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How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in AsianRegionalismAuthor(s): Amitav AcharyaReviewed work(s):Source: International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), pp. 239-275Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877858 .

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How Ideas Spread: Whose NormsMatter? Norm Localizationand Institutional Changein Asian RegionalismAmitav Acharya

Abstract Questions about normdiffusion in world politics are not simply aboutwhether and how ideas matter,but also which and whose ideas matter.Constructivistscholarshipon normstends to focus on "hard" ases of moral transformationn which"good" global norms prevail over the "bad" ocal beliefs and practices. But manylocal beliefs are themselves part of a legitimate normativeorder,which conditionsthe acceptanceof foreign norms.Going beyond an existential notion of congruence,this article proposes a dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that describes howlocal agents reconstructforeign norms to ensurethe norms fit with the agents' cog-nitive priors and identities. Congruencebuilding thus becomes key to acceptance.Localization, not wholesale acceptance or rejection, settles most cases ofnormativecontestation.Comparing he impactof two transnationalnormson theAs-sociation of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN), this article shows that the variationin the norms' acceptance, indicated by the changes they producedin the goals andinstitutionalapparatusesof the regional group,could be explainedby the differentialability of local agents to reconstruct he normsto ensure a better fit with priorlocalnorms,and the potentialof the localized normto enhance the appealof some of theirpriorbeliefs and institutions.

I thankPeterKatzenstein,ackSnyder,ChrisReus-Smit, rianJob,PaulEvans, ainJohnston, a-vidCapie,HelenNesadurai,effreyCheckel,KwaChongGuan,KhongYuenFoong,AnthonyMilner,JohnHobson,EtelSolingen,MichaelBarnett,RichardPrice,Martha innemore,ndFrankSchim-melfennigor their omments nvarious arlier rafts f the article.Thisarticles a revisedversionofa draftpreparedortheAmerican oliticalScienceAssociation nnual onvention, anFrancisco,9August-2September001.Seminarsn the articlewereofferedatthe BelferCenterorScienceandInternationalffairs,Harvard niversity,n April2001;theModernAsiaSeminar eriesat HarvardUniversity's siaCenter,nMay2001; heDepartmentf Internationalelations,Australian ationalUniversity,n September001;and he Institute f Internationalelations,University f BritishCo-lumbia,nApril2002.I thank hese nstitutionsor their ivelyseminarsfferingnvaluableeedback.I gratefully cknowledgealuable esearch ssistance rovided y TanBanSeng,DeborahLee,andKarynWangattheInstitute f DefenceandStrategic tudies. amalsogratefulo Harvard niversityAsiaCentreand theKennedySchool'sAsia PacificPolicyProgramorfellowshipso facilitatemyresearch uring 000-2001.InternationalOrganization58, Spring2004, pp. 239-275? 2004byTheIOFoundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818304582024


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240 InternationalOrganization

In considering the imprintof culturalcontacts, and the undoubted fact thatideas are importedalong with goods, there is a need to develop a more sup-ple languageof causalconnectionthansourceandimitation,originalandcopy.The transferof culturalforms produces a redistributionof imaginative ener-gies, altersin some way a pre-existentfield of force. The result is usually notso much an utterlynew productas the developmentor evolution of a familiarmatrix.1

Why do some transnational deas and norms find greater acceptancein a particu-lar locale thanin others? This is an importantquestion for internationalrelationsscholars, who are challenged by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink to pay more attentionto "thecausal mechanismsandprocesses by which ... ideas spread." A "secondwave" of norm scholarship is responding to this challenge by focusing on howdomestic political structuresandagents conditionnormativechange. As such, thisscholarshipcomplementsthe earlier literature ocusing on transnational gentsandprocesses shapingnorm diffusion at the level of the internationalsystem.3In this article, I seek to contributeto the literatureon norms in two ways: first,by proposinga framework or investigatingnorm diffusionthat stressesthe agencyrole of norm-takers hrougha dynamic congruence-buildingprocess called local-ization, and then by using this frameworkto study how transnationalnormshaveshapedregional institutions in SoutheastAsia and the role of Asian regional insti-tutions and processes-specifically the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)-in transnationalnorm diffusion. Empirically,this article focuses onhow transnational deas and norms4producedinstitutionalchange (as the depen-dent variable of norm diffusion) in ASEAN, a key regionalpolitical organizationin Asia. In the 1990s, ASEAN faced two sets of proposals to redefine its agendaand reshape its institutionalmachinery.The first proposal, emerging in the early1990s, sought the creationof a multilateralsecurityinstitutionfor the Asia Pacificon the basis of the "common security" norm. Originatingin Cold War Europe,this normhad been reframed n Asia Pacific discoursesas "cooperativesecurity."The second proposal, in the late 1990s, sought to develop ASEAN's role in ad-dressing transnationalproblems that would requireit to go beyond its traditionaladherence to the norm of noninterferencein the internal affairs of its members.This effort had its normative roots in the post-Cold Warnotions of humanitarian

1. O'Connor 986,7.2. Risse,Ropp,andSikkink1999,4.3. Cortell ndDavis(2000)call thedomestic gencyandprocessiteraturehe "secondwave" chol-arshipon normdiffusion.The "firstwave" ocusedon the level of the internationalystem, eadingexamplesbeingFinnemore 993andFinnemore ndSikkink1999.On the secondwave,see espe-ciallyCheckel1998aand2001;Gurowitz 999;andFarrell 001.Earlier,Risse-Kappen994;Klotz1995a;Cottrell ndDavis1996;andLegro1997 had also offeredpowerfuldomestic evel explana-tions. For a comprehensivereview of the second wave literature,see Cortell and Davis 2000.4. In this article, I use ideas and norms interchangeably,recognizing that ideas can be held pri-vately, and may or may not have behavioralimplications, while norms are always collective and be-havioral.Goldstein 1993.


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Norm Localization and InstitutionalChange in Asian Regionalism 241

intervention and democraticassistance, albeit modified in the regional context as"constructive ntervention"and "flexible engagement."After a period of contestation,the firstproposalled ASEAN to formalize intra-mural security dialogues, adopt a more inclusive posturetoward outside powers'role in regional order, and anchor a new security institution for the wider AsiaPacific region. In contrast,the attemptto dilute the noninterferencenorm on thebasis of the flexible engagement idea failed, producing only some weak policyinstruments.

Why this variation?Central to the norm dynamic I present is the contestationbetween emergingtransnationalnormsandpreexistingregionalnormativeand so-cial orders. But unlike other scholars who have addressedthe question of resis-tance and agency of domestic actors, I place particularemphasis on a dynamicprocess called localization. Insteadof just assessing the existentialfit between do-mestic and outside identity norms and institutions,and explaining strictly dichot-omous outcomes of acceptance or rejection, localization describes a complexprocess and outcome by which norm-takersbuild congruence between transna-tional norms (including norms previously institutionalizedin a region) and localbeliefs and practices."In this process, foreign norms, which may not initiallycohere with the latter,are incorporated nto local norms.The success of norm dif-fusion strategies and processes depends on the extent to which they provide op-portunitiesfor localization.

The article's focus on ASEAN and Asian regionalismis important.Foundedin1967, ASEAN was arguablythe most successful regional institution outside Eu-rope during the Cold Warperiod.6As Kahlerwrites, "Given the short and less-than-usefullives of manyregional organizations n the developing world,ASEANis unusual,not only for its longevity, but also for its flexibility in servingthe pur-poses of its members."7Asia is the only region where a new macro-regionalse-curityinstitutionhad emergedafterthe end of the Cold War.Based on theASEANmodel, this regionalismis regardedas a distinctive form of regional institutional-ization comparedto Europe.8Yet,ASEAN and its role in the creationof Asia Pa-cific regionalismin generalremainsneglected in international elationstheoryandthe study of normdiffusion.It is also necessary to stress at the outset that this article investigates normdif-fusion, ratherthan norm displacement. Constructivistnorm scholars have oftensought out cases involving fundamentalnormativechange, therebyavoiding "thedog who didn't bark." But I accept Hopf's view that constructivismshould be"agnosticaboutchange in world politics.... What [it] does offer is an accountof

5. "Norm-maker" nd "norm-taker" re from Checkel 1998a, 2.6. ASEAN's founding members,Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,Philippines, and Singapore,werejoined by Brunei (1984), Vietnam(1995), Laos and Burma(1997), and Cambodia(1999).7. Kahler 1994, 22. See also Kahler2000, 551.8. Katzenstein1997.9. Checkel 1998b, 4.


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how and where change may occur."10Studies of norm dynamics should accountfor a range of responses to new norms, from constitutive compliance to outrightrejection, and evolutionary and path-dependent orms of acceptance that fall inbetween. The lattermay be more common forms of normdiffusion in world pol-itics but have received less attentionin constructivistwritings.

Two Perspectives on Norm DiffusionThe first wave scholarshipon normativechange speaks to a moral cosmopolitan-ism. It has three mainfeatures.First,the normsthat arebeing propagatedare "cos-mopolitan,"or "universal"norms, such as the campaign against land mines, banon chemical weapons, protectionof whales, struggle against racism, interventionagainst genocide, and promotion of humanrights, and so on." Second, the keyactors who spreadthese normsare transnationalagents, whetherthey are individ-ual "moralentrepreneurs" r social movements.12Third,despite recognizing therole of persuasion n normdiffusion, this literature ocuses heavily on whatNadel-mann has called "moralproselytism,"concernedwith conversionrather hancon-testation (although the latter is acknowledged),13 and regarding resistance tocosmopolitannorms as illegitimate or immoral.The moralcosmopolitanism perspectivehas contributed o two unfortunate en-dencies. First, by assigning causal primacyto "internationalprescriptions," t ig-nores the expansive appealof "norms hataredeeply rootedin othertypes of socialentities-regional, national, and subnationalgroups."14Moreover, this perspec-tive sets up an implicit dichotomy between good global or universal norms andbad regional or local norms.15For moral cosmopolitanists,norms making a uni-versalisticclaim about what is good areconsideredmore desirableand more likelyto prevail than norms that are localized or particularistic.16Second, moral cosmopolitanists view norm diffusion as teaching by transna-tional agents, therebydownplayingthe agency role of local actors.17 This perspec-tive captures a significant, but small, part of norm dynamics in world politics,focusing on principledideas, which establish a fundamentaldistinction betweenwhat is good and what is evil. But normdiffusion in worldpolitics involves otherkinds of ideas as well. For example, what have been called "prescriptivenorms"

10. Hopf 1998, 180.11. For examples, see Sikkink 1993; Peterson 1992, Litfin 1994; and Klotz 1995a and 1995b.12. See Nadelmann 1990, 483; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; and Keck and Sikkink 1998.13. Nadelmann 1990, 481.14. Legro 1997, 32.15. Checkel 1998a.16. See Finnemore 1996; andFinnemoreand Sikkink 1999, 267.17. See Finnemore1993; and Barnettand Finnemore1999.


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combine moral principles with considerationsof efficiency and utility.18In suchcases, normdynamicswould be shaped by differentconditionsandprocesses, withgreaterscope for the agencyrole (voluntary nitiativeandselection) of norm-takers.A second perspective on norm diffusion looks beyond internationalprescrip-tions and stresses the role of domestic political, organizational, and culturalvariables in conditioningthe receptionof new global norms.19 ts notion of "con-gruence"describes the fit between internationalnorms and domestic norms, andnot "thedegree of fit between two, competing internationalnorms"(which is alsoa concern for the moral cosmopolitanists).20A key example is Legro's notion of"organizational ulture,"which acts "as a heuristic filter for perceptionsand cal-culation"employed by actors in respondingto outside norms.21 Anotheris Check-el's notionof "culturalmatch,"which describes "asituationwhere the prescriptions

embodied in an internationalnorm are convergent with domestic norms, as re-flected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, udicial codes, laws), andbu-reaucraticagencies (organizationalethos and administrativeagencies)."22 Normdiffusion is "morerapidwhen ... a systemic norm ... resonateswith historicallyconstructeddomestic norms." 3While capturingthe role of local agents in norm diffusion, these perspectives,which remain confined to the domestic arena (as opposed to a regional contextinvolving two or more states that is the focus of this article), can be undulystatic,describing an existential match-how "historicallyconstructeddomestic identitynorms create barriers to agent learning from systemic norms"24-rather than adynamicprocess of matchmaking.These perspectives also conformto the generalthrustof institutionalistapproaches,which have been betterat explaining what isnot possible in a given institutional context than what is.25Two otherconcepts-framing andgrafting-offer a more dynamicview of con-gruence. Framingis necessarybecause "thelinkages between existing norms andemergentnorms are not often obvious and must be actively constructedby propo-nents of new norms."26Throughframing,norm advocates highlight and "create"issues "byusing languagethatnames, interprets,and dramatizes hem."27Klotz'sstudy of the antiapartheid ampaign shows the critical role of the framingof theglobal norm of racial equality and the global antiapartheidcampaign in the con-

18. On the distinctionbetween regulative, constitutive and prescriptivenorms, see Finnemore andSikkink 1999, 251.19. See Risse-Kappen1994; Cortell and Davis 1996; Legro 1997; and Checkel 1998a and 2001.20. See Price 1998; and Florini 1996.21. Legro 1997, 33, 36.22. Checkel 1998a, 4.23. Ibid., 6.24. Checkel 1998a. Legro's more recent work proposes a more dynamiceffect of ideational struc-tures stemmingfrom the undesirableconsequences of existing ideas and the availability of viable re-placementideas. See Legro 2000.25. Ikenberry1988, 242.26. Finnemoreand Sikkink 1999, 268.27. Ibid.


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text of the prevailing civil rights discourse in the United States.28Framing canthus make a global norm appear ocal."Grafting" or "incrementalnormtransplantation"o use Farrell'sphrase,to bedistinguishedfrom "radical ransplantation" r "normdisplacement" 9)is a tacticnormentrepreneurs mploy to institutionalize a new normby associating it with apreexisting norm in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition orinjunction.Price has shown how the campaignto develop a norm against chemi-cal weapons was helped by invoking the priornormagainstpoison.30But graftingandframingarelargely acts of reinterpretation r representation ather hanrecon-struction.Moreimportant,neither is necessarily a local act. Outsidersusually per-form them.31Moreover,there is no sense of whether,to what extent, and how thepreexistingnormhelps to redefine the emergingnorm at least in the local context,or at the receiving end.Localizationgoes further. t may startwith a reinterpretationndre-representationof the outside norm, including framing and grafting, but may extend into morecomplex processes of reconstitution to make an outside norm congruent with apreexisting local normativeorder.It is also a process in which the role of localactorsis morecrucialthanthat of outside actors. Instead of treating raming, graft-ing, and other adaptiveprocesses as distinct and unrelatedphenomena, I use lo-calization to bring them togetherunder a single conceptual frameworkand stressthe agency role of local actors in performingthem.

The Dynamics of Norm LocalizationIn developingthe concept of localization,I draw on SoutheastAsian historiograph-ical concepts that claim thatSoutheast Asian societies were not passive recipientsof foreign (Indianand Chinese) culturaland political ideas, but active borrowersand localizers.32Localization describes a process of idea transmissionin whichSoutheastAsians borrowedforeign ideas aboutauthorityandlegitimacy andfittedthem into indigenous traditionsand practices. Ideas that could be constructed tofit indigenous traditionswere better received than those that did not have suchpotential.In the following sections, I draw from this literature o develop the idea of lo-calization in three importantareas: what is localization; why localization takesplace and underwhat conditions is it likely to occur; and what kind of change itproduces.

28. See Klotz 1995a; and Klotz 1995b.29. Farrell2001.30. Price 1997.31. See, for example, the idea of normtransplantationn Farrell 2001.32. See Wolters 1982 and 1999. For a summaryof the literature,see Mabbett 1977a and 1977b.


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WhatIs Localization?To localize something is to "invest [it] with the characteristicsof a particularplace."33I define localization as the active construction(throughdiscourse, fram-ing, grafting,andculturalselection) of foreign ideas by local actors,which resultsin the formerdeveloping significant congruence with local beliefs and practices.Wolters, a leading proponentof localization in SoutheastAsian studies, calls thisa "local statement .. into which foreign elements have retreated."34The concept of localization extrapolatedfrom SoutheastAsian historiographyoffers three important deas about how and why ideas travel and produce changeacross culturesandregions.35The first is "the idea of the local initiative,"associ-ated with the Dutch economic historianJacob Van Leur,who contended that In-dianideas came into SoutheastAsia neitherthroughconquest (the thesis thatIndiahad conqueredlarge parts of SoutheastAsia) nor throughcommerce (the notionthat early tradersfrom the subcontinentwere chiefly responsible for introducingIndianreligious andpolitical ideas), but through ndigenous initiative andadapta-tion.36SoutheastAsian rulerssought out Indianideas thatthey found to be instru-mental in boosting theirlegitimacy andenhancingtheirpolitical andreligious andmoral authority.The implicationsof "local initiative"for the modernconstructiv-ist concept of norm entrepreneurwill be discussed shortly.A second insight of the Southeast Asian literatureconcerns the idea-recipient'sadjustmentsto the shape and content (or both) of foreign ideas to make it morecongruentwith the recipient's priorbeliefs andpractices.This might start with anact of culturalselection: borrowing only those ideas thatare,or can be made, con-gruent with local beliefs and that may enhance the prestige of the borrower.AsMcCloud puts it, "SoutheastAsians borrowedonly those IndianandChinese cul-turaltraits thatcomplementedand could be adaptedto the indigenous system."37

33. Concise OxfordDictionary 1976, 638.34. Wolters 1999, 57.35. While Woltersdeveloped his concept of localization to study the diffusion of Indian and Chi-nese ideas into classical SoutheastAsia, the discourse on localization in SoutheastAsian social scienceliteratureextends well into the contemporaryperiod.On the localization of Chinese ideas in SoutheastAsia, see Wolters 1982, 46-47; Osborne 1979, 13-14. On the SoutheastAsian characteristicsof Is-lamic ideas, see Anderson 1990, 68.36. "SoutheastAsian rulers, in an attemptat legitimizing their interest ... and organizingand do-mesticatingtheirstates and subjects ... called Indian civilization to the east."VanLeur 1955, 98. Seealso Mabbett 1977b, 143-44. The earlier explanations focusing on conquest and commerce are alsoknown as: (1) the ksatriya (Sanskritfor warrior)theory-which saw the transmissionof Indianideasas the result of direct Indianconquest and colonization of large parts of SoutheastAsia; and (2) thevaisya (merchant) heory-which emphasizedthe role of Indian traderswith their extensive commer-cial interactionswith SoutheastAsia, who broughtwith them not just goods, but also Indianculturalartifacts and political ideas. Van Leur's thesis has since been challenged by others for having over-emphasizedlocal initiative,but it markeda decisive turningpoint towardsan "autonomous"historiog-raphyof SoutheastAsia.37. McCloud 1995, 69.


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This was followed by adjustments o foreign ideas to finda betterfit with existinglocal beliefs and practices.38The foreign idea was thus "pruned."Such adjustmentswere motivated by two main realities. First, the idea recipi-ent's chief goal was to strengthen,not replace, existing institutions, such as thekingship, with the infusion of new pathways of legitimation. Hence, wholesaleborrowingof foreign ideas that might supplantexisting institutionscould not beundertaken.Second, culturalpredilections,anddeeply ingrainedbeliefs in the im-portanceof existing institutions sanctifiedby popularbeliefs (such as myth of or-igin) and nurturedthrough rituals and practices, could not be easily sacrificedwithout incurringsocial andpolitical costs. Thus, therecould be "rational" xclu-sion of certainelements of new ideas thatmight harmthe existing social orderorincrease the risk of social and political instability.In the next section, I will dis-cuss the implicationsof these considerations n explainingthe motivationof normdiffusion.A thirdrelevant insight of the localization idea in SoutheastAsian historiogra-phy concerns its effect. Far from extinguishinglocal beliefs andpractices,foreignideas may help to enhance the profile and prestige of local actors and beliefs.Wolters claims that while borrowingHindu ideas about legitimacy and authority,Southeast Asian rulers did not abandon theirprior political beliefs and practices.Instead, the latter were "amplified,"meaning that "ancient and persisting indig-enous beliefs [were brought] nto sharper ocus." 39The latter includedpriorlocalbeliefs about the individual strengthof the ruler (the 'man of prowess') and hisinnate spiritualenergy ("soul stuff"). Similarly,Kirsch'sanalysis of the evolutionof Thaireligion suggests thatthe adventof IndianBuddhismdid not lead the Thaisto abandontheirexisting practiceof worshipping ocal spirits.RatherThai shrinesplaced Buddhist deities alongside local spirits.This transformed he statusof bothreligions, simultaneously giving a local frame to IndianBuddhism("parochializa-tion") and a universal frame to Thai animism ("universalization").This contrib-uted to a greatercivilizational complexity in Thai religion and society.40

WhyLocalize?Why do norm-takerswant to localize internationalnorms andwhat are the condi-tions that may affect the likelihood of localization because of their actions? Onemay start to address this question by looking at several generic forces thatcreate

38. An important xamplecan be found in M. B. Hooker'sanalysisof how Indian egal-moralframe-works were adjustedto fit indigenous beliefs and practicesin Indonesia.Hooker 1978, 35-36. Whilelocalization modifies the foreign idea at the receiving end, it does not necessarily producea feedbackon outside norm entrepreneur'spreferences and identity. In other words, localization need not be atwo-way process. But the content of the foreign norm does change in the context of the recipient'smilieu; the persuader's ideas are reformulated in the local context.39. Wolters 1982, 9.40. Kirsch 1977, 263.


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the demand for new norms in the firstplace. First, a major security or economiccrisis (war or depression) can lead to norm borrowing by calling into question"existingrules of the game.",41Anothercatalyst is systemic change, such as shiftsin the distributionof power or the great powers' interests and interactions.42Theend of the Cold Warbroughtto fore a set of Europeannorms aboutsecuritycoop-eration, which in turn attracted the attention of regional actors outside of Eu-rope.43A third catalyst could be domestic political changes in the norm-taker.44For example, newly democraticregimes may seek to import ideas about humanrights promotionand assistance as the basis of their foreign policy because suchideas would legitimize their authorityand new identity. Finally, internationalorregional demonstrationeffect could promptnorm borrowing throughemulation,imitation, and contagion, and so on.45

The key question for this article of course is why the demandfor new normsleads to their localization, in which some key characteristicsof the preexistingnormative order are retainedratherthan displaced wholesale. From a rationalistperspective, localization is simply easier, especially when priornorms areembed-ded in strong local institutions. Institutionalist scholars hold that it is "easiertomaintainand adapt existing institutions than to create new ones.'"46 But existinginstitutionsmight have been discredited to the extent thatlocal actorsmay seek toreplacethemwith new ones. As Keck and Sikkink'sstudyof the anti-foot bindingcampaignin China at the turn of the nineteenthcenturyand the anticircumcisioncampaignin Kenya in the 1930s show, normdisplacementoccurs when a foreignnormseeks to replace a local normwhose moral claim or functionaladequacyhasalreadybeen challenged from within, but norm displacement fails when it com-petes with a strongidentity norm.47 But if norm-takersbelieve that their existingbeliefs andapproachesarenot harmful,but merely inadequate,(thatis, not gearedto addressingnewer challenges) and thereforehave to be broadenedand strength-ened with the infusion of new ideas, then localization is more likely thandisplacement.But localization s not simplya pragmatic esponseto the demand or new norms.The prospectfor localization also dependson its positive impacton the legitimacyandauthorityof key norm-takers, he strengthof priorlocal norms,the credibility

41. Ikenberry1988, 234.42. Klotz 1995a, 23.43. Krause2003.44. Cortell and Davis 2000.45. Finnemoreand Sikkink 1999, 262.46. Nye and Keohane 1993, 19. See also Aggarwal 1998, 53.47. According to their study, the anti-foot binding campaign succeeded because it added moralforce to the Chinese national reform movement that was already seeking improvementsin women'sstatus as a "necessary part of their programfor national self-strengthening."But attemptsto ban fe-male circumcision in Kenya failed because it conflicted with the existing nationalistagenda that sawfemale circumcisionas integralto local culture andidentity.Keck and Sikkink 1998, 62.


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andprestigeof local agents, indigenousculturaltraits andtraditions,andthe scopefor graftingandpruning presentedby foreign norms.First, localization is likely if the norm-takerscome to believe that new outsidenorms-which may be initially feared and resisted simply because of their alienquality-could be used to enhance the legitimacy and authorityof their extantinstitutions andpractices, but without fundamentallyalteringtheir existing socialidentity.Cortell and Davis show that actors borrow internationalrules to "justifytheir own actions and call into question the legitimacy of others."48But whilestrengthening he norm-taker'shand,these rules may not extinguishits identity.InSoutheast Asian historiography, ndian ideas came to be accepted once the rulersrealized it could help to enhance their authorityby associating the kingship withthe notion of a universal sovereign found in Hindu religious-political traditions(absentin local theology). But the borrowingcould be done in a mannersuch thateven after Hindu ideas amplified their status and authority, ndigenous identitiessuch as a belief in the ruler's innate spiritual energy ("soul stuff") were not fun-damentallyaltered,but "remaineddominant." 9A second factorfavoring localization is the strengthof priorlocal norms. Somelocal norms are foundational to a group. They may derive from deeply ingrainedculturalbeliefs andpracticesor from international egal norms thathad, at an ear-lier stage,been borrowedandenshrined n the constitutionaldocumentsof a group.In either case the norms have alreadybecome integral to the local group's iden-tity, in the sense that "theyconstitute actor identities and interests and not simplyregulate behavior." 0 The strongerthe local norm, the greaterthe likelihood thatnew foreign norms will be localized rather han accepted wholesale.A thirdconditionfavoringlocalization is the availabilityof credible local actors("insiderproponents")with sufficient discursive influence to matchor outperformoutside norm entrepreneursoperatingat the global level. The credibility of localagents dependson theirsocial context andstanding.Local normentrepreneurs relikely to be more credible if they are seen by theirtargetaudience as upholdersoflocal values and identity and not simply "agents"of outside forces or actors andwhetherthey arepartof a local epistemic communitythat could claim a record ofsuccess in priornormativedebates.Constructivistscholarshipon normdiffusion oftenprivileges"transnationalmoralentrepreneurs." t defines their task as being to: "mobilize popular opinion andpolitical supportboth within theirhost countryand abroad,""stimulateand assistin the creation of likeminded organizationsin other countries,"and "play a sig-nificant role in elevating their objectives beyond its identification with the na-tional interests of their government."51 Much of their effort is "directedtoward

48. Cortell andDavis 1996, 453.49. Wolters 1982, 102.50. See Checkel 1998b, 325, 328.51. Nadelmann1990, 482. Emphasisadded.


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Norm Localization and InstitutionalChangein Asian Regionalism 249

persuadingforeign audiences, especially foreign elites."52 The localization per-spective calls for a shift in the understandingof normentrepreneurshiprom "out-siderproponents" ommitted o a transnational runiversalmoralagendato "insiderproponents."These actorscan be individuals,regionally based epistemic commu-nities, or nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs), whose primarycommitmentisto localize a normativeorder and whose main task is to legitimize and enhancethatorderby building congruence with outside ideas.53While the initiative to spreadtransnationalnorms can be undertakeneither bylocal or foreign entrepreneurs,diffusion strategies that accommodate local sensi-tivity aremorelikely to succeed thanthose who seek to supplant he latter.Hence,outsider proponents are more likely to advance their cause if they act throughlocal agents, rather hangoing independentlyat it. An example of the insiderpro-ponent's role can be found in Wiseman's analysis of the diffusion of the nonpro-vocative defense norm to the Soviet Union. Wiseman shows how local supportersof this norm within the Soviet defense community facilitated its acceptance "byresurrectinga defensive 'tradition' n Soviet history,"thereby reassuring"domes-tic critics that they were operatinghistorically within the Soviet paradigmandtoavoid the impressionthatthey were simply borrowingWestern ideas."54Fourth,it is the norm-takers' ense of identitythat facilitates localization, espe-cially if they possess a well-developed sense of being unique in terms of theirvalues and interactions.For example, Ball has identified the existence of such asense of uniqueness affecting regional interactions.55The "ASEAN Way"is re-garded as a unique set of norms and practices shaping regional cooperation inSoutheastAsia.56Such actors are unlikely to adopt a foreign norm wholesale andare likely to have developed a habit of localizing foreign ideas. Scholarsof South-east Asia have spoken of a deeply ingrainedhabit in SoutheastAsian societies,which "adapted .. foreign ideas to suit their own needs and values."57 In hisstudy of Indonesianpolitics, Anderson mentions the "whole trend to absorb andtransformheWesternconceptsof modernpolitics withinIndonesian-Javanesemen-tal structures."58Similarly, looking at modern political institutions in Southeast

52. Ibid.53. Such local and insider proponentsare usually physically present within the region and can beeitherfrom the government,or partof the wider local policymakingelite with reasonablydirectaccessto policymakers,orpartof an active civil society group.The theoryof entrepreneurship cknowledgesthat there has been inadequateattentionto the "adaptiverole of entrepreneursas they adjustto theirenvironment"and "to their learningexperience." Some of this learningexperience may relate to theattitude of consumers,or norm-takers.Deakins 1999, 23. See also Drucker 1999; andBurch 1986.54. Wiseman2002, 104.55. The principaldimensionsof Asian strategicculture,Ball argues,"includesstyles of policy mak-ing which featureinformalityof structuresandmodalities, form andprocess as much as substance andoutcome, consensus rather hanmajorityrule, andpragmatismratherthan idealism." Ball 1993, 46.56. See Nischalke 2000; and Haacke 2003.57. Osborne1990, 5-6.58. Describing this dynamics of ideationalcontestationinvolving ideas such as democracyand so-cialism, Andersonwrites: "Inany such cross-culturalconfrontation, he inevitable thrust s to 'appro-


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Asia, McCloud concludes that:"Atnational and popularlevels, Westernpoliticaland social institutionshave been rejected, not out of hand, and categorically,butwith the qualification-as old as the region itself-that externally derived con-cepts and institutions will be blended with the indigenous (much of which wasalso previously imported) and fitted to local sensibilities and needs."59Although this article presents localization as a dynamic process, the existentialcompatibility between foreign and local norms must not be ignored as anothercatalyst.The priorexistence of a local normin similarissue areas as thatof a newexternalnormandwhich makes similar behavioral claims makes it easier for localactors to introducethe latter.Moreover,the externalnormmust lend itself to somepruning,or adjustments hat make it compatible with local beliefs and practices,without compromising its core attributes.Hence, the relative scope for graftingand pruningpresentedby a new foreign norm contributesto the norm-taker's n-terest to localize and is critical to its success.

Drawing on the immediate discussion of the motivating forces of and condi-tions favoring localization and the previous discussion of the three aspects of lo-calization in Southeast Asian historiography, Table 1 outlines a trajectory oflocalization, specifying the conditions of progress.

What Kind of Change?In some respects, localization is similar to behavior that scholars have describedas adaptation.60But adaptation s a generic term that can subsume all kinds ofbehaviorsandoutcomes.Localization has morespecific features.As Wolterspointsout, adaptation"shirk[s]the crucial question of where, how and why foreign ele-ments began to fit into a local culture" and obscures "the initiative of local ele-ments responsible for the process and the end product.",61 In localization, theinitiative to seek change normally belongs to the local agent. Moreover, whileadaptation may involve an "endless elaboration of new local-foreign cultural'wholes'," in localization, the "local beliefs ... were always responsible for theinitial form the new 'wholes' took.")62

Moreover, n SoutheastAsian historiography,ocalizationis conceived as a long-term and evolutionaryassimilation of foreign ideas, while some forms of adapta-tion in the rationalist nternationalrelations literatureareseen as "shortrunpolicy

priate' the foreign concept and try to anchor it safely to given or traditionalways of thinking andmodes of behavior.Depending on the conceptions of the elite and its determination,either the im-portedideas andmodalities or the traditionalones assume general ascendancy: n most large and non-communistsocieties it is almost invariable thatat least in the short run,the traditionalmodalities tendto prevail."Anderson 1966, 113.59. McCloud 1995, 338.60. Johnston 1996.61. Wolters 1999, 56.62. Ibid.


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TABLE. The trajectoryof localization and conditionsfor progress

Prelocalization Local actorsmay offer resistanceto new external normsbecause of doubtsabout(resistanceand the norms' utility and applicability and fears that the norms might underminecontestation) existing beliefs and practices.The contestationmay lead to localization if somelocal actorsbegin to view the external normsas having a potentialto contributeto the legitimacy and efficacy of extant institutions without underminingthemsignificantly.Condition 1: Some aspects of the existing normativeorder remain strong andlegitimate, although other aspects may be already discredited from within orfound inadequateto meet with new and unforeseenchallenges.

Local initiative Local actors borrow and frame external norms in ways that establishes their(entrepreneurship value to the local audience.and framing) Condition 2: There must be willing and credible local actors (insiderproponents).These actors should not be seen as "stooges" of outside forces.Prospects for localization are helped if their local society has developed areputation or being unique.Adaptation Externalnormsmay be reconstructed o fit with local beliefs andpracticeseven(graftingand as local beliefs and practices may be adjustedin accordancewith the externalpruning) norm. To find this common ground,local actorsmay redefine the externalnorm,linking it with specific extant local norms and practices and prunethe externalnorm, selecting those elements which fit the preexistingnormative structureandrejectingthose that do not.

Condition 3: There must be some scope for graftingbetween the externalnormand some aspects of an existing normhierarchy.Borrowing supplements,ratherthan supplantingan existing normhierarchy.Amplificationand New instruments and practices are developed from the syncretic normative"universalization" framework n which local influences remainhighly visible.

Condition4: Borrowingand modification should offer scope for some elementsof an existing norm hierarchyto receive wider external recognition throughitsassociation with the foreign norm.

of accommodation." 3Thus, while adaptationmay be tactical and to some extentforced on the target audience, localization is voluntaryand the resulting changelikely to be more enduring.Localizationdoes not extinguishthe cognitive priorof the norm-takersbut leadsto its mutual inflection with externalnorms. In constructivistperspectives on so-cialization, norm diffusion is viewed as the result of adaptivebehavior in whichlocal practices are made consistent with an external idea. Localization, by con-trast, describes a process in which external ideas are simultaneously adaptedtomeet local practices.64Hence, in localization, the existing normativeorderand an

63. Johnston1996, 28.64. I am grateful to an anonymousreferee for InternationalOrganizationfor suggesting this for-mulationto distinguishadaptation rom localization.


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external norm are in a "mutuallyconstitutive"relationship,but the resulting be-havior of the recipient can be understoodmore in terms of the former than thelatter,althoughit can only be fully understood n terms of both.65Localization is progressive, not regressive or static. It reshapes both existingbeliefs and practices and foreign ideas in their local context. Localization is anevolutionary or "everyday" form of progressive norm diffusion. Wolters andKirsch use the Parsonian term "upgrading" o describe the political and civiliza-tionaladvancement f SoutheastAsian societies fromthe infusion of foreignideas,66while Bosch describes the outcome of localization as a situation in which "the

foreign culturegraduallyblend[s] with the ancientnativeone so as to form a novel,harmoniousentity,giving birtheventually to a higher type of civilization thanthatof the native community in its original state."67In Southeast Asian historiography, ocalization of Indian ideas produced twokinds of change: expansion of a ruler's authority to new functional and geo-graphicareas and the creationof new institutionsandregulatorymechanisms thatin turnlegitimized and operationalizedsuch expansion.68But as Wheatley pointsout, the changes to the region's symbolic and organizational eaturesproducedbyIndian ideas are best seen as "merelyredefinitionsof indigenous institutions."'69Modern political science will find it hard to translate this into usable dependentvariables. This article's focus on a regional organizationallows one to conceptu-alize andrepresent ocalization as a formof institutionalchange inducedby trans-

nationalnorms,with a view to enhance its authorityand legitimacy.Drawing on the institutionalist iterature,I focus on two generic types of insti-tutional change: (1) task (functional scope)70 and membershipexpansion71and(2) changes in the means throughwhich these new tasks are pursued,including,butnot limitedto, creation of new policy instruments,72 procedural hanges73 suchas modification of decision-making proceduresfrom consensus to majorityvot-ing), legalization,74 and the creation of new institutions.75

65. This may be called "constitutive localization" but the outcome should not be confused withwhat constructiviststake as the "constitutive mpact"of norms,which implies a fundamental ransfor-mation of the recipient's prior normativepreferences and behavior.From this article's perspective,such impact would amount to normdisplacement.66. Parsons 966.67. Bosch1961,3.68. Woltersound he chiefeffectof localization eing n theextension f theauthoritynd egiti-macyof the nativechiefs(the"man f prowess")rom he cultural ndreligious o thepoliticaldo-main. Wolters 1982, 52. Van Leur described the effects of localization as being the "legitimationofdynastic interests and the domestication of subjects, and ... the organizationof the ruler's territoryinto a state."VanLeur1955,104.69. Wheatley 982,27.70. SeeAggarwal 998,32, 60;andKeohane ndHoffmann 993,386.71. Schimmelfennig2001.72. See, for example, Haas's study of the Mediterranean leanup.Haas 1990.73. Finnemore and Sikkink 1999, 265.74. Goldstein et al. 2000.75. Aggarwal 1998, 42, 44.


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Localization is indicatedwhen an extant institutionresponds to a foreign ideaby functional or membershipexpansionand creates new policy instruments o pur-sue its new tasks or goals without supplanting ts original goals and institutionalarrangementsdefinedas "organizational haracteristicsof groupsand ... the rulesand norms thatguide the relationshipsbetween actors." 6) Parallelscan be drawnbetween what Wheatley calls "mere redefinitionsof indigenous institutions"andhistorical institutionalism'snotion of "path dependence"(the claim thatpreexist-ing choices shapethe designof new institutions),77ndAggarwal'snotion of "nestedinstitutions." 8

Figure 1 illustrates three main forms of local responses to transnationalnorms.In localization, institutionaloutcomes such as task expansion and procedural n-novation result from the acceptance of a locally modified foreign norm. Whilesome originalnormsandpracticesmay be significantlymodified,the overall normhierarchyand the institutional model remain in place. This means a locally mod-ified foreign norm can enter the norm hierarchyof an extant institutionwithoutnecessarily takingprecedence over its otherpriornorms.But over the long term, localization may produce an incrementalshift towardfundamental hangeor normdisplacement.Afterlocal actorshave developedgreaterfamiliarity and experience with the new ideas, functions and instruments,resis-tance to new normsmay weaken, opening the door to fundamentalchanges to thenormhierarchy.This comes at the very long end of localization, which occurs anddefines normativeinteractionsin the interim. Localization provides an initial re-sponse to new norms pending norm displacement,which may or may not occur.But at least localization gives such change a decent chance.In the following sections, I comparetwo proposalsaboutreshapingASEAN inthe 1990s to explain an important puzzle: Why did proposals underpinnedby areframed global norm (humanitarianintervention) that was more convergentwith the policies of powerful actors, and that was conceived as an answer tothe severe economic crisis facing the region, fare poorly with ASEAN com-pared to proposals underpinnedby a reframedEuropeannorm (common secu-rity), which had been initially rejected by the powerful actors (especially theUnited States)?The answer, I argue, lies in the relative scope of localization forthe two norms. Drawing on a range of secondaryand primarysources, I employa process-tracingapproachto illustrate how the process of localization shapedthe progress of the outside norm at differentjunctures and look for evidence oflocalization in terms of the dependentvariable of institutionalchange discussedabove.

76. Ikenberry1988, 223.77. Hall andTaylor2001, 19.78. Aggarwal argues that institutionalchange can lead either to modifying existing institutionsorcreating new ones. If new ones are created, then they could take two forms: nested institutions andparallelinstitutions.Aggarwal 1998, 42, 44.


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IV Transnationalorms

IntV Transnationalormentrepreneurs

LocalgentsD V

Resistance Localization Normdisplacement1Resistance:No new tasksand nstrumentsrecreated, ndthetargetnorm2andthe institutionalmodelremain argely ntact.Toomuchand sustained esistance eads to failureof normtransmission.Localization:New tasksand new instruments recreated,andthetargetnorm s displacedorsignificantlymodified.The normhierarchy3emainsunaltered.Theoriginal nstitution emainsinplace, although here could be "new" nstitutionsmimicking heexistingnormhierarchyand institutionaldesign/model.Norm displacement:New tasks andinstruments recreated, hetargetnorm s displacedandthenormhierarchy ltered.A new institution withoutmuchsimilarity o thepreviousone)appearsortheold institutions significantlymodified.1Arareroccurrence.2Target ormrefersto the specificpriornormthatentrepreneurs,othoutsiderandinsider,want to dilute ordisplace.3Normhierarchy Farrell2001, 81) refersto the salienceof thetargetnorm n relation o othercorenormsof the institution.

FIGURE. Local responses to transnationalnorms

Case StudiesCase 1: ASEANand CooperativeSecurityTowardthe end of the Cold War(1986-90), leaders from the Soviet Union, Can-ada, and Australiaadvancedproposals towardmultilateralsecuritycooperationinthe Asia Pacific. These proposals sharedtwo common features.79First, they were

79. See Clark 1990a, 1990b;Evans 1990; and Evans and Grant1995.


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influenced by the European dea of common security.Second, they called for aninstitution closely modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE, later renamed as OSCE after "Conference"was changed to"Organization").80The common securityidea was articulated n the 1982 reportof the IndependentCommissionon Disarmament ndSecurityIssues,chairedby thelate SwedishPrimeMinisterOlof Palme.81Althoughnot directly espoused by the CSCE, the latter didrepresent, n Asianpolicy circles at least, the closest institutionalization f the com-mon securitynorm.82The norm has four key features:(1) rejection of adversarialor balance of power approaches to security; (2) rejection of unilateralism andpreference for an "inclusive" approachto security through multilateral securitymeasures to manage the security dilemma; (3) emphasis on reassurancethroughconfidence-buildingmeasures(CBMs), armscontrol,multilateralcooperation,andthe enhancementof the collective securityfunctions of the United Nations;83and(4) establishinga link between domestic andregional andinternationalsecurity.84Proposalsfor commonsecurityapproaches n theAsia Pacificdate backto 1986,when the Soviet leaderMikhail Gorbachevproposeda "Pacific Ocean conferencealong the Helsinki [CSCE] conference,"to be attendedby all countries"gravitat-ing" toward the Pacific Ocean to discuss peace and security in the region.85Thenext such proposal came from the CanadianExternalAffairs MinisterJoe Clark,who envisaged a "Pacific adaptation" f the CSCE.86Australia'sForeignMinisterGareth Evans added to the momentumby finding it "notunreasonableto expectthat new Europe-style patternsof cooperationbetween old adversarieswill findtheirecho in this partof the world."87Assertingthat"whatAsia needs is a Europe-style CSCA" [Conferenceon Security andCooperation n Asia], Evans envisageda future Asian security architecture"involving a wholly new institutionalprocessthat might be capable of evolving, in Asia just as in Europe,as a frameworkforaddressingand resolving securityproblems."88

80. There is considerable literatureattestingto how the Europeancommon securitynorm affectedsecurity debates in Asia. See Clements 1989; Wiseman 1992; and Dewitt 1994.81. Palme Commission 1982.82. Commonsecuritywas not formallya CSCE norm,althoughthatis how it is widely perceivedinAsian debates.83. The CBM regime of the CSCE included the presence of observers from both sides at largemilitary exercises, increasedtransparencyand informationsharing.On the CSCE's CBM agenda, seeKrause2003.84. The CSCE successfully incorporatedhumanrights issues into the regional confidence-buildingagenda,therebysettingnormsthatwould regulatethe internalas well as externalpolitical behaviorofstates. Zelikow 1992, 26.85. Acharya 1993, 59.86. Clark 1990b, 1990c.87. InternationalHerald Tribune,27 July 1990, 6.88. Ibid. Evans was clearly inspired by the Palme CommissionReportandby the common securityidea. Interviewby authorwith Geoff Wiseman,ForeignMinister Evans's privatesecretary n 1990, 24March2002, New Orleans,LA.


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Althoughthese proposalscalled for an Asia Pacific institutionandwere not spe-cifically directed at ASEAN, the latter, as the most successful Asian grouping,became an importantsite for debatingthem. In its initial reaction,ASEAN fearedthat these proposals could undermine its existing norms and practices. At stakewere threekey practices.One was ASEAN's avoidanceof military-securitycoop-eration. This itself was because of fears of provoking its Cold Waradversaries,Vietnam and China, which had denouncedASEAN as a new front for the now-defunctAmerican-backedSoutheast Asian TreatyOrganization.ASEAN also feltthat attention to military security issues would be divisive and undermineeco-nomic and political cooperation.A second ASEAN norm at risk was the Zone of Peace, Freedomand Neutrality(ZOPFAN) framework.Articulatedin 1972, ZOPFANwas geared to minimizingthe role of externalpowers in regional affairs. ZOPFANwas thus an "exclusion-ary"framework.A common security institution,in contrast,would bring togetherASEAN and the so-called outside powers within a single security framework,al-lowing them a legitimate role in regional security.ZOPFANhad remained an of-ficial goal of ASEAN, althoughASEAN members were already divided over it.Singapore and Thailandfavored closer defense links with, ratherthan the exclu-sion of, the United States. ZOPFAN's post-Cold War relevance had also beenquestioned.89A third ASEAN normative tradition at stake was the "ASEANWay,"a short-hand for organizational minimalism and preference for informal nonlegalisticapproaches o cooperation.90 hallenging his traditionwerecommonsecuritymech-anisms, especially the CBM and arms control regime in the Helsinki and ViennaDocuments of the CSCE, which imposed formal, reciprocal, andbinding obliga-tions, and allowed intrusive verification.ASEAN's discomfort with the Soviet, Canadian,andAustralianproposalswasaggravatedby the fact they all came from outsiderproponents.Accepting the pro-posals could lead ASEAN to "lose its identity."91SeniorASEAN figures also ar-gued thatthe common securitynorm and the CSCEmodel were uniquely suited to"European" onditions. Capturingthis sentiment,Ali Alatas, the former Indone-sian ForeignMinisterand a key leaderof ASEAN, would laterremark:"Youcan-notjust takeEuropean nstitutionsandplantthemin Asia becausethe two situationsaretotally different."92"Unlikein the Europeansituation,"Alatas held, "therehasbeen no commonly perceived, single securitythreat n the Asia Pacific region, butrathera multiplicityof securityconcerns."To this, he addedthe "widediversityofcultures, socio-political systems and levels of economic development"among re-

89. For details, see Acharya 1993 and 2001, 54-56.90. Acharya 1997a and 2001.91. Excerptsfrom Lee Kuan Yew's interview with TheAustralian,publishedin TheStraits Times,16 September1988.92. Interviewby author with Ali Alatas, 4 June 2002, KualaLumpur,Malaysia.


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gional countriesand theirconsequentlack of "adistinct sense of a community"asobstacles to a CSCE-type structure n the Asia Pacific.93It was "sensitivity" o suchASEAN reaction thatled AustralianForeignMinis-ter Evans to modify his proposal.94Dropping the CSCE analogy, Evans recog-nized ASEAN's "pastsuccess as a prelude to the future,"thereby endorsing theASEAN model as the basis of further regional security cooperation.95In ex-changes and dialogues involving Western scholars and a regional think tanknetwork, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and InternationalStudies (ASEAN-ISIS),96 the common securitynormwas reframedas "cooperativesecurity." 7Thelatterretained two key elements of the original common security idea-the prin-ciple of "inclusiveness"and the rejection of deterrence-based ecurity systems-but rejected the legalistic measures of security cooperation found in the CSCEprocess, as well as the link established by the CSCE between domestic politicsand regional security.Though formally established in 1988, ASEAN-ISIS had been in existence asan informal networkfor over a decade, organizing"SecondTrack"meetings thatbrought together Asian and Western scholars and policymakers interested inmultilateral security. A 1991 ASEAN-ISIS document, "A Time for Initiative,"urged dialogues and measures that would result in a multilateralsecurity insti-tution.98ASEAN-ISIS thus made proposals from outsiders appear as a localinitiative.

ASEAN-ISIS pushedfor cooperativesecuritybecause it realizedthat the end ofthe Cold War and the settlement of the Cambodia conflict (which had hithertopreoccupiedASEAN andcontributed o its success) requiredASEAN to develop anew focus.99Helping to create a cooperative security institutionpromised a newandenhanced role for ASEAN in the Asia Pacific region.'00Underlyingthis aspi-ration was a measure of self-confidence that ASEAN itself representeda provenmodel of regional securitycooperation.Later,Indonesia'sAlatas would acknowl-edge: "There was a feeling ... that we had something to offer, not in terms ofEuropean-stylestructures,but in terms of a forum ... proposals for security co-operationin Asia by Russia, Canada,and Australia were seen by us as outsiders,

93. Alatas 1993.94. Interviewby authorwith Geoff Wiseman,24 March2002, New Orleans,La.95. Evans 1990, 429.96. The ASEAN-ISIS broughttogether think tanks from Indonesia,Malaysia, Singapore,Philip-pines andThailandwith the goal being to "encouragecooperationandcoordinationof activities amongpolicy-oriented ASEAN scholars and analysts, and to promote policy-oriented studies of, and ex-changes of information and viewpoints on, various strategicand international ssues affecting South-east Asia andASEAN's peace, securityand well-being."ASEAN-ISIS 1991, 1.97. See Dewitt 1994.98. See ASEAN-ISIS 1991, 2-3; Lau 1991; and Razak 1992.99. Interviewby author with JusufWanandiof the Centre for Strategicand InternationalStudiesand a foundingleaderof ASEAN-ISIS, 4 June2002, KualaLumpur,Malaysia.100. TheBusiness Times(Singapore),25 July 1994, 3.


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with good intentions,telling us what to do. So we told them:Why don't you learnfrom what we have achieved, how we did it."101An equally importantfactor behind ASEAN's more receptive attitudetowardcooperative security was its recognition of some importantcommon ground be-tween this normand the existing ASEAN principles and processes. The rejectionof deterrence itted well intoASEAN's existing policy of not organizingitself intoa regionalcollective defense system.The ideathatsecurityshouldbe pursuedmulti-laterallyresonated well with Indonesia's earliereffort to develop a sharedunder-standingof security in ASEAN througha doctrineof "regionalresilience."102At its Singaporesummit n January1992,ASEAN agreedto "use established orato promoteexternalsecurity dialogues on enhancing securityin the region as wellas intra-ASEANdialoguesonASEAN securitycooperation." 03ASEAN-ISISmeet-ings contributed o an official Japanese nitiative for a new regional securityinsti-tution based on the ASEAN model. In 1993, the Japanese Foreign Minister,TaroNakayama, proposed that an existing ASEAN mechanism, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN-PMC), be turned into the foundationof a newsecurity organization or theAsia Pacific.104The resultinginstitution,the ASEANRegional Forum(ARF) (a proposalto call it Asian Regional Forumwas rejected),came into life composedof theASEAN members,China,Japan,Russia, the UnitedStates, Australia,Canada,and South Korea (India and othersjoined later).'05As the first Asia Pacific institution dedicatedto securityissues, the ARF repre-sents a significantexpansion of ASEAN's securityagenda.It is the most inclusiveregional institution:counting among its membersall the majorpowers (includingthe EU) of the contemporary nternationalsystem. Its creationmarked a signifi-cant break withASEAN's ZOPFANnorm.106ASEAN was to occupy "the driver'sseat"and "dominateand set the pace" of the ARF.107At its firstmeeting in 1994in Bangkok, theARF endorsedASEAN's own Treatyof Amity andCooperation,acore documentthat stresses noninterferenceandpacific settlementof disputes, "asa code of conductgoverning relationsbetween states and a unique diplomaticin-strument or regional confidence-building,preventivediplomacyandpolitical andsecurity cooperation."' 8As such,ASEAN's basic normhierarchy(withnoninter-

101. Interviewby authorwith Ali Alatas, 4 June 2002, KualaLumpur,Malaysia.102. Acharya 1991. In the 1970s, Indonesiaorganizeda series of seminarsto disseminatethe con-cept of national andregional "resilience,"which createdthe basis for a multilateralsecurity approach.Interview by author with Kwa Chong Guan, Council Member of the Singapore Institute of Inter-nationalAffairs, 21 May 2003, Singapore.103. ASEAN 1992, 2.104. This initiative drewon recentASEAN-ISISproposals,withYokioSatoh,who headedthepolicy-planningbureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, providingthe link. Interviewby authorwith YukioSatoh, 1 June2002, Singapore.105. Acharya2001, 172-73.106. Leifer 1996, 19.107. TheBusiness Times(Singapore),25 July 1994, 3.108. ASEAN Regional Forum 1994, 2.


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ference at the top) remainedunchanged, while the ZOPFANidea was displacedwith a cooperative security approach.The ARF's policy instrumentshave been characterizedas "evolutionarydevel-opments from extant regional structuresratherthan the importationof Westernmodalities or the creation of new structures." 09Unlike the OSCE's intrusiveandconstrainingCBMs backed by an inspection regime, the ARF's CBM agendare-mains "ASEAN-like" n being nonintrusive and nonlegalistic, providing for vol-untary compliance. A concept paper in 1995 envisaged three stages of securitycooperation: confidence-building,preventive diplomacy and "elaborationof ap-proaches to conflicts"-the latter being modified from the notion of "conflict-resolution"thatwas deemedto be too Westernand intrusive.110 The ARF imitatesASEAN's organizationalminimalism. Its main institutional structureconsists ofan annual foreign ministers' conclave, and a senior officials meeting. Further-more, as of yet there is no ARF secretariat.ASEAN's centralityis furtherevidentin the fact that the ARF annual ministerial meetings are held in ASEAN coun-tries only.To sum up, the cooperative security norm contributed o two institutionalout-comes: new tasks (security cooperation) for an existing regional institution(ASEAN) that displaced a long-standingnorm (ZOPFAN), and the creationof anew institution,the ARF, closely modeled on ASEAN. For the first time in his-tory, Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific acquireda permanentregional securityorganization.The diffusion of the cooperativesecuritynormwas also indicatedin the partici-pation of China and the United States in the ARF. Neither was at first supportiveof multilateralsecurity.China saw in it the dangerthat its neighborscould "gangup"againstits territorialclaims in the region. But its attitudechangedin the mid-1990s. To quote a Chinese analyst, China was "learninga new form of coopera-tion, not across a line [in an] adversarialstyle, but [in a] cooperative style." This,he added,would change Chinese strategicbehaviorin the long-term.Chinesepol-icymakers consistently stressed cooperative security as a more preferable ap-proachto regional order than balance of power approaches.111'During initial debates about cooperative security,Richard Solomon, AssistantSecretaryof State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the George Bush (senior)administration,arguedthatthe region's problemscould not be solved "by working

109. Ball 1997, 16-17.110. ASEAN 1995, Annex A andB, 8-11.111. This and otherstatementson China'sgrowingreceptivityto cooperativesecuritycouldbe foundin a reportpreparedby the author after interviews conductedbetween 1997 and 1999 with analystsand policymakersat the Ministryof ForeignAffairs, Beijing; ChinaInstituteof InternationalStudies(CIIS); China Institute of ContemporaryInternational Relations (CICIR); China Centre for Inter-national Studies(CCIS);Instituteof Asia PacificStudies,ChineseAcademyof Social Sciences (CAAS);Institute for StrategicStudies,National Defense University,the People's LiberationArmy.See Acharya1999. See also Johston 2003.


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througha large, unwieldy,and ill-definedregion-widecollective securityforum." 12The Bush administrationearedthat anAsian multilateral nstitutionwould under-mine America's bilateralsecurity alliances in the region.113But the U.S. positionchangedas ASEAN began to localize the common security dea. Secretaryof StateJames Baker conceded that while U.S. bilateralties would remain the most impor-tant element of its security strategy in the region, "multilateralactions may ...supplementthese bilateral ties."114 PresidentBill Clinton, who made JapanandKoreahis first overseas destinationas president,statedin Koreain July 1993 that"new regional dialogues on the full range of our common security challenges"would be one of the priorities for his administration'ssecurity strategy for theAsia Pacific region.115Six years later, Ralph Boyce, Deputy Assistant Secretaryof State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, defended the cooperative security in-stitution:"nay-sayersexpected ASEAN Regional Forumto be short-lived, but ithas confounded these pessimists by not only surviving,but also thriving." 16

Case 2: ASEAN and Flexible EngagementThe establishmentof the ARF in 1994 boosted ASEAN's internationalprestige.But the glory was short-lived. ASEAN suffereda majorsetbackin the wake of theAsian economic crisis thatbegan in mid-1997. The crisis revealed the vulnerabil-ity of ASEAN to global economic trends.The failureof ASEAN to respondto thecrisis with a united front drew considerablecriticism.A key fallout was proposalsfor reformingASEAN to make it moreresponsiveto transnationalhallenges.Lead-ing the reformistcamp was SurinPitsuwan,who became the foreign ministerof anew Thai government n 1997. At a time when ASEAN's critics were blaming thecurrency crisis on its lack of a financial surveillance system,117 Pitsuwan urgedASEAN to look beyond its "cherishedprincipleof non-intervention .. to allow itto play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with re-gional implications." 18 According to an official Thai document:

All the ASEAN members have the responsibilityof upholding the principleof non-interference n the domestic affairsof one another.But this commit-ment cannot and should not be absolute. It must be subjectedto reality testsand accordinglyit must be flexible. The reality is that,as the region becomesmore interdependent, he dividing line between domestic affairs on the onehand and external or transnational ssues on the other is less clear. Many

112. Solomon1994.113. For nitialU.S.reservationsboutmultilateralism,ee Solomon1990.114. Cited n Capie2002, 159.115. Clinton 1993.116. Boyce 1999, 1.117. "ASEAN's Failure: The Limits of Politeness," TheEconomist,28 February1998, 43.118. "Thailand Challenges ASEAN 'Non-Interference' Policy," Agence France Presse, 13 June 1998.


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"domestic" affairs have obvious external or transnationaldimensions, ad-versely affecting neighbors, the region and the region's relations with oth-ers. In such cases, the affected countries should be able to express theiropinions and concerns in an open, frank and constructivemanner,which isnot, and should not be, considered "interference" n fellow-members'domes-tic affairs.119Pitsuwan's ideas, known as "Flexible Engagement,"became a focal point ofdebate in SoutheastAsian regional dialogues. Although ostensibly geared to aneconomic crisis, Pitsuwan's real aim was to promote greater political opennessand transparency n ASEAN, both at domestic and regional levels. Among theideationalunderpinningsof flexible engagementwere emergingpost-Westphalian

concepts of collective action,includingthe normof humanitarianntervention HI)and the advocacy of human rights and democratization by the internationalcommunity.120In SoutheastAsia, the HI norm had attractedno insider advocacy, only suspi-cion and rejection. Malaysia's Foreign MinisterSyed HamidAlbar found it "dis-quietening(sic)."121 He urgedthe region "tobe wary all the time of new conceptsand new philosophies that will compromise sovereignty in the name of humani-tarian intervention."122 The norm's clash with existing ASEAN policy frame-works was most evident in the case of the Burmese military regime. Westerngovernments-the United States, Canada,Australia,and the EU, pushedfor sanc-tions againstBurma,with the EU threatening o block economic cooperationwithASEAN if it offered membershipto Burma. SoutheastAsian NGOs such as Fo-rumAsia andAlternativeASEAN (ALTASEAN),backedby Westerndonoragen-cies, demandeda more interventionistposturetowardBurma.In contrast,ASEANpursueda policy of "constructive ngagement" oward heregime,displayinggreaterdeference to its noninterferencenorm than to the promotionof humanrights anddemocracy.Neither had the norm received backing from the local epistemic community.ASEAN-ISIS was too divided over this norm to play an advocacy role. Supportfor a dilutedform of regional interventioncame only from two individual leaders.Before Pitsuwan,Anwar Ibrahim,then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, hadproposedthe idea of "constructive ntervention"as a compromisebetween HI and"constructiveengagement."In July 1997, he urged ASEAN to assist its weaker

119. Ministryof ForeignAffairs, Thailand1998.120. Several discussions by the author with Pitsuwanconfirmedthis influence. Pitsuwan became amember of the Commission on Human Security and an adviser to the InternationalCommission onState Sovereignty and Humanitarian ntervention,which was tasked to improve the legitimacy andeffectiveness of humanitarianntervention. nterviewby authorwith SurinPitsuwan,7 September2001,Singapore;interview by authorwith Pitsuwan, 10 May 2002, Bangkok,Thailand.121. Albar 1999.122. "Malaysia Opposes UN Probe of East Timor Atrocities," Agence France Presse, 7 October1999.


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members in avoiding internalcollapse.123 But unlike the standard ormulationofHI, his policy implied supportiveassistance, ratherthan coercive interference.124Constructiveintervention would take the form of (1) direct assistance to firmupelectoral processes, (2) an increased commitmentto legal and administrativere-forms, (3) the developmentof humancapital, and (4) the general strengtheningofcivil society and the rule of law in the targetcountry.125Because of opposition from fellow ASEAN members, Ibrahim'sproposal wasnever officially tabled. Against this backdrop,Pitsuwan, who was clearly influ-enced by Ibrahim's dea,126 felt the need to reframeand "prune" he idea furtherto make it more palatableto his ASEAN colleagues. He made no mention of co-ercive interference or sanction-basedregional interactions.Flexible engagementwas called for because "ASEANneeded to put its house in order" 27 and, as theForeignMinisterof thePhilippinesDomingoSiazonputit, build"moresolid groundfor regional action."128 Pitsuwan stressed the potentialutility of flexible engage-ment in makingASEAN more transparent nd interdependent,which might makeit more effective in addressinga range of currenttransnational ssues, includingfinancialcrises as well as challenges relatedto "drugs,environment,migrants." 29Thoughdiluted, flexible engagementnonetheless was the most significantchal-lenge to ASEAN's noninterferencenorm.Regionalcrisisand domesticchangewereimportantcatalystsbehindPitsuwan'sinitiative.Pitsuwanviewed the formeras "aclear and present danger"to ASEAN.130 His new Thai governmentwas keen toprove its democratic credentials to the internationalcommunity by distancingitself from ASEAN's noninterference-basedsupport for Burma's repressive re-gime, and the lack of transparencyand accountabilityin ASEAN member statesgenerally.131But Pitsuwan's intrusiveregionalism was not backedby any priorregional tra-dition. ASEAN was founded as a groupingof illiberal regimes with no record ofcollectively promotinghuman rights and democratic governance. The antiapart-heid movement in SouthAfrica had succeeded partlybecause campaignerscouldlink their struggle with the prior norm against racism. The campaign by humanrights activists against Burma failed because advocacy of humanrights and dem-

123. Acharya 1997b. The paperwas presented at a workshop organizedby Ibrahim's think tank,Institute of Policy Studies.124. "ASEAN Turns to 'Constructive Intervention',"Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 September1997, 10.125. Anwar brahim,CrisisPrevention,"ewsweekInternational),1 July1997,29.126. When Pitsuwan first presented his ideas, he used the term "constructiveintervention." ButThai foreign ministryofficials felt this sounded "too radical"and coined the less intrusiveterm "flex-ible engagement."Capie andEvans 2002.127. Interviewby authorwith SurinPitsuwan,30 January2001, Bangkok,Thailand.128. Siazon 1998.129. See "Thailand Calls for 'Flexible Engagement' in ASEAN," Japan Economic Newswire, 26June 1998; and Pitsuwan 1998a.130. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 1998.131. Pitsuwan 1998c.


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ocratic governance had no place in ASEAN, which did not specify a democraticpolitical system as a criterionfor membership.Moreover,while ASEAN's ZOPFAN norm had alreadybeen discreditedinter-nally, noninterferencewas still enjoying a robustlegitimacy.As Singapore'sFor-eign Minister S. Jayakumarput it, "ASEANcountries' consistent adherence o thisprinciple of non-interference"had been "thekey reason why no militaryconflictha[d] broken out between any two member countries since the founding ofASEAN." 132

Pitsuwan's critics within ASEAN argued that ASEAN's existing mechanismsandprocesses were adequatefor dealing with the new challenges. Malaysia'sthenForeignMinister(andnow PrimeMinister)AbdullahBadawi claimed thatASEANmembers had always cooperated in solving mutual problems, which sometimesrequiredcommentingon each other's affairs,but they had done so "quietly,befit-ting a community of friends bonded in cooperationand ever mindful of the factthat fractious relations underminethe capacity of ASEAN to work together onissues critical to our collective well-being."133Flexible engagement offered no opportunity for enhancing ASEAN's appealwithin the largerAsia Pacific region. Instead,ASEAN members feared that such apolicy would provoke vigorous Chinese opposition and undermine the ARF, thevery brainchildof ASEAN. Indeed,the survivalof ASEAN would be at risk.Lead-ing the opposition from founding members Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore,Singapore's Jayakumar rgued hatabandoningnoninterferencewould be "thesur-est and quickest way to ruin ... ASEAN."134Success in localization dependson the insiderproponentsbeing seen as uphold-ers of local values and identity. But their ASEAN peers saw both IbrahimandPitsuwan as "agents"of the West, promotingthe latter's agenda of humanrightspromotionand democraticassistance.Though local in persona, they were insuffi-ciently local in their inspirationand motivation.Flexible engagement failed to produce any meaningful institutionalchange inASEAN.'35At the annualASEAN Foreign Minister's Meeting held in Manila inJuly 1998, Pitsuwandroppedthe term.136ASEAN nominally adopteda new pol-icy of "enhanced nteraction" althoughthis was not reflectedin any official state-ment) as a frameworkto deal with transnational ssues.137Pitsuwan would laterclaim some successes of flexible engagement, includinga brief discussion of Bur-ma's internalaffairs at an official ASEAN meeting in Singaporein 2000. This he

132. TheStraits Times,23 July 1998, 30.133. Badawi 1998.134. TheStraits Times,23 July 1998, 30.135. See The Straits Times,24 July 1998, 3; and TheStraits Times,26 July 1998, 15.136. Pitsuwan 1998b.137. See "ASEAN MinistersAdopt Policy of 'EnhancedInteraction,"Asia Pulse, 27 July 1998;Interviewby authorwith SurinPitsuwan, 10 May 2002, Bangkok,Thailand;and interview by authorwith Ali Alatas, 4 June2002, KualaLumpur,Malaysia.


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saw as the "firstever talkingaboutissues of internalnature n ASEAN."138But toconsider this to be a trueagenda expansionwould be misleading, as ASEAN con-tinues to avoid any discussion of, or approaches o, the protectionof humanrightsor the provision of democraticassistance to fellow member states. Even thoughAnwar Ibrahim'sconstructive intervention dea mooted the more modest propos-als, such as electoral assistanceor promotionof civil society, these proposalshaveremained outside of official ASEAN policy. In short,ASEAN did not departfromits noninterferencedoctrinein any significantway.139 Its reluctance and inabilityto send an interventionforce to East Timorin 1999 despite pleas from the Indo-nesian presidentfurtherattests to the continuedsalience of noninterference.ASEAN did create two new policy instrumentsas part of its "enhanced nter-action" agenda. The first was an ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) created in1998 to monitorregionaleconomic developments,provideearlywarningof macro-economic instability,and encourage collective action to prevent an economic cri-sis.140The second was a ministerial "Troika"to support regional political andsecurity crisis prevention.141However, the ASP is officially described as "infor-mal, simple and based on peer review process."142 The Troika remains a paperinstrumentand is specifically askedto "refrain rom addressing ssues thatconsti-tute the internal affairs of ASEAN membercountries." 43

ComparisonThe localization of cooperativesecurityhad threemain effects on ASEAN: (1) itsacceptance of security dialogues and cooperationas a formal task for ASEAN it-self; (2) the displacementof the inward-lookingZOPFANnormin favor of a moreinclusive approach,which allowed ASEAN to play the role of midwife to the birthof a new Asia-wide security institution;and (3) the adoptionby the new security

138. Interviewby author with SurinPitsuwan, 10 May 2002, Bangkok,Thailand.139. See Funston 1998; Nischalke 2000; and Haacke 2003. At the end of the ASEAN MinisterialMeeting in Manila on 25 July 1998, which saw the most intense debateover whetherASEAN shouldshift from noninterferenceto "flexible engagement,"Singapore'sS. Jayakumar, he incoming Chair-man of ASEAN's StandingCommittee, flatly noted that the meeting "began amidst some confusionand speculationas to whether there would be changes to ASEAN's fundamentalprinciples.These con-troversies have been laid to rest.... The basic principlesof non-interventionand decision making byconsensus would remainthe cornerstones of ASEAN."Jayakumar1998.140. Interviewby authorwith TermsakChalermpalanupap, pecialAssistant to the SecretaryGen-eral, ASEAN, 16 January2001, Bangkok,Thailand.141. ASEAN 2000. The debate over the noninterferencenormin ASEAN is unlikely to fade, how-ever. In 2003, ASEAN foreign ministersexpressed concern over the domestic situation n Burmaanddeepened cooperationagainst terrorismand the SevereAcute RespiratorySyndrome(SARS). A dilu-tion of noninterference s possible if such externalcrises bring to the fore new insiderproponentsandmore effective framing and graftingdiscourses. But any such shift from noninterferencein ASEANwill be gradualandpath dependent.142. ASEAN 1998.143. ASEAN 2000.


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institution ARF) of new policy instruments,ncludingCBMs,based on the ASEANmodel. It is fair to say that the targetnormof ZOPFANwas notjust modified,butdisplaced. In contrast, the flexible engagement proposal underpinnedby the HInorm did not produce any meaningful institutionalchange in ASEAN. ASEANcontinues to exclude humanrights and democraticassistance tasks and the targetnorm, noninterference,remains firmly in place. While some new policy instru-ments were created,these remain weak and limited.The variation can be explained in terms of the localization framework.Bothnorms challenged cognitive priors in ASEAN: advocates of cooperative securitytargetedthe ZOPFANconcept and those of flexible engagement targetedits non-interferencedoctrine. But noninterferencewas still enjoying a robustlegitimacy,while the ZOPFAN idea had alreadybeen discreditedfrom within ASEAN itself.The cooperative securitynorm had displacedthe targetnorm of ZOPFANbut didnot overridethe doctrine of noninterference n ASEAN, which remainedat the topof ASEAN's normhierarchy.When noninterference tself became the targetnorm,as in the case of flexible engagement,norm diffusion failed.Both norms had insider proponents,but in the case of cooperative security, itwas a regional network:ASEAN-ISIS. The insiderproponents n the second casewere two individuals,Malaysia'sIbrahimandThailand'sPitsuwan.This was clearlya factor explaining the variationbetween the two cases.The cooperative securitynormcould be graftedmoreeasily into ASEAN thanksto the existence of two priorreceptivenorms(one thatrejecteda balanceof powerapproachto regional security involving multilateralmilitary pacts and the otherbeing the Indonesianconcept of regional resilience) in the ASEAN framework.There were no such norms to host flexible engagement.

Finally,cooperativesecurityofferedgreaterscope for enhancingASEAN's pres-tige. It enabledASEAN to acquirea broaderregionalrelevance androle. Flexibleengagementhad no such appeal.Instead,it threatened o undermineboth ASEANand the ARF.

Alternative ExplanationsCan the variationbe betterunderstoodby alternativeexplanations?To seek expla-nations at the systemic level by linking the prospects for norm diffusion to theimpactof the end of the ColdWaron the global normativeenvironment-as wouldbe consistent with a structuralconstructivistframework-would not suffice. Theend of the Cold Warcertainlyhelpedthe diffusionof the cooperativesecuritynormby highlightingthe contributionof the CSCEin easing East-West ensions, therebycreating an imitation effect of the norm. This inspired Westernnorm entrepre-neurs such as Canada,which was part of CSCE and its CBM regime to advocatesimilarefforts in Asia. Moreover,the end of the Cold Warcreatedthe need for anew Asian security orderin light of the retrenchmentof the U.S. and Soviet mil-itary presence in the region. But the end of the Cold Warhad a similarimpact on


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the other norm. Both common security and humanitarian ntervention were ren-dered more prominentafter the end of the Cold War,the former because of thesuccess of the OSCE and the latter because of the West's new security agendafocusing on democratic"enlargement" nd concerns over famine and genocide inAfrica and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Hence, the end of the Cold War itselfcannot explain the patternof norm diffusion in SoutheastAsia, or why coopera-tive security was relatively more successful than humanitarian ntervention.There are three other possible explanationsto be considered:realist, function-alist, and domestic politics. A realist perspective would explain the prospect ofnorm diffusion in terms of the distributionof power at the global and regionallevel. A popularstrandof realistthinkingsees the engagementof the United Statesin the regional balance of power as the primarydeterminantof Asian security or-der anda basic motivatingfactor behindthe securitypolicies of manyAsian states.Hence, the acceptance of any new norm to reorganizeASEAN should have de-pended primarilyon U.S. attitude and preferences,or by the regional actors'cal-culation of the impact of the new norm in keeping the United States engaged inthe region. Going by this logic, cooperative security, which was initially fearedand opposed by the United States, should have been rejected, while the flexibleengagement, which conformedmore to the style of regional interactionspreferredby the United States and the EU, relatively more powerful actorsin strategic andeconomic senses respectively (The EU had threatened anctionsagainstASEAN),should have been accepted.But the outcome of normativecontestation in Asia, asdiscussed in the case studies, was exactly in the opposite direction-a damningindication of the limitationsof the realist framework.The United States, as discussed earlier,itself had rejected cooperativesecurity,at least initially. Hence, if U.S. power is what decisively shapes Asian securityorder, the initiative by the normally pro-U.S. ASEAN members to create a newregional security institutionshould not have been successful. Some realists havetried to move aroundthis anomalyby arguingthat the ARF was possible becauseASEAN memberssaw it as a way of maintaininga balanceof power in the Pacificby ensuringthe continuedengagement of the United States in the post-Cold Warperiod when there were concerns regardinga possible U.S. military withdrawalfrom the region and when China's power was rising. Hence, Leifer's assertionthat "the ARF was primarilythe productof a post-Cold Warconcern ... abouthow to cope institutionally with America's apparentstrategic retreat from EastAsia." 44But thisperspectivesuffers frommajorgaps.First,the goal of keepingtheUnitedStates strategicallyengaged in the region throughthe ARF was supportedonly bySingaporeandThailand,butnot by Indonesia or Malaysia. Second, if the real aimwas to ensure a stable regional balance of power, then this could have been moreeffectively addressedby offering militaryaccess to the United States to offset the

144. Leifer 1999, 116. See also Dibb 1995, 38.


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Norm Localization and InstitutionalChangein Asian Regionalism 267

loss of its bases in the Philippines.Indeed, this is precisely what Singaporedid in1990 when it offered access to its airandnaval facilities to the U.S. Pacific forces.But Singapore'smove was not matchedby other ASEAN countries,andMalaysiawas highly critical of Singapore's move.'45 Third, this perspective does not ex-plainthe natureanddesign of the institution hatemerged,which was basedcloselyon the ASEAN model, rather than being a military alliance involving the UnitedStates. In fact, the Chinese acceptanceof the ARF was strongly influencedby thevery fact that the ARF would not undertake defense cooperation and would notaccord a privileged role to the United States.146This puts to serious question therealist claim thatASEAN's acceptanceof cooperative securitywas mainly aimedat maintaininga post-Cold Warregionalbalanceof powerled by the UnitedStates.The United States itself came to accept the ARF, but only after, and not before,ASEAN had reconstructed he cooperative security norm.This move by ASEANwas not because of U.S. pressure,but because of ASEAN's urge to find congru-ence between its existing model of regionalism andthe cooperative securitynormas proposed by Canada and Australia.What about power distribution at the intra-regional evel? If this was crucial,then the diffusion of cooperativesecurity shouldhave dependedon the attitudeofthe more powerful East Asian and ASEAN states, such as China, Japan,or Indo-nesia. But as the empirical discussion shows, China was initially reluctant toacceptcooperative securityand came aroundonly afterASEAN had assumedlead-ershipof the institution-buildingprocess and reconstructed he norm.Japan'srolein pushing for cooperative securitywas also ambivalent.Sections in the Japanesepolicy establishmentwere clearly worried that such an institutionwould under-mine the rationalefor the U.S.-Japandefense alliance, the cornerstoneof Japanesesecurity policy. Despite an occasional initiative, Japanclearly deferredto the roleof ASEAN and,as has been suggested, borrowedfrom ASEAN-ISIS's ideas aboutinstitutionalizingcooperative security.WithinASEAN itself, the patternof powerdistribution s not overly hierarchical.No ASEAN country,including Indonesia,was in a power position to impose its preferrednorm over the others. Hence, noserious link can be established between the acceptanceof