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I Didnt Do It: Responsibility Biases in Open and Closed Groups

Jeni L. Burnette and Donelson R. ForsythUniversity of Richmond

Group members often take more responsibility for the groups outcomes than othersgive to them. Extending evidence that egocentrism can be muted when group membersare individuated (the unpacking effect), the authors predicted that members of opengroups would be less egocentric than members of closed groups. In open groups, thepossibility of membership fluctuation reduces collectiveness, breaking the group intoindividuals, which in turn lessens egocentrism. The authors tested these predictions ina study of groups of students working on a task relevant to their academic success.Members claimed more personal responsibility when they worked in closed groupsrelative to open groups (egocentrism), and lack of cohesion mediated the open- versusclosed-group link to responsibility allocations. Moreover, members of open groups didnot take more responsibility after a success than a failure, whereas those in closed,successful groups claimed more credit than members of failure groups (self-servingbias). The discussion suggests that open groups, although often thought to createconflict as members compete, may contribute to a reduction in both egocentrism andself-serving responsibility allocations.

Keywords: egocentrism, responsibility allocations, unpacking, open groups, closedgroups

Researchers have long been interested in thatuneasy, and in some cases illusory, boundary

between the individual and the group. From theearly analyses of phenomena thought to meldindividuals truly into groupssuch as deindi-viduation, collective consciousness, and mobmentalityto current conceptions of socialidentity, collective efficacy, and group-levelevolutionary mechanisms, researchers havespeculated about the interface between the in-dividual and the group. The individual can beconsidered a solitairea separate entity withself-determination and independence from oth-

ers. However, in most situations the individualis linked, albeit extricably, to a group, with the

result that when an individual joins a group hisor her self is an augmented, expanded, commu-

nal self (Forsyth & Burnette, 2005).The current research focuses on one facet of

this interface of the individual and the group.Specifically, we examine responsibility alloca-tions to self and to others for collective endeav-ors after success versus failure performancefeedback. When individuals work collectively,the contributions of each person are rarelyknown explicitly, and so questions of relativecontribution to the effort and, of course, relativerewards for the work, are not answered with

complete clarity. In this relatively undifferenti-ated attributional context, members of groupsoften take more responsibility for the groupsoutcomes than others give to them, regardless ofperformance outcomes; they display an egocen-tric bias (Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Savitsky, 2007).They also tend to display a self-serving bias,giving themselves more credit after success thanfailure (e.g., D. T. Miller & Ross, 1975).

Prior research indicates that egocentrism isexacerbated if members are seen as a collective(e.g., Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight,2005). Additionally, group members are morelikely to externalize failures and internalize suc-cesses when they are invested in the group and

Jeni L. Burnette, Department of Psychology, Universityof Richmond; Donelson R. Forsyth, Jepson School of Lead-ership Studies, University of Richmond.

Portions of this manuscript were reported at the AnnualMeeting of Society of Personality and Social PsychologyAssociation in January 2006. Thanks are extended to FayeBelgrave, Scott Allison, Nick Epley, and the reviewers fortheir help in many phases of this research.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Jeni L. Burnette, Department of Psychology,University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173. E-mail:[email protected]

Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association2008, Vol. 12, No. 3, 210 222 1089-2699/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1089-2699.12.3.210

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thus there are implications for their self-worth(Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998). These findingssuggest that egocentrism and self-serving biaseswill be reduced in what Ziller (1965) called

open groups; groups whose boundaries are per-meable rather than fixed. Members of suchgroups, recognizing that members may be ex-cluded and new members added, should be lesslikely to see the group as a collective and shouldbe less personally invested, which wouldthereby reduce responsibility biases. We brieflyreview empirical studies of responsibility biasesin groups before describing the results of anexperiment that lends support to the idea thatbiases are the rule in closed groups but theexception in open ones.

Responsibility Biases in Groups

Individuals, after they have completed a task,expend considerable mental energy reviewingtheir efforts and outcomes: They evaluate thequality of their performance, identify factorsthat hampered their efforts, and critique thestrategies they used to reach their goals. Theseperformance-focused cognitive processes be-come more complex when individuals work

with others, for groups must also review eachmembers performance; assign credit andblame; make decisions regarding rewards,power, and status; and decide who is responsi-ble for the groups outcomes. Anyone who hasdone anything in a groupplayed a team sport,coauthored an article with others, or jointlyplanned and executed a projectknows indi-viduals in groups sometimes take more respon-sibility for the collective outcome than seemsreasonable. When estimating time spent, contri-butions made, quality of performance, and soon, people give themselves relatively rosymarks.

Ross and Sicoly (1979) labeled this egocen-trism, which they defined as the tendency forindividuals to accept more responsibility for ajoint product than other contributors attribute tothem (p. 322). In their work they documentedthis tendency by asking married couples to in-dicate the extent to which they or their spousewas responsible for such household tasks asshopping or preparing breakfast. The couples

joint claims usually exceeded 100%, indicatingan overestimation of contribution by at least oneof the partners. This overestimation was also

seen for negative events such as which partnerwas responsible for starting arguments.

Ross and Sicoly (1979) stress the greateravailability of ones own contributions, and the

inevitable greater weighting such contributionsreceive when credit is tallied. For example, in agroup context, they noted that group memberspresumably attempt to recall each participantscontributions to the final product, but for avariety of reasons peoples personal contribu-tions are more available in memory than are theinputs of other group members: They possessmore information regarding their own contribu-tions than others contributions, they encodetheir own contributions more clearly because of

greater salience or importance, they retrievetheir contributions from memory more easily,and they may spend more time thinking (bothprospectively and retrospectively) about theirown rather than others inputs to the joint en-deavor. As a result of these heuristic biases,people may claim more credit for group out-comes than others assign to them (Ross & Si-coly, 1979; Thompson & Kelly, 1981).

Egocentrism is typically thought to occur be-cause of differential accessibility to ones owncontributions, although the motive to protectand enhance the self can play a role in intensi-fying the effect. From a motivated reasoningperspective, the quality of the outcome that re-sults from the collaborationwas the groupsuccessful or unsuccessful?is particularly im-portant (Mynatt & Sherman, 1975; Wolosin,Sherman, & Till, 1973). As in individual per-formances, reactions to collective endeavors areasymmetrical: Members see themselves as morecreditable for the outcome when it is positiveand less accountable when negative. This bias is

often labeled the self-serving bias because theindividuals private self is thought to beserved by increasing its link to good, positiveoutcomes, and decreasing the link to negativeoutcomes (Leary & Forsyth, 1987; R. S. Miller& Schlenker, 1985). As a consequence, groupmembers who consider the task to be particu-larly important (e.g., Forsyth & Schlenker,1977) or more strongly invest in their group(e.g., Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998) are morelikely to externalize failures and internalize suc-

cesses, relative to those who do not think thetask, or the groups outcomes, have implica-tions for their self-worth.

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Limiting and Increasing ResponsibilityBiases

A number of situational and psychological

factors have been shown to reduce or enhanceresponsibility biases. For example, members offace-to-face groups are more biased, comparedto nominal, noninteracting groups (Rantilla,2000). Individuals who are part of a subgroupwithin the larger group are also less likely todisplay egocentrism (Schlenker & Miller,1977). Smaller groups, and perhaps dyads inparticular, are more likely to be egocentric thanlarger groups (Forsyth, Zyzniewski, & Giam-manco, 2002). These findings could be due, inpart, to greater cohesion and collectiveness insmaller face-to-face groups, which perhapsmakes members more likely to see the group asa collective rather than breaking the group intoits individual parts, and the unity also oftenleads to more self-involvement. Further aspectsof groups that have been explored include, forexample, that members of groups anticipatingrepeated work as a team in the future are asbiased as one-time only groups (Forsyth &Schlenker, 1977) and individuals display biaseswhether or not their responses will be made

public or kept private (Schlenker & Goldman,1978). Responsibility biases are muted, how-ever, on certain tasksparticularly difficulttasks where ones own performance is shaky(Kruger & Gilovich, 1999). Individuals whoseperformance is objectively inferior to otherstend to be less biased, as reality creates con-straints on claims of responsibility (Forsyth &Kelley, 1994).

Egocentrism also rises and falls as individu-als shift their attention from themselves to oth-ers in the group (Burger & Rodman, 1983;Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006; Epley, Ca-ruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Savitsky et al., 2005).Caruso and his colleagues (2006), for example,found that simply asking participants to thinkabout their collaborators contributionswhathas been called unpackingresulted in reducedegocentrism across three studies. When, for ex-ample, authors of published manuscripts wroteabout their own contribution to an article orrated each collaborators contribution, authorswho considered their collaborators efforts

made fewer egocentric responsibility alloca-tions. They also found a reduction in egocen-trism when making participants contribution

less salient (Caruso et al., 2006). Savitsky andcolleagues (2005), across four studies, revealedthat egocentrism is reduced when group mem-bers are conceptualized as individuals rather

than the rest of the group. They illustrated anunpacking effect by simply having participantsrate their own contribution after estimating theproportion of work that each team member hadcontributed, with the provision that the alloca-tions of responsibility could be summed andcompared to a baseline of 100% (Savitsky et al.,2005). This unpacking, however, comes at acost. The concept of nave cynicism (see Kruger& Gilovich, 1999) suggests that if group mem-bers think about other people and their motives,then they may expect those others to claim morecredit than is warranted by the facts of theircollaboration. In consequence, unpacking re-duces egocentrism, but group members also be-come less satisfied with the group and less com-mitted to future work.

Responsibility Biases in Open GroupsVersus Closed Groups

Egocentrism is more likely in groups inwhich members are seen as a collective but

reduced when unpacking occurs and membersare considered as individuals (Savitsky et al.,2005). Additionally, self-serving biases aresomewhat mitigated when individuals do notidentify with their group and thus their self-worth is not closely tied to the groups perfor-mance outcomes (e.g., Dietz-Uhler & Murrell,1998). What leads some group members to beperceived as closely tied to one another andothers to be seen as independent entities? Oneanswer is the stability of the groups member-ship. As Zillers (1965) theory of open andclosed groups suggests, groups differ in theextent to which their boundaries and the mem-bership rosters are open and fluctuating versusclosed and fixed. Group membership can fluc-tuate because members are voted out of thegroup (e.g., governing committees) or becausemembers voluntarily come and go (e.g., com-munity service groups). Regardless of the rea-sons for group fluctuation, open groups are es-pecially unlikely to reach a state of equilibriumbecause members recognize that they may lose

or relinquish their place within the group at anytime. Members of open groups, especially thosein which membership is dependent on voting or

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meeting a particular standard, are more likely tomonitor the actions of others. Ziller writes: In theexpanded frame of reference of the open groups inwhich transfers frequently occur, more accurate

and more reliable ratings of the members are pos-sible. . . (1965, p. 168). Similarly, support theory(Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky &Koehler, 1994) suggests that open groups leadmembers to consider each element of the groupseparately, thereby reducing group unity.

In contrast, closed groups are often morecohesive, as competition for membership is ir-relevant and group members anticipate futurecollaborations. Thus, in closed groups, individ-uals are more likely to focus on the collectivenature of the group and should be more likely toidentify with their group as they work togetherto accomplish a collective goal. Zillers theorysuggests that open groups, by their very nature,trigger unpacking and a loss of group identity,and hence can retard egocentrism. Conversely,closed groups lead to more group unity, as theself becomes intertwined with the group. Thus,breaking each member into disjoint componentsis less likely. When individuals think of thegroup as a collective rather than individuals,egocentrism can be compounded (e.g., Savitsky

et al., 2005).We suggest that open groups not only mute

egocentrism but also lead group members totemper their self-serving biases. Why might weexpect this drop in motivated reasoning in opengroups? Research suggests that self-serving bi-ases are reduced when group members think thetask is unimportant (e.g., Forsyth & Schlenker,1977) and/or do not invest in their group (e.g.,Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998). Similarly, inopen groups the motivation to protect the selfmay be tempered as members of these groupsdo not commit to or invest in their group, andthus their self-worth is less closely tied to groupoutcomes. In contrast, members of closedgroups, whose group membership is secure andwhose identity is more closely linked to thegroup, may let their motivations bias their judg-ments. Additionally, in open groups, memberslikely realize their contributions to the collec-tive task are being monitored and thus tempertheir responsibility biases. In reference to thenature of open groups, Ziller notes, since it is

less possible to insulate and isolate oneself,inflated self-estimates do not remain uncheckedor unchallenged for long (1965, p. 168).

To examine the effects of membership mo-bility and performance outcomes on responsi-bility biases, we asked members of four-persongroups to work on an educational task. Some

groups were closed, but in open groups partic-ipants were told that one member would beselected for exclusion from the group. Afterreceiving either success or failure feedbackabout the quality of their work, participantsrated their responsibility on self-onlyfocusedand group-focused measures and completed as-sessments of the collective nature of the group(i.e., cohesion). Merging support theory, un-packing effect research, and self-serving biaswork with Zillers open- and closed-group the-

oretical perspective, we posit the following:

Unpacking Effect Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Because we expected thatmembers of closed groups would be ego-centric, we predicted a main effect of typeof group (open/closed) on responsibilityallocations (but only on self-focused mea-sures where responsibility was not alreadyunpacked by the use of group-focused as-

sessments).

Hypothesis 2: As is consistent withSavitsky et al. (2005) studies of unpacking,we expected that members of open groupswould report less group unity (i.e., cohe-sion) than members of closed groups.

Hypothesis 3: We predicted that cohesionwould in turn mediate the relationship be-tween the type of group (open/closed) andresponsibility allocation, such that when a

group is open cohesion is reduced, and thatreduction in cohesion will in turn temperegocentrism.

Self-Serving Effect Hypothesis

Hypothesis 4: We predicted that the ten-dency to take more responsibility for suc-cess than failure (the self-serving bias)would occur only in closed groups; hence,we expected that type of group (open/

closed) would interact with performancecondition (success/failure) in influencingresponsibility allocations.

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Method

Participants

We recruited undergraduate participants

(N 96; 64 women) most of whom were youngadults (M 19.57 years old, SD 4.24). Thesample was of varying ethnicity (56% White,28% African American, 5% mixed, 6% Asian,and 5% other). All participants were enrolled inan introductory course in psychology and re-ceived credit for participating. Participants hadcompleted and received feedback on at least oneexam in their class prior to taking part in theresearch. Each group had four participants for agroup sample size of 24.

Procedure

In this research we took advantage of a study-group program where students in psychologyare encouraged to form study groups. We in-vited students to the group laboratory for theirfirst session where they completed individual-ized tests before working together in a same-sexstudy group. Across conditions, the experi-menter informed participants that the currentstudy would take 1 hr and that being involved in

study groups typically helps students improvetheir scores in introductory psychology.

We then assigned half of the groups at ran-dom to the open-group condition and half to theclosed-group condition. In the open condition,the experimenter informed participants that notall study groups are created equally and thus weare interested in studying what might makesome groups more effective than others. Specif-ically, we are exploring how open groups per-form relative to closed groups: that is, whenmembers can be dropped for not contributing tothe group effort, are study groups more effec-tive? The experimenter went on to explain thatgroup members would identify individuals whoshould be dropped from membership at the endof the session. Specifically, participants wereinformed that they would vote for one memberto be excluded and would then work on anothertask either alone (if voted out) or together if oneof the three remaining participants. In theclosed-group condition, participants were alsotold that the purpose of the study was to exam-

ine the effectiveness of study groups, but theyhad no reason to believe that group membershipcould or would fluctuate. Members of closed

groups were also informed that they wouldwork together on a future task.

Following the open-/closed-group manipula-tion, the experimenter introduced the group task

to the participants. The experimenter informedparticipants that they would work alone on tasksthat test their knowledge on previously coveredmaterial in introductory psychology. The exper-imenter explained that participants first workalone because in most study groups people oftenprepare on their own before joining the group.The study simulated that individual activity byhaving people work on problems both individ-ually and in the group. The experimenter in-formed participants that after 10 min of workingalone, they would work as a four-person groupon another task related to their introductorypsychology material. The experimenter then in-formed participants that their group perfor-mance score would be a composite of eachmembers correct answers on the individual testand the groups total correct answers on thegroup task. We included both an individual andgroup component to make the performance ma-nipulation more credible and the responsibilityallocations more ambiguous.

After completing a short list of multiple-

choice questions pertaining to topics they werecurrently studying in their classes, the membersmoved from their individual seats to sit face-to-face at a small table. Each one was identified bya letter (A, B, C, and D), and they used theselabels rather than their names as they worked ona second set of multiple-choice and essay ques-tions. They spent approximately 10 min work-ing collectively to answer these questions be-fore moving back to partitioned stations wherethey were unable to see the other group mem-bers. The experimenter appeared to spend timeat the computer located in the room, scoring theparticipants individual and group responses byrunning the answer sheets through a scoringmachine and grading the short-answer writtensections. While the experimenter seeminglycomputed performance scores, the participantscompleted filler items. The experimenter thenrandomly assigned groups to the success orfailure condition. Groups in the success condi-tion received feedback indicating that theirgroup was in the top 10% of all groups that had

been tested. In contrast, groups in the failurecondition received feedback indicating that theyscored in the bottom 50% of all groups that had



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been tested. These success and failure percent-ages coincide with what students typically seeas successful and as failing in terms of theirgrades (e.g., top 10% is an A, below 50% is an F).

After receiving their feedback, participants com-pleted measures of responsibility and cohesion.

Measures

The survey that participants completed ex-plained that their perceptions of their groupwould help researchers better understand studygroups and their effectiveness. They were as-sured that their responses would remain strictlyconfidential, and were cautioned to not put theirname anywhere on the form.

Responsibility. We measured personal re-sponsibility by asking participants to rate theirown personal responsibility on a single-itemassessment that asked, how responsible areyou personally for your groups outcome? Par-ticipants completed this self-focused questionusing a 9-point scale with 1 (not very responsi-ble) and 9 (very responsible) as end points. Thisassessment is similar to the control condition inSavitsky et al. (2005). Participants also com-pleted a group-focused assessment on which

they allocated 100 points among all the mem-bers of the four-person groups, giving morepoints to the more responsible member. Thismeasure is similar to the unpacking conditionsin Savitsky et al. (2005) work. As in Forsyth etal. (2002), all members (including the partici-pants themselves) were listed by letter only.This assessment yielded three different ways ofexamining responsibility biases.

Participants own responsibility was calculatedby dividing the total number of responsibilitypoints allocated to the self by the total number ofpossible points (i.e., 100). Thus, if every groupmember gave equal allocation, each memberwould have a percentage of 25. Overall groupresponsibility allocation was calculated by sum-ming each group members percentage contribu-tion. If this exceeded 100%, it would indicate thatat least one group member over-claimed respon-sibility. Relative responsibility allocation to thejoint effort was also calculated by comparing eachparticipants rating of his or her own responsibilityto the amount of responsibility he or she was

given by the other group members. We computedthis assessment by adding the other 3 group mem-bers assessment of the participants responsibil-

ity, dividing by 3, and then subtracting this meanfrom the participants own responsibility alloca-tion. For example, a score of plus 10 suggestsparticipants overestimated their contribution rela-

tive to the other group members assessment ofthe participants contribution by 10 percentagepoints.

Group unity. We measured the cohesion ofthe group with the use of a five-item scale thatincluded measures of perceived unity of thegroup (Dion, 2000). An example of a cohesionitem is, There was a feeling of unity and co-hesion in my group. Participants respondedusing a 5-point scale with 1 (strongly disagree)and 5 (agree strongly) end points ( .84).

Group investment. We thought that notonly would open groups break down the groupunity but that individuals would also be lesslikely to invest in the group task. We assessedthis in two ways. First, we used role allocations,assuming that individuals who were more in-vested in their group would be more willing toaccept a leadership position within that group,so following Forsyth et al. (2002), group mem-bers were given a list of eight possible roles thatmay have existed in their group: leader, critic,joker, harmonizer, follower, observer, commu-

nicator, and participator. They assigned theserole labels to each of the group members, in-cluding themselves. Additionally, we assessedthe degree to which the group task was a col-laborative effort by asking In this group, mem-bers did not need to cooperate to complete thegroup tasks. Participants responded with theuse of a 5-point scale with 1 (strongly disagree)and 5 (agree strongly) end points.

Manipulation checks. We manipulated bothgroup type (open/closed) and performance feed-back (success/failure). One item assessed theperformance outcome manipulation, How wasthe overall rating of performance for the groupas a whole on the task? with 1 (very poor)and 9 (very good) as end points. One itemserved to check that group fluctuation was aclear possibility in the open groups but not inclosed groups. The item stated, At what pointduring the study were you aware that the size ofthe group would vary? with at the beginningand the endas the possible choices. As part ofanother ongoing project, participants in the

closed condition, after completing all necessaryinformation for the current study, were asked toexclude one person from the group. This ma-

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nipulation check was included at the end of thesecond studys assessment after the members ofthe closed group had been informed of exclu-sion but prior to debriefing.

Results

Because members worked in face-to-facegroups, we tested for nonindependence of partic-ipants responses within the groups by computingthe intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for thedependent measures. The ICC is calculated byusing mean squares from a fixed-effects ANOVAin which group is nested within the independentvariable (see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,

2003; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). The ICCsfor the self-focused responsibility measure (r.08, p .25), the group-focused responsibilityrating for oneself (r .05, p .21), role alloca-tions (r .03, p .33), and cooperation (r .09,p .13) were nonsignificant. Even consideringthe recommendation by Kenny and colleaguesthat a liberal alpha of .10.25 should be used toavoid erroneously rejecting the existence of non-independence, the ICC calculations for these out-comes indicate that the assumption of indepen-

dence was met and the data should be analyzed atthe individual level (Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro,Livi, & Kashy, 2002). However, results revealedsignificant ICCs for the relative group-focusedresponsibility measure (r .27, p .05) and thecohesion assessment (r .34, p .05). Addition-ally, the group-focused total responsibility alloca-tion assessment is a group-level construct. Thus,analyses involving relative responsibility, totalgroup responsibility, and cohesion are reportedwith group used as the unit of analysis (N 24).

We examined our hypotheses, unless other-wise noted, with the use of a 2 (performanceoutcome: success vs. failure) 2 (group type:open group vs. closed) ANOVA. For the indi-vidual-level responsibility allocation assess-ment, group members scores on the individualportion of the task served as a covariate tocontrol for variations in academic preparation.We included sex in both the individual-leveland group-level full-factorial models, but be-cause it had no significant effect on key out-comes, we excluded sex from analyses. To ex-

amine the hypothesis that the open/closed ego-centrism effect would be mediated by abreakdown in a sense of collectiveness (i.e.,

cohesion), we employed the standard regressionapproach recommended by Kenny et al. (1998).

Manipulation ChecksTo check the effectiveness of the perfor-

mance-feedback manipulation, participantswere asked How was the overall rating ofperformance for the group as a whole on thetask? The significant main effect, F(1, 89) 160.60, p .01, indicated members of groupswho failed rated their groups performance morenegatively than did members of successful groups;the means were 4.13 and 8.27, respectively.

The group type (open/closed) manipulation was

also effective. We asked participants in a finalquestionnaire at what point during the study theyrealized the size of the group would vary. Thirty-six of the 38 participants in the open-group con-dition (95%) who responded indicated that theywere apprised of the possibility of exclusion at thebeginning of the experiment, whereas 35 of the 41participants in the closed-group condition (85%)checked the at the end response for the at whatpoint during the study were you aware that thesize of the group would vary? question;

2

(N 79, df 1) 50.82, p .001.

Biased Responsibility Allocations: Self-Focused Assessment and Egocentrism

We predicted that members of closed groupsrelative to open groups would show egocen-trism in their responsibility claims. However,we only expected this main effect on the self-focused measure that assessed personal respon-sibility but did not include considering and

ranking other group members contributions(which would in and of itself lead to unpacking,as demonstrated by Savitsky et al., 2005). Thesignificant main effect, F(1, 83) 4.66, p .05, of open/closed group on the single-itemmeasure, How responsible are you personallyfor your groups performance? supported ouregocentrism prediction. Individuals in opengroups reported less egocentrism (M 4.56,SD 1.11) than those in closed groups(M 5.10, SD 1.24). Additionally, individ-

uals in successful groups (M 5.10,SD 1.08), claimed significantly, F(1 ,83) 4.45, p .05, more responsibility rela-



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tive to failure groups (M 4.57, SD 1.27).The interaction, although in the predicted direc-tion, did not reach significance; p .12.

Group Unity

We suggested that reduced egocentrism wouldbe due to a loss in the connection between theindividual members and the group as a whole inopen relative to closed groups. Although not di-rectly postulated, we also expected that successwould strengthen individualgroup bonds, andfailure would weaken them. As predicted, opengroups were less cohesive than closed groups;F(1, 20) 5.49, p .05. The means were 3.65and 4.03, respectively. Additionally, analyses re-vealed a significant main effect of performancefeedback on group cohesion; F(1, 20) 13.85,p .001. Members of groups that succeeded ratedtheir groups as more cohesive (M 4.14) thanthose in groups that failed (M 3.53). The two-way interaction of group type and performanceoutcome was not significant.

Mediation Model: Unpacking Effect

In line with unpacking research, we predicted

that impact of type of group (open vs. closed)would be mediated by a loss of cohesion in opengroups. Replicating the two-way ANOVA anal-yses reported earlier, in the first step of themediation model, type of group (open versesclosed) accounted for a significant proportion of

variance in personal responsibility allocations(single-item question, How responsible areyou personally for the groups performance?); .24, t(88) 2.28, p .05 and in the second

step of the mediation model, group conditionpredicted cohesion, .24, t(94) 2.43, p .05. Then, completing Steps 3 and 4 in a singleregression analysis revealed that the mediator(cohesion) .37, t(88) 3.67, p .001accounted for unique variance in personal re-sponsibility allocations. Specifically, greater co-hesion predicted more egocentrism. When thevariance accounted for by cohesion (mediator)was partialed, the association between groupcondition and responsibility allocations was no

longer statistically significant; .15, ns; So-bel z 2.02, p .05 (see Figure 1).

Responsibility Allocations: Group-Focused Assessments and Self-ServingBiases

In addition to a reduction in egocentrism, wealso expected members of open groups to beless self-serving in their responsibility alloca-tions. That is, we expected members of open

groups to allocate equal responsibility regard-less of group performance, but members ofclosed groups to claim more responsibility forsuccess than failure. We found support for thisprediction across the three group-focused re-sponsibility assessments.

Cohesion.24* .37**

.24* (.15, ns)

Group

Condition

Personal

Responsibility

Sobels z = 2.02, p < .05

Figure 1. Mediation model: Cohesion mediating the effect of open-/closed-group conditionon responsibility allocations.

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Own responsibility claims. Analysis of thepercentage of responsibility each group memberclaimed for himself or herself, when evaluatingall the group members, supported our predic-tions. The main effect for group condition wasnonsignificant, and the main effect for the per-formance condition was only marginally signif-icant, F(1, 83) 3.39, p .07, with members

of successful groups (M 26.47, SD 8.03)taking slightly more credit than members offailure groups (M 23.19, SD 8.91). How-ever, the interaction of group type and perfor-mance condition was significant, F(1 ,83) 3.94, p .05. As Figure 2 and simpleeffects testing with Tukey post hoc tests ( p .05) suggest, only members of closed groups

displayed the self-serving bias by claiming lessresponsibility after failure than success (also seeTable 1).

Group responsibility. As Ross and Sicoly(1979) note, when all the personal claims ofresponsibility by members are totaled, they of-ten surpass the logical limit of 100%. Our sub-jects displayed this tendency to overclaim re-

sponsibility, but only in the closed groups ex-periencing success. The main effect for groupand performance condition were nonsignificant,but the interaction of group type and perfor-mance condition reached significance; F(1,20) 6.52, p .05. Simple effects testing ( p .05) revealed that participants were self-serving,but only in closed groups (see Table 1).

20

22

24

26

28

30

Open Closed

Group Condition

ResponsibilityPoints

Success

Failure

Figure 2. Allocation of responsibility to self in open and closed groups following successand failure.

Table 1

Cell Means, Standard Deviations, F Ratios, and p Values for the Interaction of Type of Group(Open/Closed) and Performance (Success/Failure) on Responsibility Allocations

Measure

Closed Open

Fratio p valueSuccess Failure Success Failure

Own responsibility 28.73a 21.83b 24.25 24.50 3.94 .05

Allocations* (9.00) (9.09) (6.50) (8.72)

Group responsibility 113.67a 95.83b 97.00b 103.50 6.52 .05

Allocations** (9.69) (10.15) (7.48) (17.09)

Relative responsibility 5.57a -3.50b -0.91 1.51 7.32 .05

Allocation** (3.59) (6.84) (2.34) (6.55)

Note. For any single measure, means with a common superscript (a) differ at the p .05 level by Tukey post hoc tests

from means with alternative superscript (b). Means without superscripts did not differ. The number in parentheses is thestandard deviation.* Individual-level analysis; n 96.** Group-level analysis; n 24



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Relative responsibility allocation. Wefound similar results when we examined howmuch responsibility participants took relative tothe amount of responsibility others gave them.

For this assessment, higher scores indicate thatgroup members overestimated their responsibil-ity relative to others estimation. Again, theonly significant effect was the interaction ofgroup type and performance condition; F(1,20) 7.32, p .05. As simple effects testingwith Tukey post hoc tests ( p .05) suggest,only members of closed groups claimed lessresponsibility after failure than others gavethem, and only members of closed groupsclaimed more responsibility after success thanothers gave them (see Table 1).

Investment in Open and Closed Groups

We postulated that perhaps open-group mem-bers do not invest in the group and thus are notmotivated to protect the self. Although we donot have a direct assessment of this supposition,we have indirect indications. We expectedfewer participants to report taking on involvedroles such as the leader in open compared toclosed groups. In line with this proposition, of

those reporting roles for themselves, only 4.7%of subjects in the open group identified as lead-ers, whereas 26.3% of participants in the closedgroup indicated a leadership posit ion,2(N 88, df 1) 5.46, p .05. Addition-ally, members of open groups reported signifi-cantly less need to cooperate and work as a teamto complete the group task than members ofclosed groups, t(93) 2.00, p .05.

Discussion

Across a wide array of contexts including co-authoring manuscripts, working on a collectivetask, living with a roommate, or playing a teamsport, responsibility biases are pervasive. The re-sults from the current study, in line with pastresearch (e.g., Caruso et al., 2006; Rottenstreich &Tversky, 1997; Savitsky et al., 2005), suggest away to reduce these biases. Specifically, we foundthat making membership fluctuation salient led toa breaking apart of the group, which in turn pre-dicted less egocentrism. We attribute this finding

to an unpacking effect. That is, we suggest that thegroup type (open/closed) manipulation separatedthe individual from the collective. This proposi-

tion was supported with results revealing thatmembers of open groups report less cohesion thanmembers of closed groups. This loss of collective-ness in turn mediated the open-/closed-group ef-

fect on self-focused personal responsibility alloca-tion. The mediation revealed in the current articledirectly supports the work of Savitsky and col-leagues (2005), suggesting that egocentrismstems, at least in part, to individuals inclinationsto regard their fellow group members as a collec-tive.

Additionally, in line with Savitsky and col-leagues (2005), our egocentrism hypothesis wasonly supported when participants were askedhow responsible they were on self-focused as-sessments. As Gilovich, Medvec, and Savitsky(2000) note, because each of us is the center ofour universe it can be difficult to arrive ataccurate assessments (p. 211). However, some-times all people need is a little reminder of theirgroup members potential efforts to avoid ego-centric biases. Thus, it is not surprising that wefailed to find an open/closed egocentrism effecton the group-focused assessments as the mea-sure itself required breaking the group apart intoindividual components. These group-focusedassessments matched the unpacking condition

in the first two studies by Savitsky and col-leagues (2005), and replicated the implicit un-packing condition in their third experiment.

However, what about self-serving biases? Asthe old saying suggests, victory finds a hun-dred fathers, but defeat is an orphan. Resultsfrom our research suggest that this self-servingtendency is prevalent in closed groups but not aspervasive in open groups. Across our threegroup-focused responsibility assessments, opengroups tempered the self-serving bias. Becausemembership fluctuation depended on the vote ofeach member of the group, competition likelyincreased and social identity dwindled. Thus,perhaps members of open groups did not needto use motivated reasoning, as their self-worthwas not attached to the group. This prediction isin line with research suggesting that self-servingbiases are somewhat mitigated when individu-als do not invest in their group, and thus theirself-worth is not closely tied to the groupsperformance outcomes (e.g., Dietz-Uhler &Murrell, 1998). In support of the idea that mem-

bers of open groups were not as invested in thegroup, we found that they were less likely totake on active roles such as the leader and less

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likely to report that the group task required acooperative effort. However, future work isneeded to examine if this lack of self investmentserves a mediating function. Additionally, in

other types of groups in which membershipflows as members voluntarily come and go(e.g., community-service oriented groups),there could be different implications for respon-sibility biases compared to the type of opengroup used in the current study. Thus, futureresearch is still needed to examine not only whyopen-group membership reduces self-servingresponsibility allocations, but also to explore ifthis effect primarily holds for open groups thatcompete for membership.

Although our findings support recent researchon responsibility biases after collective endeavors,there are a few limitations of the present researchworth noting. First, like much research in person-ality and social psychology, our sample was lim-ited to university students in the United States. Itseems plausible that there could be cultural differ-ences in the degree to which ones perspective ofthe group merges with his or her self-identity. Inmore collectivistic societies, it could prove moredifficult for participants to unpack the individualfrom the group. Additionally, members of collec-

tivistic societies are often less self-serving in theirresponsibility claims. For example, a meta-analytic review of self-serving attributions re-vealed that Asian samples display significantlysmaller biases than U.S. or Western samples (Me-zulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). Futureresearch could explore the cross-cultural nature ofthe unpacking effect and subsequent effects onboth egocentrism and self-serving biases.

The use of students, although a limitation, isalso a strength, because participants took part ina group whose outcome and procedures werepersonally relevant to them. Much previous re-search on responsibility biases has examinedhow members respond to outcomes produced inad hoc laboratory groups, and such situationsmay not adequately represent the psychologicalpower of failure and success as personallymeaningful tasks. Participants in our research,in contrast, worked on problems that were ofcritical importance to their success in college,and hence the desire for success could havebeen a strong motivator, especially for closed

groups, where group identity was stronger. Thegroups were, however, short-term ones, and fu-ture research could explore the unpacking effect

and self-serving biases in naturally existing andlonger-lasting open and closed groups.

Although the current study sheds light on therole of open groups in achieving an unpacking

effect and reducing self-serving biases, the com-plexity of the manipulation raises the question ofwhat exactly the psychological reaction of partic-ipants was after hearing news of possible exclu-sion. We suggest that in open groups, the collec-tive nature of the group was lost and individualsdid not invest in the group. The results support thisprediction, in part, with cohesion fully mediatingthe open/closed personal responsibility allocationlink and with members of open groups taking onless active roles and reporting less need for coop-

eration. However, the possibility of exclusioncould have also transformed the group session intoa mixed-motive situation. For example, as Parkand Hinsz (2006) note, if a group member issocially anxious and the group is thus a source ofthreat, then increases in avoidance motivation canbe expected. Perhaps the open-group manipula-tion activated the avoidance-motivation systemand thus prompted vigilant processing of informa-tion (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999).In contrast, when groups provide a sense of unityand security like that found in closed groups, anapproach-oriented motivation system is activatedand goal commitment increases (Gray, 1972). Inlight of the Park and Hinsz (2006) theoreticalarticle calling for researchers to apply the ap-proach-avoidant motivational perspective to groupresearch, future work could explore whether re-sponsibility biases in open groups where memberscan be excluded is due, in part, to the avoidantmotivation system being activated.

These limitations aside, the current study buildson a burgeoning research that explores the con-

texts that enhance or reduce particularly pervasivebiases in judgments, namely, egocentrism andself-serving tendencies. Egocentrism and self-serving biases are an almost inevitable aspect ofgroup involvement and can have damaging effectson groups. For example, self-serving tendenciescan lead to conflict and dissatisfaction in groups(e.g., Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). Thus, find-ing ways to reduce these biases has relevant im-plications and applications for fostering effectivegroup interaction. The present research revealed

one such way to reduce overestimations of con-tributions. Namely, individuals in open groups, inwhich membership fluctuated, were less likely



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than members of closed groups to enhance theirresponsibility claims.

Building on our initial line of research, futurework could explore how the transient versus

stable nature of groups influences additionalgroup- and individual-level processes. For ex-ample, researchers could explore the presenceor absence of fear of exclusion in open groupsby using one of three conditions: (a) one personis removed from the group randomly, (b) oneperson is removed by popular vote, and (c) oneperson is removed on the basis of experimenter-judged contributions. It might also be interest-ing to contrast a condition in which the weakestlink is removed from the group with one inwhich the top performer is promoted up to amore desirable group. Along this line, buildingon Learys sociometer work (see Leary, Tam-bor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), in which self-esteem is a gauge of social inclusion, researchcould also examine how being excluded fromthese different types of open groups influencesan individuals self-esteem. It could also provefruitful to examine naturally existing opengroups in which membership is voluntary toexplore how this effects not only responsibilityallocations but also other individual and group

processes. For example, perhaps open groups,especially those in which members are excludedfor not contributing, also reduce social loafing.Additionally, what happens to the groups per-formance in these shifting groups? Are opengroups more effective after members aredropped? Or, perhaps closed groups with theirsense of group unity outperform open groups.Our initial line of work suggests open groups canreduce responsibility biases, but perhaps they canalso lead to other desirable outcomes (e.g., re-duced social loafing, better performance).

However, open groups also came at a costareduction in group unity. Reduced group cohe-sion is in turn associated with a plethora ofproblems for groups, including, for example,lower goal commitment and achievement (seeMullen & Copper, 1994) and reduced enjoy-ment of ones group (e.g., Hackman, 1992;Hogg, 1992). Although studies have highlightedpotential ways to reduce egocentrism withoutaffecting group cohesion (e.g., Epley et al.,2006, Study 5), future research could explore

additional means of introducing an unpackingeffect that does not also introduce a competitiveenvironment. Combining our findings with the

theoretical perspectives offered in the Park andHinsz (2006) work on avoidance versus ap-proach motivation could be productive whenexploring ways to reduce responsibility biases

but not group unity. For example, perhaps hav-ing individuals unpack but also adopt approach-oriented goals could result in net positive out-comes (i.e., reduced egocentrism and greatergoal commitment). In conclusion, before apply-ing an open group and unpacking perspective tointerventions aimed at reducing responsibility bi-ases, the loss of group identity and investmentsuggests that more research and thought is needed.

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Received May 30, 2007Revision received December 27, 2007

Accepted January 30, 2008


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