hpai seminar for permanent representatives to fao · hpai seminar for permanent representatives to...

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HPAI SEMINAR FORPERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO FAO

Rome, Italy14 May 2008FAO HeadquartersIran Room (B116)

agendaandbackground documents

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HPAI Seminar for Permanent Representatives to FAO

iRome, FAO HQ

14 May 2008

Agenda

10:00 Welcome J. Butler, Deputy Director-General, FAO

10:10 The HPAI programme in FAO’s overall Emergency Management Framework J.M. Sumpsi, Assistant Director-General, Technical Cooperation Department, FAO

10:20 Lessons learned from four years of experience with HPAI in animals J. Domenech, Chief Veterinary Officer, FAO, Chief, Animal Health Service (AGAH) and

S. Newman, Animal Health Officer, International Wildlife Coordinator, Animal Health Service, FAO

10:40 Lessons learned from four years of experience with HPAI in humans D. Heyman, Assistant Director-General, WHO

10:55 Implications of HPAI crisis on international animal health governance B. Vallat, Director-General, OIE

11:10 How to support a heavily affected country: The case of Egypt Dr. Mona Mehrez, Director of the Central Laboratory for Quality Control on

Poultry Production (CLQP), Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation

11:25 Discussion

11:55 The importance of disease communication S. Michiels, Communication Unit, Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases, FAO

12:05 Managing HPAI in the socioeconomic production systems and biodiversity contexts A. McLeod, Senior Officer (Livestock Policy), Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and Policy Branch, FAO

12:20 From New Delhi to Cairo D. Nabarro, United Nations Systems Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC) and Dr Fathi Saade, Head of the committee in charge of the organization of the October conference, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation

12:35 Discussions

13:00 Closure


Rome, FAO HQ14 May 2008 iii

Background documents

SItuAtIOn OF HPAI And leSSOnS leARned 1

GlOBAl StRAteGIeS tO PRevent And cOntROl HPAI 2

ePIdemIOlOGy OF AvIAn InFluenzA 4

WIldlIFe And HPAI 5

One WORld One HeAltH mAnAGInG RISk At tHe HumAn-AnImAl InteRFAce 7

vAccInAtIOn AGAInSt AvIAn InFluenzA 8

cOStS OF HPAI OutBReAkS AndBeneFItS FROm cOntROllInG HPAI 10

ImPORtAnce OF tHe POultRy SectOR 12

lOnG teRm ReStRuctuRInG OF tHe POultRy SectOR 13

cOmmunIcAtIOn 14

FAO ReSPOnSe tO HPAI 15

InteRnAtIOnAl cOORdInAtIOn 18


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14 May 2008

Situation of HPAI and lessons learned

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) will not be eradicated in the short term. But it can certainly be eliminated from the poultry sector if husbandry and marketing practices are improved and if the regulatory authorities take the measures needed for compliance to improve health and secure livelihoods. Governments also need to create a policy environment where the private sector is encouraged to adopt better production and market standards.

The fact that the pandemic has not occurred does not mean that it will not occur tomorrow – and for this vigilance is needed (public information and communication, systems for reporting, systems for inspection, good laboratory diagnostic structures) and response if it were to occur. So far WHO has not elevated their risk scale and of the more than 65 countries that have reported H5N1 infection since 2004, active virus transmission in poultry remains in 10 or 11 only including two heavily infected countries, Indonesia and Egypt. So there have been great strides in improving rapid detection and response measures. Preparedness and prevention are key ingredients for success; as is information sharing and communication. Strong surveillance is required particularly in higher risk areas, such as those with high poultry density (especially with a large duck population), areas where there are opportunities for the frequent interaction between wild birds and poultry production units, areas of known commerce across borders where one area is known or was known to be affected by H5N1 is essential. Such surveillance should be based on clinical disease and agent characterisation, i.e. tests that can identify the presence of virus, isolate the virus and characterise it. Taking blood samples for determination of antibody response is of limited value for disease surveillance.

Different countries have taken different approaches from massive surveillance without vaccination and quick culling when disease is found to wide-spread vaccination and extensive monitoring of markets. The successful plans have been those where there is strong political commitment from the highest level of government and a superior level of professionalism throughout the ranks of the integrated animal health systems. A key factor for success is the direct line of command from the Chief Veterinary Officer to those in charge of field animal health operations, laboratory information flow, surveillance data, and the interface with other Ministries responsible for public works, security, and the like.

Improvement of public-private partnership is indispensable since the private producers, traders and other stakeholders are in the fore front for surveillance, reporting prevention and control of diseases.

Rome, FAO HQ14 May 2008


2

Global Strategies to prevent and control HPAI

In discussing a Global Strategy it must keep in mind that success is measured at the local level; and as such, curbing the occurrence of HPAI (or any other disease, for that matter) must take into account local circumstances, livestock production and marketing practices, census and demographics, customs and traditions, economies and governing structures.

No one magic tool will solve or eliminate the HPAI problem. It is likely more of the balance and integration of the different tools at the right time that will lead to successes – but always in the background of strong political commitment at the highest levels of government. The tools available are identified as being:

• surveillance – both an effective and necessary tool particularly in countries at risk, those with epidemics and those endemic

• culling supported by reasonable and fair compensation• vaccination• biosecurity • rapid change of policies to mitigate the worst impacts of HPAI and its control.

One of the key ingredients to tackle the disease early – and thus, more cost effective – is to have a just compensation policy known to the public at large. Farmers or households are more likely to report a problem if they know quick compensation will be made. Should compensation not be properly addressed, farmers experiencing disease are likely to sell their poultry quickly to avoid further losses; hence, spreading the disease further through markets and buyers.

Lamentably, vaccination is often looked as a magic tool – but this is far from the case. It needs to be managed well for it to be effective. In first instance the vaccine applied must be useful against the circulating virus strain or strains; it must be potent and safe to guarantee efficacy. Having to inject every single bird complicates logistics (handling and human resources). The right vaccine in the right hands with the right strategy can be instrumental in protecting individual birds, the flock, decrease shedding and contamination, and lower the risk of viruses of avian origin to humans. The long term application of massive vaccination campaigns against avian influenza in all poultry sectors is not sustainable; and a targeted approach is preferred but this requires a good knowledge of all poultry chain production from hatcheries to intermediaries to growers to undertake risk assessments and the application of vaccine with high coverage. Post vaccination monitoring (virus presence in a vaccinated flock or measurement of antibodies after vaccination) is considered a best practice to ensure that there is no emergence of new strains or that vaccination coverage approaches the targeted percentage and that the vaccine was given appropriately. Experience has shown that when sub-optimal or improper use of the vaccine is undertaken, there is quick blame that the vaccine is not effective (vaccine failure) when in fact it has actually been a vaccination failure. This aspect of the vaccination campaign is all too often overlooked and should be planned and budgeted.

Countries that have not had HPAI are in a good position to practice their preparedness plans and promote improved hygiene at the production and marketing level, institute nodes where surveillance can take place regularly based on risk analysis (ports of entry, borders, markets ...). Upon detecting H5N1 in a flock, rapid culling operations should ensue and compensation promptly given before the disease spreads to other flocks, households, or markets. Culling affected flocks is important even if vaccination have been administered previously – as either the vaccine has not “taken hold” or was performed many months before and is no longer effective, or the virus has changed sufficiently that a more appropriate vaccine needs to be provided.


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Communication and cooperation across countries is most helpful in building trust and improved prevention and progressive control of HPAI. The establishment of networks of veterinary diagnostic laboratories (including those involved in research) and country epidemiology units of the veterinary services have been key in the fight against transboundary animal diseases, including against the threats of HPAI. Networks can also be those of a more thematic nature – such as socio-economic institutes or wildlife expertise.

Partnerships with non-governmental groups, research institutions, reference centres, and private enterprises (i.e., pharmaceutical companies, feed producers ...) have proven important in the implementation of strategies, best practices, and communication to stakeholders, or local financial assistance.



4

epidemiology of Avian Influenza

The current H5N1 virus has its origins in southern China, with its first characterisation in a goose in 1996 and it was shown to fatality affect humans when outbreaks occured in Hong Kong in 1997.

Between 1997 and 2003 the extension of H5N1 virus remains unclear, but sometime in 2003 the virus gained a foothold in several countries across Southeast Asia, and over a period of a few months over 10 countries reported HPAI among their flocks for the first time, some experiencing human illness and death.

The world has never experienced an HPAI virus to be so successfully spreading in so many countries and continents in such record time. Many avian influenza viruses have been found in wild birds, but these have generally been of low virulence and only gain virulence when cycled through susceptible poultry or combine with other influenza viruses to produce a novel HPAI virus. The case of H5N1 has several exceptions:

• Many wild birds are highly susceptible to H5N1 and disease or death is common.• The amount of virus to cause infection is lower than for most other AI viruses (infection

threshold).• Though a wildlife reservoir has yet to be found, domestic duck production – especially in

open grazing systems – is key in the maintenance cycle of the virus in nature. This has been repeatedly shown in Asia where the open rice production systems are linked with duck production. Unlike chickens, H5N1 in domestic ducks may at times be considered an ‘iceberg’ infection – it is there but no clinical signs in the infected ducks can be seen.

Close contact between an infected bird (or contaminated environment) and susceptible species is required for the transmission of infection.

H5N1 transmission and spread is highly correlated with marketing and commercial practices, poor hygiene at the market place, and the mixing of different species. The complexity and inter-relationships between hatcheries, their local and distant distribution, egg collection and marketing, market chains of birds and feed supply chains make a disease such as H5N1 HPAI difficult to contain.

The H5N1 virus has been shown to infect over 80 species of birds, and spill over into several mammalian species, including humans.

The role of the pig in H5N1 infections or maintenance appears not to be important to date, compared to other avian influenza viruses. Wild and domestic cats are to be highly susceptible to H5N1 through the ingestion of infected chicken carcases and they become infectious to other susceptible animals.


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Wildlife and HPAI

WHAt IS tHe ROle OF WIld BIRdS In tHe mAIntenAnce And SPReAd OF H5n1 HPAI?The movement of poultry and poultry products as well as wild bird trade are known to be main routes for H5N1 HPAI spread locally, across national borders, and inter-continentally. Movement of virus via wild birds most likely occurred in Mongolia and Russia (2005 and 2006), in Europe (northern winter 2005/06 and summer 2007), and Turkey (2008) demonstrating instances where wild birds transported the virus. Since the large geographical expansion of H5N1 HPAI from eastern Asia in 2005 to Africa and Europe, millions of wild birds have made multiple inter-continental migrations through infected countries to breeding grounds and back to non-breeding locations, moving through every country in the world. Yet, to date, H5N1 HPAI has only infected 60 of 192 (31%) countries worldwide.The virus was discovered in domestic chickens and a goose in 1996/7; thereafter, isolated in over 90 species from 14 orders of wild birds indicating likely spill over from domestic to wild birds. Conversely, it is believed that virus introduction from wild to domestic birds is also occurring periodically. At this point in time, virus is likely circulating in both directions, particularly in wetlands (often rice paddies) used by wild birds and for grazing domestic ducks.

IS WIldlIFe tHe ReSeRvOIR FOR H5n1 HPAI?To date, surveillance results from more than 350,000 samples demonstrates that an H5N1 HPAI wild bird “reservoir” species (i.e. healthy carrier capable of shedding virus for months to years) has not been identified. Experiments on wild bird species indicate that some infected birds die soon after experimental exposure to virus while others may shed virus for 3-7 days, recover and stop shedding. However, the potential for longer shedding or for recovered birds to start shedding at a later point in time has not been addressed experimentally and can not be evaluated.

HOW mAny HumAn cASeS HAve Been A ReSult OF exPOSuRe tO WIld BIRdS And ARe HumAnS At RISk By vISItInG WIld BIRd SAnctuARIeS OR PARkS?To date, only one human case of H5N1 HPAI infection in Azerbaijan (2006) is through plucking feathers from a dead infected swan. Most human cases are a result of contact with infectious materials from poultry related activities. The risk of human exposure by visiting wildlife areas or urban parks is low.

dOeS HuntInG POSe A RISk FOR H5n1 HPAI exPOSuRe OR SPReAd OF vIRuS tO HumAnS OR OtHeR dOmeStIc OR WIld AnImAlS? Hunting, handling, and cleaning/dressing of apparently healthy but infected wild birds poses a risk of virus exposure. In particular, infected internal organs or feathers that domestic or wild birds have access to, serves as a mechanism for potentially infecting these species as well as pets, other animals, and humans.



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HOW IS leGAl OR IlleGAl tRAde OF WIld BIRdS And OtHeRWIldlIFe FOR ORnAmentAl PuRPOSeS, cOnSumPtIOn, OR cultuRAl/RelIGIOuS PRActIceS cOntRIButInG tO tHe SPReAd OF HPAI? The H5N1 HPAI virus has been found in wild animals including tigers, leopard, the endangered Owsten’s civets, stone martens and long-tailed macaques as well as in domestic dogs, cats, ferret and pigs. Little is known about the role of these animals as vectors for the movement of this virus.The large scale use of wild birds for consumption, ornamental purposes and cultural/religious practices has contributed to spread of the H5N1 HPAI virus. While impact of trade (illegal and legal) of wild birds in virus spread is difficult to monitor, religious practices in Hong Kong, bird trade to support falconry activities, and inter-continental trade to Europe are all examples geographic movements of H5N1 HPAI virus via trade.


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One world one health managing risk at the Human-Animal interface

Moving beyond Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 and adopting an One World One Health approach implies – at least for the mandated international health agencies FAO, OIE, WHO, and also UNICEF – that the growing problem of global health hazards and food safety concerns is more effectively addressed at the intersectoral level and across geographical scales, with the initial focus on hotspots where the problem is most acute. Becoming more effective here may be qualified in terms of the need for a more livelihood centered approach in addition to the classical human health safeguarding and rural development approaches, focussing on the creation of more adequate human and animal health systems. Collaboration, coordination and capacity building would run across the different health domains in order to counter the problem of pathogens of humans, food animals and wildlife becoming freely exchanged within and between these host categories, producing flare-up of highly infectious diseases, with transboundary spread, and sometimes species shifts or pandemic threats.

There is a pressing need to step up the efforts across-the-board, at different scales, from field to global and (i) improve the response to emergency situations, comprising early detection and strike capabilities, (ii) expand horizon scanning and disease intelligence, with forecasting and prediction, and (iii) address the root causes of the growing health problems, with analysis of and response to the fundamental, underlying risk factors. It is believed that the shocks brought to the human and animal health systems relate to a set of global factors or drivers increasing the pressures placed on health systems in a globalising world. Demographic factors, land pressures, encroachment of natural ecosystems, climate change and regime shifts in terms of global water flows will continue to upset the current, already fragile pathogen-host-environment equilibria.

Adopting a hotspot approach enables placing emphasis on geographically explicit scenarios, for a harmonised response running across sectors and not just based on specific targeted disease programmes. Relating the causes of disease to the agro-ecological dynamics and socio-economic realities as prevailing in the developing world makes it possible to more directly consider the origin and genesis of globally important emerging disease problems, at source. The approach would bring recognition of the fact that high pressures in hotspots may disproportionally affect the poor even if it is well recognized that regarding highly contagious diseases all humans and all animal production systems are at risk. Redressing this problem moves beyond the strict health-technical considerations and health programmes should therefore also seek to identify the associated developmental constraints. Neglected diseases could form an integral component of novel, cross-sectoral health programmes because the ‘at source’ approach departs from the health concerns voiced by the primary stakeholders, the hotspot residents. Health programmes may thus target food and waterborne diseases, tuberculosis and other neglected diseases, apart from the highly contagious and the vector borne, viral and other disease agents that provoke so much global concern.



8

vaccination against Avian Influenza

dOeS An eFFectIve vAccIne exISt?Avian Influenza vaccines confer a protection buy increasing the host resistance to AI disease through a strong immune response against the AI virus. Experimental and field studies have shown that properly used vaccines will protect against clinical signs and death, reduce shedding of field virus if vaccinated poultry become infected and prevent contact transmission of the field virus. However, they cannot, as most of other vaccines in human and animal health prevent 100% of AI infection and shedding by infected birds.

To be effective, the vaccine has to be of good quality and administered appropriately: inoculation at the right age, quality controlled vaccines, maintenance of cold chain... The vast majority of vaccines used are inactivated conventional vaccines. The vaccine strain has to be of the same H subtype as the field viruses, i.e. H5 for a vaccination against H5N1. As AIV are viruses with high mutation rates, field viruses can evolve and in such cases, the vaccine will not match anymore with circulating viruses. A new vaccine strain will then be required.

AI vaccines are developed mainly for chickens, but they are also used for other avian species, domestic poultry (turkeys, ducks, geese, quails) or exotic or endangered wild species. Additionally, new technology vaccines have been developed such as fowl pox vectored vaccine which allows vaccination at younger age (at hatchery) or reverse genetic vaccines.

HAS tHe uSe OF vAccIneS Been SucceSSFul At cOntROllInG dISeASe?When properly applied, the use of vaccines has been successful at controlling the disease in several countries, in particular in Italy, the USA, Mexico, Hong Kong Republic of China or Viet Nam. In these cases, vaccination has prevented from mass culling. However, accompanying measures must be implemented such as enhanced biosecurity, surveillance, early warning systems, culling of infected flocks, control of movements, monitoring of the virus circulation and communication.

WHy IS It nOt uSed In All cOuntRIeS ?Vaccination is only necessary when other methods such as culling and control of movements can not be enforced or when the number of outbreaks is so important that it obliges to destroy a very high percentage of the poultry population. But vaccination can not be successfully implemented if the accompanying measures described above are not put in place. This is unfortunately what happens in many countries, particularly when backyard village and small holder producing systems are prominent.

cOuld An eFFectIve vAccIne ReAlIStIcAlly Be delIveRed tO All SuScePtIBle POultRy?A vaccine that could be realistically delivered to all susceptible poultry would be a vaccine that is easier to be administered, for example at one day old in hatcheries or administered by mucosal route (drinking water, feed, conjunctive route by spray) instead of injection route. Among the new technology vaccines, the vectorised vaccines are the most promising. The fowlpox vector vaccine, already largely used in Mexico and Viet Nam, allows a vaccination at the hatchery where many logistical problems can be overcome and where semi-automatic injectors of day-old-chicks can be used (up to 3000 chicks per


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hour). New recombinant Newcastle Disease (ND) virus vectored vaccines are being developed. They can be delivered by mucosal route and while protecting against ND and AI, be mass administered by spray or drinking water. This vaccine should be commercialised in a short-term.

Delivery to all susceptible poultry in a contaminated or at risk country supposes also that all practical conditions, accompanying methods and adequate political commitment and investment are put in place which is not very often the case.

ARe SuRveIllAnce SyStemS mORe IndISPenSABle WItH vAccInAtIOn PROGRAmS?Vaccination can allow a certain degree of sub clinical poultry infections. Monitoring of the circulation of virus among vaccinated populations is therefore one of the indispensable measures to be applied. The isolation of virus strains in vaccinated countries is also necessary since field virus can always mutate and the vaccine could become unable to match with the new virus.

Various methods exist to carry out surveillance of virus circulation in vaccinated regions or flocks such as sentinel bird and DIVA techniques. Surveillance through surveys in live bird markets is also a very effective method to monitor virus circulation.

HOW mucH dOeS It cOSt tO delIveR A vAccIne dOSe tO A BIRd?The cost of delivering a vaccine to a bird depends on the production system where the bird is found and the scale of the vaccination campaigns being implemented. For example in the large scale vaccination programmes in Viet Nam where around 350 million birds were targeted for vaccination in the initial stages of the campaign, the costs of vaccinating a bird was between 5.5 to 6 cents of US$. In smaller vaccination programmes such as Indonesia and Cote d’Ivoire the cost of vaccinating a bird were higher at between 8 to 15 cents US$ and 13 to 14 cents of US$, respectively. In all countries the most expensive system to vaccinate was predicted to be in the backyard poultry systems.

HOW dO yOu meASuRe tHe cOSt-eFFectIveneSS OF A vAccInAtIOn cAmPAIGn?Cost-effectiveness requires a combination of epidemiological and economic knowledge and skills. Epidemiology will define a poultry population at risk from being infected by HPAI. This population may be at risk because of where it is found, and can be termed geographically at risk. The population at risk may also be at a particular time of year, temporally at risk. There is also the possibility that populations will be both geographically and temporally at high risk. Having identified at risk poultry populations there is a need to convert this population into the number of bird days at risk. The total cost of a vaccination programme can then be divided by the number of birds at risk to get a measure of the cost-effectiveness of the campaign. This will give a cost per bird day at risk, rather than a cost per bird vaccinated. This measure can be defined to encourage vaccination campaigns to focus on the birds that are at highest risk, rather than vaccination any bird.



10

costs of HPAI outbreaks and benefits from controlling HPAI

HPAI outbreaks and their control have impacts on individual households and national economies. Some of these impacts are obvious and direct, others are more subtle but very far reaching.

The costs have been shared between international and national public funds, private companies and individuals. Averting the risk of a human influenza pandemic has been a strong motivation and justification for the provision of large amounts of international and national public funding. Some elements of control confer a private benefit, for example preventive vaccination, and these justify shared or private investment.

Direct costs from HPAI outbreaks result from the deaths of birds and consequent loss of their production, and the direct costs of implementing culling, disposal, compensation schemes, movement restriction and vaccination.

In an increasing number of countries, compensation is paid to farmers when birds are culled as part of a stamping out operation, although it is extremely rare that this fully recompenses for lost production. The primary objective for compensation is to encourage reporting by providing an assurance to poultry owners that the government will share their loss. Compensation rates are most commonly estimated on the basis on a percentage of market value and have ranged from as little as 30% to a more realistic range of 70-100%. People other than producers who make a living from poultry receive no compensation after culling.

Costs of vaccination in commercial poultry are largely borne by the farmers, but may be heavily subsidized when vaccination is practiced in backyard flocks. In 2007 estimates were made of the cost of providing a single dose of vaccine to a chicken in three different countries and three production systems, which ranged from 4 to 15 US cents. Out of this total, the cost of the vaccine, the vaccinator and the cold chain made up between 63% and 90%. Commercial flocks often pay for these components. The remaining cost was for post vaccination monitoring, communication and government staff involved in co-ordination and regulation.

Governments bear the direct costs of managing and co-ordinating stamping-out activities, deploying their staff and equipment and following up with outbreak investigation. They also pay or subsidize the costs of surveillance.

Indirect costs can be many times larger than direct costs and are usually underestimated. They include market shocks, wider livelihoods impacts beyond the immediate loss of birds, and opportunity costs.

The effect of market shocks spread far beyond an outbreak, as consumer worries about the safety of eating poultry products lead to falling demand and reduced prices. Since 2004, market shocks from HPAI have caused market fluctuations and changed international patterns of trade in live birds and poultry products. Shocks to poultry markets may also have changed the movement patterns and demands for other livestock in ways that have upset their markets and spread disease. There are differences in impact according to the production system, at different points in market chains, and over time. The initial market shock is mainly driven by consumer fears and in some places has led to 70% or more of consumers temporarily ceasing to eat poultry products, while in other places there


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has hardly been any impact on demand. If outbreaks occur in waves over a long period of time, but are mostly brought under control, as in Thailand and Viet Nam, the market shock effect diminishes with each outbreak.

Wider livelihood impacts have largely been felt by women who have lost small flocks, causing hardships within households. The contribution of poultry to the incomes of poor households varies from approximately 3% to over 40% depending on the place and season. The birds are a flexible asset that provides high returns on investment, approximately 700% for a backyard hen. Their loss results in sacrifices in household nutrition, education for children, dowries, social obligations and reduced standing within the community as well as some longer lasting impacts where there has been a reluctance to return to poultry keeping. Shrinkage of the poultry population from deaths, culling or running down of stock can also lead to a reduced supply of affordable protein to urban consumers.

We can assume that there have been opportunity costs of diverting attention from control of other diseases and switching to other less productive species. In the long term, if investment is made to improve the capacity of animal health systems, the balance may be redressed.

Benefits of controlling HPAI H5N1 can be considered on three scales. Globally, the prevention of a human influenza pandemic could prevent losses of billions or trillions of dollars and enormous suffering. Within the global poultry sector, there will be a benefit in removing a destabilizing element in international markets so that production and trade value can continue, for the time being, to expand - overall, the sector has already recovered from a dip in 2004-5. For individual exporting countries, control offers the possibility to recover lost markets, albeit against strong competition, and to provide a stable supply of products for growing domestic urban markets. For individual producers on all scales, protection of their asset is the primary benefit.

There has been no estimate of the total costs or benefits of HPAI control. However, a growing body of information and tools is available for partial estimates. The priority now is to assist countries in assessing the trade-offs for use of their limited national resources, using social and economic analysis to highlight approaches that will maximize the benefits of reduced disease risk without applying unduly harsh control measures. This requires a thorough understanding of the dynamics of the poultry sector and the people whose living depends upon it.



12

Importance of the Poultry Sector

The poultry sector is possibly the fastest growing and most flexible of all livestock sectors. Over the past decade or so it has expanded, consolidated and globalised, driven primarily by very strong demand. However, the sector faces considerable and multiple challenges from scarce or more expensive natural resources and public health concerns that will require entrepreneurship and flexibility from the players in the sector if they are to continue to participate in this dynamic market.

The demand for poultry products over the past 15 years has grown in countries of all income levels, with the exception of a slight decline in egg consumption in high income countries, where the effect of income growth may have reached a peak and demand may be more strongly influenced by changes in consumer taste.

Poultry meat production is the most efficient way of producing meat in intensive production systems since it has the lowest feed conversion ratio of all common domestic species. This is particularly relevant in today’s context of food crisis with the price of grain having gone up tremendously.

Finally, poultry is an important source of food and income for a majority of rural families. More than a billion people live with less than a dollar per day. 700 million poor depend entirely or partially on animal production for their subsistence and poultry is often part of the equation. For example, 65% of rural families in Viet Nam and even 90% of rural families in Egypt or Cambodia have backyard poultry.Indeed, livestock offers one of the few rapidly growing markets that poor, rural people can join, even if they lack substantial amounts of land, training and capital. Small scale and backyard poultry production enables the poor to earn income from animals feeding on common property or fed household waste. Notwithstanding its rapid growth the sector continues to be very diverse in structural terms. There are and will continue to be traditional small-scale, rural, family-based poultry systems which play a crucial role in sustaining livelihoods and importantly supporting women farmers. As long as there will be rural poverty, poultry will be there to offer opportunities for income generation and quality human nutrition.

HPAI has been a big shock to the industry, but by no means the only external pressure that it faces. Concerns about environmental pollution, shortage of water, rising cost of feed and (at least in the EU) rising welfare standards are all putting pressure on the livestock sector, including poultry. However, efforts to contain HPAI and reduce its impact have accelerated moves towards dividing and differentiating different production systems and value chains. These concerns can then be addressed more specifically within each production system.


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long term restructuring of the Poultry Sector

What is “restructuring” of the poultry sector? In the simplest terms, it means regulating or otherwise controlling how or where production, sales and marketing can take place. Moving a live bird market, closing the slaughter points in an area, banning the production of poultry in a city, are all restructuring activities. So is introducing a “compartment”, which is a population of birds under a common and very well regulated biosecurity plan, like the vertically integrated market chain of a global company.

Restructuring is currently receiving a great deal of attention because it is seen as a way of improving the biosecurity of the poultry sector. Well designed and implemented restructuring activities can certainly be helpful to produce safer poultry. However, restructuring usually restricts those who can be involved in producing, trading and processing poultry and their products. This can under some circumstances create competition and disequity, with the most vulnerable people suffering a loss of livelihood. It can also be difficult to regulate.

Various restructuring activities introduced or planned since 2003 have had the following results• A large proportion of small scale producers in one area have lost their market and moved out of

poultry production. Those who were able to comply with new regulations and remain are mostly making a greater profit than before.

• After very abrupt banning of production, a number of poor families suffered from loss of income and the dynamic within households changed when women lost their independent livelihoods activity. The ban only worked for a while, and many people have partially restocked.

• A market that was upgraded for hygienic reasons after a long consultation with stakeholders is now showing a good return on investment to the municipality that runs it.

• An assessment of one restructuring plan suggested that there would be considerable problems associated with land tenure. Apart from making it difficult to implement, this would have gender implications since women had limited possibilities to own land.

When restructuring is being considered as part of a plan to reduce human and animal disease risk in the poultry sector, we would recommend the same careful planning and implementation as for any long term development activity.

• A careful risk assessment in advance to learn where the biggest gains can be made in biosecurity with the least effort.

• An assessment of the potential environmental and social impact in any restructuring proposal.• A consultative process.• Gradual steps, to maximise buy-in and minimise livelihoods damage.• Investment of public money in basic infrastructure, training and quality monitoring• Impact monitoring once the plan has been initiated.



14

communication

Since mid-2006, the FAO communication team has successfully advocated with partners (particularly UNICEF, WHO, OIE, UNSIC, World Bank) and national governments, that in order to stop the spread of HPAI, more attention and enhanced investments (technical, financial, human) are needed in the domain of animal health communication. A key emerging lesson is the need for deeper thinking, closer linkages with technical and scientific experts, stronger multi-disciplinary research and analysis, to inform communication strategies and planning.

FAO-led socio-economic and anthropological studies in several countries took place as well as inter-agency discussions among communicators and technical partners, including the FAO/OIE Communication Roundtable (April 2007, Rome), the inter-agency Technical Meeting on Avian and Pandemic Influenza (June 2007, Rome), and the International Ministerial Conference on Avian/Human Influenza (Dec 2007, New Delhi). They have underscored that controlling HPAI requires specific attention to animal health communication issues. This recognition is clearly reflected by the large surge in demand for technical assistance and guidance in HPAI communication that FAO has been receiving in the recent past from national governments, as well as other partners involved in the coordination and implementation of HPAI prevention/control communication campaigns.

Communication research in a number of affected countries clearly indicates that while communication interventions have generally succeeded in creating a reasonably high level of public awareness on avian influenza, the same has not translated into a reduction in risky behaviours or practices among vulnerable populations. Furthermore, the perception of risk with regard to avian and pandemic influenza is generally low among the public, and over time, may also tend to decline among national authorities. Recent research is also giving a much sharper and more nuanced understanding of barriers and motivational factors among key audiences including poultry-keepers/producers, traders, transporters and other intermediaries in the production and marketing chains, for the uptake of preventive bio-security measures and greater participation in control operations in case of outbreaks. There are important lessons also emerging from the large-scale private poultry sector for understanding better poultry market shocks and ways to mitigate these shocks.

To respond to new demands for strategic policy guidance and technical assistance in animal health communication, in mid-2007, FAO/ECTAD announced the formal establishment of a new ECTAD Communication Unit, based at its headquarters in Rome. Support has been sought from a number of donors for building a critical mass of HPAI communication specialists within FAO, to conduct multi-disciplinary research to inform strategy-building, as well as, to provide direct technical assistance to Ministries of Agriculture/Livestock in rapidly building their communication capacities and competencies to respond effectively to HPAI.

FAO recognises the crucial role that media can play in setting the global and national development and policy agenda. Besides keeping the media informed through regular media releases and a dedicated Avian Influenza website, FAO is also piloting an innovative media fellowships program focusing on animal health issues and community voices in Viet Nam, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria.


15Rome, FAO HQ

14 May 2008

FAO Response to HPAI

As of 25 April 2008, FAO has secured contributions for a total of USD 195.37 million in support of its Global Programme for the control and eradication of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Activities are implemented through the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases Operations (ECTAD), established in December 2004.

Twenty countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and nine international and regional organizations (the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the United nations Common Fund for Humanitarian Action in Sudan, the European Commission, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries-OPEC, the Office for the coordination of UN assistance Programme to Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Administered Donor Joint Trust Fund, UNDP and the United Nations Development Group-UNDG/EXECCOM Secretariat) have generously contributed funds to FAO in the effort to control and eradicate H5N1 avian influenza. FAO’s initial investments through its Technical Cooperation Programme have also played a catalytic role.

Nine countries and one intergovernmental organization (Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway, France, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Greece, Jordan, China, OPEC) have channelled contributions worth USD 40.81 million through the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA). The pooling of funds through the SFERA has allowed a programmatic approach and has greatly improved FAO’s flexibility to respond. Since operations began, FAO has been active in over 90 countries and has been able to spend and commit over 60 percent of the secured contributions.

cOuntRIeS WHeRe FAO HAS teAmS And mAIn ActIvItIeS On-GOInG



1�

Activities are implemented by technical and operational teams based in FAO Representations, governmental offices and dedicated ECTAD units in nine countries (Bangladesh, China, Cambodia, Egypt, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Nigeria, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam). National teams are also present in an additional 22 countries. In close cooperation with its partners FAO has established one ECTAD regional unit for Asia (Bangkok), six ECTAD sub-regional units for South Asia (Kathmandu), the Near East (Beirut), North Africa (Tunis), West and Central Africa (Bamako), Southern Africa (Gaborone) and East Africa (Nairobi).

The programme currently employs more than 400 staff throughout the world, of which 270 professionals (56 percent national and 44 percent international). Eighty percent of the overall ECTAD personnel is based in the field and 65 percent is national.

In the initial stages of ECTAD’s response to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), a substantial amount of funds and efforts were invested in mobilizing in key countries, especially in Asia, the international veterinary and operational expertise to respond to the global crisis. More than half of the overall funds (54%) are supporting work in the Asia region. Africa also became a main focus as HPAI spread to the continent in early 2006. Nearly a quarter of available funds (24%) are being used to support the Africa region. Several countries in the Near East, North Africa and Eastern Europe had also been affected and therefore benefited from FAO’s support. About 10 percent of the received funds are allocated to thematic and transversal activities such as communication, wildlife, GLEWS, OFFLU and Laboratory Networks, socio-economics , poultry production and biodiversity analysis.

ECTAD has funnelled emergency funds to help refurbish laboratories, provide laboratory equipment and veterinary supplies, and train national veterinarians and lab technicians in the most advanced techniques and strategies for surveillance and control of HPAI. ECTAD has also supported regional networking initiatives to encourage countries and organizations to share information and experiences in mounting a unified defence against HPAI. Since HPAI can quickly spread from one nation to another, international cooperation is key to halting the disease.

Latin America1%

Near East andNorth Africa

8%Africa24%

Global11%

Eastern Europe2%

Asia54%


17Rome, FAO HQ

14 May 2008

TEN MAIN BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES (US$MIL)

1.6

1.8

2

3

4

5

5

6

7.5

16

31

Uganda

Myanmar

Ethiopia

Nigeria

Timor East

Cambodia

Egypt

Chad

Lao

VietNam

Indonesia

Once emergency equipment and supplies were put in place, over the past three years more targeted approaches have been developed to combat HPAI in countries where avian influenza has become endemic, usually due to a particular combination of economic and social factors, or could easily become endemic. Socio-economic studies have been launched in Egypt and Indonesia, for example, to help shed light on these factors. And a wildlife unit within the Animal Health Division of FAO is investigating the role of migrating wild birds in the spread of HPAI to domestic poultry.The ten countries with the highest FAO financial investment are Indonesia, Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Chad, Cambodia, Egypt, Timor Leste, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Myanmar and Uganda.



18

International coordination

Since highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) was first reported in Viet Nam in December 2003, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), together with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the World Health Organization (WHO), have taken a lead role in providing international technical and policy support to contribute to control of HPAI. This joint effort has provided the platform for the animal and public health sectors to work together in seeking common solutions to the avian influenza threat.

FAO and OIE are coordinating the international response to the spread of the disease in animals. They have provided sound technical and policy advice in harmonising national, regional and global plans, and in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation of disease prevention and control programmes in the poultry sector.

FAO and OIE, in consultation with WHO, have developed The Global Strategy for Prevention and Control of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza which is regularly updated based on the evolution of the disease situation. FAO subsequently formulated a Proposal for a Global Programme that presents its approach to addressing the needs for control of the current panzootic of HPAI over a projected period of three years (2006-2008).

The Global Programme has the following goals: to coordinate and manage, in collaboration with OIE, the international effort in assisting countries to control and ultimately eradicate avian influenza from the poultry producing sectors and to prepare non-infected countries for a rapid detection of, and response to incursions of the disease. This is managed from the global level while facilitating improved synergies at the regional level and accommodating specific needs at the national level.

To ensure a coordinated and efficient global response to HPAI, FAO has established the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD), which makes both operational and technical assistance on HPAI immediately available to countries. In addition joint actions with the OIE have been undertaken in the preparation of technical documents on HPAI control and surveillance, organisation of international conferences and establishment of Regional Animal Health Centres in several parts of the world and of a Crisis Management Centre for Animal Health in FAO, Headquarters designed to respond rapidly to requests for technical and operational assistance to countries in relation to transboundary animal diseases in general and AI in particular.

FAO, other UN agencies and OIE work under the umbrella of the office of the United Nations System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC). FAO has contributed to the formulation and development of UNSIC’s Consolidated Action Plan, which describes the concerted efforts of the relevant UN agencies and OIE in the global fight against avian and human pandemic influenza.

FAO and OIE collaborate with other international and regional organizations, such as ASEAN and SAARC in Asia or AU-IBAR in Africa, with other agencies and national governments in order to facilitate information exchange within the international community, avoid unnecessary overlap and ensure that all partners are providing complementary support to a unified approach. The Organization works also with international donor institutions involved in combating HPAI such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Union, as well as other strategic bilateral donors such as USAID, Japan, Canada, Australia, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany, U.K. ...

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