hutch erson

The Moral Emotions: A SocialFunctionalist Account of Anger,Disgust, and Contempt

Cendri A. Hutcherson and James J. Gross

Stanford University

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making(Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whetherdistinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differencesamong anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested thatthese terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior(Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a socialfunctionalist perspective, which makes the prediction thatthese emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions andjudgments. Studies 13 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions amongantecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously beendescribed, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt injudging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictionsconcerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with differentconsequences. Taken together, these studies support a socialfunctionalist account of anger, disgust, andcontempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions.

Keywords: moral emotions, anger, disgust, contempt, sociofunctional

How distinct are discrete emotions? This question has beenone of the most hotly debated within emotion research (L. F.Barrett, 2006; L. F. Barrett et al., 2007; Izard, 2007). Over thedecades, researchers have attempted to create a theoretical andempirical framework describing when and why the different emo-tion words we use should be considered to reflect true differencesin underlying psychological states. Yet despite an enormous cor-pus of research, disagreements over the structure of emotionalspace (e.g., dimensional vs. discrete models; Russell, 2003), aswell as over individual emotions, still abound. For the triad ofnegative social emotions concerned with judging the actions anddispositions of others (anger, disgust, and contempt; Haidt, 2003),the proper division of space has seemed particularly elusive.1

The link between these negative emotions and our responses tosocially relevant behavior is easy to detect. We might say that weare angry at injustice, disgusted by a heinous murder, or contemp-tuous of corrupt politicians. On a more mundane level, too, thedriver who fails to signal before swerving across lanes, the man-ager who picks his nose, the inept store clerk who drops ourgroceriesall can be targets of our anger, disgust, and contempt.

Yet even though we use different words to describe these reac-tions, it is unclear whether they correspond to different underlyingpsychological states with different consequences. More often thannot, these terms seem to bleed into one another (e.g., Marzillier &Davey, 2004; Nabi, 2002; Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton,2006), raising this question: Are there meaningful differencesamong the emotions described by these three terms, and if so, whatare they?

Defining the Space of Moral Emotions: An Outline ofPossible Models

Figure 1 presents a range of possible models depicting therelationship among these three moral emotions, from least to mostdifferentiated. In the simplest model, anger, disgust, and contempt

1 In addition to the other-condemning emotions, Haidt (2003) alsodescribed three additional families of sociomoral emotions, including theother-praising emotions (gratitude, awe), which are in many ways thefunctional opposites of the moral-condemning emotions; the other-suffering emotions (such as sympathy or compassion), which are negativefeelings associated with another persons pain or misfortune; and theself-conscious emotions (such as shame, guilt, and pride), which fall withinthe domain of the sociomoral emotions because they involve appraisals ofthe self as a social or moral object. The extent to which each of thesefamilies includes separate, distinct emotions also has yet to be completelydetermined; this article focuses on the other-condemning emotions, al-though the results presented here may have implications for understandingemotions within the other families. For a fascinating discussion of theseparability of the negative self-conscious emotions, see Tangney, Wagner,Hill-Barlow, Marschall, and Gramzow, 1996.

This article was published Online First January 31, 2011.Cendri A. Hutcherson and James J. Gross, Department of Psychology,

Stanford University.We thank Anne Cherniss, Ken Ferry, Rebecca Roediger, and Hants

Williams for assistance with data collection.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Cendri A.

Hutcherson, who is now at the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences,California Institute of Technology, MC 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125.E-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2011 American Psychological Association2011, Vol. 100, No. 4, 719737 0022-3514/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0022408

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are semantic equivalents, synonyms for the same underlying neg-ative emotional state evoked by interpersonal concerns (e.g., Nabi,2002). In a partially differentiated model, two emotion families aredistinguishable, typically on the basis of the dimension of attack/approach and avoid/withdraw: anger on the one hand and disgust/contempt on the other. Models of this type have begun to appearin the stereotyping and prejudice literature (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy,Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). In a fullydifferentiated model, the three emotions are distinct. One instan-tiation of this modeldescribed belowis the CAD triad model(Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), in which these threedifferent emotions result from a single appraisal (moral domain)with three categories (autonomy, divinity, community). Each ofthese models has received some empirical support, but it is not yetclear how to reconcile conflicting findings.

Distinguishing the Triad: A SocialFunctionalistAccount

Our perspective on this issue, favoring the fully differentiatedmodel, derives from a functionalist account of emotion, whichargues that emotions are adaptive solutions comprising a coordi-nated set of appraisals, communicative gestures, physiologicalresponses, and action tendencies tailored to respond to crucialproblems faced by our species over the millennia (Cosmides &Tooby, 2000; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). One may thus differen-tiate emotion families by considering the extent to which theyserve different purposes (K. Barrett & Campos, 1987). Socialfunctionalism examines the adaptive role that emotions play inrelations between individuals, groups, and cultures (Ekman, 1992;Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006). Thenumber of different social/moral emotions can be inferred byidentifying distinct dimensions of socially relevant actions forwhich advantageous response requires different sets of changes inbehavior, cognition, and/or motivation. The question is, within theinterpersonal domain, how many unique situations, requiringunique sets of responses, are there?

Anger, Appraisals of Self-Relevance, and DefensiveAttack/Approach Behavior

One of the most basic social challenges may involve the abilityto discern the ways in which anothers actions immediately impact

the self. When those actions lead to direct threat, vigorous defenseor attack can be the quickest way to resolve the danger, despite thepotential risks and energy expenditure. When the self is not di-rectly involved, passive avoidance may be a less costly means toreduce threat. To successfully navigate the social world, an indi-vidual must be able to distinguish and respond appropriately tothose circumstances in which the threat posed by a social actormerits more proactive, but potentially costly, strategies or morepassive, conservative tactics. In our view, anger serves this func-tion.

Unlike other negative emotions, which typically prompt avoid-ance behavior, anger tends to promote approach tendencies, in theform of attack (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Roseman, Wiest, &Swartz, 1994), although others have also noted an increase inavoidance as well (Averill, 1982). Consequently, anger results inhigher energy expenditure, evidenced by greater autonomicarousal and behavioral activation (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen,1990) and a greater willingness to take risks (Lerner & Keltner,2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). These higher cost behaviors maybe designed to prevent or terminate specific behaviors that areperceived as immediate threats to the self, and anger may alsoincrease the willingness to incur costs in order to punish betrayal(de Quervain et al., 2004; OGorman, Wilson, & Miller, 2005).One implication of this view is that the morality per se of a socialbehavior may be less important in determining an angry responsethan the extent to which it impacts the self. Moreover, despite itsmoral overtones, anger may be concerned less with how to respondto peoples moral intentions and dispositions and more with howbest to actively respond to their behavior.

Moral Disgust, Contempt, and Appraisals ofCharacter: Morality Versus Competence

Although anger may fill the need to respond directly to imme-diate social threats, there is a complementary need to respondappropriately to individuals who are not currently engaged inthreatening behavior but whose past behavior suggests they shouldbe avoided, a less costly but more widely applicable response.This, we argue, is the primary function of both moral disgust andcontempt: to mark individuals whose behavior suggests that theyrepresent a threat and avoid them, thereby reducing the risk ofexposure to harm.

Figure 1. Possible relations among anger, disgust, and contempt in the social domain. A: Equivalent model:Moral judgment of others is represented by a single underlying emotional state. B: Partially distinct model:Anger is distinct, but moral disgust and contempt are overlapping terms for a single underlying state. C: Fullydifferentiated model: Social judgment is captured by three different, nonoverlapping emotions.

720 HUTCHERSON AND GROSS

However, a simple mapping between approachanger and with-drawalcontempt/moral disgust may not be sufficient to encom-pass the full range of socially relevant situations and requisiteadaptive responses. A rich body of research suggests that socialjudgments are composed of two orthogonal dimensions. The firstdimension, referred to in different literatures as morality, warmth,communion, or affiliation, describes the benevolence or malevo-lence of an actors intentions. The second dimension, referred to ascompetence, dominance, or agency, describes the abilities, skills,and resources an actor has at his or her disposal to carry out thoseintentions (Horowitz et al., 2006; Leary, 1957; Skowronski &Carlston, 1987; Wojciszke, 2005). Approaching those with exper-tise or knowledge and avoiding those who may be a burdenbecause they lack the ability to contribute to the social group alsohas inherent adaptive value. In our view, the need to distinguishthreats posed by immorality or incompetence, respectively, maycorrespond to the functions of moral disgust and contempt.

Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, and Imada (1997) treated moral dis-gust as a socially elaborated version of nonsocial disgust (elicitedby death, decay, and disease). Nonsocial (core) disgust evokes adeceleration in heart rate (Levenson et al., 1990), avoidance (Ola-tunji & Sawchuk, 2005; Rozin & Fallon, 1987), and a facialexpression designed to limit contact with the environment (Rozin& Fallon, 1987; Susskind et al., 2008). Disgust also results in alasting reluctance to come into contact with objects themselvescontaminated by contact with something disgusting. Althoughsimilarities between nonsocial and social disgust have receivedonly indirect empirical support, such similarities could have func-tional significance (Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009).Once marked as capable of malicious behavior, an individualshould be consistently avoided, regardless of whether he or shesubsequently performs a few benevolent actions (Martijn, Spears,Vanderpligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Reeder & Coovert, 1986). Moraldisgust may serve this function.

Contempt, on the other hand, may be more strongly concernedwith appraisals of incompetence. Reliance on the help of anincompetent individual risks wasting time or resources. Moreover,seeking outside expertise and accepting the obligations entailed byaid is useful only in situations where one does not oneself have theresources to accomplish a task. Contempt may function to diminishinteraction with individuals who cannot contribute in a meaningfulway to the group, especially those individuals judged to be lower

or less capable than the self (Izard, 1977), yet who do not behavein intentionally malicious ways.

As with anger, several predictions concerning the effects ofthese emotions on judgment and decision making stem from theview presented above. In particular, both moral disgust and con-tempt may encourage a focus on a persons intentions and dispo-sitions, leading to more stable, longer lasting attributions concern-ing a persons character. In contrast, anger may be more likely todissipate once the immediate threat or injustice has been properlypunished or the appropriate restitution has been made (Ohbuchi,Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).

Empirical Evidence: Differentiation and Overlap

The account we have outlined above suggests that anger, moraldisgust, and contempt should be differentiable on the basis ofappraisals that elicit one emotion more strongly than the others,with corresponding differences in the behaviors consequent toeach emotion (see Figure 2A). Unfortunately, little empirical re-search has directly tested distinctions between these emotions.

Evidence for Differentiation

The most comprehensive evidence for differentiation among thethree other-condemning emotions comes from work on the CADtriad hypothesis (Haidt, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999). Informed bycultural and anthropological discourse, and motivated as we are bya socialfunctionalist perspective, Rozin et al. (1999) argued thatthese emotions function specifically within the moral domain todistinguish behaviors that violate three moral ethics (see Figure2B). Humans feel contempt for violations of community (respectfor hierarchical and communal obligations of an individual tosociety). They feel anger for violations of autonomy (disregard forthe personal rights or freedoms of the individual). Finally, they feeldisgust for violations of divinity (disrespecting the sacredness ofGod or causing degradation or pollution to oneself or another). Ina series of studies, these researchers presented participants in bothJapan and the United States with actions representing one of thethree moral codes (examples of which can be seen in Table 1) andasked them to select the most applicable facial expression andverbal label from examples of disgust, contempt, and anger. Par-ticipants linked the expression and label of contempt with com-

Figure 2. Two different fully differentiated models. A: The socialfunctionalist model. B: The CAD triadmodel.

721SOCIALFUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF MORAL EMOTIONS

munity violations, anger with autonomy violations, and disgustwith divinity violations.

Evidence for Overlap

Although the data for distinctions among anger, moral disgust,and contempt are appealing, a growing body of empirical evidence

is at odds with this view. Whereas participants reported feelingonly disgust toward nonsocial disgust elicitors, they endorsed arange of emotion terms, including disgust and anger, toward so-ciomoral violations (Marzillier & Davey, 2004). Anger and moraldisgust are usually highly correlated (Simpson et al., 2006), per-haps because people employ the terms anger and disgust

Table 1Emotion Intensity Ratings in the Context of Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Violations (Study 1)

Item Code

Anger Moral disgust Contempt Sadness Fear Grossed out

M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD

A child hits another child A 2.46a,b 1.79 2.29b 1.90 1.79c 1.79 2.78a 1.94 1.65c 1.80 0.73d 1.33Someone edges ahead in a very long

line A 3.38a 1.58 2.79b 1.68 2.96b 1.69 0.86c 1.29 0.71c 1.26 0.62c 1.31A person is smoking in the

nonsmoking section of a smallwaiting area A 3.65a 1.79 3.18b 1.79 3.28b 1.83 1.21d 1.60 0.99d 1.44 2.65c 2.20

Someone embezzles from a bank A 3.35b 1.54 4.27a 1.25 3.52b 1.73 1.85c 1.85 1.25d 1.73 0.83e 1.50A person fakes an injury after an

automobile accident in order tocollect on insurance A 3.67b 1.52 4.63a 1.30 3.80b 1.66 1.86c 1.85 0.84d 1.37 1.08d 1.75

Someone is a member of the Ku KluxKlan A 4.74b 1.51 5.35a 1.12 4.78b 1.59 3.73c 2.20 3.24d 2.30 2.25e 2.53

A man comes home drunk and beatshis wife A 5.22b 1.23 5.41a 0.95 4.94c 1.61 4.88c 1.51 3.29d 2.34 2.43e 2.46

A person puts cyanide in a yogurtcontainer at the supermarket A 5.04b 1.46 5.50a 1.00 4.71c 1.84 3.34d 2.33 4.46c 1.96 3.17d 2.53

A person steals a purse from a blindperson A 5.08b 1.24 5.52a 0.82 4.82c 1.57 4.12d 1.94 2.02e 2.23 1.88e 2.35

A cleaning person, who thinks no oneis watching, sits in the chair of thecompany president C 0.47b 1.01 0.48b 0.97 0.57b 1.14 1.05a 1.57 0.54b 1.21 0.23c 0.69

A salesman addresses someone byhis/her first name after just meetinghim/her C 0.96a 1.42 1.05a 1.35 1.11a 1.33 0.39b 0.81 0.39b 0.88 0.48b 1.10

An oversensitive employee directlycriticizes his boss C 1.54b 1.51 1.54b 1.48 1.93a 1.56 1.09c 1.39 1.10c 1.65 0.47d 1.04

A teenager begins to eat dinnerbefore everyone else at the table isserved C 1.25c 1.34

1.55a,

b 1.471.37b,

c 1.50 0.88d 1.30 0.44e 0.92 0.40e 0.87An 8-year-old student speaks to his

teacher in the same way as he talksto his friends C 1.46b 1.54 1.69a 1.69 1.32b 1.47 1.43b 1.57 0.73c 1.23 0.49d 0.97

An employee unjustifiably complainsto his/her boss C 2.24a 1.63 1.92b 1.69 2.31a 1.69 0.98c 1.36 0.76d 1.31 0.60d 1.22

A person burns the American flag C 2.81a 2.02 2.75a 2.05 2.47b 2.06 2.64a,b 2.04 1.62c 1.72 0.66d 1.36Someone who regularly leaves work

an hour early when no one isaround C 2.81b 1.70 3.07a 1.66

3.01a,

b 1.77 0.95c 1.31 0.46d 0.95 0.62d 1.18A 10-year-old says dirty words to his

parents C2.32b,

c 1.86 3.16a 1.87 2.11c 1.82 2.54b 1.93 1.01d 1.50 0.75e 1.26Someone doesnt go to his own

mothers funeral C 2.83c 2.11 3.71b 2.03 2.88c 2.11 4.66a 1.64 0.97d 1.59 0.94d 1.68A company executive refuses to sit

next to a laborer on a train C 4.27b 1.51 4.58a 1.47 4.16b 1.66 3.48c 1.83 0.91e 1.40 1.53d 2.07A 16-year-old refuses to give up his/

her seat on the bus to a crippledold lady C 4.25b 1.50 4.90a 1.18 4.02b 1.74 3.41c 1.88 0.90e 1.37 1.24d 2.02

A person has an incestuousrelationship D 2.79c 2.06 4.77a 1.54 3.07b 2.21 2.71c 2.26 1.48d 1.86 4.82a 1.71

A 70-year-old male has sex with a17-year-old girl D 3.17d 2.13 4.85b 1.60 3.45c 2.16 2.96d 2.26 1.56e 1.94 5.23a 1.41

Note. Emotions within a row that share a superscript do not differ significantly at p .05 for that item. Significant differences were determined on thebasis of the results of paired t tests (N 151). The highest emotion intensity rating for each item is shown in boldface. A autonomy violation; C community violation; D divinity violation.


interchangeably. Although participants almost exclusively de-scribe moral offenses when prompted with the word angry andobjects related to disease or decay for grossed out, the worddisgusted without further specification elicits descriptions ofboth nonsocial and moral events (Nabi, 2002). Furthermore, whenthese disgusting events are moral in nature, they evoke anger-like action tendencies, such as the desire to lash out, to get back atsomeone, and to overcome some obstacle. One implication of thisresearch is the importance of precise wording. Failure to specify toa lay audience whether the term disgust refers to social ornonsocial feelings may result in spurious conclusions. Similarly,failure to measure anger casts some doubt on research that claimsto find specific forms of disgust related to social and nonsocialviolations (Tybur et al., 2009).

Contempt and disgust are even more often conflated with eachother in the literature (e.g., Harris & Fiske, 2006; Mackie et al.,2000). In some cases, they seem to be used simply to describediffering intensities of the same underlying negative social emo-tional state, much as happy and ecstatic are used. Evidencelinking contempt to a unique facial expression, separate fromdisgust and anger (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Matsumoto &Ekman, 2004), has been questioned on a number of counts. Thecontempt expression, a unilateral lip curl, is frequently confusedwith the expressions for disgust and anger (e.g., Shioiri, Someya,Helmeste, & Tang, 1999), or, more disturbingly, given a label ofneutral by a ratio of nearly 2:1 when the option is available(Wagner, 2000). It is worth noting that these same studies alsoobserved a fair degree of confusion between anger and disgustexpressions. For example, approximately 30% of participants la-beled the prototypical anger expression as disgust. Similarly,nearly 40% of participants labeled the disgust facial expressionwith either anger or contempt (Shioiri et al., 1999).

Research on action tendencies also suggests less differentiationbetween contempt and disgust. Expressions of either contempt ordisgust during episodes of marital conflict predict later maritaldissolution (Gottman, 1994). Experiences of contempt and disgustalso both predict tendency to withdraw from rather than confrontan antagonistic social group (Mackie et al., 2000), and both may beassociated with prejudice toward the most stigmatized, dehuman-ized minorities, such as the homeless or drug addicts (Fiske et al.,2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Hodson & Costello, 2007). The failureto demonstrate either a unique facial expression or set of actiontendencies for contempt separate from disgust or anger (Rosemanet al., 1994) suggests that these terms may define a single under-lying state.

The Present Research

It is not clear how to reconcile these conflicting findings. Whydo some studies find evidence for distinctions among the emotionsbut others find little, if any? How do these observations fit with thefunctionalist account outlined above? One way of posing thesequestions is depicted in Figure 1, which suggests a continuumanchored by two extreme viewpoints, the first that views anger,moral disgust, and contempt as semantically equivalent terms fora single underlying emotional state (e.g., moral indignation), andthe second that views these emotions as three completely separate,independent states. Our goal was to determine where on thiscontinuum it makes sense to draw this line.

A comparison of the predictions of our socialfunctionalistaccount, which argues that the functions of these emotions extendbeyond a strict concern with morality, to the more strictly moralfunctionalist CAD triad hypothesis is instructive (see Figure 2).Both views are concerned with the adaptive functions served bythese three emotions but differ regarding each emotions function.Both accounts link contempt to status and hierarchy, although weargue that contempt may be associated with status through itsfunction in judging nonmoral, incompetent behavior. Similarly,both theories implicate anger in response to threats against rightsand property, although our perspective makes the further specifi-cation that the threat be directly and immediately relevant to theindividual. The two differ most markedly with respect to theirtreatment of disgust. Whereas the CAD triad hypothesis linksdisgust specifically to offenses against the sacred and the pure, weattribute a more general role to moral disgust. Immoral behavior,no matter whether it involves offenses against autonomy, commu-nal obligations, bodily purity, or even other ethics (Graham, Haidt,& Nosek, 2009), warrants avoidance. Two actions that indicate asimilar level of immoral or socially exploitative behavior shouldelicit the same amount of moral disgust, regardless of whether theyrepresent different kinds of ethical violations, and two actions thatdiffer in their implications for moral character should elicit differ-ent levels of moral disgust, even if they represent the same moralethic. This distinction between our account and the CAD triadaccount in part parallels the distinction between the functions ofnonsocial and moral disgust. Many exemplars of divinity viola-tions used by Rozin et al. (1999; such as biting into an apple witha worm in it or eating rotten meat) appear to more strongly tapnonsocial disgust.

Study 1: The Role of Moral Disgust in MoralViolations

Because a lumpers perspective (Panel A in Figure 1), ourextended socialfunctionalist account, and a different, primarilymoralfunctionalist account (the CAD triad) all make competingpredictions regarding disgust, we begin with this emotion. Usingquestionnaire-based methods, our goal in this study was to addresswhether there is a specifically moral version of disgust, responsiveto purely social offenses and differentiable from feeling grossedout (Nabi, 2002). On the basis of our socialfunctionalist per-spective, we hypothesized that when the distinction between socialand nonsocial disgust was made clearer to participants, moraldisgust would be associated with all forms of moral offenses.

Method

Participants. One hundred and fifty-one students (meanage 18.8 years, range 1725; 62% female and 38% male; 58%Caucasian, 22% Asian or Asian American, 6% Hispanic or Latino,3% Black, 11% other or declined to answer) enrolled in an intro-ductory psychology class participated in exchange for coursecredit.

Materials and procedure. In large groups, participants com-pleted a questionnaire consisting of a subset of the moral violationsused in Rozin et al. (1999). These included all 12 actions catego-rized as community violations (Items 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 27,28, 33, 34, and 38 from Rozin et al., 1999), all nine actions


categorized as autonomy violations (Items 12, 16, 25, 35, 36, 40,41, 43, and 44), and two actions categorized as divinity violations(Items 3 and 22). Because we were concerned primarily with moralbehavior, we selected the only two divinity violations that repre-sented obviously intentional sociomoral violations. The three itemsnot selected included (a) a person biting into an apple with a wormin it, (b) a person eating rotten meat, and (c) a person touching acorpse. These were deemed to be less clearly moral in nature andambiguous with respect to moral intention.

All items were worded to describe a person committing aparticular offense (e.g., Someone embezzles from a bank). In-structions for the questionnaire were as follows:

Often, when we learn about an immoral event (something bad, wrong,or evil) we experience strong feelings. We might feel a range ofemotions, including anger/rage, moral disgust/revulsion, contempt, orother emotions. We are interested in the reactions you might have tothe following situations. There are no right or wrong answers. Pleasejust indicate how you would feel in each situation.

For each situation described below, indicate how much of each of theemotions listed you feel at the actions/events described, on a scalefrom 0 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). Please also circle the space of theemotion that best describes your overall reaction to the behavior.

We assessed responses using six different emotion terms (anger,contempt, moral disgust, sadness, fear/anxiety, and grossed out).Of these, anger and contempt are identical to the terms used inRozin et al. (1999). Disgust, for reasons mentioned above, wasbroken into two terms, moral disgust and grossed out, to bettercapture the distinction between social disgust and nonsocial dis-gust, respectively. Finally, we included the terms sadness andfear/anxiety to assess the specificity of the emotional response tomoral violations.

Before the target questions, participants were provided with anexample, illustrating both the emotional intensity ratings and thebest descriptive rating. Text of the example read ****Exam-ple**** A man is caught selling drugs to minors. ****Exam-ple**** and was followed by numbers under the column for eachemotion, to indicate possible responses. The numbers for angerand moral disgust were the highest of the six emotions and equalto each other. A circle around the number in the moral disgustcolumn indicated to participants both how to indicate the bestdescriptive emotion and that they should circle a single emotion asbest descriptive even in cases of a tie in intensity.

Results

For each item, we conducted paired t tests on emotional inten-sity ratings for all 15 combinations of emotion pairs, reportingsignificant differences below a threshold of p .003, theBonferroni-corrected alpha level for 15 comparisons (.05/15). As asecondary analysis, we analyzed the frequency with which eachemotion was selected as the best descriptive term, using an ap-proach similar to that employed by Rozin et al. (1999). Althoughthere was a main effect of gender on emotion intensity, indicatingthat women (M 2.92, SD 1.03) responded more strongly thanmen (M 2.58, SD 1.23), F(1, 127) 5.53, p .02, p

2 .04,there were no interactions between gender and the main effects ofinterest. We therefore report the results below collapsing across

gender. Results are presented by moral code. Each action and thecorresponding emotion intensities appear in Table 1.

Across the community violations (n 12), moral disgust re-ceived higher intensity ratings than any other emotion (M 2.52,SD 1.02), all ts(150) 3.96, all ps .001, all ds 0.26.Participants reported greater levels of moral disgust than anger(M 2.26, SD 1.02), contempt (M 2.24, SD 1.07), sadness(M 1.96, SD 0.96), fear (M 0.82, SD 0.89), or grossedout (M 0.70, SD 0.90). Frequency analysis of the bestdescriptive term painted a similar picture. Averaging over all of thecommunity violations, moral disgust was chosen as the best de-scriptive term (M 31%), followed by contempt (M 23%),sadness (M 22%), anger (M 17%), fear (M 6%), andgrossed out (M 2%).

Across the autonomy violations (n 9), moral disgust (M 4.33, SD 0.82) was rated significantly higher than any otheremotion, all ts(148) 4.98, all ps .001, all ds 0.29, includinganger (M 4.07, SD 0.97), contempt (M 3.74, SD 1.24),sadness (M 2.74, SD 1.29), fear (M 2.05, SD 1.29), andgrossed out (M 1.74, SD 1.52). Averaging over all of theautonomy violations, moral disgust was chosen as the best descrip-tive term (M 42%), followed by anger (M 22%), contempt(M 17%), sadness (M 9%), fear (M 7%), and grossed out(M 3%).

Across the divinity violations, grossed out was rated highest(M 5.03, SD 1.39) but was not significantly different frommoral disgust (M 4.81, SD 4.8), t(146) 2.04, p .60,corrected for multiple comparisons. Both emotions were ratedsignificantly higher than any other emotion, all ts(146) 10.15, allps .001, all ds 0.9, including contempt (M 3.26, SD 1.98), anger (M 2.96, SD 1.89), sadness (M 2.84, SD 1.98), and fear (M 1.52, SD 1.67). Averaging over both of thedivinity violations, grossed out was chosen 58% of the time,followed by moral disgust (M 31%), contempt (M 5%),sadness (M 4%), fear (M 3%), and anger (M 2%).

Discussion

Contrary to the CAD triad model (in which moral disgustresponds specifically to violations involving sanctity and purity),our account suggests that moral disgust should be an adaptiveresponse to moral violations more generally. The results of Study1 supported this hypothesis. When moral disgust was linguisti-cally differentiated from grossed out, it emerged strongly in bothautonomy and community violations and rivaled grossed out in thedivinity violations. This relationship held whether we measuredemotion using a single rating of the best descriptive emotion (asRozin et al., 1999, did) or using a more detailed rating of theintensities of a range of emotions. Both methods also distinguishedmoral disgust from nonsocial disgust. Although moral disgust wasuniformly high across all three codes, the term grossed out wasendorsed strongly only in divinity violations.

The finding that disgust was best descriptive of all three types ofmoral violations is consistent with our view. However, the patternacross the second-most intense emotions followed the predictionsmade by the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999), identifyingcontempt, anger, and moral disgust in community, autonomy, anddivinity violations, respectively. Moreover, although the data dosuggest that moral disgust and grossed out are different emotional


entities, they do not yet rule out an account in which moral disgustis simply used to express the sum of other negative emotions,including anger and contempt. Studies 2 and 3 identified specificappraisals that differentiate anger, disgust, and contempt.

Study 2: Differentiating Anger and Moral Disgust

As outlined above, we hypothesized that in cases in which oneis directly endangered by an immoral act, a more proactive re-sponse than disgust, such as anger, may be warranted. In caseswhere one is not directly harmed by immoral behavior, the low-cost avoidance associated with disgust may be more adaptive.Alternatively, if anger responds merely to whether an action is aviolation of the ethic of autonomy, it may depend less on who thevictim is and only on the nature of the crime. Recent evidenceshowing that participants report greater anger when a moral of-fense is self-relevant than when it is not (Batson, Chao, & Givens,2009; Batson et al., 2007) is consistent with this hypothesis.However, other moral emotions, such as disgust and contempt,were not assessed in these studies. It therefore remains possiblethat, contrary to our predictions, self-relevance is not an appraisalunique to anger but is rather a general intensifier of morallyrelevant emotions. In order to test these possibilities, we presentedvignettes of moral violations, systematically varying the degree ofself-relevance of the immoral act, and assessed response acrossseveral different emotions.

Method

Participants. One hundred and thirty-one students (age range1731 years; 63% female and 37% male; 51% Caucasian, 25%Asian or Asian American, 9% Black, 6% Hispanic or Latino, 9%other) enrolled in an introductory psychology class at StanfordUniversity completed one of three alternate versions of the ques-tionnaire. Forty-five students completed Version 1, 45 completedVersion 2, and 41 completed Version 3.

Materials and procedure. Nine new moral violations werecreated for the questionnaire used in Study 2 (see Appendix A fora full list of items). Of these, three control violations appeared inconsistent position and wording (always presenting the victim as ageneric other) in each questionnaire, to ensure that when violationswere equivalently presented, the three groups did not differ. Theother six violations varied in the degree of self-relevance acrossthe three versions of the questionnaire. In Version 1, violationswere worded such that the participant was presented as the victim;in Version 2, the victim was a friend of the participant; and inVersion 3, the victim was a generic other. For example, in the itemA student steals your exam and copies it (emphasis added), theitalicized word would be replaced either with your friend or astudent in the two alternate versions. As in Study 1, participantsindicated the intensity of six different emotions (anger, moraldisgust, contempt, sadness, fear/anxiety, and grossed out). Theyalso circled the emotion term best descriptive of their overallexperience.

Results

In order to determine whether there was a difference betweenthe control (identical perspective) and test (varied perspective)

items, an average was created across the three control questionsand across the six test questions for each emotion for each partic-ipant. We hypothesized that this average would reveal higherexperiences of anger when the self was implicated than whenunrelated individuals were harmed by an immoral offense. On theother hand, moral disgust, responding to the perpetrators moralcharacter, should remain relatively constant across the three per-spectives.

As in Study 1, we observed a significantly stronger emotionalresponse in women (M 2.73, SD 0.72) than in men (M 2.36,SD 0.67), F(1, 112) 7.66, p .007, p

2 .06; however,gender did not interact with any of the effects reported below andwas thus dropped as a factor. A 3 2 repeated-measures analysisof variance (ANOVA) was conducted, with version (self, friend,other) as a between-subjects factor and question type (control vs.test) as a repeated, within-subject measure. For all emotions exceptfear, there were significant effects of question type: The controlviolations were consistently rated as slightly more intense, allFs(1, 128) 9.61, all ps .002, all p

2s .07. These effects werequalified by a significant interaction between version and questiontype for anger, contempt, sadness, and fear, all Fs(2, 128) 4.87,all ps .01, all p

2s .07, as well as a marginally significantinteraction for moral disgust, F(2, 128) 2.5, p .09, p

2 .04.Follow-up between-groups t tests indicated that, for control

questions, there was no significant effect of version for any emo-tion. Even though these items were regarded as more negative,they were responded to in an equivalent manner across all groups.However, as predicted, items in which the self-relevance of thevictim was manipulated showed strikingly different emotionalprofiles across versions. There was a significant linear effect ofversion for anger, t(128) 4.12, p .001, d 0.86, and for fear,t(128) 3.98, p .001, d 0.85. For moral disgust, this effectwas not significant, t(128) 1.45, p .15. Although fear wasconsiderably lower overall than anger, both were highest in the selfcondition (MAnger 4.24, SD 0.93; MFear 1.43, SD 0.98),lower in the friend condition (MAnger 3.62, SD 0.88; MFear 0.71, SD 0.72), and lowest in the other condition (MAnger 3.41, SD 1.01; MFear 0.62, SD 0.76). Moral disgust showedthe opposite pattern, being higher in the other condition (M 3.71,SD 1.05) than in the self condition (M 3.38, SD 0.96).Contempt and sadness did not show a clear pattern, both beinglower in the friend condition than in either of the other conditions.None of the emotions showed a main effect for version, suggestingthat the groups did not differ in a general way in their emotionalresponding.

Analysis of the frequency with which each emotion label wasselected as best descriptive revealed a similar pattern of findings.In control (identical perspective) items, moral disgust was selectedas the best descriptive term in a similar manner across all threegroups. For the test (perspective varied) items, the percentage ofpeople selecting anger as the best descriptive term was highest inthe self condition (42%), intermediate in the friend condition(40%), and lowest in the other condition (27%). Moral disgustshowed the opposite pattern of results. The percentage of partici-pants selecting this emotion as best descriptive was lowest in theself condition (20%), intermediate (but lower than anger) in thefriend condition (27%), and highest in the other condition (34%;see Figure 3). All other emotions were selected by an equivalentpercentage of participants across the three groups.


Discussion

The results of Study 2 strongly confirmed the predicted patternof results. Even though the types of moral violations were heldconstant across all three versions of the questionnaire, varying therecipient of harm had a substantial effect on the emotions felt.Consistent with the prediction that anger and its associated actiontendencies might be most adaptive when the harm directly impli-cates the self, anger was highest for the self condition, lower in thefriend condition, and lowest in the other condition. Additionally, asendorsement of anger decreased across the three conditions, en-dorsement frequency of moral disgust increased. In the intensityresults, moral disgust remained roughly constant across the threeconditions, trending up slightly. This pattern is consistent withmoral disgust being concerned with the intentions or maliciousnessof the perpetrator, whereas anger is concerned with attack againstdirect threat. It clearly differentiates anger from moral disgust anddemonstrates that people use these terms in different ways, con-trary to the conclusions drawn by some researchers (Nabi, 2002;Simpson et al., 2006).

However, this study does not clearly allow us to differentiatemoral disgust and contempt. Endorsement of each emotion as bestdescriptive revealed a different trend in moral disgust and con-tempt across the three versions of the questionnaire. Intensity datashow that moral disgust and contempt were both relatively flatacross conditions, although moral disgust was consistently higherthan contempt. These data are thus consistent with a model inwhich contempt is simply a weaker version of disgust, consistentwith some models presented in the prejudice literature, which oftenlump together contempt and disgust (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002;Mackie et al., 2000).

Study 3: Differentiating Contempt and Moral Disgust

Although contempt and moral disgust have often proven diffi-cult to separate, our extended socialfunctionalist perspective sug-gests a possible distinction between them. Whereas disgust mayconcern the likelihood that an individual harbors benevolent ormalicious intentions, contempt may concern an individuals com-petence to achieve their aims. We thus predicted that actions thatsignal immorality would be associated with a greater balance ofmoral disgust relative to contempt, whereas actions that signalincompetence would be associated with a greater balance of con-tempt relative to moral disgust. Such a pattern would clearly showthat moral disgust and contempt are not simply terms associatedwith different levels of the same emotion but respond to differentsocially relevant signals. If, on the other hand, moral disgust andcontempt are only synonyms for a general motivation to withdrawfrom morally offensive individuals, there should be no situations inwhich the emotions differ.

Method

Participants. One hundred and six undergraduate students(age range 1729 years; 71% female and 29% male; 43% Cauca-sian, 24% Asian or Asian American, 9% Black, 9% Hispanic orLatino, 15% other or declined to answer) enrolled in an introduc-tory psychology class at Stanford University completed one of twoquestionnaires (Version 1, n 56; Version 2, n 50).

Materials and procedure. The questionnaires used wereidentical in format to those used in Studies 1 and 2. To assessresponses to moral violations, we included several items used byRozin et al. (1999) that were representative of the ethic of com-munity (e.g., A teenager begins to eat dinner at the table beforeeveryone else is served). In order to assess whether contempt and

Figure 3. Selection of the best descriptive emotion in items with varied and common perspective (Study 2).Changes in endorsement of anger, contempt, and moral disgust are shown across three groups of participantsgiven moral violations that were similar except for the nature of the victim (left panel) or that were identical(right panel).


moral disgust could be differentiated by focusing on incompe-tence, we created several examples of incompetent behaviors (e.g.,A person who tries to use large words to sound smart, butmispronounces them). Finally, in order to assess replicability offindings, we created two versions of the questionnaire, each con-sisting of several community violations and competence failures.There was no overlap of items between the two questionnaires (seeAppendix B for a full list of items). Participants were givenidentical instructions to those used in Studies 1 and 2 and wereprovided with an identical example. Responses were assessedusing seven different emotion terms (anger, contempt, moral dis-gust, sadness, pity, grossed out, and amusement).

Results

Separate averages across the morality and competence itemswere created for each questionnaire version, for each emotion, andfor each participant. In initial analyses, questionnaire version andgender were included as factors. There were no effects involvingversion, so results were collapsed across the two versions. Al-though there was only a marginally significant main effect ofgender on overall intensity of response, F(1, 90) 2.9, p .09,p

2 .03, there was a significant interaction between sex ofrespondent and action type in the overall intensity of emotionalresponse, F(1, 90) 4.48, p .04, p

2 .05. Post hoc analysesindicated that although moral violations elicited greater emotionthan competence violations for both men (MMoral 1.58, SD 0.82; MCompetence 1.37, SD 0.66), t(27) 2.18, p .04, d 0.28, and women (MMoral 1.97, SD 0.64; MCompetence 1.52,SD 0.75), t(64) 6.98, p .001, d 0.65, this difference wasstronger in women, t(91) 2.16, p .03, d 0.49. However,type of emotion did not interact with this effect, and gender wasthus dropped as a factor in analyses reported here. Using theemotion intensity averages, we conducted a 2 (action type) 7(emotion type) repeated-measures ANOVA. The main effects ofaction and emotion type were significant, as was their interaction(all Fs 53.47, all ps .001, all p

2s .353). Follow-uppaired-sample t tests, Bonferroni corrected for multiple compari-sons, indicated that, in both studies, with the exception of pity,grossed out, and amusement, moral violations elicited more in-tense emotion than did competence violations, all ts(99) 7.33, allps .001, all ds 0.78. Pity and amusement were consistentlyrated higher in failures of competence than in violations of mo-rality, both ts(99) 6.9, ps .001, ds 0.74, and there was nosignificant difference for the term grossed out (see Table 2 formeans and standard deviations).

Analysis of the three emotions concerned with negative socialjudgment indicated that moral disgust was significantly higherthan any other emotion in the community violations, all ts(100) 5.9, all ps .001, all ds 0.35, followed by anger and thencontempt. In contrast, participants reported a greater amount ofcontempt than moral disgust toward incompetent acts, t(102) 6.47, p .001, d 0.62 (see Figure 4). Moreover, communityviolations elicited marginally significantly higher amounts of an-ger than contempt, t(105) 2.4, p .02 uncorrected, d 0.19,whereas incompetent behaviors elicited marginally higher amountsof contempt than anger, t(105) 2.5, p .01 uncorrected, d 0.24.

Analysis of percentages of participants selecting particular emo-tions as best descriptive of their overall experience confirmed theresults of the emotion intensity ratings (see Table 3). For violationsof community, the term moral disgust was selected most fre-quently (39%). In comparison, contempt was selected relativelyless frequently (9%) and, in both cases, was selected less oftenthan anger. In contrast, incompetent actions were associated pri-marily with amusement and pity, whereas a direct comparison ofanger, moral disgust, and contempt revealed that, of these three,contempt was selected more often than either of the other twoemotions (contempt 12%, anger 8%, moral disgust 1%).

Discussion

The primary goal of Study 3 was to test whether specificappraisals distinguished moral disgust from contempt. We hypoth-esized that two dimensions relevant to the other-judgmental emo-tions of moral disgust and contempt might be morality and com-petence, respectively. Results were consistent with this hypothesis.Restricting the focus to the three moral judgmental emotions alone,moral disgust was clearly the emotion most strongly felt in re-sponse to violations of the ethic of community, assessed eitherwith intensity reports or by selection of the best descriptive term,as in Study 1. By contrast, for incompetent actions, contempt wasrated most highly, measured either using intensity or the bestdescriptive term.

At the same time, however, several other patterns in the data areworth noting. First, other emotions, such as pity and amusement,emerged as more highly activated in incompetent acts than any ofthe three sociomoral emotions, including contempt. Second, al-though comparing the balance of emotions within either commu-nity violations or incompetent acts leads to a conclusion thatdisgust is associated with immorality, and contempt with incom-petence, comparing between these two classes of actions paints a

Table 2Emotion Intensity Ratings of Community Violations and Incompetent Actions (Study 3)

Action type

Anger Moral disgust Contempt Sadness Pity Grossed out Amused

M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD

Community violation 2.70b 1.23 3.11a 1.11 2.46b 1.24 1.74c 0.94 1.36d 0.96 0.58e 0.83 0.86e 0.76Incompetent action 1.18c,d 0.98 0.76d 0.90 1.45c 1.31 1.02d 0.98 2.18b 1.24 0.41e 0.76 2.98a 1.09

Note. Emotions within a row that share a superscript do not differ significantly at p .05 for that type. Significant differences were determined on thebasis of the results of paired t tests (N 106).


slightly different picture. Both emotions are higher in immoralthan incompetent actions.

We believe that these findings are also consistent with oursocialfunctionalist approach. First, our account does not prohibitthe coactivation of emotions. To the extent that pity or amusementshares an appraisal with contempt, one might indeed expect themto co-occur. Second, it is also important to note that competencemay refer not just to cognitive domains but also to social ones.Knowing how to respond to another person at the appropriate time,or in the appropriate mannerhow to entertain, appease, flatter, orcritique for maximum social benefitmay be just as important askill as knowing how to solve difficult mathematical problems.Indeed, given evidence that people weight social information morehighly than competence information in evaluating people (Woj-ciszke, 2005), it may be less surprising to find that contempt ishigher in community violations, which may demonstrate as mucha lack of knowledge or facility with social conventions as amalevolent intention.2

Study 4: Perceived Consequences Associated With theMoral Emotions

In Studies 13, we focused on antecedent appraisals distinguish-ing anger, disgust, and contempt; however, our extended socialfunctionalist account also makes specific predictions about thelikely consequences of these emotions. If people have observedeach of these emotions to have different social consequences, theyshould distinguish among them and have clear preferences regard-ing being the target of one versus another of these emotions.

In Study 4, we tested this prediction by examining beliefs aboutconsequences for someone evoking these three emotions. Moraldisgust, to the extent that its properties are similar in consequenceto nonsocial disgust, may be associated with a long-lasting judg-ment of the inherent moral worth of a target that is difficult toundo, and avoidance or ostracism and a loss of regard may resultfrom a person being labeled morally disgusting. Given evidencethat social rejection can be extremely painful (Eisenberger, Lieber-man, & Williams, 2003), disgust may in some sense be the worstemotion one could inspire in others. Contempt, as another emotionconcerned with judgments about a persons character, may also beundesirable, but perhaps less severe because it is associated with

incompetence, a category weighted less heavily in overall impres-sions (Wojciszke, 2005). Finally, although its aggressive actiontendencies would seem to make it the most dangerous emotion,anger might actually be the least negative, because it may befocused on temporary behavior rather than lasting judgments.

Note that these predictions differ from the predictions of eitherthe CAD triad view or the undifferentiated view. The CAD triadview argues that different individuals and cultures may emphasizedifferent ethics over others. In modern Western cultures, divinityand community ethics tend to be emphasized less in morality, andautonomy tends to be emphasized more (Haidt, Koller, & Dias,1993; Rozin et al., 1999). Thus, a prediction of the CAD triadhypothesis might be that, at least in Western cultures where au-tonomy is prioritized, anger should be the worst emotion, whereascontempt and disgust might be comparatively less bad. Alterna-tively, the CAD triad might predict that, given that all threeemotions are about morality (albeit different kinds), there shouldbe no differences between them. The semantic equivalents viewlikewise predicts no difference in the desirability of these emo-tions. To determine which account best fits the pattern of perceivedconsequences, we asked participants to make judgments aboutwhich emotion they would least like to inspire and to justify theirresponse.

Method

Participants. Forty-six participants (age range 1823 years;70% female and 30% male; 41% Caucasian, 31% Asian or AsianAmerican, 4% Black, 15% Hispanic or Latino, 9% other) were

2 This distinction may also help to place the association between com-munity violations and contempt in both Rozin et al.s (1999) work and inour Study 1 (secondary to moral disgust) in the proper light. Communityviolations may be seen less as signs of immorality and more as signs ofsocial incompetence. Indeed, we have shown that the community violationsthat were more strongly associated with moral disgust in Study 1 are alsojudged as being more strongly indicative of immorality than incompetence,whereas the community violations associated with contempt in Study 1 areperceived as more indicative of stupidity or a lack of competence than ofimmorality (Hutcherson, 2007).

Figure 4. Intensity of emotions in items representing community violations and incompetent actions (Study 3).Self-reported intensities of anger, moral disgust, and contempt are shown in the context of violations of the ethicof community (left panel) or of failures of competence (right panel). Error bars represent the standard error ofthe mean.


recruited from the Stanford University campus and surroundingcommunity.

Materials and procedure. Participants were given informedconsent, filled out a short demographic questionnaire, and thencompleted a series of questionnaires presented on a computer, inwhich participants preferences about being the target of severaldifferent negative emotions, including moral disgust, anger, con-tempt, grossed out, fear, and sadness, were assessed. Participantsmade a series of choices comparing these negative emotions pair-wise and indicated for each pair which emotion they would rathersomeone to feel toward them (e.g., Would you rather someone bemorally disgusted with you or angry with you?). Participantsmade choices for six pairs: moral disgust versus anger, moraldisgust versus sadness, moral disgust versus contempt, moraldisgust versus grossed out, contempt versus anger, and sadnessversus anger. After making their choice, they were asked to ex-plain why they chose their answer. These answers, with all refer-ences to emotion words blanked out, were coded by two indepen-dent raters, blind to participants choices, for their references tocertain categories of response. The following nine themes (andsample illustrative responses) were used to code participantsjustifications: whether an emotion (a) was temporary or could befixed (e.g., People get over anger easier. Time usually takes careof it.); (b) was indicative of ones moral sense or character (e.g.,Anger is less deep than disgustdisgust would mean they wereupset with my ideals and my personality); (c) was responding toa single, relatively localized action (e.g., Anger usually involvesa single action. For example, I am angry at you for breaking myiPod.); (d) could be a result of a misunderstanding or idiosyn-cratic response (e.g., Many times anger is unjustified and easilysolved); (e) would make the participant feel bad about him- orherself (e.g., Having someone grossed out would be embarrassingtoward myself); (f) would make the participant feel sympathy forthe pain of another person (e.g., The other person would feel hurt,and I never try to hurt anyone); (g) indicated physical rather thanmoral elicitors (I could gross out someone simply by picking upa worm; for someone to be morally disgusted with me, Id have todo something shameful); (h) was less intense or less meaningful(e.g., Lesser of the two); or (i) was indicative of a superiority orstatus judgment (e.g., Because contemptuous indicates air ofsuperiority). Justifications often invoked multiple themes andwere given a score of 1 or 0 for each theme. Justifications noteasily classified into one of these categories were given a score forother. Reliability between the two coders overall was substantial(Cohens .66), and reliability for individual categories rangedfrom .47 (feeling bad about the self) to .93 (physical elicitors).Disagreements between the two coders were resolved by a thirdcoder.

Results

Emotion preferences. Participants preferences strongly sup-ported our socialfunctionalist account. Compared with moraldisgust, participants by a wide margin preferred to be the recipientof someones anger (43 vs. 3), 2(1, N 46) 34.78, p .001;contempt (38 vs. 8), 2(1, N 46) 19.56, p .001; sadness (31vs. 15), 2(1, N 46) 5.6, p .02; and basic disgust (40 vs. 6),2(1, N 46) 25.81, p .001. Participants also stronglypreferred to be the target of someones anger than contempt (40 vs.6), 2(1, N 46) 25.13, p .001, and to anger rather thansadden someone (38 vs. 8), 2(1, N 46) 19.56, p .001.

Justifications for emotion preferences.Anger versus moral disgust. Among the majority of partici-

pants preferring to be the target of anger versus moral disgust, 58%argued that anger was of shorter duration or more easily reversed.Sixty percent further specified that anger was less indicative that apersons inherent moral character was lacking or that anger couldbe responsive to a single action (21%). A sense of self-shame orsadness was also cited as justification by 12% of participants. Thethree participants who indicated they would rather induce moraldisgust generally gave idiosyncratic responses not easily catego-rized (e.g., [I prefer moral disgust] because I always have thisfeeling that I am not like other people and am morally different inmy actions).

Contempt versus moral disgust. A similar set of justificationswas provided by participants who preferred to be the target ofcontempt to moral disgust: 30% argued that moral disgust wouldlast longer or be more difficult to remedy; 35% thought that moraldisgust was more telling of a persons character; and 14% said thatcontempt could simply be the result of idiosyncratic values on thepart of someone experiencing it. Sixteen percent of participantsargued that contempt was simply less intense. Of the eight partic-ipants preferring to elicit moral disgust rather than contempt, 42%gave idiosyncratic responses. Twenty-two percent argued that con-tempt rather than moral disgust was more difficult to undo. Noneargued that contempt would be more indicative of ones character.

Sadness versus moral disgust. Of the participants indicatingthat moral disgust was a worse emotion, 29% justified their choicebecause disgust was a stronger judgment of their moral character,was less reversible (29%), was more intense or meaningful (20%),or would make them more ashamed of themselves (13%). Amongparticipants selecting sadness as the worse emotion to inspire, mostindicated that they did not want to be the source of anotherpersons pain (40%), whereas smaller numbers indicated that sad-ness would last longer (20%).

Grossed out versus moral disgust. Of the majority of partic-ipants preferring someone to feel grossed out, most thought

Table 3Percentage of Subjects Selecting an Emotion as Best Descriptive for Community Violations and Incompetent Actions (Study 3)

Action type Anger Moral disgust Contempt Sadness Pity Grossed out Amused

Community violation 16.25 39.08 13.57 9.76 7.68 0.21 13.46Incompetent action 7.98 1.38 11.79 3.30 28.86 1.33 47.32

Note. N 106.


grossed out was less indicative of ones moral character (18%),would be a less severe or meaningful emotion (30%), would be ofshorter duration (25%), or could be felt to purely physical breachesof etiquette (23%). Of the minority who preferred someone feelmorally disgusted, two cited idiosyncratic reasons, and one personeach thought that being grossed out was more indicative of onesmoral character, less subject to idiosyncratic perspectives, wouldhurt the other person more, or would inspire more self-shame.

Anger versus contempt. Of the participants preferring angerto contempt, 60% argued the contempt would last longer or wouldbe harder to remedy than anger. However, compared with moraldisgust, fewer participants argued that contempt was a strongerstatement about a persons inherent moral character (8%). Inaddition, whereas no participants mentioned issues of status orsuperiority when comparing anger to moral disgust, 8% of partic-ipants mentioned this issue in distinguishing anger from contempt.Of the six participants preferring to be the target of contempt, twoargued that contempt would be easier to undo.

Anger versus sadness. Participants who preferred makingsomeone angry justified their choice in several ways: 50% arguedthat sadness was longer lasting or harder to undo, whereas 21%argued that they would feel worse for having hurt someone. Ofparticipants who preferred making someone sad, 25% said thatthey wished to avoid the violence or aggression of anger, 25%thought anger would be more difficult to undo, 13% cited greatersympathy for the persons anger, and 13% cited idiosyncraticreasons.

Discussion

The results of Study 4 strongly supported the predictions of oursocialfunctionalist perspective. Participants beliefs concerningthe consequences of each emotion painted a clear picture of moraldisgust as the most damaging emotion, both because it seemshardest to undo and is most indicative of a persons inherent moralcharacter. Anger, according to participants, is the most easilyremedied, is more concerned with specific actions, and is mostlikely to arise from a misunderstanding or individually held atti-tude. Contempt lies somewhere in the middle, being considerablyworse than anger, but considerably better than moral disgust.Moreover, though relatively few participants mentioned issues ofstatus or superiority for any emotion, contempt was the onlyemotion to receive justifications consistent with such an appraisal.

Study 5: Action Tendencies and Judgments inRecalled Events

Study 4 supported the predictions of our account indirectly, bydemonstrating that people distinguish these emotions when imag-ining being on the receiving end of these emotions. Whether theseemotions are associated with different action tendencies and judg-ments where actual events are concerned remains unclear. In Study5, we asked participants to recall events from their lives and ratethe responses, judgments, and emotions associated with each.

We made several predictions. First, we expected anger to beuniquely associated with active attempts to change or prevent harmto the self and to be more sensitive than either contempt or moraldisgust to attempts by the offending party to make reparations. Itshould not be as strongly correlated with character judgments of

either incompetence or immorality. Second, in contrast to anger,moral disgust should be most strongly associated with the judg-ment that a person is immoral. To the extent that it is a less activeemotion than anger, it should be associated with avoidance re-sponses but not with attempts to stop an offensive act. Finally, tothe extent that it is harder to undo and evokes more lastingcharacter judgments, it should not be sensitive to an apology andshould render attempts at reparations less acceptable. Third, incontrast to both anger and moral disgust, contempt should beassociated with the judgment that a person is incompetent, as wellas with feelings of superiority, but should not correlate withjudgments that the person is immoral.

Method

Participants. Thirty participants, recruited online through theStanford University Psychology Department participant database,completed a set of web-based questionnaires in exchange for $5.Of these, three were excluded for response times that suggestedthey were not completing the questionnaires in good faith (i.e.,taking less than 10 s to recall an event and answer 19 questions).The final sample consisted of 27 participants (mean age 34.6 years,range 1960; 70% female and 30% male; 67% Caucasian, 19%Asian or Asian American, 11% Black, 3% Hispanic or Latino).

Materials and procedure. Participants gave informed con-sent, completed three questionnaires, and then filled out a shortdemographic form. For each questionnaire, participants were givenone of three instructions, with order counterbalanced across sub-jects:

1. Think of the most recent time you can remember whensomeone did something that had a negative impact onyou. This does not have to be anything necessarilyimmoral (although it can be), but just something thataffected you in a bad way. (Self-relevant event)

2. Think of the most recent time you can remember whenyou saw or heard about someone else (not you) doingsomething immoral, wrong, or offensive, but that did notdirectly affect you. (Immoral event)

3. Think of the most recent time you can remember whenyou saw or heard about someone else (not you) doingsomething stupid, idiotic, or incompetent. (Incompe-tent event)

After describing the particular event they had recalled, participantsanswered a set of 19 questions. The first four questions askedabout specific features of the event: how long ago the event hadoccurred, whether the participants had seen the event occur them-selves (or simply heard about it through someone else), whetherthey had been directly affected by the event, and whether someonethey knew personally had been directly affected by the event.

To examine responses hypothesized to relate to anger, we askedparticipants to indicate on a Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 4(extremely) how much they felt like personally putting in effort toget the person(s) responsible to stop or change what they weredoing and how much they felt that the person(s) responsible shouldbe punished for what they did. We also asked them to indicatewhether the person(s) responsible had apologized or tried to make


amends for what they did, with yes, no, and dont know asresponse options.

To examine responses hypothesized to relate to moral disgust,we asked participants to indicate on a 4-point Likert scale howmuch they currently felt like they would go to some effort to avoidcontact with the person(s) responsible and whether an apology/amends would (or did) suffice to make up for what the person did.We also asked them to indicate how much the action had nega-tively affected their impression of the persons moral character andhow generally immoral, unethical, or offensive they thought theactor was.

To examine responses hypothesized to relate to contempt, weasked participants to indicate on a 4-point Likert scale how muchthey felt superior to the person(s) described in the event, how muchthe action had negatively affected their impression of the personsintelligence or competence, and how generally stupid, idiotic, orincompetent they thought the person was.

Participants then reported how much they had felt angry, mor-ally disgusted, contemptuous, and grossed out at the time of theevent, on a 4-point Likert scale. Because retrospective accountsmay be biased, and because some of the responses, particularlycharacter judgments, might be more strongly related to currentemotions, we also asked participants to report how much of eachof the four emotions they currently felt about the event.

Results

Manipulation check. Examination of the event descriptionsprovided by participants confirmed that they followed instructions.Self-relevant events typically evoked descriptions of minor of-fenses affecting the participant, such as insensitivity or irrespon-sibility, but also more serious crimes, such as theft and cheating.Immoral events evoked descriptions of lying, cheating, stealing,and cruelty. Most immoral events directly affected someone otherthan the participant, although a minority (28%) were reported asaffecting the self as well. Incompetent events evoked descriptionsof carelessness, illiteracy, and irresponsibility, and a substantialminority cited dangerous behavior in traffic. Just under half (46%)reported being affected by the incompetent event directly. Themajority of events (71%) had occurred within the last month.

Average emotion intensity across event types. We pre-dicted that, as in the hypothetical scenarios used in Studies 13,

anger should be highest in self-relevant offenses, moral disgustshould be highest in moral offenses, and contempt should behighest in incompetent offenses. Table 4 reports means and stan-dard deviations for each emotion for each event type. As predicted,anger was significantly more intense in self-relevant events thanany other emotion, for both past and current time periods, allts(26) 4.18, all ps .001, all ds 1.07. Also as predicted,moral disgust was the most intense emotion reported in immoralevents, for both past and current emotion, although this was notsignificantly greater than anger, the second highest emotion, ateither time point, both paired ts(26) 1.1, ns.

However, contrary to predictions, contempt was only the secondhighest emotion in incompetent events, being significantly lowerthan anger at both past, paired t(26) 1.95, p .06, d 0.33, andcurrent time points, paired t(26) 2.12, p .04, d 0.28, buthigher than moral disgust at both past, paired t(26) 2.93, p .005, d 0.43, and current time points, paired t(26) 1.76, p .05 one-tailed, d 0.29.

Association between action tendencies and emotions. Ourprimary interest in Study 5 concerned not differences in averageemotion across event types but the associations between specificemotions and specific action tendencies and judgments. To exam-ine this question, we first conducted tests to verify that the rela-tionship between emotions and action tendencies/judgments wasnot significantly different across event type. Using hierarchicallinear modeling, with subjects specified as a random factor, wetested for the presence of a significant interaction between eventtype and the influence of each emotion (anger, moral disgust,contempt, grossed out) on each action tendency/judgment (tried tostop, wanted to punish, would avoid, apology would help, feltsuperior, judged immoral, changed view of immorality, judgedincompetent, changed view of incompetence) in either time period.These analyses indicated that only for moral disgust, and then onlyfor avoidance behavior, was there a significant interaction betweenevent type and response: for time of the event, F(2, 75) 3.71,p .03; currently, F(2, 75) 2.96, p .06. For all other emotionsand action tendencies/judgments, there were no differences inrelation across event type, all Fs(2, 75) 2.5, all ps .1. In allfurther analyses, we thus examined the main effect of each emo-tion on actions and judgments.

Table 4Average Emotional Intensity by Event Type (Study 5)

Event type

Anger Moral disgust Contempt Grossed out

M SD M SD M SD M SD

Emotion at the time of the event

Self-relevant 2.14a 0.85 0.82b 1.06 1.11b 1.07 0.29c 0.71Immoral 1.61a,b 1.10 1.79a 1.07 1.42b 1.24 0.75c 1.00Incompetent 1.39a 1.23 0.54b 0.79 1.00a 1.12 0.57b 0.92

Emotion currently felt about the event

Self-relevant 1.32a 0.98 0.53b 0.92 0.64b 0.95 0.32b 0.86Immoral 1.00a 1.02 1.25a 1.00 1.14a 1.15 0.54b 0.92Incompetent 0.93a 1.09 0.39b 0.69 0.64a 0.99 0.43c 0.69

Note. N 27. Within a row, emotions that share a superscript do not differ significantly at the p .05 level.


To determine which emotions were uniquely and independentlyassociated with a particular action tendency or judgment, weconstructed a hierarchical linear model with the target actiontendency/judgment as the dependent variable and both past andcurrent intensity of anger, moral disgust, contempt, and grossedout as predictors. The model also included subjects specified as arandom effect and event type as a fixed effect. Starting from thisfull model, we then used backward elimination to remove predic-tors that were not significantly correlated with the target variableafter controlling for the effect of all other included variables,removing the least significant predictor at each step. We continuedwith backward selection until all variables continued to signifi-cantly predict that measure. For example, in the full model pre-dicting the action tendency related to attempts to stop or intervenein the event (1*Past Anger 2*Current Anger 3*PastMoral Disgust 4*Current Moral Disgust 5*Past Con-tempt 6*Current Contempt 7*Past Grossed Out 8*Current Grossed Out 9*Event Type), we found that onlypast anger was significantly related to attempts to stop (b 0.41,SE 0.17, p .02), and no other variable predicted this measureat the p .05 level. We then proceeded by running the samemodel, dropping the least significant variable from the analysis (inthis case, current anger, p .84). We proceeded in this manneruntil all included variables were significant at p .05, leaving inthis case only anger ( p .001). Below, we summarize the resultsof this procedure for each action tendency/judgment. As supple-ments to the full model, we also analyzed the effects of theseemotions separately for intensity at each time point (e.g., 1*PastAnger 2*Past Moral Disgust 3*Past Contempt 4*PastGrossed Out 5*Event Type). We discuss the results of thesemodels only if they differed meaningfully from the full model.

Anger-related responses. The hypothesis that anger shouldbe uniquely related to attempts to stop or intervene against theactions of the perpetrator when an offense took place was stronglyconfirmed. After elimination, only anger experienced at the time ofthe event predicted actions taken to stop the perpetrator (b 0.54,SE 0.10, p .001).

We also predicted that if anger motivates active response until awrong has been alleviated, it should be deactivated if the perpe-trator has apologized or tried to make amends. To test this, weexamined the relation between each emotion and the presence ofan apology (coded as 1 if present, 0 if absent, and .5 if theparticipant was unsure). As expected, only currently felt anger wascorrelated, negatively, with the presence of an apology (b 0.12,SE 0.05, p .01).

Finally, we predicted that anger might be implicated in wantingto punish a person in order to prevent future threat. This predictionwas only partially confirmed. Anger at the time of the event waspositively correlated with the desire to punish (b 0.29, SE 0.10, p .004), but moral disgust at that time predicted thisimpulse even more strongly (b 0.49, SE 0.10, p .001).

Moral disgust-related responses. In contrast to the approachand attack behavior associated with anger, we expected avoidanceto be more strongly associated with moral disgust. However, weinstead found that only current anger correlated with being willingto expend effort to avoid coming into contact with a person (b 0.51, SE 0.12, p .001).

We further hypothesized that moral disgust should nullify theeffectiveness of an apology or reparations, because the judgment

that someone is inherently evil might make such attempts suspect.Although no emotion correlated with the effectiveness of an apol-ogy in the full model, when analyzing current emotion only, moraldisgust alone marginally predicted an apologys effectiveness (b 0.22, SE 0.13, p .09).

Finally, we predicted and found moral disgust to be the emotionmost strongly tied to immoral character judgments. Current moraldisgust was the emotion most strongly associated with overallimmoral character judgments (b 0.49, SE 0.12, p .001),whereas past moral disgust was the emotion most strongly asso-ciated with a changed view of a persons moral character (b 0.77, SE 0.09, p .001). Current anger also predicted moralcharacter judgments, albeit more weakly (b 0.35, SE 0.10,p .001). No other emotions significantly predicted changes inmoral character judgments after backward selection in the fullmodel.

Contempt-related responses. We predicted and found thatcontempt would be most strongly related to issues relevant tocompetence and status judgments. Only current contempt wasrelated to feeling superior (b 0.61, SE 0.08, p .001). Inaddition, current contempt was the emotion most strongly relatedboth to overall assessments of incompetence (b 0.48, SE 0.11,p .001) and to changes in competence judgments (b 0.51,SE 0.09, p .001). Past anger was also more weakly related toboth judgments (incompetent character: b 0.20, SE 0.11, p .07; changes in incompetency judgment: b 0.17, SE 0.09, p .05).

Discussion

Substantial support was observed for our predictions. In recall-ing episodes from their recent past, participants reported the great-est anger in self-relevant events and the greatest moral disgust inimmoral events. Although contempt was only the second highestemotion in incompetence events, behind anger, this may have beendue in part to the nature of the events recalled, which were oftenissues affecting the self, or related to dangerous traffic maneuversrather than incompetence or stupidity per se.

In the more direct test linking the intensity of specific emotionsto the intensity of specific action tendencies and judgments, weobserved quite a bit of support for our hypotheses. First, only angerwas associated with active attempts to stop an offensive behavior.Anger was also the only emotion to be defused by the verifiable actof an apology. Second, although moral disgust was not stronglyassociated with any overt behaviors, it was the emotion mostpredictive of attributing an immoral character to another person.Consistent with this, it was also the emotion most likely to renderan apology or attempts at amends insufficient to make up for theoriginal act, corroborating the assertions of participants in Study 4that it is the most difficult emotion to undo. Finally, contrary to thepredictions of an account in which contempt is a specifically moralemotion, we found that it was specifically and uniquely associatedwith judgments related to incompetence, stupidity, and status, butnot to immorality.

However, we did observe some noteworthy exceptions to thegeneral confirmation of our predictions. First, we had predictedthat moral disgust, whose nonsocial counterpart is typically asso-ciated with withdrawal, would be most strongly associated withavoidance, but instead we found that only anger predicted this


behavior. This is consistent with work suggesting that anger mo-tivates both approach and avoidance behavior (Averill, 1982) andwith the idea that anger enables higher energy expenditure insupport of defense against an offensive act. The wording of ourquestion, which emphasized going to some effort to avoid aperson, may have been too suggestive of this higher energy re-sponse, whereas moral disgust may be associated with a morepassive avoidance than the kind we tested here. Second, contraryto our predictions, we observed a weaker but consistent involve-ment of anger in both immorality and competency judgments,suggesting that anger does play a role in judgments of a personscharacter. One possibility for this weaker relationship is that angerdoes indeed provoke negative character judgments, but, as anemotion more sensitive to attempts at reparation, those effects areof shorter duration and easier mitigation than the effects of eitherdisgust or contempt.

General Discussion

The primary question addressed by the studies presented hereconcerned the separability of the three other-condemning emo-tions: anger, moral disgust, and contempt. Although some theorieshave made distinctions between all three emotions (i.e., the CADtriad hypothesis; Rozin et al., 1999), more typical models havemade fewer distinctions (Fiske et al., 2002; Mackie et al., 2000),and solid evidence concerning either their distinction or separabil-ity has remained scant. As a whole, the research presented hereprovides evidence for the value of considering these emotions asthree separate entities. Varying antecedent appraisals clearly in-fluenced the emotions people considered relevant to a particularsituation (Studies 13). People also clearly distinguished theseemotions in their beliefs about the social consequences, stronglypreferring anger over contempt and contempt over disgust (Study4). Finally, these emotions were associated with unique profiles ofresponses and judgments in real-life events (Study 5). Althoughother distinctions, also motivated by social functionalism, havebeen proposed (Rozin et al., 1999), we believe that they may beimportantly incomplete and that a social functionalism that incor-porates issues of self-relevance and broadens the domain of theseemotions to include nonmoral issues such as competence is re-quired to fully explain the differences between them.

The Social Antecedents and Consequences of Anger,Disgust, and Contempt

The strongest support for the viability of the socialfunctionalistaccount presented here was found in antecedent appraisals thatdifferentiated the three emotions. The results of Studies 13 sug-gest that, on a semantic level at least, people do distinguishbetween anger, moral disgust, and contempt. Anger appears to beevoked by appraisals of self-relevance, disgust seems to be relatedmost strongly to appraisals that a person is morally untrustworthy,and contempt seems uniquely related to the judgment that someoneis incompetent or unintelligent. Given the pattern of results inStudies 13, it will prove interesting in future work to furtherelaborate the necessary and sufficient appraisals that elicit theseemotions. Self-relevance clearly impacts the degree to which angeris experienced in response to a negative event, but other consid-erations may be necessary in order to predict whether anger or

some other emotion will be evoked in response to someonesbehavior. For example, though it is unclear from the researchpresented here and elsewhere, introspection and casual observationsuggest that any significant and consequential act, regardless of itsmoral overtones, might elicit anger as long as it is self-relevant.Moreover, it is clear that people can often be angry at events thaton their surface do not directly impact the self. Whether such angeris related to an expanded definition of self that incorporates otherindividuals, groups, or nations, or whether it is sensitive to otherfactors, remains to be seen.

A similar consideration of the necessary and sufficient condi-tions for moral disgust and contempt is also instructive. Of the two,disgust seems to most clearly emerge as specifically and uniquelytied to intentional, immoral behavior. In Studies 13, the moralityof the behavior seemed to be directly tied to the degree to whichparticipants experienced disgust. One possibility is that this is anartifact of the label moral, which in all studies was applied to theword disgust and not to anger or contempt. Although this term wasused deliberately to help separate moral and nonmoral forms ofdisgust, it will be useful in future studies to linguistically distin-guish moral and nonmoral forms of anger and contempt for par-ticipants or to use other ways of distinguishing such emotions,such as facial expression, to observe the effects that this additionalspecification has on the extent to which participants treat theseterms as similar or differentiable.

Despite many of the results supporting the socialfunctionalistmodels envisioned role for contempt, this emotion still remainsthe most nebulous of the three. Although contempt was clearlylinked to incompetence in Study 3, it may be that this is only oneof a number of necessary eliciting appraisals for it. Simply beingincompetent may be enough to elicit sadness, pity, or amusement(as seen in Study 3), but to elicit contempt may require somethingmore, including but not limited to a judgment of moral laxness, anunsympathetic nature, or a competitive relationship to the per-ceiver (cf. Fiske et al., 2002).

Studies 4 and 5 provided complementary evidence to Studies13, suggesting that these emotions may be linked to distinct setsof social responses. People clearly think of these emotions ashaving different consequences and may use them in free speech tocommunicate to others their likely actions and responses. Theseemotions also appear to be differentially tied to real-world behav-iors and judgments. Although anger was most strongly associatedwith overt responses and was the only emotion sensitive to at-tempts by another person to repair the damage done by an action,moral disgust was most strongly associated with moral characterjudgments, and contempt was most strongly associated with in-competence character judgments.

Implications for Affective Science

We have argued that it is useful to distinguish anger, contempt,and moral disgust from one another and from other affective statessuch as sadness, fear, or basic disgust. Yet it is also useful to notehow much overlap was observed between these emotions. Com-paratively large differences in the relative levels of anger, disgust,or contempt often occurred in the context of comparatively smalldifferences in the overall or absolute levels. Even when peopleclaimed that disgust most strongly captured a particular experi-


ence, they also reported feeling intense contempt, anger, or evensadness.

What does it mean for affective science that emotional statesseem to be so frequently coactivated and, to some extent, inter-changeable? Does it suggest that distinctions among discrete emo-tions are the result of acquired experience of a stochastic and oftennoisy nature, rather than the action of cleanly separated, hard-wired biological mechanisms? Or that our current methodsinboth lay and scientific settingsfail to capture the truly relevantdimensions of emotional experience (L. F. Barrett et al., 2007)?

How does the evidence presented here bear upon the currentunderstanding of these emotions as they are typically viewed in theliterature? The considerable overlap and co-occurrence observedhere, combined with the observation of clear distinctions betweenthem in antecedent appraisals and functional consequences, lendssupport to models in which anger, disgust, and contempt share acommon socioemotional core. These emotions are clearly moresimilar to each other than they are to other emotions. Any differ-ences among them may be the result of linguistic and semanticelaborations overlaid on a single underlying emotion. However,this work also points to the importance of understanding when, andwhy, these emotions differ, and several avenues for future explo-ration arise out of a consideration of the limitations of the researchand the subtleties of the results.

Limitations and Future Directions

One important limitation of the studies presented here is theirreliance on self-reported measures of affect and behavior, whichrestricts any conclusions drawn from the data concerning thepredictions of the socialfunctional account. Although generallysupportive evid

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