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Space Policy 27 (2011) 127e130

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Space Policy

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Viewpoint

How far e if at all e should the USA cooperate with China in space?q

Scott PaceSpace Policy Institute, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 20 May 2011Accepted 23 May 2011Available online 22 July 2011

q This viewpoint has been adapted from Dr PUSeChina Economic and Security Review Commissio

E-mail address: space1@email.gwu.edu.

0265-9646/$ e see front matter � 2011 Elsevier Ltd.doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.05.002

a b s t r a c t

China has engaged in a steady, long-standing effort to build and strengthen its space capabilities,achieving progressively more ambitious milestones and staking its claim as a major space power. It is alsoincreasingly engaging in cooperative efforts. A number of issues must be weighed, however, before theUSA should consider any collaboration with it. These include the essentially military nature of China’sspace program, the fact that China’s intentions in space and decision-making process are far from‘transparent’, and the way it uses its space activities to pursue foreign policy goals. While the latter couldbe useful in, e.g., reducing tensions on the Korean peninsular through a space-services-for-giving-up-missiles tradeoff, and while there is scope for collaboration in space science missions, there are nocompelling reasons for the USA to pursue cooperation in human spaceflight with China.

� 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

China launched its first satellite in 1970 e the same year as thefirst satellite launch for Japan. It began offering commercial launchservices in 1985, launched its first astronaut in 2003, and sent itsfirst probe to the Moon in 2006. The country conducted its firstspace walk in 2008 and is actively developing a space laboratoryand an even more ambitious space station. Its space activities canthus only be expected to increase in the future and it has shownconcrete interest in cooperating with other countries. Does thismean that the USA should seek meaningful collaboration withChina? This article sets out the issues that need to be consideredbefore any cooperation is undertaken. Based on these, it recom-mends pursuing collaboration in areas like space science butcautions that cooperation in human spaceflight should be avoided.

2. Points to note

The first point that should be made is that China does not havea fully separate civil space program in the model of NASA and UScivil space activities. China’s development of space capabilitiesbegan in the mid1950’s at the direction of the Central MilitaryCommission, less than a decade after the founding of the People’sRepublic. The development of space launch vehicles was part of thesame development of diverse aerospace capabilities such asrockets, guided missiles and aviation. China’s human spaceflight

ace’s testimony before then on 11 May 2011.

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efforts are managed by elements of the People’s Liberation Army(PLA) and require industrial capabilities that are the same as thoseused for military programs. Thus it might be more accurate to saythat China has civil space activities, such as science and exploration,but does not have a civil space program.

An important second point is that China sees its space activitiesas part of its “comprehensive national power.” That is, the devel-opment of space capabilities contributes to China’s overalleconomic, military, foreign policy, and even social and culturalobjectives. Space launch capabilities represent a dual-use capacitythat can be used for long-range ballistic missiles. Requirements forhuman spaceflight are used to improve the quality control ofChinese industries. Offers of space technology to developingcountries are used to secure access to needed raw materials for theChinese economy. Chinese astronauts are helpful to promoting theChina “brand” in promotional videos and international conferences.Interestingly, China has also recognized the achievements ofpersons of Chinese descent, such as Taylor Wang e an Americanscientist who flew on the Space Shuttle in 1985. While an Americancitizen, Dr Wang’s achievement as the first person born in China tofly in space has been included in lists of Chinese achievements inspace.

The history of Chinese manned space activities leads to a thirdimportant point. China has engaged in a steady, longstanding effortto build and strengthen its space capabilities. Current programs arenot the results of “crash” efforts but have spanned almost the entireperiod of the modern Chinese state. Table 1 shows the dates ofmajor space milestones for China, Russia, and the United States.

China has achieved progressively more ambitious space capa-bilities over a longer period of time and with fewer missions than

Table 1Space milestones.

China Russia United States

Satellite Launch 1970 1957 1958Human Launch 2003 1961 19622-man crew 2005 N/A 19653-man crew 2008 1964 1968Space walk/EVA 2008(14 min) 1965(24 min) 1965(20 min)Space Laboratory 2011e2020? 1971(Salyur 1)

1986(mir)1973(Skylab)

Circum-lunar flight ? ? 1968(Apollo 8)Space Station 2020? 2000(ISS) 2000(ISS)

1 However, the dialog is moving forward as the PLA Chief of Staff Chen Bingdevisited the USA in April 2011.

S. Pace / Space Policy 27 (2011) 127e130128

those of the USA or the USSR. It has proceeded cautiously butsteadily without any sense of racing an adversary. While recog-nizing the experience gap with the partners on the InternationalSpace Station (ISS), there is a risk of underestimating how soonChina will have comparable space capabilities to those of thosesame partners. It is not a question of whether China will have a fullrange of human spaceflight capabilities, but a question of when andwhat they intend to do with those capabilities.

One possible use for Chinese human spaceflight would be toadvance Chinese foreign policy objectives. The USSR and the USAboth used flights of foreign astronauts as symbolic means of aidingallies and creating good will. China could do the same, as well asusing such flights to support economic growth by securing suppliesof raw materials and access to markets. Chinese space cooperationagreements in Africa (e.g. Nigeria) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil,Venezuela) have reportedly included offers of technology, training,loan guarantees, and other inducements to trade.

As its space capabilities increase, China is becoming more activein international organizations such as the International Astronau-tical Federation and is hosting more space conferences. China leadsan intergovernmental space cooperation organization, the AsiaPa-cific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) that is similar insome respects to the European Space Agency. APSCO is based inBeijing with member space agencies from Bangladesh, Indonesia,Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey. China is alsoa member of a less formal association of space agencies, the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, led by Japan. The forumincludes space agencies, governmental bodies and internationalorganizations, as well as nongovernmental organizations such ascompanies, universities and research institutes. Japan is among themany Asian countries with their own space ambitions that arepaying attention to China.

At recent international conferences, China has given clear indi-cations of what its next steps are in human spaceflight. It plans toplace an unmanned module in space, demonstrate docking usinganother unmanned module and then send a crew to visit a modestspace laboratory, Tiangong. In some respects, this would be similartowhat the USSR did in the Salyut space station program. Followingthe Tiangong would be a more ambitious space station akin to theSoviet/Russian Mir space station. It would consist of multiplemodules with an overall mass of about 60metric tons to whicha single Shenzhou ship could dock along with an unmanned cargoresupply vehicle. Interestingly, on current schedules, this stationwould be deployed at about the same time as the InternationalSpace Station may be preparing to close down.

China does not publicly have a formal program for sendinghumans to the Moon. However, the Chinese are making progresstoward acquiring the capabilities necessary to conduct suchmissions. For example, the Chinese EVA suit derived from theRussian Orlan design has boots with heels and other features forwalking on a surface as well as floating outside a spacecraft. While Iwas at NASA, we did a notional analysis of how the Chinese might

be able to send a manned mission to the Moon. We concluded thatthey could use four Long March 5 vehicles, capable of lifting 25metric tons each, to place a little under 15 metric tons on the lunarsurface. This is about the same mass as the US lunar modules thatwere launched by a single Saturn V. Fig. 1 shows the notionalconcept developed in 2008. As noted earlier, it is not a question ofwhether China will have a full range of manned spaceflight capa-bilities, but what the nation intends to do with those capabilities.

3. Cooperative developments

Growing Chinese space capabilities have naturally createdspeculation about future international space cooperationA recentissue of Aviation Week and Space Technology (22 April 2011) coveredthe wide and diverse range of international aerospace cooperationwith China, notably in commercial aircraft. Such cooperationincludes a full range of US and European suppliers as well astraditional rivals, Boeing and Airbus. The amount and depth ofcooperation is even more striking when compared to the minimallevel of cooperation in space, even including space and Earthscience.

The twomost recent USeChina summit meetings included briefjoint statements on space:

The United States and China look forward to expandingdiscussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialog onhuman spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principlesof transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit. Both sideswelcome reciprocal visits of the NASA Administrator and theappropriate Chinese counterpart in 2010. (Beijing, 17 November2009)

The United States and China agreed to take specific actions todeepen dialog and exchanges in the field of space. The United Statesinvited a Chinese delegation to visit NASA headquarters and otherappropriate NASA facilities in 2011 to reciprocate for the productivevisit of the U.S. NASA Administrator to China in (October) 2010. Thetwo sides agreed to continue discussions on opportunities forpractical future cooperation in the space arena, based on principlesof transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit. (Washington, DC,19 January 2011)

The 2009 statement was vague regarding who the Chinesecounterpart to the NASA administrator would be, as that seems tobe unclear even to the Chinese. The China National Space Admin-istration (CNSA) had previously been used as the “civil”, interloc-utor for space cooperation and it was initially assumed that thismight hold true for discussions of human spaceflightHowever, thetechnical capabilities and management of human space missionsreside with the PLA and it has not been clear that the CNSA would“add value” to discussions. For the USA, however, it would alsoseem odd to have a former Marine Corps General (AdministratorBolden) meeting with senior PLA officers if the future for U.S.Chinamilitary-to-military dialog continues to be as uncertain as it hasbeen.1

Nonetheless, the NASA administrator did visit China in October2010 and the 2011 summit statement said that discussions ofpractical cooperation would continue on the basis of transparency,reciprocity and mutual benefit. The latter two principles are unre-markable and have been a consideration in all US space cooperationsince the beginning of NASA. The principle of transparency isa different consideration and goes to one of the central concernswith all Chinese space activities e a lack of understanding of howdecisions are made and what strategic intentions drive them. In

Fig. 1. NASA Concept for a Chinese Lunar Landing.

S. Pace / Space Policy 27 (2011) 127e130 129

large part, such opacity is intentional on the part of Chinese offi-cials. In various discussions, they have expressed their discomforteven with the term “transparency”, preferring other formulationssuch as “clarity of outcomes” e thus shielding their internaldecision-making processes.

Gaining a better understanding of China’s decision-makingprocess and strategic intentions remains a central objective andproblem for the USA. This applies to civil space cooperation as wellas other areas of the relationship. To oversimplify, in the case of theUSSR, we knew their intentions as well as their capabilities. China isnot the USSR, thankfully, but we may know more about theircapabilities than their intentions. It is also possible they may notknow themselves; but it is hard to tell even that.

In the aftermath of the ColdWar, the demise of the USSR and theemergence of Russia, there was a compelling case for humanspaceflight cooperation with Russia. The Russians had extensiveexperience with long-duration manned space station just as theUSA was building its space station with multiple foreign partners.There was a desire to symbolize a new “post-Soviet” relationshipwith the USA. Finally, there was a desire to engage the Russianspace community internationally in a constructive project asopposed to seeing it engaging in missile proliferation and otherdestabilizing activities.

Unfortunately, there are no compelling political or technicalreasons to engage in human spaceflight cooperation with China.The Chinese have space capabilities but nothing unique that theUSA needs.2 As the Chinese themselves said to the NASA Admin-istrator Bolden during his 2010 visit (to paraphrase): “we don’tneed you and you don’t need us but we could do good thingstogether.”

The question of cooperation with NASA may be moot for themoment as a result of Congressional language barring bilateral

2 There is an argument that sole reliance on Russian Soyuz vehicles for access tothe ISS after the last Shuttle mission is risky. Should potential US commercialsuppliers have delays and be unavailable, and the Soyuz also be unavailable, then itmight be desirable to employ Shenzhou to reach the ISS as a back-up capability.

cooperation with China in the House 2011 continuing resolutionsappropriations bill:

SEC. 1340. (a) None of the funds made available by this divisionmay be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administrationor the Office of Science and, Technology Policy to develop, design,plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a, bilateral policy,program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate,or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company, unless such activities are specifically authorizedby a law enacted after the date of, enactment of this division.

Even if this language was not in place, I would not recommendengaging with China on human spaceflight cooperation. The tech-nical and political challenges are just too great e as are the politicalrisks of not meeting raised expectations. However, I do believe thatscientific space cooperation with China could be mutually benefi-cial and reciprocal, while improving our understanding of Chinesedecision making and intentions.

Space cooperation with China could start small with scientificprojects that have minimal to no technology transfer concerns orpotential for dual-use exploitation. As an example, European andChinese cooperation in space plasma physics has been successful.Two Chinese “Double Star” spacecraft carrying European andChinese experiments joined four ESA spacecraft in high orbitsaround the Earth. The combination of six spacecraft produced newinsights into the magnetosphere and the solar wind. A similar USproject might extend work in plasma physics and heliophysics ona traditional basis of no exchange of funds and open sharing of thescientific data produced. For example, a primary source of solarstorm warnings is an aging NASA satellite, the Advanced Compo-sition Explorer (ACE), which is almost 15 years old. Solar storms andcoronal mass ejections can cause damage to electrical power gridsand telecommunication networks. While plans are in work toreplace ACE, it would be beneficial to have more robust sources ofwarnings.

Cooperation need not involve creating new spacecraft but couldinvolve ensuring compatibility and interoperability with existingspacecraft. China and the USA already participate in internationalvoluntary standards bodies such as the Consultative Committee on

S. Pace / Space Policy 27 (2011) 127e130130

Space Data Standards (CCSDS), which develops open standards thatenable cross-support for telecommunications and space navigation.The USA has been engaged in discussions with China for some yearson its COMPASS satellite navigation system to ensure compatibilityand interoperability. While GPS and COMPASS are both dual-usesystems, commercial competition and open markets are expectedto foster sales for satellite navigation receivers that can use the civilor open signals from both systems. Joint ventures are another wayto engage commercially with China and strengthen internationaluse and acceptance of GPS while avoiding transfer of sensitivespace technologies.3

Given the reliance of the USA on space systems, it is unsur-prising that it seeks to reduce and mitigate the creation of orbitaldebris. The 2007 Chinese ASAT test of course added greatly to theorbital debris population. This was a regrettable action for manyreasons, among which was that fact that China had earlier partic-ipated constructively in technical discussions within the Scienceand Technology Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee onthe Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which developeda consensus set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines. Nonetheless,the USA continues to seek Chinese cooperation on reducing thecreation of orbital debris and routinely provides “conjunctionwarnings” to countries e including China e at risk from beingstruck by debris. If China is successful in maintaining astronauts inorbit for extended periods of time, they might have increasedincentives to cooperation with ISS partners in reducing potentialhazards to those astronauts.

If asked about protecting the space environment today, thelikely response from China, would include the RussianeChinesedraft “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of, Weapons inOuter Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer SpaceObjects”, (PPWT). The PPWT is outside the scope of this article saveto note that the USA rightly remains opposed to its adoption. Incontrast, the USA is considering a European Union draft proposalfor an international, voluntary, nonbinding “Code of Conduct forOuter Space Activities” that would promote a variety of trans-parency and confidence-building measures of value to all space-faring states. Such a code would have little value as just anagreement between the USA, Europe and Japan but would be moreeffective if space powers such as China and India, as well asemerging spacefaring states such as Brazil, Korea, Nigeria, andSouth Africa, were to adopt it. Thus, the USA should pursuea diplomatic strategy that encourages countries with which Chinacooperates in space to adopt the Code of Conduct as well asengaging with China directly.

3 On the topic of US export controls, the sentiment in Congress is clear. There willbe no change to the current treatment of space technologies (US Munitions ListCategory XV) with respect to China, even if broader legislative reforms are passed.

Chinese space capabilities could be of potential value inreducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. While the six-partytalks (North Korea, South Korea, China, the USA, Japan andRussia) are currently suspended, future discussions will continue todeal with missile proliferation as well as de-nuclearization. If NorthKorea is to give up its long-range missile capabilities and suspendspace launch activities, it is likely that the country’s leadership willrequire inducements or compensation of some sort. One such offsetcould be Chinese launch services for North Korean satellites as partof a broader agreement that eliminated North Korean strategicmissiles. While highly speculative, it is possible to imagineconstructive outcomes if China chose to pursue them.

4. Conclusion

Chinese civil space capabilities can be expected to increase inthe future. China will be able to undertake unilateral and inter-national space projects of increasing complexity that will in turnincrease commercial, military, and diplomatic opportunities attimes and places of China’s choosing. Today, US human space-flight capabilities remain considerably ahead of China by allmeasures of experience, technology, industrial base and part-nerships. Unfortunately, the continuation of the current balanceis uncertain. The USA has failed to develop an assured means forUS government human access to space, the ISS is reliant on theRussian Soyuz and unproven commercial providers witha consequent risk of loss of the station should there be a majoraccident on orbit and, finally, the USA has failed to engage itsexisting international partners in a program of explorationbeyond low-Earth orbit. Plans for a human return to the Moon areon hold and no other human exploration missions are in work. Allthese factors increase the odds that the USA will not be a globalleader in human spaceflight after the end of the ISS sometime inthe next 10 years or so.

The most important implication for the USA from Chinese civilspace capabilities is not that the Chinese will be in space, but thatthe USA may not be. The USA appears to have forgotten the stra-tegic value of a national human spaceflight program, regardless ofthe existence of successful private endeavors. This may not havea near-term economic impact on the country as a robust range ofunmanned programs will continue. However, the lack of visible USleadership in human spaceflight may have serious foreign policyand international security impacts. It is a longstanding truism thatthe rules of international relations in new domains are created bythose who show up and not by those who stay home.