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Humanitarian Emergency Response Review

28 March 2011

Chaired by Lord (Paddy) Ashdown

ForewordtotheHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview

“The water started to rise, and it did not stop…the water was already so high and strong that I could not hold on to one of my children and the water swept her away.

Luckily someone was there to grab her.”

Gonaïves,OgèLéandre,Haiti2008

ThepeopleoftheUnitedKingdomknowwhywerespond,individuallyandasasociety,tohumanitarianemergenciesaroundtheworld.Theyunderstandthatwhenweareconfrontedbytheimageofachildtrappedintherubbleofanearthquake,orofafamilyclingingtotheroofofafloodedhome,wedon’tsomuchcommittohelp,asfeelcommittedtodoso;committedbyoursharedhumanity.

Itisbecausetheimpulsetorelievesufferingisrootedinmoralitythat our interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of us.

Whatiscrucialisthatwhenwedecidetoact,wedosoeffectively.Thefactthat,acrossthecountry,householdbudgetsareunderparticularstrainatthemoment,onlyunderlinesthepoint.Peoplewanttoknowthateverypoundtheygivewillbeapoundspentsavinglivesandlivelihoods.

InlookingatthewaytheUKgovernmentrespondstohumanitarianemergencies,thisReviewhasidentifiedmuchinwhichtheBritishpeoplecantakepride.TheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment,asapolicymaker,afunderandadelivererofaid,hasbeenwidelypraisedforitsleadingrolewithintheinternationalhumanitariancommunity.

Butbeinggoodisnotgoingtobegoodenoughgiventhechallengesahead.Thescale,frequencyandseverityofrapidonsethumanitariandisasterswillcontinuetogrowinthecomingyears,andatanacceleratingpace.Expertspredictthatclimaterelateddisasterscouldaffect375millionpeopleeveryyearby2015,upfrom263millionin2010.

Thereasonsforthisaremany.Rapidpopulationgrowth,especiallyindisasterproneareas,isakeyfactor,especiallywhencombinedwithcontinuedmassurbanisation,muchofitunplannedandunsafe.Sotooarethechangesalreadyunderwayinsealevels,andinglobalrainfallandstormpatterns–changesthatwillcontributetosignificantadditionalpressureforfoodandwaterintheyearsahead.

Wearecaughtinaracebetweenthegrowingsizeofthehumanitarianchallenge,andourabilitytocope;betweenhumanityandcatastrophe.And,atpresent,thisisnotaracewearewinning.

Somerecentlyaffectedcountries,likeChinaandChilehavedemonstratedremarkableresilienceinthefaceofnaturaldisasters.EvenJapan,wherethetriplecatastrophehasledtotremendoussuffering,thingsmighthavebeenfarworsewithoutpreparation.Butothers,likeHaitiorPakistan,haveneededlargescaleoutsidehelpandwillcontinuetodoso.

Theabilityoftheinternationalhumanitariancommunitytoprovidethishelpisthreatenedbyanumberofproblems,somenew,somefamiliar.

HumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview

Thefirstistheglobaleconomiccrisis,whichcouldmakethealreadyslowergrowingcountriesoftheWestlessableorwillingtoprovideresourcesfordisasterrelief.Thisgapcouldbefilledbythefastergrowing‘emerging’worldeconomies,butthisisfarfromguaranteed.Thesecountriescurrentlycontributefarlesstodisasterrelief,andinanycasearelikelytoremainpreoccupiedwiththerelativelyhighlevelsofpovertywithintheirownborders.

Thesecondistherisingsecuritythreatfacedbyhumanitarianworkersontheground,andtheincreasingdifficultiestheyfaceinaccessingaffectedpopulations.Thetaskofprovidinghumanitarianassistanceimpartiallyandonthebasisofneedishugelycomplicatedbyconflict.Theneed,onoccasion,toworkalongsideorwithhostile–evenproscribed–groupsalreadypresentshumanitarianworkerswithanumberofmoralandpracticalproblems.Thesetooarelikelytogrowinnumberandcomplexity.

Regrettably,theleadership,managementandcoordinationoftheinternationalcommunity’seffortshavenotriseneventothechallengeswecurrentlyface.Unlessweradicallyimprovethequalityoftheleadershipoftheinternationaleffortinhumanitariancrises,wewillnotsucceedindealingwithwhatisahead.

Forallthesereasons,wehaveconcludedthatmerelyimprovinguponwhatwehavedoneinthepast–enhancingthestatusquo–willnotbesufficient.Wemustdevisenewwaystomeetthenewchallenges.

Thereareseventhreadstothisnewapproach.Theseformthestructureofthisdocument.

First,weneedtodevelopamoreanticipatoryapproach,usingsciencetohelpusbothpredict,andprepareforfuturedisastersandconflict.

Second,weneedtoplacethecreationofresilienceattheheartofourapproachbothtolonger-termdevelopmentandtoemergencyresponse.ThiswillrequireDFIDtomakehumanitarianresponseapartofitscoredevelopmentwork,engagingmorecloselywithlocalpeopleandinstitutionssoastostrengthenlocalcapacity.

Third,weneedsubstantiallytoimprovethestrategic,politicalandoperationalleadershipoftheinternationalhumanitariansystem.

Fourth,weneedtoinnovatetobecomemoreefficientandeffective.

Fifth,weneedtoincreasetransparencyandaccountabilitytowardsbothdonorandhostcountrypopulations.Farfrombeingburdensome,thisisinfactapreconditionfortheimprovementswewanttoseeintermsofvalueformoneyandimpact.

Sixth,weneedtocreatenewhumanitarianpartnershipstoallowDFIDbettertoinfluenceandworkwithinanincreasinglycomplexhumanitariansystem.Infuture,theeffectivenessofDFIDwilldependmoreonwhatitcandowithothers,thanonwhatitcandoalone.DFIDwillneedtoworkmorecloselywiththeemergingworldpowersandwiththeprivatesector,aswellaswiththemilitary.Inaddition,itwillneedtonurtureitsexistingpartnershipswiththeEU,theUS,otherdonors,theRedCrossandtheinternationalNGOs.

Finally,asemergenciesbecomebiggerandmorecomplex,soweneedtodefendandstrengthenthehumanitarian space.Thisreferstotheneedforhumanitarianworkerstobegrantedaccessandprotectionastheyseektoprovidehumanitarianassistanceinconflictaffectedareas.Thisinturnwillrequireustoreassertthecorehumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,impartialityandneutrality;thepromisetoassistpeopleonthebasisofneed,regardlessoftheirgender,religion,ethnicityorpoliticalallegiance.

AsDFIDseekstomeetthesechallenges,itwillneed,ineverythingitdoes,tobecomeevenmoreinnovative,evenmoreofalearningorganisationthatisalwaysopenandwelcomingtonewideas.

ForewordtotheHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview

IhavebeenprivilegedtochairthisindependentreviewandamgratefultoSecretaryofStateAndrewMitchell,notonlyforaskingmetodothis,butforenablingmetoworkwithaSeniorAdvisoryBoardwhosetalent,experienceandwisdomhascontributedsomuchtothiswork;withagiftedandcommittedteamofDFIDofficialswhohavesupportedusoutstandingly;andwithmyfriendoffortyyears,RossMountain,who,astheReview’sDirector,hasdrivenandsteeredusthroughoutthesevenmonthsofthereviewprocess.

DFIDenjoysapositionofrespectandleadershipintheinternationalcommunityfortheworkthatithasdoneinthepastandstilldoestoday.ItisourhopethatthisreportwillassistDFIDtomaintainthatpositionofinternationalleadershipinthefaceofthechallengesthatlieahead.

Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, Chair HumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview

Director:RossMountainSeniorAdvisoryBoardMembers:AndyBearpark;BarneyMayhew;CarolynMiller;DavidBryer;ElisabethRasmusson;GilbertGreenall;GordonConway;JodaSilva;MarkBowden;NiciDahrendorf;RandolphKent;SimonMaxwell;SteffenStenberg;SueWardell;YaseminAysan.

ExecutiveSummary

ExecutiveSummaryThereviewcomesatatimewhenthehumanitariancommunityfacesanumberofdauntingchallenges.Disastersareincreasing,asarethenumbersofpeopleaffectedbythem.ThesearesetoutstarklyintheChair’sforewordandinthereportitself.

TheUKisamajorcontributorinhumanitariancrises,andishighlyrespectedforitsrole.SomeofthebestknownhumanitarianorganisationsareUKbased,andtheBritishpublicgivesgenerouslyinappeals.TheUKgovernmenthasbeenthesecondlargestbilateraldonorforhumanitarianreliefinrecentyears,aftertheUS.

ThisreviewhasfoundthattheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID),themainconduitthroughwhichthegovernmentresponds,isalsowellrespectedandwellregarded.Ithasexcellenthumanitarianstaff,andhasplayedapositiveroleinimprovinginternationalresponse.Nevertheless,thereviewhasalsoconcludedthatinlightofthepotentialneedinyearstocome,therewillhavetobeastepchangeinthewayDFIDresponds.Thereviewmakesaseriesofhighlevelpolicy,andsomedowntoearthpractical,recommendationsintendedtobringthischangeabout.

Anticipation

If we are to meet the challenges ahead, we have to be “ahead of the curve” rather than always behind; preparing for disasters, as well as reacting to them.

Itisinthenatureofdisastersandconflictthattheycannotbepreciselypredicted.Butwecanbemoreanticipatoryinourapproach.Hurricaneseasonsarewellknown,asareearthquakefaultlines.Droughtscanbequicklyidentified.Climatescienceisimprovingallthetime.Politicalinstabilityandtheconflictitcanleadtoarereportedearly.Buttheseearlywarningsandpredictableeventsareoftennotactedoninadvance,orquicklyenoughwhentheyarehappening.Partoftheanswerisbetterpresentationofthescienceforbetterdecisionmaking.Partoftheanswerisfordecisionmakerstoactonthisinformation.Devolvingdecisionmakingtothoseclosesttoeventsisanotherpart,includingequippingatriskgovernmentsandcivilsocietywiththemeanstoact.

Resilience

The more resilient a nation, the less lasting damage disasters cause and the quicker they can recover.Resilienceisaboutbeingpreparedfordisasters,andhavinggoodsystemsforrespondingtothem.Itisaboutinvestingininfrastructure,likebuildinghousesandhospitalsthatcanwithstandearthquakes,orschoolsthatdoubleupascycloneshelters.Butitisalsoaboutinvestinginhumancapacity;strengtheningagovernment’scapacitytorespond;creatingdisastermanagementstructuresandplans;givingpeoplesupportbeforedroughtforcesthemtosellalltheirpossessions.Itisabouteconomicplanningthatrecognisesdisasterscanhappenandmakesprovisionforthem.

Wheregovernmentsarecapableofbuildingresilience,thentheUK,throughDFIDshouldhelpthemtodoso.ThisshouldbeacorepartofDFIDdevelopmentworkincountriesthatareatrisk,whichisthemajorityofthe27inwhichDFIDnowworksbilaterally.Investinginresiliencewillsavelivesandmoneyinthefuture.Mozambiqueaskedtheinternationalcommunityfor£2millionin2006tohelpprepareforthefloods,anamountitcouldnotsecure.Afterthefloodstheinternationalsystemspent£60millionresponding.


Leadership

Wheregovernmentsarenotabletorespondtodisastersorinconflictsituationstheyneedastronginternationalsystemtohelpout.Buttoooftentheinternationalsystemfailsthem.CasestudiesforthisreviewinHaitiandPakistanmakethisdepressinglyclear.TheUNistheonlylegitimateauthoritythatcanleadbutisoftentooweakandslowtodoso.

Changeisneededatthestrategicandtheoperationallevels.The UN needs to invest in a leadership cadre and ensure its best people are deployed quickly to the biggest and most complex disasters.Theseleadersneedthesupportoftheirheadquartersandtheagenciesthatdothemajorityofthework.Thesameistrueoftechnicalleadership–the‘clusters’.Theseneeddedicatedleadershipinthebiggestemergenciesandtheyneedtobestrategic,decision-makingbodieswithnationalandlocalgroupsfullyintegrated.Linesofauthorityneedtobeclearer,andwherenecessary,institutionalchangesshouldbemadetomakethemso.Overallthelevelofprofessionalisminthehumanitariansectorneedstoberaisedthroughbetterinvestmentinskillsandtraining.

TheUKhasbeenastrongproponentofchangeintheinternationalsystemtodate,andcanhelppushthisnewagenda.AlreadytheheadsofthemajorUNagencies,ledbytheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinator(ERC),arepushingtheseideas.DFID should encourage and support further reform, and work with others to deliver the change needed to face future challenges.

Innovation

Whenitcomestosavinglivesinanemergencyweneedtobeasefficientandeffectiveaswecan.Oneofthewaysthiscanbeachievedisthroughgreateruseofnewtechnologiesandnewpractices,harnessingthebestofnewscience,newprocessesandthenewideasfromthoseaffected.

Thehumanitariansectorhasbeenslowtochange.Newapproachessuchasgivingpeoplecash(insteadofbuyingthemblanketstheymaynotneed)havetakenyearstogotoscale.InPakistan,satelliteimagerywasavailabletostrategicplanners,butnottothoserespondingontheground.Intractableproblemssuchasthetimelyprovisionofshelterremainachallenge.Whilsttherehavebeenafewsuccesses,suchasinnutritionwherenewfoodproductshaveprovenrevolutionary,thesehavebeendrivenbycommittedindividualsusuallywithoutsupport.

DFIDhasagoodtrackrecordinsupportinginnovation.Ithasprovidedstartupfundingformanynewinitiatives,andcontinuestoseeksolutionstoproblemslikeshelter.Ithelpedsetupanewinnovationsfund,withotherdonorsandNGOs.Thisworkneedstobeaccelerated,andnewinnovationsneedtobetakentoscalefaster.Crucially, there is a need for more investment in research and evidence, as well as new ways of working.

Accountability

Humanitarianaidhelpsmillionsofpeoplearoundtheworldeachyear.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewalonemakesclearthattensofthousandsofchildrenweresavedfromstarvationthroughpromptaction,withDFIDfundingplayingameaningfulpart.Butthereisanaccountabilitydeficit.Thepeoplewhoareonthereceivingendofourassistancearerarelyifeverconsultedonwhattheyneed,orabletochoosewhohelpsthemorhow.This means that gender based issues and the needs of the vulnerable are too often overlooked.Whilstthishaslongbeenrecognisedasanissue,toolittlehasbeendoneaboutit.

ExecutiveSummary

Understandingtheimpactofhumanitarianassistanceisanotherareawheremuchworkisneeded.Thisisconnectedtotheaccountabilityissue;thosewhodeliverhumanitarianaidcanonlyunderstandtheirimpactiftheyunderstandwhatpeopleneed.DFIDcanhelpwithmeasuringimpactandmakingthosewhodeliverhumanitarianaidmoreaccountable. Linking impact measurement and accountability better to the funds agencies receive is a key recommendation of this review.

Humanitarian agencies should also be more accountable to donors, be they governments or the public.Donorshavearighttoknowhow–andhowwell–theirmoneyisspent.

Partnership

TheUKisnotalargedirectproviderofhumanitarianassistance,preferringinsteadtoworkwithandthroughpartners.The review endorses this approach; partnership will become even more important as the world becomes more interconnected, as power shifts towards the newly emerging economies, and as greater challenges require more capacity.

The UK should remain a committed multilateralist in its approach.Workingwithpartnersinothernations,withtheUnitedNationsandwithcivilsocietyorganisationsmakessense.Itcombinesscarceresourcesforthebesteffect.

ManyofthepartnersDFIDworkswithinhumanitarianresponseareworld-classorganisations.Nevertheless,thehumanitariansectorinrecentyearshasbeenseenbymanyasa‘closedshop’withahandfulofagenciesanddonorsdominating.Whilstthiscanbeexplained(partlybytheneedfororganisationstobeseenasneutralandimpartial)thesystemdoesneedtochange.This review concludes that DFID needs to become more of a ‘network enabler’, working with existing partners but also developing new and dynamic partnerships with emerging nations, NGOs, the private sector, faith groups and the diasporas.

Humanitarian space

Inconflictzonesorfailedstates,DFIDoftencannotworkdirectlythroughtheauthorities.Insuchcasesthereisafragile‘space’intowhichhumanitarianagenciesareadmittedtohelpthosemostinneed.Theyareonly‘allowed’in,however,whentheyareviewedasgenuinelyimpartial.Whereaidislinkedtopoliticalormilitarygoals,accesscanbedeniedandthesecurityofstaffcompromised,makingitdifficulttoreachthosemostinneed.Hencetheimportanceofthekeyhumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutralityandimpartiality.

The review concludes that DFID humanitarian policy should be to support, defend and where possible enlarge this fragile space; to work with agencies that can access and help those in dire need, and not to politicise humanitarian aid.Thereviewalsorecognisesthatincomplexconflicts,andinsituationswheretheauthorityofthestatehasbrokendowntherewillbetimeswhenmilitaryforce,mandatedbytheUN,willbeneededtoprotectciviliansandhumanitarianworkers.Insuchcases,creatingasecureenvironmentbothfortheciviliansandfortheconductofhumanitarianworkcanoftenbeafirstpriority.

Delivering transformational change in DFID

Todeliverastepchangeinthewayhumanitarianassistanceisconceivedanddelivered,DFIDwillhavetomakesignificantchanges.ThemostradicalchangewillinvolveseeinghumanitarianconcernsasacorepartofDFIDprogramming,ratherthansomethingthat


needstoberespondedtowhenithappens.There should be a closer, more integrated relationship between DFID’s core development work and the way DFID responds to meet rapid onset emergencies.SuchworkshouldalsobeofcentralconcerntoDFID’sdevelopmentpartners,suchastheWorldBankandtheUN.

DFIDshouldactivelysupporttheUNinitseffortstoreformitshumanitarianleadership.FundingformultilateralandNGOpartnersneedstobecomemorepredictable,sothattheycaninvestintheskillsandstructurestheyneedtobebetterprepared.Thereisaneedforfastandflexiblefundingforthe‘criticalperiod’immediatelyafterahumanitarianemergencyhashappened.Fundingshouldalsobeavailabledirectlytogovernmentsforresilienceandresponsework,wheretheyarecapable,willingandtransparent.

To introduce a new dynamism into the humanitarian sector DFID needs to reach out to new partners. It needs to work better with new donors and the private sector. It needs to promote innovation and bring new innovations and processes to scale faster. It needs to put the measurement of impact at the heart of its work, and demand accountability and transparency of itself and its partners. It needs to seek value for money, not crudely through comparing costs but through focusing on achieving the best outcomes for affected people and improving the quality of future decision making. It needs to drive radical change, for instance in the supply chain. It needs to improve the way it provides leadership and coordination across the UK government when responding to humanitarian emergencies. Finally, it must become better at communicating what it does, both to those who provide the money, and to those who are the beneficiaries of it.

TableofContents

TableofContents

1. Introduction 1

Howthereportisorganised 1

Howthereviewwasconducted 2

2. The international humanitarian system 3

DFID:Aleadingactorinhumanitarianresponse 5

3. Challenges 9

Increasingdisasterrisk:themajortrends,threats,andprobabilities 9

Respondingtoincreasedneed 12

4. Findings 13

4.1 Anticipation 13

4.2 Resilience 15

Embeddingresiliencewithindevelopmentprogrammes 16

Regional,nationalandlocalcapacities 18

Innovativefundingmodelsforrisktransfer 18

4.3 Leadership 19

Strategicleadership 20

Operationalleadership 20

Humanresourcecapacities 21

4.4 Innovation 23

Cashbasedapproaches 24

Shelter 25

Technology 25

4.5 Accountability 26

Impact 27

Addressingtheneedsofthemostvulnerable 29

Gender 29

4.6 Partnership 30

WorkingwiththeUnitedNationsanditsagencies 30

WorkingwiththeEuropeanUnion 31

Workingwithbi-lateraldonors 32

Workingwithnewdonorpartners 32

WorkingwithNGOs 33

WorkingwiththeRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement 35

Workingwiththeprivatesector 36

Workingwiththemilitary 38

4.7 Humanitarian space 40

Protectionofcivilians 40

Securityofhumanitarianworkers 41


5. Delivering transformational change in DFID 42

5.1 Changing the policy 42

5.2 Delivering differently 43

ShapingtheInternationalSystem 43

Changingthefundingmodel 44

Fastmobilisationfundingandpre-crisisarrangements 45

Fundingrecoveryfromdayone 46

Deliveringsmarterdirectaid 46

WorkingstrategicallyacrosstheUKgovernment 47

5.3 Changing the structure, shifting resources 49

Managingtheresponse 50

Managingrisk 50

5.4 Driving results and value for money 51

Outcomesandeffectiveness 53

Outputsandefficiency 53

Inputsandeconomy 54

Theglobalsupplychain 54

5.5 Getting the message across 55

6. Recommendations 58

1

Introduction

1. IntroductionThisindependentreviewintohowtheUKrespondstohumanitarianemergencieswascommissionedbytheSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopmentandledbyLordPaddyAshdown.ItwasaskedtoconsiderhowtheUKshouldbestrespondtohumanitarianemergenciesoverseas,andtheroletheUKshouldplayintheinternationalhumanitariansystem.

TheUKisconsideredoneoftheleadingnationsinhumanitarianresponse.Inrecentyearsithasbeenthesecondlargestbilateralhumanitariandonorglobally,andiswidelyregardedinternationally.TheUKisastrongsupporterofthemultilateralsystem,providessignificantfundingandconsistentlyprovidesexperiencedstaffandreliefitemstosupporttheresponseinmajoremergencies.

TheBritishpublicexpectstheUKtobeamajorhumanitarianresponder.TheBritishpublicitselfgivesgenerouslytoemergencyappeals.InJanuary2010,theDisastersEmergencyCommittee(DEC)AppealforHaitiraised£101millionfromthepublic.Theresponsewasespeciallynotableatatimeofglobaleconomiccrisis.

ThisreviewofhowtheUKcarriesoutitshumanitarianresponseworkcomesatamomentofreflectionfortheinternationalsystem.AsthehorrendouseventsunfoldinJapanandoverayearaftertheHaitiearthquakeandsixmonthsafterdevastatingfloodsinPakistan,manyofthoseinchargeofmajoraidagenciesarewonderinghowtomeetthechallengesofthefuture.Italsocomesatatimeofchange forDFID,whichhasrecentlypublishedthefindingsofitsBilateralandMultilateralAidReviews.

Thereviewisforwardlooking.ItisnotanevaluationofDFID’sworkinemergenciestodate.Rather,thereviewnoteswherepastresponsehasbeenmosteffectiveandlooksforwaystoenhancewhathasbeendonewell.ItaimstobuildontheUK’sstrengths.Thescopeofthereviewdoesnotcoverlong-termchronichumanitariancrises.Itfocusesonsuddenonsetdisastersor‘spikes’inconflictsituations,butmanyoftherecommendationswillalsoapplytochronicsituations.

CreatingthebestUKresponsewillonlygopartofthewaytowardsimprovingthewholesystem.ThereviewlooksatthewaytheUKcanworkwithotherinternationalbodiesandUNagenciesinemergencysituationstoensurethattheglobalresponsetodisastersimproves.TheUKmustworktoinfluencetheglobalsystemifrealimprovementsaretohappen.

TheUKworksthroughandwithpartners.Workinginpartnershipisabigpartofthereviewandtheproposedfutureapproach.ThereviewsetsoutwhereDFIDcandeepenthesepartnershipsandhow.ItalsolookstonewpartnershipsandhowDFIDcanworkbestwithintheUKgovernment.

How the report is organised

Thereportislaidoutinsixsections.Thisintroductionisfollowedbysectiontwo,whichbrieflydescribestheinternationalhumanitariansystemandDFID’sroleinit.Thethirdsectionlooksatpotentialfuturehumanitarianchallengesandthecapacitiestherearetocopewiththese.Sectionfoursetsoutthefindingsofthereview.Thereview’sconclusionsonhowDFIDshouldpositionitselfinordertomeetthefuturechallengesareoutlinedinsectionfive.Sectionsixliststherecommendations.

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How the review was conducted

ThereviewwaschairedbyLordPaddyAshdownandwasentirelyindependentinnature.ASeniorAdvisoryBoard(SAB)of15metonamonthlybasisthroughoutthereviewperiodtosteerthedirectionofthereview,examinematerialandsetoutthemainthemesandrecommendations.Theadvisoryboardservedinapersonalcapacity,butrepresentedthroughtheirexperiencethemajorinstitutionsandtraditionsinvolvedinhumanitarianresponse.

Asmallreviewteamcarriedoutconsultations,literaturereviewandpreparedmaterialfortheboard.Anindependentdirectorwasappointedtoheadtheteam.

3

Theinternationalhumanitariansystem

2. TheinternationalhumanitariansystemD

ON

OR

SD

ELIV

ERY

AG

ENC

IES

Affected population

Local NGOs

$*

International militaryorganisations

$*

NationalPrivate Sector

$*

International Private Sector

$*

International NGOs

$5.7bn

UN agencies funds and organisations

$7.8bnAffected countrygovernments

$*

Local communitiesand organisations

$*

Red Cross [ICRC, IFRC, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies]

$1.536bn

Governments

$4.1bn

Privatecontributions$12.8bn

Figure1: The international humanitarian system. Data included from the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2010. (*Amountsunknown)

Theformalinternationalhumanitariansystemismadeupofproviders(donorgovernments,foundationsandindividualgivers)andtheimplementers(RedCrossandRedCrescentMovement,NGOs,UNAgenciesandIOMandnationalandregionalNGOsandcivilsociety).Anumberofkeyactorsalsoofimportancearestillseentobeoutsidetheformalsystem,namelyaffectedgovernments,themilitary,andbusinesses.Remittanceflowsarealsonotcapturedbytheformalsystem.Thechartaboveshowsthemaincomponentsofthesystem.

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemrespondstohumanitarianemergencieswherethereisanappealforinternationalassistance,orinextremecaseswheredirectedbytheUN.ThelegalframeworkforaninternationalhumanitarianemergencyresponseissetoutinInternationalHumanitarianLaw,HumanRightsLaw,RefugeeLawandUNResolutions.

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Theselegalnormsestablishthathumanitarianaidshouldbeguidedbytheprinciplesof:

i. Humanity–thecentralityofsavinglivesandalleviatingsufferingwhereveritisfound.

ii. Impartiality–humanitarianaidshouldbeimplementedsolelyonthebasisofneed,withoutdiscriminationbetweenorwithinaffectedpopulations.

iii. Neutrality–humanitarianactionmustnotfavouranysideinanarmedconflictorotherdispute.

iv. Independence–humanitarianobjectivesareautonomousfrompolitical,economic,militaryobjectivesorotherinterestsrelatedtothelocationwhereassistanceisprovided.

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemhasgrownrapidlyoverrecentyearsandthereisoftenalackofclarityastowhatthetermactuallyreferstoandwhereitsboundarieslie.Themaindeliveryactorsfallintothree‘pillars’:theUNanditsspecialisedagencies;theRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement;andNon-GovernmentOrganisations(NGOs).Governments,nationalandlocalinstitutionsinaffectednationstypicallyleadtheresponseandprovidemuchoftheassistance,withtheinternationalsysteminsupport.Inrecentyears,internationalmilitaryforcesandlargeprivatecorporationshaveincreasinglybecomeaidproviders,asthisreportexplores.

Theinternationalsystemisfinancedbygovernmentdonors(ofwhichtheUKisasignificantone)andprivatecontributions.Figuresfortotalinternationalhumanitarianresourcesvarydependingonthesource.Althoughfundingtotheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasincreasedfasterthantherateofofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)inrecentyears,thelatestGlobalHumanitarianAssistance(GHA)reportclaimsthathumanitarianaidfellby11%from2008($16.9billion)to2009($15.1billion).

Therangeofactivitiesundertakenbytheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasalsoexpanded.Thecorehumanitarianactivitiesremain:healthservices;waterandsanitation;foodsecurity;nutritionandfoodaidandshelter.However,manyhumanitarianoperationsnowincludeawiderangeofotheractivities,including:protection;education;agriculture;mentalhealthsupport;incomegeneration;infrastructurerehabilitation;humanrightsadvocacyandsupporttothere-establishmentoftheruleoflaw1.

Thetotalnumberofstaffworkingfortheinternationalhumanitariansystemisestimatedat210,800(mostlynationalsintheirowncountry).ItismadeupofUNagenciesandtheIOM(49,500),theRedCross/CrescentMovement(48,400)andNGOs(112,900).Aidworkerpopulationhasincreasedby6%yearonyearoverthelast10years2.

Inconflictsituationsthereistypicallyapeaceandsecuritydimensiontohumanitarianemergencies.InsuchcasesothermultilateralmechanismsandinstitutionsarealsoinvolvedsuchastheUNSecurityCouncil,whichdetermineswhenandwhereaUNPeacekeeping(DPKO)operationshouldbedeployed.

1 Stoddard(2008).2 ALNAP,(2010).TheStateoftheHumanitarianSystem.

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DFID: A leading actor in humanitarian response

TheUK,throughitsDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentisthesecondlargestbilateralglobalhumanitariandonor.The2002InternationalDevelopmentActprovidesthelegalbasisforDFID’sresponsetohumanitarianemergencies.ItgivestheSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopmentpowerstoprovidehumanitarianassistance,withthesolepurposeto“alleviatetheeffectsofanaturalorman-madedisasterorotheremergency”outsidetheUK.Latterly,theUKhasalsosignedtheEUconsensusonhumanitarianaidthatenshrinestheprinciplesoutlinedabove.Asadonor,theUKhasalsosigneduptothePrinciplesandPracticeofGoodHumanitarianDonorship.DFIDdelivershumanitarianassistanceinfourdistinctways:

1. DFID shapes the humanitarian system

AsasignificantUNmemberstateandalargedonortotheinternationalsystem,theUK(throughDFID)workswithUNagenciestodelivereffectivelyandimproveperformance.DFIDcontributescorefundingtotheUN,aswellasadditionalfundinginbigemergencies.Institutionalstrategicpartnershipshavebeenformedaroundthiscorefunding,allowingDFIDandtheUNtosetlong-termgoals.

In2009/10totalDFIDhumanitarianspendwassplitasshowninthefigurebelow.3Inseveralsuddenonsetemergenciesresearchedaspartofthisreview,theUNcomponentwassignificantlysmaller,closerto40%withlargerpercentagesgoingdirectlytoNGOsandtheRedCross/CrescentMovement.Exceptionally,inthecaseoftheHaitiearthquake,morethan50%wentondirectexpenditure.

UN 53.2%

ECHO 18.9%

Humanitarian Consultancy 0.9%

Red Cross 13.5%

NGO 11.1%

DFID Direct Contribution 1.9%

Government 0.6%

Figure2: Percentage of DFID’s humanitarian spend by agency type 2009/10.

3 AdaptedfromDFID,“DFID’sExpenditureonHumanitarianAssistance2009/10”.AccordingtotheGHAReport201014donorsspentover60%oftheirhumanitarianaidthroughmultilateralagencies.

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In2005DFIDsupporteda‘humanitarianreform’processthatsoughtmorepredictableresponse.Thereformscalledformajorchangesinfunding,leadershipandcoordinationofhumanitarianemergencies.Asaresult,DFIDhasworkedtoenlargetheCentralEmergencyResponseFund(CERF)andcreatecountrypooledfunds,whichhelpUNagenciesrespondrapidlytoemergencies.TheUKhasbeenthelargestdonortotheCERF–morethan$420milliontodate–andtocountrypooledfundingmechanisms.Aswellasleadingbyexample,DFIDworkstoinfluenceothermemberstatestoincreasecontributionstotheCERF.In2006therewere52countrydonorstotheCERF.By2010thatfigurehadrisento82countries.

DFIDalsosupportedtheestablishmentofthe‘cluster’approach4,anewcoordinationmechanismthatmadeagenciesresponsibleforparticularareaslikeshelterorhealth.DFIDfundedglobalclusterappealstosetthesystemupandhascontinuedtopushagenciestodeploypeopletoleadthese.Throughitsfunding,DFIDcontinuestoplayaninfluencingroleencouragingclusterleadagenciestoviewhumanitarianleadershipandco-ordinationactivitiesaspartoftheircorework.

2. DFID funds humanitarian aid agencies and is the second largest bilateral donor after the US Government

In2009/10DFIDspentabout£528milliononhumanitarianassistance.About£100millionofthiswentthroughtheEuropeanCommunityHumanitarianOffice(ECHO),theEU’sfundforemergencies.ECHOthenspentthismoneythroughUNagencies,theRedCrossandNGOs.AlargeproportionofthefundsspentthroughtheUNwerechannelledtoimplementingNGOs.

11%wentonrapidonsetfundingforhumanitarianemergencies.TheremainderonprotractedcrisessuchasDRCongoorSudan.TheoneoffamountsthatDFIDspendsonrapidonsetemergencies,however,changesignificantlydependingonthecontext.In2010/11DFIDspent£134milliononrespondingtothefloodsinPakistanalone.

SeveralmillionpoundseachofcorefundingwenttoallofthebigUNagenciesinvolvedinemergenciesandtheRedCross/RedCrescent.TheannualcontributiontotheCERFconstitutedabout10%ofDFID’snon-ECHOhumanitarianspend.

ECHOwasthebiggestrecipientofUKaidatabout£100millionin2009/10,followedbytheICRCat£66million,andthenOCHA(includingCERF),WFP,UNDPandUNICEF(seefigure3onpage75).

4 Seewww.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=53forafulllistofclusters.

5 AdaptedfromDFID:“DFID’sexpenditureonhumanitarianassistance2009/10”.

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Inabsoluteterms,theUKhasbeenthesecondlargestbilateralhumanitariandonoraftertheUS.Asapercentageofnationalincome(GNI)however,theUKcomesafterSaudiArabia,Kuwait,Denmark,Ireland,Sweden,Luxembourgandsomeothers.

3. DFID is also on a small scale a direct deliverer of aid, providing goods in kind, Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities, and supporting secondments where appropriate

HavingadirectresponsecapabilityallowsDFIDtostrengthenandinfluencetheinternationalhumanitariansystem.In2009/10DFID’sin-kindgoodsorpersonnelsupportamountedto£7million.DFIDhasastandbyarrangementwiththeUKfireservicetodeploysearchandrescueteamsaftermajorearthquakes.Italsohasitsownstanding‘operationsteam’(CHASEOT)thatcandeployrapidlytoemergenciesandrunsalldirectdeliveryfromLondon.Theoperationsteamisonstandby24/7andisacontractedoutfacility,currentlymanagedbyCrownAgents.Ithasstandbyarrangementswithairfreightcontractorsandcandeployrapidlynichecapabilitieslikeairporthandling.ItprovidesexpertpersonneltotheUnitedNationsonrequestandassemblesteamsspeedilyforDFID.

InthecaseoftheHaitiearthquakeresponseover50%oftheexpenditurewasspentdirectly,asoutlinedbyfigure4onpage8.

8


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Figure4: Percentage allocations of DFID’s direct spend on the Haiti earthquake response.

4. DFID leads the HMG response to humanitarian emergencies

DFIDworkswithotherWhitehalldepartments,principallytheFCO,MODandCabinetOfficetocoordinatetheUKresponsetoahumanitarianemergency.DFIDleadsonmakingthehumanitariancase.DecisionsonwhethertodeployUKmilitarycapabilitiesaretakenonacase-by-casebasis.

9

Challenges

3. Challenges

Increasing disaster risk: the major trends, threats, and probabilities

Allcurrenttrendssuggestthatmorepeople–particularlyindevelopingcountries–willbeaffectedbyhumanitarianemergenciesinthecomingdecades.Notonlywilltheybecomemorefrequent,theywillalsobeincreasinglyunpredictableandcomplex.

Lastyear,263millionpeoplewereaffectedbydisasters–110millionmorethanin2004,theyearoftheTsunami.By2015,climate-relateddisasters,suchasfloods,faminesanddroughts,arepredictedtoaffectanaverageofover375millionpeopleeveryyear6.Otherdisasters(suchasearthquakes),andman-madeconflicts,willaffectmanymore.

In2009UNHCRreportedits‘totalpopulationofconcern’at36.5million,includingrefugees,statelesspersonsandthosedisplacedwithintheirowncountry.Bydefinitionthesearepeoplefleeingconflictorpersecution.Anestimated27.1millionoftheseweredisplacedwithintheirowncountriesasaresultofarmedconflict,generalisedviolenceorhumanrightsviolations7.Thisfigurerepresentedanincreaseofoveramillioninthenumberofinternallydisplacedpeople(IDPs)comparedwiththe26millioninternallydisplacedin2008andalsoin2007.Whilstthetrendforrefugees(fleeingtheircountry)hasgonedowninrecentyears,thoseinternallydisplacedhasconsistentlyrisen.The27.1millionreportedin2009weredisplacedin54countries.

Therisingworldpopulationandgrowthinurbanareas(demographicstress)willalmostcertainlyincreasethehumanitariancaseload,particularlyinlessdevelopedcountries.Alreadyanaverageof1,052peopledieinanygivendisasterinlessdevelopedcountries,comparedto23indevelopedcountries8.Theworld’spopulationispredictedtoreach9.1billionby2050,withvirtuallyallpopulationgrowthoccurringinlow-incomecountries,includingPakistan,Nigeria,Bangladesh,EthiopiaandtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo.

By2030,over61%oftheworld’spopulation(5billionpeople)willliveinurbanareas,mostlyinlowandmiddleincomenations9.Theconcentrationofpopulationsinurbanareaswillchangethenatureofmanyhumanitariandisasters.Morepeoplewillbelivingonmarginalland,inovercrowdedandpoorlyplannedhousing,lackingaccesstoadequatewaterandsanitation,healthcareandeducation.Whilstavailabilityofservicesandinfrastructureshouldmeanfewerfatalities,damagemayhavefarreachingconsequencesmakingrebuildingcostlier.Theimpactofdisastersonurbancentreswillhaveeconomicconsequencespotentiallygreaterthaninthepast,atlocal,nationalandregionallevel.

6 Oxfam,(2009).TheRighttoSurvive.7 InternalDisplacement(2010).GlobalOverviewofTrendsandDevelopmentsin2009.IDMC/NRC.8 Oxfam,(2009).TheRighttoSurvive.9 UNHABITAT.

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11

Challenges

Growingfoodinsecurityislikelytocreatenewhumanitarianemergencies,withincountriesandregionsandalsoglobally.Theexistenceofnearlyabillionchronicallyhungrypeople,primarilyinAsiaandAfrica,alreadyexacerbatestheconsequencesofemergencies.Thereispotentialforrepeatedfoodpricespikessimilartothoseofrecentyears,whichhaveespeciallydamagingeffectsondevelopingcountries.Underlyingthesechallenges,theworldasawholefacesthetaskofincreasingfoodproductionby70to100%by2050inordertocopewithagrowingpopulationwithagreaterlivestockbaseddiet.Thereisagrowingdemandforbio-fuelsandincreasingconstraintsareposedbythepriceoffertilisersandfuels,theshortageoflandandwaterandtheirincreaseddegradation.Climatechangewillreduceyields,sometimescatastrophically,necessitatingtheproductionofstoredsurplusesinsomeregionstocompensateforlosseselsewhere.

Globalisationandtheincreasinglyinterconnectedworldinwhichwelive,meansthatdisastersoftenhaveaglobalimpact.Pandemicsspreadrapidlythroughairtravel.Economicshocksinoneregionspreadthroughcommoditypriceincreaseandlossofremittanceflows.Conflictdoesnotrespectborders,andspilloverfromconflict-affectedareascontributetoregionaldestabilisationandrefugeeflows.Migrationandchangingemploymentpatternswillcontributetovulnerabilityinunexpectedways,withthepotentialtocreatenewsecuritythreats.

Futurecrisescoulddifferfundamentallyfrompastexperienceandtheprospectof‘synchronousfailures’isagrowingconcern,aswiththenuclearthreatinJapancausedbytsunami.Newsourcesofdisplacementorconflictarealsopossible,forinstanceaswaterresourcesbecomescarce10.

TheDiasporacommunityisplayinganincreasinglysignificantroleinhumanitarianresponses.Remittanceflowsarealreadythesecondlargestsourceofforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)fordevelopingcountriesandincreasesignificantlyafteranemergency.TheDiasporacommunitycanalsoinfluencethesizeandtypeofdonorresponse,dependingonitssizeandvociferousness.

AseconomiesinChina,India,BrazilandtheGulfStatescontinuetogrow,theyareplayinganincreasinglyimportantroleglobally.Theyarebecomingmoreinvolvedinhumanitarianemergencyresponses,particularlyintheirneighbouringregions.ChinawasanimportantactorintheresponsetothePakistanfloodsattheendof2010.Theinternationalhumanitariansystemneedstoworkmorewiththesepartners,particularlyasitispossiblethattraditionalDACdonorswillbeabletoprovidefewerresourcesfordisasterreliefinthecomingyears.TheUSCongressisconsideringwhethertocutAmerica’shumanitarianassistancebudgetin2011,reducingU.S.foodaidprogrammesby41%($687million)andOfficeofForeignDisasterAssistancefundingby67%($875million).

Timelyandunimpededaccesstoaffectedpopulationsisbecomingmoredifficultduetotheincreasinglycomplexnatureofemergencies.Therehasbeenanunprecedentedgrowthinviolentattacksonhumanitarianworkers(177%increasefrom1997to200811)andthereisagrowingneedforincreasedprotectionandsecurityaspartofthehumanitarianresponse.Governmentsandnon-stateactorsinconflicthavebecomeincreasinglysophisticatedintheirattemptstomanageinternationalhumanitarianism,makingtraditionalwaysofinterveningmoredifficult.

Mediareportingofhumanitarianresponseshasgrownoverthelastyearsandwillcontinuetohaveanimpactonthepoliticalandpublicreactiontodisasters.Donorswill

10 HumanitarianFuturesProgramme,(2010)TheWatersoftheThirdPole:sourcesofthreats;sourcesofsurvival.

11 JohnBorton,(2009).FutureoftheHumanitarianSystem:ImpactsofInternalChanges.

12


havetomakedifficultdecisionsonhowtorespondtoadisasterinthefullglareof24/7mediaattention.

Increasedmediacoverageandnewwaysofcommunicatingthroughsocialmediatools,suchasTwitterandFacebook,willallowclosercontactbetweenrecipientsofaidandthosedonatingthemoney.Togethertheywilldemandgreateraccountabilityofthedeliverersandtheofficialdonoragencies.

Responding to increased need

Theincreaseintheinternationalhumanitariancaseloadandchallenges,havethepotentialtobreakanalreadystretchedinternationalhumanitariansystem,whichisstrugglingtocopewithcurrentlevelsofneed.Thereweretwomajorhumanitariandisastersin2010,whichrequiredinternationalhumanitarianassistance–theearthquakeinHaitiandfloodsinPakistan.Inbothcases,theinternationalhumanitariansystemshoweditselftobelessthanthesumofitspartsandtheresponseswerecharacterisedbyweakleadership,poorcoordinationandaslowresponse.

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemevolvedover150years,itwasnotplannedordesigned.Asaresult,therearegaps,overlapsandnumerousinefficienciesinthewayitworks.Thefuturechallengesoutlinedabovewillneedamoresophisticatedoperation.Newandinnovativewaysofworkingneedtobewidelyintroducedtoimprovetheefficiencyandspeedofdisasterresponse.Strongerlinksbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentwork;betterleadershipandcoordination;accesstonewresourcesthroughimprovedpartnerships,andengagementwithnewactors;betteruseoftechnologyandinnovations;andincreasedaccountability,willallbevitalpartsofahighperforminginternationalhumanitariansystem,whichisgreaterthanthesumofitsparts.

Fortoolong,theperformanceoftheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasbeeninconsistent,failingthosemostinneed.NumerousreportshavebeenwrittenbytheUN,NGOsandotherinternationalactors,inresponsetosuchconcerns.Seriousissueshavebeenidentified,butnotaddressed.Nowisthetimeforastepchangeintheapproachtohumanitarianreform.Merelyimprovinguponwhathasbeendoneinthepastwillnotbeenoughtomeetthechallengesofthefuture.

13

Findings

4. FindingsThefirstpeopletorespondtodisastersandconflictaretheonesaffectedbythem.Friendsandneighbourssearchthroughtherubbleforlovedonesafterearthquakes;localhospitalsworkthroughthenighttocarefortheinjured.

Inmanycountriesgovernmentsroutinelyaffectedbydisastershavebecomeadeptatresponseandprevention.CasestudiesforthisreviewshowdramaticgainsinplacessuchasBangladeshandIndonesia12.Butalltoooftentheinternationalresponsearrivesasthoughthiswerenotthecase,sweepingasidelocalrespondersandaddingtothechaosratherthanalleviatingit.

Inconflictsituationstheinternationalsystemoftenbecomesthelasthopeforpeoplelivingintheworstcircumstances.Whereitisslow,orgetsthingswrong,itisthesepeoplewhosuffer.

Iftheworldisgoingtogetbetteratthechallengessetoutintheprecedingchapter,thenthishastochange.DonoragencieslikeDFIDhavetoworkwithgovernments,andwithaffectedpeople,aswellaswithaidagencies.Theyhavetosupportlocalinstitutionsratherthanweakenthem,especiallywherethereisconflict.

Wherenationalgovernmentsarecapable,theyinvariablyleadtheresponsetodisasterevenwhenitisonaninternationalscale.Whengovernmentsareoverwhelmedtheyeitherstruggletoassertthemselves,orfindtheyarecompletelyunabletocoordinate.Insomeinstancesgovernmentsareactivelybelligerent,orhostiletointernationalresponse(ortoaparticulargroupintheirpopulationbeinghelped).Thissuggestsfourbroadcategories:

• Strongandcapablegovernmentswhotakethelead(e.g.India).

• Capablebutunderresourcedgovernmentswhoneedhelptolead(e.g.Mozambique).

• Governmentswhoareunabletolead,andneedtheinternationalcommunitytodothisontheirbehalfforatime(e.g.Haiti).

• Governmentswhoareunableorunwillingtoleadandareobstructive(e.g.Nigerin2009).

Inthesefourbroadcategoriestheinternationalcommunityhastoresponddifferently,buttheapproachhasnotalwaysreflectedthisreality.

DFIDtoohastendedtorespondasifalldisasters,andallgovernments,werethesame.Thisreviewsuggestsadifferentapproachisneeded.Suchanapproachwouldrequiremuchmoreworkontheanalysisofrisksandcapacitiesinadvance,incorporatingdisasterresilienceintodevelopmentprocesses.Italsorequiresmoreworkonbringingadisparateinternationalresponsetogethersothatitperformsmorereliably.Mostofall,itrequiresbeingapartner,abuilderofcoalitionsandawillingparticipantinthem.Thisreviewhascalledthisbeinga‘networkenabler’.

4.1 Anticipation

Disastersareoftenviewedinthepublicimaginationas‘actsofGod’.Inrealitymanyarepredictable.A2005WorldBankreport‘globalhotspots’13identifiescountriesexposedtomultiplenaturalhazards(earthquakes,droughtsandstorms),andthereareplentyofcredibledataavailableidentifyingcountriesmostaffectedbydisasters.

12 TsunamiEvaluationCoalition(2006).ALNAP.13 Dilley,Metal.(2005).NaturalDisasterHotspots:AGlobalRiskAnalysis.WorldBank.

14


TheUKDefenceConceptsandDoctrineCentre(DCDC)goesfurtherinits‘horizonscanning’reportof200714.Itidentifiesareasof‘multiplestress’,factoringindemography,economyandconflict.Climatechangeisanotherobviouselementofstress,orvulnerability,witharecentreport15identifyingsub-SaharanAfricaasoneofthemostatriskareas.

Whatisclearisthatprediction,althoughfarfromperfect,ispossibleforsomehigh-risknations.HurricaneseasonsintheCaribbeanandtheBayofBengalarewellknownandmonitored.ElNinoandLaNinaoceaneffectslastforsomeyearsandchangeweatherpatternsinwaysthatarepartlyunderstood.Rainfalldataforregionsandcountriesinaridzonessuggestsdroughtcyclescanbeidentifiedearly.

Whatisalsoclearisthatasclimaterelateddisastersincrease,thebetterwewillneedtobecomeatpredictionifwearetohaveanyhopeofcopingwiththese.Butdisastermanagersdonotmakeenoughuseofsuchscience,andscientistsdonotroutinelyproduceinformationforthisaudience16.TherainfallthatproducedPakistan’sterriblefloodsof2010happenedamonthbeforethefloodwatercauseditsgreatestdevastation.Theeffectswerepredictedbutnotactedon.

Thiscanalsobethecasewith‘foodsecurity’crises(famines).Thereareprovenearlywarningsystemsthatmonitorpotentialcrises,notablytheUSAIDsupportedFEWSNET.Despitethis,andproofthatpriorinterventionnotonlysaveslivesbutischeaper,these‘slowonset’disastersareregularlymissed.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewshowshowclearevidencedoesnotalwaystriggeraresponse(theblockageinNigerwasdomesticpolitics),andhowtimelyinterventioncansavetensofthousandsoflives.

ManyagencieswereabletoactinNiger,despitetheintransigenceofgovernmentandthetardinessoftheUnitedNations.PartlythiswasduetopromptactionbytheEuropeanUnionhumanitarianorganisationECHO;itwasalsobecauseDFIDhasaninnovativeregionalfundinWestAfricaforcrisisresponse.Thisregionalfundallowsagenciestogetmoneyquicklyforunexpectedandunnoticeddisasters–itallowsforearlyaction.Thousandsofchildrenweresavedasaresultoftheseearlyactions.

Earlyactionisatleastasimportantasearlywarning,andisamatterofpoliticalwill.TheexpansionoftheCentralEmergencyResponseFund(CERF)wasinpartawayofmakingsuchdecisionsmoretechnicalandlesspolitical.Supportingresilienceinatrisknationswillfurtherincreasethelikelihoodthatearlyactionwillbetaken.Buttherewillalwaysbeanelementofrisk,howevergoodthescience.Beingabletotoleratefailure–gettingitwrongoccasionally–isimportant.Thecostbenefitofninetimelyinterventionseasilyoutweighsonewrongjudgementcall.

Oneareawherepredictionisimproving,butstillhasawaytogo,iswithearthquakesandvolcanoes.Thesegeo-physicalhazardsaredifferenttothehydro-meteorologicalonestouchedonabove(floods,droughtsandstorms).Theytendtohappenlessfrequentlybutcauseseveredamage.

Althoughearthquakescannotbepredictedwithanycertaintyinshorttimeframes,thelocationofmajorfaultlinesiswellknown.ThequestionofearthquakesinKathmanduorTehraniswhenratherthanwhether.Therehavebeensignificantadvancesinunderstandingearthquakeriskandwhentheymightoccurthroughmonitoringgroundmotion.Likewise,understandingthereasonsforbuildingdamageandcollapsesothatcodesandstandardscanbedevelopedtoensuresafeconstructioninthefuture.Science

14 TheDCDCGlobalStrategicTrendsProgramme2007–2036.See:www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/AgenciesOrganisations/DCDC/

15 DARA(2010).Climatevulnerabilitymonitor2010:thestateofclimatecrisis.16 Seeforinstancethe1MarchSelectCommitteeonScienceandTechnologyfindingsthatthere

isinadequateuseofscienceforanticipatingemergencies.

15

Findings

inthisareahasproventohaveverysignificantlyreducedfatalitiesanddamageinmanycountriesandiscritical,butresearchandinvestmentisneededelsewheretopromotesafeconstruction.

Anticipatingandpredictingconflictisanotherareathathasimprovedinrecentyears.RegularcrisesindicesfromtheInternationalCrisisGrouportheFundforPeacearebeingusedbygovernmentstoinformdecisionsonearlyaction.Theseareimportant,asincontrasttoearlywarningfornaturaldisasters,therehasneverbeenashortageofwarningaboutpendingconflictsinahostofplaces.

Whilstpredictingsinglehazardsispossiblebutoftenneglected,anticipatingunexpectedhazards,orcombinationsofhazardsisafactorofmagnitudemoredifficult.Thepossibilityofalarge-scalefloodcausinganuclearspillforinstance(asJapanhasproved),ordroughtsinRussiaandfloodsinAustralialeadingtofoodpriceriotsinWestAfricaisdifficulttoseeinadvance.Nevertheless,inaninter-connectedworldtheseeventsareevermorelikelyandpolicymakersneednewtoolstohelpthemanticipate.

Recommendations

DFID should:

1 Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.

2 MakebetteruseoftheDFIDChiefScientisttosupportUKscienceinanticipatingcrises.

3 Makethisavailableasacontributiontopre-crisisarrangementsacrossthesystem.

4.2 Resilience

Theimpactofadisasterdependsonhowwellpreparedacountryistocopewithit.Somearebetterabletobouncebackthanothers.TheHaitiearthquakeatthebeginningof2010killed230,000people.AmuchlargerearthquakeinChilelaterintheyearkilled3,000people,almostonehundredtimesfewer.

Butthisisnotonlyaboutrichnations;a1970cycloneinEastPakistan(nowBangladesh)killednearlyhalfamillionpeoplewhereasasimilarstrengthcyclonein2008killed3,000.ThedifferencewasthatintheinterveningthirtyyearsBangladeshhadbecomebetterprepared.

TheearthquakeinHaitihassetbackthedevelopmentofthatnationmanyyears.BandaAcehinIndonesiawasdevastatedbythe2005tsunami,butmanagedtorebuild100,000housesinthreeyears.BringingtheresourcesoftherestofIndonesiatobearenabledthisrapidrecovery.Beingabletochannelinternationalresourceseffectivelywasanotherkeyaspect.ThiswassimilarlytrueforKhyberPakhtunkhwaprovinceinPakistanwhichwasbetterpreparedasaresultofitsresponsetothe2005earthquake.

Beingprepared,andbeingabletorecoveriswhatmakesnationsresilient.Conversely,wherenationsarefragiletheyaremuchlessabletocope.Beingabletoanticipatedisasters,havingshockresistantinfrastructure,socialprotectionmechanisms,financialandhumanresourcesareallpartofbeingresilient,asistheabilitytoadapt.

16


Embedding resilience within development programmesDisasterscanhavesignificantimpactoncountries’development.Between2000and2009MunichReestimateseconomiclossesfromdisasterswere$670billion17.SomesmallcountrieshavesustainedlossesthroughdisasterofseveraltimestheirGDP,settingthembackyears.Vietnamlosesover1%ofitsGDPannuallydealingwithdisasters.Floodsanddroughtscanhaveknockoneffectsintermsoffoodproductionandinternationaltrade.

AseminalWorldBankstudyin2004foundthatdisasterssloweconomicgrowthinthelongtermaswellasshortterm18.Thisisespeciallytrueincountriesthatdependonagriculture.Thismeanspoorercountriesaredoublyaffected,astheyhavelessabilitytocopefinanciallywiththecostofdisasters,andtheireconomiesareworseaffectedoverall.Disastersalsoaffecttheeconomiesofmiddle-incomecountrieshowever,astheytendtohavemanufacturingsectors(forexample)connectedtoagriculture.DroughtsinsouthernAfricainthe1990sledtobigswingsinGDPgrowthacrosstheregion.

Theseriskslooksettoincreasewithpopulationgrowth,climatechangeandresourcescarcity.InthefragilecountrieswhereDFIDisincreasinglyworking,achievingpovertyreductionwillgetharder.Reducingmaternalmortalityandothermillenniumdevelopmentgoalswilldependonnationsbeingresilient.

Ultimatelydevelopmentistheanswertobeingabletocopewithdisasters–theexampleatthebeginningofthischapterillustratesthat–butgettingtodevelopmentcandependonbeingabletobouncebackfromdisasters.Bangladeshismoreresilienttodisasterseconomicallybecauseofstructuralchangesinitsagriculturalsector(thederegulationofagriculturalinvestmentledtomoredisasterresistantirrigation).TheearlywarningandactionsystemsinBangladeshhavealsopreventedhighdeathrates.

Thisanalysishasimplicationsfordevelopment,andespeciallyfortheoverallgoalwithinDFIDofreducingpoverty.Disastersoftenhitthepooresthardest.Evenwhenacountrycopesquitewelloverallwithadisaster,thepoorestandmostvulnerablecanbedisproportionatelyaffected.

TheWorldBankrecognisesthisinitsguidelinesforpovertyreductionstrategies(PRS).Oneofthefourdimensionsofpovertyis,“exposuretoriskandincomeshock”,atahouseholdlevel,acommunitylevelandanationallevel.Despitethis,littleisroutinelydoneaboutdisastersindevelopmentstrategies,noraretheymentionedintheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.Conventionalthinkinghasbeenthatscarceresourcesshouldbeusedtopromotegrowth,andthatthisisultimatelytheansweranyway.

Thisapproachisnolongerdefensible.Thebodyofacademicevidencethatdisastersandshocksmustbetakenseriouslyisgrowing,asistheevidencethatinvestmentinreducingdisasterriskshowsgoodreturns.FlooddefenceandretrofittingbuildingsforearthquakesintheUSfoundanaveragecostbenefitofonetofour19.Thesameistrueindevelopingcountries.Incorporatingdisastercostsintolongertermeconomicplanningisnecessaryifvaluabledevelopmentresourcesarenottobedivertedtorecovery.

Anewresilienceapproachwillincludeworkingatregional,national,communityandhouseholdlevel.Atnationallevelthereneedstobemoreworkondisastermanagement.Workonlegalframeworks,workonplanning,andworkonbolsteringthedepartmentsthatrespondafterdisasters,suchasnationaldisastermanagementagencies.Civilsocietyorganisationsthatrespondtodisastersshouldbesupportedtoplaytheirroletoo.

17 QuotedbyKunreutherin,“Encouraginginvestmentinadaptationmeasuresthroughmulti-yearcontracts”.Apaperforthe2010WorldEconomicForumHumanitarianCouncil.

18 BensonandClay(2004).Theeconomicimpactsofdisasters.WorldBank.19 Somecostbenefitanalysiscitefactorsashighas1:24.SeeTearfundforinstanceat

http://tilz.tearfund.org/webdocs/Tilz/Research/Investing%20in%20Communities%20web.pdf

17

Findings

Atcommunityandhouseholdlevelthereneedstobeworkonmechanismsandinstitutionstorespond(suchascivilcontingencycommittees),andoninfrastructurethatcanwithstanddisasters,orplayadualrolelikeschoolsthatareusedascycloneshelters.

Governmentsandcivilsocietyorganisationsalsoneedhelptoprovidesocialprotectionmechanisms.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewdemonstratesthattargetedcashdistributionsattherighttimecanstophouseholdsslippingintostarvation,sellingassetsandincurringdebtalongtheway.Relativelysmallinputsattherighttimecansaveyearsofmiseryanddisease.Crucially,thecombinationofsuchmeasurescanprovidethebasisforeconomicdevelopment.Peoplelivingontheperilousedgeofextremepovertycannotaffordtotaketherisksneededtoescapethissituationotherwise.

Thiskindofworkistakingplaceindifferentsectors.Disasterriskreduction(DRR)workseekstobuildlocalresponsesystemsandsmallmitigationinfrastructure.TheHyogoFrameworkforActionsetsoutfivebuildingblocksforeffectivedisasterriskreduction;governance,riskassessment,knowledgeandeducation,riskmanagementandvulnerabilityreduction,anddisasterpreparednessandresponse.Butasthemoneyisusuallyhumanitarianitisonlyavailableafteradisasterhasstruck.DFIDhadastandingpledgetospend10%ofitsresponsebudgetonDRR,butthesemeasuresareneededbefore,notaftertheevent.Climatechangeadaptationworkisoftenaboutmitigationworktoo–fromplantingmoremangrovestonewseedvarietiesforwarmersummers.DevelopmentinplaceslikeEthiopiaisfocusingmoreonsocialsafetynetsandisexploringexcitingnewideassuchasmicroinsurance.Allofthisneedstobebroughttogetherformaximumeffectiveness.

Intheaftermathofthe9/11atrocitiesintheUS,theUKputinplacea‘nationalresilienceplan’,recognisingthatitdidnothavethewherewithaltodealwithsuchadisaster.Thisplansetsoutprotocolsforincidentcontrol,establishesthecapacitiesneededforresponseandensurestraining,equippingandregularpractising.Manycountrieshavenationaldisasterprotocols,buttheyarenotresourcedorplannedindetail.

Thisreportwasnotmandatedtolookatprotractedconflicts.Itisclearthough,thatinfragilestates,orstatesinconflict,theinternationalhumanitariansystemisoftentheprovideroflastresorttotheverypoorest.ThecasestudyinDRCongoforthisreporthighlightedthevulnerabilityofstatesandsocietiestoeventhesmallestshockswhentheyareveryfragile.Alackofinstitutionsandcapacitiesmeansthataccidentsleadtomuchhigherlossoflife,smallconflictscannotberesolvedandgrowtobigonesandcommunitiesarenotabletoprotectthemselves.InDRCongothereareemergenciesalmostconstantly;boataccidentsthatkillhundreds,petroltankerexplosionsthatdothesame.Afishingconflictin2009thatledtotheexodusofthousandsofpeopleacrosstheborderwhenitturnedviolent.Massrapesandrobberyarecommittedintheeastbyrovinggroupsofbandits.

Allofthisisavoidablewithworkinginstitutions.Alicensingauthoritythatdoesnotallowferriestorunwithoutcheckingthemforsafety;afireservicethatcanattendaccidentsbeforetankersexplode;ajudicialprocessthatallowsdisputestoberesolvedbeforetheybecomeviolent;apoliceorsecurityservicethatarrestsbandits.

Inthisvacuum,muchofwhatistodaycalled‘humanitarian’inDRCongoissimplysubstitutionservicedelivery.Healthcareisnotprovidedbythestateandpeoplearetoopoortopayforit.Sohumanitarianagenciesprovidebasichealthcareandrespondwhenmajorkillerslikecholeraormeaslesbreakout.Resilienceisanimportantwaytounderstandthiswork,andwillbeimportantasDFIDworkstobuildinstitutions,makingstateslessfragile.Ensuringhumanitariananddevelopmentworkcloselytogetherwillbevitallyimportant.

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Regional, national and local capacities DFIDhasnottraditionallyfundedgovernmentsdirectlyinhumanitariancrises(lessthan1%inthelasttwoyears),althoughithasfundedmulti-donorreconstructionfundsthroughtheUNandtheWorldBank.Similarly,whilstDFIDhasbuiltupconsiderableexpertiseinrapidprocurement,itusuallydonatesitsinkindassistancethroughaidagencies,ratherthangovernment.Therehasbeenfundingfornationaldisasterpreparedness,typicallythroughtheUN,incountrieslikeBangladesh.Thisisnotroutinelylinkedwithsubsequentresponsehowever.InMozambiquethegovernmentaskedfor£2milliontohelpthemprepareaheadofanticipatedfloodingin2006.Thiswasnotforthcoming;whentherewasfloodinglaterthatyeartheinternationalresponsecostover£60million.

NeitherdoesDFIDroutinelyfundlocalNGOsorlocalorganisationsinrapidonsetemergencies,althoughitfundsthemindirectly,asmanygrantstointernationalpartnersarepassedontonationalandlocalorganisations.InBangladeshUNDPhasalistofmorethan30pre-approvedlocalNGOsthatitgaveDFIDmoneytoafterthe2008cyclone.ManyoftheinternationalNGOs(andespeciallyfaithbasedorganisationslikeChristianAidandCAFOD),routinelyworkthroughlocalpartners.TheRedCrossandRedCrescentMovementalwaysworkthroughitsnationalsocieties.Despitethis,thefundingofnationalandlocalNGOsbyDFIDremainshitandmiss.Itisnotaconsciousstrategy,butmoreofaby-product.

Anapproachtailoredtogovernmentcapacitywouldofferseveraladvantages.GovernmentslikethePhilippinesandIndonesiacanalreadyrespondtoquitelargedisasterswithoutinternationalhelp.Preservinginternationalcapacityforthosedisastersthataretrulyoverwhelmingmakesmuchmoresensethanhavingtodeployexpensiveinternationalworkerstofloodssimplybecausethelocalsystemwassounderresourced.NationalDisasterManagementAgenciesexistinmostcountriesthatsufferregulardisasters,butoftenlackequipmentandtraining.Withanestablishedrelationship,itwouldalsobepossibletogivemoneyandgoodsdirectlytothegovernmentafteradisasterknowinghowsuchresourceswouldbeused.Specialfundingchannelscouldbesetupinadvance,makingtransparencyandreportingeasier.

Thesameistrueofcivilsocietyorganisations;organisationssuchastheRedCrossandRedCrescentNationalSocietiesoftenhaveformalresponsibilitiesinthenationaldisasterplan.Withproperresourcestheycanpreparejointlywithgovernmentandotherprivateorvoluntaryagencies,leadingtopromptresponseintheeventofdisaster.

Anincreasedfocusonnationalandlocalcapacitiescouldalsoincluderegionalbodies.TheAssociationofSouthEastAsianNations(ASEAN)playedapivotalroleinfacilitatingtheresponsetocycloneNargisinBurmainMay,2008.Thisregionalcooperationarounddisasterresponsehascontinued,withjointprotocolsondeploymentofmilitaryassetsoneofthelatestdevelopments.Increasinglygovernmentsatriskfromdisastersaresharingexpertisethroughsuchregionalforums,spreadinggoodpracticeanddevelopingjointearlywarningsystems.

Innovative funding models for risk transferAsthecostofdamagecausedbyextremeweatherconditionsissoaring,moresustainablewaystotackleweatherriskareneeded.Public-privatepartnershipsinriskfinancinghavebecomemorepopular,inparticularparametricinsurance.Catastrophebondsarealsoissuedmorecommonlynow,e.g.byMexicotoprovideresourcesintheeventofsevereearthquakeorhurricanedamage.

Insurancecanplayaroleinguaranteeingpredictableandreliablepayouts,allowingforlong-termplanning,increasinggovernments’self-determinationandownership,protectinglivelihoodsanddiminishingnegativeeffectsofreliefinterventionsonlocal

19

Findings

markets20.Thelimitationsarethatpremiumscanbetoohighwithhighopportunitycosts,andthatitisnoteasytotelliftheinsurancegivesvalueformoney.Thereisalsothedangerofmoralhazard–governmentsnotfocussingenoughonriskreductionandpreventionbecausetheyfeelinsured.

TheCaribbeanCatastropheRiskInsuranceFacility(CCRIF)isthemostprominentexampleofapublicprivateinsurancemechanismthatDFIDhasfunded.Thereviewwelcomesthisgroundbreakingwork.DFIDisnowalsoinvestinginthedesignoftheAfricaRiskCapacity,leadingtotheestablishmentofanAfrican-ownedriskpoolingentityforweatherrisk.

Recommendations

DFID should:

4 Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.

5 Promote national response capacities of governments and civil society in at risk countries including:

• Thedevelopmentofnationalresiliencestrategies.

• Theestablishmentofdirectfundingmechanisms.

• Regionalresponsemechanismswheretheyaddvalue.

• ThroughcivilsocietyorganisationssuchasRedCrossandCrescentSocieties.

• Nationalandlocalprivatesectorcompanies,whichareableatthecountryleveltosupportentrepreneurial,andmarketsolutions,whichwillincreaseinresilienceandimprovedisasterresponse.

4.3 Leadership

Insituationswherethegovernmentofanaffectedcountryisunabletoleadhumanitarianresponse,theUNremainstheonlylegitimateauthoritythatcandoso.Overtheyearsacomplexsystemhasbeenputinplacetodothis,withadedicatedglobalEmergencyReliefCoordinatorsupportedbythebigspecialisedUNagencies.

AlthoughtheUNhasthemandatetolead,itsperformancehasbeenverydisappointingoverall.InallbutoneofthecasestudiesforthisreviewUNleadershipwaspoor.Thiswasespeciallytrueinthelargerdisasters.Itistrueatastrategiclevelandatanoperationallevel.Itistrueacrosstheinternationalsystem,andinindividualcrises.Thereisrarelyavisionbeyondfundraising,andrarelyanorganisingnarrativethatdrawstogetherthedisparatecapacities.

WhatisneededisacompleteoverhaulofstrategicandoperationalleadershipintheUN.Thisreviewfindsthatthereisappetiteforthiswithinthesystem,andthatitisintheinterestoftheUKtochampionit.Theissueisattheheartofensuringaffectedpeoplereceivewhattheyneedandachievingvalueformoney.Onthestrengthofthesefindingsthereviewconcludesthatthereisaneedforfurtherhumanitarianreforms.

20 ChristianAid,“DoesDisasterInsuranceHaveaRoleinClimateChangeAdaptation”,TimeforClimateJustice,June2010.

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Strategic leadershipFirstandforemost,thereisaneedforvision.ThereisaneedfortheUNatthehighestleveltosetoutthechallengesaheadandhowitplanstodealwiththem.Thereisaneedforthisvisiontobebackedpolitically,andforthispoliticalbackingtoextendintoresponseswhentheyoccur.Leadersonthegroundmustbeconfidenttheyhavethebackingoftheirseniors,andofthememberstatesoftheUN.

Secondlythereisaneedfortherightpeople.DuringthereviewsconsultationsinNewYorktheideaofa‘standaside’mechanismwherebythebesthumanitarianleaderscouldbedeployedintomegacriseswasdeveloped.ThisideahassubsequentlybeentakenupintheIASCandthereviewstronglysupportsthisprocess.

TheUNneedstodevelopacadreofcapablehumanitarianresponseleaders.Itneedstherightapproachtotalentmanagementandtherighttermsandconditionstounderpinthis.Itneedstolookoutsideitsownnarrowbasetosecurethebesttalent.

Finally,thereisaneedfortherightsupportsystemsandstructuretoenableleaders.Someofthesestructuresareinplaceandworkwell;forinstancefinancingwhichhasimprovedasaresultofthelastroundofreform.Butplanningandprioritisationremainweakandpoliticised.LeadersofthevariousUNhumanitariancoordinationmechanismshavenoformalauthorityandreportinglinesbetweenclustersandcoordinatorsareunclear.Therearefewstandingsupportstaffanddeploymentoftherightteamcantakeweeks.Thesehavebeenseenasintractableissues,butwillhavetochangeifperformanceistoimprove.

FortheUKasastrongUNsupporter,andalargedonortothesystemitisimportanttoworkontheseissues,asoutlinedabove.TheUKisalsooneofthebestplaced.Itdrovethelastroundofreformsandwillreceivemuchsupportforinitiatinganewround.Todosoitwillneedtobuildcoalitionsofsupportandworkcleverlywithitspartners.Thisisexpandedinfurthersectionsofthisreport.

Operational leadershipOneofthefundamentaldrawbackstoachievingamorereliableresponsefromtheUNisthatitismorealoosecollectionofstrongandseparateagenciesthanawellfunctioningsystem.WFPistheworld’spremierfoodagency,withlogisticsthatrivalmanymulti-nationalcompanies.UNICEFistheworld’slargestchildren’sagencyprovidingeverythingfromcleanwatertotemporaryeducation.TherefugeeagencyUNHCRcansetupcampsforhundredsofthousandsofdisplacedpeoplefleeingwarorpersecution.Eachhasseparatemandates,boards,missionsandhistoriesandallaresuspiciousoftoomuchcentraldirection.Allthreeneedtofundraiseinbigemergencies,asdotheWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO)andtheFoodandAgriculturalOrganisation(FAO)whoarealsoinvolvedinhumanitarianemergencies.Thiscreatescompetition,makingprioritisationespeciallydifficultasitcanhavefundingimplications.

Theclusterapproachwasdevelopedasthelatestattempttosolvethecoordinationproblem.Itsoughttofillgapsinhumanitarianservicedelivery.Improvedcoordinationofallplayersbyanamedleadagencywasexpectedtoeliminategapareasandavoidoverlaps.Keyagenciesweregivenresponsibilityforleadershipandcoordinationforeachsector;forexampleWFPleadsthelogisticscluster,WHOleadsthehealthcluster.TheclusterleadisusuallyaUNagencyalthoughIFRCleadstheshelterclusterandSavetheChildrenco-leadstheeducationclusterwithUNICEF.

Butperformanceofclustershasbeendisappointing.Clustercoordinatorsoftenlackexperienceandthetrainingrequiredtoprovidestrongleadership.Toooftenclustermeetingsareinformationsharinggatheringsinsteadofthestrategicdecisionmakingforumstheyshouldbe.Andthesystemhasmerelyreplicatedagencydivisionsmeaningprioritisationremainsjustasdifficult.

21

Findings

Theclustersystemneedstoberevisedtoaddressthesefailings.Theroleoftheinternationalsystemistosupportnationalgovernmentintimesofdisaster,nottotakeover.Agreateremphasisthereforeshouldbeputonclusterleadershipbynationalgovernmentwhereappropriate.NGOsshouldplayagreaterroleinco-chairingclusters.Wherethishappens,theclusteroftenhasabetterunderstandingofthesituationontheground.

Inmegacrises,thereisaneedfordedicatedandexperiencedclusterleadership.Wherethisisnotthecaseexperiencedcoordinatorsshouldbedeployed,securedbypredictabledonorfunding.Inlargeremergenciesclustersshouldbecometwo-tier,consistingofa‘strategicbody’groupandan‘informationsharing’group.Thisallowsallpartnerstobeincludedbutalsoallowsforacoregrouptosetstrategicdirection.

Somedisastershaveseenanoverproliferationofclustersandsub-clusters.Thiscanleadtoless,ratherthanmoreeffectivecoordination.Infact,notallclustersareneededineveryemergency.Thetypeofdisasterandtheeffectivenessofexistingcoordinationmechanismsshoulddictatehowmanyandwhichclustersneedtobeactivated.InnaturaldisastersthisshouldbeanationalgovernmentleddecisioninconsultationwiththeUNHumanitarianCoordinator(HC).

TobefullyeffectiveclustersneednationalNGOsandlocalgroups.Butthesearetheverypartnersthatgetexcludedfirstduetosecurityreasons,languagebarriersorsizeofcluster.Thiscouldberectifiedifdonorsmadelocalparticipationaprerequisiteforclusterfundingineachemergency.Clustersalsoneed‘nontraditionalactors’suchastheprivatesectoriftheyaretobeeffectiveincoordinatingthefullresponse.

UNagencyautonomymeansthatclusterleadsoftenreportthroughtheiragencyratherthanthroughtheHCandOCHAcanbeexcludedaltogether.ClearreportinglinesshouldbeestablishedbetweenHC,clusterlead,agencyandOCHA.

Human resource capacitiesTheunevenqualityofpersonnelisamajorlimitingfactorinhumanitarianresponse.Thisisparticularlytrueattheleadershiplevel,butalsowithclusterleadership,technicalexpertsandmid-levelmanagers.Onemajorissueisthatthereisnostraightforwardprofessionalrouteintohumanitarianwork.Aidagencieswanttohireexperiencedpeoplebuthowdopeoplegetexperienceunlesstheyareofferedajob?Gettingstartedinhumanitarianworkbecomesachickenandeggconundrum.

Thereisaneedtogrowthepoolofcompetentprofessionalsinvolvedinhumanitarianwork.Thisrequiresinvestment,andacommitmentfromhumanitarianagenciestocreatecareerpathsforhumanitarianprofessionals.Manyaidagenciesgrewupwithoutacultureoftraining,insteadvaluingrapidactionandon-the-joblearning.Thisapproachhasstrengths:aidagenciesremainnimbleandkeeptheircostslow.Butitalsomeansthat,toooften,managersandstaffdonothavealltheskillstheyneed.

Therehasbeenprogressonstaffskillsinthepastdecade,andanumberofworthwhileinitiatives.Butineverymajoremergencytherearestillsignificantnumbersofaidpersonnelwholacksomeoftheskillsessentialtotheirjobs.Theconsequencesarehardtomeasurebutareboundtoincludelostlivesandwastedfunds.

ThegulfisstarkestwhenoneconsiderstheinvestmenttheUKmilitarymakeintheirpreparedness.Typicallyprofessionalmilitaryforcesspend95%oftheirtimetrainingand5%oftheirtimeinaction.Forhumanitariansthisfigureisreversed;95%oftheirtimeisspentinactionand5%ofthetimetrainingwouldbeahighfigure.

Trainingisnottheonlymethodoflearningandshouldcomplement,notreplace,learningonthejob.Itneednotbeexpensiveorlengthy.Itshouldbebasedonanassessmentoftheskillsneededforthejob,takingaccountofskillsthatarealreadythere.Ideallyitshouldbecombinedwitharangeofcareerdevelopmentmeasures,which,overtime,resultinstrongindividualswithinwell-managedteams.

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Intheprivatesectorthislessoniswellknownevenifnotalwaysfollowed.Themostsuccessfulcompaniestakecaretoinvestintheirstaff,andfasttrackthemwhentheyprovecapable.Andindeed,someofthebestaidagencieshavebeendoingsoforyears.

Someaidagenciesmaybereluctanttoinvestintrainingforfearofincreasingthepercentageoftheirfundsspentonadministration.Theyknowthepublicarerightlysensitiveaboutthis.Iftheyincreasedtheiradministrationbudgetsfrom,say,anaverageof10pinthepound,to12pinordertopayfortraining,theymightworrythatitwouldappearwasteful.Butifthe2pspentontrainingincreasestheimpactoftheremaining88p,everyoneshouldbepleased.Aidagenciesshouldexplaintodonorsandthepublicthattheirbeneficiarieswillbebetterservedifthereisamodestinvestmentinstaffdevelopment.Skilledstaffwillmakebetteruseofthefundstheyhavebeenentrustedwith.

Professionalisationoftheaidindustrywillcomethroughbetterpreparationandtrainingofstaff.DFID’scommitmenttothiscouldbedemonstratedbyinvestinginagencyskillsdevelopmentandbybettertrainingofitsownstaffworkinginhumanitariansituations.DFIDshouldinvestigateandsupportthedevelopmentofprofessionalstandardsthatitcanuseitselfandwillbeofusetoothers.

Recommendations

DFID should:

6 Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving leadership, including;

• Rapiddeploymentofexperiencedleadershipteamsinbigcrises.Thisshouldincludea‘stepaside’systemtoensurethebestleadershipisinplaceatboththestrategicandoperationallevel.

• EncouragetheconveningofaUNHighLevelPaneltolookatwaysofimprovingtheinternationalhumanitariansystemtofacefuturechallenges.

• WorkcloselywithUKmissionstobuildcoalitionsforreformoftheinternationalsystem,includingmorecoherentuseofUNexecutiveboardpositions.

• WorkwiththeUNtocreateanewcadreofhumanitarianleadersandthetalentmanagementsystemsandtermsandconditionstosustainthis.

• WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtoresolvesomeofthedeficienciesinmanagement,recruitment,prioritisationandplanning.Thismustincludetherightsupportstaffavailableforrapiddeployment.

• WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtostrengthenandprovidebetterleadershipoftheclustersystem.

7 DFIDshouldmakeasustainedefforttoimproveskillsinthehumanitariansector.Thisshouldinclude;

• Worktocreateasetofstandardsforhumanitarianleadership.

• TrainingwithinDFID,aidagenciesandgovernmentsandcivilsocietyindisasterpronecountries.

• Ensuringpre-qualifiedpartnersdemonstrateadequateinvestmentinskillsdevelopment(seesection5.2).

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Findings

4.4 Innovation

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemisfacinggreaterandmorecomplexchallenges.Newsocial,demographic,environmentalandpoliticalproblemsincreasinglydemandinnovativeproducts,organisationalprocessesandwaysofthinking.SynchronousfailuressuchasthoseseeninJapan;simultaneousdisasterstaxingglobalcapacitywillneednewapproaches.Itisnowwidelyacknowledgedthathumanitarianactorscannotsimplydomoreofwhattheyhavealwaysdone.

Buthumanitarianpractitionersandanalystsbemoantheslowpaceofchange.Relativelystraightforwardideaslikecashtransfershavetakenalongtimetobecomeaccepted.Thebarrierstoinnovationareoftenmoretodowithpoliticsandinstitutionalinterests.

Recentresearch21hasidentifiedanumberofsuccessfulhumanitarianinnovations.Andmajororganisationsarebeginningtounderstanditsimportance.USAIDhasmadeinnovationacentralpillarofitsongoingstrategicrenewalinbothpolicyandoperations22.TheWorldFoodProgrammeisinnovatingthewayitdeliversfoodaid23.

Thiscontextofgrowinginterestandcommitmentpresentsclearopportunities.DFIDhasareputationforbeing‘outaheadofthedonorpack’intermsofflexibilityandresponsiveness.IthassupportedspecificinnovationsprocessesbothatpolicylevelsuchastheGoodHumanitarianDonor-shipinitiative;andinoperationalcontextssuchascommunity-basedfeedingtherapy.Thisexperienceandreputationareassetsthatcouldbeleveraged,establishingtheUKasaninnovativeleaderinglobalhumanitarianefforts.

Evidenceshows24thatsuccessfulinnovationshaveanumberofcommonenablingfactors,includingeffectivesupportfromdonors,headoffices,seniormanagersandlike-mindedpeersinotherimplementingorganisations.Alsoimportantaregoodpartnershipswithactorsoutsidethetraditionalhumanitariansector.Anydonorseekingtoimprovethesystemmustworkonthebasisthatitisnotpossibletosinglehandedlyreformacomplexsystemwithmultipleactorsandfactors.Coalitionbuildingisvital.

Giventhelimitedresourcesthatwillbeavailablerelativetoothersectors(e.g.theprivatesector),itisessentialfordonorstotakean‘openinnovation’approachfromtheoutset.Collectively,DFIDanditspartnersneedtoinvestinrobustinnovationprocessesfocusingonbothlongstandingunresolvedproblemsandnewemergingchallenges.DFIDneedstobecomemoreconsistentinusingevidenceandsystematicanalysistodecidewheretoinvestandhow.Resourcesforstrengtheningtheinnovationscapacitiesofhighvaluepartnerswhichwillalsobeessentialtocreatethetimeandspaceneededforreflectionandgenerationofnewideas.

Amoreinnovativeinternationalresponsetodisastersneedstobefirmlygroundedinhumanitarianprinciplesandvalues.Theyneedtobuildontheprincipleofbetterlearningfromandwith,andgreateraccountabilityto,affectedcommunities.Manyofthemostimportantinnovationsofthepast30years–fromcashtocommunityfeedingtherapy–havecomefromrethinkingthiscentralrelationship.

Thereisanurgentneedtoleverageappropriateformsofscience,research,technologyandprivatesectorknowledgetosupporthumanitarianinnovation.WhileDFIDhasplacedconsiderableimportanceonresearchfordevelopment,withsignificantinvestmentinresearchcapacityNorthandSouth,therehasbeenrelativelylessattentionpaidtoresearchforhumanitarianaction,andnoneofithasfocusedon

21 www.alnap.org/pool/files/8rhach3.pdf22 www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2010/sp101008.html23 www.wfp.org/content/revolution-food-aid-food-assistance-innovations-overcoming-hunger24 www.alnap.org/pool/files/8rhach3.pdf

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Southerncapacities.Asnotedpreviouslyinrelationtoinsuranceandnationalresilience,thereisscopefortransformativedevelopmentsinthislastarea.

InnovationalsopresentsanumberofinternalopportunitiesandchallengesforDFID.OneofthekeyfindingsofthisreviewisthatthereareopportunitiestobenefitfromfreshideasthroughoutDFID’shumanitarianpolicyandoperationalwork.Moreworkisneededtosystematicallyidentifywheretheneedforinnovationismostpressing.DFIDstaffmembersareavitalassetfortheorganisation,withawealthofexperienceandknowledgefromarangeofdisastersettings.Butstaffarenotencouragedtoinnovate,noraretheyconsistentlyrewardedforit.Thereisnotimetodevotetodevelopingideas,andthereisoftenahardbattletogetnewwaysofworkingaccepted.

Anyefforttoenhancehumanitarianinnovationsneedstobuildonandenhancetheentrepreneurialandcreativecapabilitieswithintheorganisation.Thereisaneedtoprovideappropriatetraining,secondmentsandreflectionspaceforDFIDstaff.Effectiveinnovatorsandinnovationfacilitatorsshouldberewarded,andthisshouldbebuiltintoappraisalsystemsandultimatelycareerdevelopment.Leadersneedtofosteranatmosphereofenquiry,feedbackandchallenge,wherethereistoleranceofrisk.

DFIDalsoneedstoworktojointhedotsbetweenthesuccessfulinnovationsitfundsandtheproposalsitsubsequentlyapproves.Forinstance,DFIDprovidedsomeofthefirstfundstotrialthe‘plumpynut’ideainnutrition,sincehailedasoneofthemostexcitinginnovationsofthelastdecade.Butitdidnotpushthisnewwayofworkingthroughitsfundingdecisions.ThisurgentlyneedstochangesothatDFID’sresearchfundscansupportthedevelopmentofsuccessfulinnovationthataretakentoscalethroughoperationalfunding.

Twoapproachesarehighlightedherefortheirimportanceforaneffectivehumanitarianresponse,andalsoforhighlightingtherangeofwaysDFIDcansupportinnovations.

Cash based approachesOneoftheexcitingadvancesinrecentyearshasbeentheuseofcashforreliefandrecovery.Traditionally,humanitarianagencieswouldsupplygoods,butawealthofacademicworkhasprovencashtobemoreflexible,moreefficientandmoreeffectiveincertainsituations.

Whilstthebenefitofusingcashiswidelyacknowledged,itsadoptionatscalehasbeenfrustratinglyslow.Themajorityofreliefoperationsstillsupplystrickenpopulationswithblankets,potsandpans,soapandsoon.DFID,despitebeingafunderofresearchintocash,andasupporterofitasanapproachatapolicylevel,doesnotroutinelyrequireitspartnerstoworkwithcash.Thishastochange.

IntheNigercasestudyforthisreview,twoaspectsoftheresponsestoodout.ECHOinsistedthatitspartnersusedcash,requiringthemtoargueagainstitsuseratherthanforit.ConcernWorldwide,anNGO,demonstratedthatcashdistributionscouldpreventmalnutrition.Concerndidhalfoftheircashdistributionsusingmobilephones–theydistributedthephonesandthenusedatransfersystemcalled‘zap’toallowrecipientstobuygoodsinlocalshops.Withanestablishedinfrastructurefortransfer,costscanbemarginal.Itispossibletoenvisageasystemwherebyinleanyearstargetedcashdistributionsforseveralmonthswouldpreventmalnutrition,andfarcostliermedicalinterventions.

ThisreviewhasconcludedthatDFIDshouldfollowtheleadofECHOandmakecashbasedresponsestheusualreliefandrecoverypositionforitspartners.Partnersshouldberequiredtoexplainwhy they are not using cash,ratherthantheconverse.

Inevitablytherewillbetimeswhencashisnotappropriate.Wheremarketsdonotfunctionefficiently,largevolumesofcashmightpushpricesup.Wherethereare

25

Findings

extremesecurityconcernsthismightalsobeanissue.Twoofthecasestudiesfromthisreviewsuggestthatthesecircumstancesmaybelessfrequentthanimaginedhowever.InNigerthecashdistributionsbyConcern,SavetheChildrenandotherstookplaceinremoteareasatatimeofabsolutefoodshortages.Despitethispricesdidnotriseinthemarkets,astradersefficientlydrewinsurplusfromneighbouringNigeria.SimilarlyinDRCongo,‘voucherfairs’demonstratedthatlocaltraderscouldbringgoodstoneedypopulationsfarfasterandmoreefficientlythanaidagencies.

Onefearthathasconsistentlydoggedthescalingofcashisthatofcorruption.Theextensiveliteratureoncashhasfoundnoincreasedriskofthiscomparedtootherreliefgoodshowever,andwithsystemssuchasmobilephonetransferandmicrobankaccountsitmayinfactbeless.

ShelterProvidingadequateshelterisoneofthemostintractableproblemsininternationalhumanitarianresponse.Tentsaretoocostlyanddonotlastlongenough.Plasticsheetingcanbegoodbutmostoftenislowqualityandfallsapartimmediately.Rebuildinghousestakesyears,evenwhenlandissuesarenotmajorobstacles.

Tosolvethisissue,agencieshaveincreasinglyused‘transitionalshelter’,awiderangeofalternativesolutionsincludingcash,communalbuildingsandtemporaryshelters.Typicallyacompromisebetweenatentandafullhouse,transitionalsheltercanlastforthreeyearsuntilproperreconstructionisachieved.Atbestituseslowcostlocalmaterialsandisbasedonasimpledesign.Materialscanbeusedafterwardstoo,whenpeoplemovetotheirnewhome.

Whilstthisapproachshowspromise,therearealsochallenges.Transitionalshelterscostmorethanafewbitsofplasticsheeting,andinemergenciesthatarenotwellfunded‘transitional’canquicklybecome‘permanent’.Argumentsbetweenexpertsoverdesign,qualityandcostcanslowtheprocess,andweakcoordinationinthesectoroftenleadstoawidevarianceinwhatisprovided.Thatcanmeanaffectedcommunitiesgettingdifferentlevelsofprovisiondependingontheagencyallocatedtobuildtheirshelter.

Theissueofweakcoordinationwasattheheartoftheestablishmentoftheclustersystem.Assection4.3ofthisreviewsetsout,insomeareasthishasworkedwell.Logistics,foodandwaterhaveallimproved.Otherareashaveimprovedinparts.Inshelter,theInternationalFederationoftheRedCross(IFRC)wasnominatedastheclusterleadagency,andthishasnotworkedwell.Partlythisisbecauseshelterisdifficult.PartlyitisbecausethereisanartificialsplitwherebyIFRCisresponsibleintheimmediateaftermathofadisaster,butnotbeyondtheemergencyphaseofdisplacement.

DFIDhasbeenheavilyengagedinsheltersincetheIndianOceantsunamiin2004.Ithasfundedresearchandpushedqualitystandardsandcoordination.ThisreviewconcludesthatDFIDmustcontinueandintensifyitseffortstofindbettersolutionstoprovidingshelterafterdisaster.Shelteriscriticaltohealth,employment,familyandsafety.Withoutadequateshelter,inallbutthemostbenignclimatespeopleareterriblyvulnerable.Partlythismayinvolveresolvingtheclusterissuestouchedonabove.Partlyitwillinvolvemoreresearch.Partlyitmayinvolvebringinginnewactors,suchastheprivatesectorconsortiumrecentlyfoundedthroughtheWorldEconomicForum.Continuingtofundandresourceshelterduringresponsewillalsobeimportant.

TechnologyTechnology,althoughnotasilverbullettotheproblemsofhumanitarianaid,alsoneedsmoreconcertedsupport.

Someexistingtechnologiesofferconsiderablepotential.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewhighlightedtheuseofmobilephonesforcashtransfers(alsosuccessfullyusedin

26


Kenya).Thisrapidlydevelopingtechnologycouldbecomethestandardinafewyears,revolutionisingthebankingandremittancesectoralongtheway.Satellitesarealreadywidelyusedintrackingstormsandinprovidingimageryforhumanitarianoperations.“Crowdsourcing”,suchasthatusedinKenyaandHaitimayprovetobeanimportantnewwayofdoingneedsassessment.Socialmediaisdrivingnewaccountabilitytouchedoninthesectionbelow.GooglehaspilotedseveralsoftwareapplicationsforhumanitarianoperationsincludingthroughitsGoogleEarthmapanditspeoplefindersoftwarenowbeingusedinJapan.

Thereareemergingtechnologiesthatalsohaveconsiderablepotential(andrisks).Foremostamongtheseisnanotechnology,whichiswidelyseenashavingthepotentialtotransformmedicine,watersafetyandfoodstuffswithinthenext5-10years.Anotherisagentbasedmodelling,increasinglyusedineconomics,whichmayhaveapplicationsinunderstandingthespreadofepidemicsorevenpopulationmovement.

Recommendations

DFID should:

8 Nurture innovation and its application in dealing with and preparing for humanitarian emergencies, including through partnership with operational agencies, private sector, technological innovators and science and research communities.

9 Appoint a Humanitarian Senior Research Fellow, reporting to the Chief Scientific Officer with a dedicated budget tasked with developing evidence and innovation.

10 Investinthreekeytechnologies;mobiletechnologies,satellitesanddatamanagementanddisplay.

11 Supportexplorationofemergingandcutting-edgetechnologiessuchasnanotechnology,andnewcomputermodellingapproaches.

12 Workwithpartnerstoensurecashbasedresponsesaregivenfullconsiderationandwhereappropriatebecomemuchmorewidelyadopted.

4.5 Accountability

Accountabilityinsuddenonsethumanitarianemergencieshasparticularcharacteristics:thepresenceofacuteneeds,lackofchoice,lackofvoiceandaccesstoformalprocedures,disconnectbetweendonorsandsurvivors,andtheprevalenceoflifeanddeathdecisions.Allofthesemakeaccountabilitymorechallengingbutalsomoreimportant.

TheparadigmisstillviewingtheaffectedpopulationtoomuchaswhateconomistJulianLeGrandhascalled“pawns”(passiveindividuals)andtheinternationalcommunityas“knights”(extremealtruists).Thisapproachcosts.Localcapacitiesarenotutilised,thebeneficiaryisnotinvolvedenoughandthequalityofdeliveryislowerthanitshouldbe.

Sincethelate1990sthehumanitariancommunityhasinitiatedanumberofinter-agencyinitiativestoimproveaccountability,qualityandperformance.DFIDhasbeenfundingthemostwidelyknownones:theActiveLearningNetworkforAccountabilityandPerformanceinHumanitarianAction(ALNAP),HumanitarianAccountabilityPartnership(HAP),PeopleInAidandtheSphereProject.

27

Findings

Theseinitiativesandothershaveimprovedstandards,quality,learningandtransparencyinthesectorbutnotenoughprogresshasbeenmade.Itistimenowtoputtheseapproachesattheheartofhowthesystemworks.

Thecasestudiesforthisreviewshowthatinvolvementofaffectedcommunitiesandprovisionofinformationaboutprogrammestorecipientsofaidwaspatchyeverywhere.Ingeneral,performancewasworstduringthereliefphase,andimprovingduringrecoveryandreconstruction.Theveryfactthatthemostinnovativepracticeshighlightedearlierarethosewhichfocusonrecipientcapacitiesandneedshighlightshowfarthesystemhastogo.

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemneedstoputaccountability,learningandtransparencyintothecentreofitsresponse.Withthetechnologyandmethodsnowavailable,thereisnoexcusenotto.Assistancehastobeinaccordancewithwhataffectedpeoplehavemadecleartheyneed,ratherthanwhatthesystemispreparedtooffer.Andtheinternationalsystemhastobeheldtoaccountforthat,andforlearninghowtodeliverimprovedservices.Thiscanbedonethroughbetterfeedbackloopswiththeaffectedpopulation,througharangeofmechanismssuchasListeningProject-styleassessments,HAPcomplaintsmechanismsandperceptionsurveys.

DFIDisbeingaskedtobemoreaccountablethaneverbeforetoUKtaxpayersinaperiodofheightenedgovernmentbudgetaryconstraints.DFIDhastakenimportantstepsontransparencyasasteptowardsgreateraccountabilityandisattheforefrontamongstdonorsonthis.UndertheUKAidTransparencyGuaranteeDFIDhasstartedpublishingdetailedinformationaboutallnewprojectsandprogrammesonthewebsince1January2011.DFIDrecognisesthattransparencycreatesbetterfeedbackfrombeneficiariestodonorsandtaxpayers.Ithelpstobetterunderstandwhatworksandwhatdoesnot.Italsohelpsreducewasteandtheopportunitiesforfraudandcorruption.

DFIDisalsocommittedtopushforfulltransparencyacrosstheinternationalaidsystembyaskingpartnersandotherdonorstoadheretosimilarstandardsoftransparency.

Andtosquarethecirclefromtransparencytoaccountability,DFIDhascommittedtoprovidingopportunitiesforthosedirectlyaffectedbyDFIDprojectstoprovidefeedbackontheirperformance.Thiscommitmentneedstoapplytoallhumanitarianemergencyworkaswell.Evenifputtingthemintopracticewillbemorechallengingthaninotherareas.

Improvingaccountabilityisintimatelytieduptotheworkonimpactassessments–forcredibleimpactassessmentsthereisaneedtoputdisaster-affectedpeopleatthecentreoftheanalysis.

Thiscanbesupportedthroughinnovativeuseofappropriatetechnologythatimprovescommunicationstoandfromaffectedpopulations.Hi-techwasseeninHaitiwiththeUshahidi“crowdsourcing”platform,low-tech–menonbicycleswithmegaphonesinBangladeshandBurmaforearlywarning.Mobilephonesandradioarebothimportanttoreachpeople.

Impact Theemergencyresponsesectordoesnotroutinelyassessimpact.Whatthismeansisthatforsomeoperationsitisalmostimpossibletosayhowtheassistancehelpedpeople,orevenwhetherithelpedthem.

Therearegoodreasonsforthissometimes.Inemergencies,thereislittletimetomeasureintheearlyhoursanddaysofaresponse,inwhatthereviewseesas“theCriticalPeriod”.Inconflictitcanbedangerous.Andsavinglivesisthepriority.Itisalsomoredifficulttomeasureavertingnegativechange(e.g.topreventfamine)thanbringingaboutapositivechange(asindevelopment)becauseofthelackofdecent

28


counterfactuals.Deliveringinsomeofthemostimportantsectorsofhumanitarianaid,suchasprotectionanddignity,isdifficulttoassess.Aidisonlyoneofanumberofinputsintothelivesofdisaster-affectedpeople.Anyattempttoassessevenatasystem-widelevelisplaguedwithattributionissues,neverminddowntothelevelofindividualdonors’contributionstoaparticularproject.

Otherreasonsfornotdoingimpactassessmentscannotbesoeasilyjustified:itisconvenientnottohavetodoit;theneedforhighvisibilityaction,shapedbydonorsandthemedia;thecompetitionbetweenagenciesandthelackofseriousconsultationwiththepeopleinneed;thefailuresinleadership.Perhapsmostimportant,impactassessmentsrequiretimeandresourcesthatarenottrivial,andtodatefewdonorshavebeenwillingtosupporttheseeffortsonthehumanitariansideofthesystem.

Thisisnolongeracceptable.Thesectormustincreaseitseffortstodemonstrateimpact,anditmustuseevidenceonwhatworksandwhatdoesnotandwhytoimproveitsperformance.Lessonsneedtobelearnedandapplied.DonorslikeDFIDneedtochangetheincentivesinthefinancingsystemtoensurethatimpactisroutinelymeasured,ratherthanfitfullyifatall.Perfectionisnotpossibleforthevalidreasonsoutlinedabovebutalotmorecanbedone.

Thisreviewfoundthattoolsexistorarebeingdevelopedtoovercomethemethodologicalchallenges.CasestudieshavebeencollatedbyALNAPandothers.AframeworkformonitoringandevaluatingresultsandimpactisbeingdesignedforDRCongo’sHumanitarianActionPlan.Thiswillprovidefurtherinsightintowhatcanandcannotbedone.Whatisnecessaryistomoveawayfromasystemwheremanyagenciesstillcontinuetomeasuresuccessinvolumeoffood,goodsorvaccinesdeliveredratherthantheimpactontheaffectedpopulation.Aparticularlyimportantandnecessaryareaforimpactassessmentswillbeininnovation,testingtherelativeimpactofoneapproachcomparedtoanother.

Tomeasureanddemonstrateimpact,actionneedstobetakenatvariousstagesofanemergencyresponseaswellasinresiliencebuildingprogrammes.Itcannotbedoneasanadd-onalone.Andthroughoutallstages,participatoryapproachesshouldbetakenwherepossible.

Intheory,needsassessmentsshouldprovidebaselinesagainstwhichimpactcanlaterbemeasured.Needsassessmentsshouldalsobedesignedandcarriedouthavingtheviewsofaffectedpeoplecentrestage.However,therealitylooksdifferent.Needsassessmentsroutinelylackbaselinedata.Theyaremoreaboutgatheringinformationforplanningandfundraisingbyspecificagenciesthanbuildingacomprehensivepictureofneedandprioritisation.Thereiscompetitionbetweenorganisationsandsectors,theprocessisnottransparentandsharinginformationissometimesdiscouragedasitmightposearisktoaninstitution’sroleintheresponse.Needsassessmentsarequiteoftentoolatetoinformfundingdecisions.

Thelackofbaselinesisnottheonlyproblem.Withoutacommonstrategyandagreeddefinitionsofhumanitarianoutcomes,impactassessmentsaredifficulttocarryout.Forthat,leadershipandstrongpartnershipsareessential(seesections4.3and4.6).

Monitoringhasalsobeenfoundtobeweakandsuffersfrompatchy,inconsistentefforts.Incomplexemergencieswheresecurityandaccessaremajorconstraints,monitoringisanevengreaterchallenge.Remoteprogrammingisincreasinglyused,especiallyincountrieslikeSomalia.

Ex-postevaluationstendtoevaluateactivitiesratherthanimpactanddonotoftenenoughincludeaparticipatoryelementsothatdisastersurvivorscanholdagenciestoaccount.Becauseofalackofresourcesandnarrowagendas,mostevaluationsfocusonaparticularprojectorprogramme;system-wideassessmentsarestillrare.Thequalityof

29

Findings

evaluations,asassessedbyALNAPfrom2000to2008hasbeenconsistentlydisappointing.Impactassessments,whetheragency-specific,sector-wideorsystem-wide,arenotusuallycarriedout.

Technologicaladvancessuchassatelliteimageryarestillnotusedenoughtocollectdataacrosstheprogrammingcycle,includingforneedsassessments,monitoringandimpactassessments.Neitherarenationalcapacitiesusedenoughinmonitoringandevaluativeefforts–whetheroperationalagenciesorthinktanksandacademics.

Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable Thehumanitariansystemispoorlyequippedtoensureanequitableresponseforthemostvulnerable.Whilstissuesspecifictochildren,age,oldpeople,womenandthosewithdisabilityarewidelywrittenabout,therearefewmechanismstodealwiththem.

Thereisnoformalplatformforcollectiveengagementonspecificissues,andthereislittleifanydisaggregateddataonneedsandimpactonvulnerablegroups.Alotoftheevidencebaseisanecdotal,pickedupbysomeonewhowasawareoftheneedsofvulnerablegroupswhiledoingsomethingelse.Culturallyinsensitivepracticessuchasdeliveringreliefitemsinsinglelanesarestillroutinelypractised.DuringthePakistanearthquakethispreventedwidowswithoutmalecompanyfromaccessingaid.AstudybyHelpAge25showsthatadisproportionatelylowamountofhumanitarianassistancewasdedicatedtoensuringthattheneedsofaparticularvulnerablegroupindisaster-affectedpopulations–olderpeople–aremet.

Children,definedbythoseundertheageof18,makeupatleast50%ofaffectedpopulationsinmostoftheemergenciesaroundtheworld.Humanitarianassistancethatdoesnotassessandaddresstheneedsofchildrenmaybeignoringthemajority–andwouldthereforepotentiallybefailingtohavethegreatestimpact.

AmnestyInternationalreportedthatwomenandgirlslivinginthemakeshiftcampsinHaitioneyearafterthedevastating12January2010earthquakefacedanincreasingriskofrapeandsexualviolence.Thecampsprovidedshelterandaccesstobasicservicesintheimmediateaftermathbutnoadequateprotectionforwomenandgirls.

GenderAccountabilitycannotimprovewithoutthehumanitariansystembecomingmoregenderaware.Povertyexperiencedbywomenandmenisshapedbyinequalitiesthatdiscriminateagainstandmarginalisecertainsocialgroups.Themostpervasiveoneisgenderinequalityandthisismagnifiedbytheimpactsofclimatechangeanddisasters.26AstudybytheLondonSchoolofEconomicsshowsthatnaturaldisastersandtheirsubsequentimpactonaveragekillmorewomenthanmenorkillwomenatanearlierage.27

Anapproachthatdoesnotrecognisethatwomen,men,girlsandboysinanemergencysituationhavedifferentneedsandareexposedtodifferenttypesofriskwillinthebestcasebebadqualityprogramming,intheworstcaseitcancauseharm.Projectsthataregenderblindriskmissingoutonthemostvulnerableindividualsandmayalsoprovideaninappropriateresponseduetolackofanalysisandlimitedunderstandingofwhatthegenderspecificneedsare.

Atthesametime,theroleofwomeninprevention,reliefandrecoveryisnotrecognisedenough.Previousevaluationsshowthatwomendrivethemovefromimmediateconcerns–reunitingfamilies,findingshelterandfood–toidentifyingwaystogenerate

25 HelpAge(2010).Astudyofhumanitarianfinancingforolderpeople.London.26 Gender,DisasterRiskReductionandClimateChangeAdaptation:ALearningCompanion,

OxfamDisasterRiskReductionandClimateChangeAdaptationResources,2010.27 TheGenderedNatureofNaturalDisasters:theimpactofcatastrophiceventsonthegender

gapinlifeexpectancy1981–2002.LondonSchoolofEconomics.

30


income.Andwomenhaverepeatedlyledinitiativestoadapttotheimpactsofclimatechange,andtheirknowledgeandresponsibilitiesrelatedtonaturalresourcemanagementhaveprovencriticaltocommunitysurvival.28Womenandgirlsneedtobeconsultedontheirneedsimmediately,appropriatelyandcomprehensivelythroughoutallstagesofassistance.

Recommendations

DFID should:

13 Promote and support mechanisms to give recipients of aid a greater voice.

14 Promote the development of improved needs and robust impact assessments.

15 Workwithotherstocreateanover-archingsetofstandardstoassessbeneficiaryaccountability.

16 Encouragethespreadofbestpracticeinthisarea.

17 Givegreateremphasistobeneficiaryaccountabilityfactorswhenmakingfundingdecisions.

4.6 Partnership

TheUKisnotalargedirectgiverofhumanitarianassistance,preferringinsteadtoworkwithandthroughpartners.Thisreviewendorsesthisapproach;partnershipwillbecomeevenmoreimportantasourinterconnectedworldgetsmoresoandaspowershiftstowardsthenewemergingeconomiessuchasBrazil,China,IndiaandtheGulfStates.TheUKcanachievemorethroughandwithpartners,usingitsresourcestobringtogetherorganisationswithdifferentskillstorespondtoacuteneed.Inthemodernworldthemostimportantpartofwhatanorganisationcandoiswhatitcandowithothers.

ManyofthepartnersDFIDworkswithinhumanitarianresponseareworld-classorganisations.Amultilateralaidreview,commissionedatthesametimeasthisreview,foundthat80%ofhumanitarianagencieswereeithergoodorverygood.

Nevertheless,thehumanitariansectorinrecentyearshasbeenseenbymanyasaclosedshopwithahandfulofagenciesanddonorsdominating.Whilstsomeofthishasbeenforgoodreason–theneedtobeseenasneutralandimpartialinconflictandbeingabletoaccesspopulationsmostly–someofthisissimplynotworking.Thisreviewconcludesthataseachangeinthinkingisrequired,sothatDFIDrecognisesthatitisthequalityofitspartnershipsthatmatters,asmuchifnotmorethanitsownstandalonecapacity.Itsroleshouldbemore‘networkenabler’thanindividualdoer.

Working with the United Nations and its agenciesTheUnitedNationsasawholeisthelargestpartneroftheUKinhumanitarianemergencyresponse.AsapermanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil,andafoundermemberoftheUN,theUKhashistoricallybeenactiveinsupportingmultilateralism.Thisreviewhasconcludedthatthispositionshouldbemaintained,withmultilateralresponsethedefaultpositionoftheUKandDFID.

UNagenciesareamongstthelargestdeliverersofhumanitarianaid.TheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)delivered44billionmealsin2010,mostofitinresponsetoemergenciesorongoingcrises.UNagencieshavethereachandthepresencetodeliver

28 A.Araujoetal(2008),GenderEqualityandAdaptation,IUCN.

31

Findings

aidatscale,andtheirinternationalstatusoftenmeanstheyhaveabetterrelationshipwithgovernment.ThereviewdocumentedsomeexcellentexamplesofUNagency-ledresponse;fromWFPrapidlydeliveringfoodto7millionpeopleinfloodhitPakistan,toUNICEFsupplyinginfantfoodnationallyforstarvingchildreninNiger.Therehavealsobeenfailures,notablytheinabilitytotreatandcontaincholerainHaiti.

Thesectionsonleadership,finance,accountabilityandimpactinthisreviewmakethepointthatthereisstillmuchworktobedonetoimprovetheperformanceoftheinternationalsystem.Clusterleadershipneedstobeimproved,theUNagenciesneedtobettersupportOCHAandtheERC,andneedtoworkmorecollegially.Agenciesneedtogetbetteratreportingresultsratherthanwhattheyhavepurchased.

DFIDneedstosupporttheseefforts.Asoneofthemajordonors,itneedstoprovidegreaterpredictabilityoffundingsothatthemainUNagenciescaninvestintheirhumanitarianresponsecapacities.Itisdifficulttokeepstaff,chartcareersandinvestinpeopleifyoudonotknowwhetheryouwillhavemoneynextyear.Agenciesneedmulti-yearfundingtomaketheseinvestments.ButDFIDcanalsolinkthismoreclearlytoresultsandperformance.Themultilateralaidreviewcanbeagoodbasistostartthisrebalancingoffunding.

ThisreviewconcludesthatalongsidemorepredictablecorefundingtheCERFisavaluablemechanismandshouldcontinuetobesupportedandexpanded.ItalsoconcludesthatNGOsneedsimilarsupport.PooledfundsliketheoneinDRCongohavegenerallyworkedwell.Astheyapplymostlytoprotractedcrisesthereviewhasnotstudiedtheseindepth,excepttogenerallyendorsethisapproach.

UNagenciesarethebackboneofmanyresponses,andtheUKisconsistentlyoneofthelargestcontributors.Thedefaultpositionofmultilateralismmeanstheseagenciesneedsupporting,asdoestheoverallinstitution.Butsupportcannot,andshouldnotbeuncritical.Agenciesmustcollaboratewitheachother,withgovernments,withNGOsandwithUNappointedleadership.Theclusterapproachisthecorrectvision–strategicnetworksbringingtogetherthemainactorsinvolvedinresponse.Butitsimplementationhasbeentooinflexible.Clustersneedtobegroupedaroundneedratherthanmandate,includingallkeyactors,notjustUNagenciesandinternationalNGOs.Theyneedtobestrategic,andoftentheyneedtoworkonseverallevels.Theyneedtobecreative,decisionmakingbodies,notuninspiringtalkshops.ResourcesfromDFIDshouldfollowsuccessonthesecriteria,andnotberoutinelyallocated.

Working with the European Union TheEuropeanUnioncollectivelyprovideshalfofallofficialhumanitarianaid.Italsohasitsownhumanitarianaidagency,ECHO,whichisthesecondlargestglobaldonorinitsownright.AndalthoughtheUKprovidesasixthofitsfunding,itdoesnotengagewithECHOstrategically.Thisneedstochange.

DFID’spolicylevelrelationshipwithECHOisweak.DFIDandECHOtoooftenworkinparallel,failingtocommunicateeffectively.Thisresultsinduplicationofworkandcostlyoverlaps.IndisastersituationsECHOisroutinelyunawareofwhatDFID’sresponsewillbe.Atpolicylevel,DFIDfocusespriorityattentiononthemajorUNhumanitarianpartnersratherthanotherdonors.ThelackofeffectivepartnershipwithECHOisawastedopportunity.TheUKholdsauniquepositionamongstEUmemberstates,withcapacitytoprovideeffectivehumanitarianaidwhenactingalone.Thisexperienceifbettershared,couldbebeneficialtobothagencies.

AtpresentDFID’srelationshipwithECHOappearstobedelegatedtojuniorstaff.Whatisneededisbetterengagementatpolicylevel,andbetteralignmentatdeliverylevel.DFIDneedstohaveamoreconsistentstrategicdialoguewithECHO.ItneedstobeawareofECHO’sstrategicplanningprocessesandengagewiththese.

32


Mostimportantly,DFIDneedstogetsmarteratsharingresourceswithECHO.Nigerisagoodexampleofhowthiscanwork.ECHOhasstrongtechnicaladvisorypresencethroughitsspecialisedofficesandpermanentrepresentationthroughtheEUdelegation.DFIDreliedonECHOtoleadtheresponse.ButDFIDalsoperiodicallysenthumanitarianadvisorstoreinforceandcomplementECHOleadership.InothersituationsECHOmightfollowaDFIDlead.

Working with bilateral donorsTheUSgovernmentistheworld’slargestindividualhumanitariandonor.Itisveryinfluential,withtheheadsofWFP,UNICEFandtheWorldBanktraditionallycomingfromtheUS.TheUSgovernmentisalsothelargestdonortoUNHCRandtheICRC.

ThismeanstheUShasanopportunitytoinfluenceUNagenciesatahighlevel.ThisisoftennotusedcoherentlybecauseofthefragmentednatureoftheUSaidbureaucracy.Butevenso,DFIDdoesnothaveasustainedpolicydialoguewiththehumanitarianagenciesoftheUSgovernment,andisoftenperceivedbytheUSasaloner.

TheUSwasconsideringasignificantreductionintheamountofhumanitarianaiditgivesasthisreviewwenttopress(40%offoodaidanddisasterresponseby70%).Werethistohappen,forDFIDitwouldmeanthatconversationsaboutburdenshare–similartothosewithECHO–wouldbeevenmorevital.ItwillbeimportanttounderstandwheretheUSwillfocusitsefforts,andtoensurethatscarcehumanitarianresourcesarespreadmosteffectively.WheretheUSwillobviouslylead–Haitiwasagoodexample–thenDFIDshouldbeabletofitaroundthis.

TheGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)grouphasplayedaroleinachievingchangeinthehumanitariansystem.DonorssuchastheNetherlands,Sweden,NorwayandCanadahavebeenclosealliesforDFID.GHDhascreatedaspaceforcollectiveactionthatdidnotpreviouslyexist,andprovidedDFIDwithitsmostconsistentallies.Lately,ithaslostmomentum.DFIDshouldworktoreinvigoratethisgroup,bothgloballyandincountrieslikeDRCongowhereitplaysapivotalrole.

DFIDsharesthebasichumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutralityandimpartialityasastartingpointforpartnershipwithothertraditionalhumanitariandonors.TheprinciplesofGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)bindlike-mindeddonorstogetheraroundafurthersetofcoredonorprinciples.TheGHDgroupisastartinggroundformoreeffectivedonoraction.ButmoreneedstobedonebyDFIDtodemonstrateacollegialapproach.

WideningthegroupwhoadheretoGHDprincipleswouldbeapositivewayforward.DFIDisoneofthestrongergroupmemberswithcapacitytoinfluencehowtobringothersin.TheannualMontreuxmeetingmightbetheforumforthisandcouldpotentiallybewidenedinscopeandambition.

Working with new donor partnersTheworldischanging.Chinaisnowthesecondlargestglobaleconomy.NationssuchasIndia,SouthAfrica,Russia,Brazil,andSaudiArabiaareimportantregionalpowers.Theglobalpictureofwhorespondstohumanitarianneedischangingtoo.Increasingcontributionstodisasterresponsearebeingseenfromdonorsoutsidethe‘traditional’OECDDACgroup.

Allofthenationscitedabovesignificantlyrespondtodisastersintheirregions.China’scontributiontoWFPdoubledin2005andwasoneofthelargestdonorsinBurmaafterCycloneNargisin2008(andinPakistanduringthefloodsin2010).BrazilwasamajorresponderinHaiti.SaudiArabiawasthesinglelargestdonortoBangladeshfollowingcycloneSidr(andwasoneofthetopfiveglobaldonorsin2009).IndiagavethroughmultilateralchannelstoPakistanfloodrelief.

33

Findings

Theemerginggroupofnon-traditionalpartnersisanopportunityforDFIDtoestablishnewrelationships.Todoso,DFIDmustlookforareasofcommongroundthatalreadyexist.Similarviewpointscanbeusedasstartingpoints.Forexample,Brazil’sviewonhumanitarianresponseis,likeDFIDtobuildownershipbyworkingwithlocalauthorities.

DFIDcancombineitsexpertisewiththatofnationsthatregularlyexperiencelargescalenaturaldisasters,andworkwiththemtosharelearningwithotheratrisknations.Russia’sEmergencyControlMinistry,EMERCOMhasvastcapacityandexperience.Indiahasacadreofexperienceddisastermanagersingovernment,followingdisastersinOrissa,GujuratandTamilNadu.China’shandlingoftheSichuanearthquakeresponsewasexemplary.China’scurrent5yearplan(2006–2011)includesdisasterrelief,highlightingtheimportanceofmultilateralcoordination.

Chinahasenormouscapacitytorespondanddeepexperienceofhumanitarianemergencieswithinitsownborders.AnydisastersintheregionoftheHinduKushwilllikelyseeChinarespondinginasignificantway.Toremainahumanitarianleaderintothe21stcentury,DFIDshouldreachouttoseektobuildnewrelationshipswithChinaalongthelinesoftheirrecentWhitePaper.

TheGulfStates,suchasQatar,theUAEandSaudiArabiaaresignificantdonorsinthehumanitarianassistanceandareincreasinglybecominginvolvedinotherways.TheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)hasanewhumanitarianmechanism.DFIDisalreadyworkingwiththeGCCandhumanitarianassistanceisagoodareaofcommoninterest.

Inforgingnewhumanitarianrelationships,DFIDshouldnotrisk‘goingitalone’.Alliancesmustbebuiltwithothertraditionalhumanitariandonorstowelcomenewpartnersonboard.SupportmustbecorralledfromwithintheDACgrouptocreateareceptiveforumfornewdonorstojoin.DFIDwillhavetolookwideracrossWhitehalltoinfluenceinthisaction.ClosecollaborationbetweenDFID,FCOandotherWhitehalldepartmentswillbevitaltodevelopopportunities.TheFCO’scapacitytobuildrapidconsensusthroughcablesinsupportofASEAN’sroleinresponsetoCycloneNargisin2008hasalreadybeendemonstrated.DFIDshouldmakemoreuseofthediplomaticnetworksandothergovernmentdepartmentsinordertobuildwidercoalitionsitneedstodrivethroughtheinternationalreformagenda.

DFID’scommitmenttohumanitarianprincipleswillbecomeincreasinglyimportantaspartnershipsaredeveloped.Demonstratingthevalueofthesewillbeanimportantpartofnewrulesforinternationalhumanitariancollaboration.

Working with NGOsTheUKhassomeofthemostrespectedandimportantinternationalnon-governmentorganisationsintheworld.OrganisationslikeOxfamandSavetheChildrenareknownworldwide.TheirworkhashelpedmillionsindisasterfromEthiopia,toBangladeshtoHaiti.Theirpioneeringtechnicalworkhasoftensetthestandardforotherhumanitarianagencies.TheyarehighlyregardedbytheUKpublicandreceivegeneroussupportwhenmassivedisastersstrike.

Non-governmentorganisations(NGOs)alsoprovidemuchoftheimplementationcapacityinhumanitarianemergencyresponse.IndigenousandfaithbasedNGOsareoftenthefirsttorespond,andunderstandbothcultureandcontext.InternationalNGOsareadeptatdeployingquickly,oftensettingupbigreliefoperationsweeksbeforetheUNcranksintogear.In2008NGOsspent$5.7billiononhumanitarianassistance29.NGOsoftenhavelargeprogrammesinaffectedcountriesbeforedisasterstrikes,haveexperienceinresiliencebuildingespeciallyincommunitybaseddisasterriskreductionandmanyworkwithnationalandlocalorganisations.

29 GHAreport2010.DevelopmentInitiatives.

34


ThetermNGOcoversadiversityoforganisations.WorldVisionhadaturnoverof$2.1billionin200630,rivallingUNICEFat$2.7billioninthesameyear.In2006MedecinsSansFrontieres(MSF)spent$575milliononhumanitarianaid.Onlytwogovernments–theUKandtheUS–spentmoreonofficialbilateralhumanitarianassistancethatyear.TheCatholicChurchnetworkCaritas’svoluntaryspendwasequivalenttothebilateralhumanitarianassistanceofSweden,thesixthlargestdonorin2006.Insomecases,asinglememberofanNGOfamilymakesamoresignificantcontributionthanitshostgovernment.Forexample,MSFFrancespentanestimated$81millionoftheFrenchpublic’smoneyonrespondingtocrisesin2006,comparedwithbilateralspendingofonly$48millionbytheFrenchgovernment.

NGOsarealsorapidlygrowinginscaleandgeographicspread.IndiahasamillionindigenousorganisationsthatdescribethemselvesasNGOs.BRACinBangladeshclaimstobetheworld’slargestNGOifnumberofemployeesisconsideredratherthanfinancialturnover.MercyMalaysiahasbecomeawell-knowninternationalNGOrunningprogrammesasfarafieldasAfrica;AfricaHumanitarianActioninEthiopiarunsprogrammesacrosstheHorn.

WhatNGOsrepresentattheirbestiscitizens’action.OrganisationslikeMSFhaveverygenerouspublicsupportacrossEuropeandtheUS,receiving86%oftheirfundsfromprivatedonations.Theirglobalspreadistestimonytotheirenduringappeal.

Forofficialdonorsandtheinternationalsystemthiscreatesbothanopportunityandachallenge.Theincreasedcapacity,especiallyofnationalandlocalNGOsprovidesuntappedpotential.TheHaitiearthquakeprovidesanexamplethoughoftheheadachethattryingtocoordinatetheNGOsectorcanbe,withmorethan1,000internationalNGOsflyingintoPortauPrincereadytohelp.SomeNGOsareanintegralpartofthesystem.SavetheChildrenco-leadstheeducationclusterwithUNICEF;Oxfamprovidespeoplereadytogoforthewaterandsanitationcluster.ButotherNGOseitherdonotknow,ordonotacceptthissystem.Manyturnuplookingforguidance.Otherstrytopushapoliticalagenda.

FaithgroupsareanotherexampleofagrowingNGOsectorwithpotentialtoimproveresponsesthroughtheirstronglinkswithandaccesstolocalcommunities.TheyraiseconsiderabledonationsfromfaithandDiasporacommunitiesoutsidetheDECappeals.

TheinternationalNGOsectorhasgonealongwayintryingtoself-regulate.ThereisanindustrywideCodeofConduct,technicalstandardsforeachsectorofactivityandlotsofworkonaccountability.Unfortunatelythishasnotbeenenoughtostemthetideoffirsttime“wellwishers”,manyofwhomdonotknowaboutstandards,codesandtheideathattheirhelpmightdomoreharmthangood.NeitherhasitmadeanimpactonthecompetitionbetweeninternationalNGOs.AswithUNagenciesthiscompetitionmeansthatassessmentinformationisoftentreatedascommerciallysensitive,leadingtomultiplesurveysandorganisationsjostlingforfundingforparticulargeographicareasortechnicalsectors.

AsaresultofthehumanitarianreformeffortswiththeUN,DFIDhasratherneglectedtheNGOsectorinthelastfiveyears.Latterlythishasbeenchangingwiththeestablishmentofinnovativeconsortia,bothforimprovingrapidresponseandin-countryforlocalNGOs.TheConsortiumofBritishHumanitarianAgencies(CBHA)andtheWestAfricaRegionalHumanitarianFund(WARHF)offertwoprovenmodelsataglobalandregionallevel.Theseareeffectiveandshouldbeexpanded.

DFIDshouldalsoconsider,eitherthroughconsortiaorindividually,investinginNGOswithspecialistresponsecapabilitiestoensurethesecanbedeployedrobustly.Thiscould

30 DIreportfor2009Montreuxdonorsconference.

35

Findings

belinkedtoclusterneedsandresponsibilities(forinstancewithCAREwhosupportthesheltercluster,orMerlinwhohaveco-chairedcountryhealthclusters).

IncountrieswhereDFIDhasapresencethistypeofapproachcanbeextendedtonationalandlocalNGOsandapplytointernationalNGOswithsubstantialpresenceandexperience.ThecivilsocietyfundinDRCongocouldserveasamodel,wherebyoneNGOactsasthegrantholderonbehalfofthecollective.USAIDusesthesetypesof‘umbrellagrants’routinely.AnothermodelisUNDPinBangladesh;anotheristherecentlyformedCBHA.

WhilstthesetypesofapproacheshavethepotentialtoimprovetheeffectivenessofmanyofthebiggerinternationalNGOs,itwillnotsolvetheissueofeverincreasingproliferation.OnepotentialmeasurethathasbeendebatedwithintheNGOcommunityformanyyearsisfor‘accreditation’ofsomesort,allowingaccreditedNGOseasieraccesstocoordinationmeetingsandsoon.ThisideahasbeenresistedonthegroundsthatitwouldbealmostimpossibletoachieveandthatitmightunfairlyexcludeNGOswithrealcapacityorinsighttooffer–especiallynationalNGOs.However,thereviewfindsthatasystemisneededtohelpshortcutsomeofthechaosofcoordinationofNGOs,perhapslinkedtopre-crisisarrangementsandplanning.ThisworkcanonlybeconductedbytheNGOsectoritself.ButDFIDshouldencourage,helpandsupportthisprocess.Whateveritlookslike,ithastohelpaffectedgovernmentsandthosechargedwithcoordinationtounderstandwhereareputableorganisationhasprovencapabilityandhowitcouldbestbedeployed.

Working with the Red Cross and Red Crescent MovementTheInternationalRedCross/CrescentMovementistheworld’slargesthumanitariannetwork.Thereare186NationalSocietieswithaSecretariatinGenevaaswellastheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),aprivateSwissorganisationdedicatedtohelpingvictimsofconflict.TheICRCreceivesthelargestamountofDFIDhumanitarianfundingofanysingleagency,at£66millioninfinancialyear2009/2010.

TherelationshipbetweenDFIDandtheRedCross/RedCrescentMovementhastraditionallybeenmediatedbytheBritishRedCrossSociety(BRCS).TheBRCSisoneofthestrongerNationalSocieties(NS)intheMovement,alargecontributortootherNSinitsownright,andastrategicvoiceintheIFRCSecretariat.Forthepastdecade,DFIDfundsforboththeIFRCandICRCpassedthroughtheBRCSinwhatwascalleda‘tripartite’relationship.ThisrecentlychangedfortheICRC–DFIDfundsnowgodirecttoGeneva–butremainsthesamefortheIFRC.

Thedifferentarrangementsreflectthestrengthsandcharacterofthedifferentorganisations.TheICRCiswidelyadmiredforitsprofessionalismanditsadherencetomandate.ItscoreshighlyininternalDFIDanalysis,includingtherecentmultilateralaidreview,andwithcountryoffices.ThismakestheICRCapartnerofchoiceinconflictsituationsandthisreviewendorsesthatview.DFIDshouldcontinuetoworkwiththeICRCasitis,atrustedandprincipledpartnerinconflictsituations.

TheNationalSocietiesandtheIFRCSecretariataredifferent.Thenetworkhastremendouspotential,rootedasitisinitsnationalbase.NationalSocietiesarerequiredtohaveauxiliarystatustogovernmenttobeamember,andinmanycountriesthisisasignificantrole.TheChineseRedCrosshasaround20millionvolunteersandoftenrespondsalongsidethePeople’sLiberationArmyindisasters.TheIranianRedCrescentSocietyistheofficialresponsearmofgovernment,withhugereliefstocksandlogisticsassetsincludinghelicopters.TheAmericanRedCrossisresponsibleformasscareindomesticdisasters.

Butthenetworkdoesnotroutinelyachieveitspotential.Itislessthanthesumofitsparts,withmanyNationalSocietiesthatareunder-resourcedandunder-performing.

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Particularlyinsub-SaharanAfrica,manyoftheNationalSocietiesaremarginaltotheirnationallifeandincapableoflarge-scalemobilisation.Partlythisisaquestionofresources–whenahighachievingofficerfromtheIFRCSecretariatbecameSecretaryGeneralofaweakperformingNationalSociety,andwasremuneratedataninternationallevel,therewasastepchangeinperformance.Itisalsoaquestionofmanagementandgovernance.

InthenewdirectionrecommendedforDFIDinthisreview,focusingonnationalresilience,thereisamajorroleforRedCrossandRedCrescentNationalSocieties.WorkingthroughandwithNationalSocietiescanbeagoodwaytoengagewithNationalDisasterManagementAgencies,andwithnationaldisasterlegislation.NationalSocietiesareoftenclosetocommunities,throughtheirvolunteernetworksandtheFederationhaspioneeredworkoncommunitybaseddisasterpreparedness.

TheIFRCalsoremainsamassivenetworkfordisasterresponse,oftentheveryfirsttohelpthroughlocalvolunteersandmobilisingthenetworkofNationalSocietiesataregionalorgloballevel.Theirperformanceinresponsehasbeenmixedhowever.ThiscriticalrolecouldbeimprovedwithgreaterclarityoffocusonimprovingtheglobalRedCross/RedCrescentresponsesystemfromtheFederation,andstrengthenedbettercapacityattheNSlevel.

Butthiscanonlyworkifsomeofthefundamentalproblemscanberesolved.WorkingwithandthroughtheBritishRedCrossisasensiblehalfwayhouseforthetimebeing.TheBRCShasauxiliarystatustogovernmentintheUK,althoughinpracticethishasnotoftenbeeninvokedinrecentyears.DFIDshouldworkcloselywithBRCSandtheIFRCSecretariattoinvolvetheFederationinitsresiliencework.ItshouldalsocontinuetosupporttheglobalreadinessoftheFederation.TheBRCScanactasaninterlocutor,giventheotherwisetimeconsumingnatureofapotentialengagement.

TheroleoftheBRCSasanauxiliarycouldbere-invigoratedinotherways.TheBRCSalreadyprovidesadegreeoflegaladviceonthelawsofwartotheMOD;thiscouldbeextendedtoDFID.BRCSalsokeepsanumberofhighqualityemergencyteamsonpermanentstandbyfortheFederation.ThenationalsocietyhasofferedtoextendthistypeofsurgearrangementtoDFID,somethingthatshouldbeexplored.

Working with the private sectorTheprivatesectorrepresentsahugesourceofuntappedcapacityandexpertisetoreducesufferingandhelprebuildcommunitiesintheaftermathofadisaster.Itcanalsohelptomitigatedisasterriskthroughpreventionandpreparedness.Thispotentialmustbeunlockediffuturechallengesaregoingtobemet.

Theemphasisneedstoshiftfromseeingtheprivatesectorasadonortobeinga‘doer’,andasavaluedpartnernotacontractedentity.Newmodalitiesofengagementarerequiredinordertoenablethehumanitariansectortohaveaccesstoskillsandproductsasandwhenrequired.Examplesofthisincludepublic-privatepartnershipsthatenablethesharingofrisks,creditandinvestment(e.g.theCaribbeanCatastropheRiskInsuranceFacility,theBritishEarthquakeConsortiumforTurkey).

Butthereisstilldistrustfromthehumanitariansectorthatcharacterisesitselfas‘non-profit’towardsprivatesectororganisationswhoseprimemotivationisperceivedas‘profit’.Thisbarriertocollaborationneedstobeovercome,andDFIDshouldbeactiveinhelpingtoachievethis.Theprivatesector’smotivationforengagementisbasedonawiderbusinessinterest,includingbrand,newmarkets,corporatesocialresponsibility,andstaffmotivation.Andinviewofthisfirmsareoftenwillingtoengageonareducedrateor‘atcost’basis,asforexamplewithDigicellinHaiti.HumanitarianorganisationssuchasMapActionandRedRrelyontrainedpersonnelfromtheprivatesectorbeingavailablewhenneededforcriticalshort-termassignmentsintheimmediateaftermathofadisaster,oftenonavolunteerorpartialcostbasis.

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Findings

Companiesandgovernmentshaveoutsourcedservicesforyears,concentratingontheircoreadvantage.Thehumanitariansectoralsohasasetofquasi-commercialrelationshipsinitsgrant/recipient/sub-contractingmodel.Protectionistrhetoricneedstobereplacedwithafocusonwhocandowhat,mosteffectively.Again,DFIDshouldencourageandstimulatethisprocess.

Thecurrentmodelsofprivatesectorengagementinhumanitarianactiongenerallyfocusonlargemultinationalcompaniesandinvolvepro-bonocontributionsoftheirproducts,skillsandexpertisetoresponseoperations.Thisismostlyinthesectorsoflogistics,ITandcommunication,mapping,engineeringandmedicalsupplies.ThebestknownexampleinthesectoristhecollaborationofAgility,TNTandUPSinprovidinglogisticsandtransportationservicestoWFP.Therehavealsobeenproactiveeffortsbytheprivatesectortobetterunderstandhumanitarianaction,andvariousinitiatives,suchastheWorldEconomicForumDisasterRiskPartnershiptofacilitateaccesstoprivatesectorexpertiseinengineeringandconstruction.

Theprivatesectorcanbringprofessionalism,leadershipandmanagementbestpractice,toolsfordrivingefficiencyandmanagingrisk,andtheuseofcuttingedgetechnologyandinformation.Suchskillsneedtobecontextualizedtothechallengesofpost-disastersituationsthroughworkinginpartnershipwithhumanitarianorganisationsandbuildinglong-termcollaborativerelationshipsthatenableknowledgetransfer.

Recognitionofthevalueoftheinternationalprivatesectorneedstobematchedwithunderstandingoftheimportanceoflocalbusinessesandcompaniesinimmediateresponseandincatalysingeconomicrecovery.Thisimportanceislikelytochangesignificantlywhencashtransfersbecomemoreprominent.

Thelocalprivatesectorisusuallythefirstthatcanrespondwithreliefitemsandfood.Itcanprovideemploymentandcontributetonormalisation.HindustanConstructionCompanyinIndiahasbeenabletorespondtofloodsinOrissaandfloods/landslidesinLaddakhwheretheyhadconstructionsites.Notablyitisnationalcompanieslikethesewhohavethecapacitytorespondaswellastherelationshipswiththelocalgovernmentandcommunity.

InHaiti,theruralhinterlandwasnotmuchaffectedbytheearthquakeandmarketsresumedquickly.Large-scalefoodaidwasneverthelessimported,withapotentiallydetrimentaleffectontheagriculturaleconomy.

Thelocalprivatesectorcanalsoprofiteerfromdisasters.ThereisevidencethatNiger’scerealmarketisstrictlycontrolledbyarestrictedgroupoftraders.Thesetraderskeepcerealsoutofcirculationuntilthemaximumpriceisreached.

Alltheseexamplesshowthatpositiverelationshipswiththeprivatesectorneedtobeestablishedpre-disastersothattheycanbebestusedwhendisasterstrikes.InDFID’sresilienceandpreparednesswork,thelocalandnationalprivatesectorneedstobeakeypartner.

Disastersareincreasinglytakingplaceinurbanenvironments.Urbanenvironmentsarecharacterisedbyahighconcentrationofprivatesectorinterests(markets,labour,thesupplychain).Urbanareasarealsodependentoninfrastructureforthedeliveryofessentialservices(water,solidwastemanagement,sanitation,drainage,energy)Damagedinfrastructureneedstoberapidlyreinstatedandissueslikerubbleremovalarecriticaltomakinglandavailableforcamps,andintegratedurbanplanningisneededinordertoprovideabasisforrecoveryandreconstruction.ReinstatingtheseisoutsidetheskillssetofNGOsorUNagencies,andfundingandprocurementbarriersoftenpreventsuchskillsbeingaccessedinatimelyfashionfromtheprivatesector.

Local,nationalandinternationalcompaniesholdtheknowledgeandexpertisetorespondtourbandisasters.Theycouldbeofgreatvaluetohumanitarianorganisations

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operatingoutoftheirtraditionalareasofexpertise.Thereareexamplesofmunicipalgovernmentsturningdirectlytotheprivatesector,forinstancetheDujiangyanMunicipalGovernmentaftertheChineseearthquake,andapublic-privatepartnership(PRES)betweenArauco,theministryofhousingandlocalmunicipalityinSantiago,Chile.

DFIDhassetupanewPrivateSectorDepartmentinJanuary2011tohelpraisethelevel,extentandeffectivenessofDFID’sengagementwiththeprivatesector.Thisisanexcellentinitiative.Existingandnewprogrammescouldaddressmanyoftheissuesraisedabove.FacilitiessuchasthePrivateInfrastructureDevelopmentGrouportheBusinessInnovationFacilitycouldhavehumanitarianwindows.Knowledgegenerationanddisseminationactivitiescouldincluderelevanthumanitariancases.Andwhereappropriate,CHASEandthePrivateSectorDepartmentcouldworktogetherongalvanisingprivatesectorexpertisearoundspecificopportunitiesthatneedunblocking.Anexamplewouldbefastinfrastructurerehabilitationinurbanareas.Anothermightbeencouragingtheprivatesectortohelpstrengthenthehumancapacityoflocalgovernmentsandstructurestomanageemergencies.

Working with the militaryThemilitaryhaslongbeeninvolvedindisasterreliefoperations.Domesticmilitaryareoftenthefirstresponseofgovernment.Internationalmilitaryinvolvementindisasterreliefhasbeenmorecontentious,especiallywherethereareobviouspoliticalormilitaryobjectives.Buthumanitarianworkersneedtobeabletoacknowledgeareasofmilitarycomparativeadvantageandrecognisewheretheycanworktogether.Itisvitaltoupholdhumanitarianprinciples.Itisequallyvitaltousethemosteffectiveresourcesatourdisposaltomeettheneedsofthoseaffected,especiallyifpredictionsofincreasedneedmaterialise. ThereviewtakestheviewthattheBritishmilitarydoeshavearoletoplayinsupportoftheUKresponseledbyDFID.

Itisthenationalgovernment’sresponsibilitytodecidewhethertocallinmilitaryresourcesinsupportofahumanitarianresponse.Thismaybeadecisiontousethecountry’sownmilitaryortoaccepttheuseofforeignmilitary.Inmanycountries,callingintheirownmilitarytorespondtoalarge-scaledomesticdisasteristhemostobviousthingtodo.Aftertheearthquakeof2005,thePakistanarmywasthefirstresponder,savingthemostlivesbypullingpeopleoutoftherubbleandbyprovidingthefirstreliefitems.Whenbigdisastershit,oftenacountry’smilitaryistheonlyactorwithadequateresourcestorespondatspeedandscale.DFIDshouldrecogniseacountry’srighttouseitsownmilitaryindisasterresponseandbesupportive.

Anationalgovernmentmayrequestassistancefromforeignmilitary.FollowingthetsunamithathitBandaAceh,Indonesiain2004militaryhelicoptersfrominternationalforceswereneededtoreachcutoffpopulationsandmanynationsprovidedmilitaryassetstowardthisoperation.Asubsequentreviewfounditoneofthemosteffectivepartsoftheinitialinternationalresponse31.ChinaprovidedmilitaryhelicoptersandmedicalteamsafterthePakistanfloodsin2010.Theseexamplesdemonstratethebenefitofextramilitarysupportwhendisastersaresolargethatthecombinedresourcesofdomesticmilitaryandthoseoftheinternationalhumanitariancommunityareinsufficienttomeettheneedsoftheaffectedpopulation.

Inarmedconflict,orsensitivepoliticalsituations,usingmilitaryassetsassociatedwithpartiestotheconflictcancompromisetheperceivedneutrality–andthereforesafety–ofhumanitarianworkers.Thereisanobviousneedtobeabletodistinguishbetweenthesesituationsandmakesensiblepolicydecisionsbasedoncontext.Indisasterscausedbynaturalhazard,attherequestofgovernmentandwithclearcomparativeadvantage,

31 TECcoordinationstudy:www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec/thematic/coordination.aspx

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Findings

militaryplanningandassetscanbehugelybeneficial.Inconflict,thisisnotusuallythecase,althoughUNmandatedforcescanhelpinsecuringhumanitarianaccess.

Twoinstrumentscurrentlyexisttoguidetheappropriateuseofmilitaryresourcesinhumanitariansituations,the‘Oslo’guidelinesfordisasters,andtheUNguidelines32forconflict.TheOsloguidelinesestablishtheprincipleof‘lastresort’.Thisisusefulasitmakesgovernmentsandpolicymakersthinktwicebeforedeployingmilitaryforces.ThisreviewhasconcludedthattheOsloguidelinesarestillrelevant.DFIDshouldinterpretandwherepossibledefinetheprincipleoflastresortas,‘onlyusingmilitaryassetswhennothingelsewilldo’.Thiswillopenthedoortotheuseofnichecapabilities,withoutopeningthe‘floodgates’tounwelcomedeploymentofmilitaryassetsforeverybigemergency.

NichecapabilitiesoftheBritishmilitarymayincludestrategicplanningandsurgedeployment.Itmayalsoincludeagreateruseofmilitaryassets.Thereisanassumptionthatthiskitistooexpensive.Therealissueiswhetherthereareessentialassetsforsavinglivesthatcannotbesecuredintimeanyotherway.

InconflictsituationsdeploymentofmilitaryassetsshouldbeinlinewiththeUNguidelines.Butthereisawiderpointabouthowhumanitariansengagewithmilitaryforces,andthedifferencebetweenthem.Whenmilitaryforcescontrolareasthereisaneedforahumanitariandialoguetoensurepopulationsinneedcanbeaccessed.ManyUNforcesareroutinelygivenmandatestoprotectcivilians,andinsuchsituationshumanitarianorganisationsneedtoworkwiththem.33

Recommendations

DFID should:

18 Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (including China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).

19 Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral33. In particular it should:

• EngagemoreeffectivelywithECHOonapolicylevel,andexplorethepossibilityofco-financing.

• WorkwithotherstosupporttheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinatorinthereformofOCHAandthesystemmorewidely.

20 WorkwithpartnerstopromotedonorcoordinationandrevitalisetheGoodHumanitarianDonor-shipgroup.

21 EnsurethatthenewPrivateSectorDepartmentgivesfullconsiderationtothoseareaswhereprivatesectorexpertisecanimprovehumanitarianresponseeffectiveness,includingatthecountrylevel.

22 UsemilitaryassetsinsituationswhereareconsistentwithOsloguidelinesandoffercapacityotherscannot,orprovidebettervalueformoneythancommercialalternatives.

23 WorkwithNGOstopromotetheconceptofaccreditationorcertification.

32 MilitaryandCivilDefenceAssets(MCDA):http://www.coe-dmha.org/media/guidance/3mcdaguidelines.pdf

33 Seesection5.2forrecommendationonfunding.

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4.7 Humanitarian space

Whenthereisconflict,wherestateshavefailed,whengovernmentsarebelligerentorvenalDFIDcannotworkdirectlythroughtheauthorities.Insuchcasesthereisafragile‘space’inwhichhumanitarianagenciesareacceptedandworktohelpthosemostinneed.DFIDneedstodowhatitcantonurtureandexpandthisspace;byobservingthekeyprinciplesofhumanity,impartialityandneutrality,andbyleadingwhereithasinfluencetoensureothersdo.

Humanitarianprincipleshaveevolvedovertimetohelpagenciesaccessandprotectpopulationsmostatrisk.Wherethoseagenciesareseenasneutral,impartialandindependenttheycanbuildtrustwithcombatants,allowingthemtodeliveraid.Whereaidislinkedtopoliticalormilitarygoalsthesecurityofstaffcanbecompromised,makingitdifficulttoreachthosemostinneed.

ThisreviewconcludesthatDFIDhumanitarianpolicyshouldbetoprotectandwherepossibleenlargethisfragilespace;toworkwithagenciesthatcanaccessandhelpthoseindireneedandtocontinuetoresistthepoliticisationofhumanitarianaid.Thereviewalsorecognisesthatincomplexconflicts,andthebreakdownofstateauthoritythattherewillbetimeswhenmilitaryforce,mandatedbytheUN,willbeneededtoprotectciviliansandhumanitarianworkers.

Protection of civiliansInconflictsituationsandaftersomedisasters,particularlyinurbanareasciviliansneedprotectionfromviolence.Oftentheneedforsecuritycomesbeforeanythingelse.

Thisreviewwasnotmandatedtoconsiderthefullrangeofconflictsituations,focusingonlyonnaturaldisastersandspikesinconflict.Insituationsofconflict,itisclearthatprotectionofciviliansandhumanitarianaccessisparamount.

TheUKcanplayameaningfulroleinsuchsituations,evenwhereitisapartytotheconflict.Itmustobserveinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Itcanuseitsinfluencetoremindothersoftheirobligationsunderinternationalhumanitarianlawandhumanrightslaw.Itcanworkwithlegitimatehumanitarianagenciestoassistthemintheirrole.AnditcansupporttheworkoftheUnitedNationsinpeacekeeping,byensuringthatpeacekeepingmandatesincludetheprotectionofcivilians,andthatpeacekeepingforcesareresourcedforthis.

InthecasestudyforDRCongo,itwasclearthatUNpeacekeepinghasmadeprogressinitsprotectionwork.Whilsttherecontinuetobehorrificattacksagainstcivilians(massrapesbygovernmentaffiliatedforcestonameone),thepeacekeepingforceunderstandsithasadutytotryandpreventtheseandworkswithhumanitarianstothisend.Thisshouldbereinforced.Itishardforsoldiers,trainedinthetacticsoffightingbattles,tofindwaysofpreventingattacksoncivilians,especiallywhenresourcesarescarce.MobileoperationalbasesofthetypetrialledinDRCongohavemerit,especiallywhencoupledwithwaysforcommunitiestotriggerthem.

DFIDcanworkwithagenciesliketheICRC,theUNHCRandOHCHRtoenablethemtocarryouttheirprotectionwork(visitingprisoners,registeringrefugeesandpromotingrights).InparticularDFIDmustensurethatinconflicthumanitarianbudgetsfundneutralandimpartialagencies,andsubstitutionofbasicserviceswhereappropriate.

DFIDcanworkwiththeUN,includinginpeacekeepingassetoutabove.Thisistechnicalwork,andhasmerit.Thebiggerpictureisthatconflictispolitical.Humanitarianworkcannotbethestickingplasterforalackofpoliticalaction.

CasestudiesinDRCongo,GazaandBurmademonstratethelimitedinfluencetheUKworkingonitsownhasinsituationsofconflict.Thesamecasestudiesshow,however,thattherearethingsthatcanbeachieved,especiallyworkingwithothers.InBurma

41

Findings

followingcycloneNargis,workingwiththeASEANgroupofnationsitwaspossibletogainaccessforhumanitarians.InDRCongo,thepatient,patchybuild-upofinternationalhumanitarian,militaryandlegalactiontriestocontainconflictandhelpthoseaffectedbyit.InGaza,DFIDsupportedtheUNincoordinatingaccessadvocacythroughaHumanitarianAssistanceFramework,praisedbyBanKi-Moon.

Aparticularissuerelatingtocounter-terrorismlegislationhasariseninseveralcomplexemergenciesrecently(Somalia,Colombia,SriLankaandGaza)andislikelytocomeupmoreofteninthefuture.DFID,onoccasion,hadtostopfundingthehumanitarianworkofinternationalNGOsandotherimplementingpartnersbecausetheycouldnot100%ensurethataterroristorganisationwouldnotindirectlyordirectlybenefit.Europeanlegallybindinginstrumentsoncounter-terrorismandUKlegislationstipulatethatanybodydirectlyorindirectlyfundingterroristorganisationswillbeprosecutedundercriminallaw.However,exemptionscanbemadebytheEuropeanCouncilonhumanitariangrounds.

Thisreviewfindsthatinthesecircumstances,andinallcasesofconflict,anessentialpriorityistonegotiatehumanitarianaccessonanunimpededbasis.AllpartiesarerequiredtograntsuchaccessunderInternationalHumanitarianLaw.Thisshouldbenegotiatedatthehighestnecessarylevel,andnotlefttofieldworkerstomanageontheirown.Inthecasesabove,thelegalproblemshouldbeovercomebyapplyingforexemptionsonhumanitariangrounds.Thehumanitarianimperativeshouldbeaprimaryconsideration.

Security of humanitarian workersHumanitarianworkisbecomingmoredangerous.Statisticsquotedinthechallengessectionofthisreviewoutlinehowmoreandmorehumanitarianworkersarebeingkilledandwoundedinthecourseoftheirwork.HavingUNinyourtitleandflyingaUNflagonyourvehiclenolongerprovidestheautomaticprotectionitusedto.Partlythisistheresultofamorecomplexandlesscertainworld;insomeplacesitisalsoaperceptionthathumanitarianworkerandeventheUNispartisan.

Theissuesaffectingthesafetyofhumanitarianworkersarebeyondthescopeofthisreview.Whatisclearisthattheyareinmoredanger,andthatprotectingthemisnecessaryiftheworkisgoingtogetdone.

Traditionallyhumanitarianagencieshaveworkedonthebasisofbeingacceptedbythelocalpopulation.Thishasmeantmoreinvestmentinexplainingwhattheyaredoing,andrelyingontheirgoodworkstospeakforthemselves.Thislargelyremainsthecase.Deterrence,asemployedbypartisanmilitaryforcesandforeigngovernmentsinconflicts,islargelycounter-productive.

DFIDneedstoensurethatthoseagencieswithwhichitworkstakesecurityseriously.WiththeUN,thismeanscontinuingtohaveacloserelationshipwithitssecuritydepartment(UNDSS),fundingwhennecessary.WithNGOs,thismeansputtingsecurityintoanyauditingprocessconnectedtopre-qualification,andinvestingininter-agencysecurityinitiativeswhenthesehaveprovenworth.

Recommendations

DFID should:

24 Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.

25 Ensurefundingismadeavailableforsecurityandriskmanagementforhumanitarianworkers.

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5. DeliveringtransformationalchangeinDFIDTodeliverthestepchangeinthewayhumanitarianassistanceisconceivedanddeliveredoutlinedabove,DFIDwillhavetomakesignificantchanges.ThemostradicalchangewillinvolveseeinghumanitarianconcernsasacorepartofDFIDprogramming,ratherthansomethingthatneedstoberespondedtowhenithappens.WorkonanticipationandresilienceshouldbepartofDFID’severydayworkincountrieswhereithasapermanentpresence(seesections4.1and4.2).SuchworkshouldalsobeofcentralconcerntoDFID’sdevelopmentpartners,suchastheWorldBankandtheUN.

ThestepchangesoughtbythisreviewwillalsohaveconsequencesforthewaythatDFIDprovidesfundingbeforeandduringhumanitarianemergencies.FundingformultilateralandNGOpartnersneedstobecomemorepredictable,sothattheycaninvestintheskillsandstructurestheyneed.Fundingshouldalsobeavailabledirectlytogovernmentsforresilienceandresponsework,wheretheyarecapable,willingandtransparent.

Asoutlinedintheintroduction,DFIDisashaper,afunderanda‘doer’.Thissectionsetsouthowitshouldengageintheseroles,andlooksattheresourcing,structureandaccountabilitymechanismsitneedsinplace,aswellassomecriticalareasforinvestmentsuchasresearchandinnovation.

5.1 Changing the policy

TheInternationalDevelopmentAct2002isthekeypieceofUKlegislationthatframesoverseasassistance.Intheact,humanitarianassistanceisdefinedas,“assistanceforthepurposeofalleviatingtheeffectsofanaturalorman-madedisasterorotheremergencyonthepopulationofoneormorecountriesoutsidetheUnitedKingdom”.

Inadditiontoitsdomesticlegalobligations,theUKissignatorytoEUandinternationallaw.TheEUconsensusonhumanitarianaidinparticularcommitstheUKto,‘provideaneeds-basedemergencyresponseaimedatpreservinglife,preventingandalleviatinghumansufferingandmaintaininghumandignitywherevertheneedarisesifgovernmentsandlocalactorsareoverwhelmed,unableorunwillingtoact’.

Theconsensusalsosubscribestoanumberofotherprinciplesandcodes.Notablyit‘firmly’commitstothe‘fundamentalhumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutrality,impartialityandindependence’.DFIDhasalsocommittedtotheseprinciplesinits2006humanitarianpolicy.

IftheinternationaldevelopmentactandthekeypiecesofEuropeanandInternationallawdeterminetheoverallframeworkforDFIDhumanitarianaction,thenthe2006humanitarianpolicyisthekeyinternaldocument.Ithadthreepolicygoals:

• Improvetheeffectivenessofhumanitarianresponses.

• Beabetterdonor.

• Reduceriskandextremevulnerability.

Thispolicyneedsupdating,notleastbecauseofthisreview.Anewpolicyshouldbegroupedaroundthemajorthemesidentifiedinthisreviewofanticipation,resilience,leadership,accountability,innovation,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.

Thepolicyshouldalsosetoutwhy,where,whenandhowDFIDresponds.Theconsensusofthisreviewisthatthedefaultpositionforthisresponseshouldbemultilateral,inthatDFIDwillworkwithandthroughitspartners.Wherethescaleoftheneedexceedsregularresources,thenDFIDshouldstandreadytomakeadditionalfundsavailableintothemultilateralsystem.OccasionallyDFIDwillalsoresponddirectly,basedoncomparativeadvantageincludingpresence.Thissuggeststheformulashouldbe:

43

DeliveringtransformationalchangeinDFID

• Why:becauseofinternationaldevelopmentact,EUconsensusandBritishpublicsupport.

• Where:onthebasisofneed.

• When:throughmultilateralpartnersinthefirstinstance.InmegadisastersUKtoroutinelyrespondwithadditionalfundinganddirectdelivery.

• How:throughregularfundstomultilateralandNGOpartners.Whereneedexceedsthislevelofresources,additionalfundingtobeconsidered(basedonadvice).DFIDtoresponddirectlyonlywherethereiscomparativeadvantageoroverwhelmingUKpublicinterest.

Buttheimplicationsofthisreviewgofurther.ThereneedstobeapolicychangeinDFIDonthedevelopmentsidetoo.Thisneedstoplacethecreationofresilienceinatriskcountriesintheheartofdevelopmentprocesses,seennotasa‘humanitarian’activity,butasadevelopmentnecessity.

Recommendations

DFID should:

26 Incorporate resilience into its development policy and programmes.

27 Develop a new humanitarian policy setting out why the UK responds, where, when and how. Thepolicyshouldbuildonthereviewthemesofanticipation,resilience,leadership,innovation,accountability,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.

5.2 Delivering differently

Shaping the International SystemTheUKisamajorcontributortotheinternationalsystem,withthemajorityofitshumanitarianresourceschannelledthroughpartners,asoutlinedinprevioussections.ThismeansthatDFIDhasadirectinterestinmakingtheinternationalsystemwork.Aninternationalsystemthatworksprovidesthebestvalueformoney,andhelpsthemostpeople.

ThisreviewhighlightsinseveralsectionstheinfluencetheUK,throughDFID,exertswithintheinternationalhumanitariansystem.Butthishaswaned.DFIDhasbecometooshrill,andtooinconsistent.Internationalagencieshavecometorealisethatwhilehumanitarianstaffmightbehighlycriticalofanoperation,politicalandseniororganisationalleaderswillnotexpendpoliticalcapitaltofixit.Thesameistrueacrossgovernment.IntheUN,onbudgetarygroundstheUKhasdriventermsofservicechangesthathavemadeithardertorecruithumanitarians.Atthesametime,DFIDberatestheUNfornotdoingmoretorecruithumanitarians.DFID’sinfluenceinbringingaboutmuchneededchangeandreformswillbeincreasedifitspendsmoretimebuildingalliances,andlesstimeactingalone.

Sincethehumanitarianreformsof2005,DFIDhasbeenoneoftheleadingvoicesinpressingforreformsinfinancing,leadershipandcoordination.Thereviewhasconcludedthatthisefforthasbeenbeneficialandshouldcontinue,givingspecialemphasistothechangesinleadershipstructuresandcapacitythereviewrecommends,andwhichtheIASChasrecentlyendorsed.

AnewapproachisneededifDFIDwantstocontinuetoshapetheinternationalsystem.DFIDwillhavetolearntobemorestrategic.HumanitarianadvisorsneedtobesureoftopmanagementandpoliticalsupportbeforeengaginginnegotiationswiththeUNsystemonreform.

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TheUKmissionsinNewYorkandGenevaarevaluableassets,andwhenusedwellcandeliverimpact.ButDFIDdoesnotuseeithermissionsystematicallyforitshumanitarianlobbyingandalliancebuilding.Thisneedstochange.TheNewYorkmissionhasasizeableDFIDpresence,whichshouldbebetterusedtoplanadvocacy.GenevadoesnothaveaDFIDpresence.ButUKMISinGenevacanneverthelessalsobeusedmoreeffectivelytohelpbuilddiplomaticalliancesinthepursuitofDFID’sreformagenda.

DFIDalsoneedstoworkbetterwithitsdonorpartners,asoutlinedinprevioussectionsofthisreport.WherepolicymessagesarecommonbetweentheUK,ECHOandtheUS,theyarefarmorepowerful.TheGHDgrouphasbeenanengineforchange–theUKneedstoworkwiththisgrouptoseethishappenagain.

AboveallDFIDneedtobemorestrategicinitslobbyingwork.ManyintheUNseeDFIDasthesinglemostinfluentialdonor.TheabilitytoleverageitspositionasthethirdlargestdonortoachieverealchangegivestheUKuniqueopportunities.Theseneedtobecarefullymanaged,notsquanderedinfrustration.Maintainingapositionasatopdonorwillbeessentialifthisinfluenceistoberetained.ButbetteruseofpositionsonUNagencyboards,withinthevariousUNcommittees,andsharperadvocacybyleaderswithinDFIDisneeded.Betterallianceswithestablisheddonorpartnersandthenewemergingeconomieswillbeessential,aswillnewrelationshipswithregionalbodies.

Changing the funding modelThemajorityofwhattheUKgovernmentdoesinhumanitarianassistanceisfundingothers.DFIDhaslongbeenseenasafastandflexiblehumanitariandonor.Thispositionshouldbemaintained.ButDFIDalsoneedstouseitsfundstopromotechange–toensurethatagenciesareequippedtorespondfastanddeliverwhatpeoplereallyneed.

Donorsshapetheinternationalresponsesystembythewaytheyfund.Someofthisisintended,butmostisnot.DFID,asoneofthemostinfluentialdonors,hasapowerfuleffectonthesystem–aslaidoutabove.Butthesystemisnotservingtheneedsofaffectedpeopleaswellasitmight.Fundingisnotproportionatetoneeds,itisnotequitable,itisnotcoordinatedorharmonised,itdoesnotfocusenoughonpreventionanditdoesnotdemanddemonstrableperformanceoffundedagencies.

DFIDcanchangetheincentivesinthewayitfunds,bettershapingtheinternationalsystem.Indevelopmentaid,DFIDhasbeenastrongadvocateofgreateraideffectiveness,throughseveralinternationalinitiatives.ForDFIDtoachievebetterresultsandgreatervalueformoney,thesameprinciplesofaideffectivenessneedtoapplytothefundingofhumanitarianpartners.Astepchangeisneededongreaterpredictability(includingmulti-yearcommitments),coherence,transparency,accountability,focusonresultsandvalueformoney.ThemainpriorityshouldbetoequipDFID’spartnerstobuildtheircapacityandmanagehumanitarianresponse.

DFIDcurrentlyfundsthemultilateralhumanitariansystemthroughacombinationofcorefundingandadditionalnon-corefundingatthecountrylevelforemergencies.Thesplitoverthelastfewyearshasbeenstronglyinfavourofadditionalnon-corefundinginresponsetoUNFlashAppealsforsuddenonsetdisasters.TheBilateralandMultilateralAidReviewsarechangingthissplit.ThroughtheMAR,thebestperformingagenciesshouldreceivesignificantlymorecorefundinglinkedtoresults.TheHERRwelcomesthisandrecommendsthatDFIDtakesafurthersteptowardsmulti-yearcorefundinglinkedtoperformancesothatthemajoragenciesandtheRedCrossMovementgetpredictabilityforfinancialplanningandcapacitybuilding.34

34 Carefulconsiderationwillneedtobegivennottobreachtheruleonfundinginadvanceofneed.

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Forgreaterglobalequityinallocationsandcoherence,theHERRalsorecommendsahighercontributiontotheCERFlinkedtoresults,inlinewiththeMARfindingongoodperformance.TheCERFshouldbeenabledtofundpreparedness.

Keepingwiththesameprinciplesappliedabovetothemultilaterals,thebestperformingNGOsshouldgetmorepredictablelong-termfundinglinkedtoperformancethroughstrengthenedProgrammePartnershipArrangements.Andforgreaterequityinallocationsandcoherence,theCBHAandotherregional,nationalandlocalconsortia,astheCERF,shouldgetincreasedfundingonamulti-yearbasis.

Asaresultofmorecorefundingformajoragencies,theFlashAppealsandConsolidatedAppealsshouldbecomeproportionatelysmallerovertimeapartfrominexceptionalcircumstances.DFID’scontributiontothemwillalsogodown.However,DFIDneedstoretainitscommitmenttofundinghumanitarianneedsatthecountrylevel.Often,thisiswhereDFID’sseatatthetableprovidesgreatvaluebyimprovingoverallaideffectiveness,asdemonstratedforexamplebyitsinvolvementintheDRCongopooledfund.

Whatisrequiredisastepchangeinlinkingcountrylevelfundingtoperformance.ThisreviewrecommendsDFIDlinksdemonstratingresultsandimpactcloselytofuturecountry/emergencyfunding.Inreturnforanagreedenvelopeoffundingforanemergency,implementingpartnershavetobeabletodemonstrateresultsandreportaccordingly.

AsDFID’scontributiontoECHOisfixed,DFIDshouldlookforwaysofco-financingECHOresponseswherethiswouldaddvalue.

Fast mobilisation funding and pre-crisis arrangementsAparticularchallengeinfundingsuddenonsetdisastersisthefirstweekafterdisasterstrikes,inwhatwerefertointhisreportasthe‘criticalperiod’.DFID’sabilityandwillingnesstoprovidefastfundingtogetthewheelsrollingandenablingthewidersystemtostartprovidingreliefiswidelypraised.ItisoneofDFID’smostimportantandvaluablecontributionstoemergencyresponses.Itdoescomeatacosthowever.HavingtodecidequicklywhattofundandwhatnotanddealingwithmanydifferentfundingstreamscarrieshightransactioncostsforDFID.Butmoreimportantlythecurrentapproachdoesnotprovidetherightincentivesforagenciestodeliverhighqualityworkforthebestvalue.

Oncefundingisapproved,partnershavefewpressurestoprovideinformationonhowtheirprojectwillachievethedesiredimpact,howitwillbeaccountabletobeneficiariesorhowspecificissuessuchasgenderareaddressed.Importantareasofperformancejustgetbox-ticking.Programmeauditsarerarelycarriedout.

Generally,thewayhumanitarianfundingisallocatedactsasa‘complexincentivesystem’,promotingbothpositiveandnegativebehaviours.Oneoftheperverseincentivesitcreatesisforimplementingagenciestoproposethehighestbeneficiarynumberspossiblefromtheirprogrammes.Henceaboxofwaterpurificationtablets‘servesthousandsoffamilies’,wheninfactthisisonlytrueifeachfamilyreceivesahandful–somethingimpracticalinmostdistributionmodels.Inmanyemergenciesinfacttheseboxesusuallyrotinwarehouses.

Nevertheless,agenciesdoneedsubstantialfundingtomobilise–tohirepeople,transport,purchasegoods,useequipmentandsoon.Thesemobilisationfundsareconnectedtothe‘programmes’andsohighlyspeculative‘proposals’aremadesimplytoallowagenciestomobilise.Onceapprovedhowever,thislocksagenciesintoacourseofactionthatmayonreflection(i.e.whentheyactuallyhavetimetomakeaproperassessment),notbethemostjudiciousone.

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Similarly,whileDFIDasksforgreatercoordination,itoftenfundsimplementingorganisationsindividually,therebycreatingacompetitivedynamicwhichcanerodecollectiveactionandcompromisestheoutcomesfortheaffectedpopulated.

Thenumberofprojectgrantsinemergencieshasalsobecomeoverwhelming,52intheaftermathofCycloneNargisor27afterOperationCastLeadinGaza.Becauseinsuchcomplexemergenciesobjectivesandcontextschangefrequently,DFIDdoesneedvariedfundingmechanismsandaflexibleapproach.Butthesenumbersoffundingstreamsresultinhightransactioncostsofstafftimeandprovideastrainonhumanresourcestoadequatelymonitorandfollowupprojectsfunded.

Toincreaseitsflexibility,whilstsolvingsomeoftheissuesoutlinedabove,DFIDneedsafundingmodalitythatcanprovidefastmobilisationfundinginthefirstweek.Thisshouldbebasedonpre-qualificationratherthanspeculativeproposals.

Funding recovery from day oneInternationalfundingforemergenciesisusuallysplitintothreelevels.Theimmediatereliefphase,recoveryandreconstruction.The‘criticalperiod’iswheninternationalactorsandmoneypourintocountriesintheaftermathofanemergencytryingtosavelives.Afterthefirstmonth,recoveryneedsassessmentsarecarriedoutandlonger-termhumanitarianprogrammingbegins,targetedatsavinglivelihoods.Adonorpledgingconferenceisheld,typicallywithlessmoneypledgedthanrequired.Andthen,thereconstructionphasestartssometimeduringrecoverywithdifferentfundingcomingonstreamfromtheWorldBankandIMFoftentorepairpre-existinginfrastructure.

Whatthissplitfundingmodelhascausedisafalsedichotomyinseparatingrelieffromrecoveryandreconstruction.Thisreviewhasfoundthatwhataffectedpopulationswantandneedmostisanimmediatestarttolivelihoodsrecovery.Theneatdonorsplitdoesnotworkforthem.Evaluationsshowthatwomen,forexample,drivethemovefromimmediateconcerns–reunitingfamilies,findingshelterandfood–toidentifyingwaystogenerateincomeveryquickly.OrtheexamplefromCycloneNargisinBurmaoftheprivatesectorsellingthepotsandpansthatenabledthepreparationofcookedfoodandareturntonormallongbeforetheinternationalpotsandpansarrived.Bythen,beneficiarieshadincurreddebtunderminingtherecoveryoftheirlivelihoods.Thevalueformoneyofthereliefitemsdeliveredhasbecomequestionable.

Cash-basedapproachestoacceleraterecoveryareonewayoutofthisfalsedichotomyandeasethewayintodevelopmentprogramming,forexampleintocashbasedsocialprotectionschemesthatcanreducevulnerabilityandbuildresilienceforthenextcrisis.Evidenceisbuildingupontheeffectivenessofcashresponses.Itisimportantthattheirimpactisassessedinrelationtothesegoals.

Infrastructurerehabilitationisanotherexamplethereviewfounddoesnotgetenoughattentionintheimmediateaftermathofanemergency.Theun-clearedrubbleinHaitihighlightsthis.Theresultinghighercostsofrecoveringlostlivelihoodswillhavetobepickedupbydevelopmentprogrammes.DFIDneedstorecogniselivelihoodsfundingislegitimatefromdayone.

Delivering smarter direct aidInthebiggestemergencies,DFIDcandeliveraidrapidlythroughitsstandingemergencyteam.Itcanalsodeliverhighqualitypeopleintotheinternationalsystem.Bothofthesecapacitiesarehighlyappreciatedandhavebeenproventomakearealdifference.

Inadditiontotheinternalcapacity,DFIDhasacalldownarrangementwiththeUKfireserviceforSearchandRescue.ThisprovidesforoneUNclassified‘heavy’team(64people,dogsandequipment)tobedeployedwithinhoursofbeingcalled.Onoccasion,

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theUKalsoprovidesmilitaryassetssuchasships,aircraftandhelicopters.InHaiti,DFIDhelpeddeployateamofhighlyqualifiedsurgeonstoworkoncomplicatedtraumawounds.

Alloftheinterventionscitedabovehavevalue.TheSearchandRescueteamsarehighlyvisibleanddemonstratemuchvaluedsolidarity.Theseareespeciallyusefulinthe‘criticalperiod’,lesssoafterwards.FromaUKperspectivesuchdeploymentsofferuniqueopportunitiesforteamstoexperiencearealdisaster–invaluableshouldtherebesomethingsimilarintheUK.ButSearchandRescueunderthismodeliscostlywithover£250,000perlifesavedinHaiti.AndastherearenomajorearthquakefaultlinesclosetotheUK,theycanarrivetoolate.Thesurgicalteamscostaboutonehundredthofthesearchandrescueteams(littleover£2,500)perlifesavedinHaiti.InNigeragenciesspentlittleover£100perchildsavedinfeedingprogrammes.

WhatthismeansisthattheUKneedstobesmartaboutwhereandwhenitdeploystheseassets.Italsoneedstothinkaboutthefuture,asthisreviewmakesclear.TheUKhasotherassetsthatcouldbeharnessedfordisasterresponseas‘nichecapabilities’.Thesame‘resilience’teamsintheUKfireservicehavenuclear,chemicalandbiologicalcapabilities–thesecouldberapidlydeployedincircumstanceswheretheycouldmakearealdifference,ascouldothersciencebasedassets.

WhereUKdirectassistanceconsistentlymakesadifferenceiswiththedeploymentofpersonnel.ThisisoneofthemostcosteffectiveandinfluentialactionsDFIDundertakes.DFIDdeploymentsaretypically‘enablers’–aircrafthandlerstomakesureaidflowsswiftly,informationmanagerstosetupsystemsquickly.Thiscouldeasilybeextended–onoccasionswheretheUKhasdeployedclusterleadsquicklythistoohasmadeahugedifference.DFIDshouldworkwiththeUNtoensureithasthemostneededenablingstaffonstandby(andnotsimplytakerequestsforcheappeoplethroughtraditionalagencystandbyschemes).Itshouldworkwithotherstobetteralignthissurgecapacity(forinstanceNRCandtheBritishRedCross).

DFIDhasalsobuiltanicheexpertisein‘enablingequipment’.Thismightbemachinesforunloadingaircraft,orhighqualitysheltermaterials.Thistooisvaluable,andintheworkrecommendedaroundsupplychainbythisreport,thedirectdeliveryofDFIDshouldberetained.

Working strategically across the UK governmentTheUK’sresponsetointernationaldisastersneedstobecoordinatedacrossgovernmentdepartments.TheresponseisusuallyledbyDFID,andDFIDusuallyprovidesthemajorityofresources.Othergovernmentdepartmentsprovidesupportinwayswheretheyhavedistinctadvantage.ForexampletheFCOandCabinetOfficethroughtheirinformationnetworkscanproviderapidsituationupdatestocomplementthoseofDFID’sownstaffandagencycontacts.TheNHSprovidessurgeonsforresponseinthe‘criticalperiod’.However,evidencefromthereviewsuggestswecandobetteratintegratingtheseseparateinputs.

Thereisforexample,noformalmechanismforconveningallgovernmentdepartmentsinresponsetoaninternationalemergency.ArrangementsbyDFIDaread hocanddepartmentsarecalledinasandwhenDFIDconsidersthereisaneedforwidersupport.Theinformalityofthisarrangementmeansthattherightpeoplearenotalwaysavailableatshortnoticetoattendmeetings.Morejuniorstaffmayrepresenttheirdepartmentthanisideal.Thesepeoplemaynotbeofsufficientsenioritytotakedecisions,andcontinuityofstaffwhoattendmeetingsisnotmaintained.Thiscanleadtoalackofeffectivecommunicationbetweendifferentdepartmentsandafailuretoachieveresults.ForexampletheMODchainofcommandrequiressomeoneoftherightranktoapprovetheuseofanaircraftforreliefsupplies.Iftherightpersonisnotatthemeetingwhenitisrequested,thedecisioncannotbetakenandtimeislost.DFIDmaylookelsewherefortransport.

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ThereviewunderstandsthatothergovernmentdepartmentsarekeentoprovidesupportinemergenciesandconsidertheyhavemoretocontributethanDFIDisawareof.Thisisparticularlythecaseifotherdepartmentsaregivenenoughtimetoplanandpreparetheirresponse.Incaseswheremoreformalcoordinationarrangementshavebeenmade,crossgovernmentactionhasbeenmoreeffective.ForexampletheresponsetoCycloneNargisinBurma,2008includedthecreationofacross-Whitehallteamforplanningjointresponseoptions.Theresultwasaneffectivebodymadeupofpeopleoftherightsenioritywhowereabletomakedecisionsandactrapidly.

TheNationalSecurityCouncilisthenewmechanismunderwhichcross-governmentdepartmentsareconvenedundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister.AsimilarbodythatcoulddrawtogethergovernmentdepartmentsundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister,chairedbyDFIDandconstitutedunderstricthumanitarianprincipleswouldprovidethenecessarycoordination.AwayshouldbefoundthroughtheexistingNationalSecurityCouncilmechanismtoconveneastandingcommitteeonhumanitarianemergencyresponsetodothis.

Recommendations

DFID should:

28 Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by:

• Increasingpredictablemulti-yearfundinglinkedtoperformancetomajorUNagencies,theRedCrossMovementandNGOs.

• Increasinglong-termsupporttointernational(theCERF)andcountrylevelpooledfundsandtoglobal,regionalandcountrylevelNGOconsortia,suchastheCBHAandWAHRF.

29 Design fast and flexible funding models for emergency responses:

• ProvidefastmobilisationfundingintheCriticalPeriodbasedonpre-qualificationratherthanspeculativeproposals.UsetheprocesstoreducebureaucracyinthisCriticalPeriod.

• EnsurerecoveryandlivelihoodsfundingisconsideredduringandimmediatelyaftertheCriticalPeriod,ratherthanlaterashastraditionallybeenthecase.

• Ensurethereisflexibilityoffundingasfastmovingsituationschange,perhapsbyprovidingitinstages.

30 Useallnewfundingmodelstoenforcestandardsandlinkfundingtoperformancethroughclearimpactassessmentsandreporting.Carryoutindependentperiodicprogrammeauditsandafteractionreviewstoinformfuturefundingdecisions.

31 Develop and deploy niche capabilities in a more focused way where they add value:

• OnlyusesearchandrescueinsituationswheretheUKcangenuinelyaddvalue.

• Incorporatesurgicalteamsintofirstphasedeploymentsespeciallyafterearthquakes.

• Investigatenewformsofnichecapabilitiesthatcanrespondtonewtypesofthreatssuchasnuclear,biologicalandchemical.

32 ContinueandexpandthesurgeofUKcontractedpersonnelintotheinternationalsystem.

33 Conveneandleadastandingcross-governmentemergencymechanismformegaemergencies,usingtheauthorityoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.

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5.3 Changing the structure, shifting resources

HumanitarianemergencyresponsehashistoricallybeenundersupportedwithinDFID.ThehumanitariancadrewasonlyrecentlyformedandisthesmallestofDFID’stechnicalnetworksbyamargin.Itcurrentlystandsat12peopleglobally,despitehumanitarianspendingconstituting8%ofoverseasdevelopmentaid(ODA)annually.TheConflict,HumanitarianandSecurityTeam(CHASE)managesallhumanitarianissues,includingresponse.Astheconflictportfolioofworkincreases,themanagerialloadhasbecomeincreasinglyuntenable.Despitealargeresearchbudget,DFIDdoesnotsupportsignificanthumanitarianresearch.

Theemergency(rapid)responsecapabilityhasbeenoutsourcedonathreeyearrollingcontractualbasis.Thecontractcurrentlyprovidesfor27staffsharedwiththeStabilisationUnit.Therearesixdedicatedhumanitarianstaffonthecontract.Italsopaysforasignificantlogisticalstandingcapacity–cars,communications,specialistdeploymentequipmentandsoon.ThiscapabilityiscalledtheOperationsTeam(OT)andisco-locatedwithCHASE,withOTstaffintegratedintotheDFIDmainoffice.WhilsttheinternationalreputationoftheOTisextremelyhigh(andmuchenvied),inrecentyearscorporateworkhasbeenincreasinglyundertakenbytheteamasaresultoflackofcapacitywithinDFID.

ThelackofcapacitywithinbothCHASEandOThasmeantclear,strategicdirectionhasbeenmissing,astheworkhasbeenalmostconstant‘fire-fighting’.Theimpactofsuccessivelarge-scaleemergencieshasbeentostretchresourcesstillfurther.ThislackofstrategyisnotconfinedtoCHASE.HumanitarianactionisspreadacrossDFIDinalargelyunconnectedandad hocfashion,andthereisnoseniorchampion.UntilrecentlytherewasaseparateAfricaConflictandHumanitarianUnit(ACHU)withinAfricadivision.ACHUoversawanAfricaemergencyreservefundandhadnoformalconnectionwithCHASE.Countryofficescanchoosewhethertohavehumanitarianadvisors,eveninhigh-risksituations(Pakistanhadaconflictadvisorwithresponsibilityforhumanitarianbutnoexperienceinthisarea).

Thedisparateandneglectedstructuredoesnotonlyhaveaneffectonoverallstrategy,ithasledtoaschismbetweenthepolicyfunctionandtheresponsemechanisms.ThesmallteamofhumanitarianpolicyadvisorscentrallyholdlongtermfundingrelationshipswithbigagencieslikeUNICEFandUNHCR,butitistheOTstaffthatseehowtheseagenciesperforminsuccessiveemergencies.Thishasledtomixedmessagesandlostopportunities.

PartnersremainhighlypositiveaboutDFIDandvalueboththequalityofthepersonnelanditsabilitytoreactquicklyandflexibly.ThereisdemandforDFIDtobepresentinlarge-scaleemergenciesasitsabilitytoinfluencetheoverallstrategyismuchvalued.Thereisalsodemandforacontinuedcapacitytodeploybothpeopleandgoodsintotheinternationalsystematshortnotice.

Inparalleltothisreview,DFIDalsoundertookabilateralaidreview(BAR)thataskedcountryofficestopredicttheirexpenditureforthenextfewyears.Inthisexercisehumanitarianspendwasforecasttofall,orrathercountryofficesdidnotmakeabidforhumanitarianresourcestorise.Thismightreflectanaturaloptimism–thatthingswillgetbetterorthatdevelopmentgainswillmeantheimpactofhumanitarianemergencieswillbediminished.However,itisoutofstepwithmostforecastsofneedandmayalsoreflectadesire‘nottobeinvolved’;anideathatDFID’scorebusinessisdevelopmentandthathumanitarianemergenciesareanunwelcomedistraction.ItmayalsoreflectanassumptionbycountryofficesthatCHASEwillrespondifthereisanemergencyandtheresourceswillbemadeavailablecentrally.

Tosomeextentthisassumptioniscorrect.Thisreviewconcludesthatforoverwhelminglylargeemergencies,‘megaemergencies’,responseshouldbeledfrom

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London.TheintenseinterestfromacrossgovernmentandfromthepublicmeansthatitisnecessaryforLondontoleadonstrategy.Wherethereisacountryofficetheyshouldleadondelivery,althoughDFIDshouldalsooperatea‘stepaside’policysimilartothatbeingadvocatedwiththeUN,wherebyitensuresthatdeliveryisledwiththerequisitelevelofexperience.Formediumandsmall-scaledisastersthecountryofficesarewellplacedtolead,perhapswithsometechnicalorlogisticalsupportfromCHASE.

ItalsomeansthatDFIDneedstomakebettersenseofitsinternalstructureandstrategy–reflectingtheimportanceofitshumanitarianworkinstructure,capacityandresourcesaswellasinrhetoric.IfbuildingresilienceistobecomeacorepartofDFID’sworkasthisreviewsuggests,thenbothseniormanagementandthecountryofficeswillneedtoreflectthisinthewaytheyworkandplan.IftheperformanceoftheinternationalsystemistrulytobeimprovedthenDFIDwillneedtomakebetteruseof(andincrease)itshumanitarianstaffanditsoperationsteam,andwillneedtoexpandthiscapability.IfDFIDisgoingtopromoteinnovation,buildnewpartnershipsandenablenewnetworksofhumanitarianpolicyandpractice,thenitwillneedtobebetterintegrateditself,usingitspolicydivisiontopromoteresearchandevidence,itscountryofficestoworkwithgovernmentsandUKmissionstoworkwithothernations.

Managing the responseHumanitarianemergenciesarechaoticandfastmoving.Theyneedexperiencedmanagerswithclearauthoritytobeincharge.

DFIDhasasystemof‘responsemanagement’butitisdiluted.ThisisduetotheseparationofthecontractedoutOperationsTeamfromthemanagementofCHASE.Partlyalsoitisbecausethisskillhasnotbeenprioritised.Thenewsystemmusthaveexperiencedresponsemanagerswithdelegatedauthority.

Aneffectiveresponserequiresclearlinesofauthorityandresponsibility,andaclearstrategy.Theproductionofawiderangingstrategyincludingfunding,lobbying,cross-Whitehallworkandanydirectassistance,shouldbeapriorityfortheresponsemanagement.Theownershipoftheresponsestrategyshouldbeatasufficientlyseniorlevel.InamegaemergencythiswouldbeatDirectororDirectorGenerallevel.

AcomparativeadvantagethatDFIDhaslongenjoyedisthequalityofitsadvisorycadre.ThereisaneedforDFIDhumanitarianadvisorstobedeployedtoemergencies.Theycanhelpshapetheresponse,andsafeguardUKtaxpayerinvestments.TheycanalsoprovidevaluableanalysisandinsighttoLondon.Thisisnottruejustinmega-emergenciesbutalsoinemergingcrisesandconflict.

Managing riskHumanitarianemergenciesarehigh-riskenvironments.Theyarechaoticanduncertainanddecision-makinghastoberapid.Thereismorechanceofgettingthingswrong.Theremustbeagreatertoleranceforriskinsuchsituation.

Butthereareoftengreaterriskswithdoingnothing,orrespondingtooslowly.Humanitarianemergenciesarehighriskbecausetheyinvolvelifeordeathsituations.Slowdecision-making,ornotreacting,canleadtolossofbothlivesandopportunities.Politicallythereislessriskinamessyresponse,oranaccusationofwaste,thanbeingaccusedoflettingpeopledie.

Theconsequencesofthisarethatproceduresneedtobestreamlinedforhumanitarianemergencies,anddecision-makingneedstobedelegated.Empoweringthosewiththeinformationtomakeadecision,andtoimplementitfastisessential.HistoricallythishasbeenacknowledgedwithinDFIDandprocedureshavebeenmodified.Thistraditionneedstocontinue.

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Thisreviewsetsoutseveralmeasuresforimprovingaccountabilityintheinternationalhumanitariansystem.Connectedtothisistherequirementforagenciestodemonstrateresults,andprovetheyaregoodvalueformoney.ButthiscannotcomeattheexpenseofrapidresponseorifDFIDhumanitarianstafffeelafraidtomakedecisions.

Recommendations

DFID should:

34 Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its move to being a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require:

• RebalanceresourceswithinDFIDtomeetthechallengesofrisinghumanitarianneed.

• Expandthehumanitariancadre,bothinLondonandinthefield.

• Ensuringeveryresponsetorapidonsethumanitarianneedisledbyanexperiencedresponsemanager,withsufficientdelegatedauthoritytoensureswiftaction.

• Leadlarge-scaleresponsesfromLondon,managedbyCHASE.

35 Redefinetheobjectivesforthecontractedresponseteamsothatitissolelydedicatedtosupportingrapidresponseandpre-crisisarrangements.

5.4 Driving results and value for money

Thehumanitariansectorhastraditionallybeenreluctanttocollect,systematiseandshareevidenceonwhatworks,whatdoesnotandwhy.Therehasbeenalackofdemandforthiskindofinformation,andsometimesaninabilitytofindanswers.ThereasonsarelaidoutintheImpactsectionabove.

Fundingdecisionsarenotroutinelybasedonevidence.Andwhenfundingdecisionsarebasedonevidenceofresults,itisoutputsratherthanimpactthatarebeingconsidered.

Withoutgreaterclarityonresults(bothonwhatistheevidenceandwhatisthehumanitarianobjective),itisnoteasytodeterminethevalueformoneyofhumanitarianactions.Andithasrarelybeentried.

Valueformoneyisabouttheoptimaluseofresourcestoachievetheintendedoutcomes.Itisabouttheoptimumcombinationofcostsandqualityofthegoodsandservicestomeettheneedsofbeneficiaries.AsinallotherareasofHMGspending,itisnotjustaboutthelowestcost.

Inahumanitarianresponse,togetvalueformoney,speedisoftheessence.Thereisnovalueinaresponsethatcomestoolate.Liveswillbelost.Therisksoflateornon-interventionneedtobeconsidered.Therefore,timelinessorspeedneedstobeaddedintotheequationonvalueformoney.

ThefigurebelowfromtheNationalAuditOfficeshowstheresultschainthroughitsdarkbluearrows.Andthecostsattachedtotheresultsthroughitslightbluesquares.Valueformoneyanalysishastoincludethiswholechain.

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Value for money

Economy

Costs (£) Inputs Outputs Outcomes

Efficiency Value for money

Qualitative

Qualitative

Figure6: Value for Money: Costs and results, National Audit Office.

Duringaresponse,therelativeimportanceofthethreekeycomponents,cost,qualityandspeed,hastochangeifthehumanitarianimperativeofsavinglivesistheprinciple.IntheCriticalPeriod,itisspeedthatshouldcountthemost,because,inthisphasespeedsaveslives.Costandqualitythenincreaseinimportancewithtime.

SinceJanuary2011,allproposalsforDFIDfundingmustbeaccompaniedbyaBusinessCase,whichsetsouttheneed,justificationandaffordabilityofanintervention.35Ithasnotbeendevisedthoughforcompletingwithinhoursofadisasterhittingwheninformationisscarceandpeoplearedying.AsDFID’scomparativeadvantageisfastresponse,partnerslooktoDFIDimmediatelyforfunding.

Whilethereviewrecommendsmoreworkonevidenceofwhatworksandwhatdoesnotandcost-effectivenessinhumanitarianaction,thisworkislessrelevantintheCriticalPeriod.However,post-actionreviewsandevaluationscanhelpgreatlytoinformfuturedecisionmakingaboutdeliverypartnersandmechanismseveninthecriticalperiod,throughprequalificationofpartners(seeChangingthefundingmodelinsection5.2).

Valueformoneyinaresponsecanbestbeachievedthroughafocusonachievingresultswithallresources.Beitfromotherdonors,domesticresourcesortheprivatesector.DFID’sresourcesinaneffectivesystemcanachievemuchgreatervalueformoneythaninanineffectivesystem.DFID’simportantroleinmakingthesystemmoreeffective,aslaidoutthroughoutthisreport,isthereforelikelytohavethegreatestimpactonvalueformoney.

InnovationisanotherareawhereDFIDinvestmentcouldreapsubstantialgainsinvalueformoneyinthefuture.DFID’sinvestmentinCommunity-BasedTherapeuticcare(CTC)isagoodexamplewhichhasmadethetreatmentofmalnourishedpeopleinmajoremergenciesmorecost-effectivethantraditionaltherapies.Witharelativelyhighfixedinitialcost,CTCcantreatseveralthousandmalnourishedpeoplewithlittlemorethantheextracostsoffoodandmedicine.Othersubstantialcoststothecommunity(suchastravelcostsandopportunitycostsofbeinginfull-timecare)havealsoreducedsignificantly.

Itshouldnotbeforgottenthatbuildingresilienceisoftenthebestmeansofprovidingvalueformoney.Itisestimatedthat£1inpreventionsaves£4inresponse(seesection4.2).AstheIFRCAnnualreport2008says:‘thereisnoeconomicsenseinspendingmoneyonemergencyresponsealone.Yearsofinvestmentcandisappearinminutesif

35 ThisBusinessCasemodelisbasedonHMTreasuryguidanceandensuresconsistencyacrossUKgovernmentdepartments.

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riskreductionandpreventionareignored.’36ThisiswhyDFID’sapproachtohumanitarianworkneedstohavepreventionatitscore.

Outcomes and effectivenessThesectiononimpactsetsouttheimportanceofbeingcleareraboutdesiredoutcomesandimpactandmeasuringthem.ButassessingtheoutcomesofDFID’sfundingandinfluencingisfarmorecomplexthanmeasuringoutputs.Andquantitativeassessmentsareastepmoredifficultthanqualitativeones.

JudgingfromthequalitativeassessmentsmadeinevaluationsofDFID’sresponseefforts,DFIDoftengetsitright.Fundingisfast,flexible,goestothesectorswheretheneedisgreatestandenablesotherpartsofthesystemtobecomemoreeffective.Thisshouldleadtobetteroutcomesfortheaffectedpopulation.Howexactlyitdoesthat,atwhatcostandwhatwouldhappenwithoutDFID’ssupporthoweverisoftennotclear.Costandbenefitsarerarelyquantified.

DFIDismakingeffortsonvariousfrontstorectifythis.Internally,DFIDPakistan,forexample,hasstartedpilotinganapproachtobetteroutcomeassessmentandunitcostanalysis.DFIDKenyaandSomaliaarebuildingupadatabaseofhumanitarianindicatorsandcosts.Externally,DFIDhassetuptheIndependentCommissionforAidImpact,abodythatwillevaluateDFID’swork,includingindisasterresponse,withafocusinimpact.Thereviewwelcomesthisinitiative.

Outputs and efficiencyOutputsarethefirstresultsinthechain.Anyprojectorprogrammehastobeabletoshowwhattheintendedoutputsareandlaterwhattherealoutputswere.Therearehowever,twoproblemswithreportingoutputresults.First,outputscanonlybeproxiesforimpactandcangetitwrong.Second,outputs,ascurrentlyreportedinprojectdocuments,cannoteasilybecomparedoraggregated.HenceitisdifficulttojudgetheefficiencyofimplementingpartnersandDFID’sfunding.

ThefollowingareexamplesofoutputsfromthePakistanfloodsresponse:

• Wheatandvegetableseeds,fertiliser,animalstockfeed,andveterinaryservicestomorethan115,000ruralfamiliestoavoidfurtherlossofanimalsanddependencyonfoodaidforthenextyearormore.

• Toiletsandsanitationforalmost500,000people.

Thenumberssoundimpressive,buttheydonotsayiftheseedsandfertiliserscameintimefortheplantingseason.Ifthetimingwaswrong,theimpactwouldnothavebeenthedesiredoneofrecovery.Theyalsodonotshowifthetoiletswereplacedandlitinsuchawayastobegendersensitive.Qualityandspeed–twokeyparametersofhumanitarianeffectiveness–cannotbeassessedbyoutputmeasurement.Thereisadangerbyfocusingononeareaoftheresultschainofhittingthetargetbutmissingthepoint.

Comparisonsbetweencostsofoutputsandhencethecostefficiencyofimplementingpartners,arecurrentlyclosetoimpossible.

• Outputsarenotstandardised(evenwithinsectors)withtheresultthatcomparingisoftenlikeappleswithpears.

• Somebenefitsaredifficulttomeasure,e.g.inprotectionanddifferentinterventionshavedifferentbenefits–theydonotalladdressthesameneed,e.g.cash-for-workversuspsychosocialsupport.

36 IFRCannualreport2008,p14;HowardKunreuther,November2010;otherstudiesestimateevenhighercostbenefitratios.

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• Theinformationcurrentlyreceivedfromimplementingpartnerscangivearoughindicationofwhatthingscost.Itcannotgivemuchmorethough.

• Anycomparisonsofcostswouldbemisleadingwithoutknowingtheexactcircumstancesoftheactions,includingtargetingofdifferentpopulationgroups,levelofsecurityrisk,ortiming.

Onlywhenoutputsarethesame,isitpossibletocarryoutananalysistoseewhichinterventionisthemostcost-efficient.

Inputs and economyInputsareeasytoidentifyandquantify.Allbudgetsofimplementingpartnersshowwhatinputsareusedatwhatcost.Inputsrangefrommaterialsandlogistics,personnelandpersonnelsupport(includingsecurityforpersonnel)toindirectsupportcosts(theoverheads).

Comparingunitcostsofinputsbetweenimplementingpartnersoracrossemergenciesisrelativelyeasy.Butthecomparisonsdonotmakesenseifthecontextisnottakenintoaccountasexplainedintheoutputsection.Aprojectinacomplexemergencywithsecurityimplicationswillhavegreatersecuritycoststopersonnelattachedthananotheroneinanaturaldisasterzone.Aprojecttargetingdifficulttoreachpopulationswillhaveveryjustifiablygreaterlogisticscoststhanaprojectinanurbaneasy-to-reachenvironment.

LookingthroughbudgetsofDFIDimplementingpartners,itisobviousthatcostscandiffersignificantly,notalwaysforjustifiablereasons.AnagencyinthePakistanfloodresponseforexamplewantedtochargeDFID£1millionmoreforthesamenon-fooditemsdeliveredtothesameplacebutwithaonemonthtimedelaythanifDFIDhadprocuredtheitemsitself.Withthis£1million,shelterforanadditional10,000familiescouldhavebeenpurchasedanddeliveredamonthearlier.

The global supply chainAslogisticscanaccountforasmuchas80%37oftheeffortofhumanitarianorganisationsduringareliefoperation,theglobalsupplychainwarrantsspecialconsideration.

IfDFIDwantstoimproveitsabilitytorespondattherighttimefortherightpriceandwiththeappropriatequality,supplychainmanagementneedstoberecognisedasanintegralpartofpreparednessandresponse.

End-to-endsupplychainmanagementinahumanitarianresponseincludesprocurement,stockpilemanagement,qualityandcostcontrol,managingproductioncapacity,internationalmovement,coordinationwithotheragenciesanddeliverytothebeneficiaries.

ManyINGOshavelosttheirsupplychainmanagementcapabilitiesthroughthechangeintheirfocusfromdirectdeliverytoadvocacyoverthelastdecade.Thiscapabilitylossonthedevelopmentsideofoperationshastranslateddirectlyintoalossonthehumanitarianresponseside.EvaluationsofNGOresponseshaveshownthatmistakesareroutinelymadealongthesupplychain.

UNagenciesontheotherhandhavesignificantprocurementandlogisticsdepartmentsbuttheyareconstrainedbyantiquatedprocurementrules,differentdonorrequirementsandUNbureaucracy.

Keyconcernsthatimpactnegativelyontheaffectedpopulationare:

37 Trunick(2005).

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• Qualityofnon-fooditemsbeingsubstandard.Itisestimatedthat70%ofthemillionplussheetsprovidedtoHaitiaftertheearthquakeneededreplacingafter9months.Atacost(withoutfreight)ofaround£10asheetthatmeans£7millionwasspentoncommodities,whichhaveatbestlasted9months.

• Reliefitemsarenotalwayswhatthebeneficiariesmostneedorarrivetoolate.AfterCycloneNargisinBurma,womengotintodebtbecausetheypurchasedreliefitemslongbeforetheinternationalresponsereachedthem.BlanketsprovidedintheaftermathoftheSamanganearthquakeinAfghanistanweretoothinfortheclimate.

• Lackofpreparednesscanleadtomultiplesoftransportcostsnecessary(especiallyairversusseatransport).

• Becauseoflimitedsupplysidecapacityinanemergency,pricesgoupandqualitydecreases.Thiscanbeovercomebybuildingupthesupplierbaseinadvanceandcollaboratingonqualitystandardsandspecifications,

Whilstdecreasingtheseinefficienciesshouldbeseenasaprioritynow,DFIDhastorecognisethattheglobalsupplychainislikelytochangesoonerorlater.Ifforexamplecashresponsesbecomeagame-changerinhumanitarianresponse,thiswillhaveimportantimplications.Internationalprocurementandtransportwilldecrease.Afocusonmorelocalprocurement,asincreasinglydonebyWFP,willalsochangethenatureofthetraditionalsupplychain.

Recommendations

DFID should:

36 Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.

37 EncouragetheIndependentCommissionforAidImpacttoexaminearangeofhumanitariancasesandresiliencebuildingwork.

38 Carryoutanin-depthstudyonhowDFID’sfundingimpactsonthehumanitariansupplychainrecognisingthatthesupplychainisamajorcostdriverinsudden-onsetresponses.Basedonthefindings,workwithotherdonors,theprivatesectorandimplementingpartnerstoalignsupplychainpractices.

5.5 Getting the message across

ThereisstrongpublicsupportfortheUKresponsetodisastersandemergenciesindevelopingcountries38.ButhistoricallyDFIDhasnotusedtheseopportunitiestotalkaboutitswork.WithanaidbudgetunderattackfromsomequartersandquestionsaboutfailureinHaiti,DFIDneedstogetbetteratcommunicatingthegenerallyexcellentworkitdoes.

Thecommunicationsenvironmentischanging.CommunitiesintheUKareoftenindependentlylinkedtoaffectedpopulations,throughdiasporas,faithbasedgroupsandpartnerships.Itisnolongerpossible,ordesirabletoadoptabroadcastapproachtocommunicationswork.Domesticmediacoverageisincreasinglyhostiletothe

38 93%ofrespondentsstronglyagreedoragreedwiththestatement‘WhereverpossibletheUKgovernmentshouldresponddirectlytodisastersandemergenciesindevelopingcountries’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011.

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government’sringfencedaidbudget,andtherearegreaterexpectationsaroundthespeedandavailabilityofaccurateinformationaboutDFID’swork.

HumanitariandisastersnaturallyattracthighlevelsofmediaattentionintheUK,andthepublicarereadytobeengaged.TherelationshipbetweenthemediaandNGOsisacomplexone.ThemediaoftenreliesonNGOsforaccessandinformationatthesametimeasseeingitsroletoholdthemtoaccount.IfanNGOhelpsajournalistreachacommunitythatisreceivingsupportduringaresponse,thejournalistislikelytogofurthertofindacommunitythathasbeenoverlookedtopresentthestoryofaidnotgettingtothosewhoneedit39.

UsingitsrelativeindependencefromthisrelationshipDFIDcanmakegeneralcommentsonthecontextandnatureofthedisasterandtheplannedresponse.Itisabletoreferneutrallytotheworkofothers,tosecureauniquepositionincommunicatingtotheUKpublic.Butthispositioncanonlybeexploitedifitcanofferanauthoritativevoiceonthegroundfromtheoutsetofaresponse.

Thereisalsoaneedtoemployalongertermstrategicapproachtohelpshareabetterunderstandingabouthowanemergencyresponseworks–andwhyitisimportant.

ThisneedsastrongandconsistentnarrativetoenablethepublictounderstandthatdifferentdisastersandemergenciesneedadifferentresponsefromtheUK–includingexplanationofhumanitarianpolicy,howtheinternationalcommunityisrespondingandtherangeofresponsestomeetneeds.Intimethiswillhelpchallengetheperceptionthataid,developmentandhumanitarianresponseisoneandthesame.

TheUKAidTransparencyGuaranteewillputallnewspendingon-line.Thiswillmakedetailedinformationofeachemergencyresponseavailable.Aproactiveandstrategicapproachtopubliccommunicationswork(mediaandnon-media)willbeneededtoputthisinformationincontext.

Foranemergencyresponse,strategy,plansandexpectedresultsneedtobereadilyavailable.EarlystatementsonUK’splansandobjectivestoresponseshouldbepostedon-lineassoonaspossible.Thesecanbedevelopedastheresponseprogressesandshouldcomplementmediaannouncementsonfundingallocations.

ButwhereconcernsabouteffectivenessandcorruptionaregenerallyhighthereviewpublicsurveyshowedsupportforDFID’sresponsedidn’tcarrythesamelevelsofconcernaboutwasteandcorruptionthathavebeenreflectedinothersurveys40.ItalsoshowedthatthepublicfeelpleasedwhentheyhearabouttheUKgovernment’sresponse41alongwithadesiretoknowmore42.AndmorerecentresearchcommissionedbyPlanUKreportedthat90%ofrespondentsrecalledrecentdisastersinHaitiorPakistan,and36%werepromptedtodonate43.ThispresentsDFIDwithaclearopportunitytobringitsworktotheattentionofanalreadyengagedpublic–oneofitsbestchancestoreachabroadUKpublicisthroughcommunicationsarounditsresponsetorapidonsetdisasters.

39 PlanUK:Unnaturaldisasters:compassionversuscomplexityinthemedia’sreportingofhumanitarianemergencies.MediaSymposium:Feb2011.

40 60%ofrespondentsdisagreedorstronglydisagreedwiththestatement‘Emergencyaidiswastedthroughinefficiencyandcorruption,andthemoneyandsupportdoesn’tgettothepeolewhoreallyneedit’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011.

41 98%ofrespondentsstronglyagreedoragreedwiththestatement‘IfeelpleasedwhenIhearthattheUKgovernmentishelpingplayapartinaninternationalresponsetoadisasterofemergency’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011.

42 94%ofrespondentsstronglyagreedoragreedwiththestatement‘TheUKgovernmentshoulddomoretoexplaintothepublichowitsworkishelpingtomeettheneedsofpeopleaffectedbyinternationaldisastersandemergencies’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011

43 PlanUK:Unnaturaldisasters:compassionversuscomplexityinthemedia’sreportingofhumanitarianemergencies.ComRes:Feb2011.

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Governmentrestrictionsonspendingmeansthatalongsidetraditionalbroadcastandprintmediaactivity,communicationsthroughDFID’sownwebsiteandonlinepresenceisvitaltothesuccessofitscommunicationstrategy.Thisworkhasbeendevelopingwell:e-bulletins,blogs,tweets,YouTube,FacebookandFlickrpagespresentDFID’sworktoanengagedpublic.CommunicationsactivityaroundtheUK’sresponsetomeethumanitarianneedsinGazafollowingOperationCastLead,andtheon-lineFloodMonitorshowingclearlywhereandhowUKAidishelpingpeopleaffectedbythefloodsinPakistan44,hasshownDFID’scommunicationsworkaroundanemergencyresponseatitsbest.

Thoseaffectedbydisasterareincreasinglyabletoprovideinformationandcontributetoassessmentofneedaswellascallingdonorsandtheinternationalcommunitydirectlytoaccountviaonlinechannelsmeansevengreaterneedforcontinuedbuildingofitsonlineprocess.

Recommendations

DFID should:

39 Prioritise communications as a key factor in the UK’s emergency response, and resource it accordingly.

• Embedcommunicationsatthepolicyandoperationslevelfromthebeginningofaresponse.

• MakeDFID’shumanitarianandemergencyresponseworkpermanentlymorevisiblethroughDFID’swebsite–inadditiontofeaturesonspecificresponses.Communicationsstaff,and/ortheteamleadertrainedincommunicationsshouldbesupportedtospeakpubliclyonDFID’sbehalf.

• Makebetteruseoffaithbasedanddiasporapartners.

• Workmorecloselywithfundedpartnersoncommunications–toagreeaconsistentnarrativeandsharechannels.Theserelationshipsneedtobedevelopedinadvanceofanemergencyresponse.

40 Request the International Development Select Committee to scrutinise progress on the implementation of these findings one year on from the launch of this report.

44 www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Asia-South/Pakistan/Pakistan-Floods-Monitor/

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6. RecommendationsAnticipation

1 Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.

2 MakebetteruseoftheDFIDChiefScientisttosupportUKscienceinanticipatingcrises.

3 Makethisavailableasacontributiontopre-crisisarrangementsacrossthesystem.

Resilience

4 Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.

5 Promote national response capacities of both governments and civil society in at risk countries including:

•Thedevelopmentofnationalresiliencestrategies.

•Theestablishmentofdirectfundingmechanisms.

•Regionalresponsemechanismswheretheyaddvalue.

•ThroughcivilsocietyorganisationssuchasRedCrossandCrescentSocieties.

•Nationalandlocalprivatesectorcompanies,whichareableatthecountryleveltosupportentrepreneurial,andmarketsolutions,whichwillincreaseinresilienceandimprovedisasterresponse.

Leadership

6 Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving leadership, including;

•Rapiddeploymentofexperiencedleadershipteamsinbigcrises.Thisshouldincludea‘stepaside’systemtoensurethebestleadershipisinplaceatboththestrategicandoperationallevel.

• EncouragetheconveningofaUNHighLevelPaneltolookatwaysofimprovingtheinternationalhumanitariansystemtofacefuturechallenges.

•WorkcloselywithUKmissionstobuildcoalitionsforreformoftheinternationalsystem,includingmorecoherentuseofUNexecutiveboardpositions.

•WorkwiththeUNtocreateanewcadreofhumanitarianleadersandthetalentmanagementsystemsandtermsandconditionstosustainthis.

•WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtoresolvesomeofthedeficienciesinmanagement,prioritisationandplanning.Thismustincludetherightsupportstaffavailableforrapiddeployment.

•WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtostrengthenandprovidebetterleadershipoftheclustersystem.

7 DFIDshouldmakeasustainedefforttoimproveskillsinthehumanitariansector.Thisshouldinclude;

•Worktocreateasetofstandardsforhumanitarianleadership.

•TrainingwithinDFID,aidagenciesandgovernmentsandcivilsocietyindisasterpronecountries.

• Ensuringpre-qualifiedpartnersdemonstrateadequateinvestmentinskillsdevelopment

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Recommendations

Innovation

8 Nurture innovation and its application in dealing with and preparing for humanitarian emergencies, including through partnership with operational agencies, private sector, technological innovators and science and research communities.

9 Appoint a Humanitarian Senior Research Fellow, reporting to the Chief Scientific Officer with a dedicated budget tasked with developing evidence and innovation.

10 Investinthreekeytechnologies;mobiletechnologies,satellitesanddatamanagementanddisplay.

11 Supportexplorationofemergingandcutting-edgetechnologiessuchasnanotechnology,andnewcomputermodellingapproaches.

12 Workwithpartnerstoensurecashbasedresponsesaregivenfullconsiderationandwhereappropriatebecomemuchmorewidelyadopted.

Accountability

13 Promote and support mechanisms to give recipients of aid a greater voice.

14 Promote the development of robust impact assessments.

15 Workwithotherstocreateanover-archingsetofstandardstoassessbeneficiaryaccountability.

16 Encouragethespreadofbestpracticeinthisarea.

17 Givegreateremphasistobeneficiaryaccountabilityfactorswhenmakingfundingdecisions.

Partnership

18 Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (in particular China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).

19 Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral. In particular it should:

• EngagemoreeffectivelywithECHOonapolicylevel,andexplorethepossibilityofco-financing.

•WorkwithotherstosupporttheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinatorinthereformofOCHAandthesystemmorewidely.

20 WorkwithpartnerstopromotedonorcoordinationandrevitalisetheGoodHumanitarianDonor-shipgroup.

21 EnsurethatthenewPrivateSectorDepartmentgivesfullconsiderationtothoseareaswhereprivatesectorexpertisecanimprovehumanitarianresponseeffectiveness,includingatthecountrylevel.

22 UsemilitaryassetsinsituationswheretheyareconsistentwithOsloguidelinesandoffercapacityotherscannot,orprovidebettervalueformoneythancommercialalternatives.

23 WorkwithNGOstopromotetheconceptofaccreditationorcertification.

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Humanitarian space

24 Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.

25 Ensurefundingismadeavailableforsecurityandriskmanagementforhumanitarianworkers.

Changing the policy

26 Incorporate resilience into its development policy and programmes.

27 Develop a new humanitarian policy setting out why the UK responds, where, when and how.Thepolicyshouldbuildonthereviewthemesofanticipation,resilience,leadership,innovation,accountability,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.

Delivering differently

28 Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by:

• Increasingpredictablemulti-yearfundinglinkedtoperformancetomajorUNagencies,theRedCrossMovementandNGOs.

• Increasinglong-termsupporttointernational(theCERF)andcountrylevelpooledfundsandtoglobal,regionalandcountrylevelNGOconsortia,suchastheCBHAandWAHRF.

29 Design fast and flexible funding models for emergency responses:

•ProvidefastmobilisationfundingintheCriticalPeriodbasedonpre-qualificationratherthanspeculativeproposals.UsetheprocesstoreducebureaucracyinthisCriticalPeriod.

• EnsurerecoveryandlivelihoodsfundingisconsideredduringandimmediatelyaftertheCriticalPeriod,ratherthanlaterashastraditionallybeenthecase.

• Ensurethereisflexibilityoffundingasfastmovingsituationschange,perhapsbyprovidingitinstages.

30 Useallnewfundingmodelstoenforcestandardsandlinkfundingtoperformancethroughclearimpactassessmentsandreporting.Carryoutindependentperiodicprogrammeauditsandafteractionreviewstoinformfuturefundingdecisions.

31 Develop and deploy niche capabilities in a more focused way concentrating on those areas where DFID or the UK are able to add value:

•OnlyusesearchandrescueinsituationswheretheUKcangenuinelyaddvalue.

• Incorporatesurgicalteamsintofirstphasedeploymentsespeciallyafterearthquakes.

• Investigatenewformsofnichecapabilitiesthatcanrespondtonewtypesofthreatssuchasnuclear,biologicalandchemical.

32 ContinueandexpandthesurgeofUKcontractedpersonnelintotheinternationalsystem.

33 Conveneandleadastandingcross-governmentemergencymechanismformegaemergencies,usingtheauthorityoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.

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Recommendations

Changing the structure, shifting resources

34 Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its importance as a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require

•RebalanceresourceswithinDFIDtomeetthechallengesofrisinghumanitarianneed.

• Expandthehumanitariancadre,bothinLondonandinthefield.

• Ensuringeveryresponsetorapidonsethumanitarianneedisledbyanexperiencedresponsemanager,withsufficientdelegatedauthoritytoensureswiftaction.

• Leadlarge-scaleresponsesfromLondon,managedbyCHASE.

35 Redefinetheobjectivesforthecontractedresponseteamsothatitissolelydedicatedtosupportingrapidresponseandpre-crisisarrangements.

Driving results and value for money

36 Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.

37 EncouragetheIndependentCommissionforAidImpacttoexaminearangeofhumanitariancasesandresiliencebuildingwork.

38 Carryoutanin-depthstudyonhowDFID’sfundingimpactsonthehumanitariansupplychainrecognisingthatthesupplychainisamajorcostdriverinsudden-onsetresponses.Workwithotherdonors,theprivatesectorandimplementingpartnerstoalignsupplychainpractices.

Getting the message out

39 Prioritise communications as a key factor in the UK’s emergency response, and resource it accordingly.

• Embedcommunicationsatthepolicyandoperationslevelfromthebeginningofaresponse.

•MakeDFID’shumanitarianandemergencyresponseworkpermanentlymorevisiblethroughDFID’swebsite–inadditiontofeaturesonspecificresponses.Communicationsstaff,and/ortheteamleadertrainedincommunicationsshouldbesupportedtospeakpubliclyonDFID’sbehalf.

•Makebetteruseoffaithbasedanddiasporapartners.

•Workmorecloselywithfundedpartnersoncommunications–toagreeaconsistentnarrativeandsharechannels.Theserelationshipsneedtobedevelopedinadvanceofanemergencyresponse.

40 Request the International Development Select Committee to scrutinise progress on the implementation of these findings one year on from the launch of this report.

PublishedbytheHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview

March2011

Chair:Lord(Paddy)Ashdown

Director:RossMountain

SeniorAdvisoryBoardMembers:AndyBearpark;BarneyMayhew;CarolynMiller;DavidBryer;ElisabethRasmusson;GilbertGreenall;GordonConway;JodaSilva;MarkBowden;NiciDahrendorf;RandolphKent;SimonMaxwell;SteffenStenberg;SueWardell;YaseminAysan.

HumanitarianReviewTeamSecretariat:MelindaSimmons;LewisSida;RachelKessler;SophiePongracz;LouisaBrewin;DavidPratt;MalcolmRidout;RosTendler.

Thisreportisavailableonline:www.dfid.gov.uk/emergency-response-review

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