how the trump plan makes peace possible · 2/24/2020 · improve chances that peace will one day...

MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Fall 2020 Feith and Libby: Trump Peace Plan / 1

How the Trump Plan Makes Peace Possible

by Douglas J. Feith and Lewis Libby

resident Donald Trump’s Middle East peace plan transforms long-standing official U.S. ideas about

peace diplomacy and about the U.S. role in the region. In the past, U.S. peace-making efforts aimed directly at a Palestinian-Israeli deal. The Trump peace plan, however, stresses that fundamental changes are required on the Palestinian side before such a deal can become realistic. The plan does not hold out the promise of a quick peace settlement. Rather, it has a more limited aim: to improve chances that peace will one day be possible.

A Warning The plan’s most original element is a

warning: If the Palestinian side continues to support terrorism and reject peace, its cause will suffer. For decades, Palestinian leaders, while refusing peace offers seen as reasonable by top U.S. officials, incited violence and de-manded that the status quo in the territories be frozen pending a peace deal. The Palestinians are now being told that, if they continue on this path, Washington will not block Israel from advancing its own claims to areas in the West Bank that, in the administration’s view, would be left to Israel in realistic peace talks. Those areas, according to the peace plan’s “Conceptual Map,” include not just the major settlement blocs but also the Jordan Valley.

The Trump plan effectively tells the Palestinians that the sensible question is not whether a deal provides everything they think they are entitled to, but whether it is the best deal available, now and in the fore-seeable future. A huge development program is promised as a reward for compromise. Obviously, the U.S government cannot force Palestinian leaders to accept a peace that they consider unjust, but if their demands for “justice” include the destruction of Israel, Trump warns that Washington will not support them and will not fight to preserve

P

U.S. president Donald Trump with Israeliprime minister Benjamin Netanyahu (left),January 28, 2020, White House. The Trumppeace plan warns that if the Palestinian sidecontinues to support terrorism and rejectpeace, its cause will suffer.


the West Bank’s legal status quo for their benefit.

The peace plan’s strong language and unequivocal conclusions reflect more than just this president’s personal talking style. They reflect the Trump team’s acquaintance with the long, exasperating history of U.S. diplomacy undone by Palestinian rejection-ism and terrorism.

Installation of Arafat and the PLO For nearly thirty years, Palestinian-Israeli

peace diplomacy has been based on the 1993 Oslo accords. These agreements created the Palestinian Authority (PA), which Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headed. Israeli officials empowered the PA so that it would end the intifada, which began in 1987, promote peace, and negotiate in good faith a formal end to the conflict.

Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the accords, is often portrayed as the champion of the “two-state solution,” but, until the end, he opposed creation of a Palestinian state. In his last Knesset speech on October 5, 1995, a month before he was assassinated, Rabin said the conflict’s “permanent solution” would be a State of Israel and “alongside it a Palestinian entity,” which he envisioned as “less than a state,” which would “independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”1 Rabin promised in the same speech to preserve security through permanent Israeli control of the Jordan Valley.

Arafat disappointed expectations that he would use his new power and prestige as PA president to promote peace. Rather, he spoke

1 “PM Rabin in Knesset – Ratification of Interim

Agreement,” Oct. 5, 1995, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem.

of a “jihad to liberate Jerusalem,” comparing Oslo to a peace the Prophet Muhammad accepted before obliterating his enemy.2 PA schools and official media stoked hostility to Israel. In demanding an end to “the oc-cupation,” they applied the term to cities within pre-1967 Israel—Haifa and Jaffa, for example—as much as to the territory Israel won in the 1967 Six-Day War. The PA honored terrorists that killed Israeli civilians, calling them heroes, naming streets for them, and urging children to emulate them. The PA enacted legislation that incentivized terrorism by providing official payments to terrorist prisoners held by Israel and to families of “martyrs” (i.e., terrorists killed in action). Critics call such legislation “pay-for-slay.”3 More Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks after the Oslo accords than before.4

Nonetheless, U.S. president Bill Clinton tried for years to promote mutual Israeli-Palestinian confidence through agreements on practical problems such as water disputes, boundary issues, and local security arrange-ments. He hoped that diplomacy, by resolving misunderstandings and overcoming mistrust, could resolve the conflict.

A Most Generous Bid for Peace With his term winding down, Clinton

held a peace conference at Camp David in July 2000 to push for a deal to end the conflict. Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak made extraordinary concessions, offering the Palestinians control over an area at least 95

2 Daniel Pipes, “Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad’s

Diplomacy,” Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1999. 3 Douglas J. Feith and Sander Gerber, “The Department of

Pay-for-Slay,” Commentary, Apr. 2017. 4 Efraim Karsh, The Oslo Disaster (Ramat Gan:

Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 2016), p. 18.


percent the size of the West Bank.5 Barak also agreed to divide Jerusalem and accept Palestinian sovereignty over most of the Old City, including on the Temple Mount.6 Arafat refused to make peace, how-ever, angering Clinton.

Arafat demanded accept-ance of a Palestinian “right of return” that would require Israel to admit millions of Pales-tinians—a small number of original refugees and a large number of their descendants. “No Israeli leader would ever let in so many Palestinians that the Jewish character of the state could be threatened,” Clinton told Arafat, calling the claimed right “a deal breaker.”7

After the Camp David talks collapsed, Arafat launched an all-out terrorism campaign against Israel. Many of the attacks were perpetrated by official PA security forces or other individuals re-sponsive to Arafat or protected by him.8 Before the talks, Barak had removed Israeli forces from Lebanon where for years they had been fighting Hezbollah militias that endangered northern Israel. Emboldened Palestinian demonstrators proclaimed, “Lebanon Today, Palestine Tomorrow.” At Camp David, Arafat threatened that “we can see to it that the Hezbollah [Lebanon]

5 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

2004), p. 936. 6 Ehud Barak, My Country, My Life: Fighting for

Israel, Searching for Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2018), p. 395.

7 Clinton, My Life, p. 943. 8 The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 29, 2010.

precedent is replicated in the territories.”9 From 2000 to 2005, Arafat’s terrorism campaign killed more than 1,100 Israelis.10 Palestinian fatalities are estimated between 3,000 and 5,000.11 Misleadingly called the Second Intifada, this campaign has more accurately been labeled “Arafat’s War” by Israeli historian Efraim Karsh.12

9 Efraim Karsh and Gershon Hacohen, “Israel’s Flight

from South Lebanon 20 Years On,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, May 22, 2020.

10 “Vital Statistics: Total Casualties, Arab-Israel Conflict (1860-Present),” Jewish Virtual Library, Chevy Chase; “Five Years of Violent Confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Ramat Hasharon, Oct. 2, 2005.

11 “Vital Statistics: Total Casualties, Arab-Israel Conflict (1860-Present).”

12 See Efraim Karsh, Arafat’s War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest (New York: Grove Press, 2003), p. 189.

U.S. president Bill Clinton (center) hosted a conference at CampDavid, July 2000, to push for a peace deal. While Israeli primeminister Ehud Barak (left) made major concessions, PA presidentYasser Arafat (right) refused to make peace.

MIDDLE E

Despviolence,again foWith Barhe offere(the “Clineven mothan Barpeace n“unprecedIsrael cou

a ancaJethinunPst

Arafat, h

Ar

Afteprocess somethinmisunderincreasinmatter oand natPalestiniaan indivthe Arab

13 Dennis

RelatiFarrar

14 Dennis of theFarra

EAST QUARTE

pite the ong, Clinton tr a peace drak’s agreemed Arafat tenton Parametore forthcomrak’s Camp negotiator Ddented” offeruld go and inc

Palestinian snd nearly all oapital for therusalem; sechat would nternational pnlimited righalestinian refutate.14

however, refu

rafat’s ReOslo’s Fla

er eight yearsuggested

ng more furstandings a

ngly clear thf intense betionalist idan nationalivisible, inalbs, and the J

Ross, Doome

ionship from Tr, Straus and Gi

Ross, The Mise Fight for Miar, Straus and G

ERLY Fall 2

oing tried deal.

ment, erms ers”) ming David prop

Dennis Rosr went absolucluded

state in all ofof the West Bhe state in curity arrangebe built opresence; anht of return

fugees to thei

used to make

ejectionismawed Prems, the failurethat the c

undamental and lack of hat the proeliefs rootedentities. Ast ideology,lienable po

Jews are onl

d to Succeed:

Truman to Obairoux, 2015), pp

ssing Peace: Tiddle East PeaGiroux, 2005),

i

020

posals.13 U.Sss says thutely as far a

f Gaza Bank; a

East ements on an nd an n for r own

e peace.

m and mise e of the Osloconflict wathan mutuatrust. It wa

oblem was d in religiouccording to, Palestine iossession oly a religiou

The U.S.-Israema (New York

p. 295-6.

The Inside Storace (New Yorkpp. 3-4.

The conflntense belie

and nati

S. he as

o as al as a

us o is of us

el k:

ry k:

PaleJord

polioffithatyeahavIndhimYas

werconagaIsrapermaklimby endPalthe rem

15 “

16

lict was a mefs rooted inionalist iden

Fe

estinian claimdan River to t

Martin Inicy advisor icials held st Arafat wa

ars, Clinton ve known wdyk wrote, cmself “depensser Arafat.”

Many Israre galled thncessions byainst Israeliaelis conclursuade nor cke peace.

mited agreemforeign don

d the conflestinian statviolence, s

mained unrec

“The Palestinia

the PalestineThe Avalon and DiplomaJerusalem Po

Martin IndykAccount of AMiddle East 2009), p. 375Zion: The BPalestinian University Pr

matter of n religious ntities.

eith and Libby:

group, entitleddetermish majtinian actuallyrenoun

ms over anythe Mediterra

ndyk, a sento Clinton, mso tenaciousas a peacem

and our tewith whom wcriticizing Cndent on the”16 aelis, includhat Arafat hy instigatini civilians. uded that thcompel PalePLO leade

ments—especnors—but wict. Even i

ate, Jerusalemo long as th

conciled to I

an National C

e National CounProject: Documacy, Yale Lawost, Jan. 11, 20

k, Innocent AAmerican Peat (New York: 5; see also, Elli

Bush AdministrConflict (Ne

ress, 2013), pp

: Trump Peace

not a d to nationa

mination and ajority state.15

leaders havey been will

nce, once andy territory froanean Sea. nior Middlemarveled thasly to the de

maker. “Afteream surely we were de

Clinton for me statesmans

ding on thehad repaid Bg horrific More and

hey could nestinian leaders might cially if rewwere unwillif it agreedm could nohe Palestiniasrael’s existe

Charter: Resolu

ncil, July 1-17ments in Law,

w School, art. 014.

Abroad: An Iace Diplomacy

Simon and Siott Abrams, T

ration and the w York: Cam

p. 25-6.

Plan / 4

people al self-a Jew-

5 Pales-e never ling to

d for all, om the

e East at U.S. elusion r eight should

ealing,” making ship of

e Left, Barak’s attacks

more neither ders to accept warded ling to d to a ot stop an side ence.

utions of 7, 1968,” History 20; The

Intimate y in the Schuster, Tested by

Israeli-mbridge


Israelis in large num-bers came to the unhappy realization that they lacked the ability, short of na-tional suicide, to appease their enemies. The slogan “peace now,” which im-plied that the Israeli gov-ernment could have peace simply by changing its own policies, lost its fol-lowing. The self-described “peace camp” shrank and has not recovered to this day.

Clinton warned in-coming President George W. Bush against trusting Arafat. Soon thereafter, in February 2001, Barak lost his reelection bid, and Ariel Sharon became Israeli prime minister.

A Deceitful Terrorist Despite Clinton’s warnings and the

raging violence, the Bush team entered office willing to invest additional U.S. prestige in mediating between the Israelis and Arafat. Trying to induce Arafat to end terrorism and reinvigorate cooperation with Israel, Bush broke new diplomatic ground by endorsing a Palestinian state.17 Arafat, however, con-tinued to fuel terrorist attacks. Bush was slow to anger, but Arafat’s bad will became

17 George W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations

General Assembly,” Oct. 3, 2001, State Dept. archives, Washington, D.C.; Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 786; Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 306, 307, 311; Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 16; Robert Satloff, “The Peace Process at Sea: Karine A Affair and the War on Terrorism,” The National Interest, Mar. 1, 2002.

insufferable for him after exposure of the Karine A affair.

In January 2002, Arafat tried to smuggle a huge quantity of Iranian-supplied arms into Gaza by sea in violation of his Oslo commitments. Israeli forces intercepted the contraband-laden ship, the Karine A.18 With-in weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Arafat had opted not only to continue terrorism, but to prepare an escalation and to stand with Iran, the U.S. enemy and a major state sponsor of terrorism. Bush’s concession on Palestinian statehood appeared to have no effect on Arafat’s behavior.

In her memoirs, then-national security advisor Condoleezza Rice recounted that the Karine A affair “made it absolutely clear that [Arafat] was not going to lead his people to peace.”19 Nonetheless, immediately after the

18 Satloff, “The Peace Process at Sea.” 19 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My

Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), pp. 135-6; see also, Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 25.

Military equipment confiscated from the Karine A, January 3, 2002. Yasser Arafat tried to smuggle a huge quantity of Iranian-supplied arms into Gaza in violation of his Oslo commitments. Israeli forces intercepted the contraband-laden ship.

MIDDLE E

ship’s joined Stofficials iBush writhim on timplicitlthat no sequencelow.20 Ththem quithe authoCheney’sof staff, aOfficer arguing tclarifyingmisconduU.S. dipterrorismthe issuescrapped and demawas chan

ArafKarine ABush.22 Oincluded homes, bshopping Jewish re

In show to Hussein

20 Abrams

intervRoss,Peace

21 AuthorAbram

22 GeorgeCrowIn My(New

EAST QUARTE

capture, tate Departmin proposingte Arafat, chithe Karine Aly assuring

serious ces would he idea wasickly and revors of this ars national seand Libby’sEric Edelmthat the Karg moment anuct under thplomacy and

m.21 Cheney e to Bush.the letter, ele

anded that Anging course. fat, however,

A arms smugOver the ne

shooting Ibombing civ

malls, and ligious schoopring 2002,

handle Ir’s defiance

s, Tested by Ziview with Am, Doomed to Se Process at Se

rs’ interview ms, Tested by Z

e W. Bush, Dwn Publishers, My Time: A Pew York: Thresh

ERLY Fall 2

she ment

g that iding

A but him

con-fol- to put the vive peace trticle, Lewisecurity advis deputy, For

man, opposerine A presnd that sweehe rug would likely resagreed, so R Bush oveevated the K

Arafat show c

, denied anygling, a lie t

ext months, Israeli familvilians on st

massacring ol. , Bush wasraqi dictate of U.N

ion, p. 26; aut

mb. Eric EdelmSucceed, p. 312ea.”

with Amb. Zion, p. 26.

Decision Poin2010), p. 401

ersonal and Pohold Editions, 2

020

affair behindtalks. One os Libby, thenser and chiereign Servicd the letterented a rareping Arafat’ld underminsult in morRice brougherruled Rice

Karine A issueclearly that h

y role in ththat infuriateArafat’s wa

lies in theitreets and instudents at

consideringtor Saddamresolutions

thors’ telephonman, June 20202; Satloff, “Th

Eric Edelman

ts (New York; Dick Cheneyolitical Memoi2011), p. 373.

Arafat’s waIsraeli famand massa

Jewish

d of n

ef e r, e, ’s ne re ht e, e,

he

he d

ar ir n a

g m s.

ne 0; he

n;

k: y, ir

andfutiterr

condurMidthatlimU.Showspego meeposandnewIn wriAra

receandto CheFirs

23 R

24 C25 R26

ar included milies in theiacring studereligious sc

Fe

d argued that ile and wourorism.

State Depansequences iring the viddle East trit, as a preco

mited securityS. negotiatorwever, refuseeech, Bush a

to the regioetings, Powsitive gestured Rice, nonew peace conJune, Powe

ites, the “Preafat.”25

Bush waeptive to ad

d National Smove forweney eventust, there was

Ross, Doomed

Tested by Zio

Cheney, In My

Rice, No Highe

Abrams, TesReporter Te2002; Ross, Dtelephone in2020; The Je

shooting ir homes ents at a chool.

eith and Libby:

SecretaPowellstates wIraq undiplomCheneyfense and th

new peace iuld appear t

artment officf Cheney faiice presidenip. Cheney aondition, Ary agreementr expected hed to sign.24

announced ton to prom

well urged Ae, but Arafatetheless, favnference. Buell tried agesident again

as growing dvice from

Security Couard with A

ually embracs no hope fo

d to Succeed, pon, p. 34.

Time, p. 378.

er Honor, pp. 1

sted by Zion,elegram (MidlDoomed to Sucnterview with erusalem Post,

: Trump Peace

ary of Statel believed thawould defy Bnless he reac

macy with Ay, Secretary Donald Rumeir staffs disinitiatives woto reward A

cials predicteiled to meet nt’s spring agreed with rafat should t with Israelhim to do. A4 Then, in anthat Powell

mote peace. IArafat to mt stood pat. Pvored conveush rebuffedgain, but, asn said no, no

less andState Depa

uncil staff oArafat.26 Busced three inor progress t

pp. 311, 315; A

139, 142.

, pp. 25-6; Mland, Tex.), Jcceed, p. 312;

John HannaSept. 28, 2017

Plan / 6

e Colin at Arab

Bush on ctivated

Arafat.23 of De-msfeld, sagreed ould be Arafat’s

ed dire Arafat

2002 Libby sign a

as the Arafat, n April would

In two make a Powell

ening a d them. s Rice ot with

d less artment fficials sh and nsights: toward

Abrams,

Midland Jan. 24, authors’

ah, June 7.


peace with Arafat. Second, the Palestinian issue would not bar Arab states from cooperating on important regional concerns, including Iraq. And third, as Cheney and others had re-peatedly heard from leading Israelis, Jerusalem would com-promise if Palestinians offered reasonable prospects for security and peace.

Bush saw Arafat as a deceitful terrorist. Yet he also, for the first time, gave Washington’s support to a Palestinian state. And he pressured Sharon to relax security measures in hopes of facilitating a peace deal with Arafat. All in all, Arafat could claim credit with his people for persisting in the anti-Zionist armed struggle while causing changes in U.S. policy that favored the Palestinian national cause.

Repudiating Palestinian Leadership In spring of 2002, Rice pushed for a

presidential speech that would appeal to Arafat.27 The Cheney and Rumsfeld teams favored a different speech. They wanted Bush to say that Arafat was not a peace partner.28 Undersecretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith wrote to Rice’s deputy and suggested that the president say,

Until the Palestinians have a leadership that can speak credibly of peace, prevent terrorism, counter extremism, and handle funds honestly and transparently,

27 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 39. 28 Authors’ interviews with Edelman and Hannah.

the goal of a state of Palestine will remain out of reach.29

Bush’s new speech would go through more than thirty drafts. Delivered on June 24, 2002, its main point was repudiation of the PA’s leaders and institutions. Bush called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not compromised by terror.” He criticized PA corruption, opacity, and lack of accountability. Bush said that the Palestinians needed “entirely new political and economic institutions based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism.”30 In U.S. Middle East pol-icy, this was a major departure.

Blaming the PA for the lack of peace and for Palestinian suffering was novel, even shocking, especially for those wedded to what Rice in her memoirs called “the stale ideas governing policy toward the Middle

29 Feith fax to Steve Hadley, “Notes for possible

speech,” June 10, 2002. 30 “President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership,”

White House archives, Washington, D.C., June 24, 2002.

U.S. president George W. Bush at the podium with (left toright) Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld,White House, June 24, 2002. Bush called on the Palestiniansto elect new leaders “not compromised by terror.”

MIDDLE E

East.”31 State Depargued fohis standcommittenever Arafat ag

Arab“roadmapdrafted bcall on threform thmove towfull stateh

Whehis lonbecame PBush, osecretaryas a newreformer

IsraeNot expfinished would imWest Banwithdrawnegotiaticosts of thought 2005, coverall.

AbbaPLO face

31 Rice, N32 Abrams33 Bush,

DiscuEast,”Mar.

EAST QUARTE

Within wepartment offior Bush to mod.32 He remaed, however

dealing wgain. b diplomats p” for pea

by State Dephe Palestiniaheir politicaward a provihood.33

The “Roaen Arafat dgtime depuPLO head a

on the advy of state, grw beginningand peacem

el’s Sharon ecting peacbuilding th

mpede terrornk. He also d

w from Gazons or agrestaying in

that withdrcould stren

as and his ed a political c

No Higher Hono

s, Tested by Zio

Decision Pusses Roadma” White House14, 2003.

ERLY Fall 2

eeks, icials odify ained r, to with

soon proposace. The rpartment offans to end tal institutionisional state

admap” Faied in Noveuty Mahmand presidenice of Ricreeted Abbasg and treate

maker. saw things

e in the nehe security rist infiltratidecided thatza unilateraeements. He

Gaza as toawal, comp

ngthen Isra

Fatah factiochallenge fro

or, p. 144.

on, p. 43.

Points, p. 40ap for Peace e archives, Wa

P

020

sed creating roadmap, aficials, wouldterrorism andns first, then, and finally

ails ember 2004

moud Abbant of the PAce, his news’s accessioned him as

s differentlyear term, h

barrier thaion from th Israel wouldally, withoue viewed thoo high and

pleted in falaeli security

on within thom Hamas. A

05; “Presidenin the Middl

ashington, D.C

The “RoadPalestinian l

a peace d

a as d d n y,

4, as A. w n a

y. he at he d

ut he d ll y

he As

nt le

C.,

PAbut HamPAperformcauraditerrconto a

restoffiaddwasJeruto slittlewhipurwoupoliJun

remIsraappandto ain

34 “

35 H

dmap” assumeaders weredeal in good

Fe

’s January 2Hamas wo

mas took co, after killin

rsonnel theremer secreta

utioned U.Sdicalism shourorism from ntinued refusaccept Israel

Despite all tarted peaceicials to nedressing so-cs contrary usalem that tstop terrorisme more than ich assumedrsuing in gould partitionitical reform

ne 24, 2002 sLike Ar

markably foaelis. Prime proximately d a “land swaanother 5 pe

East Jerus

“Hamas Covena

Goldman LaHaven; Abram

Henry KissingThe New Yor

med that e pursuing d faith.

eith and Libby:

the Pathe MuHamasinationkillingbolster Departm

2006 parliamon. A little ontrol of Gang or expele. As Ham

ary of state S. officialsuld not obsc

Abbas and sal, despite l’s right to ex

this, State De talks. Ricegotiate a “called final-s

to previouthe Palestiniam. The “Road

a revival ofd that Palestood faith an the Holy m, a criticaspeech, fell frafat, Abborthcoming Minister Eh94 percent ap” from preercent; Palessalem; join

ant 1988,” The aw Library, Yms, Tested by Zi

ger, “Sharon’srk Times, Feb.

: Trump Peace

alestinian brauslim Brothes calls for n of Israel ag of Jews.

Abbas, thetment suppormentary eleover a year

aza away frolling all the

mas’s power Henry Kiss that Hure the suppthe PLO, othe Oslo ac

xist.35 Department oce pressed “political hostatus issuesus assuranc

ans would firdmap” had bf the Oslo ptinian leadera peace dea

Land. Paleal issue in Bfar to the reabas receiv

offer fromhud Olmert oof the West

e-1967 Israestinian sovernt governan

Avalon Projec

Yale Universition, pp. 142, 160

s legacy and H15, 2006.

Plan / 8

anch of erhood,

elim-and the .34 To e State rted the ections, r later, om the

e Fatah grew,

ssinger amas’s

port for or their ccords,

officials Israeli

orizon” s. This ces to rst have become rocess,

rs were al that

estinian Bush’s ar. ed a m the offered t Bank

el equal reignty nce of

ct, Lillian ty, New 0.

Hamas,”


Jerusalem’s Old City; and Israeli acceptance of fifteen to twenty thousand Palestinian refugees over five years. In her memoirs, Rice expressed amaze-ment at Olmert’s “remarkable” offer, but “Abbas refused.”36 A 2007 international peace con-ference Rice had organized produced no breakthroughs.

Obama Reverses Course Barack Obama entered the

presidency hoping to transform the U.S. relationship with the Muslim world, seeing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a principal irritant in that re-lationship and holding Israel largely to blame for the lack of peace. Bush, he thought, had been too close to Israel, which relieved its leaders from making concessions, which Obama expected would bring peace.37

To encourage peace talks, Obama prevailed on Israel to accept a ten-month “freeze” on new West Bank construction. Abbas squandered the freeze, failing to negotiate directly with Israel during most of it and then refusing to talk unless Israel extended it.

As he urged Jerusalem to take risks for peace, Obama gave the Israelis additional grounds to fear for their security. Most notably, Obama offered an “extended hand” if Iran, Israel’s foremost threat, would “unclench its fist”38 The resulting nuclear deal, top Israeli officials believed, gave Iran a path to a weapon and over $100 billion that

36 Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 723. 37 Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 345-7. 38 Reuters, Jan. 27, 2009.

Iran could use to finance pro-Assad military operations and activities by Tehran’s terrorist proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.

Abbas continued to lead the PA throughout the Obama years as he still does though he was elected PA president only once, in 2005, to a four-year term. Under him, the PA continues to support terrorism and remains undemocratic, corrupt,39 and unwilling to conclude a permanent peace with Israel. Abbas insists on a Palestinian “right of return” that would end Israel as a Jewish-majority state. He said he would never recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people.40 Meanwhile, rejectionist Hamas rules Gaza, expanding its arsenal.

Over two terms as president, Obama tested his theory for advancing peace. He

39 Middle East Monitor (London), July 18, 2019. 40 Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 378, 384, 387.

U.S. president Barack Obama (right) meets with PA presidentMahmoud Abbas, White House, May 28, 2009. Obama distancedhis administration from Israel and promoted sympathy for thePalestinian cause but made no progress on peace through hisefforts.

MIDDLE E

distancedistration promotedthe PalYet, he hto show During neither Ismade subPalestiniacontinuedterrorismPA’s vioand prosunderway

DeflatinTrum

thoroughTop Truaccept thconflict affairs. Tmust dispeace orThey blato make for harmIsrael asseeks—adefense oJerusalemown trointelligengoals coStates.42

41 BBC, J

June 42 “A Con

Post,

EAST QUARTE

d his admfrom Israel

d sympathyestinian cahad no progfor his eff

his tensrael nor thebstantial nean schools ad to exh

m. Palestinianlent misrulespects. Thery when Obam

ng Hopes mp rejected Ohly as Obamump adminishe view thais the main

They do not stance itself r win cooperame Palestincompromise

ming Palests the kind a strong, deof shared inm for takingoops, makince, and bommon to

Jan. 28, 2020;6, 2019.

nversation withAug. 25, 2018

ERLY Fall 2

min-and

y for ause. gress forts. nure, e PA w political and official

hort antisemns still labor, which stiflre were no ma left offic

of DestroyObama’s pe

ma had rejestration offiat the Palesn issue in believe thatfrom Israel

ration from nian leaders es to end theinians.41 Trof foreign

emocratic alnterests. His g initiative, ring availabattling succIsrael and

Times of Isra

h John Bolton,”8.

F

a

020

concessionsnews medi

mitism andred under thled their live

peace talkce.

ying Israeace policy acted Bush’sicials do nostinian-IsraelMiddle Eas

t Washingtonl to promotArab statesfor refusing

e conflict andrump value

n partner hly, active inteam praise

relying on itble valuablcessfully fo

the United

ael (Jerusalem)

” The Jerusalem

For the Trumobstacle t

among Israewill defea

s. a d

he es ks

el as s. ot li st n te s. g d

es he n

es ts e

or d

),

m

ThiIsraPalcon

wasPalexpferithatdestheyJewknoaliebe expcen

visirecorecoGolsettintethe PA meafearconis ain idefPalU.S

mp team, tho peace is thel’s enemiesat the Jewish

Feit

is means thael to preservestinian offi

nflict. A theme o

s that Israel estinians to

pressing syming, the Trumt the prima

spair but hopy will even

wish State. Town propagaen, artificial worn down

pelled as wenturies, the E

The Trumible initiatognizing Jeognizing Islan, annountlements areernational la

PA while ihopes for

asures, takers of reacti

nvey mutuallas legitimateits land and fense. It wiestinian reje

S. support.

he primary he hope s that they h State.

th and Libby: T

TrinnovaEast pinsistinbe conPalestinin terrreason

hat outsiderve the West icials choose

of the Obafuels terrori

o despair abmpathy formp team’s cary obstaclepe among Isrntually isolaThat hope is anda argumepresence in

n, demoralizere the CrusEuropean imp

mp peace platives that erusalem assraeli sover

ncing that Ise not inherenaw, and curtait funds terror Israel’s een in defianions from tly reinforcin

e as any othehas rights toll not forevectionism. A

Trump Peace P

rump’s pration in Mpeace diplomng that there nsequences nian side prorism and rnable peace rs should nBank status

e to perpetu

ma adminisism by causibout peace. r Palestinianontrary mes

e to peace rael’s enemi

ate and deferooted in th

ent that Israethe region thed, and ultiaders and, iperial poweran and the

preceded s Israel’s creignty ovesrael’s Westntly a violatailing assistaorism—all celimination. nce of exaggthe “Arab sng messageser state. It is o security anver be hostAnd it will

Plan / 10

rincipal Middle

macy is should if the

persists refuses terms.

not tell s quo if uate the

stration ing the While

n suf-sage is is not

ies that eat the e well-el is an hat can imately in later rs. highly

it—capital, er the t Bank tion of ance to counter

These gerated street,” : Israel rooted

nd self-tage to

retain


The Trump Peace Plan The Trump plan contradicts

conventional wisdom by con-tending that there can be strategic cooperation between Israel and the Arab states before any Palestinian peace deal. Integrating Israel into the region, the plan states, would facilitate countering Iran’s threats and “set the stage for diplomatic breakthroughs.”43

The plan sees Israel as ready to make necessary compromises to end the conflict but lacking a competent, well-intentioned Pales-tinian partner to engage. It would not ask Israel to sacrifice its security, noting that “extraor-dinary geographic and geo-strategic challenges” give Israel “no margin for error.” Negative events in the West Bank—a takeover by Hamas, for example—could pose an “existential threat,” the plan observes, adding that Israel “had the bitter experience of withdrawing from territories that were then used to launch attacks against it.”44

The plan describes the Jordan Valley—a defensive buffer that benefits both Israel and Jordan—as “critical for Israel’s national security” and expects it, together with Israel’s main West Bank settlement blocs, to remain “under Israeli sovereignty” following good-faith peace negotiations. The plan’s “Conceptual Map” shows boundaries that might emerge from such talks. This has immediate real-world consequences, for, as Trump has stated, “The United States will recognize Israeli sovereignty over the

43 “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of

the Palestinian and Israeli People,” White House, Washington, D.C., Jan. 2020, p. 37.

44 Ibid., p. 7.

territory that my vision provides to be part of the State of Israel. Very important.”45 It is notable that the plan includes this map. No prior administration ever defined the territory that Israel could have U.S. support to hold permanently, with or without a peace agreement.

Replacing Palestinian Leadership The Trump plan paints a sorry picture of

Palestinian politics: “Gaza and the West Bank are politically divided. Gaza is run by Hamas, a terror organization that has fired thousands of rockets at Israel and murdered hundreds of Israelis.” In the West Bank, the PA is corrupt, runs failed institutions and,

45 “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister

Netanyahu of the State of Israel in Joint Statements,” White House, Washington, D.C., Jan. 28, 2020.

Photo: Natan FlayerRockets from Gaza hit Sderot, June 2014. The Trump plan statesthat Gaza and the West Bank are “politically divided,” andHamas is “a terror organization that has … murdered hun-dreds of Israelis.”

MIDDLE E

due to countabilernance,”dered” blars.46 Wireform, tthere wilprovemenwith Israto that in for rule separationpendent jPalestiniapublics—and comdesigned officials. people an

Critiwin accmissing has no chpolitical Abbas anegative long tratremism,declared Trump prise of nemay prov

The economic

46 “Peace 47 Ibid., p.48 “Remar

NetanD.C.,

EAST QUARTE

“lack of ity and bad

” has “sqbillions of ithout substathe plan wall be neithernt in Palest

ael. Using lanBush’s Juneof law, trann of powerjudiciary.47 Tan leaders

—children, in mmit terror

to win favoIt is an appe

nd around theics who sayeptance byits main pohance withouchanges. In and his cojudgment o

ain of terrand bad-fa

the need foplan proposeew leadershive elusive.

The $50 Bplan pro

c developme

to Prosperity,”

. 34.

rks by Presidennyahu of Israel, Feb. 15, 2017

ERLY Fall 2

ac-gov-

quan-dol-

antial arns, r im-tinians’ livenguage virtue 24, 2002 spnsparency, ars and a faTrump, like Bfor indoctrparticular—

rism.48 Thisor with curreneal over theire PA to the Ay Trump’s p

Mahmoudoint, which iut substantiathe Trump

olleagues bon themselvrorism, ideofaith diplomor Palestinians ways to enip. It admits

Billion Caromises a ent program

” p. 4.

nt Trump and l,” White Hous

7.

Tfoh

020

es nor peacually identicapeech, it call

accountabilityair and indeBush, blamerinating thei

—to hate Israes is hardlynt Palestinianr heads to th

Arab states. plan will nod Abbas aris that peacal Palestinianteam’s viewbrought thies through ological ex

macy. Havingn reform, thncourage th

s that succes

rrot $50 billionif the Pales

Prime Ministese, Washington

Trump blamor indoctrin

hate Israel a

e al ls y, e-es ir el y n

he

ot re e n

w, is a

x-g e

he ss

n s-

er n,

manZioprosa proveobjeleadof handoutw

genpartTruduccreaPalanxassuto Palsitu

proreacIsraTrucirc

49 “

mes Palestininating their nd commit

Feit

Would-be ny decades

onism by dsperity. Thourice tag, suchercome Araections to Zders framed thonor, justicd to God, weigh mater

Economic nerated a polrty in favor ump plan is cements canasing Israeliestinian div

xiety about Iume that thcommunicaestinians an

uation.

Help The Trum

omote better ch their oael.49 Clintonump officcumstances a

Sunni Ar

“Peace to Prosp

ian leaders publics to terrorism.

th and Libby: T

tiniansthat mernmenaccept for penot nois.

peacemaketo counter

dangling prugh never cah incentives cab nationaliZionism and their rejectionce, and duty consideratiorial concernsinducement

litically signof ending

testing when work nowi military anvision, and SIran. At a m

he $50 billioate U.S. synd hopes

from Aramp plan urg

Palestinian own accomn and Bush

cials thinkare more favrab states,

perity,” p. 36.

Trump Peace P

s elevate lmake neededntal reform

reasonableeace. The iovel. The a

ers have trir Palestinianrospects of arrying so enoconsistently faist and re

d Israel. Palenist case as ato the Arab

ons that thes. ts have nevnificant Pale

the conflicether econom

w, in an era d economic Sunni Arab minimum, oon carrot is ympathy foto improve

ab States es Arab sta leadership mmodations had similar

k that pvorable.

some of

Plan / 12

leaders d gov-

ms and terms idea is amount

ied for n anti-

future ormous

failed to eligious estinian a matter

nation ey say

ver yet estinian ct. The mic in-

of in-might, states’ ne can meant

or the e their

ates to and to

with hopes.

present

which


include significant Shiite populations, see Iran’s growing regional influence, revolutionary Shiite ideology, military power (including its potential nuclear weapons capability), and capable proxies as a deadly threat. The Israelis help counter Tehran militarily through strikes against Iranian forces in Syria and against Iran’s proxy Hezbollah. The Israelis also fight Tehran diplo-matically, especially in Washington, by arguing for economic sanctions and other means of constraint. Needing Jerusalem’s voice on this issue, Arab states have shown a greater wil-lingness to deal openly with Israelis and to increase their economic and strategic cooperation.50

At the same time, Arab leaders have ample grounds to be antagonized by the Palestinians’ political disunity, the power of Hamas—an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, an enemy of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states—growing Iranian influence in Gaza, and the corruption and other shortcomings of PA leaders.

The Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians consequently have an interest in promoting better Palestinian leadership. The Pales-tinians rely heavily on foreign diplomatic and financial support, so foreigners have some leverage. Improving Palestinian governance may be a mission impossible, but there is sense in appealing to regional and other actors to play a role.

50 See, for example, The New York Times, Oct. 26,

2018; TRTWorld (Istanbul), Feb. 6, 2020; The Japan Times (Tokyo), Feb. 23, 2020; The Times of Israel, Feb. 24, 2020.

Changing Strategic Calculations An innovative feature of the Trump

peace plan is the warning to the Palestinians that steadfast rejectionism will not give them victory, but further erode their position. In other words, time is not on their side, and it is not necessarily even neutral. As noted above, if the Palestinians refuse to end the conflict, Washington will support the Israelis unilaterally extending sovereignty in parts of the West Bank that the Trump team expects Israel would keep anyway in any future peace agreement.

Trump has thus set aside what had been a general principle of U.S. policy since 1967: that changes in the status of the West Bank should be made only through negotiations. Negotiated change, of course, would be pre-ferable, but the Palestinians are being warned that, if they refuse to negotiate reasonably, the Israelis can improve their position, with U.S. backing.

PA president Mahmoud Abbas (right) at Arab Leagueheadquarters, Cairo, April 21, 2019. Abbas has calledfor Arab political support for the Palestinian people. But,Arab leaders have ample grounds to be antagonized bythe Palestinians’ political disunity, growing Iranianinfluence in Gaza, and the corruption of PA leaders.

MIDDLE E

U.S.unilateraIsraeli sgeneratedtroversy Israeli Benjaminand shoulare worthIsraeli gokey goacumstanctinian sidTrump tePalestiniareject reapecting Umaintain

For have triPalestiniaimprove and makbased onThe histoTrump t“even-hato resolvwithout Pconflict oplan is thdeclaratiothat prowilling to

ThatTrump pto bring possible. form, Truthe Bush them draTrump’s

EAST QUARTE

support l extensionsovereignty d worldwide

over wheprime min

n Netanyahu ld take the ahy of seriouovernment dl is to chan

ces that havede to perpeeam is sayinan leaders tasonable off

U.S. officialsthe West Ba

Conthe last hal

ied persistean leaders t

Palestinianke realistic cn permanent ory revieweteam has

anded” U.S. ve “final-statPalestinian lonce and fohe most cateon ever that toduces newo make reasot is why it

plan is not trabout chang

In priorump’s plan bJune 24, 200

amatically. predecessor

ERLY Fall 2

for n of

has con-ether nister

will action. The pus debate. W

decides, the Tnge the dipe incentivizeetuate the cng it makes to support tffers of peacs to insist thaank’s legal s

nclusion lf century, Uently to peto do good—

n lives, fighcompromises

coexistenced above shoconcluded diplomacy

tus issues” eaders willin

or all. The Tegorical U.S.the key to pe

w Palestiniannable compris fair to

rying to makges that willritizing Palbuilds on ide02 speech buThe plan, lrs, sympathi

020

ros and conWhatever thTrump plan’plomatic cired the Palesconflict. Thno sense fo

terrorism ance while exat the Israelistatus quo.

U.S. officialersuade bad—that is, toht terrorisms for a peace with Israelows why ththat neithenor pressurwill succeedng to end thTrump peac. governmeneace is reformn leadershipromises. say that thke peace bul make peaclestinian reeas laid out inut expands onlike those oizes with th

Trump’s pU.S. polic

the PA’s vi

ns he

s r-s-he or d

x-is

ls d o

m, e l. e

er re d

he e

nt m p

he ut e

e-n n

of he

unpthe andoppthrowouplanrewtryistat

andMidcoothrecoobefoIf ieasi

conconthe terrTruagarecopubsupof tbe taboskep

dealie viewwha

plan abandocies that rewiolent intran

Feit

precedented event of c

d rejectionismpose Jerusaough steps thuld in any n abandon

warded the Ping to prestus quo.

The Trumd strength asddle East. Aoperate witheats, Trumpoperation cafore an Israeit grows, theily be achiev

Since the nstrained byncern that su

tinderbox rible effectsump adminisain successfognition of Jblication of tpport for Israthe PA. One that, in future

out the “Arabpticism.

The Trumal and does n

in exposingws about that is truly

ons past warded nsigence.

th and Libby: T

sufferitiniansendingIsrael their mto reterms,

rewards. Bucontinued Pam, the Unitealem improhat a realisticase allow.

ns past U.PA’s violenserve the W

mp team sees serving U

As it encourah Israel again’s peace plaan grow s

eli-Palestiniae plan says, ved. 1940s, U.S

y fear of thupport for Iof Arab pu

s on U.S. stration policfully floutedJerusalem asthis peace p

aeli security of the lasting

e U.S. policyb street” will

mp plan cannnot expect ong the falsityhe Middle

precluding

Trump Peace P

ng of the s and argueg the conflic

would almisery. If theyeasonable

the plan prut it warns talestinian tered States wving its pic peace agre. In this, Tr.S. policiest intransigen

West Bank’s

s Israel’s s.S. interests ages Arab stnst rising re

an argues thasubstantiallyan final peac

peace could

S. policy hahe “Arab str

srael wouldublic opinionregional intcies have timd that fear,s Israel’s cap

plan with its and blunt crg effects is li

y debates, argl be evaluate

not ensure ane soon. Its y of convenEast; point

g peace; o

Plan / 14

Pales-es that ct with lleviate y agree peace

romises that, in rrorism

will not osition eement rump’s s that nce by s legal

ecurity in the

tates to egional at such

y even ce deal. d more

s been reet”—

d ignite n with terests. me and , from pital to strong

riticism ikely to

guments ed with

a peace virtues ntional ting to ffering


ample rewards for overcoming those obstacles; and ending policies that incentivize the con-flict’s perpetuation. It advances U.S. interests in the region by sending sympathetic and constructive messages to the Palestinians and forthrightly supporting the security of the capable, democratic U.S. ally, Israel.

Douglas J. Feith is a senior fellow and Lewis Libby is the senior vice president of Hudson Institute. During the first five years of the George W. Bush administration, they served as principal national security advisers to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, respectively. This article is adapted from a historical analysis of the Trump peace plan recently pub-lished by the Begin-Sadat Center of Israel’s Bar-Ilan University.

how the trump plan makes peace possible · 2/24/2020 · improve chances that peace will one day...

Documents