how does terrorism end?

How does Terrorism End?

A case study analysis of the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Master thesis

Thijmen Robert Hamer s1610481

Crisis and Security Management

Leiden University

June 2016

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my supervisor, Alastair Reed, for his good advice and continued support.

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ABSTRACT

This Master thesis describes the case of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and its struggle for

independence. The conflict between the MILF and the government of the republic of the Philippines

(GRP) that stretched from ca 1980 to 2014 was used to answer the question “How does terrorism

end through a political process?” This case was first placed into a historical context. Then, different

lenses (State, group and context) were applied to the case that was divided into four distinctive

phases. This relied on four important theoretical concepts derived from literature. These are: greed

and grievance, spoiler roles, negotiation strategies and protracted social conflict. This led to the

following main findings:

The main reason why the MILF could continue the Moro struggle after the MNLF had agreed

to peace, was the continuance of the Moro grievances.

An acknowledgment by the government that the MILF was here to stay, opened up the

possibility of negotiations.

Militarization and internationalization of the conflict was detrimental to any peace, and

served as a clear spoiler.

Separating the radical terrorist elements from the more moderate rebels and international

oversight was crucial for creating conditions for substantive and serious negotiations.

Small steps in the negotiation process work better than comprehensive deals.

A convergence or inclusive strategy works better than a divisive and exclusive strategy.

A clear projection of the benefits of peace should be in place.

A stalemate which was not satisfactory for both parties but which they believed could only be

changed by politics.

International involvement in the diplomatic process to create trust and mutual understanding

between the parties.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ 4

List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 7

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 10

1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 10

1.2. General outline of this thesis ................................................................................................ 11

1.3. Literature review ................................................................................................................... 11

1.3.1. Terrorism, a complex area of study ..................................................................................... 12

1.3.2. Observations from quantitative research ........................................................................... 14

1.3.3. Asymmetrical conflicts: causes and dynamics .................................................................... 17

1.3.4. Ending conflict non-violently ............................................................................................... 23

1.3.4.4 Using negotiations for other ends than peace .................................................................. 30

1.4. Research Design ......................................................................................................................... 31

1.4.1. Main theoretical considerations and strategies relevant to this case. ............................... 31

1.4.2. Framework of analysis ......................................................................................................... 31

1.4.3 Method ................................................................................................................................. 32

1.4.4. Case selection ...................................................................................................................... 34

CHAPTER 2. THE CASE OF THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT .................................................... 35

2.1. Historical background of the Moro-Philippine conflict. ............................................................. 35

2.1.1. Islamic and Christian colonization of the Philippines .......................................................... 35

2.1.2. American colonization: sowing the seeds for conflict ......................................................... 37

2.1.3. World War II, a period of reconciliation and Philippine independency .............................. 40

2.1.4. Filipino rule: from an uneasy peace to overt conflict, 1946-1996 ...................................... 40

2.2. Starting negotiations and Estrada’s all-out war ......................................................................... 47

2.2.1. Timeline of events ............................................................................................................... 47

2.2.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 49

2.2.3. State..................................................................................................................................... 51

2.2.4. Group ................................................................................................................................... 54

2.2.5. Main observations ............................................................................................................... 57

2.3. Arroyo and the global war on terror (2001-2005) ..................................................................... 59


2.3.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 62

2.3.3. State..................................................................................................................................... 67

2.3.4. Group ................................................................................................................................... 71

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2.4. Negotiations center around the topic of ancestral domain (2005-2010) .................................. 75


2.4.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 79

2.4.3. State..................................................................................................................................... 83

2.4.4. Group ................................................................................................................................... 90


2.5. New energy and building trust under Benigno Aquino (2010-2014) ......................................... 94


2.5.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 96

2.5.3. State................................................................................................................................... 101

2.5.4. Group ................................................................................................................................. 104

2.5.5. Main observations ............................................................................................................. 106

CHAPTER 3. UNDERSTANDING THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE MILF-PHILIPPINE PEACE PROCESS

............................................................................................................................................................. 108

3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 108

3.2. Different lens perspectives ....................................................................................................... 108

3.3. Within-case comparison ........................................................................................................... 109

3.4 Connections to theory ............................................................................................................... 111

3.4.1. Greed and Grievance theory ............................................................................................. 111

3.4.2. Spoilers .............................................................................................................................. 114

3.4.3. Negotiation strategies and tactics ..................................................................................... 116

3.4.4. Protracted social conflict ................................................................................................... 119

3.5 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 120

3.6 Recommendations..................................................................................................................... 122

3.7 Reflection................................................................................................................................... 123

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 125

Annex ................................................................................................................................................... 132

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List of abbreviations

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AHJAG Ad Hoc Joint Action Group

ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASG Abu Sayyaf Group

BBL Bangsamoro Basic Law

BDA Bangsamoro Development Agency

BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces

BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

BIMP-EAGA Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asia Growth Area

BJE Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

BMLO Bangsa Moro Liberation Front

BPE Bangsamoro Political Entity

CAB Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro

CAFGU Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit

CCCH Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities

CPLA Cordillera People’s Liberation Army

CPP Communist Party of the Philippines

CVO Civilian Voluntary Organization

EDSA Epifanio de los Santos Avenue

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

FAB Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

FPA Final Peace Agreement

FTO Foreign Terrorist Organizations

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines

ICFM Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

ICG International Crisis Group

IMT International Monitoring Team

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IPRA Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

IRA (section 2.4.2) Irish Republican Army

IRA Internal Revenue Allotment

ISF International Security Forces (from the MILF)

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

KM Kabataan Makabayan (Communist youth wing)

LMT Local Monitoring Team

MIM Muslim (later Mindanao) Independence Movement

MIPT Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

MOA-AD Memorandum of Agreement – Ancestral Domain

NATO North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDF National Democratic Front (part of Communist movement)

NGO Non-governmental organization

NISP National Internal Security Plan

NPA New People’s Army

NSBC Philippines Statistics Authority

OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference

OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

PDAF Priority Development Assistance Fund

PDI Philippine Daily Inquirer

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

PNP Philippine National Police

PSC Protracted Social Conflict

RPM-P Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas (Communist)

RSM Rajah Solaiman Movement

SPCPD Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development

SZOPAD Special Zone of Peace and Development

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

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USA United States of America

USIP United States Institute for Peace

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Terrorist groups are one the most pressing concerns for today’s society. Almost on a daily basis,

attacks happen somewhere in the world. Although casualties are deeply distressing, it is the fear that

these attacks cause that can disrupt society. The recent events in France 1and Belgium2 have shown

that complete cities can come to a standstill because of an attack.

The study of terrorism3 aims at building a theoretical and scientific foundation to understand

the rise and fall of terrorist groups. Since the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of

Terrorism (MIPT) started to collect and combine data about terrorist groups in 1968 until 2006, 648

groups have ended (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Scientists have devoted much time on explaining the rise

of terrorism, employing both quantitative and qualitative studies (see chapter 1.2). However, on the

ending of terrorism, information is scarce (Jones & Libicki, 2008),(Cronin, 2009). It is for this reason

that the case of the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, is of particular interest.

The conflict between the separatist Muslim groups and the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines (GRP) is based on a fight for autonomy that has lasted for almost four decades (1969–

2014). If we broaden the scope to include all violent interactions throughout history, the conflict

between the Christian Filipino’s and the Muslim Filipino’s (henceforth Moros4) population is already

ongoing for more than four centuries. The militant MILF movement was founded in 1984 by Hashim

Salamat (Jubair, 1999; Gomez, 2000). The MILF came to replace the Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF) as the most important Moro resistance movement after it had signed a peace with the

government in 1996 (Jubair, 1999; Gomez, 2000).

Over the years, many violent clashes between the MILF and the Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP) have occurred, many times disrupting the continued attempts that were made to

resolve the conflict. On March 27, 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)

peace deal between the Philippine government and the MILF was signed. Notwithstanding the

frequent relapses into conflict after peace deals (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011)), we can

1 November 2015

2 22 March 2016

3 For a definition see chapter 1.2

4 This term was introduced by the Spanish. It referred to their Muslim opponents which conquered large parts of present

day Spain. The Muslim Filipino’s now use the term with pride, as it distinguishes them from the Christian Filipino’s and remembers of the struggle fought by their forefathers.

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view this as a terrorist conflict that has ended. In this respect, the MILF case could hold valuable

lessons as to why conflicts are/fail to be resolved.

This thesis aims to answer the following research question:

“How did the MILF transition to a peaceful political process?”

1.2. General outline of this thesis

The thesis is structured as follows:

First, a general review is given of the literature concerning the onset and demise of

terrorist/insurgency groups. This review presents the general theoretical framework that will be used

in analyzing the specific case of MILF (section 1.3).

Second, the research design is presented, consisting of the methodology used and the lenses

and framework applied to the case. Also, further motivation is provided for the selection of the MILF

case (section 1.4).

Chapter 2 starts a historical background of the history of the Moro-Philippine conflict (section

2.1). By understanding the history of the conflict, a better analysis of present concerns will follow.

Then, the conflict is analyzed by dividing it into four phases between January 1997 and

January 2014 (2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5). Each of these phases will be analyzed using the lenses and

framework as described in chapter 1.4.

Chapter 3 provides a systematic analysis of the MILF case. Here, the different phases will be

compared (section 3.3). Then the main observations and intermediate conclusions will be analyzed

using the most important theoretical concepts (section 3.4). This will lead to the overall conclusions

(section 3.5) and recommendations (section 3.6).

1.3. Literature review

This chapter will provide an oversight of the academic literature in the field of

terrorism/insurgency conflicts. These conflicts play an increasingly dominant role in policymakers’

security orientation. However, in contrast to interstate conflict, research into the causes, dynamics

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and solutions to terrorism/insurgency conflicts is relatively young (Jones & Libicki, 2008).When it is

done, it frequently takes little notice of what research is already out there (Cronin, 2009). However,

especially with regard to ending terrorism/insurgency, studies are scarce (Cronin, 2009; Jones &

Libicki, 2008). The RAND study by Jones and Libicki (2008), has made a significant contribution

because it has not focused upon one case, which is common in terrorist research (Cronin, 2009), but

has researched 648 cases dating from 1968 until 2006. They have singled out the most successful

methods for ending terrorism: political transition (43 %) and policing (40%). About 10 % of the groups

ended because the group had achieved its goals and in only 7 % of the cases, there was a military

victory for the government (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Concluding from this study, political transition

gives the highest odds for ending a terrorist group. The purpose of this study is to further explore the

correlative factors that Jones & Libicki have used, and to find out how political transitions come

about.

This requires an exploration of the causal mechanisms which are at work in ending terrorism

through political process. As of now, this is still a relatively uncharted part of terrorism research

(Cronin, 2009). The study will contribute to filling this knowledge gap. However, this first requires a

description of the academic field in which to maneuver. The literature review will go into differences

over approach and definition (1.3.1), observed correlations (1.3.2) causes and dynamics (1.3.3) and

non-violent endings (1.3.4).

1.3.1. Terrorism, a complex area of study

Scholars use a multitude of interpretations and/or orientations in defining terrorism or

insurgency (Schmid, 2011). The terms are often used interchangeably. This complicates the

systematic study of the literature. In his handbook on terrorism research, Schmid discusses several

leading practical terrorist definitions, such as those used by the High-level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change (2004), the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism (2001) and the United States

Department of State (2006). He asked for input from dozens of terrorist scholars on the practical

definitions formulated by the institutes mentioned above, and those definitions that were popular in

academics works (Schmid, 2011). Schmid carefully analyzed the feedback received and attempted to

capture the core dimension of terrorism as follows:

“terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special

form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a

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conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral

restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and

psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.” (Schmid 2011, 86)

The definition encompasses the thought process to commit an act of terrorism and the act

itself. By his use of the words ‘effectiveness’ and ‘calculated’, we can assume that in his mind both

are based upon a rational decision. It is a tactic that is presumed rational to pursue certain goals and

requires calculated rational planning and execution.

In addition to this, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010) have brought

more clarity on the difference between insurgency and terrorism. They argue that insurgency and

terrorism are two distinct strategies of irregular warfare. Consequently: “it is not in tactics, targets,

causes or motivations that differences lie, but in political, relational and organizational features that

are connected to the distinct strategy (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010).” Whereas an insurgency

strategy seeks to gain control of a territory and by using popular support and local resources, a

terrorist strategy seeks to create fear, provoke a reaction or coerce a government into altering a

certain policy. For both, this requires a completely different relation with the population (Duyvesteyn

& Fumerton, 2010). They conclude that acts of terrorism are not exclusive to the strategy of

terrorism. Such acts can be used in an insurgency strategy as well. However, within an insurgency

strategy, the group must be extra careful to make sure that it has popular support (active or silent) to

commit such acts (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010). This study will use both insights, the rational

tactic explained by Schmid (Schmid, 2011), and the different strategies explained by Duyvesteyn and

Fumerton (2010) in which such tactics can be used.

Besides a range of definitions, scholars use different analytical lenses to look at the subject

matter. Studies based upon assumptions of rationalism and self-interest have been contested by

more interpretative, context-sensitive studies (Tarrow, 2007). This originates from different

ontologies. Scholars in social science hold different views on whether the world consists of real

things or merely of interpretations of that world. This affects the kind of questioning one does

significantly. For example, is the human being able to think objectively? Or is he always influenced by

his surroundings and ideas? Furthermore, scholars argue differently about how knowledge can be

gained, their epistemological ground (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010). Can we learn from experience to

explain phenomena? Or is it merely possible to interpret events and gain some shared understanding

of what happened (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010)? This is the main difference between scholars that use a

positivist epistemology and those that use an epistemology of interpretative understanding. The

consequences of these different ways of looking and conducting research can be directly linked to

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the kind of questions scholars ask. A positivist research will want to distinguish factors and clearly

define independent actor capabilities, such as state capabilities (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010). Positivist

questions concerning terrorism will aim to discern the factors and actors which are relevant and add

importance to them. However, this study should not be limited to attributing saliency to such factors

and actors, but also include the dynamics of their interplay/interaction. Interpretative

understandings are more suitable for the latter task. Here it becomes possible to ask: how do actors

interact and do their relationships change over time? How should we perceive actors’ intentions, and

what motivations drive their action? Interpretative understandings are less strict in how actors are

presumed to interact (for example on the basis of rationality) and the importance of conflict factors

and actor behavior, which can change over time. Sidney Tarrow argues that true understanding of

relationships and motivations can only be derived from a more thick description (Tarrow, 2007).

Because it is the aim of this study to find out how political transitions come about and not to test a

model, an approach of interpretative understanding is applied. This has led to the following research

question:

“How did the MILF transition to a peaceful political process?”

The study builds upon two assumptions that are by no way absolute, but guide the structure

of the literature review. The first assumption relates to the correlations that were found in several

quantitative studies into the demise of terrorist groups. The study assumes that correlations are valid

and therefore does not seek to falsify them, merely to explore them in order to find causal

mechanisms. The second assumption relates to the causes of terrorism. These are well studied

(Cronin, 2009) and provide a useful frame of reference if we assume that removal of such causes is

part of the cause for the demise of a terrorist group. Consequently, in the following paragraphs, we

first explore correlations derived from quantitative research (1.2), and then causal factors (1.3).

1.3.2. Observations from quantitative research

In order for a researcher to make a decision on which factors are important and how actors

interact, it is imperative to conduct qualitative research. This can build upon correlations between

factors that were found in quantitative studies. First, I wish to elaborate on a few caveats that come

from those researches that have done large-N studies or meta-research. However useful it may

seem to derive causes for ending groups from the removal of the sources that have created them,

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Audrey Cronin states that assuming that sources of conflict are logically connected to endings is too

simple (Cronin, 2009). Factors for demise may just as likely be external as internal. Terrorism

researchers have long focused on the psychology of individual leaders and organizational dynamics

to explain endings. This does not match group dynamics anymore. Increasingly, terrorist groups are

much more decentralized and rely less on interpersonal contacts (Cronin, 2009). Another caveat is

made by Bart Schuurman (Schuurman, Eijkman, & Bakker, 2014). He contends that while conducting

terrorism research, we should be aware of the bias upon counterterrorist efforts, both because a lack

of reliable data on the group and due to government funding (Schuurman et al., 2014). This has

caused researchers to assign the causes for the decline of groups to external factors, such as state

policies (Crenshaw, 1999). Let us now examine concrete findings on correlative factors.

This study will focus on building upon correlations which were found in large-N studies such

as the RAND study by Jones & Libicki (2008) and several few-N studies such as Audrey Cronin’s (2009)

work or a study conducted by, among others, Martha Crenshaw for the United States Institute for

Peace (USIP, 1999). Several correlations between factors and the demise of terrorist groups were

found by Libicki & Jones: 1) the breadth of terrorist goals, 2) the size of terrorist groups, 3) their

ideological orientation, 4) economic conditions and 5) regime type (2008). This has produced some

interesting findings.

According to Libicki and Jones (2008), concerning the ideological orientation of groups, they

found that religious groups take decidedly longer to end. However, religious groups also never truly

achieve their objectives. Also, when religious groups have ended, this is in most cases accomplished

by policing. Only one factor consistently holds up as a correlative factor to the duration of a group:

size. Larger groups last longer and have a higher chance of achieving their goals (Libicki & Jones,

2008). They also found interesting correlations between the five factors listed above. Economic

conditions seem to be related to a group’s ideological orientation and its size. In high income

countries, groups are mostly either left-wing or nationalist. In addition, groups are small in high

income countries. Terrorist groups more often end in high income countries than in low income

countries. And lastly, policing is more effective in high income countries (Libicki & Jones, 2008). The

breadth of goals is correlated to ideological orientation and the size of groups. Religious and left-

wing groups hold the broadest goals of empire and social revolution. These groups are rarely ended

by politics because their goals cannot be bargained over. Also, Libicki and Jones find that bigger

groups often have broader and more ambitious goals. Such goals have more appeal which makes

recruiting easier (Libicki & Jones, 2008). Regime type might have an impact on the size of groups, but

this is highly contested. The argument that grievances are less in democracies, due to established

political rights, is debatable. Moreover, because of privacy rights and other checks on power,

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democracies are less capable than authoritarian regimes in repression and the tracking down of

terrorists, which could keep groups small. The last correlation is between ideological orientation and

size. Libicki and Jones (2008) find that nationalist groups are often the biggest, with religious groups

coming in second place.

All in all, one correlation was solidly produced between one of the five factors and ending the

conflict: group size. An increasing size of the group meant that it would be harder to end. However,

between factors, many also showed correlations with size. So despite not having found correlations

between the other factors and duration, certain co-variations with other factors might produce

interesting results.

Whereas Libicki & Jones focus more on group and state attributes, Audrey Cronin has

distinguished the seven most important ways in which terrorist groups end:

- capture or killing of the leader,

- failure to transition to the next generation,

- achievement of the group’s aims,

- transition to a legitimate political process,

- undermining of popular support,

- repression,

- transition from terrorism to other forms of violence (Cronin, 2009)

Capture or killing only proved important in a few cases. Cronin concludes that capture is most

likely more effective than killing a leader. If a leader is captured, this undermines his credibility and

that of the group. Moreover, with a leader still alive, it may be harder for the group to regain new

leadership (Cronin, 2009). Concerning a failure to transition to a next generation, right-wing terrorist

groups stand out. Ethno-separatist and religious groups are more successful in this regard (Crenshaw,

1999). Groups rarely succeed in achieving their aims, but when they do, it is often through a

transition to the political process. Cronin emphasizes that this is much more complex than merely

pursuing a negotiated agreement (Cronin, 2009). There are many variables that determine the

outcome of negotiations. Cronin lists a few: degree of hierarchy in the group, degree of centralized

leadership, degree and nature of public support for the cause and if the group aims are negotiable

(Cronin, 2009). Firstly, she concludes that a more hierarchical group structure and stronger

leadership is advantageous for ensuring compliance with peace terms on local levels. Also, separatist

groups often have aims that are more feasible and negotiable than other type of groups (Cronin,

2009). Potentially, additional pay-off in this respect may come if a terrorist organization struggles to

perpetuate its own absolutist perspective in justifying the use of terrorist methods (Guelke, 1998).

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Secondly, centralized leadership is deemed important because the greatest risk of pursuing

negotiations is that it often leads to the creation of splinter groups, frequently more violent and

extreme than the original group (Cronin, 2009). Leadership that is centralized is more stable is this

respect than a structure with decentralized independently operating cells. Thirdly, the loss of popular

support can greatly influence the position of a group (Cronin, 2009). It can stop the flow of new

recruits, diminish the amount of safe houses, cause a financial blow and potentially help the police

get more information out of locals (Cronin, 2009). Support is lost through fear for government

retaliation, an improvement in life conditions for the local populace, decreasing salience of the

group’s ideology and resentment about the group’s level of violence (Cronin, 2009). Popular support

is often linked to levels of repression. As levels of state violence and the profiling of certain ethnic or

social-economic groups increase, resentment will grow. This may serve to legitimize terrorist attacks

and as an effective tool for recruitment (Cronin, 2009). On the other hand, repression may deter the

local population from supporting the terrorist group (Cronin, 2009). The last way to end a group, a

transition to another modus operandi and away from terrorism, occurs when the focus of the group

shifts to making profit, or when the group gains strength and transitions into insurgency (Cronin,

2009). However, as we have established in 1.1, this does not mean that such groups seize to use

terrorist tactics.

In conclusion, a remark on the USIP study is warranted. They conclude that timing is also a

crucial element. This fits within the interpretative approach, which sees conflict and its factors of

importance as interrelated and changing over time. For example, the study states that peace

overtures must be timed correctly. Preferably, they should come at a time that the government is

strong and the group is undergoing of period of introspection (Crenshaw, 1999).

1.3.3. Asymmetrical conflicts: causes and dynamics

In order to study the dynamics of terrorism, one must be aware of the context in which it is

being used, the wider conflict. Therefore, it is important to give an insight into the academic

literature concerning the causes of/and dynamics within an asymmetrical conflict. Asymmetrical

conflicts are between parties that are inevitably unequally situated in capabilities and resources

because of their relation, for example between a state and separatist group or an employee and

employer (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Addressing the causes of a conflict may remove

incentives to use terrorism. Understanding the dynamics within the conflict can serve to distinguish

its main driving forces. Disrupting or transforming such drivers may produce the window of

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opportunity toward ending the conflict. In the following sections theory on causes and dynamics will

be elaborated on in asymmetrical conflicts. The first part will have a general focus on civil conflict.

Subsequently, this is extended to comprise the use of terrorist tactics.

1.3.3.1. Conflict resolution theory

Conflict resolution theory has produced many insights into the causes and dynamics of

conflict. Most work builds upon the studies conducted by Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1969). Galtung

came up with three triangles that were interconnected and described the dimensions of conflict and

the forms of violence. Galtung viewed conflict as inherent to a society where human beings with

different preferences live together. He did not see conflict as necessarily violent. The first dimension

of conflict is contradiction, which refers to the underlying conflict situation, the perceived

incompatibility of goals.

The second dimension is attitude. This is about the perceptions that actors have of

themselves and their adversaries, often instilled by fear, anger or jealousy. Then there is actual

behavior. Competing interests and negative attitudes can lead to different kind of behavior, often

becoming more violent as the first two dimensions cut deeper. Galtung also translates these

dimensions into forms of violence. He classifies contradiction as a sort of structural violence,

attitudes as cultural violence and behavior as direct violence. To exemplify this division, structural

violence can be poverty or disenfranchisement, direct violence can be killing or the act of rape, and

cultural violence is everything that justifies this (Galtung, 1969). These dimensions of conflict and

forms of violence can be connected to the drivers of peace. Addressing contraction requires

peacebuilding, transforming attitudes is a matter of peacemaking and changing (violent) behavior is

primarily done by peacekeeping (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). After Galtung had laid

down the groundwork of conflict resolution by distinguishing the dimensions of conflict and related

forms of violence, several scholars tried to concretize these dimensions and the dynamics within/

and between them. Edward Azar’s (1990) work on protracted social conflicts (PSC) is especially

relevant to asymmetrical conflict and the case study in chapter three.

In the 1970s, Azar contested some of the dominant thinking within the academic community

about conflicts. Until then, research focused mostly upon conflicts between states, and also clearly

separated the international from the domestic domain. Azar concluded that such a distinction was

purely artificial. According to Azar, there is one social environment in which conflicts arise and are

resolved. Sources of such conflicts predominantly lie within and across states, not between them. His

19

research emphasized the role of intercommunal relations. People may contest for material wealth,

security, status and political rights. Such struggles are often played out at a communal level. Azar

identifies four preconditions that can work to escalate conflicts: communal discontent, the

deprivation of basic needs5, degree of state failure and the degree of international linkages. He adds

that whether these preconditions will transform conflict into a violent struggle depends upon the

process dynamics present, of which he lists three: communal actions/strategies, state

action/strategies and built-in mechanisms. The former refers to identity group formation,

organization and mobilization of such a group, the choice of goals, its leadership and tactics. The

state will respond by choosing a policy somewhere between political accommodation and coercive

repression. Political accommodation will be more difficult in weak states. The built-in mechanisms

are the dynamics of conflict that always influence the choices conflict parties make. One can think of

pre-existing beliefs and biases, the security dilemma or incentives based on a war economy (Azar,

1990). The four preconditions form an important part of the context in which the process dynamics

take place.

After Azar, several post-Cold war theories have contributed to understanding the context and

process dynamics even better. They can easily be integrated within protracted social conflict theory,

and serve as a nice addition. These will be discussed in the next two sections.

1.3.3.2. Civil wars

Galtung’s idea of contradiction, based on the belief that the goals of each group are

incompatible with that of the other as long as their current relationship is sustained, is a good

starting position. Such contradiction can be grounded on greed when there is a scarcity of material

wealth that both wish to possess, or on grievance, when cultural values and political rights of one

group are denied/marginalized by the other. Many scholars in the pre-Cold War era mainly focused

upon the grievances of civil war parties. This was understandable due to the strong ideological clash

between communists and capitalists, which characterized much of these conflicts. Or the

decolonization wave that empowered many disenfranchised populations to settle old scores. Paul

Collier and Anke Hoeffler (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) have conducted a large-N study which found no

convincing correlates between grievances and the outbreak of civil war, but did so for economic

variables and civil war. Based on previous research (Collier, 1999), they assume that conflict often

pays off for rebel groups, independent of the outcome. They also state that grievances are frequently

5 Burton states that there are four basic needs: security, political access, development and identity.

20

exaggerated, something which cannot be dispelled by conflict itself, but worsens this. Since

grievances can easily be fabricated and misperceived, explanations of rebellions by referral to

grievances should be extra cautious (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). By testing a data set of civil wars

between 1960-1999 against indicators of grievance and indicators of opportunity, only the latter

performed well.

The first factor that influences opportunity is the availability of finance. Especially in

countries with large primary commodity exports, finance is easy and potentially lucrative. Also, the

availability of finance through powerful diaspora networks is found to increase conflict risk. The

second factor in opportunity is the cost of rebellion. If opportunity costs for starting a rebellion are

higher, for example in countries with higher GDP growth rates, higher rates of male secondary

education enrollment and higher per capita income, conflict risk is substantially reduced. A third

factor is that of military advantage. Significant here is the degree of population dispersion.

Concerning grievances, inequality, political rights and religious fractionalization all had insignificant

outcomes. Only ethnic dominance is found to increase conflict risk (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

Quantitative research carried out by James Fearon and David Laitin (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) endorsed

these findings. These studies hint at the explanatory power of economic variables, and the dynamics

of opportunistic greed to exploit them.

Jeremy Weinstein (Weinstein, 2006) elaborates more on the dynamics within what he calls –

opportunistic and activist rebellions – those primarily based on greed and those that were caused by

grievance. He argues that opportunistic rebellions organize on the basis of immediate rewards for

their supporters, through the distribution of resource rents or external patronage. The leadership of

the group is likely to have less control over its armed units when they do not share an ideological

belief and identity (Weinstein, 2006). Especially in dispersed areas, opportunistic groups will use

more violence to retain social control than activist rebellions (Weinstein, 2006). Insurgent groups can

also thrive on significant amounts of external aid/rewards for their resistance against the

government. Weinstein points out that such aid can fundamentally change the reality on the ground,

risking members of behaving solely self-interested because money is flowing in from abroad

(Weinstein, 2006).

In his study on civil wars, Stathis Kalyvas (Kalyvas, 2009) has focused upon the use of violence

within such wars. He expands upon Weinstein’s analysis that opportunistic rebellions are more

violent. Kalyvas stresses that beside indiscriminate violence, often connected to a breakdown of

authority as envisaged by Thomas Hobbes, groups use selective violence in order to produce local

information (for example on government informants) needed to strengthen a group’s social control

21

(Kalyvas, 2009). However, we can also think of this in a more delicate and nuanced game of rivalry.

According to Claire Metelits (Metelits, 2009), insurgent groups are not excessively violent against

local populations because of the presence of natural resources, but because they are in a state of

active rivalry with one or more other groups. Resources only become a source for aggression when

there is an impending threat of resource depletion, which is often the case when groups are in fierce

competition/active rivalry (Metelits, 2009). Metelits even states that in the absence of such active

rivalry, groups are even able to behave like a state, providing security, public goods and guarding

indigenous institutions (Metelits, 2009). This kind of behavior could legitimize a group as a valid

negotiating partner (1.5) (Zartman, 1995). Now that we have explored the most important

explanations of conflict outbreak, grievances (1.3.1) and greed (1.3.2), and the dynamics associated

with them, some final notes on other post-Cold War additions are heeded.

There is one influential theory that contributed to the preconditions described by Azar and

the opportunity thesis put forward by Collier & Hoeffler. This is the work of Barry Buzan on re-

conceptualizing security to catch all its complexities ((Buzan, 1991). Buzan stressed that during the

Cold War the concept of security was interpreted too narrowly, strictly limited to the physical

survival of the state or the nation. This centered around military and political dimensions of security.

Buzan extended this by incorporating economic security, societal security, environmental security

and regional security into the security concept. Economic security is about balancing risks, to ensure

welfare stability. It is also the one dimension that reinforces all other dimensions of security. Societal

security is about the harmony of cultures and identities that is present (lacking) in society.

Concerning environment security, Buzan admits that this is hard to measure, but one can think of the

exhaustion of farmlands or the extinction of other livelihoods, such as flora and fauna. Lastly, and in

addition to Azar and Collier & Hoeffler the most important dimension, Buzan elaborates on regional

security. This goes beyond mere conceptions of the balance of power, also comprising relationships

of enmity/amity, based upon shared/opposing forms of identity and ethnicity or territorial claims and

historical events (Buzan, 1991). Such relationships together form a security complex, which Buzan

defines as:

“a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their

national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” (Buzan 1991, p190)

He saw security as a very omnipresent concept, which should be studied from the different levels

(individual, nation state and the international system) and broken down into the dimensions set forth

above (Buzan, 1991).

22

Connected to this omnipresence was the introduction of a concept what Ole Waever called

‘securitization’ (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). Securitization is the construction of an issue as a

threat that poses a security problem to the nation. This is often done by elites and accomplished

once the audience accepts the frame (Buzan et al., 1998).

1.3.3.3. Specific dimensions of terrorism

Conflicts do not just emerge and hold the same shape, meaning and intensity over time. They

are constantly evolving and changing. Such dynamics are important to understand the developments

within conflicts and the road they take to violence, peace or a stand-off. This also includes a moment

where terrorism becomes relevant or irrelevant again. For example when it is securitized by

politicians. Buzan (Buzan et al., 1998) distinguishes three ways in which politicians can go about this:

insulation, repression and equalizing. Insulation is based on decreasing vulnerabilities to terrorism.

Repression is rather more active, aiming at eliminating the threat of terrorism. Equalizing refers to

repairing inequalities in order to soften grievances (Buzan et al., 1998). Especially the difference

between insulation and repression is an analytical distinction that is a useful addition to the more

forceful policy responses that were put forward by Libicki & Jones (policing, military force) and

Cronin (capture leaders, repression). Because our main topic of research, a policy based on political

rapprochement, is rarely successful on its own (Libicki & Jones, 2008), I wish to elaborate further on

forceful policy responses. Whereas repression relies on a pro-active and anticipatory justice system,

insulation can entail different legal choices. Sara Fiorentini and Willem-Jan van der Wolf (Fiorentini &

Van der Wolf, 2015) explore some of these choices.

Because of diverging definitions of terrorism, governments claim that it is not possible to

refer the crime of terrorism to an international court with universal jurisdiction (Fiorentini & Van der

Wolf, 2015). As to the approach governments may take to terrorism, Van der Wilt distinguishes

between the objective and subjective approach (in: Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015). The former

concentrates solely on the act that is performed. The latter also includes motive/intention. A

subjective approach is needed to engage in anticipatory justice, such as punishing people for acts

that are yet to be committed (for example a terrorist attack). However, according to Van der Wilt,

because of the reactive nature of criminal law, it is not a suitable instrument for prevention (in:

Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015). A subjective approach would entail a more farfetched curtailment

of human rights, which has a risk of being counterproductive because it can contribute to terrorist

recruitment grounds. This is an implication of a much tougher policy that influences the dynamics in

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various ways. Popular support may dwindle, in fear of arrest, or increase due to dissatisfaction with

the government. Terrorist groups may be prepared to go until further lengths to achieve their goals

because they know that a severe punishment awaits them once they are caught or the group is

dissolved Abrahms (Abrahms, 2006).

Henar Criado (Criado, 2015) connects such hard policies directly to the terrorist behavior in

his case study on the ETA in Spain. Because we assume that terrorists wish to maximize the saliency

of their attacks, we should gain a better understanding of shifts in terrorist behavior by observing

certain factors that explain such saliency. Criado points to three factors that explain terrorist

saliency: number of victims, type of victim and the dynamics of political competition. The latter is

directly connected to whether there is an exclusion of terrorism from party competition and if not,

elections draw near (Criado, 2015). Clearly, governments and political parties could decrease the

saliency of terrorism by unifying politically around the issue. A de-politicization of the issue is simply

not realistic due to the electorate’s demand for action (Fiorentini & Van der Wolf, 2015). This is

particularly the case after a big attack or event.

Gordon Clubb (Clubb, 2014) refers to these big events as triggers. These events can produce

higher levels of violence, more geographical spread, re-entry of disengaged militants and offer more

important opportunities for spoilers (Clubb, 2014). A reservation to this is made by Adam Roberts

(2015), who has done meta-research into the field of terrorism. According to Roberts, history teaches

us that is mostly not a few trigger acts of great violence that transform the conflict (Roberts, 2015).

1.3.4. Ending conflict non-violently

In order to find a political solution for an asymmetrical conflict, the parties can choose to

negotiate. The positions from which the parties can negotiate are determined by the conflict, which

is constantly evolving. To capture this, one should assess its features, actors’ capabilities and history.

Such features and capabilities were discussed in the previous paragraph. This paragraph explores

literature on the way they can interact when they choose to negotiate instead of fight. The literature

points us in the direction of four factors of importance: tactics, leadership, third parties, trust and the

role of spoilers. In order to review these factors, a clear understanding of negotiation practice is

needed. In the literature, elements of time and momentum are attached to certain practice. Also, I

will shortly give a general indication of important elements in successful peace agreements so we can

start reviewing tactics and results.

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1.3.4.1 Negotiation practices within the longer peace process

Most authors that write on conflict resolution agree that just as with other phases of conflict,

such as the emergence of a clear contradiction between parties and possibly armed conflict (Cronin,

2009), negotiating a peace, takes time. Setbacks can cause severe delay or even deterioration,

whereas breakthroughs can accelerate the road to peace. Conflicts evolve, they can spin around,

take another shape or get a different meaning over time. Negotiations, if they come about, can take

different forms depending on the conflict situation. For example, if a conflict is from its onset mainly

about political injustices but grows to become a struggle for territory and resources, negotiations

may have to take another form.

The first difference that academics have stressed is that between official and unofficial

diplomatic contacts. For asymmetrical conflicts, this is especially important. Governments are not

easily inclined to recognize the legitimacy of a rebel group, since this implies an erosion of their own

authority. However, for negotiations to work, an equal power balance is favorable. This requires

mutual recognition of the other as a legitimate actor (Zartman, 1995). Official contacts usually signify

such recognition, which would explain why some governments attempt to avoid this. Legitimacy may

preclude a government from criminalizing rebel group members, which could undermine its strategy.

In this stage of the conflict, contacts are rather made unofficial or through back-channels.

So what negotiation options do the parties have and at what stage of the conflict is an option

likely to be on the table? Besides being official or unofficial, the main differences between options

can be categorized in three tracks of diplomacy. Frequently, this involves a third party. Within track

one, top-level government representatives are involved, usually under the guidance of an

international governmental organization or another state. This involves more muscle and pressure to

come an agreement. Track one diplomacy often comes in the form of official negotiations, summitry,

or an arbitration procedure. Third parties may act as an arbiter or forceful mediator (Ramsbotham,

Woodhouse & Miall, 2011).

For track two diplomacy, no top-officials are needed and the pressure to come to an

agreement is less. Such contacts can serve to create trust, exchange views, brainstorm to reconcile

interests and needs or work out low-level issues for implementation. This can take the form of

mediation, work-group meetings or informal conciliatory meetings. According to Ramsbotham et al

(2011), a third party mediator has to provide for three basic elements in second track , diplomacy:

improve communications, exchange relevant information and befriend both parties. Second track

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diplomacy has gained more adherents and appreciation over the last decades. In these meetings, it is

easier to implement a principled negotiation approach, as advocated by Herb Kelman (Kelman,

1996). Central to this approach is to bridge the difference between positions and interests. This is

easier done in low-level meetings, where statements and promises can be made in a more

exploratory and non-binding way. Also, it is easier to explore true basic needs. According to Burton,

interests can be differentiated from needs in that they are negotiable, whereas needs are not.

Burton lists four basic needs: security, political access, development and identity. However, basic

needs can often be fulfilled by different positions, whereas interests are concrete and have a limited

range of negotiation positions that achieve them. According to Burton, focusing on needs instead of

interests presents a chance to creatively find solutions (Burton, 1990).

Finally, third track diplomacy is about including grassroots movements. This might concern

meetings between community leaders, academics or any other initiative that is organized by citizens

that seeks to bridge differences, build social cohesion and find common ground. A third party might

be an authoritative figure from a neighboring village who can fulfill the same roles as third parties in

first and second track diplomacy (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). The question that

remains is: do we need each option and if yes, when?

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2011) conclude that track one and track two diplomacy

are often most effective when they are undertaken in conjunction. Track three is needed throughout

the process, but especially when party positions are completely opposed. Grassroots movements

may demand internal change of their own party position. Also, they may explore and accomplish

things on a local scale that may serve as an example for national politicians/leaders. The question

remains to what ends should the different diplomacy methods be used?

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1.3.4.2. Successful elements of peace agreements

In order to know what method one should use, an idea of what constitutes a good settlement is

needed. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2011) list several elements of successful settlements:

- The inclusion of all affected parties

- Agreements need to be well crafted and precise

- A well-struck balance must exist between clear commitments and more flexible terms

- The parties need incentives to sustain the process, for example through power-sharing

- Provide for a dispute settlement mechanism, and a way for renegotiation in matters of

disagreement about the implementation

- Deal with the core issues, bring about transformation

- Preferable: respect for human rights, justice and group rights

However, to reach such an outcome, many variables should be taken into account. Cronin

lists a few: degree of hierarchy in the group, degree of centralized leadership, degree and nature of

public support for the cause and if the group aims are negotiable (Cronin, 2009). She concludes that a

more hierarchical group structure and stronger leadership is advantageous for ensuring compliance

with peace terms on local levels. Also, separatist groups often have aims that are more feasible and

negotiable than other type of groups (Cronin, 2009). The greatest risk of pursuing negotiations is that

it often leads to the creation of splinter groups, frequently more violent and extreme than the

original group (Cronin, 2009).

Parties will have to make tactical choices on how to deal with these variables and which of

the above listed elements they wish to make a priority. However, during conflict, it will not always be

possible to address all elements, including a rational way of dealing with them. For example, the first

element, the inclusion of all parties, will perhaps first require a confrontational tactic from a smaller

party, presenting itself as an important player in the conflict, whereas later its tactics might shift to

more conciliatory to retain a seat at the table. Bigger parties will have to engage in third and second

track diplomacy to make sure smaller factions are in agreement with the process. Another example

is on the second element, whether to get a comprehensive deal, precise and well-crafted, or to seize

momentum and make a deal on certain issues, while forestalling agreement on other topics. It may

be tempting for an incumbent leader to get a quick deal, in order to boost his standing and political

clout. However, certain studies argue that small steps are easier to sustain, and therefore preferable

to an instant all-encompassing solution (Osgood, 1962). Notwithstanding that strong incentives to

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continue working on all other issues must be in place, with clear procedures, timetables and public

commitments to see them through (Sisk, 1997). On the latter, strong leadership is needed

(Weinstein, 2006). Small-steps are best made in the second and third track, which attract less

attention and do not have to produce policy results (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011).

Clearly, choices must be made which are often ambiguous. They may involve choices for a location, a

third party mediator, the agenda and all other political/military decisions that shape the context of

the negotiations.

In conclusion, different negotiation tactics can exist in a group or government strategy. The

difference between strategy and tactic is not always clear-cut. The strategy is the grand scheme of

how a party wants to accomplish his end goals. It can also refer to part of the scheme, for example

the military or diplomatic parts. Tactics refer to certain methods of- or maneuvers in within such

broader set-ups. These may change over time and is dependent upon the state of the conflict. Tactics

may consist of different methods of diplomacy, or tracks of diplomacy. Certain factors of importance,

such as the strength of leadership, degree of hierarchy, type of group, strength of spoilers and

mutual trust are best engaged with a certain tactic and using one or several of the diplomacy tracks.

Strategy and tactics are essential for understanding the conflict and actor’s behavior. For example, a

group strategy may be to mobilize broad resistance with popular support and to seize control of

certain territories in order to gain government concessions on autonomy and self-rule. If it does not

have the military might to seize control, it might move from insurgency to terrorist tactics in order to

gain a better bargaining position. However, this could undermine its popular support and therefore

its grand strategy. This game is continuously played out by the conflict parties. The following will

elaborate on how players can approach this game and what options they have.

1.3.4.3. Strategy and tactical choices

Clausewitz famously states that “war is a continuation of political activity by other means”

(Von Clausewitz, 1873). The same can be argued the other way: “negotiations are just another

means of fighting a war” (Jubair, 1999). These are the first two options that parties have: fight or

negotiate. For the area of fighting, which is connected to negotiations because it always looms in the

background or happens simultaneously, we have explored several tactics in section 1.3. Now, this will

be extended with academic views on tactics which are concerned with negotiation processes. This

does not mean that both are deeply interrelated, as it is important for parties to keep the war option

on the table to exert pressure. Both war and negotiation tactics can be part of a grand strategy.

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First, there is a strand of scholars which argues that both fighting and negotiating are based

upon rational decisions. According to these scholars, a conflict party’s tactical choices should

therefore also be based upon rational calculations. Such calculations are made by weighing the utility

of negotiations against the utility of fighting, for example to gain a better bargaining position. These

scholars adhere to bargaining theory, which comes from international relations. However, the

strategic logic holds the same for asymmetrical conflict as for interstate conflict. Terrorist groups also

incur costs upon themselves by escalating to more violence (sunk cost human/financial, audience

costs) and gain credibility of threats by using violence (Abrahms, 2011). Because of the costs

incurred, the challenger shows resolve. Scholars subsequently presume that an escalation of violence

by the challenger will have a positive effect on coercing compliance by its adversary (Abrahms, 2011).

In conclusion, according to these scholars, a tactic based on gaining negotiation concessions by

forceful coercion is logical and sound.

Despite the logic reasoning behind bargaining theory, Abrahms (2011) shows that empirical

studies have not endorsed the theoretically expected outcomes. Several large-N studies indicate that

governments are less likely to concede to political demands when they are confronted with an

escalation of terrorist violence (Crenshaw & Peller, 1998),(Abrahms, 2006). If groups actually

achieved success of their strategic goals, it was in hybrid cases where terrorism was only used as a

secondary tactic (Abrahms, 2006). Also, violence was directed at military targets and not at civilian

targets (Abrahms, 2006). All authors contend that groups rather achieved success despite the use of

terrorist tactics than because of it (Jones & Libicki, 2008; Cronin, 2009; Abrahms, 2006). So why is

this?

Abrahms points to a sense of moral outrage, the election of conservative hardline politicians,

the prevention of incentivizing potential terrorists or a perceived correspondence between extreme

terrorist means and extreme ends (Abrahms, 2011; Abrahms, 2006). However, he contends that

more research to assess the reasons behind the inability of bargaining theory to explain negotiations

between governments and terrorist groups is needed. Clearly tactics should extend mere rational

bargaining, based on coercive and exchange power (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011).

Further proof of this can be found by applying the ‘dollar auction’ game to conflict bargaining. In this

game both parties will exceed the value of the ‘thing for auction’, here one dollar, in order to incur

greater costs upon their adversary than upon themselves. The focus is upon relative gains, which

might entail: my losses are less than that of my adversary. The logic is that due to such a focus, the

efforts/costs or resolve to gain something, for example an oil field, may not be in proportion to the

potential gain (Shubik, 1971).

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A strategy such as the ‘departing train’ rely on ideas of seizing a unique opportunity while the

momentum is there. This might offer chances for integrative solutions, but could also be used as a

tactic by a dominant party to press through its own agenda. The idea behind it is that there is a

unique opportunity to obtain peace, a ‘departing train’, but if a party does not align with the peace

process, or get on the train, it will fall short of its benefits (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011).

The role of spoilers is also important in this.

Stedman (Stedman, 1997) distinguishes between internal and external spoilers (Stedman,

1997). Spoilers exist only in the context of a peace process, which they want to undermine. Stedman

divides spoilers in three types: limited, greedy and total. The limited spoiler seeks tangible and

smaller objectives. The greedy spoiler makes a cost/benefit analysis whether there is a possibility to

profit from spoiling behavior. The total spoiler has all-or –nothing terms and refuses any compromise

(Stedman, 1997). With regards to the ‘departing train’ tactic, it is especially effective for limiting the

influence of spoilers by limiting their time to break up the peace process. A potential danger is that

inside greedy spoilers, those actors that are indispensable for a successful outcome may attain high

profits by exploiting their bargaining position (Stedman, 1997). A departing train tactic could be

especially effective when it consist of an amnesty proclamation. When the government can convince

the warring factions that this is a one-time offer, it works as a strong incentive (Ramsbotham et al.,

2011).

Then there is a strategy of inclusion. This is based on seeking integrative solutions that

presumes all parties agree that a continuation of hostilities only produces mutual suffering.

Integrative solutions are those that brainstorm for a common position that works to transform the

conflict by challenging dominant assumptions (Boulding, 1962). For example, to transform the idea

that once your adversary feels stronger and more secure, this will not worsen but improve your own

security. Changing this assumption will open up opportunities for creative joint solutions, like wealth-

sharing (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). According to Zartman, such momentum can come

about with a ‘hurting stalemate’. The idea is that if there’s enough cost to a conflict, parties will

overcome their differences (Zartman, 1995). This is in direct opposition to the idea of the dollar

auction, where parties will continue their struggle despite the large costs. A very real disadvantage of

the ‘hurting stalemate’ is that contrary to expectations, it does not give a guarantee for peace, and

might take years to overcome (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Even when it might seem

logical on the basis of absolute gains to stop fighting, a deep mistrust may prevent this from ever

materializing. So how do we overcome this and create trust?

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Strong leadership may create trust, for example by showing a clear dedication to attain

peace. Leaders may create a strong symbolic frame of unity and opportunity. According to Kaufman,

the strength of such a frame is dependent upon how much do constituents actually care about it, the

credibility of a leader, the issues or values that are bridged or connected by the frame and the fidelity

of the narrative compared to earlier beliefs/actions. Just as frames might be abused to create fear

and mobilize people for violence, they can be used to construct peace (Kaufman, 2011). Leaders can

also, as an ultimate sign of dedication, tie their own fate to the peace process. A disadvantage of this

is that opponents of the incumbent leader may use the peace process as a way to get rid of an

incumbent. Therefore, a strong leadership structure which strengthens the legitimacy and powers of

the leader is important to ensure his commitments are carried out (Weinstein, 2006). Another way to

create trust is to chop up the peace process in many steps, which can be checked and serve to build

confidence. Important here is to have agreement on procedures and timetables (Ramsbotham,

Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). Finally, a third party mediator or arbiter may bridge mistrust by creating

trustful relations with both parties. Lederach (Lederach, 1995) argues that parties rather choose a

partial-insider than an impartial-outsider. It is easier to trust an insider than an outsider. And trust is

deemed more important than neutrality (Lederach, 1995). But trust is easily lost and hard to build.

1.3.4.4 Using negotiations for other ends than peace

It may be that negotiations merely serve to stall for time and reinforce military positions. A

state strategy may be based on military domination and denial, for example by enforcing a naval

blockade. A tactical choice at a certain time within such a strategy may be to avoid fighting and

choose to negotiate. This will allow the government to attain relative gains in the meantime. Stalling

for time may also be used to pacify third parties and make them lose interest. Similarly, a

government may choose to negotiate in order to divide its opponent between those that support

negotiations and more militant wings (Duyvesteyn & Schuurman, 2011). Moreover, a government

may have to deal with several groups, choosing to negotiate with one so it can fight the other. For

the government, this might prove an effective tactic in order to prevent your opponents from joining

forces. However, this comes with a risk. Once a negotiation has failed because one party broke the

peace or disregarded an agreement that was made, it is much harder to begin afresh.

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1.4. Research Design

1.4.1. Main theoretical considerations and strategies relevant to this case.

In this study the following theories from the literature review will take an important position:

- The protracted social conflict theory (Azar, 1991)

- Peace spoiler theory (Stedman, 1999)

- Negotiation strategies (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011)

- Greed and grievance theory (Collier & Hoeffler, 2003)

The protracted social conflict theory is of particular relevance as it allows capturing the social

economic dimension of the conflict. As will be shown later in the case (chapter 2.1) this dimension

can be regarded as an essential causal element of the grievances underlying the conflict.

The Peace spoiler theory is used as it will become clear from the case description that the peace

process is a bumpy road with many different obstacles (= differing interests of participants).

Negotiation strategies are of relevance as different presidents have taken different strategies in

order to deal with the conflict.

The relevance of the Greed and grievance theory is clear, as –historically- the loss of land, the

inferior social status of the Moros has caused many grievances. Besides this, the ability to generate

economic resources and external support are crucial for sustaining the conflict. Both aspects are

relevant to this particular case.

1.4.2. Framework of analysis

In order to analyze the different phases of the conflict in a structured way, they are viewed

through different lenses: the context, the state and the group. To gain a full picture of the context in

which the parties interact, we can use three different levels of analysis: international, national and

local. On the international level, this will provide insight into the world economy and regional

stability. The national level can take into account factors such as the state of the national economy,

regional differences and the dynamics of the political system. Lastly, the local level is suited to

explain the situation in Mindanao and the conflict areas. For the state and the group lens, it is

important to discern their specific positions, interests and needs at a certain moment in time. We can

32

also call this their perspective. These are constructed through internal and external (with the

context) dynamics. This gives us the following framework:

Context : local, national and international events/developments.

State : perspective based upon internal and external dynamics.

Group : perspective based upon internal and external dynamics.

Four phases are selected. 1). January 1997 – February 2001, 2). March 2001 – July 2005, 3).

August 2005 – May 2010, 4) June 2010 – March 2014.

Phase one will consist of the start of the peace negotiations under President Ramos and end

with the impeachment trial and subsequent stepping down of President Estrada. The second phase

starts with the presidency of Arroyo and is mostly dominated by the war on terrorism. It ends when

the talks about ancestral domain start. Phase three is focused upon the theme of ancestral domain

and the disruption of the peace process through the Supreme Court suspension order. It ends with

the elections for a new president. Phase four starts with the presidency of Benigno Aquino and

focuses upon a revived peace process, culminating in a Comprehensive Agreement on the

Bangsamoro.

By using this framework consistently for all phases of the conflict, the study captures the

time and context-specific factors that shape actors’ positions and relations.

1.4.3 Method

This study will focus on a single case. The existing gap of knowledge on how terrorist groups

end is best improved by deeper exploration of the detailed processes that led to an end of the

conflict with a terrorist groups. So what are the exact merits of the single case study method and

how will this method be applied in the study?

The main contribution of a case study is its in-depth analysis. However, it is also important

that case studies rely on a reference framework of a larger population of cases, to assess the

particular situation of the case within a population of cases (Gerring, 2006). Most case-study designs

rely on the representativeness of the case in relation to the larger population of cases concerning its

33

topic of investigation. A clear connection with that larger population of cases has been made in

section 1.2, where several large-N studies are discussed.

Case studies can follow one or a combination of strategies. John Gerring concludes that there

is no reason not to pursue more strategies if the case is suitable for several functions (Gerring, 2006).

Certain strategies also apply to the case presented in section three. In some respects, the MILF

presents a typical case that has similar features found in many other asymmetrical conflicts: mixed

ideological orientation, legitimate grievances based on protracted social conflict, opportunities for

greed-incentivized behavior, weak state institutions and two sets of deep-rooted negative

perceptions of the ‘other’. This allows the ability to probe for causal relations along the correlative

factors that were produced by the large-N studies. However, the case also presents the opportunity

to pursue another strategy. Because the MILF is one of the few cases where a religiously-motivated

insurgent group has been ended by political transition, it might also function as a deviant case-study.

This holds that the outcome (Y= end by political transition) is accomplished with the existence of an

unusual independent variable (X1= religious ideology). Furthermore, the case can serve a hypothesis-

generating goal. A deviant case refines or tests a deductively presumed correlation (religious-

motivated groups do not likely end by a political process), whereas a hypothesis generating-case

inductively probes for special variables of interest, for example leadership (Lijphart, 1971). This might

seem contradictory, but is not so strange. Research is about exploring new things, whether by

deduction or induction. As Gerring already posed, pursue several strategies if the case allows for it

(Gerring, 2006).

Another feature of the MILF case is that because of its long life-span, it presents a good

opportunity for using comparative-historical analysis. Comparative-historical analysis is a research

field that uses systematic comparison and analysis of processes over time to explain important

outcomes, such as the end of conflict (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). For this study, this is

limited to within-case comparison. Frequently, such analysis is used in small-N studies that

investigate the relation of a few important variables with the dependent variable. A method that is

well suited for this type of research is process analysis. This method allows researchers to examine

mechanism through which independent variables influence the dependent variable (George &

Bennet, 2005). These linkages enrich our understanding of how the change in one variable or

conjunction of variables causes the change in a dependent variable. Especially for an analysis of

sequences of events within cases, this is a valuable tool of analysis (Mahoney, 2004). Such within-

case comparison is the basis for this study. The peace process between the MILF and the GRP can be

viewed in a continuum, but also in parts or sequences. To look at each phase on its own, but similarly

34

to place it within a continuum of historical events. Such a technique goes beyond the descriptive and

causal inferences that can be drawn from statistical analysis.

1.4.4. Case selection

For studies with many cases, random selection may produce a good representativeness

among the class of cases. This also prevents case selection bias (Gerring, 2006). However, in case

study research with a small sample, this is problematic. Randomization will produce large variance in

a sample within a large class of cases. Consequently, such selection will not produce a fair mean

sample of the population of cases (Gerring, 2006). Case selection is necessary. In section 2.3 some

reasons for selecting the MILF case were explained by reference to methods of analysis, here typical,

deviant and process analysis. However, there are other matters that play a role. For example, the

relevance the case has to policymakers and society at large. As the peace process is still underway,

and there many active terrorist groups around the world, more knowledge could also prove valuable

for both policymakers and ordinary civilians. The MILF case has a long history of troublesome and

violent interactions on different levels: national/, regional and local. This makes it all the more

interesting that despite a long history of violence and distrust, an accord for peace was struck in

2013. Such a positive case with an Islamic insurgency group may inspire and provide valuable lessons

for policymakers to seek non-violent outcomes with similar groups.

35

CHAPTER 2. THE CASE OF THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT

2.1. Historical background of the Moro-Philippine conflict.

The conflict in Mindanao knows many players, stages/phases, arena’s and dimensions. This

conflict was never just between the Moro rebels and the Filipino government. Both parties gained

supporters to their cause, domestic and foreign. For example the Moros have tried to get support

from the indigenous population, also called the Lumads, for their cause (ICG, 2011b). Internal

struggles were also common. The Moro population for example, consisted of 13 tribes, all with their

own culture and traditions (Gomez, 2000). A map of Mindanao and the Moros tribes has been added

in the annex (p. 130).

Also, the conflict did not become violent overnight, but instead grew through history from

non-violent contestation to violent clashes. The conflict was played out in several ways, at several

locations. The main arena was the contested mainland Mindanao, but terrorist attacks were also

carried out in metropolitan Manila to take the violence to the “Filipino invader”. The conflict was also

fiercely played out at the negotiation tables in Tripoli, Libya, or in metropolitan Manila to gain

support among politicians6. Similarly, the dimensions of the conflict were diverse, ranging from

cultural/religious contestation to legal and socio-economic grievances. Of course, making the case

relevant for the research question in this thesis, the conflict also obtained the violent dimension of

guerilla warfare and terrorism. In order to understand a conflict, a researcher must be aware of all

these things. Consequently, this chapter will address these different aspects and how they evolved

through history and galvanized the MILF and the GRP into seeking negotiations in 1997. The accounts

described below are specifically focused on the two conflicting parties, the Moro’s and the Filipino’s

and are primarily based on historic facts and two books, chosen to represent the different views on

the conflict. One book is written by a Muslim and prominent MILF member (Jubair, 1999), and the

other by a Christian writer from Mindanao (Gomez, 2000). This is to make sure that the narrative is

balanced, and to make good use of the in-depth knowledge of insiders.

2.1.1. Islamic and Christian colonization of the Philippines

6 Important negotiations between the MNLF and GRP were held in Jakarta, Indonesia. The MILF has preferred a

role for Malaysia as mediator, and so negotiations have often been held in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur.

36

The Philippines, as we currently name it, consists of an archipelago of thousands of islands

(7,641). Due to its geographical location, some of the societies populating the islands developed

trade relations with Eastern, Southern and Southeastern Asia. In the first millennium this led to the

growth of maritime states that were either autonomous (so-called barangays) or allied with Malay

seapowers, led by Datus7, and paying tribute to China or Indianized kingdoms, ruled by Rajah’s8.

According to Clem Bascar (Bascar, 2015), Islamization of Mindanao began already at the end

of 14th century. Hilario Gomez (2000) writes of Abu Bakr as the first true Islamic ruler on the Filipino

islands. In 1380, Abu Bakr, an Arab trader born in Johore, arrived in Sulu from Malacca. He converted

Sulu's rajah, Rajah Baguinda Ali and married his daughter. In 1450, Abu Bakr established an Islamic

sultanate in island group Sulu (see figure 1). Similarly, about 1515, Muhammad Kabungsuan created

an Islamic sultanate on the Mindanao mainland that ranged from Lanao del Sur to Cotabato (Gomez,

2000). From 1619 onwards, the Muslims gained true power under Sultan Qudarat of Manguidanao,

who conquered and united many other surrounding clans under his banner (Jubair, 1999).

The first Spanish missionary arrived in 1521 on the Visayas islands starting the spreading of

the Christian faith. In 1543, the Spanish entered the Samar-Leyte islands (see figure 1) under the

command of Ruy Lopez de Villalobos.

7

Leader of a local Philippine community 8 A monarch or princely ruler in South and Southeast Asia

Figure 1: Map of the Philippines

37

In honor of their Prince, Felipe II, they named the islands las Islas Filipinas. This is when true

colonization began (Gomez, 2000). By the time the Spanish began to make their way south towards

Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, Islam had already a solid foothold. Many peoples were still not

converted to Islam and kept to their traditional gods (Lumads), but were nonetheless client states to

the more powerful Muslims (Gomez, 2000). It is clear that despite the fact that the Muslim rulers

only controlled parts of Mindanao, they established themselves on the island earlier than the Spanish

Christians. When the Spanish arrived, colonized the Philippines and wanted to turn it into a Christian

state, this inevitably led to conflict.

The Spanish conquistadors established several forts and bases of operation on the northern

and eastern coastline of Mindanao, and in the Zamboanga peninsula. According to Jubair, heavy

fighting between the Moros and the Spanish occurred from 1635-1663. From 1718 onwards,

hostilities intensified again. In 1751, the Spanish introduced a ‘privateer system’ that rewarded

anyone who would turn against the Moros in Mindanao. However, this did not produce any

substantial gains and the Spanish were unable to gain a solid foothold inland on Mindanao (Jubair,

1999). According to Jubair (1999), the Moros were also able to bring the fight to their enemies’

doorstep instead. They raided and plundered coastal towns in the Visayas and Luzon. From 1850, the

Spanish gained more military dominance and the Moros became under increasing pressure. This was

worsened by internal competition between the different sultanates (Jubair, 1999). Gomez argues

that somewhere at the end of the 19th century, the Moros were losing Mindanao to the Spanish.

Others, like Jubair and Bascar, state that at that time a true Spanish victory was nowhere near.

However interesting such scenario-thinking may be, it was of no consequence. The Spanish never

hold Mindanao because in 1898 the Americans entered the battlefield.

2.1.2. American colonization: sowing the seeds for conflict

The Americans entered at an advantageous moment. The Spanish were weakened by the war

against the Filipino’s on Luzon and the Visayas, and the Moros were still recovering from their

clashes with the Spanish. In August of 1896, the Filipino’s rebelled against the Spanish colonial

regime. After more than a year of fighting, the Spanish came out on top and forced the Filipino’s,

under the command Andrès Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo, to sign a surrender (Bascar, 2015).

38

However, due to a conflict over Cuban independence and the sinking of US navy battleship

Maine, the Spanish-American war started. The Americans seized control of Manila bay and defeated

the Spanish garrison inland. At the Treaty of Paris, signed at the 10th of December 1898, the Spanish

surrendered the Philippine Islands to the Americans. They did not just surrender Luzon and the

Visayas islands, but also included Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, in spite of lacking any effective

control in these parts. This had two reasons. First, the Spanish wanted to trade Mindanao and the

Sulu archipelago in order to retain other parts. Second, the Americans were anxious that if they

would not obtain the entire island group, the Spanish would sell their remaining part to another

European power which could lead to future conflict (Wolff, 1961). To both the Filipino’s on the island

of Luzon and the Visayas island group, as well as the Moro’s on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago,

this was unacceptable.

The Filipino’s revolted again, this time taking up arms against the Americans. From 1899 until

1902, the American-Filipino war endured with the Americans being victorious in the end. Cleverly,

the Americans managed to prevent fighting the Moros simultaneously by striking a deal. The Moro’s

were well aware that the Americans fought their Filipino enemy. The deal was the Kiram-Bates

Treaty, which was a Treaty between the USA and the sultanate of Sulu (Kho, 2016). It contained

provisions on non-interference, the recognition of American sovereignty, a respect for Islam and

cultural customs or autonomy for the Muslim rulers the, right for U.S. troops to occupy some of the

lands of the Sultan and a promise not to sell these lands to another nation (Jubair, 1999). The Bates

Treaty only lasted until the end of 1903, when the Americans had dealt with the Filipino’s in the

north and could direct their attention to the Moros. They unilaterally abrogated the treaty arguing

that the Sultan had not adequately suppressed Moro resistance (Kho, 2016). This led to bloody

clashes between both parties that endured until 1913.

The Americans installed direct rule in Mindanao and Sulu. They created the Moro province,

which was supposed to prepare the Moros for future integration into the political system of the

Philippines (Jubair, 1999; Gomez, 2000). According to the Americans, such preparation was needed

due to widespread corruption and the need to civilize the Moro population (Jubair, 1999; Gomez,

2000). The first governor of the Moro province was General Lennard Wood. According to Charles

Byler (2005), his stance was staunch and uncompromising. He introduced legal reform, taxation for

land registration, the abolition of slavery and a general establishment of order that excluded a role

for the traditional Datu-system, if necessary enforced by physical force (Byler, 2005). Such measures

were highly unpopular and in stark contrast to ruling Moro traditions. His successors reversed some

of these policies, especially concerning the Datu-system (Byler, 2005). Gomez concludes that Moro

religion and society were hardly altered by American rule (Gomez, 2000). Jubair emphasizes in similar

39

fashion that trouble was mostly rising when the governance of Mindanao became increasingly a

Filipino matter (Jubair, 1999). Both Gomez and Jubair especially point at the land registration as a

measure of great importance and reason for grave dissent. This started with obligatory registration,

which included the payment of a small sum. Many Moros were not aware of the Land registration

Act and did not register. Moreover, the payment of the sum was seen as a tribute, something many

Moros refused to pay out of principal (Jubair, 1999). Subsequently, confiscation of all unregistered

and untitled lands followed. Finally, the terms for Moros to buy back land or get entitlements were

discriminatory (Jubair, 1999). This caused an enormous shock in Moro society, in which land and

property was central to a man’s existence (Jubair, 1999). This is an important grievance to the Moro

up until today.

From 1914 onwards, civilian governance was installed. The Americans brought economic

development to Mindanao and with their ‘policy of attraction’ (starting in 1916), education and

further development became a possibility for the Moros (Jubair, 1999; Gomez, 2000). This policy

consisted of the granting of scholarships, the building of schools, hospitals and infrastructure and

gaining allegiance of Moro leaders by seducing them with nice jobs and pleasure trips, often referred

to as ‘dollar diplomacy’ (Jubair, 1999).

Meanwhile, the Filipino plea for independence had regained momentum after the First

World War (Zaide, 1999). Such pleas were heard and in principal welcomed in the United States,

whose politicians were slightly ambiguous in the matter. Being a colonized nation themselves once,

their sympathy for Filipino independence is clear. However, geopolitical reasons, such as the

increasing threat of the Japanese empire and the strategic position of the Philippines for shipping

routes to Asia were equally weighed. Nevertheless, in the Jones Bill of 1916, The United States

expressly support Filipino Independence as soon as they could form a stable government. This would

last until 1946 and entailed a handover of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago to Filipino control.

However, such control was already exercised increasingly from the 1920’s (Gomez, 2000).

The policy of resettlement was another important development, impacting on political

stability. This policy to bring Filipino farmers from the crowded areas of the Visasyas Islands to the

fertile lands of the Mindanao mainland was introduced in 1912. This policy was not welcomed by the

Moro Muslims, who were now forced to integrate with Christian Filipino’s and share their land. Salah

Jubair writes that this integration did not go well. With the Filipino’s in control, discrimination against

Moros by the Filipino constabulary, the harassment of Moro women, bribery and more violations of

their rights were frequent (Jubair, 1999). Gomez speaks of great animosity, especially because the

Christians had sometimes sided with the Spanish and Americans against the Moros. He points at very

40

negative perceptions of the other, which were dominant in both groups, specifically with lower

education groups. However, he also points to the friendships between Christians and Muslims,

especially in the higher echelons of society (Gomez, 2000).

Because of this animosity, the Moros appealed several times to the American Congress that

their fate should not be tied to that of the Filipino’s. The Moros would rather remain under the

umbrella of American rule than be subjugated to the will of the Filipino’s (Jubair, 1999). In a petition

to the Congress of the United States, a strong desire for this becomes clear:

“Therefore, we hereby solemnly and respectfully petition the Congress of the United States for

redress and amelioration of our present economic and political situation, and ask you, in the name of

your God and our God, who is one and the same, that you promptly grant us our request in order that

this, the land of our forefathers, may not be again drenched in the blood of Mohammedans and

Christians who should be dwelling together in peace and amity in the shelter of the American flag.”

(Mangigin et al (1924) in (Jubair, 1999))

2.1.3. World War II, a period of reconciliation and Philippine independency

World War Two changed this enmity because Moros and Christians were mostly fighting on

the same side, as brothers in arms. This created the right momentum to create an independent

Filipino state that included the Moros (Jubair, 1999). On July 4, 1946, the Philippines became

recognized by the United States as independent, during the presidency of Manuel Roxas. However,

as would soon become clear, much discontent and enmity remained unaddressed, ready to ignite

conflict.

2.1.4. Filipino rule: from an uneasy peace to overt conflict, 1946-1996

As an independent state, the Filipino’s continued most of the American policies. The political

system was almost the same, with only some minor differences. Despite forged bonds of

comradeship during the war, Filipino’s did not treat the Moros as their equals (Jubair, 1999).

However, Gomez adds that this was similar in some respects for the way in which the Moros treated

Christians. For example, when it concerned marriage, Muslim women were not allowed to marry

Christian males. According to Gomez, this was a serious problem for establishing harmonious

relations and integration (Gomez, 2000). Its significance cannot be underestimated because of the

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Roxas

41

strong kinship-system, also known as the Datu-system, which still ruled in many Moro communities.

This meant that some family ties should be established as a prerequisite to fully participating in a

Moro community (Gomez, 2000). Datus were supported by their tribes. In return for tribute and

labor, the Datu provided aid in emergencies and advocacy in disputes with other communities and

warfare through the Agama and Maratabat laws9.

Manuel Roxas was the first president of the independent Philippine state. He was

determined to end the oppressive Datu-system and govern the Moros properly (Jubair, 1999). The

government, however, did not seriously stimulate wider economic development in Mindanao. It

continued awarding contracts to large mining and timber corporations, selling the extraction rights of

large swaths of land on Mindanao. Also, as a result of scaling up the resettlement program, Moro

land possessions were further contracted (Jubair, 1999). Gomez draws a similar image, adding

though that the corrupt Datu- system made things even worse for the ordinary citizens of Mindanao

(Gomez, 2000). Resettlement led to a range of problems.

The first was that Christians were doing better than their Muslim counterparts in some

important respects. For example, on schools and the labor market, Christians perform better. But

also when Christian companies compete with those run by Muslims, productivity and sales by

Christian businesses are usually higher. This leads to a lot of dissatisfaction and envy (Gomez, 2000).

And then there is the problem of representation, which Salah Jubair rightly mentions. When the

Christians first settled in Mindanao around the start of 20th century, there were already many

Muslims. This changed slowly in the beginning and then took up pace after the Second World War,

with Christians comprising around 90 % of the population (Jubair, 1999). Consequently, in many

districts, Moro candidates got outvoted by their Christian competitors due to the rapidly changing

composition of the population (Jubair, 1999). In sum, Moros lost a lot of land, influence in local and

regional governance, jobs and other positions. Next to that, there was also a loss of pride due to

gradual loss of traditions and culture, such as Islamic schooling and the hierarchical kinship system.

The latter was especially relevant concerning the implementation of Qu’ranic laws, which were

enforced by the Datus in their particular townships. And finally, the Christians generally possessed

more wealth than the Muslims.

All these factors led to an increase in tension between Christians and the ordinary Moro

populations (Jubair, 1999). Gomez points to three reasons why in spite of all this, it took more than

two decades before conflict would break out:

- due to the influx of settlers, the opposition of Christians became superior,

9 Maratabat is the honor code of the Maranaos, who live in parts of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte.

Maratabat can instruct violence when the family honor is lost.

42

- parts of Mindanao were still sparsely populated,

- the Moros could also profit economically of productive Christian farms and,

- occasional violent outbursts were successfully framed by the government as criminality

(Gomez, 2000)

Nevertheless, the tensions did not decrease, and conflict broke out.

After more than two decades of structural low-level incidents, real resistance started to form

on the Mindanao mainland in 1968. In response to the Jabidah massacre in 1968 on the island of

Corrigidor, where 64 Moro military trainees were killed10, Datu Udtog Matalam created the

Muslim/Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM). The message of MIM to no longer suffer the

degradation and humiliation from the Filipinos could count on many sympathizers among the Moros,

especially with young students. However, the aim of independence did not yet gain wide support, as

only a quarter of the Muslim population supported this at the time (Gomez, 2000).

The MIM had issued a Manifest based on four points (Jubair, 1999):

- the right of self-determination of minorities,

- support of the Islamic World Conference,

- Muslims in Mindanao were, by way isolation and dispersal, systematically exterminated by

the GRP and,

- that Islam is a communal religion, ideology and way of life, and needs an independent

territory to be exercised in

President Ferdinand Marcos, who came to power in 1965, was personally blamed for the

Jabidah massacre. Separatist movements like MIM, and the Marxist insurgents who united under the

New People’s Army (NPA) in 1968, harmed his authority. According to Thompson, Marcos was

committed to uniting the Philippines under his leadership with an ambitious development program.

He was convinced that the oligarchical system of the Philippines, with many political families having

disproportionate power, was hampering the county’s development (Thompson, 2014). Therefore, he

needed to react strongly.

Marcos first reacted with diplomatic tact by extending an invitation to Datu Matalam to meet

him in person. He appointed Matalam as his adviser on Muslim affairs. Matalam took the bait and for

someone who was already representing vested interest, making a deal with Marcos did no good to

his reputation with the ordinary Moro. However, he also failed to unite all Moro groups to his cause

10

Supposedly, this happened because they refused to participate in a mission to claim the Sabah territory. Marcos had laid claim on the Malaysian part of Borneo, on the premise that it used to belong to the Sulu sultanate.

43

because of another reason. The MIM never became a popular movement of the masses through its

lack of bottom-up organization and communications. Other groups did not fare much better between

1968 and 1971. The Banga Moro Liberation Front (BMLO), which was created in 1970 by prominent

Moro leaders such as Rashid Lucman, Salipada Pendatun and Ahmah Alonto, managed to attract

external funds from Libya. However, it was never strong enough to unite all of the Moro rebel groups

(Jubair, 1999). The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was created by students in 1969 in

Manila. One of these students was Nur Misuari, an ethnic Tausug from Sulu. Misuari believed

especially in the historic oppression of the Moros and their right to secede from the Philippines

(Jubair, 1999). Other groups were more oriented towards pan-Islamism, emphasizing the unity of

Muslims and their shared struggle (jihad). These already dated back to the early sixties, when they

were created by students of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Among these students was Hashim

Salamat. The time in Cairo laid the foundation for his revolutionary ideas. The contacts with the

Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) were instructive in this sense. It also enabled Hashim to

enter a network of global Islamic activists (Gomez, 2000). The year 1968 marked an important

moment for students worldwide, with demonstrations in all corners of the world. Also inspired by

the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, the momentum for Islamic students to organize themselves to protect

Muslim rights could not be better. Other movements also came up, such as the Barracudas under

the command Ali Dimaporo, and the Llagas under the command of Feliciano Luces. The former was a

Muslim militant group while the latter was a Christian reactionary group (Jubair, 1999). Fighting

between these groups and between elements of the MIM and the Philippine Constabulary was

frequent from 1971 onwards (Jubair, 1999).

Meanwhile, the communist insurgency was the most dangerous threat to the Marcos regime.

Both rebellious movements, Muslim-separatist and communist, were becoming stronger. To turn the

tables, on the 21th of September 1972, Marcos declared Martial Law all over the Philippines. In his

famous proclamation 1081, he gave several reasons which ‘left him no other choice’:

- Relentless bombing of the Manila metropole area since March 1972

- Fast-growing insurgencies

- Mass import of weapons, both light and heavy

- A very violent and radical ideology, especially with communist groups such as the New

People’s Army11 who he compared with the communists in Vietnam.

11

The New People’s Army had produced a regional program for 1972 that called for mass recruitment, propaganda programs, armed training and creating chaos through attacks on a wide range of legitimate targets, robbery and sabotage. (Central Committee NPA, 1972)

44

- Committing more than 50 % of the armed forces and suspending the right of habeas corpus

have not worked to stop the chaos

- The economies in parts of Mindanao and Sulu had come to a halt, in such areas a factual

state of war existed

- More than half a million refugees

Marcos declared the following: “NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the

Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution

under martial law and, in my capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed

forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress

all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to

all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”

(Marcos, 1972)

The declaration of Martial Law gave the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and law-

enforcement organizations unrestricted power to arrest, detain and torture indiscriminately. Human

rights abuses were frequent. This caused a further escalation of the conflict. On the 21th of October,

heavy fighting breaks out between Muslim militants under the command of Ahmad Alonto and the

ARP. More clashes followed and the MNLF, who had secretly attracted many adherents and

resources, claimed leadership of the Moro secessionist movement (Jubair, 1999). Nur Misuari had

been chosen as its leader, just before Hashim Salamat. The MNLF proved itself on the Mindanao

mainland and Sulu archipelago during a conventional war (1972-1975) and a guerilla war (1975-1977)

(Jubair, 1999). According to Santos (Santos Jr, 2001), Misuari united the thirteen ethno-linguistic

Muslim groups in Mindanao, Palawan and Sulu with a common identity and goal for statehood. He

proclaimed the Moro Manifesto where he stated that Filipino colonialism had oppressed and

terrorized the Moro population, even accusing them of genocide. Moreover, their land had been

stolen and mosques had been desecrated (Santos, 2001). However, his autocratic rule of the MNLF

led to two splits.

The most important one came just after the Tripoli Agreement of December 197612. With the

agreement, the MNLF and GRP sued for peace under the condition of the creation of an autonomous

12

Peace accord brokered in Tripoli, under the auspices of the Quadripartite Commission (Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia and Senegal). This accord establishes autonomy within the realm of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the GRP. Many things were left open, but the region would get its own administration. Also, the right to set up Courts which implement Sharia laws was provisioned. The treaty reaffirmed the sole prerogative

45

region, comprising of certain parts of Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu archipelago (Tripoli

agreement, 1976). The agreement would form an important reference for all future negotiations. The

most important elements of the agreement were: 1) autonomy within the realm of sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the GRP, 2) in the autonomous area, Muslims can set up Sharia Courts, 3) the

authorities will have their own economic and financial system, 4) special regional police forces are

created, 5) a ceasefire, 6) mineral resources and mines fall within the competence of the Central

Government, which shall allocate a reasonable percentage to the autonomous region, and 7) a mixed

committee shall be formed to deal with all points left for discussion. Many points were still not fixed

and this made the agreement multi-interpretable.

For some influential commanders, the agreement represented an undermining of the true

cause of the rebellion: an independent Islamic state. Furthermore, Misuari’s autocratic leadership

caused much discontent. Under the leadership of Hashim Salamat, a splinter movement within the

MNLF was created called the ‘New MNLF Leadership’. Misuari responded by branding the group’s

leaders as traitors and outcasts (Jubair, 1999). The New MNLF Leadership would grow into an entirely

new movement in 1984: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF had a ten year program

based on four points:

- Islamization

- Organizational build-up

- Military build-up

- Self-reliance

It drew its lessons from certain failures within the MNLF. It is clear that the centralized

governance structure of the MNLF caused many frictions. The MILF wanted to build an organization

from the bottom-up. Also, it strictly stuck to its ideology of Islamization, something of which the

MNLF had dwindled, favoring a more secular disposition. And, despite the fact that the MNLF had

secured wide international support, this similarly made them over-dependent on such actors. The

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) had proved itself a powerful partner in the 1970s. They

had proclaimed the MNLF the legitimate representative of the Moro people and some of its most

prominent members had put great pressure on the Marcos regime by threatening an oil embargo

(Santos, 2001). However, by appealing for such help, the MNLF had made a trade-ff. Its decision-

making autonomy diminished because of such strong external powers. Lastly, there is military build-

up. The unilateral implementation by Marcos of the Tripoli Agreement and its subsequent failure,

had taught the MILF that peace negotiations were no guarantee for real peace at all (Jubari, 1999).

of the GRP over foreign policy and extraction rights of mineral resources. Lastly, a general amnesty was decreed and a ceasefire was to be installed immediately.

46

Therefore, it was deemed necessary to keep pushing for more military power, even when conducting

negotiations (Santos Jr, 2005).

In 1986, Marcos was ousted through a revolution of the people. His dictatorial and corrupt rule came

to an end by an extraordinary uprising on the 22th of February 1986. Over two million Filipino’s

assembled at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to demand his departure. Benigno Aquino, who

was a fierce opponent of Marcos, became the symbol of the revolution. He was murdered on his

return to the Philippines after he was forced to flee earlier. In part because of her celebrated

husband, Corazon Aquino won the next elections. Corazon Aquino was a reformer and wanted to

fight corruption and restore the rule of law (Santos, 2001). This made her make a move towards

establishing peace with the MNLF. She met with Misuari personally in summitry style (for summitry

see section 1.3.4.1.) and the two agreed to continue the peace process. An accord followed in

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1987. In Jeddah, the negotiators of the GRP and the MNLF agreed to discuss

autonomy (OPAPP, 2016). Aquino was keen to cover the introduction of the ARMM within the

Constitution because she was supposed to be the keeper of the rule of law after the EDSA revolution.

She ordered the drafters of the new Constitution to include such provisions for granting autonomy.

The MNLF wanted more time and a seat at the table when such provisions were made up. Aquino

refused and proceeded, like Marcos before her, on her own. This made the peace process collapse

(OPAPP, 2016). During her presidency, this was never revived. This period of enduring stalemate gave

other militant groups the ability to grow in relative anonymity. The MILF once broke this silence to

signal its existence, strength and disapproval of the ARMM when they launched a five-day offensive

in 1987 (Jubair, 1999). Another group arose out of disapproval of the MNLF-course in 1991. Abdujarik

Janjalani, ex-MNLF, created the more extreme Abu Sayyaf Group (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Against the

communist rebellion, Aquino was very successful during her presidency. With a sound military

strategy and aid from the USA, the AFP brought Communist numbers severely down (more on this in

section 2.3.3 where the military strategy of the AFP, which was partly based on these military

successes, is explained).

When Fidel Ramos came to power, the peace process regained its momentum. Under the

guidance of the OIC, peace talks were held in Jakarta from 1993-1996. This resulted in the signing of

the Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF on the 2nd of September 1996. The MILF,

not convinced by the terms agreed to by the MNLF in the Final Peace Agreement, continued armed

resistance. The government, reluctant to recognize another rebel group as legitimate, first tried to

subdue the MILF by force. When this did not work, a ceasefire was agreed to on the 18th of July 1997

(Jubair, 1999).

47

2.2. Starting negotiations and Estrada’s all-out war

2.2.1. Timeline of events

A chronological overview of events is provided in the timeline. In the timeline, the

categorization of the events into context, state or group is made by coloring the boxes. When

context is coupled with state, it means this event describes an interaction between the context and

state. The same holds for context-group. When state and group are coupled, there is an interaction

between them. When it is labeled under ‘ALL’, this means that both the state and the group are

interacting with parties in the context in this event. Colors:

- Light green : State-Group

- Light blue : Context

- Yellow : Group

- Gold : State

- Grey : State-Context

- Light green 2 : Group-Context

- Orange : All

Date Event Description Actor(s)

Jan 1997 Start Peace process Low level representatives of GRP,

MILF explore peace

GRP, MILF

July 1997 Ceasefire Parties agreed to de-escalate GRP, MILF

July 1997 Asian financial crisis Asian financial crisis hits the

Philippines hard

Financial markets

September

1997

CCCH created,

implementing

guidelines signed

The joint Coordinating Committee

on the Cessation of Hostilities is

created.

GRP, MILF

October

1997

Implementation Social

Fund for SZOPAD

The Social Fund is created to spur

development and recovery in the

SZOPAD

GRP, MNLF

June 1998 Elections Joseph Estrada gets elected, Gloria GRP

48

Arroyo is elected as Vice-President

August

1998

General framework

agreement of Intent

GRP and MILF agree to pursue

peace

GRP, MILF

October

1999

Formal peace talks

start

GRP and MILF begin negotiations

on high level

GRP, MILF

December

1999

United Coordinating

Council created

A coordination of efforts and views

without MNLF leader Misuari

MILF, MNLF

December

1999

Ozamis bombing A ferry in the harbor of Ozamis city

was bombed, killing 37 people.

MNLF suspected

March

2000

Kauswagan attack MILF commander Bravo attacks a

town hall in Kauswagan, killing

many innocents.

MILF

March

2000

All-out war policy

declared

In response to increasing terrorist

attacks, Estrada seeks to destroy

the terrorists and their safe havens

GRP, MILF, ASG

April 2000 Sipadan hostage crisis ASG takes 21 hostages on island of

Sipadan in front of Malaysian

Sabah

ASG, Malaysia, GRP

July 2000 Fall of MILF main

camp Abubakar

The AFP overruns the last real

stronghold of the MILF

GRP, MILF

July 2000 All-out jihad Hashim Salamat flees to Malaysia

and declares all-out jihad

MILF, GRP, Malaysia

November

2000

Impeachment

proceedings started

On allegations of corruption, an

Impeachment trial was started

against Estrada

GRP, (Congress)

December

2000

Rizal day terrorist

bombings

Five bombs went off in different

locations in Metro Manila, killing

22, wounding 100+

JI, MILF special

operations group

January

2001

EDSA II protests Because of a seemingly

manipulated impeachment trial,

hundreds of thousands Filipino’s

protested for Estrada’s resignation

GRP, population

January

2001

Estrada ousted,

Arroyo elected

The military withdrew its support

of Estrada and supported Arroyo.

GRP, AFP

49

This led to Estrada’s resignation.

February

2001

All-out peace policy Arroyo declares all-out peace, GRP, MILF

2.2.2. Context

It is important to gain an understanding of the context of the conflict to get a situational

picture. This is the environment in which our main actors of analysis, the GRP and the MILF, make

operational and policy decisions.

International

The international environment starting in 1997 was seemingly more complicated than it used

to be: with the collapse of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world

gained new dimensions of struggle and conflict. Jihadi terrorism is increasingly established in global

networks and conflicts were longer tied to great power support in the way they used to do (for

example the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Korea War, Ethiopian Civil War and the Angolan Civil War).

For the Philippines, in 1997, the AFP was severely depleted in resources. Similarly, the

communists did not receive the aid they were used to because of the disintegration of the Soviet

Union. The AFP no longer received large support from the USA in money, military equipment and

advice. About 80 % of its expenditures were directed at covering personnel expenses. No

investments could be made to replace the rusted materials and worn out equipment (Cruz de Castro,

2010).

On the economic front, the period from 1997 onwards was characterized by economic

stagnation all over South East Asia (Fischer, 1998). Because of the Asian financial crisis, the Philippine

peso devalued substantially. Subsequently, assets on stock markets devalued. This affected the

Philippine real economy, which experienced years of stagnation. This was bad news for the military,

which was in dire need of funds. Moreover, it also meant that the implementation of the FPA would

get harder, which required substantial investment in the Special Zone of Peace and Development

(SZOPAD, October 1997).

The political situation at the start of the negotiations was difficult for the MILF. The OIC has

supported the MNLF since its inception in 1972, and decreed it the sole representative of the Moro

50

people on 22 May 1977. It has continued to do so after the signing of Final Peace Agreement in 1996.

This is not surprising since the OIC had put much effort into reaching the FPA. In this respect, the OIC

now supported the Philippine government in its execution of the FPA. Important member states,

such as Libya, Indonesia and Malaysia shared the opinion that a solution must be found within the

boundaries of the constitution and Philippine sovereignty (Peng, 2008). Rizal Buendia explains that

MILF pleas for support were not granted by the OIC. The OIC pleaded for a solution of the conflict

within the boundaries of the Constitution and Philippine territorial integrity (Buendia, 2004). The

MILF wanted to separate from the Philippines instead of accessing the system or sharing power in it,

and rejected the Constitution (Santos, 2005). Therefore, the MILF could not obtain effective support

from the UN or OIC for its plea of self-determination. The group’s continued affiliation with jihadi

terrorism made this even worse (Buendia, 2004). This will be further elaborated on in the national

and state sections.

National

The Asian crisis affected the economy of the Philippines. In the wake of this economic crisis

the development of SZOPAD by the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD)

did not go well. Both due to lacking funds and mismanagement, the project did not result in

economic development and improved livelihoods (Buendia, 2004). For the MNLF this meant the

beginning of splintering. The more radical commanders joined the MILF or started to organize

themselves. Naturally, this lack of success presented an excellent opportunity to MILF to gain support

and recruit fighters. Within the MNLF, two big groups remained in 2001, the Misuari group, which

was strongest in the Sulu archipelago, and the Anti-Misuari Council of 15. Furthermore, the military

strength of MNLF was weakened under the FPA because many fighters demobilized. The MNLF was

committed to the success of the FPA. The group’s fate was tied to it. However, besides the failure of

the SZOPAD, only a limited amount (7250) of fighters were integrated into the Philippine national

police (PNP) and AFP. Those who tried to integrate back into civil life could not profit from the peace

dividend (Santos, 2005).

In the meantime, in part due to weakened AFP capabilities and inadequate PNP capabilities

and expertise, the Philippines became a safe haven for jihadi fighters. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

established a training base in Mindanao and ASG attracted many fighters (Santos, 2005; (ICG, 2008a).

On its peak in 2001, ASG counted 1200 active members (Cruz de Castro, 2010). This had led to more

and bigger terrorist attacks, such as the Ozamis bombing (Santos, 2005). Also, the amount of

hostage-taking increased considerably (see timeline). For the government, MILF involvement with

the ASG and foreign jihadi fighters by either harboring perpetrators or giving assistance in executing

51

such attacks meant that a peace deal was off the table (see state). The ASG was already a true spoiler

of peace in this period (ICG, 2004).

Local

Whereas the MNLF was focused upon getting its claim recognized in the international

community, the MILF also used a bottom-up approach, laying a solid foundation as a grassroots

movement. The MILF tried to gain more support under the local population. It organized a large

plebiscite to ask for support from the local population. This would help generate the legitimacy it

needed to negotiate with the government (McKenna, 1998). Also it organized a parallel governance

structure (explained under group), which enabled them to engage actively with the local population.

This also allowed people to seek their rights on the basis of Islamic law (Torres, 2007).

Economically, Mindanao suffered from the national economic contraction as a consequence

of the Asian financial crisis. However, another specific local problem was also manifest. Due to the

increasing kidnappings of the ASG, the business climate worsened. Foreign investment and tourism

was dropping and businesses rather settled elsewhere (Fischer, 1998; Abuza, 2003).

Such kidnappings also have a negative effect on social cohesion. Christians became

increasingly afraid of the Islamic kidnapping gangs. The practice of rido remained a source of tension.

According to Wilfredo Mango Torres, the practice of rido refers to: “a state of recurring hostilities

between families and kinship groups characterized by a series of retaliatory acts of violence carried

out to avenge a perceived affront or injustice.” (Torres, 2007) His compilation of studies into rido in

Mindanao concluded that the presence of the MILF led to an increased occurrence of rido. Because

people can address their problems through different justice systems, government and MILF

enforced, conflicts often erupt (Torres, 2007). Rido is almost never solved through the formal justice

system, but always through traditional conflict resolution (Torres, 2007). Rido is an important local

phenomenon which should be adequately taken into consideration in any peace agreement. It has to

potential to spoil any hard-won peace made on the national/international level.

2.2.3. State

After his successful negotiation of peace with the MNLF, Ramos also sought peace with the

MILF. This got well underway during 1997, with both parties exchanging views in exploratory talks

and the creation of the Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities. Skirmishes and

mistrust remained a problem though, especially around the town of Buldon (Jubair, 1999). Both

52

parties were more concerned with troop movements and violations of the peace (Jubair, 1999).

Because Ramos’ term was ending, the goal of reaching a true peace agreement was left to his

successor, Joseph Estrada. The government position on a peace deal would not change significantly.

The GRP maintained that for the MILF a similar solution must be found as for the MNLF, taking some

of their special demands into consideration. However, this must be done within the framework of the

Constitution (Jubair, 1999).

Bargaining could also serve as an effective way to bide time. This could serve two purposes:

to gain an advantageous military position or to undercut popular support for the separatist

movement by stimulating development. Both did not happen, not under Ramos or Estrada (Santos,

2005). Estrada was from another party and did not come from a powerful Filipino political family.

Nevertheless, this did not mean he would alter his predecessor’s course on the peace process. Ramos

focused on attaining peace to boost economic development and Estrada continued this policy

(Santos, 2001). A substantial and meaningful development program for SZOPAD never came about.

The military remained in a weak state. With a government deficit of about 4 %, budget cuts were

inescapable13.

Estrada faced many internal struggles. Such struggles inevitably had their effect on the peace

process. He had a large popular mandate, and having a background as an actor and coming from a

more humble upbringing, Estrada was able to relate much better to the ordinary and poor citizens.

Because of the president’s far-fetched control over the budget, he was also in a good position to

reward his followers and loyal backers from the elections (Thomson, 2014). However, his control

over extra-electoral groups was more limited. Groups like the church, the military, civil society

activists and businesses can be fierce opponents for a president. Estrada failed to secure support of

three of these groups (Thomson, 2014). His image of a hero for the poor, and bad economic

conditions were debit to this.

Economically, his government experienced a period of stagnation or low growth.

Government debt continuously increased (see Figure 2). By ending all sovereign guarantees for

businesses that were rewarded public contracts, Estrada lost business sector support. Also, and

especially relevant, by starting an anti-corruption campaign against some high-ranking military

officers, he antagonized the AFP. Due to corruption allegations that were picked up by civil society

organizations, the pressure mounted. An impeachment trial in the Senate was started against him.

When his supporters blocked the use of a certain piece of information (in a closed envelope), his

13

Source: Department of Finance Philippines

53

opponents left the Senate floor. Protests emerged quickly and a new EDSA revolution erupted. When

the military withdrew its support, Estrada had to back down in January 2001 (Thomson, 2014).

Figure 2: Development of Philippines Government debt to GDP.

The internal struggles had a clear effect on the conflict. In response to increasing terrorist

attacks and some large scale clashes with the MILF in 1999, Estrada had ordered the all-out war

against the MILF and the ASG in March 2000 (Cruz de Castro, 2010). Moreover, a war could serve as a

good way to divert attention from the corruption scandals. Possibly, due to inspection of the camps

for their recognition as MILF areas, the GRP was alarmed by what was going on in these camps (see

section 2.2.4.) The struggle was violent and costly. More than a million people got internally

displaced and the costs were estimated at 1.3 billion pesos (about $30 million) (OPAPP, 2016).

However, the AFP could be considered successful in this conventional war with MILF and ASG,

overrunning all camps of the MILF. In spite of this, losses and costs were also high. Because of

inadequate military capacity and the MILF shift to guerilla warfare, it was hard to press the MILF into

real surrender (Buendia, 2004). Consequently, Estrada could not reap any future peace dividend

which made his presidency more vulnerable. This culminated in corruption charges, an impeachment

trial and a people power revolution from the middle and upper class. Estrada was deposed and

succeeded by his Vice-President Gloria Arroyo, who had led the coalition against him (ICG, 2004).

54

2.2.4. Group

During the major clashes of 1996/beginning 1997, the MILF experienced that it had the

means to resist the government. This gave the group a lot of confidence and momentum. Attracting

ex-combatants from the MNLF and others, their ranks swelled. Estimates of MILF strength at that

time ranged from 10,000 to 35,000 fighters (Buendia, 2004). Their fighters were highly organized

and concentrated on the Mindanao mainland (Santos, 2005). The fundaments of the MILF program

formulated in the 1980s had not changed: military build-up, Islamization, organizational build-up and

self-reliance. These pillars were all deemed important for achieving the end goal of Bangsamoro

independence. The MILF had a flexible strategy on how this could be done.

It was deemed important though to establish a sound organization to engage with the

population, undermine government control and increase its legitimacy. To this end, the MILF set up a

shadow government. The MILF organizational structure resembled the government levels of central,

provincial, municipality and barangay layers of governance. Each level of governance had its own

tasks and responsibilities within a designated area. The areas of the MILF were divided into ten

provinces, to be governed by the Provincial Committees. These were responsible to execute bigger

organizational programs and policies. The Municipal Committees were responsible for smaller

programs and governance. The Barangay Committees were set up to implement policies and enforce

Islamic law on a local level. Heading these committees was the Jihad Executive Council, in charge of

day-to-day affairs, and the Central Committee. The MILF Central Committee meets two times a year,

except in case of an emergency, and determines the overall policy and strategy. Members also had

leading positions in daily governance, such as head of Military affairs or Political affairs. The Vice-

President for Political Affairs for example, Ghazali Jaafar, managed the Committee-structure.

Important is that for each committee, there was a designated division or platoon of the Internal

Security Forces, that aided in enforcing the law and keeping order. This structure eroded the

authority of the government in these areas significantly (Taya, 2007).

Besides a military struggle, the MILF leaders also believed in the importance of a diplomatic

struggle. The strategy was not limited to ways for achieving military victory, but also included the use

of diplomacy and peace. The MILF, in contrast to the CPP/NPA, did consent to an agreement to limit

violence during negotiations (Santos, 2005). Such pauses and peace could also be used to the groups’

advantage, promoting rehabilitation and development (Santos, 2005). From the onset of the

negotiations, the MILF presented its agenda:

- Recognition of the Moros’ ancestral domain and of their displacement and landlessness;

55

- Reparation for victims of the war for such acts as destruction of property and violation of

human rights;

- Ending of social and cultural discrimination;

- Solution to economic inequalities and widespread poverty among the Moros;

- Ending of exploitation by outsiders of the Moro homeland’s natural resources;

- Implementation of genuine agrarian reform.

The main problem in the negotiations related to the concept of ancestral domain. The MILF

contended that it was willing to negotiate on territory which would belong to a new juridical entity,

but never on what was included under the ancestral domain of the Moros (Bacani, 2006). This would

be seen as a betrayal to their ancestors and as a denial of the land expropriation that the Moros had

suffered. It is not impossible though, that this is a part of their long-term strategy. Because the MILF

still favored independence and did not distance itself from this goal (Santos, 2005), one can infer that

such an autonomous juridical entity is merely an intermediate phase towards an independent state.

Recognition of the ancestral domain would legitimize their long-term claim. Significant in this was the

continued drive for the recognition of its camps. The MILF reasoned that by way of recognition, its

legitimacy was enhanced and so was its claim on these pieces of territory. These were no ordinary

camps. Some of the camps comprised of thousands of hectares. Also, they consisted of many

facilities for training, education and governance (Ressa, 2003). On this will be elaborated more in

phase two. To the MILF, steps in the peace process did not have to be big, as long they were solid

and irreversible (ICG, 2004). The same step-by-step reasoning can be applied to the issue of a short-

term autonomous territory, an intermediate phase, versus long-term independence on the basis of

ancestral domain.

Hashim Salamat had nurtured ties with foreign jihadi fighters during his studies in Egypt, his

period as a foreign spokesman for the MNLF and during his time in exile as chairman of the MILF

(Jubair, 1999). Therefore, it can be considered very logical that he welcomed many foreign jihadi

fighters to the Philippines during the 1990’s. As some of its leading fighters were trained in Pakistan

and Afghanistan, it was easy for them to relate to foreign jihadi fighters. Consequently, mixing and

integration happened. So how did this work?

In the late 1990s, because of increasing pressure on Pakistan, jihadi training camps are

moved from Pakistan to Mindanao. The MILF, being established in Pakistan during the 1980s, was

familiar in both worlds (Mckenna, 1998). The Philippines were a good choice for several reasons.

First, the Philippines was a tourist-friendly state with minimal visa requirements. Second, financial

oversight was lacking which was especially important for the funding structure of many jihadi groups.

56

These relied on the gifts of the ummah14, local population support, charities from NGO’s and

mosques, crowd-funding through websites and keeping their funds in confidential banks. Third, there

was a good-functioning system for remittances. Fourth, border controls, particularly in the Sulu

archipelago were lacking, which was important for smuggling. Fifth, the endemic corruption in many

parts of the Philippines created an environment of lawlessness and state failure. And sixth, there was

ample supply of illegal firearms on the black market (Abuza, 2003). Members of the ASG, and

foreign jihadi fighters from JI and other groups used the MILF training camps. Separate small camps

were set up inside the MILF training camps (Quilala, 2007). These camps were called Camp Palestine,

Camp Hodeiba and Camp Vietnam (Ressa, 2003). According to Thomas Hegghammer, between 1997

and 2000, somewhere around 70 foreign fighters entered the Philippines (Hegghammer, 2010). Ressa

(2003) stated that only the Indonesians already counted a 1000 men which received training in the

MILF camps (Ressa, 2003). Most of them were connected to JI or another branch of Al-Qaeda (Ressa,

2003). And if this was not the case, they were at least all adhering to the same pan-Islamist mother

movement (Heghammer, 2010). According to Heghammer, foreign fighters and international

terrorists sometimes cooperate but can similarly compete over resources. Heghammer stated that

foreign fighters are different in that they have more popular support than international terrorists,

fight in insurgencies against combatants, and can raise funds and other means easier (Heghammer,

2010).

For Al-Qaeda and the MILF, this was similarly true. The two organizations sprang from the

same well and cooperated. Already in the 1980s, Al Qaeda set up a sophisticated financial network in

the Philippines. Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Osama Bin Laden’s brother in law, travelled to the

Philippines to create this (Ressa, 2003). Khalifa created confidential bank accounts and used Islamic

NGOs, smaller sub-organizations and mosques to raise funds for terrorist- or armed operations. Al-

Qaeda provided a vast network of intelligence, experts and resources that the MILF would profit

from. Especially in the 1990s, its funding operations were conducted unabated (Ressa, 2003). The

MILF provided Al-Qaeda with men and a safe haven to train and plan its operations. Ressa shows that

the two organizations were intimately connected by giving certain examples. She mentions the case

of Fathur Roman Al-Ghozi, an Indonesian member of JI, and Muhklas, a Filipino and chief of the MILF

Special Operations Group15. Al-Ghozi was recruited by a man called Bin Abbas, or Solaiman.

Solaiman was head of the Mantiqi 3 division of JI, which comprised the Southern Philippines and

parts of Indonesia. Solaiman worked for the head of JI, Abdullah Sungkar, who was a personal friend

of Bin Laden and created the JI-branch of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Al-Ghozi was working with

14

The world Islamic community 15

This MILF unit was in charge of executing terrorist attacks.

57

Muhklas on a bombing in Manila in December 2000. They worked for a man called Hambali, who was

head of operations for JI and also high up in the ranks of Al-Qaeda. Hambali simultaneously planned

the Christmas bombings in Indonesia that month (Ressa, 2003). It becomes clear that the network

was highly interconnected. According to Ressa (2003), the terrorist groups were at the peak of their

strength at this time, with ASG numbering up to 4000 members. Such double affiliations were not

only true for the top branch. Other members that work for the MILF have sometimes joined

operations for JI (Ressa, 2003). All in all, it is no wonder that the MILF counted upon the fighting

strength and financial support of the Al-Qaeda linked terrorist network.

For the international diplomatic struggle, this did not produce favored results. For the

government, this was even more problematic. Estrada could not be seen as negotiating with

terrorists who bomb their own people. When the MILF was suspected of aiding in the Ozamis

bombing, negotiations with the government halted. For its long-term strategy, ties with JI and ASG

were not without negative consequences. The MILF wanted to secure recognition of the camps, but

failed because of the unexpected all-out war, triggered by terrorist attacks. On the other hand, when

the MILF was losing the all-out war, Hashim Salamat could rely on these violent groups for aid when

he called for an all-out jihad in the summer of 2000 (ICG, 2004). It made the MILF threat of using

terrorism more credible, which could be used as leverage. Also, the MILF could use the expertise of

such groups as ASG and JI when they shifted to guerilla warfare. Due to this tactic, the government

was unable to implement a peace dividend on the local population of Mindanao. Operations to

maintain pressure were unattainable for the understaffed, badly equipped AFP (Cruz de Castro,

2010). Consequently, the MILF could survive, despite having made a strategic error to engage overtly

with the global jihadi network.

2.2.5. Main observations

This period is marked by the initial surge for peace. This was however hampered by a number

of factors. Due to a lack of funds development programs did not progress. The Asian financial crisis

hit the Philippines and government budgets experienced strong deficits. Also, the MILF and other

terrorist groups were allowed the space to strengthen themselves. In terms of generating public

support and building up the military, the MILF and Communist movement made substantial gains. In

relation to military build-up, the MILF used its connections with former Jihadist colleagues from the

Afghanistan mujahedeen, for profitable exchange in training and fighters and funding. The MILF

could also recruit many of the disgruntled fighters of the MNLF. For the MILF, such military build-up

58

gave them a better bargaining position within their diplomatic struggle. In relation to organizational

build-up, the MILF set up its shadow government and enforced its control over the areas surrounding

the camps. This effectively enhanced legitimacy, public support and undermined the government.

These developments were suspiciously observed by the government and later spoiled the

beginning of the formal peace talks. Because of increasing terrorist attacks by groups like ASG and JI

(sometimes linked to the MILF Special Operations Group), the governments’ credibility was at stake.

Also, mistrust had grown as more frequent and deadly violations of the ceasefire occurred. For the

MILF, peace negotiations were also a struggle. The AFP also violated the ceasefire. Moreover, it was

hard for the MILF to convince their members, especially the more radical wings, of the gains won

through diplomacy. With the failure of the SCPDP and a weak ARMM, the reputation of the MNLF

had suffered a severe blow. Its subsequent splintering into several factions was an important lesson

for the MILF.

The MILF could only address the grievances felt by the Moro population by bargaining a

peace. Local conditions did not improve and this was an important part of their mandate to continue

fighting. Communal discontent and a deprivation of social needs are important factors for sustaining

the protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990) in Mindanao. Addressing these things was important for

the MILF and would require a peace deal. Despite restraints on government actions due to

deteriorated economic conditions and increased MILF military and organizational capability, the

group did not capitalize on these developments. The MILF overstepped and lost its potential gains.

The links with ASG and JI worked as spoilers and its position as a military power was distrusted. As an

incremental peace process, focused upon recognition of the MILF camps, was part of the MILF

strategy, the all-out war and loss of the camps was a severe setback. The MILF did not pay enough

attention to internal dynamics within the state, where Estrada came under increasing pressure. In

such circumstances, a rally to the flag war scenario is not unthinkable. This is also an opportunity for

the state, something the MILF did not see coming.

For Estrada, the serious attacks and increasing public outrage about hostage-takings provided

an opportunity. The all-out war was partly successful, almost every camp of the MILF was overrun

and Hashim had to flee to Malaysia. Unfortunately for Estrada, he could not push through and profit

from this development. This had two reasons. First, the MILF went underground and shifted to

guerilla-warfare. Second, due to his unpopularity with important extra-electoral groups such as the

military and businesses, he was vulnerable. By cleverly framing Estrada as corrupt and unreliable, he

was deposed. For the peace process, this showed that internal spoilers are just as important as

59

external spoilers. Also, it appeared that the situation on the ground must be relatively peaceful (with

predictable troop movements), for the necessary trust to arise.

2.3. Arroyo and the global war on terror (2001-2005)



March

2001

Kuala Lumpur agreement Resumption GRP-MILF peace talks Malaysia, GRP,

MILF

March

2001

Second organic act for the

ARMM

Organic act adopted, MNLF protests

that it is not faithful to FPA

GRP

April 2001 Storming of presidential

palace

Presidential palace Malacanang is

stormed by Estrada supporters,

Arroyo calls on the army to

intervene

GRP, population

April 2001 Coup for MNLF leadership,

Misuari ousted

Council of 15 created, Misuari is

deposed

Parouk Hussin,

Hatimil Hassan,

Mulsimin Sema

April 2001 Misuari creates own

organization (look up name)

Misuari creates his own organization

with loyalists on Sulu,

MNLF, GRP

May 2001 Hostage taking Dos Palmas,

Palawan

ASG takes hostages, in an attempt to

free the hostages, 22 soldiers and 5

hostages are killed

ASG, GRP,

International

community

May 2001 National legislative and local

elections

Result elections, Communists win

seats in Congress

Congress,

population

May 2001 Communist numbers swell

again

From 4500 members in 1995, the

movement reaches 10 000 members

again

CPP, NPA, KM

June 2001 Coordinative and Integrative

System for Internal Security

Cabinet Oversight Committee on

Internal Security drafted the

National Internal Security Plan

GRP

60

June 2001 Tripoli agreement on Peace GRP and MILF agree to center peace

talks on three domains: ancestral

domain, security and rehabilitation.

GRP, MILF

August

2001

Implementing guidelines

security aspect Tripoli

Agreement

Installment Local Monitoring Teams

(LMT’s), call for International

Monitoring Team (IMT)

GRP, MILF

August

2001

Bangsamoro Development

Agency - Solidarity Fund

Joint initiative MILF and MNLF to

develop the Bangsamoro area

MILF, MNLF

September

2001

Terrorist attacks Al-Qaeda Deadly attacks against the World

Trade Center in New York and other

targets. In response: ‘global war on

terror’

Al-Qaeda, USA

November

2001

ARMM elections Parouk Hussin elected new ARMM

governor, Misuari supporters

boycott elections

Council of 15,

population

November

2001

Pro-Misuari forces revolt On Sulu and in Zamboanga City,

Misuari loyalists revolt but are

defeated by AFP. Misuari flees to

Sabah but is arrested.

MNLF, GRP,

Malaysia

December

2001

MNLF Plea with United

Nations, submittal of draft

declaration of independence

Misuari, out of frustration with the

GRP unilateral implementation of

the ARMM, seeks aid with the UN.

MNLF-Misuari,

UN

January

2002

Misuari repatriated to the

Philippines and detained

Upon his return, Misuari is arrested

for rebellion.

MNLF, GRP

January

2002

Start of US-Philippine

offensive against ASG on

Basilan

Balikatan operation. Pursuing

terrorists on Basilan Island until June

2002

GRP, USA

May 2002

Implementing guidelines

rehabilitation aspect Tripoli

Agreement

Work together to help civilians in

conflict areas. Recognition by GRP of

the MILF-run Bangsamoro

Development Agency

GRP, MILF

May 2002 Creation AHJAG Creation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action

Group, creating a coordination body

GRP, MILF

61

to coordinate actions against

criminals

May 2002

Joint Coordination Council The MILF and MNLF agree to

coordinate their efforts towards a

unified Bangsamoro homeland

MILF, MNLF

Executive Council

February

2003

Buliok offensive AFP launches an unexpected large-

scale attack on the MILF Islamic

Center Headquarters

GRP

March,

April 2003

Davao- airport, wharf

bombings

The Davao airport bombing killed

21, the Davao wharf bombing

claimed 17 lives

MILF, JI

suspected

March

2003

Bombing power

transmission towers

Power transmission towers are

bombed, causing one major power

collapse.

MILF suspected

March,

2003

Arrest warrants against MILF

leadership

After the Davao airport bombing

and several other bombings, the

GRP puts out arrest warrants against

the MILF leaders, branding the

organization as criminal/terrorist

instead of a legitimate political

organization

GRP

June 2003 MILF rejects terrorism Hashim Salamat makes a statement

that the MILF rejects terrorism

MILF

July 2003 Hashim dies Hashim Salamat dies and is

succeeded by Al Haj Murad Ibrahim

MILF

July 2003 Ceasefire A general ceasefire between the

GRP and MILF is agreed to in Kuala

Lumpur

GRP, MILF

February

2004

Superferry 14 bombing A ferry on its way from Manila to

Cagayan de Oro is bombed, killing

116

ASG, RSM, JI

February

2004

Inclusion CPP/NPA/NDF in

US foreign terrorist

Due to listing the CPP/NPA/NDF as

an FTO, the peace process with the

USA,

CPP/NPA/NDF

62

organizations list communist movement broke down

March

2004

Malaysian advance team

arrives

A group of Malaysian observers for

the IMT arrives

Malaysia

October

2004

Formation IMT Malaysia, Brunei and Libya formed

the International Monitoring Team,

which was tasked with overseeing

the ceasefire

Malaysia, Brunei,

Libya, OIC

February

2005

Hostilities Sulu MNLF and AFP clash on Sulu

because of continuing human rights

violations by AFP troops

MNLF, GRP

February

2005

Valentine Day’s bombings Three bombs explode in different

cities (Manila, General Santos and

Davao City), killing 8 and wounding

150

ASG, RSM, JI

May 2005 MILF Mindanao people

consultation

Four million people give MILF

mandate to negotiate a deal with

the GRP

MILF, population

July 2005 Negotiations on ancestral

domain start

Negotiations on the third track of

the Tripoli Agreement, ancestral

domain, start.

GRP, MILF

2.3.2. Context

International

Until January 2001, the peace process was an affair of domestic actors, such as the GRP, MILF

and some NGOs (Notre Dame University, Maguindanaon Professionals and Employees Association).

When Arroyo entered office, she took a multilateral approach, involving the OIC and Malaysia

straight away. Whereas in the period after the FPA in 1996, the conflict between the GRP and MILF

was mostly viewed as an internal matter, to be resolved within the boundaries of the Constitution,

the all-out war changed this (Quilala, 2007). The OIC, Malaysia, Libya and Brunei Darussalam started

to feel they should facilitate peace. The devastating effects of the war, with almost one million

people being internally displaced (OPAPP, 2016), were clear for all to see. This activated these parties

63

to take a more facilitative role. The OIC for example, at the 27th Islamic Conference of Foreign

Ministers (ICFM), expressed its concern for the military hostilities and urged the GRP and MILF to

seek for peace (Quilala, 2007). However, the OIC could not do more because the OIC did not

recognize the MILF as the legitimate representative of the Moro people. Instead, Malaysia stepped in

as a mediator (Quilala, 2007). The GRP objected to such a role, as Malaysia was seen as biased

towards the Moros, but its third-party role was nevertheless accepted. The GRP accepted all

demands made by the MILF, being

1) Withdrawal from MILF camps,

2) Involvement of the OIC or OIC members in the peace process,

3) Negotiations should be held on foreign neutral soil, and

4) The GRP should honor all previous agreements signed with the MILF (Quilala, 2007).

Parties rather choose a partial-insider mediator, than an impartial-outsider (section 1.3.4.4).

This was also true for the GRP. The only insiders that are at close distance are Malaysia and

Indonesia. With Indonesia too closely linked to the MNLF-GRP peace process, Malaysia was the

logical choice. Soon after this, the parties agreed to resume the peace process in Kuala Lumpur. Libya

also played a facilitative role and was more acceptable for the GRP because it did not play a

prominent role in financing the conflict anymore (Abuza, 2003). Building upon the sign of trust

created in Kuala Lumpur, the parties agreed on the specific tracks for the peace process in Tripoli:

security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain (Quilala, 2007). These tracks will be discussed more

extensively under the state and group sections.

Just after the Tripoli agreement was made in the summer of 2001, the international context

changed tremendously. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the United States was an

event that changed the world everywhere and this was also true for the Philippines. The Philippines

were probably one the areas in the world where the effects of 9/11 were felt most profoundly. With

a history of terrorist attacks in a conflict which could easily be perceived as divided along religious

lines, it would become an important theatre for the war on terror. As the Americans launched their

attacks on Afghanistan, the situation in Mindanao was also watched closely. With hostage takings

and bombings still numerous, the region drew the attention of the US. It was thought that some of

the planning and training for 9/11 was done in the Philippines and that Mindanao was a ‘safe haven’

for terrorists (more under group). President Bush increased pressure on states. The National Security

Strategy (2002) called for: “And America will hold the white house Washington to account nations

that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists— because the allies of terror

64

are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow

the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every

turn“. This was solidified by strong United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions such as

S/RES/1373 and S/RES/1377. Due to strong bilateral ties and the presence of jihadi networks on its

soil, the Philippines was quickly drawn into the global war on terror (Quilala, 2007; Cruz de Castro,

2010; Buendia, 2004).

National

When Arroyo entered the presidential office, the economy of the Philippines was recovering,

in spite of a still relatively low growth of just over 2 % (Philippine National Statistical Coordination

Board). This was mainly due to the influx of remittances from the USA and other parts of the world.

Another development was that due to increasing global competition, a trend of business outsourcing

had developed. Both back-office business processes, such as accounting, financial services and

human resources, and front-office processes, such as customer related services, were more and

more outsourced to low wage countries. A country like the Philippines, with a highly competitive

labor force, could profit from this development. During this phase, the growth of the world economy

continued and the Philippines grew steadily, although a little slower than its South East Asian

neighbors, steadily16.

Despite economic growth, the country was worried by continuing violence from two sides.

First, the communist movement had gained back its momentum during the Asian Crisis and was

becoming a real threat again. After the US had branded the CPP/NPA as a terrorist organization, its

leader Joseph Maria Sison called for all-out resistance. Arroyo readily accepted the FTO listing of the

CPP/NPA and declared war on the communists. This phase is characterized by continuous conflict

between the GRP and the CPP/NPA. Because of its presence on the Island of Luzon, and its

possession of heavy arms, the communists were seen as an existential threat. This is part of

geopolitics, influenced by ideas of containment to certain geographical areas, is important for the

GRP military strategy. Contrary to the Moro rebellion on Mindanao, the communists were harder to

contain (ICG, 2008b); (Woon, 2014)). The GRP only managed to attain a ceasefire and peace

agreement with the RPM-P (in 2005), and therefore had to fight the large majority of the communist

movement.

Second, the amount and severity of terrorist attacks was increasing. The Superferry bombing

(2004) and the Valentine Days’s Bombings (2005) were especially bloody (ICG, 2005). Hostage takings

such as Dos Palmas in Palawan and the kidnapping of Indonesian and Malaysian nationals to Jolo

16

Source: World Bank.

65

Island received much attention. The bombings reached their peak in this phase, with serious

disruptions of city life in Mindanao and the Manila metropole. It forced the GRP to launch an

offensive campaign, with help of the US, against the ASG and Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) (ICG,

2008). RSM was a smaller organization which operated in Manila. According to one its captured

members, its main task was to keep the AFP busy in Manila (ICG, 2008a). For these reasons, the

inclusion of the MILF on the list of terrorist groups was a matter of constant debate (see state).

Finally, there was an important development in the MNLF. The MNLF had gotten divided

because of the unilateral implementation of the ARMM by an organic act in March 2001. Misuari

rejected the organic act but his authority was waning. In April 2001 the breakaway faction under the

leadership of the Council of 15 was created. When Misuari supporters violently rebelled against the

plebiscites and subsequent elections for the newly created ARMM, Misuari had to flee Malaysia.

There he was arrested and later extradited to the Philippines. He was sentenced to prison time for

rebellion against the state. Consequently, the MNLF was split in two, a more moderate faction under

the leadership of the Council of 15, and a somewhat more radical faction of remaining Misuari

loyalists.

Figure 3: Per Capita Poverty Threshold and Poverty Incidence among Families 2006, 2009, and 2012.

NCR: National Capital Region (Manila). ARMM: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

66

Local

On a local level, three developments are important. First, underdevelopment and poverty

continued. In some areas 30-40 % of the population lives under the poverty line (see figure 4). The

contrast between the ARMM and Manila is 40,5 % vs 2,9 % (National Statistical Coordination Board).

For groups like ASG, this provided an excellent area of operations. By distributing food and money, it

gained popular support, at least passively, among parts of the population (Ressa, 2003). Efforts by

the GRP, US and MILF run Bangsamoro Development Agency only helped to soften the blows of

conflict. They did not structurally improve the situation and address this grievance (Santos, 2005).

Second, grievances were worsened by the large number of internally displaced persons.

When refugees return to their lands, they might find it either in ruins or appropriated by someone

else. Because of the honor codes like maratabat17, the disownment of land meant a serious offence

which should be settled. Consequently, inter-clan conflicts (rido) remained an issue that kept dividing

the Moros (Torres, 2007).

Third, the war on terror was also felt locally. Due to bombings and hostage takings and

retaliatory violent counter-terrorism operations, animosity between Muslims and Christians grew.

Discrimination of Muslims by the Christian majority worsened. This was also caused by negative

framing by the media. Chen Yuan Woon (2014) studied the role of framing by the Philippine media of

the Mindanao conflict. More specifically, he has focused upon the way audiences shape, re-make or

re-produce these frames. In the case of Mindanao, Woon’s analysis of the most widely read

newspaper, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), gave a clear idea of how the PDI reported on

Mindanao. Mindanao was displayed as another world, full of lawless conflict and chaos. Fortunately,

this was contained to the island by government military action. Reports focused heavily on the

violence in Mindanao, often accompanied by images of dead bodies signifying the severe brutality of

the conflict. The religious divide was emphasized, strongly framing the conflict as a religious conflict

or ‘clash of civilizations’. The Christians were depicted as good and peace-loving, while the Muslims

were evil and antagonistic. The concept of security is portrayed one-sidedly, writing of the AFP and

PNP as ‘providers’ and the Mindanao people as ‘receivers’. Local practices for conflict resolution are

completely overlooked. Woon concludes that despite the power of people to process the reports in

different ways and making an individual assessment, the mainstream Philippine media have

exacerbated the conflict (Chen Yuan Woon, 2014).

67

2.3.3. State

In the political sphere, Arroyo faced unrest from the beginning. Besides upcoming legislative

and local elections in May, she was confronted with rebellion among angry Estrada-supporters. The

impeachment and corruption charges were by Estrada-supporters seen as a coup d’état under false

pretenses. In May, Arroyo had to call for a state of rebellion to suppress the storming of the

presidential residence Malacanang (May 1, 2001). Shortly after this, elections were held for Congress

and the lower level governance bodies, such as municipal and city councils, mayors and vice-mayors

or barangay (neighborhood council) members. Possibly due to the violent overreaction of Estrada

supporters, Arroyo’s people power coalition performed well in the election, winning 8 out of 12

senators and a large majority in the House of Representatives. This meant that she had gained a

strong mandate to conduct further peace negotiations with the MILF and other groups. In June that

year, the GRP and MILF moved forward with the peace process by outlining the major tracks for

peace in the Tripoli Agreement: security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain (Quilala, 2007). For

security, in order to create trust and monitor troops on the ground effectively, it was deemed

necessary to create independent monitoring teams, composed of foreign nationals. As for

rehabilitation, the parties agreed that the MILF-run Bangsamoro Development Agency will lead these

efforts in MILF controlled areas (Quilala, 2007). For the MILF, this was a big step forwards, as it would

get more legitimacy and standing (Taya, 2007). On ancestral domain, the parties merely

acknowledged the need to identify such a geographical area (Quilala, 2007).

At the same time, the Arroyo administration had to deal with an exhausted AFP and PNP

after the all-out war and the growing support for insurgency movements in Mindanao. Arroyo

ordered the creation of a Coordinative and Integrative System of Internal Security. A National

Internal Security Plan (NISP) was drafted, which called for a holistic approach. The strategy enabled

the entire government machinery to make concerted and coordinated efforts to eliminate roots

causes and take out insurgents effectively. Arroyo called for a military, diplomatic, cultural and

economic path (Ressa, 2003). Within this framework, the AFP formulated its own policy of ‘focus and

contain’. It stressed that limited resources should be used on focus points for maximum impact (Cruz

de Castro, 2010). One might link the Buliok offensive to this policy, where the AFP tried to force a

breakthrough into one major MILF stronghold. The strategy further specified a tactics for counter-

insurgency, drawing from successful operations against the Communists from 1989-1995. An

approach of Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop was implemented along three phases:

- Military defeat of armed rebels and the dismantling of critical institutions/structures support

them

68

- Strengthening of territorial gains to create momentum and keep the initiative

- Create the conditions for other government agencies to operate safely (Cruz de Castro, 2010)

In order to implement such a strategy, the GRP could use external help. After 9/11, Arroyo

quickly pledged her allegiance to the war on terror. For the Americans, the Philippines and Southeast

Asia was an important region to fight international terrorists. After Arroyo granted US forces access

to Philippine air space in late 2001, help was on its way (Cruz de Castro, 2010). Short on all kinds of

material, the US supplied helicopters, weapons, aircraft and training. Also, it supplied 600 men of

Special Forces for operations on Basilan against ASG (Cruz de Castro, 2010). Operation Balikatan,

which lasted from January till July 2002, was a clear signal to all insurgency/terrorist groups of the

determination of the GRP/US coalition. It was also well-timed because terrorist groups had

regrouped after the all-out war. Whereas 2001 was relatively peaceful compared to the previous

year of destructive war, 2002 was characterized by a steady rise of bomb attacks (ICG, 2004).

Whether the bomb attacks were triggered by US presence on Philippine soil remains unclear.

However, the frequent bombings worked as a clear pressuring tool on the peace process (Quilala,

2007).

From an MILF perspective, the bomb attacks might have been part of a strategy to increase the

need for a peace deal. From the GRP perspective, because of continuous suspicion of MILF elements

aiding and sheltering terrorists, its peace stance toward the MILF became more vulnerable. At the

same time, a US threat to put the MILF on its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) loomed over

the peace process. However, the GRP wanted to separate its struggle with the MILF from the global

war on terror (ICG, 2004). The GRP successfully lobbied against FTO listing, but as the indiscriminate

violence started to grow, this was exceedingly difficult (ICG, 2004). It knew from experience with the

CPP/NPA that listing the MILF among as an FTO would mean a breakdown of the peace process.

Therefore, it was needed to establish some sort of coordination mechanism to signal a clear MILF

commitment that the group is on the side of the international community against terrorism. Having

agreed on implementation guidelines for security (August 2001) and rehabilitation (May 2002)

earlier, the peace panels made a significant step in this regard. They agreed to create a mechanism to

cooperate on fighting criminal syndicates. The agreement enabled the creation of an Ad Hoc Joint

Working Group to coordinate such efforts (ICG, 2004). For the moment though, the agreement was

more symbolic than of true value, since it was not operationalized. Sporadic clashes endured while

the peace process started to come to a halt (ICG, 2004). For both the MILF and the GRP, negotiations

at this point were used for military build-up. Santos (2005) concludes that Arroyo’s government was

mostly concerned with two tracks: pacification and demobilization, and military victory. Based on the

69

logic of the NISP and the fact that negotiations stopped after agreeing on provisions concerning

security and development (part of the NISP), this is justified conclusion.

In February 2003, the government launched the Buliok offensive. On the same day, a proposal

concerning the peace process was made. This caused serious doubt on the side of the MILF whether

the GRP was sincere in its quest for peace (ICG, 2004). Taya (2007) claims the Buliok offensive was

thoughtfully orchestrated because of the state visit of President Bush that same month. Contrary to

the report of ICG, Taya (2007) states that the GRP did lobby to get the MILF listed as an FTO.

According to Taya, the Buliok offensive was planned to convince President Bush to list the MILF as a

FTO during his visit (Taya, 2007). The exact reason for the Buliok offensive remains unclear, but

whether it was to convince the Americans or because of a deadlock in the peace process, it caused

the immediate shattering of any trust which existed between the parties. The Buliok offensive may

have also been launched because of new intelligence that certain camps were re-used by foreign

jihadi contingents (Ressa, 2003). Following a series of battles and a surge in terrorist attacks, a

ceasefire was struck in July 2003. For the GRP, some gains were accomplished. The MILF stronghold

was eventually overrun and delivered significant evidence of the MILF terrorist connections (Ressa,

2003). The offensive triggered a sequence of bombings. It caused a serious disruption of the peace

process which would yet gain track in 2005. I will return on this disruption at the end of this section.

Something that might have been more effective than the Buliok offensive was the arrest warrant

against the MILF leadership which was issued after the Davao bombing in April 2003. Effectively, this

turned MILF leaders from legitimate political figures into criminals (ICG, 2004). After an appeal by

Arroyo to stop aiding terrorists and the looming threat of being listed as terrorists by the US, Hashim

Salamat, the MILF leader, pleaded: “it has always, and will continue to reject terrorism (22 June

2003).” The GRP could use this declaration as a sign that it could trust the MILF. After this, the

number of clashes decreased significantly. Similarly, the number of bomb attacks decreased. The

latter could be explained in four ways:

- The killings/capture of several leading jihadi fighters paid off, for example JI-leaders on

Mindanao Zulkifli (capture), Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi (killed) and Taufiq Rifqi (capture)

- After the rejection of terrorism and the ceasefire, the MILF curtailed further attacks

- Internal dissension in the MILF after the death of Hashim turned attention inwards

- Terrorist tactic: lay low for a while to ensure success of the next big attack.

70

The supposed détente in terrorist attacks would not last. In February 2004, the deadliest attack

in Southeast Asia since the Bali bombing18 took place. A ferry was bombed killing 116 people. In

December that year, a bomb in a market in General Santos killed 16. Finally, in February 2005, the

Valentine’s Day bombings in three different locations killed 8 people. For the GRP, it was hard to

make any progress with the peace process. Getting an easy peace would not last and lack any

legitimacy if the MILF was continuously associated with terrorism. Similarly, the Buliok offensive

showed that going to war was not bringing the group to its knees. For the GRP, it was absolutely

critical to separate the MILF from terrorist groups. Mixing of the two presented the worst situation

(ICG, 2004). A good step was made in December 2004, when the AHJAG19 mechanism became

formally established an. AHJAG would serve as a coordination mechanism between the AFP and BIAF

commands to address “lawless elements in Mindanao”. The mechanism would be made operational

at the next meeting of the CCCH in January 2005 (ICG, 2008b). From then on, the GRP also

committed to a major offensive on the island of Jolo against the ASG in February 2005. Regrettably

though, this drew the fighters into the fray at the side of the ASG. It proved to be a tactical error that

the GRP did not have a coordination mechanism with the MNLF. From July 2005, the first joint

counter-terrorist operations on mainland Mindanao would be held (ICG, 2008b). These will be

discussed in the next phase.

In conclusion, it is clear that for the state there were several major problems that halted the

peace process in 2003. One is the degree of legitimacy a peace process would have if the MILF has

continuing terrorist links, even after the public rejection of terrorism by its leader Hashim in 2003.

Another is the military build-up that was taken place during negotiations. A third is the change of

leadership in the MILF. With whom were they dealing and can this person enforce a possible

agreement? Within the state itself, it is possible that the government was too preoccupied with the

May 2004 elections, in which Arroyo successfully defeated Fernando Poe. A change of leadership in

Manila could have caused another approach to the peace process, especially because it was always

so vividly politicized (Buendia, 2004). Finally, the government might have purposely waited to see if

an internal power struggle within the MILF would evolve after the death of Hashim. A break-up like

what happened with the MNLF, would have certainly strengthened the GRP position. In the end,

Murad Ebrahim proved capable of unifying the MILF and giving diplomacy a new impetus. We now

turn to this story.

18

On 12 October 2002, a tourist district on Bali was bombed, killing 202 people. 19

Ad Hoc Joint Action Group

71

2.3.4. Group

For the MILF, the all-out peace policy declared by Arroyo came at a good time. Dispersed and

hard-pressed by the offensives under President Estrada, the group needed to reorganize. The six

large divisions were split into smaller fighting groups, with more autonomy. However,

communication got harder and the command structure less cohesive (Taya, 2007). The camps were

better secured or rebuilt in more remote and better protected places. However, the MILF basic

model of a shadow government besides the GRP in its controlled areas would be continued.

According to Taya, this is where their main strength came from (Taya, 2007). The support of the local

population enabled the MILF to fight better, negotiate with more power and become more self-

reliant (Taya, 2007). Eventually, the MILF moved back into some of the camps and fortified them in

2004 (ICG, 2005). Although the grassroots strategy was still firmly in place, it could better be

executed from strong camps which facilitated parallel governance and civil engagement.

This phase sparks a slight change in the MILF strategy. When Estrada declared all-out war, he

also did something else. He declared all previously made agreements with the MILF invalid. In this

regard, it really was all-or-nothing for Estrada, because he literally destroyed years of diplomatic

work. The MILF concluded that if there was no third party witness, the GRP could go back on its

promises too easily. The MILF needed international protection and would more actively engage the

international community for it (Taya, 2007). This was essential for its diplomatic struggle, which was

based on small but irreversible steps of recognition of the Moro’s legitimate rights. When Arroyo

agreed to the four terms made by the MILF, this was considered an important strategic victory.

Besides agreeing to a third party and the legitimacy and validity of all previous agreements, the talks

would be held in a neutral, foreign venue (Taya, 2007). According to Taya, this served another

purpose for the MILF. To gain more protection, it needed a platform to express its ideas. Because the

Philippine media had short ties with Manila, the MILF felt its views were not accurately or sufficiently

represented. An international stage, for example in Malaysia or Libya, would serve this goal perfectly

(Taya, 2007).

Under fourth term, the AFP would retreat from all MILF camps. This meant that the first

political strategy, grass-roots organizational build-up, could be continued more easily, with the

existing camps already being center stages for this structure.

Two elements in this phase deserve more elaboration: the MILF role in terrorism and its

leadership change in 2003.

72

Since the war on terror had started, several ASG- and MILF members had returned to the

Philippines. Estimations are that at least 20 ASG members had returned and 10 MILF members

(Hegghammer, 2010). Clearly, a continuous flow of exchange within the global network was still

ongoing. Even after the signing of all-out peace by the Arroyo administration, this did not change.

The GRP simply denied the existence of Al-Qaeda in the Philippines and concentrated on the ASG,

which was framed as a domestic kill-for-ransom group (Ressa, 2003). While the GRP formulated a

staunch policy against the ASG of ‘no ransom’, which was undermined and unsuccessful, the

government still treated the MILF as a domestic insurgency (Ressa, 2003) The terrorist threat was

either downplayed for political reasons, or the intelligence services were unable to connect the dots,

for example because they had no central data base. It allowed the MILF to continue and strengthen

its ties within the Jihadi network. Some of its camps were used again, military build-up continued and

some horrific attacks were conducted and planned. The Bali bombing in 2002, an attempt to truck-

bomb a US embassy in Singapore in 2001, a bombing in General Santos in 2002, the Davao city

airport bombing and the wharf bombing, the ferry bombing in 2004 and the Valentine’s Day

bombings in 2005. All came from the same network as described in section 2.3.4 (Ressa, 2003).

However, as already explained in the state section, the MILF came under increasing pressure

to cut off its terrorist ties. With a listing on the United States FTO list, used as an important reference

for many other FTO lists, its members would be turned into criminals and terrorists instantly. For the

MILF, it became an increasingly difficult situation. Betray their comrades and Islamic brothers, which

would damage their reputation among jihadi groups around the world and negatively affect their

fighting capability and financial funding, or avoid becoming a prime target of the international

community. Although Hashim already publicly declared a rejection of terrorism shortly before he

died (July 2003), it was Murad Ebrahim who actually cut some important ties.

In the wake of Hashim’s death, there was dissension among the Moros on who should

succeed him. Would it be Mimbantas, until then head of Internal Affairs and in command of the

Internal Security Forces, or Murad, head of Military Affairs and famed for his leadership of a local

divison. Mimbantas was favored by his clan, the Maranaos, while Murad represented the

Manguindanaos. Fortunately for the MILF, the odds were not even. The Manguindanaos

outnumbered the Maranaos 4 to 1. This was important for solving the situation peacefully (Taya,

2007). Murad offered Mimbantas his old post, while creating a new post as chief of the BIAF (which

was previously a responsibility of the Vice-chair for Military Affairs) to limit Mimbantas’ power. He

took control of the Internal Security Forces himself (Taya, 2007). While this was ongoing, the MILF

kept Hashim’s death silent from the outside world until it had elected a new leader (Ressa, 2003). In

this way, it never showed any weakness.

73

Under state, the gap in peace negotiations in the period beginning 2003-beginning 2005 was

made clear. From the MILF perspective, this had several reasons. The group was keen on getting

more international protection before entering into new agreements. The MILF lobbied intensively for

the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and advance Malaysian Team, which were made

operational in 2004. Local monitoring teams (LMTs) were also installed then. Secondly, there was the

issue of recognition of MILF camps. This was a continuously contested issue between the GRP and

the MILF. In this case, the parties kept on discussing what was to happen with the Buliok complex.

The GRP found clear evidence of terrorist training and plotting when it captured Hashim’s

headquarters (Ressa, 2003). By giving the camp back, it feared that it would be used for similar ends

once again. For the MILF, the recognition of the camp was central to their plan of gradual

legitimization. If these swaths of land could be made exclusively MILF-controlled and governed, it

would serve as an example for the new Bangsamoro homeland (Mckenna, 1998). The break-through

came when Murad agreed to joint operations under AHJAG. From July onwards, the MILF expelled

many foreign jihadi fighters by cooperating with the government, giving intelligence and by

facilitating special operations (ICG, 2008a). To signify the shift, even on the top branch of terrorists,

the MILF cooperated under AHJAG. For example with Khaddafy Janjalani, when Murad personally

called him to say he should leave within three days (ICG, 2008a). This created the momentum to

proceed with the peace process, turning to track three of the Tripoli agreement in 2001, ancestral

domain.


The period 2001-2005 is characterized by several crucial events and changing dynamics. The

context, comprising of a more active international involvement, determined much of this. On the one

side, the continued expansion of the global jihadi network, in which the MILF played an important

role as facilitator of training, fighters and a safe haven to plot terrorist attacks. On the other, the

involvement of the US after the 9/11 attacks who expanded their operations against Al-Qaeda to

form a second front in the Philippines. Arroyo’s policies are coordinated in such a way that her

administration would get US support. The MILF did the same in order to maintain its links of funding,

training and intelligence within the larger jihadi network. However, both parties did not comply

completely with the war campaigns of their peers, because it did not really fit within their strategies.

The MILF, having lost many of its camps in the all-out war against Estrada, prefers to walk both the

diplomatic path and the military path. The camps are crucial for this and cannot be lost in military

74

conflict. While talking peace, the MILF can fortify the camps. This is different from groups like JI, who

have a much more destructive agenda. The GRP in turn, lobbied against an FTO listing of the MILF to

continue peace. While presenting itself as a reliable partner in the war on terror, its strategy was not

to fight the MILF. The communists were considered a bigger danger and either the GRP could live

with occasional terrorist attacks linked to the MILF, or it was not completely aware of such links for

much of 2001 and 2002. However, a change came for both parties.

The GRP was anxious to label the MILF a terrorist group and enter into military operations in

Mindanao against it because its armed forces were running thin. Also, there was a clear

understanding that to end a protracted social conflict like this, the four root causes must be

addressed. Arroyo talks of a military, diplomatic, cultural and economic path. The change came when

either evidence of terrorist activity was just too important to ignore, or because talking peace had

served its purpose. The Buliok offensive exerted more pressure on the MILF and drew in more US

support. Also, by issuing arrest warrants against the MILF leadership, a serious signal was given to

everyone that the MILF was no better than other terrorist groups. For the MILF, recognition of its

legitimate cause and good governance in its areas of control was paramount. With this move, the

GRP pressured the MILF to choose. Either it could choose diplomacy as a legitimate party, or it would

be placed in the same category as JI and ASG. For the MILF ambitions and its popular support, the

source of its power, this was a price too costly to pay. While putting its cooperation with the jihadi

network on halt for a while, it sought the international protection and guarantees it needed for

walking the diplomatic path. Then, it cooperated with the GRP using the AHJAG mechanism. This

triggered confidence-building and increased the MILF’s credibility and legitimacy.

We can relate the GRP’s move to keep the MILF from the FTO list as an understanding of

protracted social conflict, and addressing the root causes. However, this could also be seen as a

negotiation strategy, keeping pressure on the MILF by using the FTO listing as something to bargain

with. The jihadi network had a positive effect on the MILF military capabilities, but worked as a

spoiler in the diplomatic track. In the end, for its long-term strategy, spoiling this diplomatic track

became too large a problem for the MILF. Its strategy relied on addressing the grievances of the local

population, not merely fighting a jihad. This could best be done by a diplomatic route. Enabling US

funding to Mindanao and setting up a strong Bangsamoro Development Agency were important

developments for this. In sum, due to significant pressure to make a choice, the MILF shifted, at least

officially, from an insurgency with terrorist tactics, to one with insurgency tactics.

75

2.4. Negotiations center around the topic of ancestral domain (2005-2010)



July 2005

Negotiations Ancestral

domain take off

Negotiations on Ancestral Domain start GRP, MILF

July-

October

2005

Operation Tornado First joint operation under AHJAG to expel

ASG and foreign Jihadi fighters from

mainland Mindanao, 8 ASG/JI killed

GRP, MILF,

US

August

2005

Elections ARMM Elections for the ARMM are rigged with

fraud, voter intimidation and violence. Zaldy

Ampatuan is elected governor.

Ampatuan

clan

October

2005

RSM leader Ahmad

Santos arrested

RSM has been involved in major bombings in

Manila. Arrest of its leader a clear success

RSM, GRP

February

2006

Arroyo declares state

of national emergency

In response to rallies and a plot for a military

coup (in alliance with communists) Arroyo

arrests leaders and takes control of

important institutions

GRP,

dissident

military

commanders,

population

February

2006

29 consensus points A breakthrough in the negotiations, parties

agreed to 29 consensus points on ancestral

domain

GRP, MILF

February

2006

Balikatan exercises US and AFP troops do joint exercises and

work on development programs, for

example on Jolo Island.

GRP, US

March

2006

Eleventh round of

talks, stalemate on

ancestral domain

Because of increasing pressure of

conservatives and the attempted coup a

month before, Arroyo needed to realign

them by ensuring constitutional approval

and plebiscites. This was not accepted by the

MILF

GRP, MILF

May 2006 OIC fact finding Review status of the implementation of the OIC

76

mission FPA

August

2006

Military operation :

Oplan Ultimatum

AFP and US special forces began an offensive

on Sulu against ASG contingent of 500 and

targeting leaders such as Dulmatin and Umar

Patek

GRP, US

August

2006

Gentlemen’s

agreement with the

MNLF

Learning from its mistakes in early 2005, the

GRP made an agreement to reaffirm the FPA

and install an ad hoc coordinating group

MNLF, GRP

October

2006

Three bombings

across Mindanao

Bombings in three places, killing six. Zulkifli

bin Hir (Marwan) and Abdul Usman (MILF

commander) involved

JI, MILF

January

2007

Bombings Bombings in General Santos, Cotabato City

and Kidapawan, killing six.

Allegedly

same group

January

2007

Killing ASG leaders Khaddafy Janjalani and his successor Abu

Sulaiman are killed

GRP

February

2007

Confinement General

Dolorfino

Tensions between the MNLF and AFP rose.

After several incidents involving AFP troops

shooting innocent civilians and the

postponement of the tripartite meeting,

Dolorfino and his men were confined in

Commander Malik’s camp

GRP, MNLF

April 2007 Break-up of the

gentlemen’s

agreement

MNLF men under command of Ajibun were

drawn into a fight where the AFP pursued

the ASG. Subsequently, Malik attacked other

AFP troops.

GRP, MNLF,

ASG

May 2007

Mid-term elections Important for Arroyo to avoid impeachment

by the conservatives. After election the

cabinet was reshuffled to meet increased

conservative power. Within the cabinet,

opposition to a peace deal grew, chief

negotiator Afable resigned. Ampatuan Sr. re-

elected as governor of Maguindanao.

GRP

May 2007

Heavy fighting and

seizure of MNLF bases

The seizure of the MNLF bases after heavy

fighting. Effective dispersion of MNLF troops

GRP, MNLF

77

on Jolo and loss of goodwill with the population

June 2007

Expiring of AHJAG AHJAG expired and was not renewed GRP, MILF

July 2007 Battle of Guinanta AFP and MILF forces clash on the Island of

Basilan, near the village of Guinanta, 14

marines get killed, 30 MILF fighters die

GRP, MILF

July 2007 Al-Barka Incident Because the AHJAG mechanism was not

extended, 10 marines entered MILF-held

territory, were captured and beheaded.

GRP, MILF

July 2007

Human Security Act

becomes law

Main counter-terrorism legislation enacted.

The law gives powers to government to

arrests suspects without warrants and detain

them for 72 hours

GRP

September

2007

USAID grant of $ 190

million

As part of its socio-economic strategy, the

US directed a large sum to develop

businesses in Mindanao

US

November

2007

Tripartite Review

meets for the first

time

The GRP, MNLF and OIC meet for the first

time to discuss the implementation of the

FPA

GRP, MNLF,

OIC

November

2007

Failed coup attempt

military rebels

Military rebels call for people power

revolution and withdrawal of military

support for Arroyo

AFP

dissidents

February

2008

Ipil village, Maimbung

Incident

Seven civilians and one soldier die because

of miscommunication on the Island of Jolo.

GRP, MILF

March

2008

MILF Congress Consulting the population on the MOA-AD,

obtaining a mandate

MILF

May 2008

Creation Bangsamoro

Leadership and

Management Institute

(BLMI)

This institute was created to train future

governors and bureaucrats for the new

Bangsamoro Juridical Entitiy (BJE)

GRP, MILF

July-

August

2008

Three MILF

commanders go rogue

in opposition to the

Three commanders (Kato, Bravo and

Pangalian) go rogue and engage in violent

attacks on Christian villages

MILF

78

MOA-AD

August

2008

Suspension order

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court orders the suspension of

the MOA-AD after a complaint was filed by

Christian farmers on Mindanao

Supreme

Court

October

2008

Supreme Court

declares the MOA-AD

unconstitutional

The MOA-AD is declared “contrary to law

and the Constitution” by the Supreme Court,

effectively killing it

Supreme

Court

November

2008

Expiring of AHJAG AHJAG expires again and is not extended GRP, MILF

November

2008

IMT leaves Mindanao IMT members resign because they cannot

enter the areas which they are supposed to

monitor.

IMT

July 2009

Stop military

operations in

Mindanao

The GRP decides to stop its operations to

give the diplomatic track a chance again

GRP

August

2009

Basilan war In confrontations between the MILF and

GRP, who was in pursuit of the ASG, 44 were

killed.

GRP, MILF,

ASG

September

2009

International Contact

Group

International Contact Group created,

consisted of UK, Japan, Turkey and three

NGOs.

GRP, MILF

November

2009

Massacre in

Maguindanao

58 people are killed in a move by the

Ampatuan clan to get rid of their rivals, the

Mangudadatu. Half of the victims were

journalists

Ampatuan

clan

December

5-12 2009

Arroyo imposes

martial law on

Maguindanao

province

In response to the chaos and violence after

the massacre, and because the police had

been bought by the Ampatuan clan, the

army was sent in with more powers to arrest

and detain.

GRP

April 2010

Peace talks Kuala

Lumpur

Last effort of Arroyo to get an interim-

agreement with the MILF, parties could only

agree on return of IDPs and the removal of

GRP, MILF

79

landmines

2.4.2. Context

International

In the period August 2005 until June 2010, some important events happened in the world

that affected the Philippines. First, the war on terror was still ongoing and more and more nations

joined the fight in Afghanistan. Although it never loomed over the Philippine conflict, which was still

seen as ‘domestic’ by the majority of states, it did provide a useful insight to the MILF: once a conflict

becomes part of the war on terror, you could find yourself opposed by many states. Secondly, there

was the world financial and economic crisis in late 2008. Because of continuing globalization and

closer integration of the Philippines into the world economy, this affected the Philippines in several

ways: economic slowdown and a cutback on foreign investment and development aid.

When we look at the international actors that were active, in the peace process, a clear

upward trend is noticeable. With the involvement of the IMT, international attention was gained

more easily. Several new countries offered their services, such as Japan and Norway. Within the IMT,

Malaysia, Brunei and Libya remained responsible for the security aspect, whereas Japan monitored

the socio-economic part (Mastura, 2015). Also with the break-down of negotiations at the end of

2008, a new group was founded as a confidence-building measure for new negotiations. The

international contact group, created in September 2009, consisted of the UK, Japan, Turkey and

Saudi Arabia (Mastura, 2015). According to Mastura, the international contact group was unique in

international diplomacy. First, it was not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. Second,

it created a fair amount of leverage because of the involvement of so many regional players with

relevant experiences (Mastura, 2015). For example, the UK had made the Good Friday Agreement

with the IRA (Jones & Libicki, 2008). This also widened the geographical scope considerably, creating

a voice for the MILF in parts of the world where it was not yet heard. Another development was that

the OIC got more involved with the Moro cause again. Its frustration on the peace process with the

MNLF was clearly signaled in the ICTM. With a fact-finding mission to investigate the implementation

of the FPA, it started to exert more pressure on reviving this peace process. Under the guidance of

the Tripartite Review Commission, this was slowly revived in phase 3. One member of the

International Contact Group got especially more influential in this phase.

80

Japan entered the scene in 2006, when it joined the IMT, and since then grew more

influential. For Japan, Mindanao presented an excellent opportunity to diversify its foreign policy

agenda and act more independently from the US (Peng, 2008). Japan was an acceptable candidate to

both the MILF and the GRP. For the MILF, it was essential that the US was kept out of the

negotiations. The MILF also understood that it needed a strong aid donor to implement any

agreement it made. Because Japan was the largest aid donor to the Philippines, Japan certainly

qualified in this respect. Also, Japan, in contrast to the US, did not pose a military threat to the MILF

(Peng, 2008). The GRP was open to a Japanese role because it is an important economic partner, and

a non-Muslim country (Peng, 2008). Japan played an important role because of two reasons. Japan

made significant contributions to development by investing in education and infrastructure. Besides

this, it was accepted by both parties as unbiased and neutral which enabled it to play a role in

bringing the parties back to the negotiation table after the breakdown of the MOA-AD (Yildiz, 2014).

National

On the national stage, Arroyo’s grip on power continued to be a balancing act. With

dissension among her military, and almost no support from the poor class, the threat of a coup was

looming over her presidency. However, Thomson writes that Arroyo, in contrast to Estrada, managed

to sufficiently secure extra-electoral interests to maintain her grip on power (Thomson, 2014).

Basically, the EDSA People Power Revolution shaped a dangerous precedent where with enough

support from the population, a democratically elected president could be deposed. For Arroyo

became extra dangerous after a corruption scandal related to the 2004 elections was uncovered.

Similarly, Arroyo could not fulfill some of her promises. For example, the fight with the communists

kept dragging on, and the peace negotiations with the MILF collapsed. In the fight against the

communists, Arroyo declared several timelines on when they should be defeated. However, at the

end of her presidency, despite being reduced to lesser numbers, the communist insurgency was still

very much alive. The role of the Supreme Court is important in this phase. By suspending the MOA-

AD, the Court undermined years of hard work in a single stroke20. According to Michael Mastura, the

Court failed to take into account the issue of global justice and what the political situation of the day

seemed to require (Mastura, 2015). According to my own judgment, the Court’s decision was to be

expected. In the state section, an extensive elaboration of the MOA-AD and the Court’s decision is

given.

20

A more elaborate description is provided in section 2.5.3.

81

Within the peace process, the links between the conflict actors and NGOs have increased

(Mastura, 2015). These organizations have been helpful in facilitating talks and corroborating any

claims made by the parties in the talks.

Because of AHJAG and continuing US support, the fight against ASG and foreign jihadi

fighters paid off. Important leaders were captured or killed, and the movement was contained in the

Sulu archipelago. Its numbers decreased to about 400-500 (ICG, 2008a). What became increasingly

difficult though is the mixing of ASG and MNLF soldiers. In the Sulu archipelago, MNLF support is

high, mainly because Nur Misuari is an ethnic Tausug and comes from Jolo Island. Because there no

AHJAG mechanism was agreed with the MNLF and its organizational structure is fragmented into

many factions, this was a difficult terrain for the GRP to operate. This became worse because the

MNLF never disarmed. Because of the MNLF ambiguous status, misunderstandings with AFP troops

regularly occurred (ICG, 2008a).

Local

From a local perspective, the Arroyo administration played a game similar to that of the

Marcos administration. She backed, like Marcos did, certain families to create a powerful block

against the MILF on the ground. One family in particular had become a formidable force. At the time

in 2008, the Ampatuan clan was in control of Manguindanao. Its leader, Andal Ampatuan Senior was

the governor of Manguindanao since 2001. Another member, Zaldy Ampatuan, had become

governor of the ARMM in 2005. And there were more family members in influential political

positions, such as city mayor (ICG, 2010). The Ampatuans controlled most of the local police, military

auxiliaries and civilian volunteers. These forces, together with other armed private guards, formed

their private army (ICG, 2010). The military auxiliary, the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units

(CAFGUs), were armed with guns. The Civilian Voluntary Organizations (CVOs), took more of a

community policing role, often un-armed or with batons (Podder, 2012). Arroyo needed the support

of the Ampatuans to win the 2004 elections, so an alliance was made. In fact, Arroyo backed the

Ampatuans by looking the other way while they improved their position with coercive methods. The

2005 ARMM elections were characterized by violence and intimidation (ICG, 2010). In 2007, the

situation became even worse throughout Mindanao. The Human Security Act was enacted in

Congress, which gave the AFP considerably more power. They could now make arrests without

warrants and detain suspects for 72 hours. According to Santos, this law does not distinguish

between terrorists only targeting combatants (MILF foot-soldiers) and terrorists that target civilians

(Santos, 2010).

82

The situation exploded in 2008, when the MOA-AD was rejected in the Supreme Court.

Fighting erupted and massive displacement followed. After the all-out war in 2000, this was again a

moment of mass displacement, with over 600 000 people forced to flee their homes (OPAPP). After

this, in what was either a stroke of overconfidence or a lack of intelligence, the Ampatuan clan

committed a terrible crime. By massacring a 58 people convoy on the road, composed of half

journalists and half members of their rival Mangudadatu family, they caused an international scandal

(ICG, 2010). This was a serious tactical blunder, which forced Arroyo to intervene. Issuing arrest

warrants against 196 suspects, the military moved into Ampatuan controlled territory in Mindanao.

Because the police was bought and private armed contingents were on the loose, Arroyo had to

declare martial law to restore order (ICG, 2010). After this massacre, the amount of rido conflicts

quickly increased (ICG, 2011a). Chaos in Manguindao dominated. With counter-terrorist operations

in the Sulu archipelago and chaos on the Mindanao mainland, the local conditions in the ARMM were

not favorable to peace.

This violent local context was fed by another dimension. Carmen Abu Bakar (2015) writes

that the ARMM does not really appear in both regional and national plans, and if they do, plans are

not viable (Abu Bakar, 2015). According to Abu Bakar, “why else are poverty levels in the ARMM

increasing?” (Abu Bakar, 2015) She also claims that globalization has had significant local effects.

Because of the continuously increasing flow of remittances from abroad, families had become less

self-reliant. While remittances can spur economic growth, the outgoing flow of oversee workers also

caused brain drain (Abu Bakar, 2015). For the Moro population, destinations in the developed Gulf

area were popular. Combining a stay abroad with Islamic education or the Hadj was an attractive

option (Abu Bakar, 2015). This has increased the ties between the Moros and the wider Islamic

ummah, facilitating more cultural exchange. For example in the way Moro women dress, Arab

religious custom such as the hijab, abaya and nikab became more popular21. This exchange is

strengthened by the connection to the Internet. The Internet and further integration into the world

market also caused another effect, which Abu Bakar calls the homogenization of culture (Abu Bakar,

2015). The neoliberal drive to connect all parts of the world into a large world market, viewing

people mainly as potential customers, affected local culture and tradition. The adoption of a western

lifestyle by Moro youth was a fear among many Moros (Abu Bakar, 2015). This intensified a narrative

of a clash of civilizations, which was already fueled by the War on Terror. Locally, this did not create a

favorable context for peace.

21

The hijab refers to the Islamic headscarf. The abaya is a robe-like dress. A nikab is clothing worn by Muslim women to cover their faces, except the eyes.

83

2.4.3. State

From July till October 2005, the AFP launched operation Tornado. This operation was the first

operation under the AHJAG agreement and specifically directed against ASG and JI. Its aim was to

expel these groups from Mindanao. However, at the beginning of the operation, AFP troops clashed

with MILF fighters. After agreeing to reposition the MILF troops, the operation got successful. Most

importantly, ASG leaders and foreign jihadi fighters were driven off the Mindanao mainland to Sulu.

Despite minor clashes between troops, the MILF was able to hold off its troops in most cases (ICG,

2008a). The operation only killed/captured eight targets, but was nevertheless a turning point.

Successful cooperation had resulted in the separation between the MILF and the ASG/foreign jihadi

groups (ICG, 2008a). This paved the way for the next step in the negotiations: ancestral domain.

It was already foreseen that this would be the most contentious issue for both parties. The

Moros were fighting for political recognition of their lands and their historical claim. On the other

hand, the government did not want to cede too much territory and power. There was a consensus

among the parties that the MILF would not bring up independence, if the GRP would not bring up the

Constitution. For the MILF the Constitution represented a document that undermined the legitimate

rights of the Moro people, since it was based on a unitary state. Consequently, they did not recognize

it (ICG, 2008a).

The first obstacle presented itself in September 2008, on which villages should be included in

the territory. The MILF claimed 1000 villages for the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) while the GRP

only wanted to include 600 villages (Taya, 2007). Other obstacles related to the formula for wealth

sharing and governance structures. Wealth sharing from natural resources was a major problem for

the ARMM, since it was only entitled to keep about 10 % (Abuza, 2003). For the MILF it was

important to get better conditions. The same holds true for off-shore exploitation rights and marine

resources (ICG, 2008b). On governance, the main contestation would be the relation between the

GRP and the BJE. For the MILF, this relation should be associative, as two units which were nearly

equal and shared sovereignty. They would rely on the GRP for foreign affairs, monetary policy and

defense matters. The GRP wanted to emphasize that the BJE would be part of a larger body, the

Philippine state. They envisaged a model like the US, making the BJE the equivalent of a US state

(ICG, 2008b). The parties reached consensus on many things in February 2006, but a month later,

the talks stalemated.

Arroyo was confronted with continuous allegations of corruption and abuse of power,

especially after the Hello-Garci scandal. In the scandal, Arroyo is caught on tape admitting to

84

electoral manipulation in the Presidential election of 2004. She got the necessary votes in

Maguindanao with the help of Governor Andal Ampatuan Senior (ICG, 2010). Due to past

experiences with People Power Revolutions, this was a constant threat to her power. When in

February 2006, a coup d’état was attempted, she proclaimed martial law. The rebellion called for

another people power revolution, but this was effectively pre-empted. The leaders were arrested

and important institutions secured (ICG, 2008a). Nevertheless, it seemed that Arroyo needed to

pacify her conservative opponents. With regard to the peace negotiations, this meant taking a

tougher position and effectively stalemating the negotiations.

After this setback, it was important for Arroyo to regain some of her power by other means.

Her approach now focused more on the military. She declared an all-out war against the Communist

movement, launched extensive exercises with the US military and used her political allies in

Mindanao to limit MILF control and influence. The exercises with the US military were to precede

large-scale operations against ASG and other foreign jihadi fighters active in the Sulu archipelago. In

August 2006, the AFP and the US military contingent launched Operation Ultimatum, in which they

targeted ASG forces on Jolo, with some prime high value targets. Having learned from their clashes

with MNLF forces in February 2005, they made a gentlemen’s agreement in advance to Operation

Ultimatum. The agreement was based upon the AHJAG mechanism that existed with the MILF, but

had a less formal and institutionalized structure (ICG, 2008a).

The AFP and US Special Forces vigorously pursued the ASG and elements of JI for months. In

a terrain which consisted of thick jungle and many mountains, this was difficult. Moreover, the ASG

enjoyed quite some support among the local population. They had a fierce reputation for violence,

but also distributed their funds from ransom-kidnapping generously among the local population

(Ressa, 2003). AFP forces patrolled many areas surrounding the MNLF camps for several months and

this made them uneasy. After several cases of extra-judicial killings by AFP troops, tensions reached a

boiling point. In April 2007, the situation escalated. In pursuit of the ASG, AFP troops came too close

to MNLF troops, which joined the ASG in the fight. After this, another MNLF commander on Jolo

attacked the AFP and heavy fighting erupted. The AFP seized the MNLF bases, which caused their

dispersion. Very possibly, contingents may have joined the ASG. Also, a massive displacement of

civilians on the Island took place, which was a severe blow for public confidence in the government.

For the GRP, this should have been an important lesson. Taking external spoilers like the MNLF into

account might not be enough to keep them from interfering, especially for operations in a small

target area. It is much better to bring them over to your side, or establish a sound coordinating

structure. Afterwards, the GRP chose to continue its rejectionist, divisive approach to the MNLF. It

only issued an arrest warrant against Commander Malik, giving his colleague a free pass. Operation

85

Ultimatum was successful in weakening the ASG, killing several important targets (see timeline), but

did antagonize the MNLF which caused massive displacement (ICG, 2008a).

In May 2007, midterm elections caused Arroyo extra trouble. Because of conservative party

gains, Arroyo needed to reshuffle her cabinet. Internal resistance against a peace deal grew within

the cabinet (Abinales, 2010). Suspicions of MILF terrorist activity were shared by several cabinet

members, because of several terrorist attacks in late 2006 and the start of 2007. Perhaps due to the

failed coordination attempt with the MNLF, or the lack of progress in the peace process with

increasing suspicions of MILF terrorist activity, AHJAG expired in June and was not extended. The

consequences were however clear. Miscommunication led to two incidents in the month of July. The

Al-Barka incident, where 10 marines were captured and beheaded, was especially painful (ICG,

2008a).

For Arroyo, this was a good moment to put forward the Human Security Act. This law

effectively strengthened the government’s counter-insurgency capability by allowing the AFP to

make arrests without a warrant and detain terrorist suspects for 72 hours (Human security act, RA

9372, 2007). It was pressured by the US and other NATO members, which were concerned about the

many shortcomings in the Philippine police and justice chain. Many cases were not put together

properly and suspects could escape justice too often. Where other countries in Southeast Asia, such

as Malaysia and Singapore, were arresting many members of the Southeast Asian terrorist network

after 9/11, the Philippines was less effective (Ressa, 2003). This was another step towards a more

military pronged approach. It coincided with US involvement becoming more exclusively a matter of

two things: counter-terrorism operations and large aid and development projects22. After the US

ambassador terminated the United Stated Institute for Peace (USIP) Philippines Facilitation Project,

the US played no role anymore in the diplomatic domain (ICG, 2008a).

In the beginning of 2008, there was a new breakthrough. Perhaps because she had fought off

another coup attempt in November 200723, Arroyo felt confident enough to continue the peace

process. More likely is that because of continuing internal pressure, Arroyo was desperate for

political success (ICG, 2010). Besides, this was the path she had taken since her inauguration into the

office of the Presidency. It was politically impossible to declare an all-out war with the MILF as she

had done with the communist insurgency without a trigger cause. More in general, Abinales (2010)

stressed that there was a sense among government officials that real economic development would

22

For example, a grant of $ 190 million was awarded by USAID for a five-year period to the Philippines. Most of this money was destined for Mindanao (ICG, 2009) 23

On November 29, 2007 the Manila Peninsula Siege occurred. 25 officers mutineered and called for the ousting of president Arroyo. They were arrested after several hours.

86

only take off if these insurgencies were pacified/defeated (Abinales, 2010). Because of these

reasons, Arroyo must have given her negotiators a strong mandate to get a deal. In March 2008, the

government let go of its insistence on constitutional processes for the extension of the BJE outside

the ARMM. This issue had kept the stalemate going since September 2006 (ICG, 2008b). In July 2008,

the parties reached consensus on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain in Malaysia.

In this memorandum several things were agreed to (Rodolfo & Iqbal, 2008). Each point is followed by

a summarized conclusion of its effects:

- Concept of who belonged to the Bangsamoro included all persons who were descendants

(whether full, partly or through marriage) from the original inhabitants of Mindanao,

Palawan and the Sulu archipelago since the creation of the first Sultanates. Consequently,

this comprised a larger group than just the Muslims. The main concept that this document

revolved around is that of ancestral domain. Ancestral domain and ancestral land refers to:

“those held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by individually since time

immemorial continuously to the present, except when prevented by war, civil disturbance,

force majeure, or other forms of possible usurpation or displacement by force, deceit, stealth,

or as a consequence of government project or any other voluntary dealings entered into by

the government and private individuals, corporate entities or institutions.” Taking into

account the historical background, this would come down to an area covering every piece of

land on Mindanao which was ever colonized by the Moros or one of its client peoples.

- The territory of the BJE was divided into three categories: 1) core consisting of the ARMM

and six municipalities, 2) a second category consisting of 737 Muslim-majority barangays

which would vote on joining the BJE within the next year and 3) a third category consisting of

1459 areas or Special Intervention Zones which would be subjected to a socio-economic and

cultural affirmative program by the GRP and offered a plebiscite to join the BJE in 25 years

after signing a Comprehensive Deal. The territory would comprise the land mass, maritime,

terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, aerial domain and the atmospheric space. Territorial

waters would stretch beyond the 15 kilometers demarcation for the internal waters, in the

territorial waters the parties will exercise joint jurisdiction. This meant that the BJE could

grow into a potentially far larger area (figure 5). The territorial delineations of the BJE would

be quite similar to that of an independent state.

- On natural resources, the parties agreed to a formula of 75%/25% revenue-sharing in favor

of the BJE. Natural resources included all minerals and sources of energy. The BJE is allowed

to issue permits in this regard, for example for the extraction of minerals or forest

operations. This also extended to the ability to enact agrarian laws, to ensure control of the

87

food supply for the BJE. This would effectively create an entity which can become financially

independent from Manila. Ensuring control over minerals, food and energy is similarly

reducing any reliance on Manila.

- Governance falls in three categories: the sole prerogative of the BJE, the sole prerogative of

the GRP or shared in an associative relationship. The first comprised of the power to build its

own institutions in: civil service, electoral process, financial and banking, education,

legislation, legal, economic, law and order, judicial system and correctional services. The

second is external defense and parts of foreign policy and the third concerns parts of foreign

policy (explained in the next bullet point) and other matters such as border policing (much of

which has yet to be determined). The relationship between the GRP and BJE shall be

associative. The provisions for governance are far-fetched, reaching much further than that

of a state in a federal governance system. The associative relationship assumes a relation of

equality between two ‘nations’. This is also confirmed in international law, which is

applicable because the MOA-AD is placed in an international legal context. In practice, this

has been used for former colonial states as an intermediate stage on their way to full

independence (Supreme Court Order 183591, 14 October 2008).

- The BJE can enter into agreements with other nations provided that these do not constitute

an act of aggression towards the GRP. It shall also be represented in ASEAN or UN meetings

on all relevant matters. This would practically grant the BJE, except from the military domain,

a status as equal to other states in international relations.

The fact that the territory of the BJE and the Moro ancestral domain are not the same is a

complicating factor. Both concepts are used interchangeably in the text of the MOA-AD. The same

holds for the total Moro ancestral domain and the claims that distinct communities may have. A

provision (MOA, “Concepts and Principles”, par 6) stating that the BJE shall have jurisdiction and

authority over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands is increasing the ambiguousness and

confusion.

For the GRP, the MOA-AD could easily be interpreted as a knee-fall to the MILF. Because of

its far-reaching content and the fact that Arroyo’s administration did not take enough care to involve

all stakeholders in the process, it cannot come as a surprise that two Christian politicians petitioned

the Supreme Court for an injunction of the signing of the MOA-AD. North Cotabato Governor

Emmanuel Pinõl and Zambuanga City Mayor Celso Lobregat were the main banner carriers for the

anti-MOA movement. They were joined by the Archbishop of Cotabato and another 18 mayors from

88

Christian towns (Schou, 2014). The Supreme Court suspended the signing of the MOA-AD and later in

October rejected the MOA-AD entirely as unconstitutional (Schou, 2014). The Court concludes:

“Indeed, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the

Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a

capacity to enter into relations with other states.” (Supreme Court Order 183591, 14 October 2008)

Further emphasizing: “The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national

government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that

many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict

with the Constitution and the laws.” (Supreme Court 183591, 14 October 2008)

Figure 4: Map of territorial agreements in the MOA-AD. The red area is the ARMM. The yellow areas are the category B

lands.

Not merely the local Christians that were against the MOA-AD. The Lumads were similarly

not consulted by the Arroyo administration and concerned they would become a minority within a

minority state (Schou, 2014). The Lumads feared that their lands would not be recognized in the BJE,

as many of their people did not possess the official titles. Moreover, the Moros could limit their right

to self-governance and claim the resources in their lands. This fear is not entirely without cause,

89

since the ancestors of the present Lumads were enslaved by the Moros (ICG, 2011b). The Lumads

invoked the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) with supporters in Manila. The IPRA is part of

international law guaranteeing self-determination rights to indigenous peoples within the boundaries

of the national state. The IPRA is recognized and signed by the Philippine State, which made many

Manila politicians sympathetic to the Lumad call (Schou, 2014). The Court’s decision and the fierce

opposition dynamics created an opposition block that was comprised of almost all important

politicians in Manila.

Because of the Supreme Court decision, the MOA-AD had become an utter failure. Arroyo

had to distance herself from the peace process, stressing she did not know what had been on the

table (ICG, 2008b). Arroyo did what she had always done when negative attention focused on her:

shift the spotlights.

Not entirely inconvenient to the Arroyo administration was the breakaway of three MILF

commanders due to the signing of the MOA-AD. While the mainstream MILF kept their calm after the

Supreme Court order, these groups caused havoc. Violent clashes occurred and because these

groups also attacked unprotected Christian villages, a man-hunt was quickly opened. A strategy

change by Arroyo effectively stalled the peace negotiations completely. The GRP would now only

commit itself to dialogue with authentic communities, not with rebel groups (ICG, 2008b). This

comes down to an approach which is very similar to the US-approach of winning the hearts and

minds of the local population while fighting the Taliban, or in this case, the MILF. Two developments

did not aid any resumption of peace talks. First, AHJAG expired again. Second, the IMT decided to

leave because it could not access the areas where it should work (ICG, 2009).

In July 2009, Arroyo decided to cease extensive military operations against the MILF rogue

commanders. Not only did the GRP needed to cut costs due to an increasing budget deficit, for

Arroyo, some accomplishment of peace with the MILF had become a matter of personal prestige

(Abinales, 2010). Due to the Maguindanao massacre (see local section), the climate for closing any

deal was off. Even though the Ampatuan clan was a former ally to the administration, the image of

lawlessness and violence persisted in the ARMM region. From this easily flows a belief that this area

and its people could impossibly govern themselves. Finally, with the 2010 elections drawing near and

constitutional amendment being a prerequisite for a deal, the parties could not agree on much. In

April 2010, an agreement on the return of IDP’s and the removal of land mines was Arroyo’s last feat

in the peace process.

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2.4.4. Group

For the MILF, this phase is characterized by three developments: cooperation with the AFP

and US military under AHJAG, diplomatic success and internal dissension.

After the operationalization of AHJAG, the MILF cooperated with the AFP and US troops to

remove ASG and JI elements from the Mindanao mainland. An example is the warning that Murad

issued to Kadaffy Janjalani in June 2005 (leader ASG), ordering him to leave because he would reveal

his location within 72 hours to the AFP (ICG, 2008a). It is unclear whether the MILF really completely

severed its ties with Al-Qaeda in this period, but if such contacts were there, they were covert and

small-scale (ICG, 2008a). As explained in section 2.4.4, such ties increasingly became a liability to the

MILF. Besides Al-Qaeda, MILF contacts with terrorist seemed to continue. According to the

International Crisis Group, there is enough evidence signaling continued cooperation between MILF-,

ASG- and JI- contingents (ICG, 2008a). However, it is unclear if the MILF Central Committee is 1)

aware of these events, 2) unable to stop them or 3) still actively supporting them (ICG, 2008a). What

is clear though is that counter-terrorist operations under AHJAG worked to weaken ASG and JI. Also,

it caused the attention of the GRP and US to shift towards combating these groups. It seemed that

terrorism was no longer a factor which could decisively spoil the negotiations. For the MILF, this

meant that it could operate undisturbed on the Mindanao mainland to strengthen its support base

and legitimacy. Its shadow government continued to function effectively while the MILF tried to

increase its influence in competition with local clan leaders, such as the Ampatuans (see section

local). These were necessary preconditions to improve the success chances of any potential peace

deal with the GRP.

On the diplomatic track, the MILF performed exceptionally well. This may have had several

causes. First, the MILF successfully pacified US and GRP concerns on its terrorist ties. Despite

continued suspicion of MILF engagement in terrorist activity in the Philippine media, the government

was not keen on going back to a pre-2003 situation. Since the government could never admit that it

negotiated with a terrorist group, this was a paradigm which worked in favor of the MILF. Second,

the involvement of Malaysia as a third party mediator was favorable to the MILF. With Malaysia

being sympathetic to the Moro plea of more Muslim rights, this created an environment in which a

similar tone could be set forth within the MOA-AD. Third, the GRP seemed to need an agreement

more than the MILF. For the GRP, a status quo was not a favorable result. Because the Moro peace

process was so politicized, a status quo at the end of Arroyo’s term would come down to failure (ICG,

2010). And fourth, the MILF negotiators had more experience because their composition, in contrast

to the GRP negotiating team, had remained fairly stable throughout the years. Perhaps as a

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consequence, the MILF had won a clear victory in the negotiations for the MOA-AD. The satisfaction

of the victory was however short-lived, because they also made a strategical error.

Like the GRP, the MILF had not sufficiently addressed external -and to a lesser degree-

internal spoilers. External spoilers with especially strong connections to Manila had either been

overlooked, or ignored. For example the mayors of the big Christian cities which were included in

category B, or the archbishop of Cotabato (Schou, 2014). Despite the fact that the Muslims

comprised about 87 % of the population, the group of about 10 % Christians was not without means

and power. According to Schou, it is very different for a local minority group of the overall dominant

group than for any other minority group (Schou, 2014). The MILF did not sufficiently recognize this

fact. With continuing speeches about an Islamic state for Muslims, the Christians felt threatened.

These Christians feared that they would not be able to practice their faith in freedom, and that their

lands would be seized. Such fear was not completely without cause. Shortly after the Ancestral

Domain was announced, several incidents of Moros, sometimes violently, claiming Christian lands

were reported (Schou, 2014). The MILF could have used a more tolerant and plural outlook in their

speeches about the new Bangsamoro homeland. Another external spoiler was the Lumad population.

They sided with the Christians in fear of being dominated by the Moros. This was especially

unnecessary because the Lumads shared many grievances with the Moros (Schou, 2014; ICG, 2011b).

Finally, there was the MNLF. The MNLF viewed the MOA-AD as a direct attack upon the FPA and

were disappointed for being sidelined (Stanford/Group/MILF). The MNLF was opposed to the MOA-

AD and this was further damaging the frame of a unified Bangsamoro homeland. An argument for

opponents was quickly made: “if the Muslims themselves could not agree, how could they ever rule a

state with many different groups and tribes?” The MILF has tried to coordinate efforts with the

MNLF, but never on the diplomatic path. In this way, the two groups made each other look weaker.

Internal spoilers were also present within the MILF. There was dissension on two fields. First,

some disagreed with the strict interpretation of Islam by the MILF (Stanford/Group/MILF). In

Southeast Asia, the interpretation of Islam has always been somewhat less strict than in the Arab

world. However, the Arab interpretation had gained preference within the MILF. Due to the foreign

connections with groups like Al-Qaeda but also with countries like Saudi-Arabia, a strand of

Wahhabism Islam had become more influential among its members (Stanford/Group/MILF). Another

spoiler group did not agree with the MOA-AD because it gave up the goal of independence. Acting on

their grievances, three commanders, Kato, Bravo and Pangalian, started hostilities in July 2008 (ICG,

2008b), (ICG, 2012b), (Santos, 2010.) The MILF Central Committee distanced itself from these

commanders, but did not cut them loose. For the government this created an opportunity to shift

attention away from the failure of the MOA-AD to combating these commands. The MILF retained

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almost all of its major commanders and lost only several hundred of its fighting strength (ICG,

2012b). What is more, these commanders were already known for their cruel methods and foreign

jihadi ties (ICG, 2008a). This was especially true for commander Bravo, who had a reputation for

violence. In this regard, his loss could also be regarded a blessing for the MILF. Kato was more

respected, and because he was like Murad an ethnic Manguindanao, a more painful loss for Murad

(ICG, 2009). Due to continuous hostilities between these groups and the AFP, it was impossible for

the MILF to restart the peace process and set a favorable benchmark with this president before her

term would end (ICG, 2010).

It becomes clear that the MILF was highly successful in its diplomatic strategy with the

government, but far less with other players in Mindanao. Its grass-roots strategy of consultation with

the people, for example by organizing big assemblies, was an effective method to gain public

approval, but not for securing the support of important leaders from the establishment in Mindanao.

This turned out to be a strategic error.


Full of expectations and hopes, this phase ended in a big disappointment for the peace

process. After the MILF chose the diplomatic path in 2005 by aligning with the GRP and the US in

counter-terrorist operations against ASG and foreign jihadi fighters, it took the group some time to

really cut ties. While cooperation under AHJAG was ongoing, attacks were still linked to the MILF.

However, its leadership denied any terrorist endorsement and if terrorist activities were still

employed by MILF contingents, actions were covert and small-scale. Important for the research

question, this kind of terrorist involvement proved no obstacle for the GRP to continue the peace

process. Whether this level of activity eventually undermined the MOA-AD is hard to say because

there were so many factors which played a role. In this regard, it was not terrorist ties that were the

largest spoiler to peace, as was the case in the two previous phases.

The contextual factors can be interpreted as both aiding and undermining a peace. Growing

international involvement, for example with the IMT, and active roles for Malaysia and Japan, had a

positive effect on the peace process. AHJAG, the IMT and the local monitoring committees for the

CCCH created a relatively peaceful environment on the ground. As we have seen in phase one and

two, peace on the ground is a necessary requirement to keep the focus within the negotiations on

non-military affairs. On a national level, the context was less favorable. An enduring struggle with the

communist movement drained resources. Also, internal pressure from conservatives and dissatisfied

93

military commanders grew. The threat of people power revolution was long looming over Arroyo’s

presidency. This decreased her standing and authority, which became apparent after the MOA-AD

plan was made public. The administration clearly had many opponents with spoiler intentions.

Locally, the counter-terrorist operations in the Sulu archipelago had mixed results. Because of

fighting with the MNLF, large populations got displaced. Moreover, their fighters got dispersed and

mixed with ASG and JI contingents. This created a much more difficult situation for counter-terrorist

operations than under AHJAG in MILF territories. Furthermore, globalization processes had

significant local dynamics. The war on terror raised antagonism and discrimination between Muslims

and Christians. Next to this, economic globalization threatened Moro culture. Western lifestyles were

easily accessible to Moro youth. As a countermovement, Muslims got more connected to the wider

ummah and identified stronger as such. This widened the gap between the population on Mindanao

and undermined reconciliation and local peace initiatives. Finally, the carte blanche that the Arroyo

administration gave to the Ampatuan clan, especially in combination with more far-reaching counter-

terrorist legislation, triggered large scale extra-judicial killings and human rights violations. Overall,

both parties did not show sufficient knowledge of the contextual factors, or simply chose to ignore

them.

The administration was under too much pressure to produce results. Whether by pressure

from conservative politicians, the military or international partners, the GRP sold itself short with the

MOA-AD. Besides this, the administration overestimated its own ability to enforce the deal, or

underestimated resistance in Congress, among locals and through legal proceedings.

The MILF aimed too high. A victory in the negotiation room is only worth something when

there is support for the implementation of the deal. Clearly, the MILF did not want to involve local

politicians, minority groups and the MNLF, as the MILF resisted the kinship system and secularism.

This was a strategic error, because it were local politicians that killed the MOA-AD in the Supreme

Court. Also, the MILF had almost no sympathizers in Congress, which made it helpless in the political

and media battle that followed the publication of the MOA-AD.

This phase clearly shows that many dimensions should be addressed during peace

negotiations, and that a room in Kuala Lumpur can produce an outcome which is far from realistic in

practice. Addressing external and internal spoilers, maintaining a ceasefire with international

auditors and the implementation of credible, realistic and inclusive strategies should all be taken into

account.

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2.5. New energy and building trust under Benigno Aquino (2010-2014)



June 2010

First State of the

Nation Aquino

Aquino expressed commitment to peace

arguing that the Philippines will remain

poor if peace will not come

GRP

January

2010

Tripartite Review

Process resumed

The GRP resumes the Tripartite Review

Process under Aquino

GRP, MNLF,

OIC

February

2011

Resumption formal

peace talks, 20th round

The peace negotiations were reopened and

the MILF submitted a revised proposal for

the Comprehensive Compact

GRP, MILF

August 2011 Aquino meets Murad

Ebrahim in Japan

In order to give a boost to the peace

negotiations and show sincerity, the two

leaders Aquino and Murad met face to face

in summitry style

GRP, MILF

August 2011 GRP send a

counterproposal to

the MILF

GRP submits the 3 for 1 proposal. (Revenue

sharing 75%-25%)

GRP

October

2011

Fighting erupts in

Basilan and

Zamboanga

MILF and AFP clash again. Both parties

blame each other for violating the

ceasefire.

GRP, MILF

November

2011

Agreement on shape

of negotiations

Negotiations would be structured around

four themes: governance, wealth-sharing,

territory and transition.

GRP, MILF

April 2012 The decision points on

principles are signed

The panels solidify the points on which

they have agreed , important confidence-

building moment

GRP, MILF

May 2012 Parties agree to take a

step back an d take

time to review their

Review positions on: wealth-sharing,

power-sharing, governance, transition

roadmap, normalization process

GRP, MILF

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positions Bangsamoro political entity (BPE).

October

2012

Framework agreement

on the Bangsamoro

(FAB) signed

The framework agreement was an

agreement on the main points and

procedures to establish a new autonomous

entity. From this moment, the technical

work group in the various areas would

have to work these points out into further

detail.

GRP, MILF

December

2012

Transition Commission

enacted

Aquino signs the Transition Commission

into law, tasked with drafting the

Bangsamoro Basic Law. MILF chooses 8

(including chair), GRP chooses 7 members,

all from Bangsamoro.

GRP

January

2013

Third party monitoring

team operationalized

The third party monitoring team was to

oversee the implementation of the FAB.

GRP, MILF

February -

March 2013

Royal Sulu Forces

invade Sabah,

Malaysia

Approximately 200 men from the Royal

Sulu Forces invaded a town in Sabah,

claiming it as part of the Sulu sultanate.

When security forces stormed the village,

56 militants were killed. Ten soldiers died

and six civilians.

Royal Sulu

Forces,

Malaysia

February

2013

Aquino and Murad

Ebrahim jointly launch

Sajahatra Bangsamoro

program

A joint socio-economic program to help

alleviate poverty, improve health and

sanitation and education in Bangsamoro

communities.

GRP, MILF

February

2013

Annex on transitional

arrangements signed

A detailed roadmap to the creation of the

BJE is agreed to

GRP, MILF

July 2013

Annex on revenue

generation and wealth

sharing signed

Agreement on detailed provisions for

revenue generation, wealth sharing and

fiscal administration

GRP, MILF

August 2013

Misuari declares

Bangsamoro Republic

Misuari rebels against the FAB and the

Tripartite Review Process, using the

MNLF

96

situation to call again for independence.

Over 50 commanders sign a resolution to

affirm the FPA.

September

2013

Zambuanga City

attacked

MNLF forces loyal to Nur Misuari attack the

city of Zambuanga, raising the flag of the

Bangsamoro Republic

MNLF

January

2014

Operation Darkhorse The AFP launched a counter-insurgency

operation against the BIIF. They were

assisted by the MILF. Four BIFF camps were

taken.

GRP, MILF,

BIFF

March 2014 Comprehensive

Agreement on the

Bangsamoro (CAB) is

signed

The CAB is an overall agreement that

includes all detailed provisions for the

different areas of the peace agreement.

This consists of: FAB, and annexes on

transitional arrangements, revenue

generation/wealth sharing, power sharing

and normalization

GRP, MILF

2.5.2. Context

International

When President Aquino entered office in the summer of 2010, the financial crisis had

plunged many economies into recession. Banks were saved with public money and the European

debt crisis started to evolve. In the Philippines, the crisis did not produce similar effects. While the

country used to carry the title ‘the sick man of Asia’, it became one of the fastest growing economies

in Asia during Aquino’s term (Cook, 2015). After a brief period in 2009 of growth less than 2 %, the

economy quickly recovered in 2010, reaching an almost 9 % annual growth rate that year24. It cannot

be stated that this was because of Aquino’s efforts, since he just started his term. What is clear

though is that the Aquino administration could take off with great enthusiasm and a large mandate.

Throughout this phase, the government had growth rates above the Asian average (Cook, 2015). The

global financial crisis did hardly slow down the Philippine economy. Foreign direct investment

recovered in 2013 and the value of remittances kept growing steadily (Cook, 2015).

24

Source: www.tradingeconomics.com/philippines

97

The Philippines had already become the second arena for the War on Terror in 2002. This

War on Terror did not stop in this phase. Though the US pulled back its forces from Iraq and

Afghanistan, Jihadi terrorist groups were not defeated and could profit from this power vacuum.

With conflicts igniting in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Nigeria, and ongoing conflicts involving terrorists in

Afghanistan and Iraq, the War on Terror remained a top policy priority for the international

community. In this light, the focus on diplomacy for the conflict in Mindanao was not in accordance

with the international trend.

For this diplomacy, several actors played an important role. First and foremost there is

Malaysia as facilitator- and third party to the peace negotiations. Despite continuing Philippine

suspicion and cynicism on Malaysia’s role in the peace process, both by media and politicians,

Malaysia acted seemingly unbiased and without a side-agenda (Franco, 2013). It used a soft style for

the negotiations, providing both parties with enough space to shape the peace process according to

their wishes, or to service their respective audiences. However, on the ground, Malaysia was a strict

and very professional leader of the IMT, which contributed to the shaping trustful conditions to sue

for peace (Franco, 2013). In 2012, the MILF and AFP counted no armed clashes (OPAPP, 2016). When

approximately 200 Filipino men of the Royal Sulu Forces intruded on Sabah in February 2013,

claiming the land under historic pretenses, Malaysia did not retreat from its role in the peace

process. According to Franco, Malaysia, was primarily interested in creating stability in Mindanao and

the Sulu archipelago (Franco, 2013). Malaysia had to deal with a large influx of refugees after the

consecutive violent outbursts since the start of the conflict. This caused security concerns. Also,

groups like ASG were able to operate freely in the archipelago and its surrounding waters, also

affecting Malaysia. Exemplary for this is the kidnapping on the Sipadan Island, in front of the Sabah

beaches. Moreover, these groups engage in piracy and smuggling, which harmed the important

shipping routes in the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asia Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA).

Franco states that for Malaysia, these concerns trump any sympathetic bias they may have towards

the Moro population (Franco, 2013).

The international contact group played a valuable role. Japan, Turkey, the UK, Saudi Arabia

and the NGOs involved monitored the negotiations and subsequent implementation of agreements.

A core task was to keep all relevant parties involved, facilitate trust and exchange and to ensure the

implementation of agreements. A difficulty for the ICG was to find the right balance between

confidentiality of the information supplied by the partners, while also advocating transparency to

make sure all stakeholders are on board (Yildiz, 2014). The International Contact Group was a crucial

source of information, both from a grassroots level through NGO involvement, as a government

level. The UK for example could provide valuable advice from its experience in Northern Ireland

98

(Yildiz, 2014). The ICG also indirectly produced more financial support: development assistance from

the UK and Japan for Mindanao grew. Turkey made two trade and investment agreements with the

Philippines. Saudi Arabia had its own investment agenda25, but took no part in significant multilateral

development projects (Democratic Progress Institute, 2014).

National

Aquino took office with a mandate that was bigger than any post-Marcos president. Aided by

significant economic growth, circumstances for seeking peace were clearly in his favor. However,

certain formidable obstacles to the peace process continued. The political system of dynasties

instigates a continuous drive to take strong positions by the family banner carriers. The weak political

parties in the Philippines cannot serve to align interests in a meaningful way. Patronage networks in

local constituencies often trump a political alliance with an incumbent President in Manila. This

meant that already with the midterm elections in 2013, dissenting voices from Mindanao on the

peace process would gain leverage with their Manila patrons, for example with Vice-president

Jejomar Binay or Interior Secretary Mar Roxas26 (ICG, 2012b).

Aquino had a spotless record when it concerned corruption. This gave him the necessary

credibility. It did not last though. In July 2013, a scam was discovered which showed that politicians

were illegally using public funds through the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Three

senators were charged with corruption, but all from the opposition. This gave immediate rise to

suspicions of bribery of public prosecutors by the Aquino camp (Cook, 2015). Another scandal truly

harmed his image. When the Supreme Court ruled the Disbursement Acceleration Program, the

successor of the PDAF,27 unconstitutional, because it was reallocated without congressional approval,

Aquino protected his friend Florencio Abad, the Budget Secretary. Aquino argued that the Supreme

Court was too powerful and that its power should be curbed by constitutional amendment (Cook,

2015). Two dynamics in Philippine politics amplify the strength of such events. The fact that the Vice-

Presidency is a separate ticket means that there can be competition between the President and Vice-

President. The Vice-President might want to trap the President, so he or she can grasp power. This

happened to Estrada when Arroyo formed a coalition against him. Secondly, the one-term Presidency

causes supporters to shift focus on Presidential candidates early on. Consequently, creating broad

support in the second half of the Presidency is arguably much more difficult (Cook, 2015).

25

Saudi Arabia was known to support the MILF financially. Also, the country financed mosques and madrassas all over the world. In the period since 1997, hundreds of madrassas were built in Mindanao. 26

Both have been presidential candidates for the 2016 elections. 27

This program was supposed to accelerate spending in public development projects.

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Until now, the national perspective has focused upon internal spoilers within the national

polity. But there are different developments that should be taken into account. Aquino believed that

in order to gain credibility with the MILF, the GRP should also fulfill its commitments to other groups,

such as the MNLF and the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army28 (ICG, 2013). Concerning the CPLA,

the GRP had success and concluded a closure agreement which paved the way for true disarmament

and positive transformation (OPAPP, 2016). With the MNLF, the government initially got the peace

process back on track. The Tripartite Review sessions were continued under Aquino and led to 42

consensus points (OPAPP, 2016). However, after the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro was

struck with the MILF, the MNLF felt excluded. It demanded integration of the FPA into the BBL (Cook,

2015). This reason and the GRP position that the Tripartite Review Process should be concluded

because it had produced consensus points which addressed all specific MNLF concerns which were

left out of the FAB, caused Nur Misuari to rebel. He proclaimed the independent Bangsamoro

Republic and his forces attacked Zambuanga City a month later (OPAPP). Not surprisingly, the peace

process with the MNLF was put on hold. Also the communists continued to resist. After a brief

attempt in the beginning of 2011, peace talks with the CPP/NPA broke down because of distrust and

strong, inflexible communist demands (ICG, 2013). What all these peace attempts had in common

though, is that the GRP had showed its willingness to do concessions and strive for sustainable peace.

Local

The ARMM continued to be in desperate state during phase 4 (2010-2014). The region

ranked at the bottom of the Human Development Report by the UNDP, with the lowest income per

capita and functional literacy rate (Bacani & Ferrer, 2014). Under Aquino, with help from the

Japanese and the US, large investments were made in the region to counter the trend of an

increasingly impoverished region (Bacani & Ferrer, 2014). This was much needed because poverty in

the ARMM was, contrary to the national trend, increasing, up from 39.9 % in 2009 to 48.7 % in 2012

(figure 4). The ARMM was long controlled by the Ampatuan clan, but they were in a weak position to

retain control after the Maguindanao massacre and the military actions that followed against them

when Arroyo declared martial law in Maguindanao (section 2.5.2). This would leave a power vacuum

in a region which is already characterized by criminality and warlordism (ICG, 2011a). The GRP feared

this might threaten the peace process, since it could produce a governor which was distinctly anti-

MILF.

Aquino used his powers to appoint a caretaker governor in the meantime, while delaying the

ARMM elections until 2013 (ICG, 2012a). A friendly clan to the Aquino’s, the Hatamans from Basilan,

28

The Cordillera People’s Liberation Army was a small-scale insurgency movement which fought for more autonomy in the Cordillera region.

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were accepted by most stakeholder. Its foreman, Mujiv Hataman, did well and crushed Misuari in the

2013 election for an official term. For Aquino, the delay meant extra time to get potential spoilers on

board. Since the MILF was strongly represented in the Maguindanao and Maranao clans, this meant

addressing the concerns of other clans. Especially the concerns of the Tausugs, which originate from

the Sulu archipelago, should be managed. The governor of Sulu, Sakur Tan, was a powerful man who

could not be ignored (ICG, 2012b). The Tausugs feared the loss of power to the MILF with a peace

deal and resisted any domination from the Mindanao mainland (ICG, 2012b). The question which

institution would get control of the money flow was perhaps the most important. The Internal

Revenue Allotment (IRA) accounted for nearly 80 % of local governments’ budget, and is directly

transferred from Manila. The MILF wanted control of the IRA because it feared the IRA could be used

to undermine its power. Local governors such as Tan understandably argued against MILF control

(ICG, 2012b). For Manila, managing these concerns was a balancing act. On the one side, Manila

could not antagonize the MILF too much, only exerting tolerable pressure. On the other side, the

new Bangsamoro region should become a more unified and better governed region than the present

ARMM. Besides this concern, Jolo was home to the ASG and foreign Jihadi fighters (ICG, 2012b).

Consequently, the Aquino administration had to be careful not to delegitimize its own counter-

insurgency campaign by engaging too friendly with politicians which were known to have ties with

these groups, such as Sakur Tan. This would alert the conservative hawks in Congress all the more.

Finally, it was essential for the Aquino administration to get development underway in the

ARMM region. For the MILF this was also important, because any agreement had to be endorsed by

local plebiscites. This was a crucial missing element in the FPA agreement, which did not deliver such

a peace dividend (Cook, 2015). Work in the Bangsamoro Development Agency continued and in the

FAB and CAB, extensive provisions on securing economic development were incorporated (ICG,

2012a). The government also worked with the MNLF to get development in MNLF communities

underway. Whereas other regions in Mindanao, such as the Davao region, got accelerating growth

rates, the ARMM stagnated. Income levels in the ARMM were severely behind other regions. On

average, people in the ARMM made about $ 400,- a year, which comes down to slightly over $ 1,- a

day. No administration really succeeded in raising income levels. This is one of the reasons that

peace is so necessary.

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Figure 5: Income levels according to region. Source: Philippine Statistics Authority.

2.5.3. State

The Aquino administration was convinced that with some new ideas and a strong mandate,

which they had obtained, a breakthrough in the peace process with the MILF could be made (ICG,

2012a). After the failed MOA-AD, it was necessary to regain trust and carefully move for a new

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agreement. The grand strategy of the Aquino administration was one of convergence. Whereas other

administrations had been keen on a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, for example by Marcos through his

alliance with Ali Dimaporo, or Arroyo’s alliance with the Ampatuans, Aquino used local actors in a

different way. Aquino’s strategy was not to divide the clans/groups to cause internal fighting, but to

manage their differences by actively engaging them (ICG, 2011a),(ICG, 2012a),(ICG, 2012b). The

convergence strategy consisted of three paths:

1) A peace deal with the MILF based on broad support,

2) Finish the peace process with the MNLF, and

3) Partner with local politicians and civil society to improve the ARMM.

For the latter, the administration had to make difficult choices. For example, disarm the

private armies of local governors or allow them to retain such forces? Channel the money for

development directly to local administrations or create a separate fund? On both questions, Aquino

chose the first option and it worked. The trade-off was simple. Aquino allowed local actors, the

establishment of the ARMM, to retain their privileges in the short term, while pleasing the MILF by

allowing them to challenge the system in the long run. The latter was done by allowing the MILF to

be in control of the Bangsamoro Transitory Authority, the body which would oversee and implement

the transition towards the Bangsamoro Political Entity (ICG, 2012a). In this body, the MILF held most

seats and delivered its chair (ICG, 2012a). Jonathan Powell (2014) describes this as ‘sunset’ and

‘sunrise’ clauses (Powell, 2014). In this case, it concerns a policy and a clause but because they are

interconnected, the same logic applies. The sunset clause will allow the established parties to

anticipate a new situation over a limited period of time, and the sunrise clause provides a party with

an essential element of its political program that can be further developed in time (Powell, 2014).

In the section on context, elaborations have already been made of the second and third part

of the convergence strategy. Having mixed success in the second, the third track was well executed

by the administration. Now we turn to the first track of the convergence strategy.

The peace process with the MILF was the main policy priority. For Aquino, it was important

to move the MILF away from the MOA-AD, since any outcome that would come near to it would be

undoubtedly challenged in the Supreme Court and rejected in Congress. If any constitutional

amendments were necessary, the Aquino administration would not reject this in advance. However,

the administration was not fond of the prospect of leading such a campaign and would much rather

avoid it (ICG, 2012a). Clearly, these were the two main concerns. A potential agreement should not

resemble the MOA-AD and it should be done within the framework of the Constitution.

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The first thing about the MOA-AD which was striking was its depth and detail. Having agreed

on security arrangements (2001) and rehabilitation (2002) in a much more parsimonious way, the

MOA-AD was extensive in its coverage. Much unlike the MILF strategy of small and irreversible steps,

the MOA-AD was supposed to become a knock-out homerun. However, its detail made the MOA-AD

more vulnerable for legal challenges. Aquino opted for a framework agreement, in which all

important matters would be concluded, but on headlines instead of on detailed implementation

provisions. The details of contentious issues such as power-sharing and revenue-sharing were left to

technical working groups.

The process of concluding a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March

2014 was not without obstacles. Especially in the beginning, the MILF was unwilling to take a step

back from the MOA-AD. The talks threatened to fail when Aquino did something remarkable. Just like

his mother had met with Nur Misuari just after she came into office, Aquino met with Murad in

Japan, Tokyo29. This summit was a risky but a well-timed step. Powell writes that leaders are often

overconfident that they can accomplish something in a conversation face to face. He warns that this

may backfire in two ways. First, once a leader has mingled in the process, the group opposition can

expect high government officials to engage with them in the future. Second, if the process fails, a

leader may become blamed and lose credibility (Powell, 2014). It is generally recommended to

engage when a peace accord is almost concluded and these risks are significantly lower (Powell,

2014). Opinions are divided though, as Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall write that leadership

pushes at difficult times are important (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). In this case of

Aquino, two elements gave it extra momentum. The meeting was a well-kept secret which took the

media by surprise, and the timing, with the negotiations at the verge of collapse, were perfect

(Powell, 2014). The Aquino-Murad meeting brought the negotiations back on track, at the end of the

month the parties were out of the impasse. Other obstacles which the GRP encountered in their

dealings with the MILF were tackled one by one. Because of good work from the IMT and LMTs, plus

a functioning AHJAH mechanism, the issue of armed confrontation was less threatening. The amount

of attacks between the AFP and the MILF reached 0 in 2012 (OPAPP). Terrorism was still an issue of

concern, but was more linked to groups like ASG, JI and BIIF, not the BIAF (ICG, 2012a).

In what ways did the CAB differ from the MOA-AD? The tone and nature of the agreement is

definitely different. Substantively, the most important differences lie in the provisions on territory

and governance. On the first, the MOA-AD automatically included the ARMM in the new territory,

while the CAB provides for a plebiscite in these areas. Manila used the plebiscite requirement in the

ARMM so that the MILF would have to reach out to local government leaders (ICG, 2008b). Also,

29

June 24, 2014

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there was no additional category B (see figure 5) anymore which could possibly mean a much larger

loss of territory. However, the potential reach of the CAB was greater, because contiguous areas

could petition to hold a plebiscite to join the region. The threshold for this was only 10 % (ICG,

2012a). On governance, the GRP clearly demarcated its higher authority in the CAB. The relationship

between the GRP and BPE would be asymmetrical, instead of the envisioned associative relationship

in the MOA-AD. Also, the GRP would retain more control and powers than under the MOA-AD, for

example shared control on the new Bangsamoro police force, social security and pension systems or

land registration (Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, (CAB), 27-3-2014). What is also

crucial is that the CAB differs in some important regards from the FPA. The government system in the

new region will be parliamentary, with a cabinet of ministers. This is done to ensure that power is

also shared on the regional level, and not centered on the governor as in the ARMM. The CAB also

enables the new region to become much more self-reliant. On wealth-sharing, provisions for the BPE

have improved significantly, with a 75/25 distribution formula of gains from natural resources.

Furthermore, the BPE will be able to tax more effectively than the ARMM (Bacani & Ferrer, 2014).

The rights of minority groups are better ensured in the framework agreement. And finally, the

provisions on transition are more detailed and meaningful, with longer financial commitments; full

disarmament and demobilization over time, and a stronger commitment to good governance by

fostering a party system (CAB, 2014).

For the Aquino administration, the first and foremost pillar of its convergence strategy was

accomplished. Successful engagement with spoilers, a sound negotiation strategy and favorable

contextual conditions played a role to bring this about. The Aquino administration has clearly tried to

make sure that the CAB cannot be successfully challenged before the Supreme Court. The process

ensured congressional approval of the Bangsamoro basic law, the organic act for the new

Bangsamoro Political Entity, first. Also, the democratic process seemed to be sufficiently warranted

with stakeholder consultation and popular approval through plebiscites. If a challenge is successful,

the separability clause in the CAB will ensure that all elements of the agreement which would be

founded constitutional by the Court can still come into effect (Cook, 2014).

2.5.4. Group

For the MILF, this phase would become characterized by a sense of realism. Because the

MILF had obtained the MOA-AD, it was very hard to take a step back (ICG, 2011a). The MOA-AD

failed because of many reasons, but the general perception was that it mainly failed because of an

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intervention from the Supreme Court, judging it unconstitutional. For the MILF, which had never

recognized the Constitution as legitimate, acknowledging the judgment as a new reality was hard.

This did not send a straight message to their supporters. With the new administration, the MILF did

not expect anything else from what they had experienced since 1997. The government would try to

show its good intentions, but would lack any real commitment to push it through (ICG, 2011a).

However, eventually a breakthrough was made. In the following, an analysis is made of why this

breakthrough came about and what it produced for the MILF.

The breakthrough can, besides favorable contextual conditions, be attributed to a different

interaction between the GRP and the MILF, different process dynamics. These different dynamics

changed the MILF position within the peace process. The significance of this is clear. The MILF had

always followed a very consistent negotiation path: no recognition of the Constitution, a relationship

based on equality and the highest degree of sovereignty within the new territory (see section 2.3.4).

The preconditions for a protracted social conflict had remained: state failure, deprivation of needs,

legitimate grievances of the community and international involvement. However, the process

dynamics changed. A discussion of the different GRP strategy was made under ‘state’. The MILF

strategy though, needed to change accordingly because of several factors.

First, the GRP was led by a highly popular President which had good relations with local

actors in Mindanao. With his all-encompassing peace initiative, not based on fighting one group

while talking to another, it could have been considered an illegitimate course of action by the local

populace to pursue a more militaristic strategy for the MILF.

Second, despite the limited number of active fighters, the BIFF movement created an

alternative choice for many more radical young recruits. This might have forced the MILF core to

distance itself from Kato’s BIFF and officially renounce its independence goal. While many MILF

members may still cherish this goal, such a declaration does produce confidence for a continuation of

the peace negotiations. The split between a more moderate old guard and younger more radical

fighters became apparent. A statement made by Teresa S. Abesamis makes this very clear: “Let us be

mindful that the MILF peaceniks are competing with domestic war freaks and international jihadists

who have been orienting and recruiting discontented militants to their insane causes. The peaceniks

need our help to win this competition for the hearts and minds of their own people. To weaken their

leadership is to lose the peace. Consideration of this is probably what has caused Deles and Ferrer to

be accused of ‘lawyering for the MILF’.” (Abesamis, 2015) 30

30

The last sentence refers to Teresa Deles, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and Miriam Coronel Ferrer, chief negotiator for the GRP.

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Third, the dynamics on the ground changed. Sukanya Podder (2012) argues that because of

stronger AFP, CAFGU and CVO presence on the ground, it has become harder for the MILF to gain

civilian support. This support was not merely based upon the shadow government system, but also

on more informal contacts. For example, civilians often supplied the fighters with food or medicines

(Podder, 2012). Such informal contacts had decreased because of fear of government troops

(Podder, 2012). The proximity of the camps was important for social service delivery and the degree

of interaction with the population. Many fighters stayed in camps which were close to their original

residence. In this way, they could spend much time with their families if there was no fighting going

on (Ozerdem, Podder, & Quitoriano, 2010) . Also, children were often sent to the camps to receive an

Islamic education and be initiated into adulthood through military training (Ozerdem et al., 2010).

The introduction of local Madrassah schools made the former redundant. Also, because Murad lost

control of more radical factions, the number of camps which provided these services for the MILF

decreased (Podder, 2012). In sum, informal contacts decreased which made popular support

decrease. The appeal to religious duty and the ideology of a Bangsamoro state lost some of its appeal

in the face of risk of displacement, loss of property, interrupted education and stronger GRP military

presence (Podder, 2012). These factors contributed to an MILF change of strategy, accommodating

the GRP on some crucial points and distancing itself from the terms of the MOA-AD. So what did it

produce for the MILF?

The CAB has many parts that appeal to the MILF and which form a significant improvement

compared to the FPA. The abilities of the new BPE to become financially self-reliant, its control over

natural resources, better provisions for minority and indigenous rights, more areas of exclusive

discretion for the BPE, the political party system to counteract clan dominance, the financial

commitments to stimulate development, an expansion of the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts, more

international involvement and sustained international monitoring of implementation, a gradual

transition, less interference of the central government in law and order and the ‘separability’ and

‘repealing’ (all other legislation becomes subordinate to the basic law) clauses (ICG, 2012a; Cook,

2014; Cook, 2015; Bacani & Ferrer, 2014; CAB, 2014). Clearly, the CAB is a big achievement for the

MILF.


In this phase, several things came together which caused the peace negotiations to succeed.

The contextual environment was favorable to a diplomatic solution. Internationally, the involvement

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of more actors with stronger financial means and more authority was beneficial. Learning from the

ARMM and other cases, it is clearly important that already during the peace process some peace

dividend should be felt by the local population. Such peace dividend does not necessarily have to be

more income, but can also be education and stability. Also, the International Contact Group

facilitated more trust and mutual understanding within the negotiations. Nationally, the mandate

which Aquino received enabled him to pursue an inclusive peace strategy. This in turn generated

more trust in the government’s intentions. Another trust-building tactic was the involvement of more

grassroots NGOs. Finally, Aquino engaged with local players and the MNLF, to make sure they were

satisfied and, at least for the moment, on board. These measures created the right climate for the

peace process to deliver. For the state, the result came at the right time. With the framework

agreement in place, corruption and loss of support for Aquino became less important. The

negotiations had moved on to more a technical level, which impeded effective spoiler behavior.

Within the MILF, both internal factors such as radical splintering, loss of popular support and

decreasing fighting strength, as external factors such as increased GRP military presence had forced

the group to moderate its strategy. Moreover, for both the GRP and MILF, it would have been a

significant loss to its leaders if the negotiations would collapse. Both parties had invested strongly in

the peace process, with leaders pulling their personal weight as leverage. Finally, because the MILF

needed to distance itself from its radical rogue commanders, terrorist ties also watered down.

The resulting CAB seemed to be a defendable compromise for the Aquino administration

and a great achievement for the MILF. The document is realistic and well-considered and addresses

the root causes of the conflict. After seventeen years of negotiations, this should be considered a

major milestone.

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CHAPTER 3. UNDERSTANDING THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE MILF-

PHILIPPINE PEACE PROCESS

3.1. Introduction

As stated in the introduction to this thesis, there is a fair understanding of the onset of

terrorist/insurgency groups. In contrast, very little is known about the processes leading to the

demise of such groups. For this reason, the aim of this thesis is to focus on the demise of the MILF

and answer the following research question: “How did the MILF transition to a peaceful political

process?” The method followed (outlined in section 1.2.) consist of a literature review, a detailed

case study description and an analysis.

This chapter will combine the different observations and intermediate conclusions from the

case study. The analysis is divided into three different methods (see section 1.4.2.). First, the analysis

reflects on the different lens perspectives (context, state, group). What insights has this produced on

the MILF case and terrorism/insurgency research in general? Second, a within-case comparison of

the different phases is conducted. What factors were important in each phase and which

connections can be made, or should be further explored? Third, the case is viewed from the

perspective of the literature knowledge base. This will place the MILF case in the broader class of

cases and single out its particular interesting features, and additional value. Observations will then be

combined and summed up in a conclusion followed by recommendations. Finally, a reflection of the

research process is made to establish some lessons learned.

3.2. Different lens perspectives

The MILF case had many dimensions. International dimensions such as the war on terror and

the process of globalization had a profound impact on the conflict. The war on terror fueled

antagonism between the Moros and the Christians, and undermined reconciliation. Globalization

increased a clash of cultures, with traditional Moro culture being potentially eroded by a neoliberal

model of homogenized consumption culture. Furthermore, globalization increased feelings of pan-

Islamism, especially due to many Moros working in the Gulf area. This created more antagonism

between Muslims and Christians on Mindanao (Abu Bakar, 2015). For the international jihadi

movement, this war was already global before 2001. Their struggle already got mixed up with the

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Moro independence struggle in the 1990’s. By functioning as a safe haven for jihadi terrorists, where

they could receive training within the MILF camps in exchange for funding, fighting strength and

recognition within the pan-Islamist movement, the MILF became a part of the global war on terror

(Ressa, 2003).

National dimensions, whether the war against insurgencies or the state of the national

economy, can also impact the conflict. If the economy is doing well, the government has a stronger

mandate to walk the path of peace and patience. In the MILF case, in periods where economic

growth was high (2007-2008, 2012-2013), the peace process was clearly progressing better. Similarly,

the war against the Communists and the counter-terrorist operations against ASG and JI had their toll

on the military capacity of the AFP to wage war against the MILF. In this sense, a peace process with

the MILF might also have been a military necessity for the GRP.

In the end, conflict is waged on the ground, in villages and communities. The local

dimensions determine the way a war is fought, but also how and if peace can be implemented. When

the Philippine economy was growing, but poverty in the ARMM still increased, this negatively

affected the level of trust for the government in these areas. The same logic holds for a situation

where the parties are talking peace in Kuala Lumpur, while meanwhile armed clashes cause massive

displacement. Finally, when the MILF and the GRP agreed to something in the negotiation room, this

did not mean the local population would accept the outcome. This is best seen when the MOA-AD

was published.

3.3. Within-case comparison

A comparison of the four phases delivered some interesting results. Naturally, the fourth

phase where a peace deal was forged is a positive reference point, whereas the first phase, with all-

out war, frequent terrorist attacks and massive displacement is the most negative reference. The

scheme below gives a clear overview (see figure 6). If a factor is present or ‘true’ (colored green), it is

presumed as positive for the peace process. If a factor is absent or ‘false’ (colored red) is it

considered negative for the peace process. If a factor could be viewed present or ‘true’ but only to a

limited extent or not during the entire phase, it is colored orange. Two factors have been marked in

italics, because their effect can be interpreted both ways. A certain degree of internal spoilers in the

group can be positive, because it might drive the group to further lengths to ensure peace. For

example, when the MILF warned that a younger, more radical stream in the group would gain more

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influence if the peace negotiations would fail, this worked as a positive driver for the peace process.

The same logic holds true for the degree of popular support of the MILF. Popular support should be

sufficient to be a legitimate force, but not so high that the group can continue to fight/ or plead for

independence.

Factor Phase one Phase two Phase three Phase four

Unbalance in military power

Good economic performance

A bad learning example MILF

A bad learning example GRP

Active international involvement

Low level of terrorism

Low level terrorist ties MILF

Development efforts ARMM

GRP strategy aimed at diplomacy

MILF strategy aimed at diplomacy

No GRP ‘divide and rule’ tactic

MILF guerilla tactic

Peaceful internal spoilers GRP

Active internal spoilers MILF

Peaceful external spoilers

No FTO listing pressure MILF

Successful ceasefire

Inclusive strategy GRP

Inclusive strategy MILF

Popular support MILF

Popular support GRP

No people power revolution threat

President’s engagement

No massive displacement

Figure 6: Within-case comparison table, most important factors

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The table consists of general categories that still leave many significant details out. It is also

not true that every designation of green and red is clear-cut and without caveats. Many factors

depend on other factors. Clearly, not everything was bad in phase one and good in phase four. Let us

now examine the most relevant factors and connect them to theory.

3.4 Connections to theory

In the research design, a number of theories are singled out because of their importance for

understanding the case, and to place the MILF case within a broader theoretical context (see section

1.4.1.). In the case descriptions, mention is made of spoiler behavior, greed/grievance motives,

negotiation strategies and the wider protracted nature of this conflict.

3.4.1. Greed and Grievance theory

Greed and grievance theory goes into the motivations to start and sustain a conflict Collier &

Hoeffler (2004) conclude that greed is the main explaining factor in civil war, and that there is only

one significant grievance factor, ethnic dominance. Other factors, such as inequality and political

rights proved insignificant according to their statistical research. Greed consists of three factors, 1)

the availability of finance (mostly in the form of primary commodity exports and a powerful

diaspora), 2) cost of rebellion and 3) military advantage, which is mostly about population dispersion

and terrain. For the MILF case, finance is available but not abundant. There are no easy exportable

primary goods such as oil or diamonds, only timber (Abu Bakar, 2015). The diaspora factor has grown

stronger, as more Moros have gone oversees to work. Finance has also been made available through

the Islamic ummah (see section 2.3.4). The second factor, the costs of rebellion, is relatively low in

Mindanao. Economic conditions in the ARMM are bad and the prospects are similar (NSCB, 2012).

The third factor, military advantage, is clearly present. Mindanao is sparsely populated and the

terrain is very suitable for guerilla tactics. Still, despite some rent-seeking behavior, for example by

groups like ASG with its many hostage-takings, this conflict was mostly dominated by grievances. This

is illustrated by the fact that even ASG used much of its money not for greedy purposes but to help

out the local population in Basilan and Sulu (Ressa, 2003).

The Moro’s grievances included the disownment of their lands and ancestral domain,

erosion of their culture (kin-ship system), structural discrimination as second-class citizens, economic

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underdevelopment (leading to continuous and large scale poverty) and restrictions on the exercise of

the Islam by being subjugated to the secular Philippine law system. Some of these grievances date

back to the time of the American colonization (see section 2.1.2.). Under US governance (land

registration act) lands were disowned causing a deep rooted grievance. After the Philippines got

independent, migration policies intensified and Mindanao, once a Muslim bastion, became

dominated by a large Christian majority. Overall, the Moros had a justified cause, triggered by ethnic

domination. This perhaps explains why the Jabidah massacre was no more than the fuse lighting the

powder keg. When the AFP committed the Jabidah massacre, a full-scale insurgency was underway in

a few years’ time.

If we look at how these grievances have developed and fed the conflict, some things stand

out. Most grievances are still valid in phase four and have been admitted to by the government

throughout the peace negotiations. This is not surprising because initially, the government felt it had

already given a solution to the Moro problem by negotiating the FPA with the MNLF. However, it

soon appeared that the FPA did not address al grievances. Particularly in the areas of the influence of

Islam, credible autonomy, self-reliance and economic underdevelopment, the ARMM region fell

short of addressing Moro grievances. Economic underdevelopment continued. All administrations

were unsuccessful in upstarting significant structural development in the ARMM (Abu Bakar, 2015).

The ARMM became a viper’s nest of corruption, failed governance and warlordism. Part of the

reason was the internal revenue allotment, which was quickly pocketed by local politicians.

Consequently, poverty even increased: In 2012 nearly 50 % of families in the ARMM region were

poor vs 40 % in 2006. The economic development issue was also politicized as a carrot once a peace

deal was struck, but not sufficiently undertaken during the peace negotiations. This was a missed

opportunity because it could have given the peace process more momentum, and spoilers more

irrelevant. International involvement did something to remedy this in phase 3 and 4. This failure of

the ARMM undermined the credibility of the MNLF and helped the MILF to get significant popularity

and carry on the struggle. Clearly, the halfhearted actions of the GRP to address grievances backfired

and spoiled the peace process. The MILF cashed on this omission by addressing the grievances in

their own way.

Autonomy and self-reliance come together in the control of land and the power to govern

and collect resources. The MILF wanted to set an example of how a new Bangsamoro homeland

would look like. They therefore developed a strategy that very meticulously addressed grievances

like autonomy and self-reliance. MILF claimed control over large swaths of lands, created camps from

which areas were made economically self-reliant and could be governed according to Islamic laws,

undermined local government control. This is a strategy which fits with Duyvesteyn & Fumerton’s

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(2010) insurgency category. The political, relational and organizational features of the MILF were

very much directed at the local population. The MILF took this lesson from the MNLF, which had a

more international focus, but became very dependent on the OIC. Naturally, the MILF needed

finances and the group used its connections with the global jihadi network, wider Islamic ummah and

the kidnap-for-ransom groups under its protection. However, the MILF’s primary goal was to address

the grievances and gain legitimacy for it. Especially on ancestral domain (which includes control of

natural resources), Islamization, and the rehabilitation of Moro pride, the group had success. On

economic development, also the MILF could not succeed. This can be attributed to the threat of war,

or the necessity for guerilla tactics after 2000. By addressing these grievances, the conflict can take

another shape, with parties and their followers more inclined to follow a path of peace and

reconciliation. Despite the fact that the conflict was mainly motivated by grievances, as Mats Berdal

(2005) has noted, there can be interactions between political and economic agendas (Berdal, 2005).

Discrimination got worse after the war on terror was declared in 2001. This triggered further

antagonism between Christians and Muslims. The national Philippine media strengthened this

antagonism by framing Mindanao as lawless, chaotic and uncivilized (Chen Yuan Woon, 2014). The

rhetoric coming from the MILF, desiring an Islamic state and emphasizing Muslim identity, was

similarly contributing to this. This clearly hampered the peace process.

The erosion of Moro culture was very much tied to Islamism and the kin-ship system. The kin-

ship system was not embraced by the MILF, because it would undermine their position and fostered

economic stagnation. This was clearly demonstrated by the corruption and clan-feuds in the ARMM,

which fostered enduring underdevelopment. Therefore, the MILF tied the loss of culture completely

to a lack of Islam. Consequently, the Moro struggle got very much connected to a worldwide Muslim

struggle. Since the 1980s, Hashim Salamat had integrated the MILF in the global jihadi network.

Many MILF fighters underwent training in Pakistan. Lessons in Wahabism were part of the

compulsory training of foreign fighters in Pakistan. Later, in the MILF camps, similar schools were

established. Because of this connection, the outbreak of the war on terror would internationalize the

Moro secessionist struggle. Only when they were forced to choose for their secessionist aspirations,

the MILF cut ties with their terrorist connections such as Al-Qaeda, JI, ASG and RSM.

The last true grievance had a long history and has continued throughout the centuries. This

was the element of arbitrary and excessive violence against the Moro civilians, and violations of the

ceasefire against combatants. Such acts triggered cycles of violence. It also provided the MILF a

strong frame for new recruitment. Both parties sometimes broke the ceasefire unilaterally. The GRP

committed extra-judicial killings, either by the AFP, CAFGU or private armies. The MILF would

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respond, with conventional warfare and bombings and after 2000, when the group adopted guerilla

tactics, with raids and bombings. These developments turned out to be true spoilers for the peace

process. When atrocities became too great or when grievances were still ‘fresh’, parties lost their

mandate to negotiate. Violence could be used as a part of politics, but excessive and too arbitrary

violence, like the Estrada all-out war and Hashim all-out jihad campaigns, were not successful.

Abrahms came to a similar conclusion about the effectiveness of excessive violence (Abrahms, 2006).

This breakdown of trust prolonged the conflict considerably. Both parties used the threat of violence

as a bargaining tool within the negotiations. However, this only works when violence can be

controlled. Until the summer of 2005, the parties were mainly occupied with troop movements and

violations of the ceasefire. After this, AHJAG proved an effective mechanism to create trust and low-

intensity conflict. This turned out to be an essential precondition for discussing non-military affairs

during the negotiations.

In summary, grievances played a very important role in extending or ending the armed

conflict between MILF and GRP. Repression and lack of economic development continuously eroded

trust in the GRP and helped MILF in rallying local support and continuing their struggle. Addressing

these grievances was key for the MILF in lifting its standing, both with the local people as its image of

a legitimate benefactor and trustworthy party grew, and with the government as a party with staying

power. Also, by lowering grievances such as the level of violence and discrimination, mutual distrust

could be overcome. This was significant for reaching a peace deal.

3.4.2. Spoilers

Stedman (1997) distinguishes between internal and external spoilers (Stedman, 1997).

Spoilers exist only in the context of a peace process, which they want to undermine. Stedman divides

spoilers in three types: limited, greedy and total. The limited spoiler seeks tangible and smaller

objectives. The greedy spoiler makes a cost/benefit analysis whether there is a possibility to profit

from spoiling behavior. The total spoiler has all-or –nothing terms and refuses any compromise

(Stedman, 1997).

One can argue that internal spoilers (commanders inside the MILF who commit violent acts)

are negative as they erode the credibility of a partner to negotiate. This is also important when it

comes to enforcing an agreement. The AHJAG mechanism is a combined effort of the negotiating

parties to prevent such spoilers, from bandits, JI and ASG/foreign jihadi groups. On the other hand,

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whereas outright violent actions are a clear spoiler, the threat of violence has been an important

pillar under the MILF strategy. This has been a balancing act throughout the peace process.

For the GRP, politics oftentimes presented itself as an inside spoiler. Congressional approval

has been a fictive bomb under the peace process, and so has a potential ruling from the Supreme

Court. This became apparent after the MOA-AD, when internal opposition was exceptionally strong

within the state. For the GRP, this became an important lesson. The MILF had already drawn this

lesson from the splintering within the MNLF after it had signed the FPA. Because of its grassroots

structure, it had continuously engaged with its members and supporters to get an adequate

mandate. The MILF organized consultative conferences and engaged with the population through its

shadow government. However, both parties did not engage external spoilers.

The US government presented itself in two ways. First, due to its black and white frame of

“you’re either with us or against us” in the war on terror, cooperation with MILF became increasingly

difficult for the GRP because the US linked the MILF to international terrorists. And second, the listing

of the MILF as a foreign terrorist group would make any peace unattainable. However, the threat of a

FTO listing was a credible threat to induce the MILF to cut its ties with terrorist groups. The latter

meant that the MILF would no longer function as a custodian of these external spoilers, which

decreased their ability to spoil. The MILF would be able to negotiate more freely after this. This is one

of the policy options that Stedman also identified to limit spoiler influence (Stedman, 1997). The ASG,

JI and other foreign jihadi fighters continued to play a spoiler role, but unlike in phase 1 and 2, these

groups no longer caused the peace process to collapse. This was mainly because of steadfast

leadership and a clear preference for a diplomatic strategy by both parties. Whereas terrorist groups

did not derail the peace process in phase 3, a similar thing cannot be said of local politicians in the

ARMM or leaders from minority groups. Because both the MILF and the Arroyo administration did

nothing to consult these parties and take away their fears, virtually all parties that were left out of

the peace process were against the MOA-AD. This group consisted of local Christian leaders (who

petitioned the Supreme Court), the MNLF, some local Muslim leaders and the Lumad population. Any

implementation of a deal would be much more difficult with their disapproval. This was a clear lesson

learned as all groups were consulted in the final peace settlement.

In summary, spoilers play an important role in the GRP-MILF peace process. Only when

violence related spoilers were removed by joint coordination (AHJAG) and international monitoring

(IMT) or the severing of ties (MILF-Al-Qaeda affiliates), the road to a peace settlement was opened

again. Also, limited spoilers may develop when they are not consulted and their concerns taken into

account.

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3.4.3. Negotiation strategies and tactics

In this category, it is important to distinguish between strategies and tactics. The strategy is

the grand scheme of how a party wants to accomplish his end goal through negotiations. Tactics

refer to certain methods of- or maneuvers in diplomacy to get the most desirable outcome (see

section 1.3.4.4.).

The strategy of the MILF was mostly consistent throughout the phases. However, some

changes occurred in phases two and four. The grand strategy since the 1980s was based on four

pillars: Islamization, military build-up, organizational build-up and self-reliance (Jubair, 1999). Self-

reliance, organizational build-up and Islamization came together in the shadow government

structure which centered on the sovereign camp areas. Military build-up was based on its grassroots

structure and recruitment in local villages, and the connection to the global jihadi network.

Islamization was also influenced by the latter. For the MILF, diplomacy was another way of fighting

the struggle. Both military strategy and diplomacy were intricately related, because the MILF

negotiation strategy required a position of strength and credible deterrence. The group relied on

both a diplomatic path and a military path. Within this military path, the group had to choose

whether to remain a part, at least overtly, of the global jihadi network when a credible threat of FTO-

listing was made. The FTO listing would undermine its primary goal, recognition and legitimacy of

their secessionist struggle. The MILF chose to cut ties and cooperate with the AFP under AHJAG in

2005. Within the diplomatic path, two shifts occurred. After Estrada had reneged on all former

agreements and had declared all-out war (March 2000, section 2.3.1.), the MILF needed to seek

international protection. International involvement would make it harder for the GRP to renege on

previous agreements and would provide an excellent stage for the MILF to communicate its views to

the world. The second shift came after the Kato split (July-August 2008, section 2.5.1.). Because of

failed reconciliation attempts, the MILF leadership had to distance itself from the BIFF. Because a

new, more radical generation came up, and popular support somewhat dwindled, two steps were

taken. The first was a firmer commitment to the diplomatic path, and two, the relinquishment of its

official independence goal under the leadership of Murad. These were factors that contributed to

peace.

The GRP had different strategies during the different presidencies. These ranged from a total

military victory to a diplomatic convergence strategy of the three major issues in Mindanao. All

administrations had in common that peace would be desirable for economic development of the

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Philippines and the presidential prestige. In this respect an autonomous region was a good outcome,

provided that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippine state would be untouched.

Also, all administrations wanted to get a deal which did not need any constitutional amendment.

Fidel Ramos thought he could deal with the MILF in the same way as he did with the MNLF.

He therefore offered a proposal like the FPA with some minor changes. Naturally, this was rejected

by the MILF. Why else would they have fiercely resisted the FPA? Estrada continued most of Ramos’

his policy until he decided, forced by terrorist attacks and bloody violations of the ceasefire, that

military force was the only viable policy solution. Although this significantly harmed the MILF, this did

not work, as the MILF went underground and dispersed. Arroyo changed to an all-out peace, and

adopted a more comprehensive approach. She identified four paths: military, diplomatic, cultural

and economic (Ressa, 2003). Overall, only the military part gained some success, although endorsed

by AHJAG, a diplomatic tool. By separating the MILF from JI and ASG, both the group and the state

had gained considerably more freedom to negotiate on non-military affairs. On the diplomatic track,

her administration failed to deliver. This was due to many internal and external pressures

(conservatives, dissatisfied military commanders, people power revolution and the communist

insurgency). The MOA-AD completely misfired. Where this should have sealed her success in

reaching peace, it failed and became a clear MILF victory instead. Moreover, because the

administration had not consulted important stakeholders, the breakdown of the MOA-AD led to a lot

of chaos. On culture, Arroyo’s frame of the war on terror only worsened antagonism. Economically,

poverty levels in the ARMM rose. Aquino applied a different strategy, focusing on inclusiveness. His

convergence strategy of 1) the MILF peace process, 2) the MNLF review process and 3) engaging with

local stakeholders in the ARMM, paid off. It worked to create trust and limit the influence of spoilers

on the peace process. So what tactics did the parties use?

First, we can distinguish between official and unofficial negotiations. Official negotiations

give the group a degree of recognition and legitimacy. The MILF managed to force the government to

engage with them on an official level because of their popular support base and military strength.

This can fast-track the negotiations to a more substantive and serious level. Already during the

Ramos administration, this produced the Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities

(CCCH). Unofficial contacts, or back-channel diplomacy, were used throughout the phases. These

were necessary to manage expectations or search for opportunities to restart the negotiations.

Second, there are the different tracks of diplomacy that the parties can use. Some

differences can be discerned. From the third phase onwards, when international involvement also

increased, more grassroots diplomacy was undertaken. Until then, the parties had mostly held

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exploratory talks and official meetings. The grassroots diplomacy proved useful to increase the links

between the parties and build mutual understanding and validation (Mastura, 2015). Within track

one, there are some differences between the administrations. For example, the amount of changes

in the peace panel and whether leaders used their personal leverage to fast track the peace process.

The literature is divided on the latter, some arguing that leadership is necessary at tough moments

(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011; Cronin, 2009), and others, such as Powell (2014), that

leadership engagement can have ambiguous effects. Powell argues that leaders often think they can

force a breakthrough, either by engaging in summitry or by making threats and deadlines (Powell,

2014). With Estrada, who put down a strict deadline, and threatened with military action, this did not

work. The deadline was too artificial and could be easily ignored by the MILF. Aquino though,

engaged in summitry by meeting Murad in Tokyo on the fifth of August 2011. This meeting had a

more pressing invisible deadline. Both leaders knew that if they did not agree, the situation would

deteriorate. Aquino managed to make a push at a decisive moment. This is a clear example

illustrating that the way leadership is timed and implemented is crucial to its success.

Third, there are different tactical maneuvers which the parties have used. In the beginning,

mainly because of low levels of trust and bigger internal pressures, both in the group and state,

negotiations were mostly used as a moment to regroup, or to divide the opponent. On the latter

issue, only the Aquino administration wanted to include all stakeholders and increase unity. The

troop movements around the frontline at the Buliok complex, Buldon or camp Abu Bakar caused

continuous suspicion. Until 2005, diplomatic efforts were mainly made to serve the military cause. An

exception holds for the recognition of the camps at the end of the 1990s, which had clear political

purpose. A maneuver which was made was the ‘departing train tactic’. Both the MILF and GRP

engaged other stakeholders in the fourth phase to commit to the peace process, by making clear that

this would be the main vehicle for change in the Bangsamoro. Rejecting participation or actively

spoiling the process would certainly fail and leave them empty-handed.

Finally, there are ways of influencing the process. Both Estrada and Arroyo aimed at reaching

a fast, comprehensive deal within their term. This had several reasons, for example the internal

political pressures that kept looming over the peace process. Ceasefires could collapse so the time-

frame for reaching a deal was perceived as short. Also, to ensure implementation of the deal within a

single presidential term, the time-frame was shorter. The Aquino administration chose to take

smaller steps. This was good for confidence-building, and the intermediate agreements were less

vulnerable to legal proceedings and other types of spoiling. The MILF also preferred this strategy. The

group aimed at making small, but irreversible steps in their secessionist struggle. Only in phase three,

when the quite comprehensive and detailed MOA-AD, was so favorable to the group, they deviated

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from this. When the MOA-AD was cast down, it proved a valuable lesson and the MILF went back to

the policy of smaller steps. The FAB is a good example. Since it consists of more principled

agreements and less detail, it was less vulnerable. During the follow-up phase, technical negotiations

were less likely to be spoiled. Consequently, in this case, smaller steps proved successful. The frames

that parties use are another factor of importance. The war on terror frame that Arroyo adopted was

considerably less trustworthy for the MILF than the Aquino frame of national healing and

reconciliation. Similarly, the frame of a duty for every Muslim to engage in jihad that Hashim Salamat

used was less trustworthy than the more moderate frame, emphasizing the importance of peace, of

Murad.

In summary, negotiation strategies and tactics have been used with varying success. The

willingness of both parties to compromise (GRP: granting far-reaching autonomy; MILF: relinquishing

independence goal and associative relationship), grass roots diplomacy and small step strategy have

been positive factors in this respect. In this respect, the effect of different leaders both for the GRP

(different presidents) and MILF (Hashim Salamat to Murad) has been crucial, as these often signaled

policy changes.

3.4.4. Protracted social conflict

Azar’s protracted social conflict theory is a comprehensive theory on protracted domestic

conflict, such as the Moro struggle. Many things that Azar has emphasized have already been

mentioned under the greed and grievances section. His emphasis on the role of communities is a

valuable addition though, as are the process dynamics. In short Azar lists four preconditions for an

escalation of conflict:

Communal discontent

Deprivation of basic needs

Degree of state failure

International linkages

These preconditions were all fulfilled throughout the conflict but to a different degree. Locally,

communities engaged in rido conflicts because of economic failure, parallel legal systems,

antagonism and state failure (especially in the governance of land titles). The international

dimensions, the war on terror and globalization, played out in diverse ways. Islamization,

westernization, digitalization, illegal migration and smuggling were all factors of importance in

changing communities. Their effects had to be addressed by the government and the MILF. Three

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things were crucial to this, bringing development, reducing interethnic tensions and cooperation in

law-enforcement. Under Aquino, this was done most successfully. His administration adopted a more

positive frame, engaged development together with the MILF and had the best record on reducing

the often arbitrary, violence in Mindanao.

Azar points to process dynamics which determine how the preconditions are addressed and what

outcomes they produce. He lists state strategies, communal strategies and built-in mechanisms

(Azar, 1990). On the first two, an elaboration was given in the previous section. With built-in

mechanisms, Azar points to the security dilemma and greed (see section 3.4.1. greed/grievance). The

security dilemma consists of a dilemma which forces parties to think the worst of their opponents. In

the case of the GRP-MILF conflict this was overcome by three factors: international monitoring, the

establishment of AHJAG and other confidence-building measures, and limiting the influence of

spoilers. Clearly, all these factors were best addressed in the fourth phase.

In summary, Azar’s theory is useful for understanding the Moro case. His preconditions apply and

take a different shape throughout the conflict. This is done through the process dynamics, which

have similarly changed because of internationalization or internal developments within the state and

the group, for example a change of leadership.

3.5 Conclusions

How did the MILF transition to a political process by signing the 2014 Comprehensive

Agreement on the Bangsamoro with Government of the Republic of the Philippines? This is the main

question for this research. To assess this, it was necessary to study the causes and motivations

driving the conflict. The causes could be traced back to the sixteenth century, when conflict between

the Moros and Spanish conquistadors erupted. Since then, throughout the history of the Moro

people, the Moros have been victim to injustices. These grievances manifested itself in different

ways: the dispossession of land, economic underdevelopment, cultural erosion in a Philippine unitary

state, discrimination as secondary citizens and secularism. The main reason why the MILF could

continue the Moro struggle after the MNLF had agreed to peace, was the continuance of these

grievances. The FPA did not address any of these factors in a meaningful way. Both the SZOPAD

region, and later the ARMM, became a failure. Mainly because of its lack of powers in areas such as

taxing, law and justice and social-welfare systems, the ARMM governor became a puppet of Manila.

Throughout the conflict, the ARMM remained an area of corruption and warlordism, especially after

2001. These failures effectively legitimized the MILF struggle. The MILF could rally the Moro people,

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divided in 13 tribes, along the lines of a distinct Bangsamoro identity based on Islam. As it turned out

admitting the MILF legitimacy was the first step to peace.

An acknowledgment by the government that the MILF was here to stay, opened up the

possibility of negotiations. However, when negotiations start, it is important that they are not just

used for tactical purposes. The lack of mutual trust or to obtain a better bargaining position is crucial

in this respect. For the MILF and the GRP, this was exacerbated by two developments. The MILF went

underground after its camps had been overrun in the 2000 all-out war. The domestic Moro

secessionist struggle became a part of the global war on terror. On the one hand there was the MILF

connection to the global jihadi network, with organizations as Al-Qaeda and JI. On the other, there

was the alliance between the GRP and the US. Militarization and internationalization of the conflict

was detrimental to any peace, and served as a clear spoiler. The parties had to overcome this,

because it did not serve their main goals and long-term strategies. The MILF wanted to increase their

standing as a legitimate party by governing swaths of lands concentrated around their camps. All

Presidents of the GRP saw the conflict as undermining the economic development of the Philippines.

Several things caused a breakthrough. A successful lobby from the Arroyo administration to

keep the MILF from the FTO list, the creation of the AHJAG mechanism and international monitoring

of the ceasefire. The threat of an FTO-listing, and the criminalization of the MILF top branch after the

Davao bombing, moved the group towards a strategy change. The MILF project of recognition of its

legitimacy to address the Bangsamoro grievances would be endangered by continuing terrorist

affiliations. Under AHJAG, ties with terrorist groups were cut and ceasefires could be better

implemented. The role of the International Monitoring Group, headed by Malaysia, was important in

this. Separating the radical terrorist elements from the more moderate rebels and international

oversight was crucial for moving on to substantive and serious negotiations.

Within the negotiation process, two questions are relevant for their success: how and under

what conditions? On the former, it is clear that small steps worked better than comprehensive deals.

Smaller steps can create confidence and decrease the vulnerability of agreements against legal

proceedings. This becomes clear with the MOA-AD failure, and FAB success. Also, a convergence or

inclusive strategy works better than a divisive and exclusive strategy. Consultation with stakeholders,

especially on a local level, prevented spoiler behavior with the FAB. The role of leadership is also

important. Leaders can suppress internal spoiler behavior, create mutual trust by using a frame of

reconciliation and push the peace process out of a deadlock. Aquino and Murad both proved this.

Finally, a clear projection of the benefits of peace should be in place. Despite the fact that the ARMM

never meaningfully developed economically, a period of stability could already prove beneficial.

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The following conditions appeared to be favorable to peace. A stalemate that was not

satisfactory for both parties and which they believed could only be changed by politics. For Aquino,

peace was a political promise, and every day the end of his term would come closer without

progress, was disadvantageous. For Murad, the evolvement of a new radical generation, and the

somewhat decreasing level of outright public support, was similarly disadvantageous. Another

element was that international involvement in the diplomatic process was further institutionalized

with the International Contact Group. This facilitated more mutual understanding. And finally, the

power of potential spoilers was limited because of two things: successful military operations against

ASG and JI, and a clear mandate won at the elections for Aquino.

In conclusion, the conditions in which the negotiations were held, taking into account local,

national and international actors into account, were important. Furthermore, the strategies of the

parties had a certain preference for the diplomatic path. And lastly, while conducting negotiations,

an inclusive and small-step process worked best to avoid spoilers from breaking up the peace

process.

3.6 Recommendations

The case of the MILF-GRP contains a number of learnings for policy-makers:

On starting a viable negotiation process

Acknowledge the legitimate grievances of a group with mass support

Acknowledge that a diplomatic strategy is preferable to a military strategy for a large group

Separate the moderate core from the radical wing within the group

Make sure that international- or third party actors are present to monitor the process

On creating favorable conditions during the process

Concerning internal spoilers: depoliticize their concerns, for example by addressing them in

technical work groups.

Concerning external spoilers: limiting the influence of all-or-nothing spoilers is often a matter

of law-enforcement operations. Engage limited spoilers through political/economic carrots

Address all root causes: economic (stimulate real development during negotiations), cultural

and political.

On how to negotiate

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Step-by-step agreements work better to solidify gains and limit spoiling

Consult all stakeholders

Use a positive frame

Make clear projections of the peace dividend

3.7 Reflection

In reflecting on the research process applied for this thesis, I would like to discuss three

things: the use of a framework of lenses, the potential of interviews and –more in general- the value

of in-depth case study research.

The application of the different lenses (context, state and group) was instrumental in

separating certain dimensions of conflict. Different geographical scopes (international, national,

local) produced distinctive dimensions. At the international level, there is a dimension of the war on

terror and the global jihadi network. On a national level, there is a dimension of the war against

insurgencies (communist and Moro). On a local level, one dimension is the rido related conflicts,

while another is the battle between competing governance systems between the MILF and the GRP.

It was instrumental to understand these perceptions. By applying the framework of lenses, it was

easier to separate the dimensions and understand the factors of importance within them. Moreover,

the connections between different dimensions are better comprehensible. The framework also had a

downside. Sometimes it was hard to clearly separate between the lenses. When addressing one lens,

the clarity of the storyline frequently obliged me to transgress these framework boundaries. For this

reason some of the text about national development and the state, or local development and the

group are overlapping. This was also true for the agreements between the state and the group. It is

difficult to not repeat certain stories from a different perspective. However, in reflection, this

presents only a limited downside versus the clarity obtained by using the different lenses.

The work presented in this thesis is not based on interviews. However, this needs not be a

drawback as a number of books were used that were based on first hand experiences and interviews

(examples are Ressa (2003), Abuza (2003), McKenna (1998)). Also, the many ICG reports used are

based on interviews with Philippine people.

The case study method was highly interesting. In my personal opinion the Moro case stands

out not only because it covers decades of armed conflicts and negotiations, but also because it has

both national and international dimensions. Of course, this also complicated matters as the amount

of publications on the Moro case is huge. For this study many books and publications were studied

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that allowed me to obtain a deep level of understanding of this conflict. This specifically holds true

for the importance of negotiations and elimination of spoilers.

Thijmen Robert Hamer, June 2016.

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Annex

Map of the Mindanao mainland, the Sulu archipelago and the island of Palawan. The darker parts are where there

is a high concentration of Muslims. In the darker parts on Mindanao, comprising of Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte,

Manguindanao and North Cotabato, three of the four most powerful tribes of the Moros can be found: the Maranao (7), the

Iranun (8) and the Manguidanao (9). Another important tribe is the Tausug (4) tribe, which come from Jolo, Sulu.

Source: Gomez (2000)

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