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How geography shapes NationalIdentitiesDavid H. Kaplan a & Guntram H. Herb ba Kent State Universityb Middlebury CollegePublished online: 21 Nov 2011.

To cite this article: David H. Kaplan & Guntram H. Herb (2011) How geography shapes NationalIdentities , National Identities, 13:4, 349-360, DOI: 10.1080/14608944.2011.629424

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How geography shapes National Identities

David H. Kaplana* and Guntram H. Herbb

aKent State University; bMiddlebury College

Geography is an intrinsic part of national identities, and the contributions to thisjournal have reflected this throughout its existence. In this essay, we discuss howgeography has shaped National Identities in particular ways. Several of thejournal’s articles have examined how would-be nationalists form a geographicalimage of the prospective nation in order to make it real or how they have turnedvarious landscape elements into national icons. Other articles have specificallyexamined the vital role of geographical scale in mediating between nationalconceptions, subnational movements, supranational ideas, and globalization.Finally we look at those essays that specifically focus on the role of maps inconstructing, displaying, and propagandizing national identity.

Keywords: space; territory; maps; landscape; scale

National Identities was conceived with geography in mind. This was affirmed in its

initial manifesto, which stated that National Identities ‘will be the first [journal]

concentrating on historical and geographical approaches to national identities’ and

that it would discuss the forces that shape national identity, the uneven development

of national identity, and the expression and transmission of national identity. All of

these themes can be approached geographically, and the range of papers from the

very first volume reflected this interest. Explicit geographic treatments such as Rady’s

(1999) discussion of how officials of the Austro-Hungarian Empire used maps to

depict the spaces of Bulgarians, Agnew and Brusa’s (1999) examination of the

interrelationships among various geographic scales in rendering Italy’s Northern

League and its proposed ‘Padania’, or Lammers (1999) observations regarding the

way changing identities on the French periphery point to how geography is

interwoven with nationalism.

Nationalism is an intrinsically geographical doctrine in that it seeks to conjoin a

self-identified group of people � a ‘nation’ � within a sovereign, bounded

geographical area � a ‘state’. Because national identity cannot really be conceived

without the presence of a nationalist territorial ideology, national identities must

always contend with their geographic manifestations. Spaces are bounded, they have

texture, and they are imbued with meanings that represent different elements of

the national identity. Within these spaces, national identity varies � identity at the

geographic core is far different from the national identities displayed at the

peripheries. Boundaries between national groups create borderlands, each with a

different sense of identity. We said ‘contend’ because national identity may not always

be clearly defined in regard to a bounded space. Some national groups are scattered

*Corresponding author. Email: dkaplan@kent.edu

National Identities

Vol. 13, No. 4, December 2011, 349�360

ISSN 1460-8944 print/ISSN 1469-9907 online

# 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2011.629424

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across space, perhaps as part of a diaspora population. More recently, national

identities are even rendered in cyber-space, populating various websites and blogs.

In this essay, we seek to encapsulate how National Identities has provided a forum

for interesting scholarship, tying together national identity and geography, especiallyin regard to narrating, scaling, and mapping geographic space. Some of this work has

been conducted by geographers, but much of it is found in the work of other scholars

who take a more geographic approach. Since the journal’s inception, we have sought

out geographic scholarship, and looked to encourage greater geographic attention in

all of our submissions. Most basically, we have encouraged the use of maps, attention

to issues of scale, and the ways that landscape narrates and shapes identities.

The importance of geography to the core mission of the journal was recognized

through the composition of the editorial board, and the appointment of a geographyeditor. And before proceeding further, we would be remiss in not using this space to

commemorate the first geography editor, Dr David Hooson, who passed away in

2008. Professor Hooson was a Professor of Geography at the University of

California at Berkeley, who specialised in the former Soviet Union and in national

identity. Already in 1994, Professor Hooson edited a book entitled Geography and

National Identity which was perhaps the first volume to comprehensively bring

together scholarship in these two areas. Geography and National Identity included 23

essays covering different cases around the world and came at an especially fortuitoustime following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and

the development of a host of new political entities. In part because of this volume,

and the interest it spurred, we saw a continuing need to offer scholarship in the

geographical aspects of national identity. Professor Hooson retired as the geography

editor of National Identities in 2001.

Narrating geographic space

Every nation has its articulators, and they will use every means at their disposal to

bundle together attributes � some of which are more or less objective such as

language and religion; others of which tend to be based on moral attributes,

personalities and of course stereotypes � which together form a national definition.

Space is part of this definition, and is particularly urgent for those who seek

recognition, autonomy or independence. Sometimes the national territory has a basis

in history; but occasionally it does not. Agnew and Brusa (1999) discuss how the

head of the Northern League of Italy, Umberto Bossi, has helped to create ofgeographical depiction of Padania, from an old Roman term, that includes most of

the northern third of Italy. That a region like Padania has never really existed makes

this depiction more audacious, but the place-name has helped to cement this new

national identity within a geopolitical entity. Other nationalists may have more

history to work with, but each is essentially attempting to create a geographical

image of the prospective nation to make it tangible.

At times, the national identity may be cohesive on one level, but subject to multiple

interpretations. This appears in Jones’s (2008) discussion of the search for the individualwho best represents the Bengali nation. ‘Bengali’ is a term that has held different

meanings to people over its long history, from those who speak the Bengali language, to

those who live in the region of West Bengal or the present-day state of Bangladesh, to

an identity which either includes either Hindus, Muslims or both. The term ‘Bengali’

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and its spatial extent depend on whatever serves the interests of the times. These

different ways of interpreting a singular identity renders it quite difficult to find

common ground. National interpretations can also be developed from the outside.

After the collapse of the USSR, the US was forced to come to grips with a new Russia.

As Dittmer (2007) points out, there exist multiple interpretations of what ‘Russia’ is.

According to US newspaper accounts in the 1990s through to the early 2000s in regard

to the expansion of NATO, the meanings of Russia included a more sympatheticWestern narrative, a hostile Orientalist narrative, and a geopolitical interpretation that

assumes Russia to be a country that will operate in its own best interests.

Geographers and others have built on the important relationships between

landscape and national identity. Each landscape image ‘would evoke a geographical

area, each region a narrative, thus triggering national pride, melancholy or aesthetic

appreciation’ (M. Hayrynen, 2000, p. 16). National Identities has published several

articles that examine this link. Landscape encompasses many elements of course. For

example Schrenk (1999) looked at the role of architecture in rendering different

depictions of national identity, in essence summoning how landscape may represent

national identity in a group of buildings. For a special issue published in June 2007,

the focus was on riverscapes. Underlying the contributions to this issue was the notion

that rivers ‘have been appropriated as symbols of national vitality’ (Cusack, 2007, p.

101) and that they help to geographically represent the flow of national history. Rivers

may also serve to unite a single nation; they can assume the status of a ‘national river’

as the Rhine helps to unify Germany (Plonien, 2000). But in the case of the Jordanriver, it serves the mythologies of two opposing national identities: that of Israel and

Palestine (Havrelock, 2007). An interesting twist to this notion comes from Medlicott

and Heffernan’s (2004) discussion of the proposed development of a national road.

The Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR), an iconic if controversial

association, took it upon itself in the early twentieth century to argue that a national

road was necessary to inculcate ideals of Americanism, civilize the frontier and also

highlight the achievements of American women. The National Old Trails Road, as it

was called, never was actually built, but the ideas behind it were powerful testaments

to the intertwining of transportation networks and US national identity.

Landscapes often provide a visual trope that easily captures a nation’s sense of

itself. This is particularly important for those countries under subjection to other

powers or which have recently gained independence. The emergence of an

independent Finland was accompanied by a body of landscape imagery. Much of

Finland’s ‘typical’ imagery was comprised of rural, lake-and-forest scenes. Peripheral

landscapes, first of eastern Karelia and later of northern Lapland, also fed into

Finland’s sense of itself as being on the margins of wilderness. But there were alsourban pictures showing the national capital of Helsinki and other civilising scenes

that projected a more modern view. These landscape images are easily identified by

Finns, and help to embody their national character (M. Hayrynen 2000). For the

nascent Irish state, a landscape made up of thatched cottages and the peasants who

lived and laboured in them, became an essential aspect of the Irish view of themselves

as a traditional people, in contrast with the urban, industrial image of Great Britain

(Cusack, 2001). This ‘cult of the rural’ was promoted by a particular kind of Irish

nationalism, similar to the dominant national ideology in pre-1960 Quebec. It

fostered not only a cohesive national identity, but a particular kind of Irish identity

that was antithetical to progress. A nation’s uniqueness is constantly flagged by a

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host of symbols that are displayed in the landscape. Crameri (2000) demonstrates

how this works in Catalonia, beginning with the flag itself � which has moved from

illegality under Franco’s regime to a ubiquitous presence today. ‘Banal Catalanism’,

as she terms it, is displayed on Catalan language signs, in newspapers, on televisionand within several culturally marked festivities.

Often the more focused site of a national commemoration situates national

identity away from ‘banal nationalism’ as popularized by Billig, to a more

extraordinary nationalism. But the content and placement of these memorials tells

us a lot about how national identity is conceived. For example, along its National

Old Trails Road, the Daughters of the American Revolution also proposed a series of

monuments which would commemorate events that were both locally and nationally

significant (Medlicott & Heffernan, 2004). The memorials themselves can also tapinto an ambivalent relationship to a dominant national identity. The relationship

between the Isle of Man and Great Britain is complicated, with the Manx controlling

their own parliament, taxes, currency, post office and a host of national symbols.

World War II is of course commemorated throughout the UK, but it is symbolized

just a bit differently on the Isle of Man. As Travers and Heathorn (2008) argue, the

island hosted 10 large internee camps for Germans, Italians, Finns and Japanese.

This experience of internment affected the internees and also the islanders who

hosted them, and it is this occurrence which predominates in commemorations of thewar. For instance, the Manx Museum includes several displays that illustrate the

internment experience: barbed wire, blue striped pajamas and wooden objects carved

by internees. These types of representations are far more common on the Isle of Man

than the more typical war-related monuments depicting soldiers and battles.

Scaling geographic space

The negotiation of identity within multiple scales has been of particular concern tomany of the articles published in National Identities. The exploration of national and

regional identities has entailed several excursions into the role of scale. Just as

scholars consider these identities to be constructed, so they must also consider how

they fit within a continuum of alternative identities that exist at different geographic

scales. Among those of special interest are peoples that feel themselves distinct

enough to be called a nation, apart from the dominant nationality within the state.

These could be considered sub-national identities or simply nations without states,

and they may seek outright independence, autonomy or perhaps simply recognitionof their unique status. Humpage (2008) addresses the issues of how state

governments address minority ‘nation’ concerns in the case of New Zealand’s Maori

people. S. Hayrynen (2006) shows the extent to which central governments � in this

case Finland and New Zealand � have helped to privilege certain manifestations of

identities, Sami and Maori identity respectively, while marginalizing other forms of

identity.

These actions by the state can have repercussions in regard to a minority nation’s

own self-awareness, how it practices its identity and its mode of interaction with thestate. The goals and the means by which representatives of the nation deal with state

authorities is the subject of Boomgaard’s (2008) essay on the shift of Breton political

strategies. In the early twentieth century, the Breton culture was under attack because

it did not conform to the French ideal of cultural unification. The Breton language, a

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Celtic language akin to Gaelic, had declined mostly through formal neglect and

informal stigmatization. Other symbols of Breton culture were also discouraged. The

Breton organizations that arose were primarily interested in cultural preservation

and tended to be traditional and collaborationist in outlook. By the late twentieth

century, French policy had changed some, with an increased acknowledgement of

Breton culture. But this also corresponded with the rise of much more militant

Breton groups that exist alongside of Breton groups that continue to lobby theFrench government. Crameri (2000) shows a different outcome. She argues that the

new Spanish (Castilian) willingness to allow Catalan cultural symbols to flourish and

allow some degree of autonomy has created conditions wherein Catalonia feels as if

it can operate as an established nation, but which has tempered much more militant

forms of nationalism.

The line between regional and national identity can be fairly murky, and most

countries contain regions that at once participate in a broader national identity while

maintaining a distinct and perhaps even competing identity of their own. The US

South certainly qualifies as such a region, and Jansson (2005) describes how

depictions of the South, in this case in the form of a big-budget Hollywood movie,

help to ascribe to it a geography of racism, violence and especially all things opposed

to more enlightened national values. L’Hoeste (2004) paints a story of how the

Caribbean identity has long been subverted to the more dominant Andean identity

within Colombia. Colombia itself has a somewhat weak national identity within

which can flourish many pronounced regional identities. The Caribbean coastalregion is much more accustomed to diversity and interactions with foreigners. As is

true of the American South, Colombia’s Caribbean has long been portrayed as an

‘other’, ‘in radical juxtaposition to the civilising influence of the central [Andean]

provinces’ (L’Hoeste, 2004, p. 178).

Regions often seek to redefine their relationship with the central government, and

this is especially true among regions that feel culturally distinctive. While Great

Britain is noted as a site for devolutionary movements among residents of Scotland,

Wales and Northern Ireland � and certainly with a legacy of the successful Irish

independence movement of some 90 years ago � less well known are some of the

movements found in regions such as Cornwall. As Sandford (2006) relates, Cornwall

has its own cultural history, its own Cornish language and, while few people speak

the language, a full third of the population identify themselves as ‘Cornish’ in

contrast with either ‘British’ or ‘English’. How then to accommodate this identity

within a larger British government system, and one that is fairly unified within

England itself? British attempts to vest more authority in ‘regions’ with their own

assemblies did not sit well with Cornish desires, since Cornwall is too small tocomprise a region of its own. Moreover, the British idea was intended to primarily

address concerns of economic development and offered little to satisfy cultural

demands.

Regions near borders take on a particular saliency in studies of national identity.

Borders can reaffirm, blur or even challenge exisiting national identities. We can cite

several examples in National Identities dealing with the borderland scale. A more

longstanding border is found between Portugal and Spain. An examination of

the attitudes of two towns straddling this border, as filtered through a government

official, indicates that while the towns share a border, they seem to approach it in

different ways (Oliveira, 2002). For the inhabitants of the Spanish town, in the

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province of Andalusia, little influence seems to spread from nearby Portugal. In fact,

the inhabitants appear to identify fully as Andalusians with few nods to their

Portuguese neighbours. Barrancos, the Portuguese town, shows considerable Spanish

influence and takes a great deal of pride in being different from other towns in

Portugal. The ‘eyes and ears of the average barranquenho seem to be turned towards

Spain’ (Oliveira, 2002, p. 249). But what of another borderland in Spain, that of the

Basques who straddle the boundary between Spain and France (Beck, 2008)? Theopening up of this border, with Spanish entry into the European Union (EU), might

promise to also create a larger Basque unity. This would fit within the larger vision of

a Basque country. Paradoxically, the option for closer unification has not made a big

difference. It is not that the French Basques do not share many aspects of Basque

culture. Their knowledge of the Basque language is extensive. Rather the French

Basques continue to identify primarily with France, perhaps owing to the much more

successful efforts by the French state in developing a sense of French unity. Spain

was long held together by force, and never developed a sense of common national

identity. For the much more active Spanish Basques, they continue to focus on their

struggle against the Spanish state and on their political positioning with the regional

administrative boundaries that define the Basque Autonomous Community.

The geopolitical changes that occurred in eastern Europe and Southwest Asia in

the 1980s and 1990s have reshuffled border identities considerably, revealing how

processes at different scales are interrelated. Much of this is a result of a host of

independent new states that have been able to claim some aspects of their nationalidentity. Much is also due to the easing of state suppression towards the cultural

practices of various minority groups that live within the states. Poland’s eastern

border was dramatically altered when the Soviet Union gave way to Ukraine and

Belarus, and when Poland itself became more democratic (Haase, 2005). These

changes have helped revive many of the cultural freedoms of borderland minority

groups. After World War II, these groups were culturally suppressed, cross-border

traffic was closed and the many conflicts between the various ethnic groups were

downplayed. With the opening up of each state � the emergence of Ukraine and

Belarus and Poland’s democratization � it allowed for a flowering of new individual

minority rights (albeit as individuals, rather than as members of organized groups),

which included much greater religious and language rights. There has also been much

greater cross-border visitation and trade. At the same time, there has also been a

greater freedom to indulge in some of the past antagonisms. Haase (2005) speculates

on how all of this may change with Poland’s inclusion in the EU and the creation of a

new eastern border that newly divides and may again limit cross-border traffic.

For Nagorno-Karabakh � an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan � the situationparallels the emergence of newly independent regimes in the wake of the Soviet

Union (O’Lear & Whiting, 2008). An enclave adds a layer of complexity to the

interplay between state and nation. During the Soviet era, the presence of an

Armenian population with Azeri territory was not terribly consequential � in fact it

was the Soviet drawing of boundaries that created this situation in the first place. But

the independence of both Armenia and Azerbaijan allowed for new political

movements. Fundamental to the problem is that each participating stakeholder

views territory differently. Nagorno-Karabakh now identifies itself as an independent

state and elects its own government despite not being recognized by the world

community. For Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh is an inviolable part of their

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territory. Armenia has more diffuse claims, based in part on the activities of the

strong Armenian diaspora, but on balance would like to see Nagorno-Karabakh

‘returned’ to them. Outside states � Russia, the USA, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and

Germany � have all meddled in this situation as well.At a larger scale we can consider how forces such as globalization affect state and

national identities. Globalization has been touted as a challenge, perhaps even a

threat to state sovereignty (see Agnew, 2009). Antonsich (2009) asks the question of

whether this increasing interdependence among world regions, the growth of a post-

Fordist global assembly process, and the development of large multinational

structures such as the EU has resulted in a ‘re-scaling’ of national identity. Based

on survey data from Eurobarometer, Antonsich sees no decline in the national

attachment and pride of various European countries. More qualitative data affirmthat ‘in the age of globalisation nations are still alive and kicking’ (Antonsich, 2009,

p. 291). National identity remains strong, though varying between more regressive

aspects that see globalization as a threat and more progressive aspects which see it as

an opportunity. The negotiation of a single national state within a larger arena is the

topic for Feldman’s (2001) essay. Estonian identity discourse, as Feldman puts it,

displays contradictions between the ‘Homeland’ narrative, which takes a very

exclusive view of Estonian identity and sees the EU as a threat to this identity.

This is contrasted with the ‘Return to Europe’ narrative which sees Estonia as a partof Europe, summoning historical visions of the Hanseatic League and the Roman

Empire to further bolster this case. Interestingly, both narratives exclude the history

of Estonia’s relationship with Russia, its current boundary with Russia, and its still

significant ethnic Russian presence. This studied avoidance of Russia provides an

implicit narrative that also frames Estonian identity.

National Identities has also delved into the role of global communications, such

as the internet, in reimagining and re-scaling national identities. Renwick’s (2001)

article on Japan shows how the internet has forced Japan to break out of its moretraditional practices and adherence to longstanding institutions. A movement toward

e-politics and cyber-nationalism has occurred, as hundreds of cyber-communities

offer forums to interact and an alternative means to press political claims. For Indian

immigrants, the internet allows for the recreation of community across vast

geographical distances, allowing them to engage more closely with India and each

other (Skop & Adams, 2009). Indian immigrants in the US who use the internet form

different attitudes towards India and its culture. They are more concerned with

cultural preservation, have a more positive attitude towards India’s role in the world,and are more resistant to the forces of assimilation in their host countries. There the

sense of Indian identity is distinct from non-users, especially inasmuch as they are

more aware of the trends and culture of modern India.

Mapping geographic space

Geographic approaches to nationalism are difficult to conceive without maps. The

spatial focus of geographic inquiry makes maps as spatial forms of communication arequisite tool. For example, Agnew and Brusa (1999) use maps of electoral data to

mark regional variations in the support for the Northern League and many articles

in National Identities use maps to illustrate their findings or for reference. But maps

are not just important for analysis, research and illustration; mapping has been

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linked to national identity from the beginnings of modern nationalism because maps

are crucial to visualize the nation, to make its territory tangible. While verbal

references to natural boundaries, such as rivers and mountain ranges can provide a

general idea of the extent of the nation, only maps show clear and unambiguous

boundaries (Herb, 1997). This is not only important for civic national identities,

where maps can effectively portray abstract geometric boundaries, such as the lines

of latitude that separate the USA from Canada, but even more so in ethnic nationalidentities where maps are needed to determine the distribution of its members and to

define the spatial extent of the homeland. In the latter case, often ‘the map precedes

the territory ‘of the nation to use the words of Baudrillard (1995, p. 1) because it is

generally used as the first step to outline claims to national self-determination.

Rady (1999) provides the example of southeastern Europe where ‘19th-century

Balkan nationalisms could not be channeled into any existing state-formations’. In

contrast to western Europe where nations emerged in existing state structures based

on ideas of the Enlightenment, national identities in central, eastern and southern

Europe were inspired by ideas of romanticism and largely based on language and

ethnicity. This posed major problems as many of the ethnic groups lived in a complex

regional mosaic. True, there were regions with homogeneous populations but the

border zones were highly intermixed. Moreover, in southeastern Europe identities

were weakly developed and did not always follow linguistic lines. Thus, when

romantic nationalism took a foothold in this region in the mid-nineteenth century it

resulted in a ‘revolution in ethnic cartography’. Aided by ethnographic studiessponsored by newly formed geographic societies (Capel, 1981), a series of new

ethnographic maps appeared that took a decidedly more political stance.

Rady argues that it was ironically foreign cartographers who had a decisive

influence on claims to national territories presented by different Balkan ethnic

groups. For example, in making claims to Macedonia at the Paris Peace Conference

in 1919, Bulgarians reproduced territorial demarcations used in maps of the Czech

Pan-Slavist Safaık which showed Bulgarians as the dominant group in the Balkans.

However, in the end, another foreign cartographer won the day. The Serbian

geographer Jovan Cvijic was able to present the case that the ethnic distribution in

the Macedonian region was so complex as to yield a new Balkan people, Macedo-

Slavs, who could be easily integrated into Serbian identity (see also Wilkinson, 1951).

It seems that Cvijic’s impeccable academic credentials � he was a respected professor

of physical geography � helped not only to convince the powers at Paris to accept this

pro-Serbian view, but also to have nearly all major European publishers adopt his

maps in their atlases (Rady, 1999, p. 77). However, Ivelin Sardamov (2001)

vehemently rejects Rady’s claim that foreign cartographers gave Bulgarians ‘themain material to define the extent of territories inhabited by the Bulgarian peoples’

(Sardamov, 2001, p. 187). Instead, Sardamov purports that Bulgarians had a long

and distinguished record of producing their own statistical evidence and maps. It is

obvious that to this day that the mapping of national territory remains a highly

sensitive and contentious issue.

One of the main reasons why the mapping of national territory so often results in

charges of bias, political partisanship or even propaganda, is the fact that maps have

an aura of being objective because they are perceived as scientific documents. The

premise is that a true representation of reality is possible and therefore any map that

does not represent the views of a given national group must be based on falsified data

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or misleading representation. However, as Brian Harley pointed out, the dichotomy

of objective scientific maps versus propaganda maps is flawed; all maps are

inherently biased. Their production is influenced by the cultural values of map-

makers and their societal contexts. Maps should be viewed as texts rather than true

representation of the world and deconstructed to reveal the discourses implicated in

their creation (Harley, 1992). Taylor’s (2007) article on misplaced identities nicely

captures this view when he states, ‘reflection shows the objectivity of maps as arepresentational medium to be illusory’. He uses the example of terrain maps and

argues that when cartographers smooth over the gaps between the surveyed lines,

objectivity is lost. In depictions of the Swan river in Australia, Europeans portrayed

landscape features in a way that confirmed their own cultural perceptions and

silenced the sites of indigenous communities.

In addition to the role of maps in delimiting or defining the territorial extent of

national identity, maps are a most effective means to disseminate an image of the

nation to help create a stronger identification and attachment with the territory. As

Anderson (1991) has pointed out, reproducing the shape of the nation’s territory over

and over on maps creates an emblematic icon of the nation, in other words, ‘the map-

as-logo’ (p. 175). Kosonen explains how both scientific maps and those in the

popular press produced Finnish national space and territory, and established a

pictorial form of Finland between 1899 and 1942 ‘that most Finns must have

recognized’ (2008, p. 44). Finnish maps supported not only early nation-building

efforts, created perceptions of a Russian threat and gave prominence to the capitalcity of Helsinki, but some also laid claims to territories beyond the existing nation-

state boundaries, such as eastern Karelia. While the political arguments in Finnish

maps varied greatly � from the far right to the extreme left � the overall message was

very similar: an autonomous or independent Finland. Kosonen argues that, ‘for

Finns, cartography was the ‘‘science of the nation’’’ (2008, p. 44).

Public displays of maps are similarly effective. Mussolini displayed maps of the

Roman Empire in marble on the Via dell’Impero in Rome to remind Italians that

they were destined to greatness and that their goal should be to make the

Mediterranean their ‘mare nostrum’ once more (Minor, 1999). Another example

can be found where Glyptis (2008) discusses two large maps displayed in a museum

that is attached to Kemal Ataturk’s Mausoleum. One map shows present-day Turkey,

the other shows the much smaller Turkish boundaries in the Treaty of Sevres.

According to Glyptis, juxtaposing these two maps ensures that Turks do not ‘forget

that their country would not have existed had it not been for Ataturk’ (2008, p. 367).

Maps are often used to advance specific national projects. Medlicott and Heffernan

(2004) reproduce a map by the Missouri Daughters of the American Revolutionwhich shows the ‘DAR National Old Trails Road’ highway. This map was not only

an effective visualization of this project to use the system of roads to ‘conquer space’

(Medlicott & Heffernan, 2004, p. 241), but it expressed a symbolic conquest of the

territory, just as European maps of new lands did during the age of discovery.

Maps should not just be viewed as two-dimensional representations of national

territories, but also as part of a complex process with different spatialities. Hakli

(2008, p. 6) urges us ‘to break away from territorial imagery as the dominant

conception of space’ and asks us to consider topological or networked space. In

contrast to simple metrical geometries in Euclidean space, where the distance

between two points can be directly measured on a flat surface, distance in topological

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space is defined by the temporal sequences and intensities of relations between points

in networks. He illustrates the advantages of such an alternative approach with a

discussion of the mapping of Finland.

Finnish maps in the form of two-dimensional representations on paper wereclearly important to perform the functions outlined above, such as conveying a clear

image of the shape of Finland and intensifying the attachments of Finns to their

land. They also made administration and control of the national population easier.

Maps contained statistical and topographical information that had been collected

throughout the territory of Finland. Governing elites in the capital could design

policies simply on the basis of these paper maps: policies that would apply to the

most distant corners of Finland and serve to bind the nation together. However, of

crucial importance is not the Euclidian space of the maps themselves, but thetopological space of the complex, centralized network of institutions and actors that

brought the maps into existence and put them to use: land surveyors were sent out to

bring maps and data back to the capital. There they were collected, combined and

archived in statistical offices. Now government agencies could use these representa-

tions stored in the capital to govern and rule anywhere rather than having to traverse

the physical (Euclidean) distance. In the process, the nation and its territory became

more uniform, controllable, and transportable; Finland and Finnish identity

were ‘literally drawn into existence’ (Hakli, 2008, p. 13).Hakli’s insightful approach complements the current concern in the cartographic

literature with ontogenesis or mapping as a process (Kitchin & Dodge, 2007). New

digital technologies and media make it easier and easier to create and manipulate

maps. Professional training in cartography is no longer a requirement and the

distinction between map user and map producer becomes increasingly blurred.

Organizations and individuals can easily present maps online and ask for user input.

Transnational social movements have used this approach successfully to oppose

border restrictions in the EU. For example, the group Hackitectura � a collection ofhackers, artists and architects � has produced an online map of the Straits of Gibraltar

that emphasizes contacts across the Strait, such as cell phone coverage, migrant flows

and police networks (Herb et al., 2009, p. 340). It is a powerful statement against the

fixity of borders that is so fundamental to exclusivist nationalism.

Concluding comments

Over the past decade, National Identities has provided an effective forum forgeographically informed scholarship on nationalism and it is our hope that future

contributions will continue and even expand on this effort to address geographic

aspects. Recent developments promise much opportunity for future geographic

inquiry. Greater mobility of people and the increasingly pluralistic make-up of state

populations will make modern communications technologies increasingly important

in the creation and maintenance of national identities. How will communal bonds in

cyberspace interact with attachments to local places that are created through daily

lived experiences? How will sovereign states respond to competing loyalties that areexerted from beyond their borders through the digital domain? We will certainly not

get a better understanding by holding on to static territorial divisions and

dichotomies that juxtapose national identities with identities at other scales. As

Agnew and Brusa (1999) pointed out, our focus should be on the malleability and

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multiplicity of identity. Hakli’s discussion of the nation as fluid space mirrors their

concern when he explains that national identities are ‘always transforming, yet

flexibly enduring’ and ‘travel when necessary’ (2008, p. 14). The ever-changing spaces

of identities will not only lead to new mappings in the literal, but also in the

conceptual sense. We look forward to the new destinations your submissions will take

us over the coming decade.

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