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'Moral Panic' and Moral Language in the MediaAuthor(s): Arnold HuntSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 629-648Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591600 .
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Arnold
Hunt
'Moral
panic'
and
moral
language
in the
media
ABSTRACT
This article provides
a comprehensive
survey
of the use
of the term 'moral
panic'
from its coinage
in 1972
until the
present
day. It traces
the evolution
of the term
in academic sociology
and criminology,
its adoption by
the media in
the
mid-
1980s and its subsequent
employment
in the
national press.
It shows how
and
why
the term
changed
its meaning,
and how far
its use
in academic
discourse
affected
its use
in the media.
The
article traces the
development
of 'moral
panic' in
the
media, where it
was
first used
pejoratively,
then
rejected for being
pejorative,
and finally
rehabilitated
as a term
of approval.
It explains
why the term
developed
as it did:
how
it enabled
journalists
to justify
the moral
and social
role of
the media, and
also
to support
the reassertion of 'familyvalues' in the early l990s.
The article
concludes
by considering
the relationship
between 'moral
panic'
and moral language
in general. This
is a more
speculaiive
analysis of
the term,
drawing
on the
work of moral
philosophers
and attempiing
to
predict
how 'moral
panic' may develop
in the future.
'Moral panic',
I suggest,
is an unsaiisfactory
form of moral
language
which may
adversely affect
the
media's ability
to handle
moral issues seriously.
KEYWORDS:
Media; morality;
moral
panic
I
first encountered
the
term 'moral
panic'
at a seminar
in earlymodern
history
n
1991.As I
later discovered,
t
had been around
for nearlytwenty
years and
had
alreadybecome
firmlyestablished
n the literature
of soci-
ology
and
criminology;
but
it wasonly
just beginning
to
find its way
into
wider
circulation.
I
was curious,
first about
its application
to the
fields
of
social
and
culturalhistory
withwhich
I
was concerned,
then
aboutits back-
ground,
its original
use and its subsequent
development.
Despitethe exist-
ence of a sizable body of literatureon the subject, most recentlyErich
Goode
and Nachman
Ben-Yehuda's
Moral
Panic: The
Social
Construction
f
Deviance
(1994),
whose
usefuldistinction
between
three
different
theories
of
moralpanic
('interest-group',
elite-engineered'
and 'grassroots')
have
gratefully
adopted
here, there
is
no fully detailed
or
satisfactory
istoryof
the term.
This article
attempts
o provide
one,
and to suggest,
through
an
Bnt. Jnl. of Socgologzy
olume no. 48
Issue no.
4 December 1997
ISSN 0007-1315
i) London
School of Economics
1997
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630
Arnold
Hunt
examination
of
the
various
meanings
of
the
term,
that
sociologists
need
to
be
more
rigorous
n
its
use
and
more
sensitive
to
its
hidden
implications.
In
particular, doubtwhetherGoodeandBen-Yehudare ustified n treat-
ing
it
as
a
homogeneous
concept
and
in
attempting
o
construct
a
grand
unified
theory
of
moral
panic.
A
personal
apologia
eems
necessary,
as
I
am
a
historian,
not a
sociologist,
uneasily
aware
of
the
tension
between
the
empirical
method
in
which
I
was
rained
and
the
more
theoretical
approach
which
I
adopt
here.
This
is
intended
as
an
interdisciplinary
work,
an
encounter
between
two
academic
traditions
hat
meet
too
seldom,
to
the
disadvantage
f
both.
While
this
article
was
being
written,
the
problem
of
'moral
panic'
took
on
a
new
dimension.The termhas appearedoccasionallyn the national
press
for
at
least
ten
years,
but
suddenly
came
to
prominence
in
1993,
as a
survey
of
the
broadsheet
newspapers
demonstrates.
FT
Profile,
a
computer
database
overing
most
of
the
national
press
rom
the
late
1980s,
ists
eleven
uses
of
the
term
in
1989,
twelve
n
1990,
eight
in
1991
and
seventeen
in
1992,
but
eighty-nine
n
1993.
This,
as
we
shall
see,
has
implications
or
the
academic
use
of
the
term,
for,
asJean
Aitchison
has
argued,
newspapers
do
not
initiate
linguistic
change
so
much
as
'push
the
language
along
further
in
the
direction
n
which
it
was
already
going',
and
sociologists
must
there-
fore
bear
some
responsibility or the use of 'moralpanic' in the media.
(Aitchison
1994:
19)
The
media's
heightened
sensitivity
o
moral
ssues
may
be
just
a
temporary
phase,
one
of
a
series
of
media
debates
about
'moral
decline'
that
have
gone
on
since
the
1960s,
flaring
up
and
quickly
dying
down
again.
But
in
looking
at
'moral
panic'
in
the
context
of
this
wider
debate
on
public
morals,
this
article
will
also
consider
the
possibility
hat
the
potent
association
of
morality
with
panic
may
have
a
permanent
effect
on
the
moral
language
used
by
the
media.
1.'INTEREST-GROUP'HEORY
Discussion
f
moral
panic
properly
begins
with
Stanley
Cohen's
Folk
Devils
and
MoralPanics
1972),
a
classic
ociological
tudy
of
the
Mods
and
Rockers
phenomenon
of
the
mid-1960s.
Cohen
offered
the
following
definition
of
the
term:
Societies
appear
to
be
subject,
every
now
and
then,
to
periods
of
moral
panic.
A
condition,
episode,
person
or
group
of
persons
emerges
to
become
defined
as
a
threat
to
societal
valuesand interests; ts natureis
presented
in
a
stylized
and
stereotypical
ashion
by
the
mass
media;
the
moral
barricades
are
manned
by
editors,
bishops,
politicians
and
other
right-thinking
eople;
socially
accredited
experts
pronounce
their
diag-
noses
and
solutions;
ways
of
coping
are
evolved
or
(more
often)
resorted
to;
the
condition
then
disappears,
submerges
or
deteriorates
and
becomes
more
visible.
Sometimes
the
object
of
the
panic
is
quite
novel
and
at
other
times
it
is
something
which
has
been
in
existence
long
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'Moral anic'and moral
anguagen themedia
631
enough, but
suddenly appears in the limelight.
Sometimes the panic
passesover and is forgotten, except in
folklore and collective
memory;at
other times it has more seriousandlong-lasting epercussions nd might
produce such changes as those in legal
and social policy or
even in the
waythe society
conceives tself.
Severaldetailsof
Cohen's thesishave provedparticularly
nfluential.The
first s the idea thateverymoralpanic has
its scapegoat, he
'folkdevil' onto
whom public fears and
fantasiesare
projected.The moral panic must have
an object; it must be
about something.
This does not mean that the folk
devil is created by the
moral panic. Cohen was at pains to
point out that
'despite using termssuch as panic nd analogiesfrom the studyof mass
hysteriaand delusion' he did not mean to
implythat the Mods
and Rockers
would not have existed if there had been
no moral panic or 'would have
gone away f we had simply gnored them',
only that turningthem into folk
devils was an inappropriate solution to
the problem. That 'problem',
however,wasnot the activities f the Mods
and Rockers,or onlyin a limited
and temporary ense;
the underlyingcause of the moralpanic
wasthe 'cul-
turalstrainand
ambiguity' ausedby social change. The object
of the moral
panic wasnot so much
the ModsandRockersas the post-war
ffluenceand
sexualfreedom thatthey represented; onsequently, he Modsand Rockers
were forgotten withina few years,and
new folk devils
emerged to replace
them. Recent writershave gone further
than Cohen in
emphasizingthe
arbitrary election of folk devils.
Nowadays, he term 'folk
devil' is more
likely to be applied to vulnerablefigures
such as unmarried
mothers or
people with AIDS,or
to contestable
phenomena such as the satanicabuse
of children, than to
aggressively eviant
or anti-socialgroups such as the
Mods and Rockers.
One linguisticresult
of this has been the conflation of
the moral panic and
the folk devil. Single
mothers,wroteJulie Burchill n
the Mailon Sunday 15 August1993), 'havetakenover from drugpushers
(an
equally lorid,unrealisticmyth) as
society'smain folk
devil and moral
panic'. This implies
that the moral panic is not about he
folk devil; the
moral panic is the folk devil, or, to put it
another way,the folk
devil would
not
be perceived as a
problem - might not even exist at all -
without the
moral panic.
Another influentialaspect of Cohen's
thesis is the
argumentthat moral
panicsare generatedby
the media, or by
particularnterest-groupsCohen,
following Howard
Becker, calls them
'moral entrepreneurs') using the
media to publicize their concerns. An example of this approach can be
found in
PhilipJenkins'srecent book
Intimate nemies:MoralPanics n Con-
temporary reatBritain
(1992) which
identified various interest-groups,
including charities, he
police and social workers,who made
claims about
the sexual and ritual
abuse of children
which were then 'takenup by a sig
nificant section of
the mass media and presented as
factual'. Cohen,
however, aid
particular tresson the media itself, as an
'especially mpor-
tant carrierand
producerof moralpanics'.Most
commentators, ven those
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632
Arnold
Hunt
within
the
media,
have
tended
to
agree.
As
the
Financial
Times
ommented
on
13
March
1993:
Thatthe Britishmediaexercisea uniquelydecisive nfluenceon national
political
life
has
been
notably
demonstrated
n
recent
days:
n
no
other
country
would
what
has
been
termed
the
'moral
panic'
over
juvenile
crime
have
provided
the
basis
of
such
a
concerted
campaign
hat
led
to
almost
nstant
action
on
the
part
of
the
government.
While
this
was
a
cause
of
alarm
o
some
writers,
others
were
inclined
to
cel-
ebrate
the
power
of
the
press
to
initiate
a
moral
panic
on
an
issue
of
public
importance.
Name
an
issue',
wrote
MartinJacques
n
the
Sunday
Times
n
7
March
1993,
and
it
is
more
than
likely
that
the
newspapers
have
been
responsible
or
making
it
happen:
the
moral
panic
over
the
state
of
society,
economic
policy .
.
.
the
royal
amily
.
.
It
is
no
exaggeration
o
say
that
without
he
press
none
of
these
issues
would
have
acquired
he
importance
hey
have.
Perhaps
the
most
far-reaching
spect
of
Cohen's
thesis,
however,
s
the
remark
hat
'the
processes
by
which
moral
panics
and
folk
devils
are
gener-
ated
do
not
date'.
This
has
encouraged
historians
o
transport
he
concept
of
moral
panic
into
other
periods.
Rob
Sindall,
or
example,
employs
the
termas 'a usefulanalytical ool' in his studyof streetviolencein the nine-
teenth
century,
on
the
assumption
hat
'Cohen's
model
is
...
applicable
over
ime',
the
only
precondition
or
a
moral
panic
being
the
existence
of
a
mass
media
capable
of
transmitting
t.
(Sindall
1990:
29)
Historians
of
the
seventeenth
entury
have
been
particularly
eceptive
o
the
term,
perhaps
encouraged
by
the
fact
that
a
work
of
seventeenth-century
istory,
Kai
Erikson's
Wayward
urztans
1966),
was
one
of
Cohen's
own
sources
or
the
study
f
deviance.
David
Underdown
describes
he
Puritan
reformation
of
Dorchester
n
the
1620s
as
'pursued
with
an
intensity
bordering
on
a
state
of moralpanic ',with Puritanpreachersand magistratesn the role of
moral
ntrepreneurs.
Moral
panics,
he
suggests,
are
timeless:
small
towns
are
mall
towns
n
any
time
and
place',
and
Dorchester
n
the
1620s
s
com-
parable
o
Brighton
n
the
1960s.
(Underdown
1985:
52,
Underdown
1992:
x)
ohn
Morrill
argues
hat
in
the
1650s
he
gentry
were
'caught
n
a
moral
panic '
hich,
as
in
Cohen's
model,
was
media{Iriven,
uelled
by
'the
rapid
growth
f
newspapers
and
pamphlets
at
a
time
of
political
uncertainty'
(Morrill
993:
370-1).
Christina
Larner
points
out
that
witch-hunts
n
early
modern
cotland
tended
to
occur
at
moments
of
political
tension,
often
accompanyinghe transitionto a new regime, as in the late 1650s:'The
absence
f
a
machinery
or
law
and
order
.
.
.
seems
to
have
engendered
an
anxiety
mong
the
ruling
classes
amounting
to
a
moral
panic .'
(Larner
1981:
98-9;
see
also
Larner
1984:
64)
Similarly,
.C.
Davis
argues
that
in
periods
f
history
when
moral
boundaries
are
undergoing
wholesale
reappraisal
or
revision,
as,
for
instance,
n
the
wake
of
a
revolution
.
.
moral
uncertainty
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'Moral
panic' and moral
anguage in the media
633
can lead to great
anxiety or 'moral panic'
and to the demand for a
reassertionor
redefinition of moral
boundaries.
In the
1650s, he believes, there was a moral
panic aboutantinomianand
libertinesects such as the
Ranters,generatedbya varietyof
interest-groups
including printersand
publishers,
oyalistjournalists, nd conservative ec-
tarians
using the image of
the Ranter to police the sects' own
boundaries,
to
induce conformity'.
Davis1986:96-8)
Davis'sworkexposes one of the weaknesses f
the 'interest-group'
heory
of moral panic:a tendency
to concentrateon
deep-seatedculturalcauses
'religiousanxieties',a 'sense of dislocation',a
fear of sexualinversionand
a 'preoccupationwith
order and disorder', to
quote some of the expla-
nations that Davisoffers -
and to neglect local and particular auses.
As a
result,moral panics can
appearstrangely
divorced rom reality.An article
in the
Independentn May 1994 assumes that
moral panics occur
spon-
taneouslyand have no connection with real
events:
We are in the grip of a
moralpanic aboutcrime on television.Quite
when
it
started,or who was
responsible,nobody can be sure, but a classic
panic
it
most definitely is. Like some medieval
plague, it springs from
every
sewer n a spontaneous
overflow, eaches ever
pitch, then mercifully ub-
sides . . . The essentialelements of the moralpanic are now all in place.
No obvious beginning,
no single individualresponsible ...
And, of
course, most important,no evidence at all to
support the case.
In interpreting Cohen,
Davis makes the revealing assumption
that Folk
Devilsand MoralPanics s
not about real
deviance, or about real activities
subsequentlyclassifiedas deviant, but about
'the manufactureof
the chi-
maera
of the existence of
those activities'; nd this provides he
theoretical
basis for his controversial
rgument that the
Rantersnever really existed.
While this is a misreadingof Cohen's work,certain passages n the book,
such as the remark hat the
situation could take
on a mythical,chimerical
meaning' (1980: 171),
could easily end
themselves o such a misreading.
Cohen has recognized
the problem and acknowledges, n the
preface to
the 1980 edition of Folk
Devilsand MoralPanics,
hat the book is guiltyof 'a
certain
timelessness,an unveiling of a set of
consequences nsulatedfrom
historyand politics'.Some
historianshave also
begun to growuneasyabout
the
indiscriminateuse of the term:John
Springhall, or example,
hesitates
to
describe the campaignagainst 'horror
comics' in the 1950s as a
'moral
panic', on the grounds that 'assigningeach successive crisis o the inclu-
sive
categoryof moralpanic risksdisregarding
particular eaturesof his-
torical
context, new technology, or social
anxiety' (Springhall
1994).
Others, however,continue to present moral
panic as historically
imeless.
The most extreme
statement of this view can
be found in the preface to
Goode and Ben-Yehuda's
ook, in which the
'fearsand concerns' under-
lying
moralpanics are said to be 'partand parcel
of the humancondition',
an expressionof human
frailty.We are all
subjectto them; all societies are
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ArnoldHunt
34
wrackedby them'. The same determinist iewof humanbehaviour,and dis-
belief in historicalchange, occur frequently n the media. The Independent
(3 December 1992) reported the view of the Education Secretary, ohn
Patten, that Britishsocietywas n a state of moral decline.
Historiansmight take a different perspective,however,and argue that
societyhas not become less orderlyand peaceable, hat there have always
been areaswhere gangs of young thugs have flourished.If they are right,
Mr Patten and Mr Pascallmay simplybe a part of one of society'speri-
odic moral panics over an issue that never reallygoes away.
2. 'ELITE-ENGINEERED'HEORY
The second theory of moral panic is describedby Goode and Ben-Yehuda
as the 'elite-engineeredmodel' and is developed at lerlgth by StuartHall
and others n Policing heCnsis:Mugging,heState, ndLawand Order1978)
The authorsof Policing heCrisis uoted Cohen's definition of moral panic
with approval,commenting that the panic of 1972-3, when the national
press began to use the term 'mugging'with reference to a perceived epi-
demic of violent crime, fitted Cohen's definition 'in almost every detail'.
However, heir model of moralpanicwasdesigned to plug some of the gaps
in Cohen's use of the term: in particular, o explain where moral panics
originatedand whythey occurredwhen they did. Cohen implied that moral
panics originated n the media, in ways hat depended on establishedpat-
terns of crime reporting,on journalists'own perceptionsof a 'good story',
or simply on the absence of any alternativenews; in short, 'the media
created the news and imageswhich lent the cognitivebasis for the panic'.
Hall and his co-authors greedthat the mediawere 'amongthe most power-
ful forces in the shaping of public consciousnessabout topical and contro-
versial ssues'. But they went on to argue that moral panics about law and
order typically riginated n statementsby membersof the police and the
judiciary,which were then amplified by the media. The media does not
'create' the news so much as 'reproduce and sustain' the dominant
interpretationsof it, and can thus be said to function, consciouslyor not,
as an instrumentof state control (Hall et al. 1978:220-2).
The two theories of moral panic differ in other ways.Cohen adopts a
studied neutralit in his discussionof moral panic, and although his own
sympathies can quite easily be inferred, they are never spelt out. He
refrains, oo, from drawing irm conclusionsabout the 'policy mplications'
of his work,merely commentingthat 'differentreaderscan drawdifferent
implications' and that 'sociologistsdo not have the power to stop such
implicationsbeing made or acted upon'. The authorsof Policing the Cr7sis,
on the other hand, incorporate n their definition of a moral panic the
notion of an irrationalor unjustifiedresponse. 'When the officialreaction
to a person, group of persons or series of events s out of all preportion o the
actualthreat offered', and
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'Moral
anic and
moral anguagen the
media
635
when the media
representations
niversally tress
sudden
and dramatic'
increases in numbers
nvolved
or events)and 'novelty',
bove
and beyond
thatwhich a sober,realisticappraisal ould sustain, hen we believeit is
appropriate
o speakof the
beginningsof a maralpanic.
p.
16)
This is a much
more partisan definition
of
moral panic, signalling
an
entirely different
purpose; for whereas
Cohen
is pessimistic about
the
chances of breaking
the cycle of repeated
moral
panics,Hall and
his co-
authors regard their
work
as an 'intervention'
n 'the struggle
to change
the structures
and conditions'
by which moral panics
are
produced (p. x).
By aying
stresson particular
structures nd conditions',
Policing heCnsis
also calls into questionthe timelessnessof moralpanics,their apparently
endlessrecurrence
over the whole course
of history.
t treats he succession
of moral
panics
between the early 1960s
and the late 1970s,
between
the
emergence
of moral
panicsand their
incorporation nto
a general
panic
about
law and order, as an
'exceptional
moment' in a long-term
historical
process.
To use Marxist (more
precisely,
Gramscian)terminology,
that
process is the 'crisis
of hegemony',
the breakdown
of consensus
which
forces the ruling
classto resort
to new techniques
of exercising
controland
repressing
dissent. This marks
another
departurefrom
Cohen's original
theory.Hall andhis co-authors re far stricter n defining the historicalcir-
cumstancesunder
which moral panics
occur,
although they share
with
Cohen
a sense of the inevitability
f moral
panicsonce the
appropriate
on-
ditions
are met.They do not
go so far as to suggest
that the
'mugging'panic
could
not haveoccurredbefore
the 1970s,but
they argue
that 'it makes a
great
deal moresense' than
it would havedone at
an earlier
period,because
only bythe 1970s
were all the
'essentialconditions'
n place. Other eft-wing
commentators
have
also tried to give
the concept of moral
panic greater
historical
specificity,
though with slightly
different emphases.
Kate
Mar-
shall,for example,associatesmoral panicswiththe economic recessionof
the 1980s
and the need to transfer
he
cost of theWelfareState
onto private
families (Marshall
1985).
Goode and Ben-Yehuda's
ccount
of the 'elite-engineered'
model
is that
the ruling classes
deliberately
nd consciously'
create a moral
panicabout
'an issue
that they
recognisenot to be
terriblyharmful to
the society
as a
whole'
in order to
divertattentionfrom
more seriousproblems.
As the
New
Statesman
xplained in December
1993,
moral panics are
'diversions
or
those
in power who prefer
that the
socialand moral community
s not
examinedtoo closely for fear it is found bankrupt'.PolicingheCrisis ctu-
ally takes
a less
conspiratorialview of
this process, pointing
to 'evidence
. . . that in this
period the
ruling classesthemselves
substantially
elieved
the definition of
an emergent
social crisiswhich
they were propagating'
(Hall et al. 1978:
220). But
the conspiratorial eading
alerts us to the
fact
that,
as far as Policing he
Crisis s concerned,
moral panics
are political
phenomena
and are generated,
whether
'deliberatelyand
consciously'
or
not, throughpolitical
and uridical
activity.This
is quite differentfrom
the
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636
Arnold
Hunt
view
of
Folk
Devils
and
Moral
Panics
that
moral
panics
are
the
product
of
'cultural
strain
and
ambiguity'.
As
Cohen
puts
it,
in
reviewing
he
differ-
ences betweenhis theoryof moralpanicand thatof
PolicingtheCrisis,
the
level
of
explanation
'is
shifted
from
social
control
agencies
or
cultures
-
or
vague
allusions
to
the
wider
ociety
to
the
specific
operation
of
the
state'
(Cohen
1980:
xxiii).
This
distinction
between
cultural
and
political
models
of
moral
panic
may
seem
dubious.
The
two
categories,
after
all,
are
not
mutually
xclusive:
for
Cohen,
political
agents
are
incorporated
n
the
notion
of
a
control
culture,
while
for
Hall
and
his
co-authors,
hegemony
is
as
much
a
matter
of
cultural
as
of
political
dominance.
However,
Cohen
also
suggests
that
'casesof masshysteria,delusionandpanics'mightprovideaframeworkor
the
study
of
moral
panics,
mplying
hat
the
moral
panic
was
a
form
of
col-
lective
irrationality
which
must
have
deep
cultural
or
psychological
roots,
and
for
which
a
purely
political
or
ideological
explanation
would
be
in-
adequate.
(Cohen
1980:11)
This
is
the
sort
of
language,
unattached
o
any
historical
period,
that
leads
Hall
et
al.
to
reject
the
concept
of
a
control
culture
as
'too
imprecise',
preferring
nstead
to
set
moral
panics
in
the
context
of
a
specific
moment
in
history
and
'a
specific
type
of
political
regime'
(Hall
et
al.
1978:
195).
3.
'GRASSROOTS'
HEORY
Goode
and
Ben-Yehuda
dentify
a
third
theory
which
stresses
he
extent
of
popular
participation
n
moral
panics
and
which
they
term
the
'grassroots
model'.
According
to
this
theory,
'politicians
and
the
media
cannot
fabri-
cate
concern
where
none
existed
nitially',
and
moral
panics
must
therefore
be
founded
on
genuine
public
concern,
reflected
or
magnified
by
the
media,perhaps,but arisingmore or less spontaneously.This is a 'bottom
up'
rather
than
'top
down'
theory
of
moral
panic;
the
authors
of
Policing
the
Crisis,
by
contrast,
are
sceptical
about
'this
seemingly
pontaneous
public
opinion'
and
argue
that
it
is
'transmitted
nd
constructed
higher
up
in
the
chain
of
communication'
nstead
of
being
generated
from
below
(Hall
et
al.
1978:
137;
Goode
and
Ben-Yehuda
994:
127).
The
'grassroots'
heory
resembles
the
work
of
so-called
'realist
crimi-
nologists'
such
as
TrevorJones,
Brian
Maclean
andJockYoung,
co-authors
of
The
Islington
Crime
Survey
(1986),
who
suggest
that
people's
perceptions
of crime 'are not basedon moralpanic and/or a regurgitationof media
stereotypes,
but
bear
a
close
relationship
to
the
real
facts
about
the
areas
n
which
they
live'.
Realist
criminologists
end
to
be
unhappy
with
the
term
'moral
panic',
identifying
'moral
realism',
rather
than
panic
or
hysteria,
n
people's
attitudes
o
crime.
However,
hey
do
not
simply
reject
the
concept
of
moral
panic.
In
their
view,
moral
panic
and
moral
realism
are
symptoms
of
the
same
problem,
signs
that
crime
really
is
on
the
increase.
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'Moralpanic' and moral anguage in the media
637
The same forceswhich make for the increase n crime fuel a moralpanic
about crime.That is, the real fear about crime s intimately elatedto the
moral hysteriaabout crime. It not only provides a rational kernel for
alarm,but its genesis lies at the same source;and the mass media serve
and exaggeratesuch public fears. (Lea and Young 1993:49, 263)
This leaves the statusof moral panic slightlyambiguous.The line between
'fear' and 'hysteria', alarm'and 'panic', s a fine one: if it is rational o be
alarmedabout crime, it mayalso, perhaps,be rational o panic. One of the
most telling objectionsto Policing the Crzsiswas that it treated the moral
panic as an irrationalor disproportionate esponse to a situation,without
providingany 'criteriaof proportionality' o distinguish t from a rational
response (Waddington1986). The realistcriminologists olve this problem
ratherneatlyby eliminatingthe need for any such distinction.
In shifting the focus of attentionaway rom the utterancesof politicians,
journalists and other professionalsto the attitudes and opinions of the
general public, the 'grassroots'model marksa significantdeparture rom
previoustheories of moral panic. However, t can also be seen as continu-
ing and developing some of the themes of Cohen's original definition. Its
proponents have tended, like Cohen, to treat moral panic as a cultural
phenomenon. StuartA. Scheingold, n
ThePoliticsof Law and Order
1984),
arguesthat moral panics about street crime are rooted in a 'mythof crime
and punishment' hat has little to do with the actual ncidence of crime but
is sustainedby the pervasive culturalpresence' of violence in contempor-
aryAmericansociety.In a discussionof the moral panic in Swedencaused
by a proposal to provide clean syringes o intravenousdrug users, Arthur
Gould suggests that an analysisof 'political, deological and institutional
factors' s incomplete without reference to the 'widersocial structureand
culture' and, in particular, he sense that Swedish national identity was
under threat. Unlike Cohen, Scheingold and Gould treat moral panics as
the product of a diffuse sense of crisis,not obviously n the interestsof any
particulargroup. As with Cohen, however, there is a timelessnessabout
their view of moral panic: they emphasizethe cultural actorswhich make
it inevitable hat similarmoralpanicswill occur again n the future,regard-
less of social or politicaltrends.Scheingoldsuggests hat there are 'cultural
constants' n Americansociety which favour the development of punitive
policies on law and order (Scheingold 1984, Gould 1994).
A tentativegenealogy of moral panic, then, would depict Cohen's orig-
inal theoryas the parentof twoother, mutually pposing theories.One (the
'elite-engineered') theory accepts Cohen's suggestion that moral panics
serve the interestsof particulargroups, but rejectsthe idea that they have
deep-seated cultural causes; the other (the 'grassroots' heory) accepts
Cohen's cultural nterpretation f moralpanicsbut rejectsor severelyqual-
ifies the interest-group xplanation. The work of David Underdown,dis-
cussed brieflyabove, illustrates he developmentof the 'grassroots' heory
particularly learly. In locaiing the moral panic at the level of 'cultural
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638
Arnold
Hunt
conflict'
and
identifying
moral
entrepreneurs
who
promote
it,
Underdown
resembles
Cohen;
yet
he
argues
that
there
was
widespread
popular
partici-
pationin the moralpanic,and considershimselfto be asserting he auton-
omy
of
popular
culture,
as
opposed
to
historians
who
'say
that
...
everything
of
importance
n
seventeenth-century
ngland
happened
from
the
top
down ,
with
the
common
people
always
obediently
following
the
lead
of
their
betters'
(Underdown
1992:
x) .
Like
other
'grassroots'
heorists
-
David
Herman,
for
example,
deploring
the
'sneering,
cynical
tone'
used
by
the
left
to
denigrate
real
cultural
anxieties'
(New
Statesman,
3
May
1994)
-
he
defines
his
own
position
n
opposition
to
the
'elite-engineered'
heory.
'MORAL
ANIC'
N
THE
MEDIA,
98y1995
The
evolving
use
of
'moral
panic'
in
the
media
parallels
ts
use
in
academic
discourse,
hough
with
a
marked
ime-lag.
Folk
Devils
and
Moral
Panics
ame
out
in
1972
and
was
reprinted
n
1980;
by
1984,
references
o
'moral
panic'
were
starting
o
appear
regularly
n
the
broadsheet
newspapers.
Policing
he
Crzsis
ame
out
in
1978
and
was
often
reprinted
hereafter;
ts
effect
on
the
media's
use
of
'moral
panic'
is
not
evident
before
1988.
Lea
and
Young's
What
s
ToBeDoneAboutLawandOrder?ppeared n 1984,and Wadding-
ton's
article
Mugging
as
a
Moral
Panic'
n
1988;
witha
few
exceptions,
our-
nalists
did
not
follow
up
their
critique
of
the
'elite-engineered'
heory
until
1993.
It
may,
seemingly,
ake
up
to
ten
years
or
new
developments
n
soci-
ology
and
criminology
o
filter
through
to
the
media.
There
are,
of
course,
exceptions
to
this
chronology.
One
of
the
earliest
newspaper
rticles
o
use
the
term,
on
18June
1985,
proved
to
be
remark-
ably
prescient
n
anticipating
hings
to
come.
Moral
panic,
Digby
Anderson
explained
to
the
readers
of
The
Times,
was
'1960s
sociologese
to
refer
to
public
concernssociologistswouldpreferto brushunderthe carpet'.There
was
no
social
scientific
evidence
of
a
moral
panic'
about
AIDS,
but
in
the
light
of
attempts
o
'relativize
moral
standards'
and
'extend
the
incidence
of
homosexual
practice',
perhaps
there
ought
to
be:
Should
not
those
within
Judaism,
the
Christian
churches,
Islam
and
among
half-churched
but
traditionally
nclined
parents,
and
the
many
homosexuals
who
do
not
approve
of
homosexual
proselytization,
tart
o
be
concerned?
In
short,
what
we
need
is
a
little
more
moral
panic.
Having
egun
by
dismissing
he idea of moralpanic,Andersonended up
by
endorsing
it.
Over
the
next
ten
years,
the
use
of
'moral
panic'
in
the
national
press
would
follow
the
same
trajectory.
In
the
course
of
the
1980s
the
term
was
applied
to
a
wide
variety
of
issues,
including
AIDS,
child
abuse,
crowd
violence
at
football
matches,
drug
addiction,
uvenile
crime
and
surrogate
mothers.
Moral
panic
was
attriS
uted
ither
to
the
media
alone
('a
Fleet
Street
moral
panic')
or
to a
mood
of
public
concern
created
by
the
media
('The
public's
moral
panic
is
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'Moralpanic' and moral anguage in the media
639
accompanied by a good deal of misinformation').The term was almost
alwaysused pejoratively. Moralfervour often breeds and benefits from
moral panic', declaredone writer n the Guardian n 12July 1985. 'In con-
ditions of such alarm, nformed and sustaineddebate seems to go by the
board.' Most of the references to 'moralpanic' in the mid-1980soccurred
in the Guardian r in left-wingweekliessuch as the NewStatesmannd New
Society, ut by the end of the decade the term had made its way nto other
broadsheetnewspapers nd wasbeginning to be treatedas a commonplace.
At first, quotationsfrom academicswere used to establishthe credentials
of an unfamiliarterm: 'Whatwe are witnessing s a moral panic, says
MichaelFreeman,Professorof EnglishLawat UniversityCollege, London'
(Guardian 5January1985) Within a few years, ournalists elt sufficiently
familiarwith the term to refer casually o 'the inevitablemedia moralpanic'
(IndependentOctober 1988) or 'the media-saturatedpace marked moral
panic ( TheTimes 2 February1992)
The interpretationof moral panic underlyingmost of these newspaper
articles is neatly summed up in an extract from the Daily Telegraph20
March1991):
Dr Thompson does not deny the existence of occult crime . . . 'I'm not
saying hat this sort of abuse could never happen,' he says. Butso far this
bears all the signs of a classicmoral panic - a scare promoted by a par-
ticulargroup to achieve a particular nd.'
The influence of the 'interest-group'heory can also be detected in articles
which suggest,by means of historicalparallels, hat moralpanicsare eternal
or cyclical n nature. A Guardian rticle on 30 May 1985 recounted 'the
extraordinarystory of a fourteenth century moral panic that swept
Europe' at the time of the BlackDeath, and an articleby Roy Porter,pub-
lished in NewSocietyn December 1986, drew similarparallelsbetween the
present-daymoral panic about AIDS and the panic about cholera in the
nineteenth century,or plague in the sixteenth century,noting that scape-
goats (Cohen's 'folk devils')were found for each epidemic.Viewingmoral
panics in historicalperspective, here was a tendency to attribute hem to
culturalrather han social or economic causes.A book review n the Sunday
Times n June 1992 declared that 'as the last years of centuries seem his-
toricallyprone to moral panics, it should not surpriseus that the Aids epi-
demic has, with wearisome predictability,been interpreted as an act of
God'. Moralpanic, agreed The
Tix?zesin
a leading article (24 February 993),
was a pervasiveelement in 'contemporaryWestern culture' and a 'pre-
dictablefixture in fin de siecle life'.
By the late 1980s,however,other theoriesof moralpanic had entered the
media. The term was ncreasingly elt to belong to left-wingpolemic rather
than detached historicalanalysis,and there was consequentlya reluctance
to use it uncritically. nterestingly, his originated in the left-wingmedia.
The Guardian ommented on 17 June 1988 that recent cases of football
hooliganism had provoked 'predictable responses. On the demagogic
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640
ArnoldHunt
right, there are calls for such louts to be locked up for a long time . . . On
the jargon-laden eft it's all being blamed on moral panic, Mrs Thatcher
and social deprivation'.On 28 August1989 the
Guardian
attacked he 'con-
ventionalwisdom', 'widelyaccepted in Home Office and policing circles',
'that risk of crime is much lower than the public suspect . . . and that the
mass media have contributed to irrational fears, particularlyamongst
women and the elderly'.Again, this waspresented as politicallybipartisan:
'whilst he Right talksof irrationalear ,much of the Left talksof moral
panic .All of this is palpablyuntrue for inner city areasand for the more
vulnerablemembers of our society'.These two articlesare exceptional in
being up to date with the work of realist criminologists; ther newspaper
articlesof about the same date are awareof the 'elite-engineered' heory
but accept t uncritically.An article n the Sunday Timesattacked those who
wish to whip up moralpanics and cut backon socialspending' (3 Decem-
ber 1989) and an article n the Independenteporteda claim that 'the police
and local authorities'had 'whippedup hysteria n relation to acid house
and are using their powersaccordingly . . It's moral panic. They see it as
somethingwickedand they want to stop it' (24July 1990).
The sudden popularity f 'moralpanic' in 1993was argelydue to a single
news story:the killing of the toddlerJames Bulger in February1993, and
the arrestof twoother boyswho were subsequently onvictedof his murder.
As The Timessummed it up eight months later:
When a toddler was abducted and murderedearlier this year, with sus-
picion falling on two other boys,the killing nspireda moralpanic across
Britain. John Major announced a 'crusade against crime', and the
numberswho told MORI heywereworriedabout awand order doubled
within a month.
As a result of the Bulger murder, the Home Secretary,Kenneth Clarke,
announced plans for more custodial sentences for young offenders. A
statement by a group of charities, published in The Timesand widely
reported in other newspapers,warned that 'in the atmosphereof moral
panic , here is a danger that all the lessons learned in recent yearsabout
the clear link between uvenile custodyand high re-offendingrateswill be
lost' (The Times3 March 1995). The Times tself commented in a leading
article on the same day that 'Britain s in the grip of one of those moral
panics that afflictseverynation periodically,usuallyduringrecessions'and
thatyoung people were being cast as scapegoats.This use of 'moralpanic',
based on
Folk Devils and Moral Panics,
was not at all unusual. Simul-
taneously,however, he popularityof the termwas eading some writers o
examine it more critically.
On the weekend afterJames Bulger'smurder, the Sunday Timestook a
conventionallypejorative iewof moral panic ('Weare in the midstof what
sociologistscall a moralpanic ,a contagiousburstof popularoutragethat
risks osing sight of reality'),while a leading article n the relatively iberal
Independent n Sunday
mounted a sustainedcritiqueof the term:
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'Moralpanic' and
moral anguage
in the media
641
Moralpanic is
one of those deflating
phrases
used by sociologists
and
otherallegedly
mpartial
tudentsof human behaviour
o condescend
to
excitements among the general populace. The phrase usuallycomes
equipped
withstatisticswhich
demonstrate hat
alcohol
consumptionwas
in fact much larger
in the 1840s,
or that football
hooliganism actually
began
in 1898.
. . The doctoralmessage
s calming:do not
worry,we
have
been
here before,your concerns
are
an ersatzcompound
manufactured
by the
media, a few odd
bishops,
strident voices from
the left and the
right,
moralistsand nostalgists
of all
kinds. (21 February
1993)
Beforethe Bulger
case, ournalists n
the right-wing
ress had occasionally
experimented
with
differenttheories
of moralpanic.An article
n the
Daily
Telegraphn 3July 1987 had attempteda reworkingof the 'interest-group'
theory,
arguing
that the moralpanic
about child
abuse wascaused 'not
by
the popular
press'
but by professional
ocialworkersand their
political
sut
porters,
people
like the LabourMP,
MissClareShort'.On
18 October
1992
the Sunday
Times ad made
an ingenious
attempt o commandeer
he 'elite-
engineered' theory
n the cause
of right-wing opulism,
with
the suggestion
that
the anti-smoking
movement . . . is
only the latest
in a long line of
coer-
cive crusadesand moralpanics, by means of which upper and middle
class elites seek
to impose their
lifestyles and
preferences upon
the
workingclasses.
Theseare plausible
arguments,playing
on fears
of left-wingor middle-class
elitism
and skilfullydrawing
on the pejorative
connotations
of 'moral
panic', but as interpretations
of moralpanic, they
did not catch on.
The
Independent
n Sundayhelped
to popularize
a new theory
of moral
panic,
similarly
nti-elitist, ut now
seeking to endorse
moral panic,
ustifying t as
rationaland repudiating
he
pejorativeuse of the
term.
This version of the 'grassroots' heory rapidlygained ground in the
broadsheet
papers.
On 28 February1993,
only
a week afterthe Independent
on Sunday's examination
of moral panic, the
SundayTimes
ollowedsuit
with an
articlebyGreg Hadfield
which placed Stuart
Hall
in a sinisterpan-
theon of 'sociologists,
criminologists,
academics
and clerics'
whom 'critics
blame
for the nation'swoes':
'In 1978,
in PolicingheCrisis,
e argued that
concern
about mugging was
a moral
panic ,based on
exaggerated evi-
dence.' 'Bringback
the voice
of authority',pleaded
Melanie
Phillips n the
Guardian
n 5
March1993:
Onlythe ivory-towermiddle classeswith a bad dose of Utopianmyopia
could
delude themselves
hatjuvenile
crimeisn't an immensely
serious
problem
. . .
Realitysuggeststhat
juvenile offending is
up, not
down.
Community
anxiety is understandable.
The term 'moral
panic' is mis-
placed.
A successionof
similar articles
appearedin both
left-wingand right-wing
papers
throughout
1993, attacking
'progressive criminologists'
for
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642
Arnold
Hunt
'dismissing
the
crime
epidemic
and
crisis
in
values
as
moral
panic '
(Obsgrver
9
September
1993)
or
complaining
that
alarm
about
single-
parent
families
'has
been
labelled
in
progressivecirclesas mere moralpanic (DailyTelegraph
November
1993).
Some
attempts
were
made
to
recapture
the
term,
often
by
readers
responding,
hrough
the
letters
pages,
to
applications
of
'moral
panic'
that
they
disagreed
with.
Thus
the
Independent
n
Sunday's
ditorial
was
ollowed,
a
week
later,
by
a
reader's
etter
castigating
t
for
'a
misunderstanding
f
the
valuable
concept
of
moral
panic '
and
reiterating
Cohen's
theory
of
folk
devils:
popular
concerns'
(in
this
case,
'widespread
oncern
about
the
state
of
British
society
arising
rom
the
Bulger
case')
was
taken
up
by
'poli-
ticians
and
the
media',
turned
into
a
moral
panic and directed against'scapegoats'.Forcedonto
the
defensive,
he
writer
was
prepared
o
concede
that
moral
panics
were
an
exaggerated
version
of
'popular
concerns'
about
real
social
problems.
ProfessorJock
Young
put
forward
a
similar
argument
in
a
letter
to
the
Guardian
n
8
June
1994,
in
which
he
attempted,
not
altogether
uccessfully,
o
gloss
over
the
ambiguities
of
'moral
panic'.
'Soci-
ologists
n
Britain
coined
the
term',
he
suggested,
to
refer
to
cases
where
public
reaction
was
completely
disproporiionate
o
the
actual
problem
aced
.
.
.
At
no
point
was
t
suggested
hat
such
a
term
should
be
usedto blankout anddenigrategenuinefearsandconcernsaboutcrime.
These
attempts
o
contest
and
to
regulate
the
definition
of
moral
panic
failed
o
dispel
the
ambiguity
of
the
term.
It
was
an
ambiguity
which
could
sometimes
ome
in
useful.
It
enabled
the
film
censorJames
Ferman,
nter-
viewed
n
the
Independent
13
August
1993),
to
offer
a
sop
to
both
liberal
and
onservative
eaders:
We
seem
to
go
through
a
wave
of
moral
panics
in
Britain,
but
there's
always
omething
at
the
heart
of
it.'
It
helped
The
Times
leading
article,
23
May
1994)
to
sell
the
idea
of
a
'new
politics
of
social
esponsibility'
o
readers
who
might
be
suspiciousof moralcoercion:'Thought is easyfor a nation
to
slip
into
moral
panic
unnecessarily,
he
concern
which
is
felt
by
ordinary
people
about
such
issues
can
no
longer
be
gnored
by
those
who
represent
them'.
This
ambivalence
about
'moral
panic'
llustrates
he
writer's
doubts
about
the
popular
credibility
of
moral
language
a
problem
neatly
encapsulated
n
William
Oddie's
description
of
he
'back
to
basics'
campaign
as
'a
kind
of
controlled
moral
panic'
(
The
Times
0
March
1994).
At
other
times,
of
course,
the
ambiguity
was
acci-
dental
nd
simply
ed
to
confusion,
as
different
meanings
of
'moral
panic'
came
nto
collision.
Writing
n
the
London
Review
f
Books
n 1993,MarinaWarnereferred o incestas 'one of
the
dominant
focuses
of
moral
panic';
she
vidently
ntended
to
use
the
term
in
a
neutral,
descriptive
ense,
but
one
eader
interpreted
it
differently,
assuming
that
'moral
panic'
was
a
pejorative
erm,
and
accusing
Warner
of
condoning
incest
(LRB
7
October
and
November
1993).
In
examining
the
recent
and
current
use
of
the
term,
several
features
stand
ut.
The
first
is
the
assumption
that
moral
panic
is
a
cultural
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'Moralpanic' and moral anguage n the media 643
phenomenon. As The Timesput it, in a leading article on 8 August
1994:
Few now feel comfortablewith the notion of a zeitgeist or spirit of the
age. Common sense dictates, however, that moments in history are
defined in part by moods, attitudesand propensities or action. Future
historiansof Britainwill ook backon the twoyearsafterthe 1992general
election as a period of moralpanic, culturaluncertainty nd politicaldis-
orientation.They mayalso recordthat a subtleshift n the nationalmood
took place during 1994.
Even those who used the term pejoratively ended to accept the idea of a
'national mood', and to use phrases like 'moral panic grips the nation'
(Guardian3 June 1994) or 'the latest moral panic to sweep Britain'
( Guardian 3June 1994) EvenLivingMarxismonceded in November1994
that moral panic affected 'not only the media and a small circle of reac-
tionaries', and 'not only those in authority',but 'society as a whole'. A
second, and related,aspectof the term'srecent use is the increasingpreva-
lence of the 'grassroots' theory. The American conservative Charles
Murray,writing n the SundayTimes n 22 May1994 in the first of a much-
publicizedseries of articleson the 'Britishunderclass',argued that Britain
needed to return to the traditionalvalues of marriageand the two-parent
family n order to ensure social stability, nd claimed to detect a 'changed
public mood' on the current social crisis. The academic associationsof
'moral panic' were now used to discreditrather than to support the term.
'Most ntellectualsare still holding out: all but a handful of the academics
I met continued to dismissproblemsof risingcrime and single parenthood
as a moralpanic .But concern was evident everywhere lse'.
Murraywas correct to suggest that 'moral panic' was on the retreat.
Writerswho used the term in a manner consistentwith the 'interest-group'
or 'elitesngineered' theories did so more cautiously,even apologetically.
'Though the concept of the moralpanic has been somewhatdiscreditedof
late (or at least found wanting), it still has its uses', ventureda reviewer n
the Guardian n 28 January1995. The growingrecognition of the 'grass-
roots' theory ed to its appearance n the DailyMailon 11 March1995,one
of the first occasions on which the term 'moral panic' had appeared n a
tabloid newspaper.Following Murray, he subject under discussion was,
once again, the threat to the two-parent amily.
Perhaps he time has come when we should not be ashamedof standing
up for old-fashionedvalues, merely because of taunts that we are suc-
cumbing to a 'moralpanic'. We need, for the sake of all our children, to
foster a sense of communitywhich depends on these traditionalvalues.
The term 'moral panic' is rejected; but the phenomenon, redefined as
'standing up for old-fashionedvalues', is presented more positively han
ever before. Several ournalistshad already tartedto use 'moral panic' as
a term of approval:Suzanne Moore wrote that the problem of feckless
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644
ArnoldHunt
fathers, not single mothers, was 'whatwe should have our moral panics
about' ( Guardian7 May1994);Nick Hornbywrotethat on seeing a contro-
versialworkof art inspiredby the Bulgermurder I found that I could par-
ticipate much more directly n the moral panic' (Indtpendentn Sunday
June 1994).
CONCLUSION: HEMEDIAANDMORAL ANGUAGE
Supportersof 'moralpanic' have argued that the term is everybit as rele-
vant to the media in the l990s as it was to the relativelyunsophisticated
reporting of the Mods and Rockers n 1964 and 1965. Moral panics have
evolvedand developed,admittedly,but the species is in no dangerof dying
out. Now that the term has established tself in the media, professional he-
oristsof moralpanic no longer have sole control over the way t is used;but
its popularity cross he politicalspectrumand amongjournalists s well as
academicsonly goes to show, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda emark, hat the
concept is generallyagreed to be valid. The media has become more self-
conscious about participating n moral panics,and it could be argued that
recent moralpanicshavebeen more self-referential, ven theatrical n char-
acter, as well as being more open to criticism rom within the media; but
the result, n the wordsof AngelaMcRobbie, s that 'the model of the moral
panic is urgently n need of updating and revisingpreciselybecause of its
success'.McRobbie's xaminationof moral panic is a good example of the
'evolution, not extinction' school of thought. She suggeststhat we live in
an era of postmodernmoral panics, when the moral panic can no longer
proceed unchallenged and cannot, therefore, be used to justify new
measuresof social control. But she seesJamesBulger'smurderas the cata-
lystfor a moral panic of a thoroughlyold-fashionedkind, 'wherea horrific
event givesrise to a spiralof anxietiesand leads to punitivemeasuresbeing
taken'.For all its sophistication,postmodern ournalism akesus full circle,
back to a theory of moral panics and folk devils hardly changed from
Cohen's originalmodel (McRobbie1994: 198-219).
But there is a need for a much more searchingcritiqueof the concept.
Recent writing on moral panic incorporatesseveral highly questionable
assumptions: irst,that moral panicsare timeless,common to 'all societies'
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda1994: x) and 'subject to eternal recurrence'
(Downesand Rock 1988:96); secondly, hat they are embedded in the 'col-
lective conscience' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 994:202) as partof the 'land-
scape of the public imagination' (McRobbie1994: 203). The presence of
these assumptions s not particularly urprising,as recent histories of the
sociology of deviance have shown that the theory of moral panic has
descended from functionalismand ultimatelyfrom Durkheim (Downes
and Rock 1988: 96; Summer 1994: 263). But while they can be found in
Cohen's original model of moral panic, it is in the 'grassroots' heory of
moral panic developed by the realistcriminologists, nd even more in the
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'Moralpanic' and moral anguage in the media
645
simplified version of that theory that took root in the media, that they
become most prominent and most damaging. Colin Sumner describes
Cohen's model as a blend of Marxand Durkheim,
suggesting that we could rely on Durkheim for insights into general
societal changes/evolution and on Marx for the internal, detailed,
dynamicsof that change;an approach hatwasnot uncommon in British
sociology n the 1960s. (Sumner 1994:263)
In the 'grassroots' heory, Marx drops out of the picture, and one is left
with a theory of moral panic that is disengagedfrom the immediatepoliti-
cal circumstances n which a panic occurs.There is a worrying ack of his-
torical specificity (as in Goode and Ben-Yehuda's eclectic approach'
applied to phenomena as diverse as the Renaissancewitch-craze nd the
American drug-panicof the 1980s) and a facile optimism (compare, for
example, McRobbie's sympathetic depiction of pressure groups with
Cohen's much harsher treatment of moral entrepreneursand Jenkins's
highly criticalaccount of the role of the NSPCCand other 'claims-makers'
in the panic over child abuse).
A further problem is that no theory of moral panic has yet provided a
satisfactory xplanationof the relationshipbetween the media and public
opinion. McRobbiecriticizes existing theories for assuming 'a clear dis-
tinction between the world of the media and the world of social reality', n
other words,betweenwhat 'really'happens and what the paperssay.It is a
valid criticism,as we shall see in a moment; but one could argue ust the
reverse: hat the problem with 'moral panic' is that it fails to distinguish
betweenthe media and socialreality,betweenwhatthe paperssayand what
the public thinks. Keith Tester has criticizedthe assumption hat 'simply
because there was a moral panic in the media there must also have been a
moral panic among the viewers and readers' (Tester 1994: 85). Colin
Sumner puts it more bluntly: 'Was there actually a moral panic about
mugging?'Presscuttings,as he points out, are an unreliableguide to public
opinion, and 'it is quite conceivable that the public statementsmade by
journalists,policemen, and politiciansdid not have much impact on the
public at large'. (Sumner1981:282-3) The seeds of this problemweresown
in FolkDevilsandMoralPanics,where there is said to be 'littledoubt that the
mainstreamof reaction expressed in the mass media - putativedeviance,
punitiveness, the creation of new folk devils - entered into the public
imagery', despite Cohen's finding that some sections of the public per-
ceived the media as having over-reacted Cohen 1980: 70). Once again,
however, the problem is most acute in the 'grassroots' heory of moral
panic, with its assumption hat the media reflects, though in a distorting
mirror, 'real' public fears about crime, and in the thoroughlyself-serving
versionsof this theory that have appeared n the media itself.
Testerdoubtsthe socialrealityof moralpanicbecausehe doubtswhether
the media is capableof communicating ssuesof moralsignificance. Media
significancemeans moral insignificance.' n other words,the media is less
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646 ArnoldHunt
likelyto createmoralpanics than 'moralboredom and dullness'.This is an
extreme statement of the increasinglycommon view that we are experi-
encing a moralcrisiswhich is, in essence, a crisisof moral anguage.Among
moralphilosophers,AlasdairMacIntyre as arguedthatmoral anguagehas
become devaluedor dislocated,and MaryMaxwellhas identified a 'moral
inertia' resulting, in part, from 'the unavailability f words needed to
express certain concepts . . . [or] to portray he relationshipof responsi-
bility and blame in particular ituations'.(MacIntyre 981, Maxwell1991)
This sense of moral crisishelps to explain the sudden popularityof 'moral
panic' in the media. 'Moralpanic' was not only a way of diagnosing the
crisis; t also appeared o providea moralvocabulary o meet it. Interviewed
in the Guardian n 22 February1995, the right-wingournalist Matthew
D'Anconaexplained that Britainhad
experienced a sort of moral panic between the case ofJamie Bulger and
the death ofJohn Smith,which was seeminglyalleviatedby the arrival f
Tony Blair.You see, Blairhas a linguisticprojectwhich is to constructa
language that his partycan win with . . . by appropriating ome thinking
from conservative nd liberal traditions.
The remedy or moralpanic, according o this argument,was the language
of citizenship, community and 'civic responsibility',of a 'moral order'
stressing duties rather than rights, 'a coherent vocabulary',as The Times
leader-writer alled it on 23 May1994, 'withwhich to develop these emerg-
ing ideas' of moral renewal.As part of this 'linguisticproject', the term
'moralpanic' itself had to be redefined as a form of civicconsciousness,an
expression of public anxiety rather than a conspiracyof elites or interest-
groups.
Cohen's original set of synonyms 'moral panic . . . moral crusadesor
moral ndignation . . moral campaigns' made it clear that a moral panic
was a temporaryburstof moral excitement,a diversion rom seriousmoral
discussion.Poticing he Crzsisimilarlycontrastedmoral panic with 'sober,
realistic appraisal';and journalists n this tradition have done the same,
stressing he need to 'separate he wheat of real moral concern from the
chaff of moral panic' (Michael Ignatieff in the Guardian, 2 May 1981).
McRobbie's riticismof the distinctionbetween moral panic and the 'real'
world is extremely elling here, and in this respect the 'grassroots' heory
does mark a significantadvance on its predecessors, n its integration of
moral panicswith the continuousprocessof moral discourseand practice.
Whatwe are dealing with, as Simon Watneyobserves, s not a stringof 'dis-
continuous and discrete moralpanics ,but rather the mobility of idew
logical confrontation across the entire field of public representation'
(Watney1987: 42). But there are obvious difficulties n transplanting he
language of 'moral panic' into this radicallydifferent context, as, for
example,when the Archbishopof Canterbury,n his sermon on EasterDay
1993, equates moral panic with the instinctive human response to evil.
Morality, t seems, naturally akes the form of panic:
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'Morat anic ' and
morat anguage n the
media
647
There is a battle in the world,and
we all know t, between
good and evil.
It is within each
one of us and it is
in each society . . Evil: t fills us with
horror and a kind of moral panic.
It is hard to see how
this form of moral
anguagecould incorporatenotions
of moral reasoning or decision-making.
t makes morality
appear danger-
ouslyvolatile,as in PaulJohnson'sprediction
hatpopular
discontentwould
'reach a criticalmass and detonate
a moral explosion' (SundayTimes2
January1994), and
the result is an attitude
of moral helplessness.
Manyof the
metaphorsused to describe
moral behaviourreflect a pre-
occupation with
moral aggression,as if to echo Goode and
Ben-Yehuda's
observation that
the concepts of moral panic and moral
crusade have
tended to overlap
( 1994: 19) Susie Orbach's 'new
moral consensus'
requires nothing
less than 'a secular moral crusade' (Gqbardian
5 April
1995);Will Hutton's
'moraleconomy' involves a call to arsns
n a world n
which time is runningshort' (Hutton
1996:26). The concern
with shared
moralvalues s laudable,
but by conflatingmoralitywithpanic,
these writers
(both, ironically,
on the political eft) have committed hemselves
o repro-
ducing moral panics
uncritically. f, in Cohen'swords, 'more
moral panics
will be generated', it will be because
of a moral language
that admits no
other possibility.
(Date accepted:June
1996)
ArnoldHunt
Trinilt College
CamEdge
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