husserl, e. (1924) 1974, kant and the idea of transcendental philosophy

8/10/2019 Husserl, E. (1924) 1974, Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy

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Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy Husserl, Edmund Southwestern Journal of Philosophy; Fall 1974; 5, 3; Periodicals Archive Online pg. 9


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Kant and the dea of

Transcendental

Philosophy

EDMUND HUSSERL

T h e expanded version of the thou ghts of a lecture for the

Kan t Celebration a t the University of Freiburg on May 1, 1924.

Foreword

T h e two-hund redth anniversary of Im man uel Kant's birth mu st not go

uncelebrated even in our phenomenological yearb0ok.l For in the

fundamental development which phenomenology has undergone in

my life's work, in its course of development from a method, novel in

for m, for th e analysis of origins (as in its first breakthrough in the

ogical

Investigations

to

a new and, in t he strictest sense, indep ende nt

science ( th e pure or transcendentzl phenonlenology of my Ideas ,

there has emerged an obvious essentia1 relationship between this

phenomenology and the transcendental philosophy of Kant.

In

fact,

my ado ptio n of the Kan tian word transcendcntal, despite all remote-

ness from t he basic presuppositions, guiding problems, and methods of

Kant, was based from the beginning on the well-founded conviction

that all senseful problems which Kant and his successors had treated

theoretically under the heading of transcendental problems could, at

*

Trunslators' No te: Kant und die Idee der Transcex~dentalphilosophie

1924)

was first published as a Supplementary Text to Erste Philosoph k 1923/24),

Volume I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956 , pp. 230 87. Ours is the first

English translation. W e have attem pte d to leave unaltered as far as possible the

peculiar characteristics of the German text and yet to achieve a readable English

text.

Ou r gratitude is o ffered here to James Street Fulton, Professor Emeritus

of

Rice

University, for his encourag ement and valuable assistance with this project. We are

also grateful to Dr. H. J. H . Hartgetink of M artinu s Nijhoff for granting us per-

mission on behalf of the publisher and the Husserl Archives to publish this

translation.

Copyright @

1956

by M artinus Nijhoff.

Copyright

@

1974byTed

E

Klein, Jr. and William

E

ohl, translators.

1.

Husserl's in tention (as can be seen from this senten ce) of publishing this

treatise in the Jahtbuch ur Philosoph ie und Phiinom enologie was never realized.

Th e text appears here fo r th e first time in print. (N ot e by editor of H usserlian VII . )

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merely subjective7') his becam e imm ediately a great the me of phe-

nomenological descriptions. The world took on an infinite wideness

as soon as th e actual life-world, th e world in the how of th e givenness

of men tal process, was observed. I t took on th e whole range of t he

manifold subjec tive appearances, mo des of consciousness, modes of

possible position-taking; for i t was, for th e subject, never given other-

wise than in this subjective milieu, and in purely intuitive description

of th e subjectively given there was no in-itself th at is not given in sub-

jective modes of t he for-me or for-us, an d t he in-itself itself appears as a

characteristic in this con text and has to undergo therein its clarification

of sense.

T h e principle, guiding from th e start, of granting its due and its

primary right of conceptual form

to

all tha t is given an d to b e given to

the Ego in imm ediate intuition also led, however, already in th e ogical

Investigations,

to t he recognition of th e primary legitimacy of givenness

of truly existing ideal objectivities of every kind , and in pa rticular, of

the eidetic objects, of the concep tual essentialities and

of

the eidetic

laws. W i t h a ll these, obviously, ther e was connected th e knowl-

edge of th e un iversal possibility of sciences of essences for ob-

jectivities of each a nd every objective category and th e requirem ent

of

the system atic developm ent of ontologies, formal an d material. For th e

description of t he infinity of im me diate data in their subjective how,

however, there cam e, once again in im me diate sequence, the knowledge

of the possibility and necessity of a description of essence to be carried

out everywhere; of an

eidefic

description which did not remain de-

pendent on t he particular empirical data but rather searched after their

eidetic types and the contexts of essence (as necessities, possibilities,

regularities of e ssence) belonging thereto. T h e freedom with which the

look may turn from straight to reflective data and the knowledge of the

correlations of essence th at emerge hereby led to intentional analysis of

essence and to the basic elements of the intentional clarifying of the

essence of reason, and first of all of th e logically judging, pred icating

reason and its preliminary stages.

Even thou gh in th e beginning of th e spreading phenomenological

movement the analysis and description of essence in th e case o f psy-

~ h o l o g i c a l l ~nterested phenom enologists usually withou t any stressing

of its basic character as being of th e essence, of th e genuine

a

piori

which must be intuitively grasped) was carried out

in

various fields,

phenomenology seemed to most either a funda me ntal method of an

imm anen tly pure and a t best eidetic-psychological analysis or-to those

whose interest was chiefly scientific-theoretical-a philosoph ical me thod

y

which to accomplish

for

th e various already existing sciences a clari-

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fication of th e origin of t hei r fou ndatio ns or a radical new derivation of

basic concepts of their theory a nd m eth od from th e ultima te sources.

Precisely th e most profound an d mos t difficult discussions of th e Logical

Investigations foun d little following. In th em abov e all in th e 5th an d

6th Investigations of t he second volum e) th e way to t h e phenom enol-

ogy of logical reason an d therew ith also th e mode l of all reason in

general) was opened up, beginnings of an intentional constitution of

categorial objectivities in th e pure consciousness were laid bare, an d th e

me tho d of a genuine in tent ion al analysis was developed.

It was little understood how progressive this decisive step was com-

pared to th e way my teacher Brentano-the brilliant discoverer of th e

intentionality of consciousness as a basic descriptive fact of psychology

-remained caught up in th e methodological attitudes of traditional

sensationalism in which he described the psychic acts

y

classifying

the m witho ut exception as scnsuous data in order to base a naturalistic,

inductive causal investigation upon them . Thu s, with its establishment,

aftcr long years of study of phenomenology as an independent science

or, more precisely, as a universal eidetic transcen denta l philosophy, t h e

Ide m a t first caused great offense even amon g those w ho ha d emerged

as distinguished fellow phenomenological investigators in t he h ithe rto

existing sense.

A very large par t of

my

research results-made pub lic only in lectures

-of those decades following th e appe aranc e of my first phenom enologi-

cal att em pt still awaits literary fixation an d, with an im mense am ou nt

of work yet to be don e, is still in t h e process of fur ther de velop men t;

still, there is put fo rth in t he Ideas th e universal unity of th e realm o f

immed iate intuition a nd of t he most original description within th e

me tho d of phenom enological reduction-the mo st fun dam enta l of all

methods. W it h th e Ideas the deepest sense of t he Cartesian turn of

modern philosophy is,

I

dar e to say, revealed, an d th e necessity of an

abso lute self-contained eidetic science of pure consciousncss in general

is cogently demon strated-this, however, in relation to all correlations

grounded in th e essence of consciousness, t o its possible really imm an en t

mo men ts and to its noem ata and objectivities intentionally-ideally de-

termined therein. Systematic work on it is actively undertaken, meth od-

ically as well as materially bro ught int o th e shape of a rigorous theory

tha t mus t continually be furthe r developed. T h e determ ination of this

eidetic descriptive phenomenology is indicated beforehand an d not

only in th e title) as in itself first philosophy a nd therewith as th e be-

ginning and basis of a universal philosophy, i.e., of a universal science

grounded in absolutely ultim ate sources. T h e working ou t of descriptive

phenomenology in going beyond mere description, while, however, re-

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maining in the eidetic attitude, leads to the system of all a priori

sciences-the transition from th e transcendental a priori to th e trans-

cend ental fact leads to th e system of all empirical sciences on a trans-

cendental foundation.

However essentially the phenomenological transcendental philoso-

phv is distinguished from all historical philosophies, me thodically an d

in ih e whole contex t of its basic results an d theories, it is nonetheless

out of inexorable inner necessity transcendental philosophy. Even

though the circle of phenomenological investigators may originally

have felt itself to be in sharp opposition to Kant's a nd t he post-Kantian

school's methods; even though it may with good reason have rejected

the attempts to continue and merely improve Kant historically in the

manner of a renascence (which presupposed a comnlonality of

method); even though,

vis

r

vis

all Kantianism, it mav with good

reason have championed th e methodological principle tha t th e uncon-

ditional prius for any ge nuine scientific philosophy is th e all-inclusive

founding through systematic descriptions

o

consciousness, through

making universally clear th e essential layers of th e cognizing as well as

the evaluating and practical subjectivitv, according to all possible for-

ma tions an d correlations-nonetheless, now tha t we see ourselves

in

broad lines at one with Ka nt in t h e essential results of our work, which

is systematically arising from the

absolutelj? ultima te sources of all

knowledge, we must honor him as the great pre-shaper of scientific

transcendental philosophy. Th a t no one, and were he th e most extreme

anti-Kantian, can remove himself as a child

of

the times from t he in-

fluences of this mighty genius; that everyone experience~n some form

or other the power of the motivations that moved Kant and were

awakened by him-this is a n almost trivial truth. T o see him (as do all

great schools resting on Kant) with phenon~enologicaleyes is also to

understand h im anew a nd to a dmire t h e grcatness of his foresighted

intuitions, phenomenological sources of which can now be found in

almost all his theories; bu t to do this is not, even now, to imitate him

and t o lend supp ort to a mere renascence of Kantianism or of Germ an

Idealism. Naturally, we m ust fr om th e outset go beyond all of the, n

the worst sense of th e word, metaphysical stock elements of th e

critique of reason (like th e doctrine of th e thing-in-itself, th e doctrine

of

intellectus archetypus

th e mythology of th e transcendental apper-

ception or of th e consciousness in general, etc .), that oppose the

phenomenological transcendentalism and with it th e deepest sense and

legitimacy of the Kantian position; and for his still half-mythical con-

cept of the a priori we mu st su bst itute the phenomenologically clarified

concept of t he general essence an d law of essence (wh ich Hu m e really

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had in m ind under th e heading relation of idea, but w hich he ha d sensa-

tionalistically and nominalistically reinterpreted and depreciated).

transcendental subjectivism, carried out in th e purity an d necessity

of essence, in which precisely the indefeasible essence of subjec tivity is

predelineated as th e primal locu s an d primal source of all sense-bestowal

and tr uth achievements, an d therewith, of all true objectivities an d true

worlds (a nd no less, all fictitious one s) ; [such a transcenden tal sub-

jectivism] leaves no room for metaphysical substruc turings of a being

behin d th e being intentionally cons tituting itself in actua l and possible

achievements of consciousness, whe ther it be a m atte r of a n in-itself of

na tu re or an in-itself of souls, in-itself of his tory , an in-itself of eidetic

objec tivities, an d of ideal ones of w hatever type.

T h e execution of a genuine an d pure transcendentalism is, of course,

not the task of one man and one system, bu t rather the most exub-

erant of all scientific tasks for all mankind. It is the idea of a final

system of all sciences and, therefore, one carried ou t on th e final, trans-

cendental-subjective ground of science, carried o ut, th at is to say, by

means of a descrip tive phenomenology as th e primary science of all

scientific metho d. T h e sphere of all possible sense an d of all tr uth is,

nevertheless, at th e outset conceptually predelineated in it a nd by the

method of phenomenological reduction as the correct and intuitively

shown sense of consciousness in general, includin g inseparably all its

possible correlates. Metaphysics in th e com mo n sense of the w ord, re-

ferring to transcendences in principle trans-subjective, is an infinite

realm, but realm contrary to sense, as mu st be made evident. There -

fore, only if we disregard such c ons titue nt elements, which for Kant's

philosophy, of course, are no t indifferent, will we transcendental phe-

nomenologists be able to confirm Kant's genuine intuitions. Tho rough-

going studies, indeed, have taug ht m e tha t, if one abstracts from such

Kantian metaphysics (an d tha t yields really a full con text ), Kant's

thinking and research moves

e

facto in the framework of the phe-

nomenological attitu de a nd th at the force of these genuinely trans-

cendental theories do in fact rest on pure intuitions which in their

essential lines are drawn from original sources. O f course, it makes a

differenceand, w ith regard to th e level of scientific adequacy, an essen-

tial difference: whe ther one theorizes

na ively

in the phenomenological

attitu de or whether, in radical self-reflection one obtains fu ndam ental

clarity abou t the essence of this attitu de a nd th e essence of th e infinity

of possible consciousness as such standing directly before one's

qr s

an d whether o ne therefore produces a description tha t runs its course

in originally conceived concepts of essence an d explains

the

sense and

necessity of an at titud e and mode

o

knowledge tha t leads beyond all

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the modes of knowledge

of

a natural attitude, that is to say, a com-

pletely new one, th e transcendental.

T o give such a description for th e new atti tud e in which the Kantian

thinkin g a nd research indeed moves is eo ips0 to go beyond him. It is to

develop in ultim ate philosophical self-consciousness th e m etho d of

phenomenological reduction, through which the concrete thematic

horizon of transcendental philosophy-transcenden tal subjectivity in its

true sense-is fou nded, and simultaneously with it the m ode of work

appro priate only to it, the ordering of t he problematics arising from

the intuitive origins is discovered. A philosophy, and above all the

first of all philosophies, which is supposed to enable us to d o the

critique of any achieveme nts of reason whatever, must do its utmost

in m ethodological self-examinations; it m ust not do anything where it

has not itself grasped what is methodological in this activity and made

it clear according to its necessities of essence. Kant was ab le to go be -

yond the realm of pure consciousness only because he neglected to

wrench from th e source-point of all modern philosophy-the Cartesian

ego cogito-its ultima te sense, th at of t he absolute, concretely intuiting

subjec tivity. Also, thro ugh th is lack of ultim ate sense-investigations, he

does no t get so far as to b ring the manner and me thod of an analysis of

consciousness-as an unraveling

of

intention al implications an d essence-

correlations-to an actual developm ent, although in his profound doc-

trine of th e synthesis he already discovered, basically, t he peculiarity of

intention al con texts and already practiced, in his own naiveti., genuine

intention al analyses. H ad Ka nt realized th e necessity of such ultima te

sense-investigations an d essence-descriptions, realized their uncond i-

tional necessity for making possible a rigorously scientific philosophy,

then his whale c ritique of reason and his philosophy would also have

becom e somethin g different. I t would the n of necessity have had to go

the ways th a t we phenom enologists go on th e basis of arduous indi-

vidual work o n t he consciousness itself and th e essence-typology of its

phenomena.

T h e following expositions of th e phenom enological sense of th e

Kantian revolution in the natural way of thinking-with

the

appro-

priate simplification, which consideration of th e audience demanded,

of course-formed th e essential th ou gh tc on te nt of a talk

on

Kant that

I delivered at th e Kant C elebration at th e University of Freiburg on

May of thi s

year

For the present readership have not only added

significant dep th

to

th e presentation bu t have added some additional

pieces after it which ca n clear up th e misunderstandings of phenom en-

ological transce nden talism t ha t are circulating. These latter pieces, by

the way, derive

in

large

p rt

from th e fac t that as a consequence of the

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war that broke out shortly after the appearance of Volume I of the

Ideas th e publication of Part II which had been planned a t the same

t ime as t h e la tte r, was ~ o s t ~ o n e dnd has not yet come about . W ha t

was lacking

in

th e published part was all too naively called

an

oversight,

and where it could not be seen how the continuation was possible,

absurd consequences were imp uted to m e, as mig ht be expected of th e

still all too primitive thinking an d t he phenomenological infantilism of

the critics where they tried to refute me with a show of what they

tho ugh t was phenomenology.

Phenom enologv is no t literature by mean s of which one goes riding

for pleasure, as it were, while reading. As in any serious science, one

must of course work in order to acquire

a

methodically schooled eye

and only thereby th e capability of making one's own judgm ent.

Kant and t he Idea

of

Transcendental Philosophy

T h e time for com n~ em ora ting great scientific genius is, for the

living generation of scientists who a re boun d t o him by th e unity of a

historical tradition, a challenge to responsible self-examination. W i t h

this, th e worthiest the m e for comme morative celebrations in science is

prescribed in th e m ost general sense. And so the Kan t Jubilee arouses

in

us th e question: after one and

a

half centuries of an influence that has

helped to determine our whole philosophy in all its directions, what

mu st we today regard as th e lasting signific;nce of Kant's mo num ent al

critiques of reason and therefore as tha t of w hich th e pure working out

is entrusted to us and to th e entire future? However, to evaluate Kant's

whole life's work

sub specie ader ni

and thereby, a t one and the same

time, to assess an d be respons ible for the sense of ou r own p resen t work

-that would be all too great a task for us to d o it justice here

in

this

limited framework. Let us try to limit ourselves. Let us keep Kan t at a

certain distance, as if we were surveying from a distant point a mighty

mountain range that we had often wandered through with an

in-

defatigable interest in getting to know it, and now only the general

form ation, th e total type, emerges for us.

T h e completely dom inant total form of th e Kantian philosophy in

its distant aspect

is

th e idea of transcendental philosophy. Th is desig-

nates a radically novel form of philosophical theory. Our question is

this: can we not delineate the idea of a general prob lematic a nd science,

which is understa ndab le in itself as its sense and ete rnal legitimacy an d

which m ust be regarded as the essence of his transcendental philosophy,

purified of th e con ditions of Kant's time, as th e idea of me tho d th at

imp arted to him his most fundam ental motivation-an idea which,

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although limited and obscured by his historical motivations, found its

first concrete realization in his systematic theories?

I. T h e Revolut ion

in

the N atural

anner

of

hinking

Kant's transcendental philosophy, as already intimated, is not an

achievem ent significant merely for its tim e or only for one line of de-

velopment, on which we can with all du e admiration look back as one

long since fully exploited and in th e mean time outmode d. Rather, th e

revolution in the total manner of philosophical thinking which Kant

demanded and in which he brought forth the powerful and perhaps

even violent design of a new science, is still th e de mand of th e present;

and this new body of knowledge is our task and a never-to-be-sur-

rendered task for all the future.

The foregoing designates that wherein Kant's indeed quite unique

significance in t h e whole history of philosophy is to be seen: in nothin g

other than that in which he himself saw it and to which he also re-

peatedly gave empha tic expression. His significance for all time, there-

fore, lies in th e mu ch discussed bu t little understood Copernican turn

to an interpretation of t he world th at was new in principle and thereby

rigorously scientific, but at the same time his significance lies

in

the

first grou nding of th e completely new science belonging thereto-

i.e., th e transcende ntal, which, as Kant himself stresses, is the only one

of its kind an d of which, as h e even says, no one has previously had as

much as a thought , even th e mere

idea

of it was unknown.

Surely Kant would have considerably limited this pronoun ceme nt in

his last work, if h e had do ne some research in historical studies of the

development of the transcendental idea. It was

~ a r t l y hat the main

documents of this development were unknown to him, partly that he

was no longer able, af ter th e breakth rough of his final philosophy, to

work through and interpret anew those works that came into con-

sideration. In th e history of mode rn philosophy, to speak only of that,

Descartes mus t b e seen as

a

precursor of transcendental philosophy. It

was he who throug h his Med itations founded this modern period, irn-

parted to it its characteristic developmental tendency toward a trans-

cendental philosophy. T h e ego cogito, understood

in

its profound sense,

can surely b e regarded as th e first form of th e discovery of transcen-

dental subjectivity. We also know now that Leibniz

was

by no means

the dogmatic metaphysician tha t Ka nt conceived him to be. It m ight

further be shown th at t he Essay

[sic]

of David Hume,

y

which Kant

%as awakened from his dogmatic slumber,'' stands far behind th e

systematic Treatise-which Ka nt obviously did not know, or not from

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his own thorough study-and th at in this brilliant work of Hum e's

youth a whole system of transcen dental problematics is already out -

lined and thought through in a transcendenta l spirit-even though

don e in th e negativistic form of a sensationalistic skepticism tha t nulli-

fies itself in its pervasive absurdity.

But, as always, Kant's originality is not thereby diminished. N ot only

did h e discover anew, impressed with h is peculiar stamp, t he transcen-

dental idea which, since Descartes, had again an d again cropped up and

disappeared; to him also belongs the praise for progressing with un-

paralleled energy of th oug ht fro m the idea to the theoretical deed and

for causing th e transcenden tal philosophy itself to arise with th e whole

of his thr ee inexhaustible major works-this, however, in the way in

which a new science generally and in the most serious sense arises;

namely, in the form of a systematically guiding problematic and a

systematic unity of rational theories that provide positive solutions.

Therefore, he did not, like Leibniz, remain mired in a general a p e r ~ u

and it goes without saying that h e did not, like Hume-to use a Kantian

metaphor- let his ship go aground and decay on th e beach of scepti-

cism instead of seeing th e dangerous journey throug h t o a good end.

O ne may justifiably complain abo ut th e obscurities of t he Kantian

critique of reason, ab ou t th e puzzling profundity of his basic concepts

and deductions; one may come to be persuaded tha t th e gigantic Kan-

tian structure of transcenden tal science is still far from having tha t

perfection of compe lling rigor which its creator himself believed he

could attrib ute to it-indeed even that K ant did not penetrate at all to

the true foundations, to t he m ost basic problematics, and t o th e ulti-

mately valid m ethod of a transcendental philosophy. O ne thing, how-

ever, mu st in t he en d become evident to any unprejudiced person who

thinks for himself and seriously takes upon himself the self-

denying efforts at penetrating into these mysterious depths: that the

problematics and the science tha t make th eir appearance a t this point

are not contrived in abstruse speculation but, however strange it may

seem, are necessary ones, which will be forever inescapable , if no t in

their original form, then in

a

refined an d enriched form. science

which satisfies the intellectual needs awakened by Kant and makes

unde rstandable theoretically th e whole realm of transce nden tal

achievements

of

pure subjectivity, must be designated as the greatest

of

all

the theoretical tasks that could be given to modern humanity.

Indeed , th e sense an d cognitive value of all genuine sciences, as Kant

himself-and qu ite justifiably-teaches, depen d on the success of a

transcenden tal philosophy. Therefore, not until-nothing less is being

asserted-a transcenden tal philosophy is established an d pu t on its




12/49

course as rigorous science, can all other sciences attain the highest and

final level of theoretical rationality, which they must, a fter all, neces-

sarily demand of themselves.

Anyone who has been broug ht u p in th e beliefs still prevailing in our

time will hear such claims with indignation. According to these con-

victions, t he positive sciences are autonomous vis i

vis

philosophy.

o

devise methods an d theories, to interpret some, even th e ultimate, sense

of t h e truth s they have gained are merely a mat ter for specialized scien-

tific work. Does not the de ma nd for an inversion of th e entire manner

of thinking practiced in them-even if with the intentio n not of com-

promising their method but rather of furnishing them with a novel

perfection of co gnition ou t of h ithe rto undisclosed sources beyond t he

specialized sciences-does no t tha t deman d soun d like one of those

philosophical extravagances th at have so seriously damaged th e repu-

tation of philosophy in recent times?

How unsu itable such a verdict would be-this I hope is some thing of

which th e following considerations will be able to convince us.

11 Matters of the W orld Th at Are Taken for Granted

and the ife of Cons, z ~ u ~ n ~ ~

As already indicated, I wa nt to try, while disregarding the historically

cond itioned pecuIiarities of th e Kantian points of departure, for ma tions

of concepts an d form ulation s of problems, to clear up, first of all, th e

basic sense of tha t co mp lete inversion of the natural m anne r of think-

ing with which are revealed for the first tim e t he previously completely

hidde n realm of pure subjectivity an d th e infinity of transcendental

form ulation s of questions. Althoug h relating itself to all the world, to

all sciences, to a ll kinds of hu m an life, activity, and creation, i t never-

theless takes up none of the questions which the nature-oriented

sciences have to d irect to t he w orld and to life in t he world.

If we begin with human life and its natural conscious course, then it

is a communalized life of human persons who immerse themselves in

an endless world, i.e. viewing it, sometimes in isolation an d some times

together with one another, imagining it variously, forming judgments

about it, evaluating it, actively shaping it

to

suit our purposes. This

world is for these persons, is for us humans, continually and quite ob-

viously the re as a common world surrounding us all; obviously there-

it is the directly tangible an d visible world in entirely imm ediate and

freely expandab le experience. I t embraces not merely things an d living

beings, amo ng them animals a nd hum ans, b ut also communities, com-

munal institutions, wor s of art, cultural establishments of every kind.

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Wh atever in our individual and co mm unal activities has achieved sense

an d form belongs forthw ith to th e world too; it is, or in principle may

possibly be, a co nsti tuen t of existence accessible to everyone a nd there-

fore to be included by us in a possible new operation. W e hum ans our-

selves are subjects who experience, know, evaluate, and deal with the

world; and we are at the same time objects in the world and as such

precisely objects of our experiencing, valuing, and acting. Especially as

scientific subjects, given to theo retical interests and cncornpassing there-

in each a nd every real and possible world, we create th e sciences in in-

dividual and com mu naliztd work. As theories, th e sciences compreh end

all the world; as human constructions, they themselves belong to the

world.

This all takes place and is understood in the natural attitude. The

natural attitude is the form in which the total life of humanity is

realized in running its natural, practical course. It was the only form

from millennium to millennium, until out of science and philosophy

there developed uniq ue motivations for a revolution. W h a t is charac-

teristic of this naturalness appears in a presupposition which remains

beyond every mo de of inquiry an d which, in all naturally active living,

provides part of its foundation everywhere as belonging essentially to

life's intrinsic sense. I t is a ma tte r here of som ethi ng that is taken abso-

lutely for granted precisely by virtue of this naturalness, a nd is therefore

also hidden from anyone in th e natural attitude. I t can be formulated

thus :

Ou r waking life is, as it also was and will be, always experiencing and

always able to experience the world, th e totality of realities. O f

course, our experience is and always remains incomplete. In it, we

grasp only fragm ents of th e world an d even these only on e side at a tim e,

and the sides, again, never in ultimately valid adequacy. T o be sure,

instead of passively allowing an experience t o ru n its course, we can

proceed in experience actively to pe netrate into th e unkno wn reaches

of the world or to bring things already experienced ever more com-

pletely into experience. But an actually compIete experience is impos-

sible; for in principle there is no limit set t o a progression. N o thing, n o

side of a thing, no real property-nothing belon ging to the world is, as

it

is

experienced, an ultimately valid given; the most we can say is that

it is sufficient for us for th e practical life-goal a t any given tim e. Th is

well-known and unquestionable incompleteness does not, however, dis-

tur b our conviction th at we can throug h experience become acqu ainted

with th e world itself and th at experience is wha t originally certifies real

existence to us.

B ut now, with regard to a noth er and, we are convinced, insuperable

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incompleteness, we must say more precisely: not just any experience

but rather harntonious experience certifies [existence]. Experience can

indeed also become discordant, can make us succumb to doubt and

deception . I n any case, however, the productioil of ha rmony, and u lti-

mately of the enduring harmony of the totality of experience, is pos-

sible; an d only in it-as is unquestionable-is there completed a thor-

oughgoing an d enduringly indub itable cognizance of the existing world

itself.

This

world, already given perpetually

by

our continu al cxperience, is

then furt her to b e judged and cognized in its objective theoretical truth

in corresponding methods of the theoretical-insightful mode of judg-

ment, as, on the other hand, it can be formed in practical reason by

purposeful action. W e fashion the method s in our scientific thinking

abo ut th e condition s of insightful theorizing; th e a p ~ i o r i rinciples of

the meth od, t he essential condition s of rational m ethod , in general, we

seek and find under t he hea ding of logic. O n th e other hand , th e seek-

ing subjectivity forms its particular experiential-logical methods for

itself i n every particular science of reality. W h a t we in this man ner,

purely subjectively, produce in ourselves an d our insightful thinking,

on th c ground of actu al an d possible experience, serves us as the nor m

of our world-cognitions-as th e norm of trut h for the world itself, as it

is in an d for itself, wh ether we live or die, whe ther we cognize it or not.

There is, therefore, and without question, a harmoriy between the

world itself, or the truths that are valid for it itself, and the acts and

structures of cognition . O r otherwise expressed: wit hou t question our

cognition directs itself toward the world itself. T h a t our theoretical

cognition does this presupposes that our experience does it in its man-

ner; that this experience as harmoniously formed has objective legiti-

macy is taken for granted with out question.

W h a t has just been delimited as a never-formulated

presupposi-

tion

is th e basis of all positive sciences an d correspondingly limited ,

all oth er na tura l living and working. As a funda me ntal presupposition

on t he basis of which they unfold their uniqueness a nd becom e possible

as positive, this presupposition cann ot appear in the m a t all as th

the m e of any positive questions whatever. Th eir very formulation mu st

appear strange if not perverse to one in the natural or positive

attitude. All positive questions move within the framework of the

world's unque stionable pre-givenness in living experience an d of the

furt her unqu estion ed ma tters built u pon it. Th ey a1wa)rs aim therefore,

only a t how this experienced an d progressively experienceable w orld is

to be determined in truth as regards the individual realities, their

properties, relationships, laws-and especially how th e world is to be

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determined in objective truth, which makes our cognition inde-

pe nd en t of th e relativity of merely subjective modes of appearance.

Likewise all practical qu estions of th e outwardly w orking life have to

do with how th e given world is to be formed according to purposes in

practical reason2

If the thoug ht is here suggested th at this presupposition, which is

included in th e essential form of na tura l life and, especially, in th at of

th e scientific cognition of nature, could an d must be put in question,

then no damage of any kind is to b e supposed done by tha t to th e proper

legitim cy of this life. Nothing lies further from our intention than to

play skeptical paradoxes off a ga ~ ns the na tural rational activity of life-

or against natural experience an d its self-confirmation in its harm oniou s

contin uation , or against natural thinking (a nd also valuing, active striv-

ing ) in its natural methods of reasoning (a nd , therefore, also against

natural science), and it is not intende d tha t any of these be de precated.

T h e genuine transcenden tal philosophy-let it be emphatically stressed

a t th e outset-is no t like th e

Hum ean and neither openly nor covertly

a skeptical decomposition of th e world-cognition and th e world itself

int o fictions, th at is to say, in mode rn terms, a philosophy of As-If.

Least of all is it a dissolution of th e world in to mere subjective ap-

pearances, which in som e still senseful sense would have some thing

to do with illusion. It does not occur to transcende ntal philosophy to

dispute th e world of experience in th e least, to take from it th e least bit

of

th

sense which it really has in t he actuality of the experience and

which in its harmonious course certifies itself in its indubitable legiti-

macy. And again, it does not occur to i t to deprive the objective truth

of positive science of the least bit of the meaning that it really creates

in the actual employment of its naturally evident methods and bears

within itself as legitimately valid.

But, of course, transcendental philosophy is of th e opinion th at this

sense of legitimacy, as it mature s in s uch ac tuality, is in no way

under-

stood

thereby. T h e unquestionableness of wha t goes witho ut ques-

2

Presupposition does not mean premise. Presupposition (not without reason

do we put the word in quotes) is of course an improper expression; for what we S

designate is the general conception of that which lies in concrete particularity in

every act of natural living itself. In every act of experience there lies: This or that

real thing

is

there ; and in every connecting of new experiences to the same, there

lies: The same thing is there, which was experienced before, only now grasped in

a later phase of its being; and in the interim, while I was meanwhile experiencing

something else entirely, it was unexperienced; and similarly, for acts founded on

experience. Therefore, we described under the heading presupposition7' he general

sense of natural living, which, as such, it continually carries in itself-as a form of

all

its convictions without its ever being brought out.

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tion in th e natura l cognition, o f wha t is valid in its nalve evidence, is,

says transce nden tal philosophy, no t the understandableness of t he in-

sight developed thro ugh th e most radical lines of inquiry an d clarifica-

tion, is not that highest and ultimately necessary indubitability which

leaves rem aining no unasked an d therefore unsettled questions of t ha t

fundamental sort which belong inseparably, because esssentially, to

every th em e of cognition whatsoever.

T h e whole aim of tran scend ental philosophy goes back ultimately to

those fu nd am ent al matters th at are unquestioned (a nd all others essen-

tially akin to t h e m ), of which we spoke earlier. In them it sees th e most

profound an d most difficult problems of th e world and w orld-cognition

(or , in its necessary expansion: problem s of all objectivities in

general-

also of th e nonreal-in relationship to their cognition as existing in

themselves, as substrata for truths in themselves ). I t says:

Certainly, the being-in-itself of

the

world is an indubitable fact; but

indubitable fact is nothin g other tha n our naturally well-founded

statem ent, or, more precisely pu t: c on ten t of ou r statement, based on

that which is experienced in our actual and possible experience, that

which is thought and seen in our experiential-logical thinking; so it is

here, it is wherever we mai nta in something, establish i t as legitimate, as

the me of tru ths in themselves. Does no t th at which is expressed, es-

tablishe d, seen-in shor t, cognized-and does no t th e essentially cog-

nizable draw its sense from th e cognition, from its own essence, which

cogn ition is, after all, in all its levels in consciousness, subjective m en tal

living? W ha tev er it may relate itself to as content and whatever

signification this word content may thereby assume-is no t this re-

lating accomplished in consciousness itself, and does not the content

therefore lie enclosed in consciousness itself? But how is the being-in-

itself of th e world to be understood now, if i t is for us no thing other,

and can

e

nothing other, than a sense taking shape subjectively or

intersubjectively in our own cognitive achievement-naturally includ -

ing th e cha rac ter tru e being, which is conceivable only of senses?

And finally: if the substratum of these questions is understood, can

there still be any kind of philosophical c onsideration of th e world th at

proceeds as though talk of a world existing in itself could have a

legitimate sense tha t would still be completely differen t from th e sense-

formations in cognition, from the sense concretely taking shape by

synthesis in the multiplicity of acts of insightfully cognitive conscious-

ness-as though it could me an metaphysical transcendence, which

throu gh th e transcendent regulation by

a

metaphysical causality

could be connected with the merely subjective cognition formation

as if with picture of cognition effected inside subjectivity? W ou ld

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th at n ot be a sense which, having been torn fro m t he primal place of all

sense in t he sense-bestowal of consciousness, is precisely nonsense?

But questions mu st n ot preconceive answers. O ne thing is clear from

th e outset: th ere can be only one m ethod of really answering all such

questions and of obta inin g a real understand ing of th e relationships be-

tween cognized being and cognizing consciousness. One must study

the cognizing life itself in its own achievements of essence (and that,

naturally, in th e wider framework of t he concretely full life of con-

sciousness in general) and observe how consciousness in itself and

according to its essentiai type constitutes and bears in itself objective

sense an d how it constitu tes in itself true sense, in order the n to find

in itself th e thu s constitu ted sense as existing in itself, as tru e being

an d tru th in itself.

111. Discovery of

the

Realm of Transcendental Experience

( a )

Pure subjective and intersubjective consciousiness.

W it h tha t we stand before t he decisive point: before th e necessity of

a reversal of the total natural manner of thinking. Let us prepare a

deeper u nders tanding fo r ourselves in several steps.

am what I am, and we are w hat we are, as subjects of a multi-form

life of consciousness, of a private and an intersubjectively communal-

ized one.

Sum

cogitans-I am, in tha t I see and hear and otherwise per-

ceive externally or am reflectively related to myself, remem ber, await,

in that

I

presentiate som ething t o myself in a n image or likeness or

throu gh signs, let som ething hover before m e in inventive fantasy; in

that I combine and separate, compare and generalize, declaratively

judge and theorize, or also, in that, in the modes of affectivity,

I

have

pleasure or displeasure, I am happy or sad, I am driven by wishes or

fears, decide practically, be have effectively. Th os e all a re typical exam-

ples of special forms of th e c~n scio usn ess,~ 'treaming in a continually

flowing unity, in which, communalized through intersubjective acts of

consciousness, we live an d move, an d have ou r being. Obviously, th e

most general characteristic belonging indefeasibly to th e proper essence

of all consciousness is th a t i t is consciousness o something, of som ething

objective of which, as we will soon under stan d mor e precisely, one is

conscious in varying modes acco rding to t h e particular form of con-

sciousness. Therefore, consciousness and that of which there is con-

sciousness-in an app rop riate how7'-are inseparable .

Also inseparably involved in this is the fact that I who live

in

this or

that consciousness, am necessarily also conscious of myself and am

conscious of this being conscious itself. But from the outset

it

must be




18/49


19/49

cisely because in its last par t t ha t of which one is conscious was m eant.

T h e distinction between objective sense and object pure an d simple

does away with the equivocation; likewise the simpler manner of ex-

pressing it in print: object (in quotes) and object (wi thou t quo tes).

-According to the prevailing trend of judgment, y the way, object

means som ething real, object of th e world, which ou r distinction itself

would m ake equivocal if we were no t careful to keep pure t h e indis-

pensable, m ost general, concep t of object, t ha t is, to speak expressly of

som ething real where we mean it .

In o rder to learn to see iha t of which one is conscious as th at of which

one is conscious, to learn to see objective sense in its how according

to im port ant new dimensions of this how, let us turn our attentio n to

some basic types of processes of consciousness, of concrete particulars

in the-only now properly concrete in th e full sense-stream of th e life

of consciousness. Th ey shall be considered purely according to w hat we

find in or on them, in or according to their proper essence, which is,

therefore, inseparable from th em .

Let us consider perception If we take the word in a completely

general sense but, of course, not th e usual one, the n perception is the

kind of consciousness th at m akes us conscious of a n existent as existent,

completely originally, as it itself. T h e object stands in th e mode

peculiar own being an d being-thus, it itself in th e original in the

gaze of consciousness; where t he perceiving has t he mo de of attentio n

(atte ntiv e awareness, graspin g), th e object is grasped in this character

of t he so-called being there in person'? and has th e character obviously

from th e perceiving itself.-If

we

take perception in the m ore restricted

and more obvious sense, in the ordinary sense of the perception of

reality, then it is wha t originally makes us conscious of th e realities exist-

ing for us and the world as actually existing. T o cancel o ut all such

perception, ac tual an d possible, means, for our to tal life of conscious-

ness, to cancel ou t th e world as objective sense and as reality accepted

bv

us; it means to remove from all though t ab out t he w orld (i n every signi-

fication of this wo rd) th e original basis of sense and legitimacy.

n

individual perception, considered itself, is consciousness of some phy-

sicalities and, taken q uit e concretely, is perception of th e world by

virtue of th e horizon of perception belonging to it. Let us atte nd strictly

to t he fact tha t th e particular perception in itself makes us conscious of

th e world with these or those in tuitive traits an d, in fact, as being there

in personal presence. T o make thu s conscious is, so to speak, the achieve-

m en t of consciousness essentially peculiar to perception

as

perception.-

W e re we more closely to consider perception a nd what it has perceived,

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there would still be here much to be found pertaining to its proper

essence (aspects, etc .).

An oth er of th e typical form s of t he life of consciousness is memory

Again we see: in mem ory itself the re lies, as a new kind of consciousness

of a nd m aking conscious, th e kind in th e time m ode of being-past and,

included with in it, of having-been-perceived by m e.

And so it is now quite generally obvious, whether we now want to

take as an example

a

significative or a pictorial representing, a con-

sciousness of universals, a predicative judgment an d inference, a hypo-

thetical positing, holding as possible and probable, a doubting, affirm-

ing, or denying, or wha tever else-every new mod e of consciousness

bears wit hin itself as an objective sense inseparable from i t its object

of consciousness, according to th e kind an d particularization of con-

sciousness, its cha nging modes of sense; for example, as signs for some-

thing, as a copy, as universal of particulars, as reason or consequence, as

hypothesis, etc.; also, however, as purely and simply existing or as pos-

sible, presumable, doub tful, null, etc.

L,et

us

have another look at the realm of the connections o con

sciousness.

In the transition from consciousness to consciousness-

from one perception to further perceptions, to memories, expectations,

acts of think ing, to valuing and other consciousness-the individual

acts of consciousness do not remain isolated and a mere succession.

They come into connection, and every such connection is itself again

one consciousness, which effects its new synthetic production of

sense; above all, when we are continually conscious of one an d th e

same thing in transitions of consciousness, even when they connect

very diverse acts. Th en th is self-same thing, which little by little makes

itself de finite just as it does, is nothin g other tha n t he un ity of a struc-

ture of sense th at builds itself up in t h e unity of th e train of conscious-

ness connecting itself together in its continuation. By virtue of the

identifying connection of the individual acts that follow upon one

another and perhaps continually pass over into one another, each of

which is conscious of its objec t in its what an d how,'? its aspects and

traits presented therein, its empty horizons or other subjective modes

by virtue of such identifying connection, the senses individually in-

cluded in the acts constitute a single sense always changing itself

modallv in its contin uation , namely, th e one object'? which,

U

the

same object deter min ing itself step by step mo re richly, unifies th e

sense achievem ents of all th s acts. And o ut of tha t, obviously, all talk

of the unity of a n object, of its identity in t h e change of its modes of

appearance and its traits th at appear, gets its significance. Fu rthe r: if, in

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all this, the experiencing consciousness goes on throughout in con-

tinuous harmony, the n th e that's right, it is actual, is again a for-

ma tion of sense making itself conscious, and , to b e sure, in this mo de of

concordan t consciousness, an d likewise if th e harmony is broken, in the

new synthe tic type of consciousness of th e inne r strife, th e it does not

accord, it is doubtfu l, or null.

[ It is] not otherwise in conceptual thinkin g and in th e ever so highly

developed syntheses of theoretical action. In tha t action itself the

concepts and concept forms, judgments a nd judgm ent forms take shape.

If the theoretical train of thought progresses with perfect insight as

genuine grounding and terminates in evident truth , th en there lies in

th e unity of this syn the tic activity of consciousness itself, as a form atio n

produced by t he m ind t ha t has developed in th e imm anence of this

activity, the grounding theory, and its thesis bears the characteristic

of consciousness that in turn has developed purely immanently:

grounded truth. But true being, for example, physical being to which

this tru th refers, naturally lies in th e nexus of consciousness which at

first had already constituted it in itself by objectifying it in pre-

theoretical objectivations as som ething existing in certainty, th en set it

as a target of cognition in theoretica l thinking , and , proceeding method -

ically in th e unified flow of insightfully predica ting co gnition, deter-

mines it in theoretical tru th.

I n

th e synthe tic connection of repeated arguments-whe ther one's

own or another's arguments-truth and tru e being are constituted as the

same in t he man ner peculiar to consciousness: th e practical freedom of

being able in the wider contex t of on e consciousness to repeat the

argument and to restore

origin liter

the same truth in insight, the

ontological character of truth as something existing in itself in the

realm of cognition. Likewise, in t he conscious insight in to t he possi-

bility of being able to thin k of t h e argument as carried out by anybody

at any time w ho can intuitively be conceived as in com munity w ith

us,

there emerges the character of truth as something supertemporal and

exalted above any cognizing subject-and therefore always as tru th

in itself.

If we remain consisten t in thi s sort of m editation, with a radical con-

sistency tha t quit e exclusively goes after subjective an d intersubjective

consciousness in all its actual and possible forms, particular and syn-

thetic forms, and quite exclusively directs its gaze upon what belongs

to consciousness in and fo r itself-then we are already in the transcen-

dental

attitude. T h e conversion of t he na tural man ner of thinking then

is

complete. W h a t is basically essential to it is th e

r dic lism nd

the

universalityo a pure meditation on consciousness, a m editation tha t is




22/49

fully conscious of this peculiarity, and is willed and carried out with

unbroken consistency. For only thereby does pure consciousness as the

absolutely self-contained realm of purely subjective being become

known a nd , wit h its purely im m an en t interconnections, abilities, sense-

structures, for m the realm of a unique science in contrast to all posi-

tive sciences, ind epe ndent in principle of all their statem ents: namely,

transcendental philosophy.

T h e radicalism of th e transcendental attitude demands, therefore,

the firm resolve to b ring consciousness, consciousness in its pu re ow n-

essentialness, exclusively to intuitive self-comprehension and to the-

oretical cognition, and thereby consciousness in its full concretion, in

which

it

is subjectivity existing purely for itself an d conta ined purely in

itself, according to each an d every thin g t ha t is included in i t in really

immanent and intentional moments, syntheses, centering, that is ex-

hibitab le in and of it as intuitively and theoretically inseparable from its

own essence; this radicalism obviously demands, then, th e resolve to see

to it th at we radically exclude every accompanying m eaning of what is

not consciousness an d of w hat is assigned to consciousness so as to b e

interwoven with it by na tur al or even scientific-psychological or

philosophical, legitimate or perverse-convictions.

O f course th at is more easily said and desired tha n actually done-

and done in th e understan ding of its whole range, indeed, of its true

sense.

At t h e outset, th e idea of a subjectivity purely closed off in itself an d

taking charge of itself intuitively in its own pure life of consciousness

through the self-reflection of the ego cogito is nothing especially

astounding, bu t on th e contrary-since Descartes' time-is som ething

quite familiar; and accordingly also, the idea of an analysis and de-

scription of cognition geared to theory, first of all in immediate PSY-

chological self-experience and then by way of empathy) in the

experience

of

someone else. Perhaps it is the case that the struggle

against transcendental-philosophical psychologism and a gainst th e sub-

stitution of psychology for th e science of transcendental consciousness

has the fundamental root of its legitimacy in the fact that conscious-

ness in t he sense of psychological appercep tion is not pur in th e sense

in

question here. W e foresee, therefore, tha t t he transcendental atti-

tude, even if i t is in itself a successful att itu de tow ard consciousness in

its own essentials and leads to theoretical results that are in our plain

sense transcendental-purely according to the theory of consciousness-

cannot yet be accepted as transcendental-scientific and transcendental-

flhilosophical, so long, that is, as a special methodological sense-inve~ti-

gation ha s no t clarified more deeply t he sense and th e legitimacy of the

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dem and of t h e purity in question an d a me thod t h at scientifically justi-

fies itself has n ot secured in general th e effecting of a tran scend ental

experience, of an evident grasping of self by th e pure consciousness,

an d therewith opened th e way for th e original ground ing of a trans-

cend ental philosophy as a rigorous science.

T h e dem and tha t is hereby being made has already been satisfied by

th e new phenomenoIogy under th e title

phenomen ological reduction.

Since th e development of this me tho d makes indispensable a few con-

siderations that are not easy and are understandable only with some

elaboration, we shall deaI with the m in a section of their own.

( b )

Transcendental essence-research and transcendental science of

mu tters of fac t.

At t h e outset-assuming th e full success of t h e following clarifica-

tions and therew ith of t he distinctio n between psychological an d trans-

cendentally pure consciousness-the definite sense of a science of th e

transcen dental in its universal range is firmly established

n

f o r m , so

to speak. W e a t once call it transcen dental philosophy-anticipating, as

canno t until later be established, tha t it embraces all philosophical

tasks of th e enti re tradition. I n any case, it is no t supposed to be any-

thing other than that science which in th e transcendental attitude, and

methodologically secured attitude, theoretically investigates pure sub-

jectivity in general and, concerning all formations possible in it, con-

tinuously asks only about that which belongs to it according to its

proper essential sort and its own laws of essence and abo ut th a t which

subjec tivity brings ab ou t in the way of possible achiev ements of sense

an d reason-achievements under manifold titles of th e true , th e gen-

uine, the correct. This obviously amounts to saying that all possible

experiences an d sciences as well as all formations of consciousness tha t

are at all possible must b elong t o th e area of research of this science.

They are for it themes of investigation, in no way, however, logically

basic cognitions the determinations of which could serve in it as pre-

mises. Transcendental philosophy, therefore, also refers correlatively

to th e world and to all possible worlds-and, again, not as given already

and plainly and simply existing in reality or possibility, but rather as

forms of harmony a nd tru th th at display themselves imman ently in th e

life and work of rational philosophy.

Along with this, the universe of pure possibilities and the fact are

naturally separated in view of th e transcendenta l investigations to be

carried out. T h e factual life of consciousness, th e universal life of con-

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sciousness, in its transcendental intersubjective immanence, bears

in

itself as phenom enon th e correlative fact of the world cons tituted in

it in th e form of representation. Ta ken concretely, then, it is the uni-

verse of a ll transcen den tal facticity. As such, it is the un iverse of possible

transc ende ntal experience and presents the task of a correspondingly

universal theory of experience. Th is factu al correlation is t be regarded

as one possibility th at leaves open an infinity of o ther possibilities-as

merely imag inable , as a prior?' or essential possibilities. Transcen-

denta l essence-research (t h e eidetic ) is investigation of the essential

possibilities of tr anscen denta l consciousness in general, with th e a pr or

possible world to be constituted therein pre-theoretically or theoreti-

cally. Indeed, we must make the framework even wider. In our pre-

dominating interest in the naturally pre-given world, which at first

represents for us th e totality of th e existent, we limit our transcendental

interest to it as well without taking notice. But, already, in order to

satisfy a transcend ental con temp lation of th e world, we soon see our-

selves forced to free ourselves from all limitations and to investigate

transcendentally th e universe of consciousness in general th at is possible

a

Priori, as well as th e universe of objectivities in general th at a re to be

cons tituted therein-whereby ou r broadest concept of object must be

brought in to play, in to which, indeed , many kinds of ideal objectivities,

such as pure num bers, ideals, an d t h e like, are integrated.

In itself, eidetic science everywhere precedes science of facts and

makes possible for th e first time t h e theoretically highest form ation of

the latte r in rational theories, thus, of course, in natura l science. T h e

eidetic transcendental science that is indeed to be grounded purely by

itself, th e universal science of essence of a tra nscendenta l subjectivity in

general, has priority, with all transcendental phenomena that are

a

priori

possible in i t.

Finally, one must pay careful attention to the fact that a possible

transcendental subjectivity in general is not merely to be understood

as a possible singular bu t rather also as a possible communicative sub-

jectivity, and primarily as one such that purely according to con-

sciousness, that is to say, through possible intersubjective acts of

~on scious ness, t encloses togeth er in to a possible llness a multiplicity

of individual transce nden tal subjects. T o wh at extent a solipsistic

subjectivity is at all possible in th ough t, outside of all community, is

itself on e of th e transcend ental problems.

W e, standin g as actual subjects of reason in th e actuality of fate ful

life, engage in science as functio n and me thod of precisely this life.

Ou r interest lies accordingly, in th e factual. In further consequence,




25/49

therefore, eidetic transcendental philosophy (transcen dental phenome-

nology, as we also say) is the instrument or method for the transcen-

dental science of m atters of fact.

If we look back from here at natural living and knowing, to w hich the

radicalism of tran scend ental consideration rem ains foreign, then it has,

on th e ground of natural experience, th e world, and related t o it, th e

positive sciences of ma tters of fact; on th e ground of t he natural

attitude toward pure possibilities, it has eidetic sciences (such as the

ma them atical sciences), functionin g as instrum ents of t he positive

me thod of th e sciences or' matters of fact. Wh atev er th e extent to

which it penetrates th e infinities of natural ho rizons, it never happens

upon-even if in principle it can in its att itu de happe n upon th e

transcendenta l data and theories-the actual and possible transcenden-

tal consciousness, th e world, possible worlds, as its intentional

construction, nor upon the above designated transcendental sciences.

How, then, the one might stand in relation to the other, in what

sense one can speak at all of ano the r, in wh at sense the universal science

of the transcendental-and, above all, th e transcen dental eidetic phe-

nomeno logy with its immediate essential descriptions of th e possibili-

ties of pure achievem ents of consciousness of transcend ental subjects-

is called upon to interpret the ultimately true sense of the naturally

given and cognized .world, is similarly called upon to exercise criticism

of all positive sciences an d of all in the sam e sense positive ( dogm atic )

philosophies, indeed, with regard t o these, even called upon to p roduce

in its own framework all science in ultimately scientific form and to

realize in itself every possible sense of philosophy in ultima te form-

these are th e questions tha t are now pressing upon us or open ing up.

But, before we take a further step in this direction, it will be neces-

sary to assure ourselves still furt he r of th e previous separation of the

two kinds of thinking, that is to say, above all, to illuminate more

deeply tha t rem arkable radicalism of an exclusive letting-be-accepted

and seeking of th e purely subjective, in th e concretely self-contained

whole of a pure subjectivity. We have already said tha t it shall belong

to t he essential sense of this pu re subjectivity not to presuppose or

tolerate in principle any co-positing of naturally objective being (de-

cided in the universe of positive fac t) .

c)

Natural and transcendental refectionand the underlying b sis o

intentionality.

Let us go back again to something already considered. In th e course

of our natural living we human subjects at every moment have the

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26/49

existent already given, the existent in t he abu nd ant sense, coming in

man ifold ways with in th e grasp of consciousness an d disappearing

again, but even then still existing for us. 411 things thus given before-

hand are in a certa in sense unified; they form a universe of things

already there fo r us.

A

na ture is continually the re for us- the tota lity

of na ture , uni tin g in itself all mate rial objectivities existing for us. I t is,

however, merely a dep enden t structu re of th e concretely full world,

with its hu m an beings, states, churches, works of art, sciences, etc. T o

the real m un da ne universe, th e totality of the really existent, is then

referred everything which otherwise offers itself as existing, such as

ideals, ideas of every sort, mathe matic al objectivities (num bers, m ulti-

plicities), theories, an d t he like; it is in a certain way a mere a nnex of

the real world, according to the sense that natural living gives it. Our

total natural praxis (our praxis in the usual narrower sense

of

real in-

dustry and also our cognitive praxis) is related to the current universe

of th ings given to us beforehan d. Through praxis

of

both kinds we

reshape th e universe of th at which is existent for us at any given time,

as validities existing for us-and only produce for ourselves thereby new

things given beforehand; we expand the old universe, simultaneously

narrowing it by striking o ut of it many things as being henceforth no

longer accep ted by us.3

Throughout this total life, which is continuously active individually

and com munally in t he performa nce of acceptances, there run efforts

directed toward th e attainm ent of truths (in th e widest sense). O u t

of subjective and changing acceptances we toil to shape legitimately

verified tru ths an d tr uth s th at are to be verified at any tim e subjectively

as well as intersubjectivelv, and finally-under th e title of science-

ultimately valid trut hs, th e existent in the true, in the ultimately

valid sense.

Now everything, so we tell ourselves, that is accepted by us as an

existent in such

nat ura l living-and perhaps in th e form grounded

with final validityn-is som ething being accepted and perhaps accepted

with finality, as synthetic unity in multiform consciousness, as some-

thing o ne a nd th e same in manifold subjective modes of givenness, in

th e subjective synthesis

of

which it constitutes itself precisely as a unity

arid in th e character of the un ity of t ha t which is accepted, or perhaps

3

Bu t it must not be overlooked that the modification of th acceptance-as-

being in th e for m of rejection nd th at any possibIy occurring mod a~i zatio n of this

acceptance whatsoever establishes again and again a sort of positive acceptance and

therefore an existent for u again, even

though

in a changed attitude (possible at

any

t ime) .

Under the objectively existent, then, we have: existing objective

pas-

sibilities, probabilitie s, impossibilities, question abilities.

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Copy right University of Arkan sas Press.


27/49

of t he verified, th e true, etc. So even th e simple title perception

of som e th ing or other , and experience of this thing in general, is-as my

an d ou r total experience, related and to b e related to this sam e thing-

a title fo r exceedingly mu ltiform lived experiences an d modes of given-

ness as lived experiences, without which th e latter can no t be conscious-

ness of th e thing, an d any things in general, as this one an d same exis-

ten t. But while perception gives us th e th ing as existing in person, we

know nothing of the exceedingly manifold modes of consciousness,

sense-contents, modes of positing, etc., which m ake

up

th e experiencing

as th at of th is thing . T h e grasping view rests exclusively on th e consti-

tute d syn thetic unity and its elem ents of unity, th e physical properties.

In the natural attitude, an d to b e sure, in th e basic attitud e of straight-

forwardly, unreflectively living along, we see the thing and not the

subjective manifold in which it is constituted as unity. If something

pre-given becomes th e th em e of a n action of consciousnesss foun ded at

a high er level, e-g., of a theorizing an d perhaps of a n e viden t theorizing,

the n n othing other th an this is th e case: in the process of this theorizing

we have exclusively in t h e them atic view t he consequences of the

theor ems given as existing; of th e modes of consciousness cons tructed in

an entangled and very much changing manner, with their sense-

con tents, mo des of positing, syntheses, etc., as whose struc ture of un ity

each com pon ent of th e theory and, in t h e successive building up, th e

whole of the theory comes int o view-of these we know noth ing in the

performance; they remain extra-thematic. In general, actually given ob-

jects are themes; themes are unities of act manifolds remaining

unthernatic.

W h a t has been said abou t th e objectivities given in th e mod e of the

actual present, with th e subjective features belonging to them , is trans-

ferabIe to th e objectivities in some way presentiated with th e cor-

respondingly presentiated subjectivity (remembering, depictive repre-

sentation, an d t he lik e) ; likewise, it is transferable from th e objectivities

of which there is consciousness and which are accepted as actual with

th e acts actually positing the m in acceptance to th e objects represented

in the mode of mere phantasying an d to the correlative acts of an ac-

ceptan ce which on e merely thin ks or phantasies instead of actually,

husserl, e. (1924) 1974, kant and the idea of transcendental philosophy

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