husserl's theory of language as calculus ratiocinator

MARINA PAOLA BANCHETTI-ROBINO

HUSSERL’S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS CALCULUSRATIOCINATOR

ABSTRACT. This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl’s theory of language, specif-ically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as an example of a larger body of theoriesdubbed ‘language as calculus’. Although this particular interpretation has been previouslydefended by other authors, such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contributeto the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible are Husserl’s dis-tinction between the notions of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, his view thatmeaning is instantiated through meaning-intending acts of transcendental consciousness,and his view that the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. Aswell, the paper argues that the phenomenological method of reduction itself presupposes thenotion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of thenatural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conceptionof language as a reinterpretable calculus.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl’s theory of logic and lan-guage, specifically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as an exampleof a more general category of theories dubbed ‘language as calculus’. Tothis end, the paper will focus, in particular, on Husserl’s ideas in the Log-ical Investigations, though it is understood that Husserl had a lot to sayabout these issues in his later works. Although this interpretation has beenpreviously defended by other authors,1 such as Jaakko Hintikka and MartinKusch, this paper seeks to contribute to the discussion by arguing that thecrucial elements which classify Husserl’s theory as ‘language as calculus’are his distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment,his view that meanings are ideal ‘universal’ objects that are instantiatedby transcendental consciousness in meaning-intending acts, and the viewthat the content of meaning-intending acts is precisely this ideal meaningsimpliciter.

These claims about meaning in general can also be applied to linguis-tic meaning specifically. Doing so allows Husserl to defend the notion oftruth as correspondence. More specifically, it allows Husserl to expresstruth as correspondence as the fulfillment of a meaning-intention. One can

Synthese 112: 303–321, 1997.c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

304 MARINA PAOLA BANCHETTI-ROBINO

also find strong support for the claim that semantical relations betweenlanguage and the world are both accessible and expressible. The languagewith which to express these semantical relations and the notion of truth ascorrespondence is a metalanguage which is itself the product of the Husser-lian transcendental reduction. In this reduction, language is stripped of theontological commitments of the natural attitude, is reinterpreted, and isused to describe the results of phenomenological investigation into theessence and origin of meaning and meaning relations. Thus, one sees inHusserl a commitment to the notion that reality as such can be reached bysubtracting the influence of the language of the natural attitude with allof its ontological commitments, and a commitment to the notion that lan-guage is a reinterpretable calculus which can be used in phenomenologicalinvestigation.

I shall accomplish my task by first clarifying the distinction between‘language as calculus’ (calculus ratiocinator) and ‘language as univer-sal medium’ (lingua characteristica). Following this, I will conduct anin-depth examination of the distinction between meaning-intention andmeaning-fulfillment in Husserl. This shall be followed by a discussion ofthe nature of meaning-intending acts and a discussion of the content ofthese acts. This will lead, finally, to a discussion of the ways in whichHusserl’s theory of language fits into the larger context of ‘language ascalculus’.

2. CALCULUS RATIOCINATOR VS. LINGUA CHARACTERISTICA

It is important first to clarify the distinction between the two views oflogic and language, ‘language as calculus’ and ‘language as universalmedium’. According to Jean Van Heijenoort’s seminal paper ‘Logic asCalculus and Logic as Language’,2 there are two general views of logicand language. Logic can be either a calculus ratiocinator or it can bea lingua characteristica. Van Heijenoort’s paper specifically focuses onFrege’s conception of logic. However, this distinction can also be used tounderstand Husserl’s general conception of logic and language.

First of all, the tenets of these two very different theories of logic andlanguage must be clarified. The conception of language called ‘languageas the universal medium’ (lingua characteristica) sees semantical rela-tions between language and the world as inexpressible. There are severalcorollaries of this general theory. First of all, since semantical relationsare inaccessible, it follows that we cannot imagine different semanticalrelations. If this is the case, modal theory is not possible (since it is basedon the “systematical variation of meaning relations”). Because we are thus

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trapped in our language, linguistic relativism is inevitable. Thus, reali-ty cannot be grasped without distorting linguistic interference. Followingfrom this, the construction of a metalanguage is impossible and, therefore,truth as correspondence is inexpressible. This finally leads to the claim thatwe must limit ourselves to syntax, i.e., formalism (Kusch 1988). JaakkoHintikka describes this view of language as claiming that

[: : : ] one cannot as it were look at one’s language from outside and describe it [: : : ] thereason for this alleged impossibility is that one can use language to talk about somethingonly if one can rely on a given definite interpretation, a given network of meaning relationsobtaining between language and the world. Hence one cannot meaningfully and significantlysay in language what these meaning relations are, for in any attempt to do so one mustalready presuppose them. (Hintikka 1986, 1)

This view, of course, is directly opposed to the position defended byHusserl. Hintikka has suggested that Husserl’s position be termed one of‘language as calculus’ (calculus ratiocinator). The corollaries of ‘languageas calculus’ directly oppose ’language as universal medium’ in the follow-ing manner. First of all, since semantical relations are accessible, we cansay what it would be to have different semantical relations. Therefore,modal theory is possible. Reality as such can be reached by subtractingthe influence of language, thus rendering linguistic relativism an untenabledoctrine and the construction of metalanguages possible. Truth as corre-spondence is expressible, and we need not limit ourselves to formalism,i.e., syntax, but can also carry on semantic theory (Kusch 1988).

3. MEANING-INTENTION VS. MEANING-FULFILLMENT

Before I demonstrate how Husserl’s theory of linguistic meaning fits intothe ‘calculus ratiocinator’ view, I must first explain his distinction betweenmeaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, a distinction central to histheory. At this point, however, a general discussion of Husserl’s theory ofintentional noetic acts is in order to set the foundation for the distinctionbetween meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment.

The basis for his notion of meaning-intention lies in the general phe-nomenological doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness. The noeticapproach, which is taken in the Logical Investigations, deals with theintentional acts of consciousness, the noetic acts. The noematic approach,which is taken in Ideas I, deals with the content of the intentional actsof consciousness, i.e., with the noema. It seems, though, that in Husserl’stheory of meaning the noetic approach predominates over the noematicapproach. Husserl’s theory of meaning is predominantly noetic because,for him, without acts of consciousness there would be no meaning. He,


thus, speaks of meaning-intending noetic acts. He claims that there are twoelements involved in our experience of meaningfully using an expression.First, we are sensuously aware of the physical sign. Second, a peculiarintellectual ‘awareness’ transforms the physical sign into a meaningfulexpression. According to Husserl, rules and customs governing the useof words presuppose meaning-intending acts. Thus in meaning-intendingacts we are not objectively aware of the meaning of the expression. Rather,it is in a subsequent act of reflection that we become objectively aware ofit as such.

Husserl offers the following classification of intentional acts as a foun-dation for his account of meaning-intention. Intentional acts can be eitheracts that are intentional in the widest sense in which all acts of conscious-ness are intentional, or they can belong to a subclass of these acts bybeing intentional in the narrower and more specific sense of being capableof founding fulfilling relationships. Among the latter group of intentionalacts there are two further subclasses: the class of non-objectifying inten-tional acts, i.e., acts that cannot function as components of a knowledgesituation (e.g., desires, hopes, etc.), and the class of objectifying intentionalacts, i.e., acts that can function as components of a knowledge situation.Objectifying acts can be further subdivided into signitive acts, that is, actsof symbolic thinking, and intuitive acts. Within the group of intuitive actsare found perceptual acts and imaginative acts.

Though all awareness and thinking is intentional, the class of meaning-intending acts belongs to that narrower group called objectifying acts. Asmentioned above, objectifying acts are acts that are capable of an identify-ing fulfillment, that is, a fulfillment that identifies itself with the intendingact. In objectifying acts, the meaning-fulfillment is identified with themeaning-intention. Objectifying acts contain unfulfilled intentions with-in them and thus belong to the other, narrower class of intentional acts,described above, called signitive or symbolic acts. Thus, although all con-sciousness is intentional in the broad sense, thinking is also intentionalin the narrower sense. Hence, meaning-intending acts are those intention-al acts that serve as the foundation for the possibility of the meaning-fulfillment of an expression. Without the intentional act of meaning-bestowment, there would be no possibility of a particular sign bearingany relationship to a corresponding designatum.

The meaning-intending act serves as a mediator between the sign andits designatum by making the sign into an expression. The fulfilled mean-ing and the object referred to are involved, therefore, in an indirect rela-tion, with the meaning-intention as mediator between them. In meaning-fulfilling acts, the objective reference of the meaning-intention is realized,


and naming becomes an actual and conscious relation between the nameand the named. Consequently, an experience can be recognized as thefulfillment of a meaning only if the meaning-intention has already beenapprehended. The apprehension of a meaning-intention determines thetype and range of fulfillment that an expression is capable of having andis the pre-condition for our recognition of an experience as a meaning-fulfillment.

There are two types of relations between meaning-intention andmeaning-fulfillment. One type is the static unity between intention andfulfillment. This is the type of relation in which the thought and the intu-itive apprehension are already together. In a static unity, meaning-intentionand meaning-fulfillment coincide with one another temporarily. The mean-ingful use of the expression must be accompanied by the requisite intuition.The other type of relation is the dynamic unity between intention and ful-fillment. This occurs when the signitive meaning-intention of a thought isnot at first fulfilled but is fulfilled when the corresponding intuitive appre-hension brings about meaning-fulfillment. In a dynamic unity, meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment do not coincide with one another but,rather, come together one after the other (Mohanty 1976, 49).

The relation between the expression and the object meant, the inten-tional object, can be of two types. This relation can either be realized or notrealized. If the intentional object is not present before the mind as an intu-ition or a representation (mental image), then the relation of the expressionto the object is unrealized, unfulfilled; “mere meaning is all there is to it”(Logical Investigations I x9, Husserl 1970b, 280). The relation is confinedto a meaning-intention. On the other hand, if the object is present beforethe mind and the actual and conscious relation of expression to object isrealized, the meaning-intention is fulfilled.

The first kind of acts described above, meaning-intending acts, areessential to the expression. A linguistic sign without meaning is not anexpression. The second kind of acts, the meaning-fulfilling acts, are notessential to the expression. The expression is still an expression, i.e., it stillhas meaning, whether or not its meaning is fulfilled. There is an objectmeant, i.e., an intentional object, and it can have a designatum, but thelatter is not experienced. “In the realized relation of the expression toits objective correlate [which includes not only objects in the narrowersense but also states of affairs, properties, and non-independent forms,whether real or categorical] the sense-informed expression becomes onewith the act of meaning-fulfillment” (Husserl 1970b, 282). The word isunited with the meaning-intention, thus becoming an expression whichcan possibly be united with the meaning-fulfillment. The expression is the


experienced unity of the sign and the thing signified. Yet, though Husserldraws these distinctions, he stresses the phenomenological unity which‘fuses’ meaning-fulfillment and expression together (Husserl 1970b, x10,282).

In his discussion, Husserl is concerned not with the expression as aphysical event but with the expression as such. As said above, the expres-sion as such is more than the physical event. It is the unity of a physicalsymbol and a fixed meaning. Mohanty makes this point clearly when heasserts that “[i]f an expression as such is constituted by its meaning and isnot an expression without it, it follows that one cannot even strictly say thatan expression ‘expresses’ meaning. To be an expression is to be animatedby its entire meaning” (Mohanty 1976).3 The linguistic expression is notmerely a physical phenomenon, for if it were it could never be repeated.Because it is a symbol unified with a meaning, the expression can havebeing again and again, ad infinitum. It is in this sense that it is an ideal struc-ture (Husserl 1970b, x11, 286). Therefore, when a physical phenomenonsuch as a word acquires meaning and thus becomes an expression, its ‘rep-resentation’ changes. According to Mohanty, “the intuitive representationin which the physical appearance of the word is constituted undergoes anessential modification. The physical pattern enters into a new intentionalunity” (Mohanty 1976, 32).

Husserl’s distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfill-ment is designed to oppose naturalistic, nominalistic, and psychologistictheories of meaning. In fixing the relation of meaning to expression, Husserlexcludes all forms of psychologism and nominalism from his theory. Thepsychologistic image theory of meaning, which identifies meaning with animage or a mental picture, is especially problematic for Husserl. He states:

Verbal expressions are no doubt often accompanied by images, which may stand in anintimate or a distant relation to their meanings, but to treat such accompaniments asnecessary conditions for understanding runs counter to the plainest of facts. Thereby weknow that the meaningfulness of an expression – let alone its very meaning – cannot consistin the existence of such images, and cannot be disturbed by their absence. (Husserl 1970b,x17, 299)

Husserl stresses what is meant by an assertion, whether it is a conceptualor a perceptual judgment and whether or not it is accompanied by an‘image’. According to Mohanty, what Husserl means by an assertion “isnot any such experience or image but something objective, something thatcould be communicated to and shared by others” (Mohanty 1976, 33). Evenif the image presented in such judgments were to change or disappear,the judgment would retain its meaning (Husserl 1970b, x17, 300). ForHusserl, then, expressions and language in general can be understood in


the complete absence of mental imagery (Husserl 1970b, Investigation IV,x4, 681).

The idea of meaning-intention makes sense once it has been settledthat an expression does not consist of either an inner or an outer intuitiveexperience (perception) but rather of an intuitive apprehension of mean-ing. Again, since expressions can be meaningful in the total absence ofintuitive experiences, meaningfulness itself must not come from havingsuch an experience. For example, an expression such as ‘the round square’is meaningful even though, a priori, no corresponding experiential intu-ition is possible. This expression, as Husserl claims, is animated by ameaning-intention. To clarify this point, let us consider the following: (1)‘Abcaderaf’, (2) ‘round square’, (3) ‘Pegasus’, (4) ‘The present king ofFrance’, (5) ‘The other side of the moon’, (6) ‘Man’, and (7) ‘This whitewall before me’. The characteristic distinction between (1) and (2)–(7) isthat (2)–(7) are animated by meaning-intentions and are thus meaning-ful, whereas (1) is not animated by a meaning-intention and is thus notmeaningful. Consequently, (1) cannot be considered an expression. It is ameaningless perceptual phenomenon, a string of letters.

As stressed above, an expression as such is essentially meaningful. It isconstituted by a noesis, a meaning-intending act. Expressions (2)–(7) sharethis essential meaning-intending characteristic. They are differentiated bythe fact that, in some, the corresponding perceptual intuition is ruled out apriori, while in others it is ruled out a posteriori and in others it is not ruledout at all. Thus, the possibility or impossibility of meaning-fulfillmentand the precise nature of this fulfillment is part of what distinguishesthese expressions. It is by virtue of the meaning-intention that meaningfulexpressions are meaningful, not by virtue of meaning-fulfillment. “Thismediating act must be the true giver of meaning, must pertain to thesignificantly functioning expression as its essential constituent, and mustdetermine its possession of an identical sense, whether or not it is associatedwith a confirming percept” (Husserl 1970b, 682).

This is why the image theory of meaning is not correct, according toHusserl. According to the image theory, since meaning is a mental picture orintuitive perception, an expression that does not have such a correspondingintuition is meaningless. This would render expressions like ‘round square’and ‘Pegasus’ meaningless, since these expressions a priori fail to elicit theappropriate intuition or mental picture.4 Yet this seems wrong. Accordingto Husserl, it is not verifiability that makes meaning possible but meaningthat makes verifiability possible. We do understand the meaning of ‘roundsquare’ and similar expressions. It is precisely because we understand themeaning of ‘round square’ and ‘Pegasus’ that we know the impossibility


of their meaning-fulfillment. Husserl, by claiming that it is not meaning-fulfillment but meaning-intention which renders an expression meaningful,provides an explanation of why we understand these expressions. Theydo have meaning. They are merely unfulfilled. “Perception accordinglyrealizes the possibility of an unfolding of my act of this meaning with itsdefinite relation to the object, e.g. to this paper before my eyes. But it doesnot, on our view, itself constitute this meaning, nor even part of it” (Husserl1970b, x5, 684).

Thus, if we consider the expressions that were listed above and keepin mind the distinctions Husserl makes, the following conclusions follow.Expression (1), ‘Abcaderaf’, is meaningless, that is, it has no meaning-intention. Expression (2), ‘round square’, has a meaning-intention but itsfulfillment is impossible a priori. Expression (3), ‘Pegasus’, has a meaning-intention which cannot be perceptively fulfilled. However, it can be fulfilledimaginatively (i.e., in imagination). Expression (4), ‘the present king ofFrance’, can also be fulfilled imaginatively although it is incapable ofperceptive fulfillment. However, the difference between ‘Pegasus’ and ‘thepresent king of France’ is that the latter, at one time, was actually fulfilled.Expression (5), ‘the other side of the moon’, has a meaning-intention andis capable of fulfillment but, as a matter of fact, present circumstancesmake fulfillment difficult. Expression (6), ‘Man’, has a meaning-intentionand can be fulfilled either statically or dynamically. Expression (7), ‘thiswhite wall before me’, has a meaning-intention in a static relation with themeaning-fulfillment.

This distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillmentcan also help explain the distinction between thought and knowledge.Whereas I can think of ‘Pegasus’, I do not know Pegasus for there is no des-ignatum present to my mind. Thought consists of the meaning-intendingact. But, if the meaning is not fulfilled, there is no knowledge. Knowl-edge, thus, involves both the objectifying act of meaning-intention andthe intuitive fulfillment of the intention “accompanied by a consciousnessof the identity of the fulfillment with the intention” (Mohanty 1976, 46).Therefore, though expressions are meaningful prior to and independentlyof verification and verifiability, there is a relationship between meaningand verification. This relationship is that between meaning-intention andmeaning-fulfillment. Knowledge requires fulfillment of the meaning, i.e.,the appropriate fulfillment of the meaning-intending act. Mohanty supportsthis interpretation when he argues that, in Husserl,

[k]nowledge is an intuitive apprehension of what otherwise was only symbolically thoughtof. And yet the symbolic theory of meaning should bear this in mind, and should not confusebetween meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. This latter confusion is, according toHusserl, the chief error of all imagism and verification-theories. (Mohanty 1976, 37–8)


4. THE CONTENT OF MEANING-INTENDING ACTS

So far, we have discussed meaning-intending acts and meaning-fulfillingacts. It is now time to discuss the contents of these acts. Though, meaning-intentions are acts, meaning in the substantive sense is the content of theseacts. The content of meaning-intending acts is the intended meaning, andthe content of meaning-fulfilling acts is the fulfilled meaning. It is preciselythe intended meaning that is ideal, according to Husserl (1970b, 290–1).

The content as intended meaning is identical in all possible acts thatintend the same object. “This content is therefore the ideal correlate of thissingle object, which may, for the rest, be completely imaginary” (Husserl1970b, 292). There are three different senses in which ‘content’ can beused: content as meaning simpliciter (ideal), content as fulfilling sense,and content as object. It is the first sense of ‘content’ that Husserl adoptswhen claiming that the essence of ideal meaning is found in its content, inthe “single, self-identical intentional unity set over against the dispersedmultiplicity of actual and possible experiences of speakers and thinkers”(Husserl 1970b, 327).

There is a distinction between the content of expressive experiencesunderstood in its psychological sense and the content of expressive expe-riences understood in the sense of a unified meaning. For psychology, a‘content’ is any real part of an experience. All experience has its psycho-logical component or content which includes all sensuous and phenomenalelements of the experience. In the case of the expression, the psycholog-ical content involves the phenomenal sign, the letters, the appearance ofthe word, in their purely visual or auditory mode. “The psychic stuff hereinvolved is well-known to be vastly manifold, varying greatly from oneindividual to the next, and for the same individual from one moment toanother, even in respect of ‘one and the same’ word” (Husserl 1970b, 327).

The phenomenological and ideal content of meaning is radically dif-ferent from this psychological component of expressions. The content ofa meaning-experience in its ideal sense is something that goes beyond theparticular experience of meaning. When we understand an expression, i.e.,its content in the sense of a unified meaning, what we understand is its logi-cal content and this is “nothing which could, in a real sense, count as part ofour act of understanding” (Husserl 1970b, 327). It is this ideal content thatdoes not vary from person to person or from time to time when the sameideal unity is meant. It is why we can understand the expression, the mean-ing, the concept, or the proposition always even though the psychologicalcomponent varies. “Through this character, expressive experiences strong-ly differing in psychological make-up first become experiences endowed


with the same meaning. Fluctuation of meaning here certainly involvesrestrictions which make no essential difference” (Husserl 1970b, 328).

What Husserl stresses then is that, though persons and acts multiplyindefinitely, propositional meanings do not multiply. Judgments in theirideal and logical sense remain single. The meaning remains the samewhether or not I think or exist, or whether any person thinks or exists.Ideal meanings and their properties (i.e., truth and falsity, possibility andimpossibility, generality and singularity, determinacy and indeterminacy)are independent of any meaning-intentions, meaning-fulfillments, or con-sciousness (Husserl 1970b, x31–32, 330–31).

Meanings, in the Logical Investigations, are a class of ‘universal objects’or species literally instantiated by meaning-acts. Yet, though the meaningsare universal objects, they take the character of individual, specific mean-ings with respect to the objects they refer to. In reflecting upon meaning-intending acts, our consciousness is not of meaning as an object but ofmeaning as the content of the act. Furthermore, the connection betweenmeanings ‘in themselves’ and the signs through which we understand themis not intrinsic; instead, they become connected to each other through ourmeaning-intending acts. Ideal unities are not expressed meanings but theydo “become real in human mental life” (Husserl 1970b, x35, 333). Thebeing of these ideal and universal objects is not contingent upon theirbeing thought of or expressed. Thus, there are countless meanings whichare merely possible since they have never been expressed or thought of andmay, “owing to the limits of man’s cognitive powers, never be expressed”(Husserl 1970b, 333).

According to Husserl, the domain of pure logic is precisely concernedwith the ideal unities that he calls meanings and with their “a priori rela-tions of adequacy, founded in [their] essence” (Husserl 1970b, x29, 323).After his considerations in the Prolegomena, in which he claims to haveestablished the unacceptability of psychologism, he has set the groundsfor the notion of logic as a science of meanings (Husserl 1970b, 322).Meanings, for Husserl, are considered to be ideal unities that are expressedthrough a manifold of expressions and thought about in a manifold of acts(meaning-intentions). Yet meanings as such are distinct from the expres-sions in which they are expressed or from the meaning-intentions in whichthey are thought about. The meaning-intending act is one which bestowsan ideal meaning on the linguistic sign, turning it into an expression, andwhich points to the object referred to (the intentional object). It serves as alink between sign and expression and between expression and designatum.It is the act which relates the ideal meaning to this particular expressionand unites it to all other expressions which contain the same ideal meaning.


Logic, then, is the science which studies the differences between meaningsand their relations and the laws of thought “which express the a prioriconnection between the categorical form of meanings and their objectivityor truth” (Husserl 1970b, 323).

In acts of inference, a distinction is made between the act itself andthe content (syllogism) of what is inferred. Husserl calls the latter the“self-identical meaning of certain complex statements”, and it is this self-identical meaning which he calls a proposition. “Propositions are not con-structed out of other propositions, they ultimately point back to concepts[i.e., ideal unities, meanings]” (Husserl 1970b, 324). Thus, the relationsinvolved in the inference are not psychological relations and connectionsbetween judgments as experienced, but rather they are ideal connectionsbetween propositions, possible statement-meanings. Therefore, at the foun-dation of all the sciences, there must be a study of the essential ideal unities(meanings) and propositions (Husserl 1970b, 324–25).

Again, it is meaning, concept, and proposition which concern logic andscience, not the act of meaning, not meaning-intentions. And everythinglogical, according to Husserl, falls either under the category of meaningor under the category of object. “If we speak in the plural of logicalcategories, we have only to do with the pure species distinguishable a prioriwithin the genus of meaning, or with the correlated forms of categoricallyconsidered objectivity” (Husserl 1970b, 325). All the laws formulable inlogic have their foundations in the latter categories. On the one hand, thereare laws concerned with the ideal relations between meaning-intention andmeaning-fulfillment and, thus, with the knowledge and the use of meanings.On the other hand, there are logical laws concerned with meanings andwith whether or not these meanings have objects, whether they are true orfalse, whether they are consistent or absurd (Husserl 1970b, x29, 326).

5. LANGUAGE AS CALCULUS IN HUSSERL

Keeping in mind the above exposition of Husserl’s theory of meaning andthe central tenets of logic and language as calculus ratiocinator, let us seehow this view is exemplified in Husserl’s phenomenological method andin his theory of intentionality. The method of phenomenological reductionitself presupposes the possibility of bracketing the ontological commit-ments of the natural attitude and, thus, of ‘transforming’ its language intosomething new, into a language that can be used to describe the resultsof phenomenological investigation into ‘pure’ experience. When movingaway from the natural attitude, through the psychological and transcenden-tal reduction, both the ontological commitments and the language based


upon these commitments are bracketed. After the second reduction, ouranalysis must be carried out in a language that is free from any of the com-mitments of the natural and psychological attitudes, e.g., commitment to‘soul-like’ entities. Language is re-interpreted. Thus, it is clear that Husserlcommits himself to the possibility of using language without accepting theontological commitments that this language has when used in the naturalattitude (Husserl 1970a, x59, 210).

The transcendental-phenomenological language is thus intended in partto serve to describe ‘pure’ experience and, hence, goes beyond the pos-sibilities that it has in the natural attitude. The suggestion that languagecan be re-interpreted, i.e., disengaged from its previous commitments, iscentral to the position of ‘language as calculus’. The last, eidetic reduction,where phenomena are reduced to essences through the imaginative vary-ing of attributes, offers even stronger evidence for the claim that Husserladopts this position. The view that modal theory is possible and, thus, thatsemantic relations are accessible and that we can say what it would be tohave different ones, is clear in the eidetic reduction. Modal theory is usedto study different meaning structures for different transcendental Egos.According to Martin Kusch,

[h]ere the subject matter of variation is not just any object, but the world as a phenomenon.This world is studied with the method of variation in order to find its invariant, necessarystructures, i.e., structures that are to be found in every ‘possible world’. It should be notedhere that it is a peculiarity of Husserl’s version of possible worlds that different possibleworlds are consituted by different transcendental Egos that belong under a common essenceor ‘Eidos’. (Kusch 1988, 102–3)

Thus the phenomenologist passes from the level of the physicalis-tic, naturalistic commitments of the natural attitude to the level of thepsychological-phenomenological commitments of the psychological atti-tude then, consecutively, to the levels of the transcendental-phenomeno-logical and transcendental-eidetic commitmentless attitude (the latter beingreached through the first and second transcendental reductions). This showsthat the phenomenologist can turn facts into phenomena and phenomenainto essences and, therefore, that language is a reinterpretable calculus.Linguistic relativism is an untenable position, under this view, because weare not caught in the trap of factual language-world relations or of cultur-al and linguistic differences but can escape them, raise ourselves ‘above’them, and describe them through phenomenological reduction and throughthe re-interpretation of language (Husserl 1970a, x40, 150).

Through the transcendental epoche, reality as such can be reached andexpressed in the noematic content. Thus Husserl can say that language doesnot have an influence or come between ourselves and reality. On the tran-


scendental level, there is complete transparency between consciousnessand reality as such, meaning that nothing is inaccessible to transcendentalconsciousness, not even other possible worlds. Once the meaning as idealcontent of meaning-intention is isolated, the door is opened for the tran-scendental Ego to other possibilities. Furthermore, truth as correspondenceis expressible because truth “is the complete filling of a meaning-intention.Here meaning-filling is a perception, and meaning-intention is (in general)a linguistic significative intention, the intending of some linguistic meaning(Kusch 1988, 107).

Husserl’s correspondence theory of truth can be explained in the follow-ing manner. A judgment is true if and only if the subject of the nominativeact has, in reality, the properties that are predicated of it in the judgmentalact. For example, the judgment “The Empire State Building is in New YorkCity” is true if and only if the Empire State Building is, in reality, in NewYork City.5 Conceptual judgments about essences are true if and only ifwhat is ascribed of the essence in the judgment is, in reality, a proper-ty of that essence. For example, the judgment “The geometrical point isdimensionless” is true if and only if the geometrical point is, in reality,dimensionless.

In the natural attitude, some of the subjects of our judgments are takento exist. In the phenomenological attitude, no assumption about existenceis made with regard to any object of our judgment. Yet, the objects ofour judgments in the phenomenological attitude have being as intentionalobjects, and judgments about these objects are true if and only if whatis predicated of these objects is, in reality, a property of these objects.Furthermore, in the natural attitude, we sometimes make judgments con-cerning mental acts, and in the phenomenological attitude we constantlydo so. As stated above, judgments about these acts are true if and only ifwhat is predicated of these is, in reality, a property of these. “[T]ruth asthe correlate of an identifying act is a state of affairs (Sachverhalt), as thecorrelate of a coincident identity it is an identity: the full agreement of whatis meant with what is given as such” (Husserl 1970b, x39, 765). We neednot experience this agreement between what is predicated of the objects ofour judgments and their real properties. Our judgments can be true withoutour knowing them to be true. Furthermore, we can believe our judgmentto be true without that judgment having been verified. Verification or con-firmation occurs when an adequate intuition fulfills the meaning of thejudgment and demonstrates that the object, in reality, has the propertiesthat were predicated of it in the judgment. “The concept of verificationrelates exclusively to assertive acts in relation to their assertive fulfill-ment, and ultimately to their fulfillment through percepts (Husserl 1970b,


x38, 765). In perceptual judgments, verification occurs through perceptualintuitions. In conceptual judgments, verification occurs through concep-tual or abstract intuition. However, in the situation of self-evidence, theagreement between the judgment and reality is always experienced. For,in self-evidence, the truth of the judgment is evident before consciousnessat the very moment the judgment is made.

This agreement we experience in self-evidence, in so far as self-evidence means the actualcarrying out of an adequate identification [: : : ] Truth is indeed ‘present’. Here we havealways the a priori possibility of looking towards this agreement, and of laying it beforeour intentional consciousness in an adequate percept. (Husserl 1970b, 765–66)

Husserl does not only speak of truth as correspondence simpliciter. Yet,though he draws a distinction between the conception of truth discussedabove and three other conceptions of truth, these are all connected to thecorrespondence theory of truth.

2. A second concept of truth concerns the ideal relationship which obtains in the unityof coincidence which we defined as self-evidence among the epistemic essences of thecoinciding acts [: : : ] truth in this sense is the Idea which belongs to the act-form: theepistemic essence interpreted as the ideal essence of the empirically contingent act ofself-evidence, the ideal of absolute adequation as such.

3. We also experience in self-evidence, from the side of the act which furnishes ‘fullness’,the object given in the manner of the object meant; so given, the object is fullness itself.This object can also be called being, truth, the ‘truth’ [: : : ] as that which makes an intentiontrue (or as the ideal fullness for the intention’s specific epistemic essence).

4. Lastly, considered from the standpoint of the intention, the notion of the relationshipof self-evidence yields us truth as the rightness of our intention (and especially that ofour judgment), its adequacy to its true object, or the rightness of the intention’s epistemicessence in specie [: : : ] In this we have the expression of the ideal, and therefore general,possibility that a proposition of such and such a ‘matter’ admits of fulfillment in the senseof the most rigorous adequation. (Husserl 1970b, 766)

Husserl’s adoption of the ‘language as calculus’ conception of logic, mean-ing, and language is obvious in the Logical Investigations where his projecton logic is advanced. Since Husserl allows not only for interpretation overreal but also over possible worlds, thus allowing for changes in the universeof discourse, it is clear that he is not concerned with interpretation over onlyone domain. Since logic is not concerned with the universe of discourse,but with ideal unities, concepts, and propositions and their relations, it isnot particularly concerned with the reference of logical discourse. His con-cern is with a logic that can abstract itself from reference and confine itselfto meanings. “[A]ll questions concerning truth are excluded, for by usingthe predicate ‘true’ (and all its deviates) we go beyond the pure a priori ofthe sphere of senses [: : : ]” (Husserl 1969, 55). Husserl also formulates auniversal theory of types (forms) and the relations which pertain to them.


Husserl makes certain metasystematical demands of his system, demandsof completeness and consistency, that he could not make unless he adoptedthe calculus conception of logic. In order to make these metasystematicaldemands, Husserl has to allow that the logician can somehow move to ahigher metalogical language from which to describe and evaluate the logi-cal object-language. Furthermore, the whole notion of transcendentally andphenomenologically grounding logic and language entails the notion of aregion outside of logic and language, a region which is itself pre-logicaland pre-linguistic, as well as the notion that this region can be reached bythe transcendental Ego. This region, for Husserl, is the region of essencesand is intuitively reached by the transcendental Ego through the process ofabstraction.

It might be objected that some of Husserl’s pronouncements on the issueof the nature of language directly go against the calculus interpretationof language which has been defended here. At this point, I would liketo address briefly such objections. In the Logical Investigations, Husserlmakes the following claim concerning language,

[l]anguage offers the investigator a widely applicable sign-system to express his thoughts,but, though no one can do without it, it represents a most imperfect aid towards strictresearch. The pernicious influences of ambiguities on the validity of syllogistic inferencesare familiar. (Husserl 1970b, 68)

For Husserl, then, language is used to express thoughts. A calculus, on theother hand, does not perform these functions. Furthermore, Husserl makesit clear that language is full of ambiguities so that it renders strict researchdifficult. A calculus, on the other hand, is very precise and unambiguous andis, many times, developed specifically for the purpose of strict research.Thus, it can be objected, based on these considerations, that languagecannot be considered a calculus.

To this last objection, however, I offer the following reply. With regardto the ambiguities in language, Husserl himself shows how they can beovercome by simply using definitions. “The careful thinker will not there-fore use language without artificial precautions; to the extent that the termshe uses are not unambiguous and lack sharp meaning, he must definethem. The definition of names we therefore see as a methodical auxiliaryprocedure towards ensuring validations [: : : ]” (Husserl 1970b, 68–9).

I will now turn to the first objection that, since language functions toexpress thoughts and calculi do not function in this way, one ought not toimpose this interpretation of language as calculus on Husserl’s texts. Thisobjection misunderstands the use of the term ‘calculus’ in the expression‘language as calculus’. The interpretation of language as calculus doesnot claim that language is a calculus in the sense of being a mathematical


calculus. Language and mathematical calculi are clearly distinct in manyways. Among other things, mathematical calculi are closed and formal,they do not admit of ambiguities and they cannot be used to expressthoughts. Language, on the other hand, is open and growing, it admitsof ambiguities (though these can be overcome through definitions) andit is used, among other things, to express thoughts and to announce thespeaker’s experiences. To this extent, I would agree that language, forHusserl, is not a mathematical calculus.

The interpretation of language as calculus, however, defines calculusratiocinator in the sense specified by Van Heijenoort. I believe that onceone understands Van Heijenoort’s distinction between calculus ratiocina-tor and lingua characteristica as well as Husserl’s distinction betweenmeaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, and once one understands thefull implications and purpose of the phenomenological method of reduc-tion, one must agree that Husserl’s conception of language fits better underthe label of calculus ratiocinator than under that of lingua characteristica.Although this has been argued above at length, let me reiterate those pointswhich strikingly support this interpretation. If we examine the corollariesof ‘language as universal medium’, i.e. that semantical relations are inac-cessible, that modal theory is impossible, that reality cannot be graspedwithout linguistic interference, that linguistic relativism is inevitable, andthat truth as correspondence is inexpressible, we realize that Husserl doesnot endorse any of these positions. As a matter of fact, he would stronglyoppose them. If, on the other hand, we examine the corollaries of ‘lan-guage as calculus’, i.e. that semantical relations are accessible and thusmodal theory is possible, that reality as such can be reached by subtractingthe influence of language, that linguistic relativism is untenable, and thattruth as correspondence is expressible, we realize that Husserl, in the Log-ical Investigations, supports all of these positions. Furthermore, as arguedextensively above, there are crucial elements of Husserlian phenomenolo-gy which make this interpretation most tenable. These are the following:his distinction between meaning-fulfillment and meaning-intention and hisview that meanings are ideal ‘universal’ objects instantiated by transcen-dental consciousness in meaning-intending acts, his notion that the contentof meaning-intending acts is this ideal meaning simpliciter, and the viewthat the things-themselves can be known through phenomenological reduc-tion, one function of which is to bracket the ontological commitments ofthe language of the natural attitude. One must understand that the dis-tinction between calculus ratiocinator and lingua characteristica which isfound in Van Heijenoort’s work is a distinction made long after Husserl’sdeath. To expect to find, in Husserl’s writings, specific references to and


a defense of either of these two positions concerning language is unre-alistic. However, given the distinction made by Van Heijenoort, one canlegitimately ask the question of how most plausibly to classify Husserl’sown views on language. The answer to this is not only found in Husserl’sspecific pronouncements on the nature of language but also in his views onthe nature of meaning, on the nature of truth, and on the nature and purposeof the transcendental phenomenological reduction. Once these aspects ofHusserl’s phenomenology are examined, one sees that the most plausibleinterpretation of Husserl’s views on language, as they appear in the LogicalInvestigations, must be that of language as a calculus ratiocinator.

6. CONCLUSION

I hope to have demonstrated that, in defending an interpretation of Husserl’stheory of language as ‘language as calculus’, one must pay special attentionto his distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment andto the nature of meaning-intention and its content. It is these notions whichallow truth as correspondence to be expressible in Husserl. Furthermore, thenotion of phenomenological investigation through reduction itself entailsa conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus which can be usedto describe the semantical relations between the language of the naturalattitude and the world.

It becomes clear, at this point, how every aspect of Husserl’s phenom-enological project, whether it be the method of reduction, the theory ofintentionality, or the theory of meaning, is tied into the notion of languageand logic as calculus and how all of this intended to oppose and defeatrelativism and psychologism in logic and in philosophy in general. Fur-thermore, along with a defeat of psychologism and relativism, the projectcan carry out its intent to establish phenomenology as the foundation of allsciences by itself being the science of essences.

It must be understood, though, that Husserl was primarily concernedwith experience and consciousness, with how consciousness gives rise tomeaning, and with how an analysis of ‘pure’ experience carried throughby means of evident steps reveals certain eidetic and self-evident truths.It is through his analysis of experience that Husserl discovers the originsof meaning in meaning-intending acts and the self-evidence of logicallaws. Thus, Husserl does not start off as a linguistically motivated philoso-pher, though he does have certain very specific views about the nature oflanguage and logic.6 His motivation is to show the truth of these viewsby conducting a study of the essence of ‘pure’ experience and how theself-evident truth of his views on logic and meaning are discovered in


this analysis. Furthermore, Husserl cannot begin philosophizing by takinglanguage, logic, and meaning for granted since he is concerned preciselywith discovering the foundations for these through the phenomenologicalmethod.

NOTES

1 Earlier defenses of this interpretation of Husserl’s general conception of logic and languageas calculus ratiocinator can be found in Hintikka (1986), Kusch (1988) and Kusch (1989).2 Van Heijenoort (1967, pp. 324–330). For more on this topic of logic as calculus vs. logic asuniversal language see: Haaparanta (1985), Hintikka (1986), Kusch (1988), Kusch (1989),and Smith and McIntyre (1982).3 For a further discussion of this topic, see also: Gullvag (1972), Mohanty (1977), Mohanty,(1974); Mohanty (1986), and Welton, (1973).4 Positivists changed the verification criterion for meaning to render expressions suchas ‘the other side of the moon’ meaningful. In the latter expression, though verificationis not possible under present circumstances, it is possible in principle (if circumstanceswere different). Thus, it meets the verifiability criterion, though it does not meet the olderverification criterion. Yet, expressions like ‘round square’ or ‘Pegasus’ fail to meet bothverification and verifiability criteria. Not only is there no designatum as a matter of fact;there can be no designatum a priori. According to Husserl, this switch from verification toverifiability is a tacit admission that the meaning of an expression cannot be identified withany actual designatum or perceptual intuition, that the recourse to possibility is inevitable.Unfortunately, according to Husserl, the verifiability criterion is still problematic becauseits recourse is a recourse to possibility of perception. Thus, the verifiability criterion neverrejects imagism (the mental picture theory). Imagism, however, is precisely what Husserlrejects since, for him, it is a form of psychologism.5 Of course, this is merely another phrasing of the Tarskian formulation “Snow is white” ifand only if snow is white.6 I have argued elsewhere against recent interpretations (such as that of Smith and McIntyre)which claim that Husserl was primarily a linguistically motivated philosopher and againstreadings of Husserl (such as the Føllesdalian notion of the noema as a Fregean sense) whichhave strongly influenced such interpretations. See Banchetti (1993).

REFERENCES

Banchetti, M. P.: 1993, ‘Føllesdal on the Notion of the Noema: A Critique’,Husserl Studies10, 81–95.

Gullvag, I.: 1972, ‘Reference and the Object Theory’, in R. E. Olson and A. M. Paul (eds.),Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, Introduction by G. H. von Wright, The JohnsHopkins Press, London.

Haaparanta, L.: 1985,‘Frege’s Doctrine of Being’, Acta Philosophica Fennica 39, 1–182.Hintikka, J. and Hintikka, M. B.: 1986, Investigating Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.Husserl, E.: 1969, ‘Formal and Transcendental Logic’, Translated by Dorion Cairns, in

Analecta Husserliana XVII, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.


Husserl, E.: 1970a, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, Translated with an Introduction byDavid Carr, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philoso-phy, Northwestern University Press, Evanston.

Husserl, E.: 1970b, Logical Investigations, translated by J. N. Findlay, from the secondGerman edition of Logische Untersuchungen, Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York (TheHumanities Press).

Kusch, M.: 1988, ‘Husserl and Heidegger on Meaning’, Synthese 77, 99–127.Kusch, M.: 1989, Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium: A Study

in Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer, Synthese Library, Vol. 207, Kluwer AcademicPublishers, Dordrecht.

Mohanty, J. N.: 1974, ‘On Husserl’s Theory of Meaning’, The Southwestern Journal ofPhilosophy V, 229–44.

Mohanty, J. N.: 1976, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,The Hague.

Mohanty, J. N. (ed.): 1977, Reading on Edmund Husserl’s ‘Logical Investigations’, Marti-nus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague.

Mohanty, J. N.: 1986, ‘Perceptual Meaning’, Topoi V, 131–36.Smith, D. W. and McIntyre, R.: 1982, Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning,

and Language, Synthese Library, Vol. 154, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht.Welton, D.: 1973, ‘Intentionality and Language in Husserl’s Phenomenology’, Review of

Metaphysics XXVII, 269–97.Van Heijenoort, J.: 1967, ‘Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language’, Synthese 17, 324–30.

Department of PhilosophyFlorida Atlantic UniversityBoca Raton, FL 33431-0991U.S.A.

husserl's theory of language as calculus ratiocinator

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