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How Much Insurance in Bewley Models? Greg Kaplan New York University Gianluca Violante New York University, CEPR, IFS and NBER Boston University – Macroeconomics Seminar Lunch Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 1/43

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  • How Much Insurance in Bewley Models?

    Greg Kaplan

    New York University

    Gianluca Violante

    New York University, CEPR, IFS and NBER

    Boston University – Macroeconomics Seminar Lunch

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 1/43

  • Consumption Insurance

    • To what degree are households insulated from idiosyncraticincome fluctuations?

    • Most empirical studies “reject” full insurance

    1. Consumption responds to individual income shocks:Cochrane (1991), Attanasio-Davis (1996)

    2. Consumption mobility exists:Fisher-Johnson (2006), Jappelli-Pistaferri (2006)

    • Two key difficulties in identifying the degree of transmission ofshocks into consumption:

    1. No panel data combining info on income and comprehensiveconsumption measure

    2. Shocks are not observable

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 2/43

  • Consumption Insurance

    • To what degree are households insulated from idiosyncraticincome fluctuations?

    • Most empirical studies “reject” full insurance

    1. Consumption responds to individual income shocks:Cochrane (1991), Attanasio-Davis (1996)

    2. Consumption mobility exists:Fisher-Johnson (2006), Jappelli-Pistaferri (2006)

    • Two key difficulties in identifying the degree of transmission ofshocks into consumption:

    1. No panel data combining info on income and comprehensiveconsumption measure

    2. Shocks are not observable

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 2/43

  • Consumption Insurance

    • To what degree are households insulated from idiosyncraticincome fluctuations?

    • Most empirical studies “reject” full insurance

    1. Consumption responds to individual income shocks:Cochrane (1991), Attanasio-Davis (1996)

    2. Consumption mobility exists:Fisher-Johnson (2006), Jappelli-Pistaferri (2006)

    • Two key difficulties in identifying the degree of transmission ofshocks into consumption:

    1. No panel data combining info on income and comprehensiveconsumption measure

    2. Shocks are not observable

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 2/43

  • Consumption Insurance

    • To what degree are households insulated from idiosyncraticincome fluctuations?

    • Most empirical studies “reject” full insurance

    1. Consumption responds to individual income shocks:Cochrane (1991), Attanasio-Davis (1996)

    2. Consumption mobility exists:Fisher-Johnson (2006), Jappelli-Pistaferri (2006)

    • Two key difficulties in identifying the degree of transmission ofshocks into consumption:

    1. No panel data combining info on income and comprehensiveconsumption measure

    2. Shocks are not observable

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 2/43

  • Recent Progress

    • Blundell-Pistaferri-Preston (2007, 2008)

    • Developed data by merging PSID and CEX

    • Developed empirical methodology to distinguish consumptioninsurance against shocks with different “durability”

    • Their findings:

    1. The insurance coefficient with respect permanent shocks toafter-tax household earnings shocks is estimated at 0.36

    2. The insurance coefficient with respect to transitory shocks toafter-tax household earnings is estimated at 0.95

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 3/43

  • Recent Progress

    • Blundell-Pistaferri-Preston (2007, 2008)

    • Developed data by merging PSID and CEX

    • Developed empirical methodology to distinguish consumptioninsurance against shocks with different “durability”

    • Their findings:

    1. The insurance coefficient with respect permanent shocks toafter-tax household earnings shocks is estimated at 0.36

    2. The insurance coefficient with respect to transitory shocks toafter-tax household earnings is estimated at 0.95

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 3/43

  • Importance of “BPP Facts” for Macroeconomics

    • Can our incomplete-markets models replicate the BPP facts?

    1. Degree of consumption insurance is a direct summary statisticin incomplete-markets model

    2. Policy evaluation depends on insurance channels available tohouseholds (“crowding-out”)

    • We begin exploring this question within the standardincomplete-markets model (“Bewley model”)

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 4/43

  • Importance of “BPP Facts” for Macroeconomics

    • Can our incomplete-markets models replicate the BPP facts?

    1. Degree of consumption insurance is a direct summary statisticin incomplete-markets model

    2. Policy evaluation depends on insurance channels available tohouseholds (“crowding-out”)

    • We begin exploring this question within the standardincomplete-markets model (“Bewley model”)

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 4/43

  • “Bewley Models”

    • Key ingredients:

    I Continuum of households with concave preferences overstreams of consumption

    I Households face idiosyncratic exogenous earningsfluctuations

    I They can borrow/save through a one-periodnon-state-contingent asset, subject to a borrowing limit

    I Equilibrium in the asset market determines interest rate

    • A workhorse of quantitative macroeconomics: precautionarysaving, wealth inequality, labor supply, asset pricing, fiscal policy,welfare costs of business cycles, inflation

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 5/43

  • Three Questions

    1. How much consumption insurance is there in Bewley models withrespect to transitory and permanent shocks ?

    2. Is this amount high or low relative to the data?

    • Given the discrepancy, how do we reconcile model and data?

    3. Is the BPP methodology reliable?

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 6/43

  • Three Questions

    1. How much consumption insurance is there in Bewley models withrespect to transitory and permanent shocks ?

    2. Is this amount high or low relative to the data?

    • Given the discrepancy, how do we reconcile model and data?

    3. Is the BPP methodology reliable?

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 6/43

  • Outline

    1. General framework for the identification and measurement ofconsumption insurance

    • BPP methodology as a special case

    2. Outline and calibration of life-cycle Bewley model

    • Calculation of insurance coefficients in the model

    • Assessment of bias in BPP methodology

    • Argument that model-data discrepancy is large

    3. Reconciliation of model vs. data discrepancy

    • Advance information

    • Lower durability of shocks

    • Other possibilities left for future work

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 7/43

  • Outline

    1. General framework for the identification and measurement ofconsumption insurance

    • BPP methodology as a special case

    2. Outline and calibration of life-cycle Bewley model

    • Calculation of insurance coefficients in the model

    • Assessment of bias in BPP methodology

    • Argument that model-data discrepancy is large

    3. Reconciliation of model vs. data discrepancy

    • Advance information

    • Lower durability of shocks

    • Other possibilities left for future work

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 7/43

  • Outline

    1. General framework for the identification and measurement ofconsumption insurance

    • BPP methodology as a special case

    2. Outline and calibration of life-cycle Bewley model

    • Calculation of insurance coefficients in the model

    • Assessment of bias in BPP methodology

    • Argument that model-data discrepancy is large

    3. Reconciliation of model vs. data discrepancy

    • Advance information

    • Lower durability of shocks

    • Other possibilities left for future work

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 7/43

  • A Framework for Measuring Insurance

    • Detrended log-earnings yit for individual i of age t:

    yit =

    t∑

    j=0

    a′jxi,t−j

    where xi,t−j is an (m× 1) vector of orthogonal i.i.d. shocks, andaj is an (m× 1) vector of coefficients

    • Definition: insurance coefficient φx with respect to shock x

    φx = 1−cov (∆cit, xit)

    var (xit)

    • Identification problem: realized shocks xit not directly observable

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 8/43

  • A Framework for Measuring Insurance

    • Detrended log-earnings yit for individual i of age t:

    yit =

    t∑

    j=0

    a′jxi,t−j

    where xi,t−j is an (m× 1) vector of orthogonal i.i.d. shocks, andaj is an (m× 1) vector of coefficients

    • Definition: insurance coefficient φx with respect to shock x

    φx = 1−cov (∆cit, xit)

    var (xit)

    • Identification problem: realized shocks xit not directly observable

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 8/43

  • A Framework for Measuring Insurance

    • Detrended log-earnings yit for individual i of age t:

    yit =

    t∑

    j=0

    a′jxi,t−j

    where xi,t−j is an (m× 1) vector of orthogonal i.i.d. shocks, andaj is an (m× 1) vector of coefficients

    • Definition: insurance coefficient φx with respect to shock x

    φx = 1−cov (∆cit, xit)

    var (xit)

    • Identification problem: realized shocks xit not directly observable

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 8/43

  • Identification Strategy

    • Let yi be the entire lifetime history of income realizations forindividual i, from t = 1, ..., T

    • Suppose there exist functions of observable histories of individualincome gxt (yi) such that:

    cov (∆cit, xit) = cov (∆cit, gxt (yi))

    var (xit) = cov (∆yit,gxt (yi))

    • Then, we can identify φx as:

    φx = 1−cov (∆cit, g

    xt (yi))

    cov (∆yit, gxt (yi))

    • BPP is a special case of this strategy

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 9/43

  • Identification Strategy

    • Let yi be the entire lifetime history of income realizations forindividual i, from t = 1, ..., T

    • Suppose there exist functions of observable histories of individualincome gxt (yi) such that:

    cov (∆cit, xit) = cov (∆cit, gxt (yi))

    var (xit) = cov (∆yit,gxt (yi))

    • Then, we can identify φx as:

    φx = 1−cov (∆cit, g

    xt (yi))

    cov (∆yit, gxt (yi))

    • BPP is a special case of this strategy

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 9/43

  • The BPP Methodology

    1. Permanent + Transitory earnings process

    • Recall our log-earnings representation:

    yit =

    t∑

    j=0

    a′jxi,t−j

    • Set m = 2, xit = (ηit, εit)′, a0 = (1, 1)

    ′ and aj = (1, 0)′, j ≥ 1

    ∆yit = ηit +∆εit

    • MaCurdy (1982), Abowd-Card (1989), Carroll (1997)

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 10/43

  • The BPP Methodology (transitory shocks)

    2. Identify φε through the function:

    gεt (yi) = ∆yi,t+1

    = ηi,t+1 + εi,t+1 − εit

    and note that:

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t+1) = −var (εit)

    cov (∆cit,∆yi,t+1) = −cov (∆cit, εit)

    where the second equality requires:

    A1 [no advanced info]: cov (∆cit, ηi,t+1) = cov (∆cit, εi,t+1) = 0

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 11/43

  • The BPP Methodology (transitory shocks)

    2. Identify φε through the function:

    gεt (yi) = ∆yi,t+1

    = ηi,t+1 + εi,t+1 − εit

    and note that:

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t+1) = −var (εit)

    cov (∆cit,∆yi,t+1) = −cov (∆cit, εit)

    where the second equality requires:

    A1 [no advanced info]: cov (∆cit, ηi,t+1) = cov (∆cit, εi,t+1) = 0

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 11/43

  • The BPP Methodology (permanent shocks)

    3. Identify φη through the function:

    gηt (yi) = ∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1

    = ηi,t−1 + ηit + ηi,t+1 + εi,t−2 + εi,t+1

    and note that:

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1) = var (ηit)

    cov (∆cit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1) = cov (∆cit, ηit)

    where the second equality requires:

    A1 [no advanced info]: cov (∆cit, ηi,t+1) = cov (∆cit, εi,t+1) = 0

    A2 [short memory]: cov (∆cit, ηi,t−1) = cov (∆cit, εi,t−2) = 0

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 12/43

  • The BPP Methodology (permanent shocks)

    3. Identify φη through the function:

    gηt (yi) = ∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1

    = ηi,t−1 + ηit + ηi,t+1 + εi,t−2 + εi,t+1

    and note that:

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1) = var (ηit)

    cov (∆cit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1) = cov (∆cit, ηit)

    where the second equality requires:

    A1 [no advanced info]: cov (∆cit, ηi,t+1) = cov (∆cit, εi,t+1) = 0

    A2 [short memory]: cov (∆cit, ηi,t−1) = cov (∆cit, εi,t−2) = 0

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 12/43

  • BPP Estimation: Main Results

    1. The insurance coefficient with respect permanent shocks toafter-tax household earnings shocks is estimated to be φη = 0.36

    2. The insurance coefficient with respect to transitory shocks toafter-tax household earnings is estimated to be φε = 0.95

    3. The estimated age profile of φηt is roughly flat

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 13/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Demographics: Overlapping generations of households who liveup to T periods: work until age T ret, and retire thereafter.Unconditional survival rate ξt < 1 after retirement

    • Preferences: E0∑T

    t=1 βt−1ξt

    C1−γ

    it−1

    1−γ

    • Idiosyncratic households (after-tax) earnings process:

    log Yit = κt + yit = κt + zit + εit

    zit = zi,t−1 + ηit

    I κt common deterministic experience profile

    I zit permanent component, εit transitory component

    I zi0 is drawn from a given initial distribution

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 14/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Demographics: Overlapping generations of households who liveup to T periods: work until age T ret, and retire thereafter.Unconditional survival rate ξt < 1 after retirement

    • Preferences: E0∑T

    t=1 βt−1ξt

    C1−γ

    it−1

    1−γ

    • Idiosyncratic households (after-tax) earnings process:

    log Yit = κt + yit = κt + zit + εit

    zit = zi,t−1 + ηit

    I κt common deterministic experience profile

    I zit permanent component, εit transitory component

    I zi0 is drawn from a given initial distribution

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 14/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Demographics: Overlapping generations of households who liveup to T periods: work until age T ret, and retire thereafter.Unconditional survival rate ξt < 1 after retirement

    • Preferences: E0∑T

    t=1 βt−1ξt

    C1−γ

    it−1

    1−γ

    • Idiosyncratic households (after-tax) earnings process:

    log Yit = κt + yit = κt + zit + εit

    zit = zi,t−1 + ηit

    I κt common deterministic experience profile

    I zit permanent component, εit transitory component

    I zi0 is drawn from a given initial distribution

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 14/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Demographics: Overlapping generations of households who liveup to T periods: work until age T ret, and retire thereafter.Unconditional survival rate ξt < 1 after retirement

    • Preferences: E0∑T

    t=1 βt−1ξt

    C1−γ

    it−1

    1−γ

    • Idiosyncratic households (after-tax) earnings process:

    log Yit = κt + yit = κt + zit + εit

    zit = zi,t−1 + ηit

    I κt common deterministic experience profile

    I zit permanent component, εit transitory component

    I zi0 is drawn from a given initial distribution

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 14/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Markets: Households can borrow (up to A ≤ 0) and save throughrisk-free bond. Perfect annuity markets.

    • World interest rate: r

    • Government: Social security benefits P (Yi) paid to retirees

    • Budget constraints:

    Cit +Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + Yit, if t < T ret

    Cit +ξt

    ξt+1Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + P (Yi), if t ≥ T ret

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 15/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Markets: Households can borrow (up to A ≤ 0) and save throughrisk-free bond. Perfect annuity markets.

    • World interest rate: r

    • Government: Social security benefits P (Yi) paid to retirees

    • Budget constraints:

    Cit +Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + Yit, if t < T ret

    Cit +ξt

    ξt+1Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + P (Yi), if t ≥ T ret

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 15/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Markets: Households can borrow (up to A ≤ 0) and save throughrisk-free bond. Perfect annuity markets.

    • World interest rate: r

    • Government: Social security benefits P (Yi) paid to retirees

    • Budget constraints:

    Cit +Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + Yit, if t < T ret

    Cit +ξt

    ξt+1Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + P (Yi), if t ≥ T ret

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 15/43

  • A Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    • Markets: Households can borrow (up to A ≤ 0) and save throughrisk-free bond. Perfect annuity markets.

    • World interest rate: r

    • Government: Social security benefits P (Yi) paid to retirees

    • Budget constraints:

    Cit +Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + Yit, if t < T ret

    Cit +ξt

    ξt+1Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + P (Yi), if t ≥ T ret

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 15/43

  • Calibration

    • Preferences:

    I Relative risk aversion coefficient: γ = 2

    I Discount factor β to replicate aggregate net-worth-incomeratio of 2.5 for bottom 95% of US households

    • Interest rate: r = 3%

    • Earnings process:

    I Rise in earnings dispersion over lifecycle: ση = 0.01

    I Initial earnings dispersion: σz0 = 0.15

    I BPP estimate: σε = 0.05

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 16/43

  • Calibration

    • Debt limit: Natural or no-borrowing constraints

    • Initial wealth: Zero or calibrated to net-worth distribution of 20-30years-old

    • Social security:

    1. Net earnings ⇒ gross earnings by inverting Gouveia-Strausstax function

    2. Benefits modelled as concave function of gross averagelifetime earnings, as in US two-bendpoint system

    3. Benefits partially taxed

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 17/43

  • Lifecycle Implications

    30 40 50 60 70 80 90

    0

    0.5

    1

    1.5

    2

    x 105

    Age

    $ (0

    0,00

    0)

    Lifecycle Means

    Natural BCZero BC

    30 40 50 60 70 80 900.05

    0.1

    0.15

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    0.4

    0.45

    0.5

    0.55

    Age

    Var

    Log

    s

    Lifecycle Inequality

    Natural BCZero BCWealth

    ConsumptionNet earnings

    Net benefits

    Consumption

    Net earnings

    Net benefits

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 18/43

  • Baseline Economy

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData Model Model Data Model ModelBPP BPP TRUE BPP BPP TRUE

    Natural Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.22 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.94 0.94

    Zero Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.07 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.82 0.82

    • Model has right amount of insurance wrt transitory shock(if borrowing limit is loose)

    • Model has less insurance than data wrt permanent shock

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 19/43

  • Baseline Economy

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData Model Model Data Model ModelBPP BPP TRUE BPP BPP TRUE

    Natural Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.22 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.94 0.94

    Zero Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.07 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.82 0.82

    • Model has right amount of insurance wrt transitory shock(if borrowing limit is loose)

    • Model has less insurance than data wrt permanent shock

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 19/43

  • Baseline Economy

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData Model Model Data Model ModelBPP BPP TRUE BPP BPP TRUE

    Natural Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.22 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.94 0.94

    Zero Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.07 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.82 0.82

    • Model has right amount of insurance wrt transitory shock(if borrowing limit is loose)

    • Model has less insurance than data wrt permanent shock

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 19/43

  • Baseline Economy

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData Model Model Data Model ModelBPP BPP TRUE BPP BPP TRUE

    Natural Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.22 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.94 0.94

    Zero Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.07 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.82 0.82

    • BPP coefficient for transitory shocks are unbiased

    • BPP coefficient for permanent shocks are downward biased

    I Bias massive for no-borrowing economy

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 20/43

  • Baseline Economy

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData Model Model Data Model ModelBPP BPP TRUE BPP BPP TRUE

    Natural Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.22 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.94 0.94

    Zero Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.07 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.82 0.82

    • BPP coefficient for transitory shocks are unbiased

    • BPP coefficient for permanent shocks are downward biased

    I Bias massive for no-borrowing economy

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 20/43

  • Baseline Economy

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData Model Model Data Model ModelBPP BPP TRUE BPP BPP TRUE

    Natural Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.22 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.94 0.94

    Zero Borrowing Limit0.36

    (0.09)0.07 0.23

    0.95

    (0.04)0.82 0.82

    • BPP coefficient for transitory shocks are unbiased

    • BPP coefficient for permanent shocks are downward biased

    I Bias massive for no-borrowing economy

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 20/43

  • Age profile of φε

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    0.4

    0.5

    0.6

    0.7

    0.8

    0.9

    1

    Age

    φε

    Natural BC

    TRUEBPP

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    0.4

    0.5

    0.6

    0.7

    0.8

    0.9

    1

    Age

    φε

    Zero BC

    TRUEBPP

    • Ability to borrow crucial to smooth transitory shocks at young ages

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 21/43

  • Age profile of φη

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Natural BC

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Zero BC

    TRUEBPP

    TRUEBPP

    •• Age profile of insurance coefficients against permanent shocks(φηt ) in the model is increasing, whereas in the data it is flat

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 22/43

  • Age profile of φη

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Natural BC

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Zero BC

    TRUEBPP

    TRUEBPP

    • Age profile of insurance coefficients against permanent shocks(φηt ) in the model is increasing, whereas in the data it is flat

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 22/43

  • Age profile of φη

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Natural BC

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Zero BC

    TRUEBPP

    TRUEBPP

    • Bias in BPP estimator large when agents are close to theconstraint

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 23/43

  • Why the Downward Bias in BPP Estimator?

    • From the definition of φηBPP :

    φηBPP = 1−cov (∆cit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    = 1−cov (∆cit, ηi,t−1 + εi,t−2 + ηit + ηi,t+1 + εi,t+1)

    var (ηit)

    = φη +cov (∆cit, ηi,t−1 + εi,t−2)

    var (ηit)︸ ︷︷ ︸

    A2: short memory

    +cov (∆cit, ηi,t+1 + εi,t+1)

    var (ηit)︸ ︷︷ ︸

    A1: no adv. info

    = φη +cov (∆cit, εi,t−2)

    var (ηit)︸ ︷︷ ︸

    ¿0

    • Last term large when agent close to borr. constr. at t− 2

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 24/43

  • Sensitivity Analysis (Natural BC)

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockTRUE (0.23) BPP (0.22) TRUE (0.94) BPP (0.94)

    Initial Wealth Dist. 0.23 0.23 0.94 0.94γ = 5 0.27 0.24 0.93 0.93

    γ = 10 0.32 0.29 0.92 0.92

    Rep. ratio = 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.93 0.93Rep. ratio = 0.65 0.27 0.26 0.94 0.94ση = 0.02 0.25 0.24 0.93 0.93

    ση = 0.005 0.22 0.20 0.94 0.94

    σz0 = 0.2 0.23 0.22 0.94 0.94

    σz0 = 0.1 0.24 0.22 0.94 0.94

    σε = 0.075 0.24 0.22 0.94 0.94

    σε = 0.025 0.23 0.22 0.94 0.94

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 25/43

  • Sensitivity Analysis (K/Y and r)

    1 2 3 40.05

    0.1

    0.15

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    Wealth−Income Ratio

    φη

    − In

    s. c

    oeff.

    for p

    erm

    . sho

    ck

    Natural BC

    1 2 3 40.05

    0.1

    0.15

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    Wealth−Income Ratio

    φη

    − In

    s. c

    oeff.

    for p

    erm

    . sho

    ck

    Zero BC

    r=2%r=3%r=4%r=5%

    r=2%r=3%r=4%r=5%

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 26/43

  • A Welfare Calculation

    • Economy where agents survive with probability ζ = 1/ (1 + π),discount future at rate β = 1/ (1 + ρ)

    • Consumption allocation:

    cit = (1− φη) zit

    • Log-Normal shocks

    • The welfare cost of going from φη = 0.36 to φ̃η = 0.23 is:

    ω 'γ

    2

    [

    (1− φη)2−(

    1− φ̃η)2]

    σηρ+ π

    • With γ = 2, ρ = 0.03, π = 0.0286, and ση = 0.01: ω = −3.1%

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 27/43

  • A Welfare Calculation

    • Economy where agents survive with probability ζ = 1/ (1 + π),discount future at rate β = 1/ (1 + ρ)

    • Consumption allocation:

    cit = (1− φη) zit

    • Log-Normal shocks

    • The welfare cost of going from φη = 0.36 to φ̃η = 0.23 is:

    ω 'γ

    2

    [

    (1− φη)2−(

    1− φ̃η)2]

    σηρ+ π

    • With γ = 2, ρ = 0.03, π = 0.0286, and ση = 0.01: ω = −3.1%

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 27/43

  • A Welfare Calculation

    • Economy where agents survive with probability ζ = 1/ (1 + π),discount future at rate β = 1/ (1 + ρ)

    • Consumption allocation:

    cit = (1− φη) zit

    • Log-Normal shocks

    • The welfare cost of going from φη = 0.36 to φ̃η = 0.23 is:

    ω 'γ

    2

    [

    (1− φη)2−(

    1− φ̃η)2]

    σηρ+ π

    • With γ = 2, ρ = 0.03, π = 0.0286, and ση = 0.01: ω = −3.1%

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 27/43

  • A Welfare Calculation

    • Economy where agents survive with probability ζ = 1/ (1 + π),discount future at rate β = 1/ (1 + ρ)

    • Consumption allocation:

    cit = (1− φη) zit

    • Log-Normal shocks

    • The welfare cost of going from φη = 0.36 to φ̃η = 0.23 is:

    ω 'γ

    2

    [

    (1− φη)2−(

    1− φ̃η)2]

    σηρ+ π

    • With γ = 2, ρ = 0.03, π = 0.0286, and ση = 0.01: ω = −3.1%

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 27/43

  • Advance Information

    • Model I: households observe, one period in advance, a fraction ofthe permanent shock

    • Model II: households know their own deterministic income profileat age t = 0 (e.g., Lillard-Weiss, 1979)

    • Given BPP identification method, neither form of advanceinformation can reconcile model and data

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 28/43

  • Advance Information

    • Model I: households observe, one period in advance, a fraction ofthe permanent shock

    • Model II: households know their own deterministic income profileat age t = 0 (e.g., Lillard-Weiss, 1979)

    • Given BPP identification method, neither form of advanceinformation can reconcile model and data

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 28/43

  • Advance Information

    • Model I: households observe, one period in advance, a fraction ofthe permanent shock

    • Model II: households know their own deterministic income profileat age t = 0 (e.g., Lillard-Weiss, 1979)

    • Given BPP identification method, neither form of advanceinformation can reconcile model and data

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 28/43

  • Advance Information

    • Model I: households observe, one period in advance, a fraction ofthe permanent shock

    • Model II: households know their own deterministic income profileat age t = 0 (e.g., Lillard-Weiss, 1979)

    • Given BPP identification method, neither form of advanceinformation can reconcile model and data

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 28/43

  • Preempting the permanent shock

    • Permanent income growth in period t comprises of two orthogonaladditive components, ηsit and η

    ait

    • The component ηait is already in the information set of the agent attime t− 1

    • From the definition of insurance coefficient:

    φη = 1−cov (∆cit, ηit)

    var (ηit)= 1−

    cov (∆cit, ηsit + η

    ait)

    var (ηsit + ηait)

    =var (ηsit)

    var (ηit)φη

    s

    +var (ηait)

    var (ηit)

    [

    1−cov (∆cit, η

    ait)

    var (ηait)

    ]

    ≈ (1− α)φηs

    + α

    increasing in α, since with loose borrowing limits cov (∆cit, ηait) ≈ 0

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 29/43

  • Preempting the permanent shock

    • Permanent income growth in period t comprises of two orthogonaladditive components, ηsit and η

    ait

    • The component ηait is already in the information set of the agent attime t− 1

    • From the definition of insurance coefficient:

    φη = 1−cov (∆cit, ηit)

    var (ηit)= 1−

    cov (∆cit, ηsit + η

    ait)

    var (ηsit + ηait)

    =var (ηsit)

    var (ηit)φη

    s

    +var (ηait)

    var (ηit)

    [

    1−cov (∆cit, η

    ait)

    var (ηait)

    ]

    ≈ (1− α)φηs

    + α

    increasing in α, since with loose borrowing limits cov (∆cit, ηait) ≈ 0

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 29/43

  • Preempting the permanent shock

    • Ignoring the usual downward bias, the BPP methodology yields:

    φηBPP = 1−cov (∆cit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    = 1−cov

    (∆cit, η

    sit + η

    ai,t + η

    ai,t+1

    )

    var (ηsit + ηait)

    ≈ (1− α)φηs

    + α

    [

    1−cov

    (∆cit, η

    ai,t+1

    )

    var (ηait)

    ]

    ≈ φηs

    • BPP estimator is independent of the amount of advanceinformation

    • Simulations confirm this finding

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 30/43

  • Preempting the permanent shock

    • Ignoring the usual downward bias, the BPP methodology yields:

    φηBPP = 1−cov (∆cit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    = 1−cov

    (∆cit, η

    sit + η

    ai,t + η

    ai,t+1

    )

    var (ηsit + ηait)

    ≈ (1− α)φηs

    + α

    [

    1−cov

    (∆cit, η

    ai,t+1

    )

    var (ηait)

    ]

    ≈ φηs

    • BPP estimator is independent of the amount of advanceinformation

    • Simulations confirm this finding

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 30/43

  • Predictable individual income profile

    • Generalize log-earnings (deviations from common age-profile) to:

    yit = βit+ zit + εit

    zit = zi,t−1 + ηit,

    with E [βi] = 0 in the cross-section, and SD [βi] = σβ

    • The individual-specific slope βi is learned at time zero

    • Lillard-Weiss (1979), Baker (1997), Haider (2001),Guvenen (2007)

    • When we increase σβ , we decrease ση accordingly to keep thetotal rise in lifetime earnings inequality constant

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 31/43

  • Predictable individual income profile

    • Generalize log-earnings (deviations from common age-profile) to:

    yit = βit+ zit + εit

    zit = zi,t−1 + ηit,

    with E [βi] = 0 in the cross-section, and SD [βi] = σβ

    • The individual-specific slope βi is learned at time zero

    • Lillard-Weiss (1979), Baker (1997), Haider (2001),Guvenen (2007)

    • When we increase σβ , we decrease ση accordingly to keep thetotal rise in lifetime earnings inequality constant

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 31/43

  • Predictable individual income profile

    • Generalize log-earnings (deviations from common age-profile) to:

    yit = βit+ zit + εit

    zit = zi,t−1 + ηit,

    with E [βi] = 0 in the cross-section, and SD [βi] = σβ

    • The individual-specific slope βi is learned at time zero

    • Lillard-Weiss (1979), Baker (1997), Haider (2001),Guvenen (2007)

    • When we increase σβ , we decrease ση accordingly to keep thetotal rise in lifetime earnings inequality constant

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 31/43

  • Predictable individual income profile

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData 0.36 (0.09) 0.95 (0.04)

    Model Model Model ModelTRUE BPP TRUE BPP

    Natural BC40% 0.23 0.25 0.94 0.94

    60% 0.23 0.28 0.94 0.94

    80% 0.22 0.37 0.94 0.94

    Zero BC40% 0.23 −0.01 0.82 0.82

    60% 0.23 −0.10 0.82 0.82

    80% 0.23 −0.31 0.82 0.82

    • Upward bias in BPP coefficient with natural BC

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 32/43

  • Predictable individual income profile

    Permanent Shock Transitory ShockData 0.36 (0.09) 0.95 (0.04)

    Model Model Model ModelTRUE BPP TRUE BPP

    Natural BC40% 0.23 0.25 0.94 0.94

    60% 0.23 0.28 0.94 0.94

    80% 0.22 0.37 0.94 0.94

    Zero BC40% 0.23 −0.01 0.82 0.82

    60% 0.23 −0.10 0.82 0.82

    80% 0.23 −0.31 0.82 0.82

    • Additional downward bias in BPP coefficient with zero BC

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 33/43

  • Why the Upward Bias in the BPP Estimator?

    • From the definition of φηBPP :

    φηBPP = 1−cov (∆cit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    = 1−cov (∆cit, ηi,t−1 + εi,t−2 + ηit + ηi,t+1 + εi,t+1 + 3βi)

    var (ηit) + 3var (βi)

    • Ignoring usual downward bias due to binding constraint:

    φηBPP ≈

    [var (ηit)

    var (ηit) + 3var (βi)

    ]

    φη+

    [3var (βi)

    var (ηit) + 3var (βi)

    ] [

    1−cov (∆cit, βi)

    var (βi)

    ]

    = (1− α)φη + αφβ

    φβ ≈ 1 with loose borrowing constraints (upward bias)

    φβ ≈ 0 with tight borrowing constraints (downward bias)

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 34/43

  • Why the Upward Bias in the BPP Estimator?

    • From the definition of φηBPP :

    φηBPP = 1−cov (∆cit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 +∆yit +∆yi,t+1)

    = 1−cov (∆cit, ηi,t−1 + εi,t−2 + ηit + ηi,t+1 + εi,t+1 + 3βi)

    var (ηit) + 3var (βi)

    • Ignoring usual downward bias due to binding constraint:

    φηBPP ≈

    [var (ηit)

    var (ηit) + 3var (βi)

    ]

    φη+

    [3var (βi)

    var (ηit) + 3var (βi)

    ] [

    1−cov (∆cit, βi)

    var (βi)

    ]

    = (1− α)φη + αφβ

    φβ ≈ 1 with loose borrowing constraints (upward bias)

    φβ ≈ 0 with tight borrowing constraints (downward bias)

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 34/43

  • Persistent (rather than permanent...) shocks

    • Generalize log-earnings process to AR(1) + transitory:

    yit = zit + εit

    zit = ρzit−1 + ηit, with ρ < 1

    • BPP instruments no longer valid [misspecification]

    • Define quasi-difference: ∆̃yt ≡ yt − ρyt−1

    • Identification of (φη, φε) can still be achieved by setting

    gεt (yi) = ∆̃yt+1

    gηt (yi) = ρ2∆̃yt−1 + ρ∆̃yt + ∆̃yt+1

    under same assumptions A1 & A2

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 35/43

  • Persistent (rather than permanent...) shocks

    • Generalize log-earnings process to AR(1) + transitory:

    yit = zit + εit

    zit = ρzit−1 + ηit, with ρ < 1

    • BPP instruments no longer valid [misspecification]

    • Define quasi-difference: ∆̃yt ≡ yt − ρyt−1

    • Identification of (φη, φε) can still be achieved by setting

    gεt (yi) = ∆̃yt+1

    gηt (yi) = ρ2∆̃yt−1 + ρ∆̃yt + ∆̃yt+1

    under same assumptions A1 & A2

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 35/43

  • Persistent (rather than permanent...) shocks

    • Generalize log-earnings process to AR(1) + transitory:

    yit = zit + εit

    zit = ρzit−1 + ηit, with ρ < 1

    • BPP instruments no longer valid [misspecification]

    • Define quasi-difference: ∆̃yt ≡ yt − ρyt−1

    • Identification of (φη, φε) can still be achieved by setting

    gεt (yi) = ∆̃yt+1

    gηt (yi) = ρ2∆̃yt−1 + ρ∆̃yt + ∆̃yt+1

    under same assumptions A1 & A2

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 35/43

  • Persistent shocks

    Persistent Shock Transitory ShockData 0.36 (0.09) 0.95 (0.04)

    TRUE BPP BPP (missp.) TRUE BPP BPP (missp.)Natural BCρ = 0.99 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.93 0.93 0.93

    ρ = 0.97 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.93 0.93 0.92

    ρ = 0.95 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.93 0.93 0.90

    Zero BCρ = 0.99 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.82 0.82 0.82

    ρ = 0.97 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.81 0.81 0.81

    ρ = 0.95 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.81 0.81 0.80

    ρ = 0.93 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.81 0.82 0.78

    • Reconciliation of model and data for ρ ∈ (0.93, 0.97)

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 36/43

  • Persistent shocks

    Persistent Shock Transitory ShockData 0.36 (0.09) 0.95 (0.04)

    TRUE BPP BPP (missp.) TRUE BPP BPP (missp.)Natural BCρ = 0.99 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.93 0.93 0.93

    ρ = 0.97 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.93 0.93 0.92

    ρ = 0.95 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.93 0.93 0.90

    Zero BCρ = 0.99 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.82 0.82 0.82

    ρ = 0.97 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.81 0.81 0.81

    ρ = 0.95 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.81 0.81 0.80

    ρ = 0.93 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.81 0.82 0.78

    • Misspecification bias in BPP estimator is small

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 37/43

  • Persistent shocks

    Persistent Shock Transitory ShockData 0.36 (0.09) 0.95 (0.04)

    TRUE BPP BPP (missp.) TRUE BPP BPP (missp.)Natural BCρ = 0.99 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.93 0.93 0.93

    ρ = 0.97 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.93 0.93 0.92

    ρ = 0.95 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.93 0.93 0.90

    Zero BCρ = 0.99 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.82 0.82 0.82

    ρ = 0.97 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.81 0.81 0.81

    ρ = 0.95 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.81 0.81 0.80

    ρ = 0.93 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.81 0.82 0.78

    • Usual downward bias in BPP estimator

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 38/43

  • Persistent shocks

    Persistent Shock Transitory ShockData 0.36 (0.09) 0.95 (0.04)

    TRUE BPP BPP (missp.) TRUE BPP BPP (missp.)Natural BCρ = 0.99 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.93 0.93 0.93

    ρ = 0.97 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.93 0.93 0.92

    ρ = 0.95 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.93 0.93 0.90

    Zero BCρ = 0.99 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.82 0.82 0.82

    ρ = 0.97 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.81 0.82 0.81

    ρ = 0.95 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.81 0.81 0.80

    ρ = 0.93 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.81 0.82 0.78

    • Insurance coefficients for transitory shocks unaffected

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 39/43

  • Age profile of φη

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Natural BC

    TRUEBPP missp.

    30 35 40 45 50 55

    −0.6

    −0.4

    −0.2

    0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    Age

    φη

    Zero BC

    TRUEBPP missp.

    ρ=0.97

    ρ=1

    ρ=0.93

    ρ=1

    • In the model, age profile of insurance coefficients wrt to persistentshocks is flatter, hence closer to the data

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 40/43

  • Relationship with STY

    0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 10.4

    0.45

    0.5

    0.55

    0.6

    0.65

    0.7

    0.75

    0.8

    Autocorrelation coefficient (ρ)

    1−φη

    One minus the insurance coeff.

    NBCZBC

    0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    0.4

    0.45

    0.5

    Autocorrelation coefficient (ρ)

    Incr

    ease

    from

    age

    25−

    60

    Increase in variance of log cons.

    NBCZBC

    • These two norms of consumption insurance can disagree

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 41/43

  • Relationship with STY

    0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 10.4

    0.45

    0.5

    0.55

    0.6

    0.65

    0.7

    0.75

    0.8

    Autocorrelation coefficient (ρ)

    1−φη

    One minus the insurance coeff.

    NBCZBC

    0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    0.4

    0.45

    0.5

    Autocorrelation coefficient (ρ)

    Incr

    ease

    from

    age

    25−

    60

    Increase in variance of log cons.

    NBCZBC

    • These two norms of consumption insurance can disagree

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 41/43

  • Age profile of wealth: model vs. data

    30 40 50 60 70 80 90

    0

    0.5

    1

    1.5

    2

    x 105

    Age

    $ (0

    0,00

    0)

    Lifecycle wealth profiles

    Natural BC (ρ=0.97)

    Zero BC (ρ=0.93)

    SCF Net worth (89−92)

    • A version of the model with more realistic age profile of wealthwould be also more successful in replicating the BPP facts

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 42/43

  • Age profile of wealth: model vs. data

    30 40 50 60 70 80 90

    0

    0.5

    1

    1.5

    2

    x 105

    Age

    $ (0

    0,00

    0)

    Lifecycle wealth profiles

    Natural BC (ρ=0.97)

    Zero BC (ρ=0.93)

    SCF Net worth (89−92)

    • A version of the model with more realistic age profile of wealthwould be also more successful in replicating the BPP facts

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 42/43

  • Conclusions

    1. We generalized BPP methodology, and argued that insurancecoefficients should become a key summary statistic of IM models

    2. BPP estimator downward biased when BC tight

    3. Plausibly calibrated Bewley model has too little insurance

    4. Ins. coeff. 6= rise in consumption inequality over life cycle

    5. Advance information does not reconcile model and data

    6. A (very) persistent income shock goes a long way

    7. Modifications of model that get age-wealth profile right promising

    Kaplan-Violante, ”Insurance in Bewley Models” – p. 43/43

    Consumption InsuranceConsumption InsuranceConsumption InsuranceConsumption Insurance

    Recent ProgressRecent Progress

    Importance of ``BPP Facts'' for MacroeconomicsImportance of ``BPP Facts'' for Macroeconomics

    ``Bewley Models"Three QuestionsThree Questions

    OutlineOutlineOutline

    A Framework for Measuring InsuranceA Framework for Measuring InsuranceA Framework for Measuring Insurance

    Identification StrategyIdentification Strategy

    The BPP MethodologyThe BPP Methodology (transitory shocks)The BPP Methodology (transitory shocks)

    The BPP Methodology (permanent shocks)The BPP Methodology (permanent shocks)

    BPP Estimation: Main ResultsA Life-cycle Bewley EconomyA Life-cycle Bewley EconomyA Life-cycle Bewley EconomyA Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    A Life-cycle Bewley EconomyA Life-cycle Bewley EconomyA Life-cycle Bewley EconomyA Life-cycle Bewley Economy

    CalibrationCalibrationLifecycle ImplicationsBaseline EconomyBaseline EconomyBaseline Economy

    Baseline EconomyBaseline EconomyBaseline Economy

    Age profile of $phi ^{varepsilon }$Age profile of $phi ^{eta }$Age profile of $phi ^{eta }$

    Age profile of $phi ^{eta }$Why the Downward Bias in BPP Estimator?Sensitivity Analysis (Natural BC)Sensitivity Analysis (K/Y and r)A Welfare CalculationA Welfare CalculationA Welfare CalculationA Welfare Calculation

    Advance InformationAdvance InformationAdvance InformationAdvance Information

    Preempting the permanent shockPreempting the permanent shock

    Preempting the permanent shockPreempting the permanent shock

    Predictable individual income profilePredictable individual income profilePredictable individual income profile

    Predictable individual income profilePredictable individual income profileWhy the Upward Bias in the BPP Estimator?Why the Upward Bias in the BPP Estimator?

    Persistent (rather than permanent...) shocksPersistent (rather than permanent...)shocksPersistent (rather than permanent...)shocks

    Persistent shocksPersistent shocksPersistent shocksPersistent shocksAge profile of $phi ^{eta }$Relationship with STYRelationship with STY

    Age profile of wealth: model vs. dataAge profile of wealth: model vs. data

    Conclusions