have not

Community Relations

The vast majority of the studies ~at have looked at the impact of community policing on citizens attitudes toward the police have uncovered positive effects Clearly citizens generally appreciate mini-stations in their neighborhoods foot patrols problem-solving efforts and other forms of community policing

Police Officer Attitudes

A clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officers job satisfaction perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects Officers involved in community policing especially if they are volunteers or members of special units typically thrive on theirnew duties and responsibilities What is somewhat less certain however is (1) whether these effects will survive the long term and (2) whether these benefits are as universal when all officers are required to engage in community policing Whenever comshymunity policing is practiced only by specialists as has generally been the case until recently in most departments one condition that is nearly universal is conflict between the

bull specialists and other members of the agency frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad

Police Officer Behavior

Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that foot patrol problem solving permanent assignment mini-stations and other features ofcommunity potic ing lead to changes in some police officers behavior but these behavioral effects have only been lightly documented thus far Evidence also sugshygests that many officers resist changing their behavior out of opposition to the philosophical underpinnings of community policing doubts that community policing really works or just plain habit

Conclusion

A great deal of energy has been invested since 1980 in determining the nature of community policing and its effects These efforts have paid off to the extent that the scope and variation of community policing is much better understood today and some of its effects have been fairly well docushymented Since community policing has evolved significantly during this period however some of its elements have been more carefully evaluated than others In addition programshymatic complexity multiple effectlt variations in scope and research design limitations have hampered many of the community policing evaluations conducted thus far Nevershytheless the programmatic elements of community policing do seem to produce several beneficial outcomes for citizens and officers and have the potential to impact crime and disorder Whether the more philosophical and strategic elements of community policing will become firmly rooted and whether they will ultimately have beneficial effects is yet to be seen

Note

1 Preparation ofthis chapter was supported in part under award 94-IJ-CX-0006 from the National Institute of Justice US Department of Justice Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice

References

Bennett Trevor 1994 Community Policing on the Ground Deshyvelopments in Britain In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testing the Promises Thoushysand Oaks CA Sage pp 224-246

Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994a A Police Guide t() Surveying Citizens and Their Environment Washington OC author

__ 1994b Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Rural Commushynities A Program Planning Guide Washington OC author

__ 1994c Understanding Community Policing A Framework for Action Washington OC author

Cordner Gary W and Robert C Trojanowicz 1992 Patrol in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Poicing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinshynati OH Anderson pp 3-18

Eck John E 1992 Criminal Investigation in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Policing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinnati OH Anderson pp 19-34

July 1995 7

and William Spelman 1987 Problem Solving ProblemshyOriented Policing in Newport News Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Goldstein Hennan 1977 Policing A Free Society Cambridge MA Ballinger

__ 1987 Toward Community-Oriented Policing Potential Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions Crime amp Deshylinquency 25 236-258

__ 1990 Problem-Oriented Policing New York McGrawshyHill

Greene Jack R and Stephen D Mastrofski eds 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger

Greenwood Peter W and Joan Pelersilia 1975 The Criminal InvestigaJion Process Volume I Summary and Implications Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation

Kelling George L Tony Pate Duane Dieckman and Charles E Brown 1974 The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment A Summary Report Washington DC Police Foundation

Kelling George L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy ofPolicing Perspectives on Policing No4 Washingshyton DC National Institute of Justice

Klockars Carl B 1988_ The Rhetoric ofCommunity Policing In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 239-258

Leighton Barry N 1994 Community Policing in Canada An Overview of Experience and Evaluations In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 209-223

Manning Peter K 1988 Community Policing as a Drama of Control In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski cds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp2746

McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

Moore Mark H and Robert C Trojanowicz 1988 Corporate Strategies for Policing Perspectives on Policing No6 Washshyington DC National Institute of Justice

Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

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Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

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Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

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Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

I f

I

j juveniles An argument is made that police officers by1 serving as mentors and role models and by providing educashytional recreational and even counseling services can affect peoples behavior in positive ways that ultimately lead to reductions in crime and disorder In essence police are asked to support and augment the efforts of families churches bull schools and other social service agencies This kind of police i

~ activity is seen as particularly necessary by some in order to offset the deficiencies and correct the failures of these other I social institutions in modem America

f J Substantive Focus The third key element of community l policing strategy is a more careful and deliberate focus on

substantive problems in the community (Goldstein 1990) This substantive focus stands in contrast to three interrelated tendencies of professional model policing (1) a tendency to regard law enforcement as the end of policing rather than as one of several means available to police officers (2) a tendency to focus more attention on the process of policing than on substantive problems and outcomes and (3) a tenshydency to focus more attention on administrative issues within police organizations than on substantive problems in the community

Confusion in modem policing over the role of law enforceshyment reflects a common organizational pathology called goal displacement by which over time favored methods come to be seen as ends in themselves To overcome this confusion community policing emphasizes that in our society the law is but a means to the greater ends of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness The particular ends of policing tie in to these societal goals and relate to the protection oflife and property the maintenance of public order and the protection of indishyvidual rights One of the primary tools given to police for accomplishing these ends is the law and its enforcementshyuse of this tool has no great value in its own right however except as it contributes to protection of life and property maintenance of order and protection of rights

This distinction between means and ends has very significant practical implications It reminds us for example that the best policedepartrnentisnol necessarily the one that enforces the law the most but rather the one that provides the best protection and order Similarly the best officers are not necessarily those who make the most arrests and issue the most tickets but rather the ones who are most successful in controlling crime maintaining order and improving traffic safety in their assigned areas

The distinction between means and ends also directs attenshytion to the other means besides law enforcement that are available to police officers The simple recognition that law enforcement is but one of several methods available to police officers then leads to the realization that effectiveness in policing requires choosing in each instance that method which maximizes attainment of police goals and objectives and adherence to important police values This conception of policing not simply as law enforcement but rather as decision making has important implications for the selection training

bull supervision and evaluation of police officers

Thinking of policing as involving choosing the most effecshy

live method for handling a situation or solving a problem also points out the need to focus greater attention on substance rather than process That is the body of policing knowledge that has been most highly developed and transmitted through formal education and training emphasizes the processes of call handling reporting mediating enforcing and investishygating and largely ignores both information about substanshytive problems (cg domestic violence drug abuse fear of crime) and information about what works best in handling such problems To be effective decision makers however police officers need information about substantive problems and about what works as well as skills to assist them in diagnosing and analyzing situations and selecting the most appropriate responses

Police administrators similarly need to shift the focus of their attention Under the professional model the preeminent concern of police executives was seen as overseeing the efficient operation of the police department Attention was directed inward toward the workings of the police organizashytion itself As a consequence of this focus police manageshyment training and education came to be dominated by considshyeration of the processes of administration with near total disregard for either the work performed by police officers or the substantive problems that police departments are exshypected to address Without denigrating the importance of efficient administration community policing emphasizes that the primary focus of police executives should be on the accomplishment of the police mission This requires that police executives spend more time looking outward toward the substantive problems in the community and that they worry as much about effectiveness as about efficiency

The Programmatic Dimension

The programmatic dimension of community policing ultishymately translates ideas philosophies and strategies into concrete programs tactics and behaviors Even those who insist that community policing is a philosophy not a proshygram must concede that unless comm unity policing eventushyally leads to some action Some new or different behavior it is all rhetoric and no reality (Greene and Mastrofski 1988) Indeed many commentators have taken the view that comshymunity policing is little more than a new police marketing strategy that has left the core elements of the police role untouched (see eg Klockars 1988 Manning 1988 Weatheritt 1988)

Reoriented Police Operations An essential programmatic feature of community policing is a reorientation of police operations that entails less reliance on random motorized patrol immediate response to all calls for service and followshyup investigations by detectives Studies over the past two decades have convincingly demonstrated the limitations of these traditional police practices and have suggested some promising alternatives

Many police departments today have increased their use of foot patrol directed patrol door-to-door policing and other alternatives to traditional motorized patrol (Cordner and Trojanowicz 1992) Generally these alternatives seek more targeted tactical effectiveness more attention to minor of-

Police Forum4

fenses and incivilities a greater feIt presence of police andor more police-citizen contact Other police departments have simply reduced their commitment to any form of conshytinuous patrolling preferring instead to have their patrol officers engage in problem solving crime prevention and similar activities when not handling calls and emergencies

Many police agencies have also adopted differential reshysponses to calls for service (McEwen Connors and Cohen 1986) Rather than attempting to immediately dispatch a sworn officer in response to each and every notification of a crime disturbance or other situation these departments vary their responses depending upon the circumstances Some crime reports may be taken over the telephone some service requests may be referred to other government agencies and some sworn officer responses may be delayed A particularly interesting alternative is to ask complainants to go in person to a nearby police mini-station or storefront office where an officer a civilian employee or even avolunteer takes a report or provides other in-person assistance Use of differential responses helps departments cope with the sometimes overshywhelming burden of 9-1-1 calls and frees up patrol officer time for other acti vities such as patrolling problem solving and crime prevention

Traditional criminal investigation has also been reexamined in recent years (Eck 1992) Some departments have deshyspecialized the activity reducing the size of the detective unit and making patrol officers more responsible for follOW-Up investigations Many have also eliminated the practice of conducting an extensive follow-up investigation of every reported crime focusing instead on the more serious offenses and on more solvable cases Investigative attention has also been expanded to include a focus on offenders as well as on offenses especially in the form of repeat offender units that target high-frequency serious offenders A few departshyments have taken the additional step of trying to get detec~ tives to expand their case-by-case orientation to include problem solving and crime prevention In this approach a burglary detective would be as concerned with reducing burglaries through problem solving and crime prevention as she was with solving particular burglary cases

Not all contemporary alternatives to motorized patrol rapid response and criminal investigation are closely allied with community policing Those specific operational alternashytivesand those usesofthe freed-up time of patrol officers and detectives that are consistent with the philosophical and strategic foundations of community policing should be disshytinguished from those that conform to other philosophies and strategies of policing (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988)

Problem Solving Supporters of community policing are convinced that the very nature of police work must be altered from its present incident-by-incident case-by-case orientashytion to one that is more problem-oriented (Goldstein 1990) Certainly incidents must stilI be handled and cases must still be investigated Whenever possible however attention should be directed toward underlying problems and condishy

bull tions Following the medical analogy policing should adshydress causes as well as symptoms and should adopt the

epidemiological public health approach as much as the indishyvidual doctors clinical approach

This problem solving approach should be characterized by several important features (1) it should be the standard operating method of policing not an occasional special project (2) it should be practiced by personnel throughout the ranks not just by specialists or managers (3) it should be empirical in the sense that decisions are made on the basis of information that is gathered systematically (4) it should involve whenever possible collaboration between police and other agencies and institutions and (5) it should incorposhyrate whenever possible community input and participation so that it is the communitys problems that are addressed (not just the police departments) and so that the community shares in the responsibility for its own protection

The problem solving process consists of four steps (l) careful identification of the problem (2) careful analysis of the problem (3) a search for altemative solutions to the problem and (4) implementation and assessment of a reshysponse to the problem Community input can be incorporated within any or all of the steps in the process Identification analysis and assessment should rely on infornlation from multiple sources A variety of alternative solutions should be considered including but not limited to traditional enforceshyment methods Typically the most effective solutions are those that combine several different responses including some that draw on more than just the police departments authority and resources

A crucial characteristic of the problem-oriented approach is that it seeks tailored solutions to specific community probshylems Arrests and law enforcement are not abandonedshyrather an effort is made in each situation to determine which alternati ve responses best fit the problem Use of the criminal law is always considered as are civil law enforcement mediation community mobilization referral collaboration alteration of the physical environment public education and a host of other possibilities The common sense notion of choosing the tool that best fits the problem instead of simply grabbing the most convenient or familiar tool in the tool box lies close to the heart of the problem solving method

Community Engagement Participation of the community in its own protection is one of the central elements of commushynity policing (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994c) This participation can run the gamut from watching neighbors homes to reporting drug dealers to patrolling the streets It can involve participation in problem identification and probshylem solving efforts in crime prevention programs in neighshyborhood revitalization and in youth-oriented educational and recreational programs Citizens may act individually or in groups they may collaborate with the police and they may even join the police department by donating their time as police department volunteers reserves or auxiliaries

Under community policing police agencies are expected not only to cooperate with citizens and communities but to actively solicit input and participation (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994b) Theexactnature of this participation can

July 1995 5

and should vary from community to community and from situation to situation in keeping with the problem-oriented approach As a general rule though police should avoid claiming that they alone can handle crime drug or disorder problems and they should encourage individual citizens and community groups to shoulder some responsibility for dealshying with such problems

Police have sometimes found it necessary to engage in community organizing as a means of accomplishing any degree of citizen participation in problem solving or crime prevention In disorganized and transient neighborhoods residents are often so distressed fearful and suspicious of each other (or just so unfamiliar with their neighbors) that police have literally had to set about creating a sense of community where none previously existed As difficult as this kind of community organizing can be and as far from the conventional police role as this may seem these are often the very communities that most need both enhanced police protection and a greater degree of citizen involvement in crime prevention order maintenance and general watchfulshyness over public spaces

One vexing aspect of community organizing and community engagement results from the pluralistic nature of our society Differing and often conflicting interests are found in many communities and they are sometimes represented by comshypeting interest groups Thus the elders in a community may want the police to crack down on juveniles while the youths themselves complain of few opportunities for recreation or entertainment Tenants may seek police help in organizing a rent strike while landlords want police assistance in screenshying or managing the same tenants Finding common interests around which to rally entire communities or just identifying common interests on which to base police practices can be very challenging and at times impossible

It is important to recognize that this inherent feature of pluralistic communities does notarise because of community policing Police have long been caught in the middle between the interests of adults and juveniles landlords and tenants and similar groups Sometimes the law has provided a convenient reference point for handling such conflicts but just as often police have had to mediate arbitrate or just take the side of the party with the best case Moreover when the law has offered a solution it has frequently been a temporary or unpopular one and one that still resulted in the police taking sides protestations of were just enforcing the law notwithstanding

Fortunately nearly all citizens want to be safe from violence want their property protected and want some level of ordershyliness in their neighborhoods Officers can usually find enough consensus in communities upon which to base coopshyerative efforts aimed at improving safety and public order Sometimes apparently deep conflicts between individuals or groups recede when attention is focused on how best to solve specific neighborhood problems It would be naive to expect overwhelming community consensus in every situation but bull it is equally mistaken to think that conflict is so endemic that widespread community support and participation cannot be achieved in many circumstances

What Do We Know

Despite the programmatic and evaluation complexities disshycussed earlier we do have a substantial amount of informashytion from empirical studies of community policing Table I summarizes the preponderance of the evidence on the effects of community policing based 011 a review of over 60 such studies (recent reviews have also been completed by Normandeau 1993 Bennett 1994 Leighton 1994 and Skogan 1994)

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The first thing to note in Table 1 is that two-thirds of the 21 cells-all those in the top two rows-are labelled unshyknown Nearly all of the evaluations conducted to-date have focused on the programmatic dimension of community poshylicing (the bottom row of the table) leaving us with little or no infonnation on the effects of philosophical and strategic changes This gap in community policing research is unshydoubtedly caused by a combination of two factors (1) most community policing efforts at leas until recently have been limited programmatic and street-level initiatives rather than large-scale strategic or organizational-change initiatives and (2) evaluation of narrowly-focused programmatic initiatives is much easier and more feasible than evaluation of philoshysophical and organization-wide change

The most useful way to summarize the evidence on the effects of community policing is to scan the bottom row of Table 1

Crime

The evidence is mixed Only a few studies have used experimental designs and victimization surveys to test the effects of community policing on crime many others have relied on simple before-after comparisons of reported crime or single-item victimization questions drawn from commushynity surveys Overall a slight majority of the studies have detected crime decreases giving reason for optimism but evaluation design limitations prevent us from drawing any authoritative conclusions

Fear ofCrime

Again the evidence is mixed but it leans more heavily in the positive direction A number of studies have employed community surveys to make before-after comparisons of fear

Police Forum6

and related perceptions some with experimental designs Fear has typically been measured using a variety of survey items lending the studies more credibility The now widelyshyaccepted view that community policing helps reduce levels of fear of crime and increases perceptions of safety seems reasonably well-founded although some efforts have failed to accomplish fear reductions

Disorder

The impact of community policing on disorder minor crime incivilities and signs of crime has not been subjected to careful testing as frequently as its impact on crime and fear The available evidence suggests though that community policing and especially foot patrol and problem solving helps reduce levels of disorder lending partial support to the broken windows thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982)

CaNs for Service

Community policing might reduce calls for service in several ways problem solving might address underlying issues that generate calls collaboration might increase call referrals to other government agencies foot patrols and mini-stations might receive citizen requests directly thus heading off calls to central dispatch and workload management might find alternative responses for some types of calls Although the ability of the last approach (workload management) to reduce the volume of calls dispatched to sworn units for immediate response has clearly been demonstrated (McEwen et al 1986) the rest of the evidence on the effects of community policing on calls for service is mixed Several studies have found positive effects but several others have not

Community Relations

The vast majority of the studies ~at have looked at the impact of community policing on citizens attitudes toward the police have uncovered positive effects Clearly citizens generally appreciate mini-stations in their neighborhoods foot patrols problem-solving efforts and other forms of community policing

Police Officer Attitudes

A clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officers job satisfaction perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects Officers involved in community policing especially if they are volunteers or members of special units typically thrive on theirnew duties and responsibilities What is somewhat less certain however is (1) whether these effects will survive the long term and (2) whether these benefits are as universal when all officers are required to engage in community policing Whenever comshymunity policing is practiced only by specialists as has generally been the case until recently in most departments one condition that is nearly universal is conflict between the

bull specialists and other members of the agency frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad

Police Officer Behavior

Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that foot patrol problem solving permanent assignment mini-stations and other features ofcommunity potic ing lead to changes in some police officers behavior but these behavioral effects have only been lightly documented thus far Evidence also sugshygests that many officers resist changing their behavior out of opposition to the philosophical underpinnings of community policing doubts that community policing really works or just plain habit

Conclusion

A great deal of energy has been invested since 1980 in determining the nature of community policing and its effects These efforts have paid off to the extent that the scope and variation of community policing is much better understood today and some of its effects have been fairly well docushymented Since community policing has evolved significantly during this period however some of its elements have been more carefully evaluated than others In addition programshymatic complexity multiple effectlt variations in scope and research design limitations have hampered many of the community policing evaluations conducted thus far Nevershytheless the programmatic elements of community policing do seem to produce several beneficial outcomes for citizens and officers and have the potential to impact crime and disorder Whether the more philosophical and strategic elements of community policing will become firmly rooted and whether they will ultimately have beneficial effects is yet to be seen

Note

1 Preparation ofthis chapter was supported in part under award 94-IJ-CX-0006 from the National Institute of Justice US Department of Justice Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice

References

Bennett Trevor 1994 Community Policing on the Ground Deshyvelopments in Britain In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testing the Promises Thoushysand Oaks CA Sage pp 224-246

Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994a A Police Guide t() Surveying Citizens and Their Environment Washington OC author

__ 1994b Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Rural Commushynities A Program Planning Guide Washington OC author

__ 1994c Understanding Community Policing A Framework for Action Washington OC author

Cordner Gary W and Robert C Trojanowicz 1992 Patrol in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Poicing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinshynati OH Anderson pp 3-18

Eck John E 1992 Criminal Investigation in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Policing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinnati OH Anderson pp 19-34

July 1995 7

and William Spelman 1987 Problem Solving ProblemshyOriented Policing in Newport News Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Goldstein Hennan 1977 Policing A Free Society Cambridge MA Ballinger

__ 1987 Toward Community-Oriented Policing Potential Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions Crime amp Deshylinquency 25 236-258

__ 1990 Problem-Oriented Policing New York McGrawshyHill

Greene Jack R and Stephen D Mastrofski eds 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger

Greenwood Peter W and Joan Pelersilia 1975 The Criminal InvestigaJion Process Volume I Summary and Implications Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation

Kelling George L Tony Pate Duane Dieckman and Charles E Brown 1974 The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment A Summary Report Washington DC Police Foundation

Kelling George L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy ofPolicing Perspectives on Policing No4 Washingshyton DC National Institute of Justice

Klockars Carl B 1988_ The Rhetoric ofCommunity Policing In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 239-258

Leighton Barry N 1994 Community Policing in Canada An Overview of Experience and Evaluations In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 209-223

Manning Peter K 1988 Community Policing as a Drama of Control In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski cds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp2746

McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

Moore Mark H and Robert C Trojanowicz 1988 Corporate Strategies for Policing Perspectives on Policing No6 Washshyington DC National Institute of Justice

Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

fenses and incivilities a greater feIt presence of police andor more police-citizen contact Other police departments have simply reduced their commitment to any form of conshytinuous patrolling preferring instead to have their patrol officers engage in problem solving crime prevention and similar activities when not handling calls and emergencies

Many police agencies have also adopted differential reshysponses to calls for service (McEwen Connors and Cohen 1986) Rather than attempting to immediately dispatch a sworn officer in response to each and every notification of a crime disturbance or other situation these departments vary their responses depending upon the circumstances Some crime reports may be taken over the telephone some service requests may be referred to other government agencies and some sworn officer responses may be delayed A particularly interesting alternative is to ask complainants to go in person to a nearby police mini-station or storefront office where an officer a civilian employee or even avolunteer takes a report or provides other in-person assistance Use of differential responses helps departments cope with the sometimes overshywhelming burden of 9-1-1 calls and frees up patrol officer time for other acti vities such as patrolling problem solving and crime prevention

Traditional criminal investigation has also been reexamined in recent years (Eck 1992) Some departments have deshyspecialized the activity reducing the size of the detective unit and making patrol officers more responsible for follOW-Up investigations Many have also eliminated the practice of conducting an extensive follow-up investigation of every reported crime focusing instead on the more serious offenses and on more solvable cases Investigative attention has also been expanded to include a focus on offenders as well as on offenses especially in the form of repeat offender units that target high-frequency serious offenders A few departshyments have taken the additional step of trying to get detec~ tives to expand their case-by-case orientation to include problem solving and crime prevention In this approach a burglary detective would be as concerned with reducing burglaries through problem solving and crime prevention as she was with solving particular burglary cases

Not all contemporary alternatives to motorized patrol rapid response and criminal investigation are closely allied with community policing Those specific operational alternashytivesand those usesofthe freed-up time of patrol officers and detectives that are consistent with the philosophical and strategic foundations of community policing should be disshytinguished from those that conform to other philosophies and strategies of policing (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988)

Problem Solving Supporters of community policing are convinced that the very nature of police work must be altered from its present incident-by-incident case-by-case orientashytion to one that is more problem-oriented (Goldstein 1990) Certainly incidents must stilI be handled and cases must still be investigated Whenever possible however attention should be directed toward underlying problems and condishy

bull tions Following the medical analogy policing should adshydress causes as well as symptoms and should adopt the

epidemiological public health approach as much as the indishyvidual doctors clinical approach

This problem solving approach should be characterized by several important features (1) it should be the standard operating method of policing not an occasional special project (2) it should be practiced by personnel throughout the ranks not just by specialists or managers (3) it should be empirical in the sense that decisions are made on the basis of information that is gathered systematically (4) it should involve whenever possible collaboration between police and other agencies and institutions and (5) it should incorposhyrate whenever possible community input and participation so that it is the communitys problems that are addressed (not just the police departments) and so that the community shares in the responsibility for its own protection

The problem solving process consists of four steps (l) careful identification of the problem (2) careful analysis of the problem (3) a search for altemative solutions to the problem and (4) implementation and assessment of a reshysponse to the problem Community input can be incorporated within any or all of the steps in the process Identification analysis and assessment should rely on infornlation from multiple sources A variety of alternative solutions should be considered including but not limited to traditional enforceshyment methods Typically the most effective solutions are those that combine several different responses including some that draw on more than just the police departments authority and resources

A crucial characteristic of the problem-oriented approach is that it seeks tailored solutions to specific community probshylems Arrests and law enforcement are not abandonedshyrather an effort is made in each situation to determine which alternati ve responses best fit the problem Use of the criminal law is always considered as are civil law enforcement mediation community mobilization referral collaboration alteration of the physical environment public education and a host of other possibilities The common sense notion of choosing the tool that best fits the problem instead of simply grabbing the most convenient or familiar tool in the tool box lies close to the heart of the problem solving method

Community Engagement Participation of the community in its own protection is one of the central elements of commushynity policing (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994c) This participation can run the gamut from watching neighbors homes to reporting drug dealers to patrolling the streets It can involve participation in problem identification and probshylem solving efforts in crime prevention programs in neighshyborhood revitalization and in youth-oriented educational and recreational programs Citizens may act individually or in groups they may collaborate with the police and they may even join the police department by donating their time as police department volunteers reserves or auxiliaries

Under community policing police agencies are expected not only to cooperate with citizens and communities but to actively solicit input and participation (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994b) Theexactnature of this participation can

July 1995 5

and should vary from community to community and from situation to situation in keeping with the problem-oriented approach As a general rule though police should avoid claiming that they alone can handle crime drug or disorder problems and they should encourage individual citizens and community groups to shoulder some responsibility for dealshying with such problems

Police have sometimes found it necessary to engage in community organizing as a means of accomplishing any degree of citizen participation in problem solving or crime prevention In disorganized and transient neighborhoods residents are often so distressed fearful and suspicious of each other (or just so unfamiliar with their neighbors) that police have literally had to set about creating a sense of community where none previously existed As difficult as this kind of community organizing can be and as far from the conventional police role as this may seem these are often the very communities that most need both enhanced police protection and a greater degree of citizen involvement in crime prevention order maintenance and general watchfulshyness over public spaces

One vexing aspect of community organizing and community engagement results from the pluralistic nature of our society Differing and often conflicting interests are found in many communities and they are sometimes represented by comshypeting interest groups Thus the elders in a community may want the police to crack down on juveniles while the youths themselves complain of few opportunities for recreation or entertainment Tenants may seek police help in organizing a rent strike while landlords want police assistance in screenshying or managing the same tenants Finding common interests around which to rally entire communities or just identifying common interests on which to base police practices can be very challenging and at times impossible

It is important to recognize that this inherent feature of pluralistic communities does notarise because of community policing Police have long been caught in the middle between the interests of adults and juveniles landlords and tenants and similar groups Sometimes the law has provided a convenient reference point for handling such conflicts but just as often police have had to mediate arbitrate or just take the side of the party with the best case Moreover when the law has offered a solution it has frequently been a temporary or unpopular one and one that still resulted in the police taking sides protestations of were just enforcing the law notwithstanding

Fortunately nearly all citizens want to be safe from violence want their property protected and want some level of ordershyliness in their neighborhoods Officers can usually find enough consensus in communities upon which to base coopshyerative efforts aimed at improving safety and public order Sometimes apparently deep conflicts between individuals or groups recede when attention is focused on how best to solve specific neighborhood problems It would be naive to expect overwhelming community consensus in every situation but bull it is equally mistaken to think that conflict is so endemic that widespread community support and participation cannot be achieved in many circumstances

What Do We Know

Despite the programmatic and evaluation complexities disshycussed earlier we do have a substantial amount of informashytion from empirical studies of community policing Table I summarizes the preponderance of the evidence on the effects of community policing based 011 a review of over 60 such studies (recent reviews have also been completed by Normandeau 1993 Bennett 1994 Leighton 1994 and Skogan 1994)

TABLE L PrtpondtJWtlaquo of lbc EIIampnce oa CoounWlity Pobcina

poundIf JIuJl10U

~

BrotdPollcePalC1tcn ClciawrttnpA N_ variation-F_~jeFow _~~~iy~_~- 01-SoiYint

I~ue~

UNK

Mll(

UNK

M

I I OS I MIX I

UNK

PO

I UNK

I OS I

UNK

MIX

umd POS bull poWw df ~fd effedI) NHi MJ~ dffldl MIX tnWIoddJlaquolJ UNK ~ (compklCly CIt ~hatly utUskd)

The first thing to note in Table 1 is that two-thirds of the 21 cells-all those in the top two rows-are labelled unshyknown Nearly all of the evaluations conducted to-date have focused on the programmatic dimension of community poshylicing (the bottom row of the table) leaving us with little or no infonnation on the effects of philosophical and strategic changes This gap in community policing research is unshydoubtedly caused by a combination of two factors (1) most community policing efforts at leas until recently have been limited programmatic and street-level initiatives rather than large-scale strategic or organizational-change initiatives and (2) evaluation of narrowly-focused programmatic initiatives is much easier and more feasible than evaluation of philoshysophical and organization-wide change

The most useful way to summarize the evidence on the effects of community policing is to scan the bottom row of Table 1

Crime

The evidence is mixed Only a few studies have used experimental designs and victimization surveys to test the effects of community policing on crime many others have relied on simple before-after comparisons of reported crime or single-item victimization questions drawn from commushynity surveys Overall a slight majority of the studies have detected crime decreases giving reason for optimism but evaluation design limitations prevent us from drawing any authoritative conclusions

Fear ofCrime

Again the evidence is mixed but it leans more heavily in the positive direction A number of studies have employed community surveys to make before-after comparisons of fear

Police Forum6

and related perceptions some with experimental designs Fear has typically been measured using a variety of survey items lending the studies more credibility The now widelyshyaccepted view that community policing helps reduce levels of fear of crime and increases perceptions of safety seems reasonably well-founded although some efforts have failed to accomplish fear reductions

Disorder

The impact of community policing on disorder minor crime incivilities and signs of crime has not been subjected to careful testing as frequently as its impact on crime and fear The available evidence suggests though that community policing and especially foot patrol and problem solving helps reduce levels of disorder lending partial support to the broken windows thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982)

CaNs for Service

Community policing might reduce calls for service in several ways problem solving might address underlying issues that generate calls collaboration might increase call referrals to other government agencies foot patrols and mini-stations might receive citizen requests directly thus heading off calls to central dispatch and workload management might find alternative responses for some types of calls Although the ability of the last approach (workload management) to reduce the volume of calls dispatched to sworn units for immediate response has clearly been demonstrated (McEwen et al 1986) the rest of the evidence on the effects of community policing on calls for service is mixed Several studies have found positive effects but several others have not

Community Relations

The vast majority of the studies ~at have looked at the impact of community policing on citizens attitudes toward the police have uncovered positive effects Clearly citizens generally appreciate mini-stations in their neighborhoods foot patrols problem-solving efforts and other forms of community policing

Police Officer Attitudes

A clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officers job satisfaction perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects Officers involved in community policing especially if they are volunteers or members of special units typically thrive on theirnew duties and responsibilities What is somewhat less certain however is (1) whether these effects will survive the long term and (2) whether these benefits are as universal when all officers are required to engage in community policing Whenever comshymunity policing is practiced only by specialists as has generally been the case until recently in most departments one condition that is nearly universal is conflict between the

bull specialists and other members of the agency frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad

Police Officer Behavior

Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that foot patrol problem solving permanent assignment mini-stations and other features ofcommunity potic ing lead to changes in some police officers behavior but these behavioral effects have only been lightly documented thus far Evidence also sugshygests that many officers resist changing their behavior out of opposition to the philosophical underpinnings of community policing doubts that community policing really works or just plain habit

Conclusion

A great deal of energy has been invested since 1980 in determining the nature of community policing and its effects These efforts have paid off to the extent that the scope and variation of community policing is much better understood today and some of its effects have been fairly well docushymented Since community policing has evolved significantly during this period however some of its elements have been more carefully evaluated than others In addition programshymatic complexity multiple effectlt variations in scope and research design limitations have hampered many of the community policing evaluations conducted thus far Nevershytheless the programmatic elements of community policing do seem to produce several beneficial outcomes for citizens and officers and have the potential to impact crime and disorder Whether the more philosophical and strategic elements of community policing will become firmly rooted and whether they will ultimately have beneficial effects is yet to be seen

Note

1 Preparation ofthis chapter was supported in part under award 94-IJ-CX-0006 from the National Institute of Justice US Department of Justice Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice

References

Bennett Trevor 1994 Community Policing on the Ground Deshyvelopments in Britain In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testing the Promises Thoushysand Oaks CA Sage pp 224-246

Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994a A Police Guide t() Surveying Citizens and Their Environment Washington OC author

__ 1994b Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Rural Commushynities A Program Planning Guide Washington OC author

__ 1994c Understanding Community Policing A Framework for Action Washington OC author

Cordner Gary W and Robert C Trojanowicz 1992 Patrol in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Poicing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinshynati OH Anderson pp 3-18

Eck John E 1992 Criminal Investigation in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Policing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinnati OH Anderson pp 19-34

July 1995 7

and William Spelman 1987 Problem Solving ProblemshyOriented Policing in Newport News Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Goldstein Hennan 1977 Policing A Free Society Cambridge MA Ballinger

__ 1987 Toward Community-Oriented Policing Potential Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions Crime amp Deshylinquency 25 236-258

__ 1990 Problem-Oriented Policing New York McGrawshyHill

Greene Jack R and Stephen D Mastrofski eds 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger

Greenwood Peter W and Joan Pelersilia 1975 The Criminal InvestigaJion Process Volume I Summary and Implications Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation

Kelling George L Tony Pate Duane Dieckman and Charles E Brown 1974 The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment A Summary Report Washington DC Police Foundation

Kelling George L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy ofPolicing Perspectives on Policing No4 Washingshyton DC National Institute of Justice

Klockars Carl B 1988_ The Rhetoric ofCommunity Policing In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 239-258

Leighton Barry N 1994 Community Policing in Canada An Overview of Experience and Evaluations In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 209-223

Manning Peter K 1988 Community Policing as a Drama of Control In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski cds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp2746

McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

Moore Mark H and Robert C Trojanowicz 1988 Corporate Strategies for Policing Perspectives on Policing No6 Washshyington DC National Institute of Justice

Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

and should vary from community to community and from situation to situation in keeping with the problem-oriented approach As a general rule though police should avoid claiming that they alone can handle crime drug or disorder problems and they should encourage individual citizens and community groups to shoulder some responsibility for dealshying with such problems

Police have sometimes found it necessary to engage in community organizing as a means of accomplishing any degree of citizen participation in problem solving or crime prevention In disorganized and transient neighborhoods residents are often so distressed fearful and suspicious of each other (or just so unfamiliar with their neighbors) that police have literally had to set about creating a sense of community where none previously existed As difficult as this kind of community organizing can be and as far from the conventional police role as this may seem these are often the very communities that most need both enhanced police protection and a greater degree of citizen involvement in crime prevention order maintenance and general watchfulshyness over public spaces

One vexing aspect of community organizing and community engagement results from the pluralistic nature of our society Differing and often conflicting interests are found in many communities and they are sometimes represented by comshypeting interest groups Thus the elders in a community may want the police to crack down on juveniles while the youths themselves complain of few opportunities for recreation or entertainment Tenants may seek police help in organizing a rent strike while landlords want police assistance in screenshying or managing the same tenants Finding common interests around which to rally entire communities or just identifying common interests on which to base police practices can be very challenging and at times impossible

It is important to recognize that this inherent feature of pluralistic communities does notarise because of community policing Police have long been caught in the middle between the interests of adults and juveniles landlords and tenants and similar groups Sometimes the law has provided a convenient reference point for handling such conflicts but just as often police have had to mediate arbitrate or just take the side of the party with the best case Moreover when the law has offered a solution it has frequently been a temporary or unpopular one and one that still resulted in the police taking sides protestations of were just enforcing the law notwithstanding

Fortunately nearly all citizens want to be safe from violence want their property protected and want some level of ordershyliness in their neighborhoods Officers can usually find enough consensus in communities upon which to base coopshyerative efforts aimed at improving safety and public order Sometimes apparently deep conflicts between individuals or groups recede when attention is focused on how best to solve specific neighborhood problems It would be naive to expect overwhelming community consensus in every situation but bull it is equally mistaken to think that conflict is so endemic that widespread community support and participation cannot be achieved in many circumstances

What Do We Know

Despite the programmatic and evaluation complexities disshycussed earlier we do have a substantial amount of informashytion from empirical studies of community policing Table I summarizes the preponderance of the evidence on the effects of community policing based 011 a review of over 60 such studies (recent reviews have also been completed by Normandeau 1993 Bennett 1994 Leighton 1994 and Skogan 1994)

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The first thing to note in Table 1 is that two-thirds of the 21 cells-all those in the top two rows-are labelled unshyknown Nearly all of the evaluations conducted to-date have focused on the programmatic dimension of community poshylicing (the bottom row of the table) leaving us with little or no infonnation on the effects of philosophical and strategic changes This gap in community policing research is unshydoubtedly caused by a combination of two factors (1) most community policing efforts at leas until recently have been limited programmatic and street-level initiatives rather than large-scale strategic or organizational-change initiatives and (2) evaluation of narrowly-focused programmatic initiatives is much easier and more feasible than evaluation of philoshysophical and organization-wide change

The most useful way to summarize the evidence on the effects of community policing is to scan the bottom row of Table 1

Crime

The evidence is mixed Only a few studies have used experimental designs and victimization surveys to test the effects of community policing on crime many others have relied on simple before-after comparisons of reported crime or single-item victimization questions drawn from commushynity surveys Overall a slight majority of the studies have detected crime decreases giving reason for optimism but evaluation design limitations prevent us from drawing any authoritative conclusions

Fear ofCrime

Again the evidence is mixed but it leans more heavily in the positive direction A number of studies have employed community surveys to make before-after comparisons of fear

Police Forum6

and related perceptions some with experimental designs Fear has typically been measured using a variety of survey items lending the studies more credibility The now widelyshyaccepted view that community policing helps reduce levels of fear of crime and increases perceptions of safety seems reasonably well-founded although some efforts have failed to accomplish fear reductions

Disorder

The impact of community policing on disorder minor crime incivilities and signs of crime has not been subjected to careful testing as frequently as its impact on crime and fear The available evidence suggests though that community policing and especially foot patrol and problem solving helps reduce levels of disorder lending partial support to the broken windows thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982)

CaNs for Service

Community policing might reduce calls for service in several ways problem solving might address underlying issues that generate calls collaboration might increase call referrals to other government agencies foot patrols and mini-stations might receive citizen requests directly thus heading off calls to central dispatch and workload management might find alternative responses for some types of calls Although the ability of the last approach (workload management) to reduce the volume of calls dispatched to sworn units for immediate response has clearly been demonstrated (McEwen et al 1986) the rest of the evidence on the effects of community policing on calls for service is mixed Several studies have found positive effects but several others have not

Community Relations

The vast majority of the studies ~at have looked at the impact of community policing on citizens attitudes toward the police have uncovered positive effects Clearly citizens generally appreciate mini-stations in their neighborhoods foot patrols problem-solving efforts and other forms of community policing

Police Officer Attitudes

A clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officers job satisfaction perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects Officers involved in community policing especially if they are volunteers or members of special units typically thrive on theirnew duties and responsibilities What is somewhat less certain however is (1) whether these effects will survive the long term and (2) whether these benefits are as universal when all officers are required to engage in community policing Whenever comshymunity policing is practiced only by specialists as has generally been the case until recently in most departments one condition that is nearly universal is conflict between the

bull specialists and other members of the agency frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad

Police Officer Behavior

Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that foot patrol problem solving permanent assignment mini-stations and other features ofcommunity potic ing lead to changes in some police officers behavior but these behavioral effects have only been lightly documented thus far Evidence also sugshygests that many officers resist changing their behavior out of opposition to the philosophical underpinnings of community policing doubts that community policing really works or just plain habit

Conclusion

A great deal of energy has been invested since 1980 in determining the nature of community policing and its effects These efforts have paid off to the extent that the scope and variation of community policing is much better understood today and some of its effects have been fairly well docushymented Since community policing has evolved significantly during this period however some of its elements have been more carefully evaluated than others In addition programshymatic complexity multiple effectlt variations in scope and research design limitations have hampered many of the community policing evaluations conducted thus far Nevershytheless the programmatic elements of community policing do seem to produce several beneficial outcomes for citizens and officers and have the potential to impact crime and disorder Whether the more philosophical and strategic elements of community policing will become firmly rooted and whether they will ultimately have beneficial effects is yet to be seen

Note

1 Preparation ofthis chapter was supported in part under award 94-IJ-CX-0006 from the National Institute of Justice US Department of Justice Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice

References

Bennett Trevor 1994 Community Policing on the Ground Deshyvelopments in Britain In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testing the Promises Thoushysand Oaks CA Sage pp 224-246

Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994a A Police Guide t() Surveying Citizens and Their Environment Washington OC author

__ 1994b Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Rural Commushynities A Program Planning Guide Washington OC author

__ 1994c Understanding Community Policing A Framework for Action Washington OC author

Cordner Gary W and Robert C Trojanowicz 1992 Patrol in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Poicing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinshynati OH Anderson pp 3-18

Eck John E 1992 Criminal Investigation in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Policing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinnati OH Anderson pp 19-34

July 1995 7

and William Spelman 1987 Problem Solving ProblemshyOriented Policing in Newport News Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Goldstein Hennan 1977 Policing A Free Society Cambridge MA Ballinger

__ 1987 Toward Community-Oriented Policing Potential Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions Crime amp Deshylinquency 25 236-258

__ 1990 Problem-Oriented Policing New York McGrawshyHill

Greene Jack R and Stephen D Mastrofski eds 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger

Greenwood Peter W and Joan Pelersilia 1975 The Criminal InvestigaJion Process Volume I Summary and Implications Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation

Kelling George L Tony Pate Duane Dieckman and Charles E Brown 1974 The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment A Summary Report Washington DC Police Foundation

Kelling George L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy ofPolicing Perspectives on Policing No4 Washingshyton DC National Institute of Justice

Klockars Carl B 1988_ The Rhetoric ofCommunity Policing In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 239-258

Leighton Barry N 1994 Community Policing in Canada An Overview of Experience and Evaluations In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 209-223

Manning Peter K 1988 Community Policing as a Drama of Control In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski cds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp2746

McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

Moore Mark H and Robert C Trojanowicz 1988 Corporate Strategies for Policing Perspectives on Policing No6 Washshyington DC National Institute of Justice

Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

and related perceptions some with experimental designs Fear has typically been measured using a variety of survey items lending the studies more credibility The now widelyshyaccepted view that community policing helps reduce levels of fear of crime and increases perceptions of safety seems reasonably well-founded although some efforts have failed to accomplish fear reductions

Disorder

The impact of community policing on disorder minor crime incivilities and signs of crime has not been subjected to careful testing as frequently as its impact on crime and fear The available evidence suggests though that community policing and especially foot patrol and problem solving helps reduce levels of disorder lending partial support to the broken windows thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982)

CaNs for Service

Community policing might reduce calls for service in several ways problem solving might address underlying issues that generate calls collaboration might increase call referrals to other government agencies foot patrols and mini-stations might receive citizen requests directly thus heading off calls to central dispatch and workload management might find alternative responses for some types of calls Although the ability of the last approach (workload management) to reduce the volume of calls dispatched to sworn units for immediate response has clearly been demonstrated (McEwen et al 1986) the rest of the evidence on the effects of community policing on calls for service is mixed Several studies have found positive effects but several others have not

Community Relations

The vast majority of the studies ~at have looked at the impact of community policing on citizens attitudes toward the police have uncovered positive effects Clearly citizens generally appreciate mini-stations in their neighborhoods foot patrols problem-solving efforts and other forms of community policing

Police Officer Attitudes

A clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officers job satisfaction perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects Officers involved in community policing especially if they are volunteers or members of special units typically thrive on theirnew duties and responsibilities What is somewhat less certain however is (1) whether these effects will survive the long term and (2) whether these benefits are as universal when all officers are required to engage in community policing Whenever comshymunity policing is practiced only by specialists as has generally been the case until recently in most departments one condition that is nearly universal is conflict between the

bull specialists and other members of the agency frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad

Police Officer Behavior

Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that foot patrol problem solving permanent assignment mini-stations and other features ofcommunity potic ing lead to changes in some police officers behavior but these behavioral effects have only been lightly documented thus far Evidence also sugshygests that many officers resist changing their behavior out of opposition to the philosophical underpinnings of community policing doubts that community policing really works or just plain habit

Conclusion

A great deal of energy has been invested since 1980 in determining the nature of community policing and its effects These efforts have paid off to the extent that the scope and variation of community policing is much better understood today and some of its effects have been fairly well docushymented Since community policing has evolved significantly during this period however some of its elements have been more carefully evaluated than others In addition programshymatic complexity multiple effectlt variations in scope and research design limitations have hampered many of the community policing evaluations conducted thus far Nevershytheless the programmatic elements of community policing do seem to produce several beneficial outcomes for citizens and officers and have the potential to impact crime and disorder Whether the more philosophical and strategic elements of community policing will become firmly rooted and whether they will ultimately have beneficial effects is yet to be seen

Note

1 Preparation ofthis chapter was supported in part under award 94-IJ-CX-0006 from the National Institute of Justice US Department of Justice Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice

References

Bennett Trevor 1994 Community Policing on the Ground Deshyvelopments in Britain In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testing the Promises Thoushysand Oaks CA Sage pp 224-246

Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994a A Police Guide t() Surveying Citizens and Their Environment Washington OC author

__ 1994b Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Rural Commushynities A Program Planning Guide Washington OC author

__ 1994c Understanding Community Policing A Framework for Action Washington OC author

Cordner Gary W and Robert C Trojanowicz 1992 Patrol in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Poicing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinshynati OH Anderson pp 3-18

Eck John E 1992 Criminal Investigation in Gary W Cordner and Donna C Hale eds What Works in Policing Operations and Administration Examined Cincinnati OH Anderson pp 19-34

July 1995 7

and William Spelman 1987 Problem Solving ProblemshyOriented Policing in Newport News Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Goldstein Hennan 1977 Policing A Free Society Cambridge MA Ballinger

__ 1987 Toward Community-Oriented Policing Potential Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions Crime amp Deshylinquency 25 236-258

__ 1990 Problem-Oriented Policing New York McGrawshyHill

Greene Jack R and Stephen D Mastrofski eds 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger

Greenwood Peter W and Joan Pelersilia 1975 The Criminal InvestigaJion Process Volume I Summary and Implications Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation

Kelling George L Tony Pate Duane Dieckman and Charles E Brown 1974 The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment A Summary Report Washington DC Police Foundation

Kelling George L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy ofPolicing Perspectives on Policing No4 Washingshyton DC National Institute of Justice

Klockars Carl B 1988_ The Rhetoric ofCommunity Policing In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 239-258

Leighton Barry N 1994 Community Policing in Canada An Overview of Experience and Evaluations In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 209-223

Manning Peter K 1988 Community Policing as a Drama of Control In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski cds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp2746

McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

Moore Mark H and Robert C Trojanowicz 1988 Corporate Strategies for Policing Perspectives on Policing No6 Washshyington DC National Institute of Justice

Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

and William Spelman 1987 Problem Solving ProblemshyOriented Policing in Newport News Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Goldstein Hennan 1977 Policing A Free Society Cambridge MA Ballinger

__ 1987 Toward Community-Oriented Policing Potential Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions Crime amp Deshylinquency 25 236-258

__ 1990 Problem-Oriented Policing New York McGrawshyHill

Greene Jack R and Stephen D Mastrofski eds 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger

Greenwood Peter W and Joan Pelersilia 1975 The Criminal InvestigaJion Process Volume I Summary and Implications Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation

Kelling George L Tony Pate Duane Dieckman and Charles E Brown 1974 The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment A Summary Report Washington DC Police Foundation

Kelling George L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy ofPolicing Perspectives on Policing No4 Washingshyton DC National Institute of Justice

Klockars Carl B 1988_ The Rhetoric ofCommunity Policing In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 239-258

Leighton Barry N 1994 Community Policing in Canada An Overview of Experience and Evaluations In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 209-223

Manning Peter K 1988 Community Policing as a Drama of Control In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski cds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp2746

McEwen J Thomas Edward F Connors III and Marcia I Cohen 1986 Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test Washington DC National Institute of Justice

Moore Mark H and Robert C Trojanowicz 1988 Corporate Strategies for Policing Perspectives on Policing No6 Washshyington DC National Institute of Justice

Normandcau Andre 1993 Community Policing in Canada A Review of Some Recent Studies American Journal ofPolice 121 57-73

Skogan Wesley G 1994 The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents A Cross-Site Analysis In Dennis P Rosenbaum ed The Challenge ofCommunity Policing Testshying the Promises Thousand Oaks CA Sage pp 167-181

Spelman William and Dale K Brown 1982 Calling the Police Citizen Reporting ofSerious Crime Washington DC Police Executive Research Forum

Trojanowicz Robert and Bonnie Bucqucroux 1990 Community Policing A Contemporary Perspective Cincinnati OH Andershyson

Weatheritt Mollie 1988 Community Policing Rhetoric or Realshyity In Jack R Greene and Stephen D Mastrofski eds Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality New York Praeger pp 153-176

Wilson James Q and George L Kelling 1982 Police and Neighshyborhood Safety Broken Windows The Atlantic Monthly (March) 29-38

bull

Police Forum 8

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

THE FIRE SERMON (ASHES TO ASHES DUST TO DUST) WACO SLA MOVE

AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Vance McLaughlin PhD Director of Training

Savannah Police Department

It is a rare event in the United States when law enforcement officers confront large numbers of armed and barricaded suspects The most recent example was in Waco Texas where federal law enforcement agencies assaulted the Branch Davidian Compound In the afteImath of the final assault when all of those who stayed in the compound were killed a number of investigations of the incident were conducted Many of those responsible for the assault expressed their surprise when the compound erupted in flames apparently they had never considered this possibility

In point of fact there have been two other situations where armed and barricaded suspects did not surrender to the police and were engulfed in flames These occurred with the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles and MOVE in Philadelphia This article examines each of these incidents briefly the political pressures involved and proshyposes procedures that law enforcement agencies should use when confronting armed and barricaded suspects

Three Similar Incidents

The Branch Davidians in Waco MOVE in Philadelphia and the SLA in Los Angeles all had factors in common First each group was composed of true believers This means that the group either held religious or political beliefs which were so far out of the mainstream of the nOImS mores and values of American society that they had difficulty relating to the society at large The leaders of each group had cast off the names with which they were born and adopted symbolic names andor titles Second each group of true believers allowed those unconventional beliefs to dominate its actions While positive change can often be traced to unconventional beliefs these beliefs all had as an outcome strong opposition to the government Third the final outcome was the destrucshytion of the groups with conflagration as the centerpiece of their denouement Each incident will be examined in some detail to provide situational specifics

Branch Davidians in Waco

David Koresh was a charismatic religious leader who orgashynized a group of followers and separated from the Davidians hence the Branch Davidians This group felt thal the book of Revelations was to be treated as the dominant part of the Christian Bible The group built a compound in Waco and David Koresh was treated by many ofhis followers as the Son of God The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) investigated this group and obtained an arrest warshyrant for Koresh and a search warrant to investigate if the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons at the compound This

interest by the BATF was prompted when a United Parcel Service driver delivered a partially open package containing what appeared to be hand grenades On February 28 1993 approximately 75 BATF members in full SWAT gear stoImed the compound They were met with heavy gunfire from approximately 40 points inside the compound Four BATF agents died and several were wounded along with six Branch Davidians killed and an unknown number wounded

At this point a 51-day standoff occurred The Federal Bureai of Investigation (FBI) assumed responsibility keeping the BATF in a supporting role A number of other agencies were involved including the Texas Rangers Negotiations began with the purpose of a peaceful resolution anticipated by the authorities David Koresh and his followers might surrender after Passover maybe a natural disaster would be interpreted as a sign from God that they then should give up perhaps surrender would occur after David Koresh had completed a manuscript On April 19th the FBI initiated its plan of entering the compound and dispersing non-lethal gas using armored vehicles Several hours into this operation a fire started which immediately spread through the compound killing all who had remained inside The Texas Rangers have found 72 bodies of men women and children It is possible that some other individuals were totally incinerated (Annin Liu amp Cohn 1993)

MOVE in Philadelphia

The incident involving MOVE in Philadelphia was the prodshyuct of years ofproblems between MOVE and its neighbors resulting in a confrontation with law enforcement authorities Much time and effort were spent formulating the best strategy to deal with the problem

MOVE was a group of people who had a lifestyle which rejected modern technology and rejected man-made law The word MOVE that was adopted to signify this group was never explained by its followers It has been hypothshyesized it may be a shortened teIm from movement or may have been what the police said to members when they saw them on the streetcorners The primary membership was African American and only African Americans lived at the headquarters Members adopted the surname of Africa to show they were all of one family John Africa was the leader of the group MOVE schooled its followers in challenging the system which included not obeying laws or paying bills or taxes ignoring court orders arguing in court purposefully to be charged with contempt and trying to fill the jails The courts lawyers and neutral arbitrators tried to deal with these conflicts but to no avail In 1978 there was a confrontation between the police and MOVE when officers attempted to arrest six MOVE members on misdemeanor warrants Acshycording to Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1988)

The roots of the Osage Avenue conflict lie in Powelton Village Six days after Judge DiBonas order to arrest the MOVE members in Powelton 300 police officers and fire fighters arrived at the MOVE house A gun battle ensued and police officer James Ramp was killed Four other officers six fire fighters two MOVE memshybers and three MOVE sympathizers were wounded

bull July 1995 9

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

MOVE was overpowered and surrendered Someofficshyers were seen on television dragging Delbert Africa out by his hair hitting and kicking him Later that day city bulldozers razed the house (p 97)

Delbert Africa was severely beaten after he was taken into custody The officers seemed to have vented their outrage on him This outrage may have been fueled because male members of MOVE kept women and children around them as they ftred at the police only to immediately surrender when faced by the approaching assault team According to Boyette (1989)

Witnesses news photos and videotape all documented the savage beating that Delbert had sustained on the sidewalk outside the MOVE house on August 8 The identity of the police who beat him was never in dispute Even so Judge Stanley Kubacki acquitted all three defendants without even permitting the case to be deshycided by the jury

Philadelphia is bleeding to death because of the MOVE tragedy he explained No verdict will stanch the flow of blood It can only be stopped by setting upa lightning rod I will be that lightning rod (p 1(9)

A number of MOVE members were imprisoned for a murder of the police officer MOVE shunned attention for a period of time and then moved its headquarters to a row house on Osage A venue Once again conflicts began between MOVE and its neighbors The members of the neighborhood put together the following list of grievances against MOVE

1 Open garbage bags and chunks of raw horse meat placed in milk crates in driveways of neighbors

2 MOVE removes all animals even pets ofresidents and feeds them They have removed flea collars from one resident s cat five times There are pigeon coops and feeding of birds on their property

3 MOVE has extended their yard across driveway preventing passing through driveway Residents reccnlly paid $2000 per house for repaving

4 House has approximately 13 or more children and 8 adults

5 Vending produce (watermelons sold from property and out front) Homemade watermelon carts are parked in street and handles protrude onto sideshywalk inhibiting passing Some carts are parked on the pavement and residents must walk into street

6 MOVE children are openly aggressive to neighborS

children but on some occasions they were discishyplined when neighbors spoke to MOVE members

7 MOVE members threatened to kill the 17 -year-old son ofone neighbor who threw dirt at a MOVE cat that would not leave his property

8 Neighbors have called LampI who referred them to Streets and Highway department who all said they could do nothing Fire department also unresponshy

bull sive regarding violations MO VE has built a wooden barrier around their skylight on roof and walk up and down all roofs day and night One resident said she looked as she sat on the toilet and saw MOVE

walking up there (patrolling not peeping) 9 At night MOVE opens all gates where residents

have pets enclosed and lets pets out and feeds them and allows them to roam the streets

10 MOVE picks in their neighbors trash and garbage that has been set out for collection PoliceSanitashytion gives tickets Lo residents

11 Clothes consistently disappear from residents lines and MOVE is suspected

12 Neighbors observed two MOVE women jump on Wayne Marshall One bit a piece of his jaw on September24 Wayne was present and says he will file a complaint at the police station

13 MOVE claims they will have a large demonstrashytion

14 MOVE says if anyone comes back on extended area behind their property they will shoot their heads off (Bowser 198976-77)

These problems were ignored by the authorities primarily because the police had tried to deal with MOVE once and the result had been the death of an officer and the members of MOVE reestablishing their headquarters The various city agencies did not want to risk the Iives of their employees over such things as code enforcement Volunteer negotiators never were able to resolve these conflicts As time went on the members of MOVE stepped up their aberant lifestyle in ways that directly impacted their neighbors On Christmas Eve 1983 MOVE began to use loudspeakers to broadcast its political and religious beliefs which included the use of words such as motherfucker whores and bitches Neighborhood children were constantly exposed to this type of language The stench from the house continued to grow because of the lack of hygiene On August 8 1984 hundreds of police assembled but they took no action MOVE memshybers studied their tactics and reinforced their building

The actual confrontation that culminated in the conflagration occurred on May 13 1985 The police began the operation at six in the morning The police had a number of misdeshymeanor arrest warrants to serve on MOVE members Neighshybors had been evacuated and police had exchanged gunfire with those in the MOVE headquarters By 430pm it was apparent that the evacuees would not be able to return home that evening if the police did not arrest the members of MOVE Before the assault could continue the bunker on the top of the building had to be destroyed The police had expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and thrown explosives into the house without increasing their tactical advantage With evening approaching a decision was made by the police to drop a bomb on the house Their intent was to blow the bunker off the roof and if possible make a breach for the SWAT team

The police made a bomb from two sticks of Tovex TR2 (a commercially available explosive) and 1 14 pounds of C4 (a military explosive) The explosive was put into a satchel to be dropped by a member of the Philadelphia Police Department from a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter At 529 pm the fuse was ignited and the bomb dropped

Instead of blowing the bunker off the roof a bright orange

Police Forum 10

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

fireball and a fire were the result The police had chosen inappropriate material for the bomb and in addition reported that they were unaware that gasoline was on the roof The fire department aUowed the house to bum and when they did begin to try to put it out it was too late Eleven MOVE members six adults and five children died (Anderson amp Henvenor 1987 Boyette 1989 Bowser1989Harry1987)

Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

The S ymbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a group lead by Donald DeFreezean African American escaped convict He adopted the name Cinque and started a revolutionary group that usually had no more than ten active members Most of the membership was composed of white females The first violent crime the SLA committed was a bank robbery in September of 1973 They followed this by the premeditated murder of Marcus A Foster the black Superintendent of schools in Oakland Foster was shot down with cyanide tipped bullets because he was considered a counter-revolushytionary Foster had once mentioned the possibilty that police officers would be welcomed in public schools to help provide security for the students On February 4 1974 the SLA kidnapped heiress Patty Hearst It is still unresolved if she was brainwashed and forced to help the SLA or if she was a willing accomplice Randolph Hearst her father supplied a quantity of food for the poor when this was demanded by the SLA On April 15 1974 the SLA got $10600 in another bank robbery wounding two citizens (McLean amp Avery 1977 Payne Findley amp Craven 1976)

The publicity generated by the SLA was huge because of the combination of two bank robberies kidnapping and murder The SLA helped fuel the media by releasing a number of commumquesthatwereramblingandself-important(Pearsall 1974 These communiques tried to explain the above incidents as revolutionary acts against the state instead of crimes against people

The final confrontation between the police and SLA Cinque and five of his followers occurred in Los Angeles on May 17 1974 The SLA was tracked down to a house that they had recently occupied in their attempt to escape from the police According to Gates (1992)

At 530 pm we began deploying people from Newton (station)

Within minutes 218 police officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the immediate area sealing it off from traffic and pedestrians SW AT officers quietly evacuated residents from the surrounding houses A command post had already been set up at 57th Street and Alba several blocks away Fire trucks and ambulances were parked there waiting

The door opened Hesitantly an eight-year-old boy walked out A SWAT officer led the child away After that S W AT made fifteen more surrender announcemiddot ments in the next eight minutes

The safest and most effective way to arrest them SW AT concluded was to try to pressure them to surrenshyder now

They went for the tear gas first

Two projectiles were shot through one of the windows For a long moment my radio carried only silence Then the SLA answered back with heavy bursts of gunfire from a big scary automatic weapon called a BAR

SWAT was calling for fragmentation grenades Jesus I thought We didnt even have fragmentation grenades

At 641 about fifty minutes into the shootout flames suddenly poured out the front windows Within aminute the tiny wood-frame house was consumed by fire

Early the next morning I retwned to East 54th Street Many houses were scarred by the firing or explosion of 3772 rounds of SLA ammunition and the 5371 rounds expended by us (p134-137)

All six people inside the house were dead The firefighters feared approaching the hOllse as it burned because of the possibility of sniping or ammunition exploding and did not try to extinguish the flames A mobile grenade launcher was on route to the scene from the military and may have been used to shell the puilding if the fire had not started (Gates 1992)

Differences Among the Incidents

I have identified four key variables that illustrate the differshyences among the three incidents These are danger to the government and community time passage political realities and predictable outcomes

Danger to the Government and Community

This article has discussed similarities among the Branch Davidians MOVE and the SLA and the common aspects of the fmal assault The most disturbing aspect of Waco as compared to the other two incidents is the difference among the three in danger to the government and community MOVE members had been convicted in court of crimes and had threatened neighbors directly and actually assaulted one of them Broadcasts were heard over the MOVE loudspeaker threatening Mayor Goode and President Reagan People not affiliated with MOVE were hurt and the city ofPhiladelphia was obligated to take some sort of direct action after trying a variety of dialogues The SLA committed a homicide and a number of bank robberies They went into the community heavily armed and preached revolution The City of Los Angeles owed a duty to its citizens to control the SLA The situation in Waco was entirely different

No member of the Branch Davidians had ever been convicted of a violent crime (though David Koresh and some of his original followers had been involved in a shoot-out with another claimant who wanted to be the leader of the Davidians) There is no record of the Branch Davidians ever threatening any of their neighbors The whole focus of the Branch Davidians was the Christian Bible with a focus on Revelashytions They armed cloistered and barricaded themselves against the onslaught of the outside world The only real danger they posed was to themselves which with the help of the government became self-fulfilling prophecy

July 1995 11

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

Several times in the government reports alluded to the clear and present danger of the Davidians Yet when these same reports focus on specifics they seem to offer contradictory evidence A BA TF agent says that one reason a warrant wasnt served on Koresh in the customary fashion was that they didnt want to give him time to destroy any illegal weapons Even though there would be evidence of this destruction during a search if the illegal weapons were destroyed wouldnt this have served the government and community interests If Koreshs group had an offensive mind-set is it plausible that a tactical leader would put his troops in two cattle trailers and move them toward the compound The best time to launch an attack on the BA TF teams was while they were in these cattle trailers where gunfire could be concentrated on the vehicles This was never thought to be a danger by the tactical leaders because they understood the defensive mind-set of Koresh

In the MOVE and SLA incidents nobody seriously argued that the government lacked probable cause in obtaining warrants The warrants in the MOVE incident were primarily for non-violent misdemeanors such as contempt of court violating probation and public nuisances In the SLA incishydent warrants were issued for violent felonies In the Waco incident researchers (Blackman1993 Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) have called into question the quality of the information used in the warrants issued by the federal magistrate In retrospect it appears there would have been enough evidence available to obtain a search and arrest warrant on illegal weapons charges (if a proper investigation would have been done) and that in point of fact the Branch Davidians had illegal weapons But the government is violating its own niles when they find a crime has been committed and then work back to probable cause Even if the federal government had the probable cause to search the compound was it morally right in launching an assault that they should have known would produce an Armageddon type response Unshylike MOVE and the SLA David Koresh had previously surrendered to legal process

Time Passage

Each of the scenarios involved different amounts of time between the first knowledge that a barricaded situation exshyisted and the final assault on it The assault at Waco began at 947 am on February 28th with an exchange of gunfire that lasted over an hour and then a short exchange of gunfire at 4 pm followed by a 51 day standoff (Pate 1993) In Philadelshyphia the police had the area blocked off for months In Los Angeles the police were engaged only from 530 pm until 641 pm The irony was that in each case those who opposed the police met death engulfed in flames (though some may have died from gunshots) The amount of time available for planning by the different law enforcement agencies did not seem to change the outcomes

In the case ofMOVE the situation had continued for over ten years The police had tried to blockade the house for a year before the first shootout in 1978 The final assault on MOVE occurred seven years later after a number of social service agencies and mediators had attempted to resolve the conflicts bull non-violently Finally the police as the agency of last resort

was ordered in by the Mayor According to Boyette (1989)

Certainly Goode waited too long to act against a group that was building a gun bunker in a residential neighborshyhood but ultimately he was right when he told the neighbors that arrests on misdemeanor charges and zoning violations wouldntsolve their problem for good MOVE was able to defy the city for more than a decade because it did not play by the rules that others do What is the threat of a jail term to someone who is willing to barricade himself inside a house and die for his cause How does one negotiate with people whose aim is the annihilation of modern civilization (p 263)

Political Realities

As mentioned earlier police are the agency of last choice in many situations In the incidents discussed involving barrishycaded subjects specially trdined SWAT teams using military tactics and military weapons attempted to deal with highly dangerous situations still encumbered by civilian rules

Frustration is created in a Rodney King Syndrome Incident (McLaughlin amp Smith 1993) when the police are not sucshycessful in their initial attempts to bring a subject under control using the tactics and techniques which they have been taught An officer finds that hisher physical skills with or without weapons and tactical knowledge is not equal to these highly unusual incidents The mind-set which develops within a police officer is formed by the police subculture training and television shows on the police A central belief in this mindshyset is that the police must take control of all situations When police are unable to handle potentially dangerous situations this leads to frustration which can lead to anger In the three previously discussed events serious levels of resistance were immediately leveled at law enforcement officers

In the incidents with MOVE and at Waco the law enforceshyment officers had become extremely frustrated with the failure of negotiations MOVE had been negotiated with for months by a number of different parties but without results In Waco the FBI had heard Koresh promise to surrender after Passover which he failed to do Koresh then promised to come out after he finished writing his manuscript on the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelations After a number of such broken promises the FBI felt that Koresh would never come out (Kantrowitz Carroll Annin Barrett Cohn amp Liu 1993)

If we speculate as to three facts the dilemma becomes clearer First in all three of these incidents it would be improper for the police to ignore the situation and not to become involved Second the officers all gave a good faith effort to bring the situation to a close without using force Third despite these efforts the subjects were either killed or severely injured Perhaps in all of these incidents the subjects resistance was the main cause of their injuries On the other hand could the police have done better

Predictable Outcomes

The BA TF had the compound under surveillance for months and they had the option of when and how to serve the warrant

Police Forum 12

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

POLlCE FQRUMisa publication ofthe POliSebtionof the Acaderny otCriminaf Justice SciencesandseN$stogt

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POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

In the investigationofBATF actions at Waco (Report ofThe Department of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol TobaccoandFirearmslnvestigationofVernonWayneHowell also known as David Koresh 1993) it was found that those supervising the tactical teams knew the element of surprise was lost yet ordered the assault to go forward Surprise was mandatory for this type of raid to have any chance of success The investigation of the FBI role at Waco (Dennis Jr 1993 Heymann 1993 Recommendations ofExperts for Improveshyments inFederal Law Enforcement After Waco 1993) made clear that the behavioral scientists who worked full-time for the Bureau or those hired as outside consultants had near unanimity in their views They felt that increased pressure on the Davidians would force an armed confrontation and that David Koresh was paranoid and suicidal Koresh would rather die than give up his power This analysis was consisshytently disregarded by FBI tactical supervisors

Proper Police Procedure

There are certain procedures with which law enforcement officers must comply in democratic states There are three basic requirements that law enforcement officers should adhere to when dealing with barricaded antagonists First the subjects should be told what they are charged with Second they should be told that if they submit to lawful arrrest they will not be mistreated Third law enforcement has a responsibility that suspects be arraigned promptly and have access to legal counsel

Statement or Charges

Every person arrested in the United States should know exactly what heshe is being arrested for This requires the police officer to articulate the charges and communicate them This communication can be by phone a written document or person-to-person This assumes that probable cause exists and if no exigent circumstances are present a warrant has been issued

In dealing with armed and barricaded subjects this statement of charges becomes problematic for many administrators If they inform those subjects of the charges they also convey the fact that they know their position and are capable of offering opposition if the subjects attempt to leave There is a natural inclination by law enforcement to do some variation of a no-knock warrant which is increasingly done in situations where a suspected drug house is going to be searched The police try to hit the door immediately before armed drug dealers can get in defensive positions andor drugs are flushed down the toilet Many officers on SWAT teams serve high risk drug warrants so this response is second nature

In reality the police sometimes make a regular search warshyrant a no-knock warrant in practice They will rapidly knock on the door yell police and when there is no answer within two or three seconds force the door open If they are questioned on how much time elapsed between the knock and

bull forcing the door they tend to err in judgement towards a long time span

The vital importance of the concept of the statement of charges cannot be overstated This is the area from which all other actions flow The subjects may surrender without incident they may try to resist arrest or they may even make a suicidal stand The law enforcement officers involved rarely have any experience in similar situations to call upon which only adds to the stress of facing armed subjects that have chosen the terrain and may want to kill them instead of escaping

There are two factors that law enforcement must keep in mind First the government of the United States never loses when taking armed action within its geographical boundshyaries They initially may be fought-off or out-maneuvered but will ultimately be victorious This is an awesome power that the government has so due care must be taken in starting armed engagement

Second the charge notonly must be supported by probable cause but should also have a degree of balance in the manner in which it is enforced If a person is being arrested for a mala prohibitum crime versus a mala in sen crime it is possible that more force will be justified in the latter instance If the person arrested has never surrendered peaceably in the past or has a record of violence this may require quick incapacitation by law enforcement officers The amount of actual physical force used on a subject must be based on their actual resistance The amount and type of notice of charges must be based on a number of factors If at all possible a person should be given a chance (without sacrificing the safety of any officer) to surrender

Explanation of Arrest

If there is hesitancy on the part of the subject in surrendering to a lawful arrest by the police and the police have the opportunity the subject should be told that he will not be harmed As stated above physical force is only used when physical resistance is encountered A subject will not be punished by the police if he surrenders It doesnt matter if the person is charged with the serial killing of infants or overdue parking citations the seriousness of the crime is not a factor When the subject is handcuffed and under control physical action by the police should cease

Arraignment

Arraignment should be as quick as possible especially with a serious crime or when law enforcement has had to use extraordinary means to take a subject into custody The subject should be brought before a magistrate immediately after theincidenl so that the magistrate can confirm that probable cause was present and proper procedures were followed

Fundamental Principles

The question of how incidents such as the type discussed can be dealt with is a major focal point The following points may provide a foundation for this examination

July 1995 13

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

POLlCE FQRUMisa publication ofthe POliSebtionof the Acaderny otCriminaf Justice SciencesandseN$stogt

ItcaditryOfCrlmtnQJJustlce Sciences ~oltceSct1on

Ex_cutive Board

Chalr iqtOrEKappel$fmiddot

~feE~SJern~emultkyyniJersity

~~middotmiddotrYc~yen8Jiii

O$l(lMilw~lIJ(ee

)

~rof91n~flnattgt lt~S~~(( ~~

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WalkerUniversftyof ArkanSaS-U Crimi(lal JlJstce(~aQtSQuth

72204gt

POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

1 Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility when dealing with barricaded antagonists to

a tell them with what they are charged b tell them that if they submitto a lawful arrest they

will not be mistreated c make sure they are arraigned promptly and have

access to legal counsel

2 The polilicalleaders are ultimately responsible for the actions of the Jaw enforcement agencies The law enforcement executives in each of these agenshycies serve elected officials The question of who has the expertise and how much discretion to act will always vary among politicians and agency heads The politician must decide if he or the law enforceshyment agency head has the greater ability to deal with the situation and based on that assessment the Jaw enforcement agency head must be given the requishysite amount of discretion to act

3 If an assault is to be made tactics which have the best chance of producing the fewest (and least serishyous) casualities must be used

This third point is the most problematic A discussion of culture is relevant

Culture and Tactics

It is difficult to explain to those outside the law enforcement field how important the culture of the community in which you are operating is to the tactics which can be used An example of this is the use of dogs in police work Large dogs are used by police agencies allover the world to help in patrol and in protecting police officers In many cities in the United States dogs are used in law enforcement agencies but dogs are rwely used in the South The reason is that the images of how the dogs were used during the civil rights marches in the South is indelible in the minds of many Americans Police dogs were used in some cases to attack African-Americans who were peaceably assembled in an attempt to secure civil rights No matter how practical or efficient dogs may be the culture will not accept them

Law enforcement agencies must realize that there is great variance in the culture of different groups within the United States Religious ethnic gender political and geographic variables vary from person to person and group to group These variables help to define the group and must be seriously considered in tactical planning because they are the key to how people will react in certain situations

Avoiding Similar Situations

There may be other ways to deter some of these situations from happening While moral suasion is not always effecshytive there should at least be some ground rules of what

bull responsibilities each individual has in living in this democshyracy In all three incidents discussed if the subjects had surrendered the incidents would have been resolved peaceshyably In the Waco situation the search warrant was issued

improperly Many of the allegations made against Koresh and the Branch Davidians were not corroborated by reliable sourcesoreven iftrue did notconstitute illegal acts (Fiddleman amp Kopel 1993) Citizens should have the right to object to any search but should not violently oppose the police The citizen should have the opportunity of prosecuting the police criminally and civilly for illegal searches

It should be emphasized again that the three described incishydents are rare in the United States On the other hand continuing divisions and radicalization among religious racial and political groups may give rise to an increase in such incidents

One way to possibly avoid these incidents may be to take the leaders of the group into custody away from the residence

In the Waco incident David Koresh was observed jogging shopping at a mall and driving through the community during the two weeks before the assault He could have been taken into custody at that time Ironically David Koresh had been questioned earlier about having illegal guns When the Sheriff telephoned him and asked him to come in an talk about Mr Koresh came in One could argue that because he had never resisted a warrant in the past he deserved the opportunity to surrender rather than having his home asshysaulted by 76 armed agents

John Africa was the head of MOVE He seldom left home but others charged in the warrants did They may have been apprehended away from their home Admittedly those MOVE members who had been arrested in the past for complaints by their neighbors had almost always been reshyleased when found guilty The criminal justice system was overwhelmed by the circus that was created by their shenanishygans

The SLA was headed by Cinque The SLA was the only group discussed which was committing violent felonies with weapons It may have been prudent to stakeout the residence and wait until the suspects exited it before apprehending them The downside of this is that it could have put citizens in danger if the confrontation turned violent out on the street

Considering the time money and officers lives involved in such incidents it may be wise to create a special squad of officers trained to serve warrants on dangerous criminals when they are away from their residence This would not only take officers highly trained in the use of force but supervisors who could evaluate when and how the use of force would be tactically the most advantageous In the Waco incident the timing of the assault was made based on the photo opportunity that it provided A number of video journalists were on the scene at the invitation of the BAIF before the assault began Tactics were sacrificed for the chance of getting film footage of federal agents performing a successful raid

Conclusion

The three incidents discussed above were unusual occurshyrences Law enforcement officers rarely confront situations that are as inherently dangerous as those mentioned In each

Police Forum 14

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

POLlCE FQRUMisa publication ofthe POliSebtionof the Acaderny otCriminaf Justice SciencesandseN$stogt

ItcaditryOfCrlmtnQJJustlce Sciences ~oltceSct1on

Ex_cutive Board

Chalr iqtOrEKappel$fmiddot

~feE~SJern~emultkyyniJersity

~~middotmiddotrYc~yen8Jiii

O$l(lMilw~lIJ(ee

)

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bull (1) encour~gereSe$rchand theory deV~lopmentrelatfJd to poUcing(2) link res~~rchac8demicpractjUonerari9lt policymaking$ecenttorstQfurtherdevek)pknowledge~bollt middotpoliceltandpoli9ingind(~)encourage apprdpti~teartd0~~ effectiV$ieachingpractices forpollcemiddotrEICited cP4rses)JSubntsI6n~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot raquo bull

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WalkerUniversftyof ArkanSaS-U Crimi(lal JlJstce(~aQtSQuth

72204gt

POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

instance large numbers of law enforcement officers exshypended thousands of rounds of ammunition as a precursor to the inferno that neutralized the threat In the SLA situation police followed the SLA to their hideout and after asking them to surrender were fired upon In the MOVE situation police had planned for months on how to take certain memshybers of MOVE into custody and were intent on making the arrests The Branch Davidians were besieged in their comshypound based on alleged mala prohibita crimes They had never been convicted of harming anyone and no complaints existed against them except those made by the federal government

It would seem based on these incidents that a fIre may be the likely result in such conflicts Uncontrolled burning does not discriminate between the armed and unarmed the resisting and the unresisting or adults and children It is an immutable fact that the police as an extension of the government must win The police should examine every strategy to reduce the possibilty of casualties to both offIcers and subjects

The agents who work for BA1F are dedicated professionals who offer aid to the local police departments in getting armed career criminals off of the streets The agents in Waco who lost their lives obeyed orders and followed the tactics ap- proved by supervisors in the BA1F Neither the safety of these agents nor the safety of the Branch Davidians was of primary concern to the government At the federal state and local level those deciding the target and tactics for law enforcement offIcers should be equal in professionalism to those who carry out their directives

Bibliography

Anderson J and Hevenor H Burning down the house MOVE and the Tragedy ofPhiladelphia Ontario Penguin Books 1987

Annin P Liu M amp Cohn B Sifting Through the Ashes Newsweek May 10 199344

Assefa H and Wahrhaftig P Extremist groups and conflict resolution The MOVE crisis in Philadelphia New York Praeger 1988

Blackman PH Affidavit to kill Obtaining and Serving the Arrest Warrants for David Koresh and His Compound A paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology 1993

Bowser C Let the bunker burn The final battle with MOVE Philadelphia Camino Books 1989

Boyette M Let it burn Chicago Contemporary Books Inc 1989

Dennis Jr ESG Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standmiddotoffin Waco T faas Washington US Departshyment of Justice October 81993 (Redacted Version)

Fiddleman TH amp Kopel DB ATFs Basis forthe Assault on Waco Is Shot Full of Holes Insight June 28 199321middot22

Gates DE Chief My Life in the LAPD New York Bantam Books1992

Harry M AUention MOVE This isAmerica Chicago Banner Press 1987

Heymann PB Lessons ofWaco Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement Washington US Department of Justicebull October 8 1993

Kantrowitz B Carroll G Annin P Barrett T Cohn B and Liu M Day of JUdgment Newsweek May 3199322-27

McLaughlin V amp Smith S The Rodney King Syndrome paper presented in 1993 at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

McLaughlin V Police Use ofForce The Savannah Study New York Praeger Press 1992

McLellan V and Avery P The voices ofguns the definitive and dramaticstoryofthetwenly-twomonlhcareeroftheSymbionese Liberation Army one ofthe most bizarre chapters in the history of the American Left New York Putnam 1977

PateIL Gun Gestapos Day of Infamy Soldier of Fortune 1993 18(6)48middot53 62middot64

Payne L Findley T and Craven C The life and death ofthe SLA New York Ballantine Books 1976

Pearsall RB The Symbionese Liberation Army Documents and Communications Amsterdam Rodopi NV 1974

Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco Washington DC US Department of Justice 1993

Report of The DepartmenJ of The Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco andFirearms Investigation ofVernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh Washington DC US Government Printing Office September 1993

SocietyofProfessional Journalists Report ofthe Waco T ask Force Greencastle Indiana PO Box 77 September 8 1993

Book News

From Fate to Choice Private Bobbies Public Beats

by Michael McManus Ashgate Publishing 1995 165 pages $5195 hardback

Private security patrols in public places are occurring in many areas of the United Kingdom and move closer to that tradishytional domain of the public police - streets and neighbourhoods Such a phenomenon is ripe for sociological enquiry and accordingly Michael McManus provides a focused interpretation of six key concepts each central to the equity debate on private policing Data from three research sites in the United Kingdom are presented throughout the book in the form of case studies

Equity of justice is crucial and intrinsic to the association policing should have with a democratic equal and free society Private security however is not conducive to these requirements for it has an inherently competitive style exshycluding freedom from those who are non-competitive through either choice or economic disadvantage Accordshyingly an embarrassing characteristic of private security is that it promises too much freedom of choice in a less than equal world

July 1995 15

POLlCE FQRUMisa publication ofthe POliSebtionof the Acaderny otCriminaf Justice SciencesandseN$stogt

ItcaditryOfCrlmtnQJJustlce Sciences ~oltceSct1on

Ex_cutive Board

Chalr iqtOrEKappel$fmiddot

~feE~SJern~emultkyyniJersity

~~middotmiddotrYc~yen8Jiii

O$l(lMilw~lIJ(ee

)

~rof91n~flnattgt lt~S~~(( ~~

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bull (1) encour~gereSe$rchand theory deV~lopmentrelatfJd to poUcing(2) link res~~rchac8demicpractjUonerari9lt policymaking$ecenttorstQfurtherdevek)pknowledge~bollt middotpoliceltandpoli9ingind(~)encourage apprdpti~teartd0~~ effectiV$ieachingpractices forpollcemiddotrEICited cP4rses)JSubntsI6n~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot raquo bull

l v (~~ 0 lt-Ci Carl8KJ()ckai$ bullbull ManusQnPtsandresearc~notesilnthe broad~reaofj ~f UniVerSityofOelalN~relt ~Ilcestudies are invited for~upmiSSiO~ fv1anus~rip~$

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~~1~~i~~~pound~~I~~~~~B~~f2~l~~bull~~~jmiddotOej)aqm~ntofCrimlnal)USticeWaiTensburgMo6409~

Illfl~iU~Ylt7ritn~~~~ middotmiddotmiddotmiddoti ikimiddotmiddotS~middot~~~~middotmiddot Membershipregtte$t$S~Uldbej

WalkerUniversftyof ArkanSaS-U Crimi(lal JlJstce(~aQtSQuth

72204gt

POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16

POLlCE FQRUMisa publication ofthe POliSebtionof the Acaderny otCriminaf Justice SciencesandseN$stogt

ItcaditryOfCrlmtnQJJustlce Sciences ~oltceSct1on

Ex_cutive Board

Chalr iqtOrEKappel$fmiddot

~feE~SJern~emultkyyniJersity

~~middotmiddotrYc~yen8Jiii

O$l(lMilw~lIJ(ee

)

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bull (1) encour~gereSe$rchand theory deV~lopmentrelatfJd to poUcing(2) link res~~rchac8demicpractjUonerari9lt policymaking$ecenttorstQfurtherdevek)pknowledge~bollt middotpoliceltandpoli9ingind(~)encourage apprdpti~teartd0~~ effectiV$ieachingpractices forpollcemiddotrEICited cP4rses)JSubntsI6n~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot raquo bull

l v (~~ 0 lt-Ci Carl8KJ()ckai$ bullbull ManusQnPtsandresearc~notesilnthe broad~reaofj ~f UniVerSityofOelalN~relt ~Ilcestudies are invited for~upmiSSiO~ fv1anus~rip~$

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WalkerUniversftyof ArkanSaS-U Crimi(lal JlJstce(~aQtSQuth

72204gt

POLlCE STUDIES THE INTERNA110NALREVIEW

OF POLlCE DEVELOPMENT

Call For Papers

The Editor of Police Studies Lawrence F Travis III is interested in manuscripts from Police Scction members Papers dealing with police and law enforcement topics inshycluding theory research practice and policy issues are inshyvited Of particular relevance are those papers examining police issues from an international perspective and those based on research and experience in foreign countries Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate to

Lawrence F Travis III Editor University of Cincinnati

bull Department of Criminal Justice ML 389

Cincinnati OH 45221-0389

JOURNAL OF OFFENDER MONITORING

Call For Papers

A monograph devoted to the use of technology for supervishysion of offenders in the community and monitoring criminal activity Issues also include information on other tools such as drug testing alcohol testing ignition inter-lock systems and wiretapping In short the Journal brings you the latest technologies and their application for both police surveilshylance and community based supervision of offenders The Journal is issued quarterly To submit manuscripts or obtain marc information contact

Editor Journal ofOffender Monitoring

PO Box 326 Richmond KY 40476

Police Forum 16