how accurate was clement attlee in his assertion that the indian national army was the principal...

7/27/2019 How accurate was Clement Attlee in his assertion that the Indian National Army was the principal reason for Britain's withdrawal from India in 1947?

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HOW ACCURATE WAS CLEMENT ATTLEE IN HIS ASSERTION

THAT THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY WAS THE PRINCIPALREASON FOR BRITAINS WITHDRAWAL FROM INDIA IN

1947?

BY

DAVID TOMLINSON

(200536162)

SCHOOL OF HISTORY

UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

APRIL 2013

DR. CATHERINE COOMBS


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 2

CHAPTER I A SHORT HISTORY OF SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY ... 7

CHAPTER II THE RED FORT TRIALS .................................................................................................. 10

CHAPTER III THE INA AND THE ARMED FORCES ............................................................................ 27

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 42

LIST OF SOURCES ............................................................................................................................... 46


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INTRODUCTION

When I was the acting Governor, Lord Atlee, who had given us independence by withdrawing the

British rule from India, spent two days in the Governors palace at Calcutta during his tour of India. At

that time I had a prolonged discussion with him regarding the real factors that had led the British to

quit India. My direct question to him was that since Gandhis Quit India movement had tapered off

quite some time ago and in 1947 no such new compelling situation had arisen that would necessitate

a hasty British departure, why did they have to leave? In his reply Atlee cited several reasons, the

principal among them being the erosion of loyalty to the British Crown among the Indian army and

navy personnel as a result of the military activities of Netaji [Subhas Chandra Bose]. Toward the end of

our discussion I asked Atlee what was the extent of Gandhis influence upon the British decision to quit

India. Hearing this question, Atlee's lips became twisted in a sarcastic smile as he slowly chewed out

the word, minimal.1

P. B. Chakravarty, Acting Governor of West Bengal, 1956

In Britain, we tend to view our imperial history through a narrow lens. Very recently, Michael Gove

made a remark on BBCs Question Time about the proposed governmental changes to the school

history curriculum which demonstrates common attitudes to both Indian independence and imperial

history as a whole. He said, for the first time, we have suggested that people know about Nehru,

Gandhi and Jinnah... that they know about the people who fought for independence and liberation

at a time when Britain was withdrawing from her Empire.2

It is not surprising that he chose these

three individuals as the foremost examples of the people who fought for Indias independence and

liberation; many academics focus their studies of independence around this triumvirate and

consequently, the role of Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army (INA) is somewhat

overlooked. Further research into the INAs place within the Indian independence movement is

1

Quoted in: Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, Three Phases of Indias Struggle for Freedom (Bombay: BhartiyaVidya Bhavan, 1967), pp. 58-592Question Time, BBC 1, 21 March 2013, 10.35pm.


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certainly warranted, not least because Clement Attlee, the man who ultimately made the decision to

grant India her independence, reportedly stated that the INA was the principal reason behind

Britains departure by 1947.

The other interesting aspect of Goves remark was the way he framed it in a manner which suggests

that Britain was not forced out of India. He said that the campaign for independence came at a time

when Britain was withdrawing from her Empire, the implication of which is that the wheels were

already in motion and the choice was fundamentally Britains. This too is a common attitude,

particularly amongst western scholars who tend to encourage the idea of authority solemnly being

handed over to the Indian people at an appropriate point of Britains choosing. The title of the

distinguished 12 volume series, The Transfer of Power in India, 1942-7is evocative of this attitude

and has been used extensively by historians to reinforce it.

This dissertation will also use these volumes extensively with a view to ascertain the impact of Bose

and the INA on British imperial policy, relating this to the decision to grant India her independence.

The sources contained within the volumes are of considerable value to those studying Indian

independence as they provide an excellent insight into the communications, decisions and attitudes

of the upper-echelons of colonial government. Their provenance is undisputed and the fact that

many were formerly classified implies that what is written can generally be considered a fair

reflection of the thoughts and concerns of the author. Of course, one must also take into account

limitations such as who the intended recipient or readers would be and how this would change the

content or writing style, as well as the fact that British sources often cannot be relied upon for an

accurate evaluation of Indian opinion. In the third chapter, for example, the discrepancies between

British perceptions of ideology amongst Indians serving in the British Indian Army and actual

patterns of thought are explored in detail.

For a more accurate representation of popular Indian opinion, contemporary newspaper reports

have been used, as well as the memoirs, writings and accounts of politicians and INA men.


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Newspaper reports are useful for gauging public opinion and are used particularly in the second

chapter to assess the relationship between the dialogue of the national press and British

policymaking. The writings of prominent politicians, especially speeches, which would have reached

a considerable audience both through the radio and in newspapers, are also useful. They aid in

understanding factors which may have influenced public opinion and, importantly, were used by

British policymakers to analyse the trajectory of Indian political demands. The claims and reported

facts in these speeches and writings must not be considered factually accurate due to the vested

interest of the authors in presenting information in a politically favourable way. Similarly, the

testaments of former-INA men are used sparingly due to their unquestionable bias and tendency to

prevaricate or aggrandise the actions of the organisation. They have not been used to provide

historical information, but rather as an indication of the way INA members perceived themselves

and were perceived by other Indians. By analysing this range of primary sources, it is hoped that the

interrelationships between the INA, popular opinion, political rhetoric, direct action and British

policymaking will be exposed. This will indicate the extent to which the INA influenced the British

decision to quit India in 1947.

The INA is not a topic which has attracted a great deal of historical research or discourse; many

major works on colonial India, such as Bose and Jalals Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political

Economy, under-analyse the INA or fail to mention it entirely.3

Judith Browns Modern India: The

Origins of an Asian Democracyand Sumit Sarkars Modern India, 1885-1947, which can be seen as

syntheses of the Cambridge and subaltern approaches respectively, also deemphasise the INAs

role in Indian independence. These distinguished scholars, whose works together can provide the

general reader with a rich and informed understanding of Indias past,4

allude to the INA only in

3Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy(New York: Routledge,

2003), pp. 132-4. Just two and a half pages are devoted to discussing the INA and although the authors

mention the effect of the INA on Army loyalty, no explanation further explanation is offered.4Thomas R. Metcalfe, Book Review ofModern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracyby Judith M. Brown

and Modern India: 1885-1947, by Sumit Sarkar, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 45 (1986), pp. 1095-1098


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passing; Browns reference to it takes up barely four lines of text.5

Sarkar does go into more detail,

covering the INA trials, the publics reaction to it, Congress appropriation of the cause and its

connection to the Royal Indian Navy mutiny of 1946, however the scope of his book only allows for

his analysis to span five pages.6

As such, the connections between these elements are not delineated

to a sufficient degree.

There are certain historians who have researched the INA to a more considerable extent and

examined its impact on the Indian independence movement. Primary among these are Peter Ward

Fay, Kalyan Kumar Ghosh and Leonard A. Gordon. Fays book, The Forgotten Army, Indias Armed

Struggle for Independence, 1942-45, provides a detailed narrative of the INAs creation,

development and downfall told chiefly from the perspective of two of the organisations

commanders, Prem Sahgal and Lakshmi Swaminadan.7

Much of Fays research was conducted by

interviewing these two and it is supplemented by some intelligence reports, official correspondence

and secondary sources. It is perhaps due of the nature of his core body of research that the book

takes on a slightly informal and speculative approach, which somewhat undermines its authority.

Compounding this non-academic tone is the scarcity of references in his work; his final two chapters

dealing with the Red Fort trials and their effects, for which sixty pages are allocated, include just 48

references.

K. K. Ghoshs The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement, on the

other hand, is meticulously referenced and clearly benefits from extensive and varied research on

the part of the author.8

Amongst other source materials, he uses interviews with over fifty

witnesses, contemporary publications, and some official correspondence, although presumably he

did not have access to many of the declassified documents published in the Transfer of Power

5Judith Brown, Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.

3246

Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885-1947(London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 418-4237

Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army: Indias Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945 (Calcutta: Rupa

and Co., 1993)8Kalyan Kumar Ghosh, The Indian National Army: The Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement

(Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969)


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volumes as his analysis of British imperial policy relies chiefly on contemporary speeches and

retroactive explanations of decision making.A more intricate and detailed argument is needed in

order to establish that the INA and the political fallout of the Red Fort trials directly influenced the

highest levels of colonial administration, ultimately expediting the British decision to quit India. This

can be achieved through careful study of the official documents of the Indian Government and is

what this dissertation shall endeavour to elucidate.


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CHAPTER I A SHORT HISTORY OF SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE AND THE

INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY

Subhas Chandra Bose was born in Cuttack, Orissa on 23 January 1897 to a traditional Bengali family.9

Following a difficult childhood, throughout which Bose felt small and insignificant,10

he secured a

place studying the Mental and Moral Sciences Tripos at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge with the

intention of taking the Indian Civil Service examination upon graduation.11

He passed and was thus

offered a position, however after a lengthy period of self-reflection he decided to decline and

instead enter into Indian politics.12

After serving as Mayor of Calcutta from 1930-32, he embarked

on a tour of Europe which radicalised his political beliefs and instilled in him the notion that swaraj

should be attained through proactive means. He was particularly inspired by the men of action he

encountered such as De Valera, Mussolini and Hitler.13

His return to India saw him assume

Presidency of the Indian National Congress twice, once with Gandhis support and once against his

wishes, which put him at odds with the mainstream Indian political elite. He was detained and jailed

for the last time in 1940 for sedition, but escaped house-arrest and made his way to Europe using a

false passport.

In March 1941, he arrived in Berlin and set about convincing the Nazis to provide him with resources

to start the Free India Centre, a broadcasting centre transmitting propaganda and speeches to

Indian radios, and an Indian Legion, which by the end of the War was made up of three thousand

sepoys captured in the North Africa campaign.14

From there, he persuaded the Germans to arrange

transportation for him to Singapore where in July 1943 he assumed control of the fledgling Indian

9Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj: A Biography of Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose (New Delhi:

Penguin Books India, 1990), p. 710

Subhas Chandra Bose,An Indian Pilgrim (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 2, 2511

Sugata Bose, His Majestys Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and Indias Struggle Against Empire (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 35-612

Gordon, p. 5913Fay, p. 190

14Ibid. p. 199


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National Army, hitherto commanded by Mohan Singh. The First INA was made up of Indian soldiers

captured during Japans swift occupation of the Malayan peninsular and benefitted from generous

support from Japanese military intelligence under the tutelage of Major Iwaichi Fujiwara, who

recognised its potential as a propaganda tool.15

Bose, or Netaji (great leader) as he came to be known, was drafted in to command the Second INA

due to his charisma and reputation as a strong nationalist leader.16

The character of the INA under

Bose was an inclusive one; he introduced a womens regiment, The Rani of Jhansi Regiment under

Lakshmi Swaminadan, and promoted non-communalism through a strong Muslim presence in the

ranks and leadership.17 The strength of the force is unknown due to the destruction of many INA

records under Boses orders; some estimates place it at around 20,000,18

whereas the British

ventured a figure close to double that at 43,000.19

In any case, the Japanese only provided arms

enough for 16,000 men so the INA was underequipped throughout its wartime operations, a primary

factor influencing their crushing defeat during the Battles of Imphal and Kohima in northeast India,

near the Burmese border.20

The INA had little military success overall and was to all intents and

purposes disbanded following the defeat of the Japanese at Mount Popa in Burma. Many INA men

now found themselves back under the control of British officers in POW detention centres awaiting

repatriation and, in some cases, trial for desertion, waging war against the king and brutalities

committed against captured Indian soldiers who had refused to forsake their loyalty to the Crown

and join the INA. The dramatic end to the INA came with Boses death in an air crash in Taihoku on

15Fay, p. 82

16Joyce C. Lebra,Japanese Trained Armies in South-East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp.

27-817

Sarkar, p. 41118

Ibid, p. 41019

Annexure 1 to Memorandum by Secretary of State for India and Burma, 20 October, 1945, in in The

Transfer of Power in India, 1942-7, ed. by Nicholas Mansergh, Vol. 6, No. 48 (London: Her Majestys StationaryOffice, 1976),20

Fay, p. 526


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18th

August 1945, however to this day there are those who maintain that he did not die and the

crash was the biggest cover-up in Indian politics.21

21See, for example: Mission Netaji, [accessed

01/04/2103]


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CHAPTER II THE RED FORT TRIALS

The nature of the trials

Between November and December of 1945, the first post-war court-martials were held for ex-INA

men. There had been previous courts-martial of captured INA soldiers in 1943 and 1944, but they

had failed to gain any contemporary publicity owing to their clandestine nature and the reluctance

of the government to provide information regarding the INA.22

The conclusion of the war had led to

this veil of ignorance and propaganda being lifted and the British could no longer keep the existence

of the INA a secret from the politicians and people of India. The British reasoning behind supressing

information relating to the INA during the war was that its disclosure would have been dangerous

for growing political upheaval inside and outside the country. Such disclosure would have adversely

affected the dwindling morale of the British troops...23

Indeed, growing political upheaval and

dwindling morale were exactly what the trials resulted in; however the British were in a far stronger

position to deal with it following the cessation of their wartime commitments.

The trials of Captain Shah Nawaz Khan, 1/14, P.R., Captain P.K. Sahgal, 2/10, Baluch. and Lt.

Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon, 1/14, PR., garnered much public and political interest, not least due to the

chosen setting for the proceedings. Field Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of the

Indian Army, decided upon the location of the Red Fort in Delhi as a suitable location due to its

proximity to Army Headquarters and the convenient fact that many members of the INA were being

held there in custody.24

There is also an element of historic suitability about his choice; the titular

king of Delhi and last of the Mughal emperors was tried there for his involvement in the 1857

22Stephen P. Cohen ,Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army, Pacific Affairs Vol. 36, No. 4

(Winter, 1963) pp. 411-42923R. P. Singh, Rediscovering Bose and the Indian National Army(New Delhi: Manas, 2010), p. 239

24Ibid, p. 242


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Mutiny,25

and the rallying cry Bose gifted to his men was Chalo Dilli (Onwards to Delhi), a

proclamation of their mission to take the capital, which would not be complete until the tricolour

flag flew over the Vice-regal Palace and they stood at the gates of the Red Fort.26

It is ironic then

that three of the INAs top commanders would find themselves successfully in Delhi but facing trial

in the most historic of buildings, and one which elicited romantic ruminations of a pre-Raj period in

Indian history.27

Auchinleck was advised not to hold the trials in a location as accessible to the

general public and the press as it was quite rightly thought that they could unduly report or disrupt

the proceedings, but he ignored this advice on the grounds that such secrecy belonged to outworn

tradition and was contrary to the concept of justice and fair play.

28

As summarised by H. V. Hodson,

honourable as this attitude was, the choice proved disastrous for the image of the regime.29

The British were deeply concerned about the potential impact of the INA on Indian thought and

action. Their primary concern was the reliability of the army, the lever on which imperial authority

hinged, and an issue that had been the preoccupation of Army officials since the 1857 Mutiny.

Therefore, they were eager to make an example of the INA men for the benefit of discipline within

the British Indian Army, but they were faced with a dilemma. Harsh treatment would most likely

upset and aggravate the Indian general public who saw Bose as a patriot despite his misguided

actions.30

Therefore, they sought a middle ground whereby the full force of the law would be used

against the leaders and instigators but leniency would be shown for the misled regulars, a policy

25Lucinda Downes Bell, The 1858 Trial of the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah II Zafar for Crimes Against the

State (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 2005)26

Boses Special Order of the Day, 25 August, 1943, in The Essential Writings of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose,

eds. Sisir K. Bose and Sugata Bose,(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 296.27

William Kuracina, Sentiments and Patriotism: The Indian National Army, General Elections and the

Congress's Appropriation of the INA Legacy, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 44, (2010), p. 82528

Singh, p. 24229

H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide (Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 1986), p. 25030

Telegram No. 10494 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 21 August, 1945 in The Transfer of Powerin India, 1942-7, ed. by Nicholas Mansergh, Vol. 6, No. 48 (London: Her Majestys Stationary Office, 1976), p.

109. Hereafter referred to as TOP


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which the British believed to be consistent with maintaining the reliability of the Army and the

public peace.31

Furthermore, they intended to prove to the Indian public that their position on the INA was justified.

Telegrams sent between British civil servants indicate the Rajs attitude towards Bose and his

renegade army; a telegram from Sir E. Jenkins, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, to Sir F. Mudie, a

home member in the Viceroys executive council, dated 28 July 1945 describes Bose as a war

criminal,32

and propaganda during the war had described him variously as a henchman of the Axis

powers, a quisling and a fascist stooge.33

In order for this tactic to be effective, the British

sought to ensure success at the trials by enlisting Sir Noshirwan P. Engineer, Advocate General of

India, as counsel for the prosecutor. The Defence Committee also featured distinguished names

from the Indian legal community. Recognising the importance of the trials, especially as a vehicle for

advancing the process of independence, the Indian National Congress took up the case of the

accused and provided a pantheon of great legal minds to act as counsel for the defence. Amongst

the two dozen lawyers they provided for the first trial were: Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru; Dr Khatju, former

Minister of Justice; Asaf Ali; two former judges of the Lahore High Court and one of the Patna High

Court; Bhulabhai Desai, leader of the Central Legislative Assembly, who was responsible for the

defences conduct; and Pandit Nehru, who donned after thirty years his barrister's gown and white

band as a defence counsel.34

Congress appropriation of the cause

The involvement of Nehru, and indeed Congress as a whole, is curious at first glance. Nehru had

stated in 1942 that members of the INA had put themselves on the wrong side and were

31Ibid.

32

Telegram from Sir E. Jenkins to Sir F. Mudie, 28 July, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 5, No. 512, p. 129733Subhas Chandra Bose, Testament of Subhas Bose, ed. by Arun (Delhi: Rajamal Publications, 1946), p. ii

34L. C. Green, The Indian National Army Trials, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1948), p. 52


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functioning under Japanese auspices...[they] had to be resisted in India and outside,35

as well as

dramatically stating in 1943 that he would personally go to the front and fight Bose and the

Japanese if they invaded India.36

He was a socialist and supporter of Gandhis vision for Indian

independence through non-violent resistance, as was Congress, at least ostensibly. Significantly,

both he and Bhulabhai Desai had resigned from the Congress Working Committee following Boses

re-election in 1939.37

Now both men appeared as key figures responsible for the defence of the INA

and sought to legitimise their quest for independence. What caused Nehru and Congress

appropriation of the INA cause, which ran contrary to two decades of non-violent struggle and

[disregarded] the Congress leaderships well publicized and irreconcilable ideological feud with the

INAs Netaji, Subhas Chandra Bose?38

William Kuracina has written a seminal thesis on this question and argues that the sentimental and

symbolic nature of the INA, which had elicited a powerful and passionate reaction across Indian

society, provided Congress leaders with an opportune electioneering weapon...to counter the

emotional responses to the Muslim Leagues campaign message.39

For Congress, one of the most

powerful aspects of the INA legacy was its all-inclusive nature; as Nehru wrote in 1946, the trial by

court-martial of some of its officers aroused the country as nothing else had done, and they became

the symbol of unity among the various religious groups in India, for Hindu and Muslim, and Sikh and

Christian were all represented in the Army.40

This spirit was one which Congress wished to be

associated with in order to both counter the claims of the Muslim League that they failed to

represent the interests of all Indians equitably and to legitimise their position as the leading political

party in the country. Amidst the winter election campaigning, the prospect of harnessing a spirit

which recognises no distinction between Hindu and Muslim, between one community and another,

35Hugh Toye, Subhas Chandra Bose: The Springing Tiger(London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 171

36Gordon, p. 552

37Kuracina, pp. 818, 833

38

Ibid, p. 81839Ibid, p. 826

40Jawaharlal L. Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004), p. 634


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maintaining throughout the period of the INAs political prominence that Bose was quite wrong in

his methods when he thought that he could win the freedom of India with the help of the

Japanese.47

Despite these reservations, he had no qualms about also calling them brave men and

patriots when expedience demanded it.48

Leonard Gordon argues that Nehru, and indeed Gandhi

as well, were responsible for bringing it [the INA movement] and Subhas Bose back into the

mainstream of Indian nationalism and in doing so, were able to yoke the powerful emotions of

support for the INA to the Congress bullock cart.49

Gandhi also came out in support of the INA men. Like Nehru, he maintained that their approach was

misguided but he saw numerous saving graces, such as Boses patriotism which he described as

second to none and his bravery [which] shines through all his actions, as well as a spirit amongst

the INA men of self-sacrifice, unity irrespective of class, and discipline.50

This was a spirit which he

had been eager to foster amongst Indian nationalists for decades and Boses INA must have seemed

like a near-perfect embodiment of Gandhis model force for independence, albeit one founded upon

violence. Still, he could see the value of the INA - or rather the media-friendly image of the INA

expounded by the Congress propaganda machine - and stated that he too had been enchanted by

the hypnotism of the Indian National Army which had cast its spell on us all.51

He also pointed

out that Shah Nawaz Khan had reported Boses last wishes to be that the INA return to India and act

in a non-violent manner to help the Congress in the continuing fight for Indian independence.

Leonard Gordon says that this suited Gandhi perfectly. Gandhi had assimilated the INA troops into

his non-violent army. He had given due recognition to Bose, but discarded his violent means.52

47Jawaharlal Nehru, Interview to the press, Bombay, 23 June 1945, in Selected Works, p. 21

48Jawaharlal Nehru, Report on Speech of December 24, 1945, in Selected Works, pp. 279-80

49Gordon, p. 551

50Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, How to Canalise Hatred, in The Collected Worksof Mahatma Gandhi, Vol.

83 (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1977), p.

13551Ibid.

52Gordon, p. 552


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The British had hoped that Gandhi would be somewhat of a calming influence on the increasingly

firebrand Congress, but ill health had kept him on the side-lines for the time being. Wavell was

beginning to feel the heat of the situation, his growing alarm evident in a note he sent to HMG on 5th

November 1945:

[Congress] began by taking the credit for the 1942 disturbances; asserting that the British could be

turned out of India in a very short time; denying the possibility of compromise with the Muslim

League; glorifying the INA; and threatening the officials who took part in the suppression of the 1942

disturbances with trial and punishment as war criminals From these general attempts to excite

communal and racial hatred, they have now passed to a disclosure of their programme, which is,

briefly, to contest the elections, to serve an ultimatum on HMG, and, in default of its acceptance, to

organise a mass movement on the 1942 lines but on a much larger scale.53

Deterioration of the political situation

By November 1945, Congress was intensifying the pressure on the Government, using the INA and

the Red Fort trials as a vehicle to advance their political aims, as well as the cause of Indian

independence. They seemed to have abandoned their previous policy of non-violence and Wavell

picked up on this, musing, either there is a secret policy which includes the use of violence, or the

more extreme leaders are out of control.54

The British administrators were wise to Congress true

motives however, and Wavell commented in a telegram to Pethick-Lawrence on the 1st

October that

they were making a play to support the INA and trying to channel public opinion by demanding their

unconditional release and lauding them as heroes.55

During an informal conversation in the

Chelmsford Club, New Delhi, about the INA and the forth-coming trials on 15 November 1945,

Bhulabhai Desai mentioned that the INA trials have given them the best weapon they ever had for

53Archibald Percival Wavell, Wavell: The Viceroys Journal, ed. by Penderel Moon (London: Oxford University

Press, 1973), p. 18154Ibid.

55Telegram No. 36 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 1 October, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 127, p. 305


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their propaganda and that if any of these are executed, it will only make them the greatest martyrs

India has ever had, and he continued that as things are going now it may lead to an armed

revolution.56

In Congress eyes, leader and army made a formidable stick with which to beat the

British.57

Certainly, Nehru did nothing to dispel this threat of armed revolution. His speeches on

the INA question gradually changed in tone from August, when he stated that British refusal to

accede to Congress demands of releasing the men would likely cause unrest in India,58

and their

mistreatment would leave a lasting effect on the minds of Indians,59

to more ominous

proclamations such as there would be a great stir and tremendous repercussion if public interests

were not satisfied.

60

He talked of a wave of resentment, which would sweep the length and

breadth of the country if the prisoners were mistreated.61

These thinly veiled threats of violence did

not go unnoticed throughout the upper echelons of the Rajs administration. Wavell told Pethick-

Lawrence on 16th

October 1945 of Nehrus intemperate speeches and statements, which he

perceived to be whipping up public sentiments and laying the groundwork for inciting anti-

Governmental disturbances.62

Not even Nehru would deny his role as an agitator who capitalised on the looming threat of violent

insurrection to intimidate the British. He practically admitted in an interview with the Viceroy on

the 3rd

November that he had been preaching violence and that he did not see how violence was

to be avoided if legitimate aims could not be attained otherwise.63

A report on the INA situation

date 20th

November 1945 and prepared by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau summed up by

stating that, the public feeling which exists is one of sympathy for the INA and genuine disapproval

of its conduct is lacking. Congress campaign of propaganda was clearly working, and it was working

56M. C. Setalvad, Bhulabhai Desai(Mumbai: Botavala Cembarsa, 1973), cited in Singh, p. 307

57Fay, p. 435

58Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech at Lahore, 26 August, 1945 in Collected Works, p. 166.

59Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech at Tekri Kalan, 30 August, 1945 in Collected Works, p. 173.

60Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech at Allahabad, 2 October, 1945 in Collected Works, p. 208.

61

Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech at Lucknow, 4 October, 1945 in Collected Works, p. 21162Telegram No. 38 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 16 October, 1945 in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 146, p. 347

63Kuracina, p. 848


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on a nationwide and community-wide level, as alluded to by the report: the measure of sympathy is

substantial and is not confined to towns or to any particular community, and that day by day it is

being whipped up by the speeches of nationalist leaders and the writings of the nationalist press.

This is likely to continue and intensify.64

The national press is a good indicator of public opinion and by analysing newspaper reports, one can

glean a better understanding of the atmosphere which the British policymakers faced in India. There

were detailed and up-to-date reports on the proceedings of the trials almost every day and

newspapers such as Patlipura of Patna, Bihar, brought out comprehensive publications in local

dialects which reported the major issues, thus bringing the matter to all Indian ears.65 Needless to

say, the tone of such reports was overtly biased towards the INA and the Congress view was

supported completely by the nationalist press.66

Not only this, but the manner in which it was

presented was decidedly anti-British and pro-Independence. Ghosh sees the nationalist press

coverage of the trials and the history of the INA as the Saga of Indias battle for freedom,67

and by

simply looking at some of the headlines between October and December 1945, we can see that this

was the case. For example, The Hindu published two articles on 10 December 1945 titled, INAs role

in Imphal Battle and Freedom for India: INAs Objective Explained, which glorified the

organisations role in their ill-fated campaign in Manipur and Assam and put the trials in the wider

context of the independence movement.68

The reports captured public imagination, playing on the

uniqueness of the circumstances and the fact that the trials were unprecedented in British Indian

history.69 They argued that the charge of treason was unjustified for these patriots and drew

parallels between the efforts of De Valera in Ireland and Bose in South Asia, contending that the

64Enclosure to Telegram No. 21/6/45-Poll from Government of India, Home Dept. to the Secretary, Political

Dept., India Office, 20 November, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 222, p. 51565

Kalyan Kumar Ghosh, The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement

(Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), cited in Singh, p. 30666

Kuracina, p. 84867

Ghosh, in Singh, p. 30668The Hindu, 10 December 1945

69The Hindustan Times, 6 November 1945


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dividing line between the obloquy of treason and the glory of sacrificial patriotic service is extremely

thin.70

Many of Boses Orders of the Day were reproduced and the adventures of the Rani of

Jhansi Regiment were narrated elaborately.71

The effect of this nationalist propaganda cannot be understated, especially when we consider that it

was proffered to an Indian public who were growing increasingly despondent both with British rule

and the continuing indolence and inefficacy of the Gandhian campaign for independence. Leonard

Gordon describes the British as somewhat unwise to this state of affairs: What they did not foresee

was the powerful political impact that the story of the INA would have on a nation primed for

independence after the war. After all, this war, like the First World War, had been fought by the

British and their allies in the name of democracy and self-determination.72

From September 1945,

when Congress first published their resolution on the INA which stated that it would be a tragedy if

these officers, men and women were punished for the offence of having laboured, however

mistakenly, for the freedom of India and calling for their immediate release,73

to February 1946 the

political tide in India changed dramatically. On 13 February, The Statesman published an article

called Mob Rule which stated that political leaders have too little control over the passions they

arouse amongst certain sections of the population.74

On 5 November, the opening of the first trial, heavy police barricades were erected to control the

huge crowds surrounding the Red Fort. The crowds held posters and large banners with messages

like Save INA Patriots and They are patriots and not traitors were draped across the battlements

and gates of the fort.75

It was not only in Delhi that Indians by their thousands had come out to

protest; In Madura police had fired against the unruly crowds and a national INA Day had been

70The Indian Express, 18 October 1945

71Harkirat Singh, Indian Nation Army Trial and the Raj(New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2003),

p. 7672

Gordon, p. 55373

Enclosure 4 to Telegram No. 34 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 September, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No.

115, pp. 279-8074

Mob Rule, The Statesman, 13 February, 1946, in The Statesman: An Anthology, ed. by Niranjan Majumdar(New Delhi: The Statesman Ltd., 1975), p. 495.75

Singh, Rediscovering Bose and the Indian National Army, p. 256


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observed in many parts of the country.76

Over the next fortnight or so, the All-India Womens

Conference,77

the teachers and the students would express their disproval and vehemently protest

against the trial.78

By 21 November, the day court reconvened following a two week adjournment,

law and order was balancing on a knife edge as serious rioting broke out in Calcutta, soon to be

followed by Bombay, Karachi, Patna, Allahabad, Benares, Rawalpindi and other places.79

In Calcutta,

students were organised into a procession by activists from the Forward Bloc and had proceeded to

Dalhousie Square, all the time demanding the release of the INA prisoners. In a phenomenal act of

communal unity, they had been joined by their bitterest enemies, the Communist Student

Federation and also students from Islamia College carrying the Muslim Leagues flag.

80

A brutal

police backlash in which two students a Hindu and a Muslim were killed sparked a city-wide

demonstration and the situation escalated, the violence eventually lasting for three days. In this

time, 33 were killed, 200 civilians were injured along with 70 British and 37 American soldiers, 150

official vehicles were destroyed or damaged.81

Perhaps most worrying of all for the authorities the

crowds when fired on largely stood their ground or most only receded a little, to return again to the

attack.82

They would face the same stony determination from a unified crowd of Bengalis who

seemed equally unafraid of imperial authority in February 1946, the significance of which shall be

explored in the next chapter.

The British also faced the resurgence of certain terrorist organisations and violent troublemakers. Sir

Maurice Hallett, Governor of the United Provinces, expressed his immediate concerns to Wavell in a

telegram dated 19 November, not long after the commencement of the first trial. He demarcates

the link between Congress appropriation of the cause for their election campaign and the

consequent intensification of public feeling vis--vis the INA trials with the re-emergence of terrorist

76The Hindu, 7 November 1945, p. 4; 8 November 1945, p. 8

77The Hindustan Standard, 5 November 1945, The INA supplement, p. 1

78Ghosh, p. 215

79Ibid.

80

Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947(Delhi: Macmillan, 1984), p. 42181Ibid.

82Telegram No. R.G.C. XXVI from Governor Casey to Wavell, 2 January 1946, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 326, p.725


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groups and signs of the formation of private armies, some of which were linked to former-INA

men.83

I see a report from Benares that some agitator there threatened that if INA men were not saved,

revenge would be taken on European children. In Agra, Hindi and English handwritten leaflets are said

to have been found in a hotel that if any INA soldier were killed, Britishers would be murdered... These

may seem rather petty matters, but they do show which way the wind is blowing.84

Clearly the wind was not blowing in favour of the British; the threat of further violence was apparent

and they faced the unprecedented situation of large sections within Indian society being united by a

universal cause and whipped up into a state of hysteria, which threatened to become unmanageable

either by them or by Congress. Hallett suggests that contacts should be established with

demobilised soldiers and with the families of the INA prisoners,85

but the seditious threats and

criminal actions were not localised to the community of former INA men.

Wavell knew that the true threat lay at Congress door. By early November, Congress had sharpened

their revolutionary rhetoric; Patel stated in a speech at Bombay that the party was not going to sit

quiet after the elections and wait on the convenience and pleasure of the British Government. The

Congress would demand an immediate and final solution... If such a solution was not forthcoming...

sure as day follows night there would be another struggle... When the time for action comes and the

time for action may come soon, we must be able to act as one man. Nehru built on this call for

action with a statement of his own, saying that revolution is inevitable.86

In reaction to this and

the heightening political unrest, Wavell sent a note to HMG reporting the situation of great difficult

and danger and requesting support and guidance from His Majestys Government.87

He warned

with the utmost gravity of an imminent coup, orchestrated by the Congress leaders with the INA

83Telegram from Sir M. Hallett (UP) to Wavell, 19 November 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 218, pp. 506-7

84Ibid.

85

Ibid.86Wavell, p. 182

87Ibid., p. 181


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as the spear-head of their revolt.88

He expected it to happen in spring of 1946, after the elections,

although he proposed that circumstances could cause force their hand. The purpose of the

uprising would be to subvert the British administration and to make them capitulate to Congress

demands for immediate independence, an objective which would be achieved by:

organised attacks on the railways and public buildings, treasuries would be looted and records

destroyed. In fact Congressmen would attempt to paralyse the administration, as they did in 1942;

they would also attack and possibly murder any officials, British and Indian, on whom they could lay

their hands.89

Britains response

By closely analysing the correspondence sent between British officials from August to December

1945 we can see the effect that the violence, the campaigning, the threats and the public pressure

had on governmental policy. On 11 August, estimates were sent from the Governor-General to the

War Department about how many INA prisoners would be tried and how many would be executed,

as well as updated classifications of the captives. Each INA man was categorised by their

involvement and complicity in the organisation; blacks were those who were fanatical in their

loyalty to Bose and the cause, they were usually officers and it was recommended that they ought to

be court-martialled; greys were those who willingly became members of the INA but could not be

considered fundamentally or incurably disloyal to the Raj; whites were those who were forcibly

made to join the INA and whose loyalty to the Raj was beyond question.90

In this telegram, it was

estimated that 600 men were to be brought to trial and, whilst it was recommended that most of

88Ibid., pp. 182-183

89

Wavell, pp. 182-18390Telegram No. 10234 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 11 August, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 17,

pp. 49-52


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the anticipated death penalties issued ought to be commuted to imprisonment or transportation,

some 50 executions were predicted.91

In the third part of the telegram, a draft press communique is discussed. The communique stresses

the leniency and good-natured manner in which the majority of INA men were to be treated,

opening with, The Government of India have decided to treat with mercy and generosity...92

This

demonstrates that public relations were a concern of the authorities, however most of the

correspondence from August indicate that logistic and legal considerations were at the forefront of

British thought.93

By late August though, as the interests of nationalist leaders in the INA were

beginning to pique, public opinion became increasingly prominent in Governmental considerations;

on 21 August, the Governor-General suggests that the communique discussed earlier in the month

ought to be published as soon as possible due to the likely involvement of nationalist leaders.

Strategically, the Governor-General thought that a quick publication of their statement of intent

would give the Government the upper-hand and forestall criticism from politicians and the press. He

also believed that a policy of maximum forcefulness against the instigators and leniency towards the

misled regulars would be consistent with maintaining the reliability of the Army and the public

peace.94

Congress first official statement of interest in the INA situation was the resolution passed in Poona

on 15 September which called for the immediate release of the prisoners; it is discussed in a

telegram from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence on 18 September. Wavell notes the exaggerated and

embittered language of the resolution and anticipates that Congress involvement will cause

91Ibid.

92Ibid.

93See, for example: Telegram No. 18179 from Secretary of State to Governor-General, 17 August, 1945 in

TOP, Vol. 6, No. 32, pp. 75-6; Minutes from Meeting of India and Burma Committee, 17 August, 1945 in TOP,

Vol. 6, No.33, pp. 76-82; Telegram No. 31 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 20 August, 1945 in TOP, Vol. 6,

No. 47, pp. 105-994Telegram No. 10494 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 21 August, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 48,

pp. 109-111


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difficulties for the Government of India.95

By 5 October, we can already see the British willing to

change their policy in order to temper public opinion; Pethick-Lawrence proposes that only those

who were directly responsible for the death of Indian soldiers or for torture should be put to death.

This, he believes, will take the wind out of Congress criticism and prevent further censure.96

However, by 2 November 1945 it was clear that further concessions were needed in order to keep a

lid on the rapidly deteriorating political situation. General Sir Claude Auchinleck had been consulted

in order to provide his opinion on whether the release of large numbers of guilty INA men would

pose a security risk to the provinces, especially volatile areas such as Bombay, Bengal and the

Punjab,

97

and what the reaction of loyal members of the Indian Army would be to this. In his report,

he stated his intention to drop the charges against a, b, c, e category prisoners i.e. all but those

responsible for murder, brutality, desertion or capture of Allied subjects98

and his intention to

remove the waging war against the King from the chargesheet of those being tried. This was

irrefutably due to the treasonable implications of the charge and the reactionary nationalist clamour

that suggested that fighting for the independence of ones own country cannot constitute treason.

About this, Auchinleck wrote in early 1946 that, as regards confirmation [sic] of the sentence

waging war, I hold that it is our object to dispose of this most difficult problem of how to deal with

the so-called INA in such a way as to leave the least amount of bitterness and racial feeling in the

minds of the peoples of India and Britain...99

In addition to the removal of this charge, Auchinleck

estimates that there will be no more than 20 executions, assuming an estimated 120 INA men go to

trial. This number was down from 50 executions from 600 trials on 11 August,100

showing a growing

sense of apprehension to prolong a situation which was, by all accounts, proving to be far more

trouble than had been anticipated.

95Telegram No. 34 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 September, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 115, p. 273

96Telegram from Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 5 October, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 131, p. 315

97Telegram No. 1882-S from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 28 October, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 174, pp. 416-

41898

Telegram from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 11 August, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 17, p. 4999

John Connell,Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck(London: Cassel, 1959), pp.807-808100

Telegram from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 11 August, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 17, p. 50


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Reflecting back on British media strategy, Wavell told Pethick-Lawrence on 5 November 1945 that

Congress would have sought the same effects on public opinion whether the government had taken

pre-emptive, counter-propaganda measures or not. However, he does admit that their response was

stilted, saying that they ought to have fed the press accurate reports on the INA as soon as the war

ended, thus enabling them to temper the mood of the nationalist press and creating a fairer

atmosphere for the trials to proceed in.101

In his private journal, he had written a day earlier that

propaganda and publicity over the INA was fatally slow and ineffective.102

What this indicates to

the historian is that the main issue here can interpreted to be a psychological one. We have seen the

psychological impact of the INA on the masses insofar as the violent passion Congress and other

agitators successfully aroused. We shall see later on the psychological impact the affair, and

particularly the involvement of the nationalist press, had on army loyalty.

For now, Auchinleck had to take a judgement call; the three INA soldiers had been found guilty and

been sentenced to transportation for life, cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowances.103

With

the political pressure in the country mounting and the issue of army loyalty to thoroughly consider,

Auchinleck reflected on his options. In a note to Wavell on 17 November 1945, he had passed on the

concerns of the Governor of Punjab who warned that if the Government intend to carry out the

death sentences, they must be prepared to face unparalleled agitation, more widespread than 1919

and 1942 and use ruthless force to suppress it.104

He reiterated that, the representatives of the

Provinces expressed considerable uneasiness about the political situation which might result from a

continuance of the present agitation.105 Clearly, public opinion and the threat of violence had their

effects as Auchinleck immediately commuted the sentences of all three to one of cashiering and

101Telegram No. 41 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 5 November, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 190, p. 443

102Wavell, pp. 180-81

103Singh, Rediscovering Bose and the Indian National Army, p.306

104

Enclosure 2 to Telegram from General Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November, 1945 in TOP, Vol. 6, Enclosure2 to No. 233, p. 535105

Telegram from General Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 233, p. 530


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forfeiture of pay and allowances on 31 December 1945.106

In a telegram circulated to all Army

Commanders in February of the next year, he revealed the circumstances that influenced his

decision: to have confirmed the sentence... would have probably precipitated a violent outbreak

throughout the country, and have created active and widespread disaffection in the Army, especially

amongst the Indian officers and the more highly educated rank and file. Therefore commuted

sentences were the only option available in order to maintain the stability, reliability and efficiency

of the Indian Army so that it may remain in the future a trustworthy weapon for use in the defence

of India, and we hope, of the Commonwealth as a whole.107

106

Connell, pp. 808-09107Enclosure to Telegram from General Auchinleck to Wavell, 13 February, 1946, in TOP, Vol. 6, Enclosure to

No. 425, pp. 939-946


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CHAPTER III THE INA AND THE ARMED FORCES

The importance of military authority in India

The British Indian Army was a cornerstone of imperial authority within the subcontinent. Not only

this, but it had a more far-reaching importance insofar as it protected British imperial interests from

North Africa to East Asia. Sarkar sums its role up succinctly as a domestic rod of order and an

international fire brigade,108

and throughout the nineteenth century it was dispatched variously to

China, Persia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Burma, Singapore and Hong Kong amongst many

others.109

Furthermore, India was regarded by many British imperialists as an English barrack in the

oriental seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them.110

Therefore, the reliability and efficacy of the British Indian Army had been of paramount importance

to both internal security within India and regional power in general since the beginning of the Raj.

Little had changed even after the First World War; commenting on the Rawlinson Committees

proposals for Indianisation of the forces, Montagu sent Lord Reading a telegram on the

fundamental principles of Indian Government which said the security of the country from dangers

without and within... depends [on] the capacity of its Government to fulfil its primary duties [which]

can only be ultimately guaranteed by the Army in India.111

The question of reliability within the British Indian Army had always preoccupied colonial thought,

owing to the circumstances of its origin. Following the dissolution of the dismal failure that was

the East India Company administration in India,112

and the mutiny of their army which was primarily

made up ofsepoys, there came the transferring [of] all rights that the company had hitherto

108Sarkar, p. 79

109Ronald Hyam, Britains Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (Basingstoke:

Palgrave, 2002), p. 37110

Sir Charles Lucas, ed., The Empire at War, Vol. 1 (London: 1921-26), pp. 56-7.111

Telegram from Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu to Viceroy, Lord Reading, 14 February, 1922, London,

British Library, India Office Records L/MIL/3/2534 M. 1348/1922, No. 1112C. A. Bayly, The Consolidation and Failure of the East India Company's State, 1818-1857, in Indian society

and the Making of the British Empire, by C. A. Bayly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 106


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enjoyed on Indian soil directly to the Crown.113

With it came a restructuring of the army. Patterns

of recruitment changed to concentrate on the martial races of north India, especially those in the

Punjab and those who had stayed loyal throughout the mutiny.114

Further evidence of British

cautiousness is seen in the ratio, which Keith Jeffrey describes as a central tenet of the Indian

military administration and a crude index of mistrust.115

The ratio was approximately one British

soldier for every two Indian soldiers and this was adhered to fairly stringently until the outbreak of

the First World War. In 1914, there were 81,000 British troops and 152,000 Indian troops but by

1918, there were six Indians for every British soldier.116

At the conclusion of the war, this balance

was quickly redressed; British high command still thought that such a high ratio posed an internal-

security risk.117

This shows that even over half a century after the mutiny, imperial paranoia was still

influencing military decisions and that the British Indian Army was seen as an entity that had to be

carefully managed and maintained so that authority in the subcontinent could be continued.

During the war, the INA posed no considerable threat to the British position in India, either internally

or externally. The dismissive terms in which British officials describe Bose and his organisation are

testament to this, although Military Intelligence was still wary of his potential subversive influence.

On 14 July 1943, just ten days after Bose officially assumed leadership of the Indian Independence

League and the INA, MI2 prepared a note on his recent activities. It describes his espionage

connections in India and propaganda campaign, but concludes that pragmatically Bose has little

chance of fomenting a revolution in India or providing any substantial military threat.118

His

propaganda campaign largely consisted of radio broadcasts and pamphleteering, facilitated by

Japanese broadcast centres and aeroplanes. Of a number of pamphlets that had been dropped on

113Stanley Wolpert,A New History of India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 237

114Keith Jeffery, 'An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas'? India in the Aftermath of the First World War,

Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 15 (1981), p. 371115

Ibid. p. 370116

Government of India, The Army in India and its Evolution: Including an Account of the Establishment of the

Royal Air Force in India (Calcutta: Superintendent Govt. Printing India, 1924), p. 219117

Jeffrey, p. 371118Note by M.I.2 on the Recent Activities of Subhas Chandra Bose, 14 July, 1943, in TOP, Vol. 4, No. 37, pp.

74-5


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the villages east of Aijal, near the Burmese border, Sir Andrew Clow wrote to Wavell that they were

extremely inept, written in unfamiliar languages, poorly designed and featured little

understanding of local mentality and conditions.119

There was a state-sponsored blackout of his

radio broadcasts although some did manage to reach Indian audiences thanks to Japanese

transmission infrastructure.120

The British initiated a counter-propaganda campaign on the radio,

designed to deride Bose and his men as traitors, spread the notion that he was a Japanese fascist

pawn and pillory his transparent personal ambition.121

The broadcasts made no mention of an

army at all, least of all its reported strength or accounts of their operations; instead, it granted the

existence of Jiffs (Japanese-Indian Fifth Columnists) who out of... ignoble motives... had hitched their

fortunes to the puppet Bose and his brutal Japanese masters.122

The campaign enjoyed moderate success and at the close of the war, there were still many Indians

who had never heard of the INA or were convinced by British propaganda that Bose and his men

were mere stooges of the Japanese. The British were now faced with the problem of how to treat

captured INA men and what the implications of the situation would be regarding army loyalty. An

intelligence report delivered on 15 June 1945 gives us an early insight into the post-war problems

the British anticipated because of the INA; the report is based on an interview with a captured Jiff

who warns that:

these men [INA soldiers], having no immediate hope, will return to their depots and appear as good

and well-disciplined soldiers on parade. Off duty, however, they will probably discuss their past

experiences, the Bose movement, independence, an Indian army without British soldiers and more

especially the hardships they themselves bore in an effort to achieve these objects... The source goes

on to state that this will mean a rapid permeation of nationalism throughout the entire Indian Army...

119Telegram No. 77 from Sir A. Clow to Wavell, 19 December, 1943, in TOP, Vol. 4, No. 274, pp. 557-8

120

Fay, p. 419121Ibid., p. 425

122Ibid.


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Rehabilitation [of INA men] he considers cannot be successful unless it is based on the fostering of a

national rather than communal spirit.123

The intelligence officer also reports the apparent aloofness of the British Indian Army towards the

INA and a willingness to both denounce them as traitors and execute the worst of them. Some, he

reports, even suggested that a court-martial would be an appropriate outcome.124

It is in fact likely

that this attitude was commonplace amongst the loyal sepoys of the Indian Army. They were cut

from the same cloth as the INA men, they had benefitted from the same influences and training, yet

they had stayed faithful whilst the Jiffs had defected in order to fight against them. British wartime

propaganda again had a huge influence in their conceptualisation of the INA; counter-intelligence

agents were sent to areas in which Boses contact parties were operating. Tales of Japanese

cruelty were spread and intermingled with tales of Jiff complicity until there was no longer a clear

distinction between the two. Their disloyalty and brutishness were reiterated again and again by

radio broadcasts, newspaper reports and commanding officers. The natural obscurity of war,

compounded by censorship and normal information management, virtually guaranteed that the

prevailing image of the INA officer would remain that of a man who was part traitor, part coward,

part bully, a lackey in the service of Nippon.125

Changing trends within the Armed Forces

How long this conception remained prevalent amongst the men of the British Indian Army is difficult

to ascertain. What is very likely, however, is that their opinions regarding the INA began to be

swayed by the gradual outpouring of public support for the latter. As stated in the previous chapter,

the Red Fort trials elicited a widespread emotional response from the Indian people, which was

123Note by Military Intelligence No. 10005, South East Asia and India Command Weekly Security Intelligence

Summary No. 189, in TOP, Vol. 5, No. 512, p. 1127-8124Ibid.

125Fay, pp. 427-28


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kindled by the nationalist press, Congress propaganda and speeches, and political activism.

Following his release from British custody, Shah Nawaz Khan, one of the accused from the first trial,

addressed a reception at Gandhi Ground held in honour of the INA heroes. He declared that for

the first time, the might of the British Government had bowed down before the wishes of the Indian

people and the right of the subject races to wage war for their freedom of the country has been

recognised.126

Statements such as this, along with the nationwide glorification of the INA cause,

must have set the sepoys thinking as to why they had not taken the same opportunity to fight for the

independence of their homeland. It became apparent to them that the image of the Indian Army

within the collective Indian mind was unfavourable; it was seen as an instrument of the British

imperialism to keep India and other Asiatic countries in subjugation.127

Brigadier Rajendra Singh

wrote that the effect on the morale on the men was devastating; the sepoyfelt chagrined at the

publicity given to the INA soldiers, his prestige was stolen from his sails. He wanted to emulate the

INA soldiers and unconsciously become a fighter for the independence of India.128

Such thinking had cause to be particularly predominant due to a heightening of political awareness

which had begun to take place within the ranks, notably because of the vast expansion of the armed

forces. The pre-war recruitment process, as described above, focused on certain classes or martial

races that were believed to be untainted by political consciousness.129

They invariably hailed from

areas with well-established civil-military structures, such as District Soldiers Boards, best illustrated

by the example of the Punjab area.130

But the need for soldiers during the Second World War had

left these classes unable to supply the total requirement. As such, men were drafted in who had no

previous association with the military and because of their urban and educated backgrounds, they

126Singh, Soldiers Contribution to Indian Independence, p. 308

127Ghosh, p. 228

128Brigadier Rajendra Singh, Far East in Ferment(Delhi: Army Educational Stores, 1961), p. 28

129

Ibid., p. 226130Tai Yong Tan, Maintaining the Military Districts: Civil-Military Integration and District Soldiers Boards in the

Punjab, 1919-1939, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October, 1994), pp. 833-874


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brought politics with them.131

Furthermore, considering the level of awareness and the country-wide

platform the trials commanded, it was impossible to keep the armed forces isolated from the

growing sense of unrest.

On 22 June 1945, the Congress Working Committee had passed a resolution instructing

Congressmen on the importance of giving an Indian character to the Indian Army, which entailed

breaking down the barriers which had previously prevented the politicisation of the armed forces.132

As described above, the army was already somewhat primed for politicisation due to the vast

changes in its demography and Congress therefore planned to use the INA as a national

counterweight to the apolitical British Indian Army.133 As one might expect, the Indian government

was wise to this desire; since 1934, Congress had been concerned with unfettered national control,

among other things over the army and other defence forces.134

Wavell notes on 22 October in a

telegram to Pethick-Lawrence that Congress growing interest in army affairs, which was evident

even at the Simla Conference, and their effort... to suborn the Army is likely to be the most

dangerous development of the near future.135

Abdul Kalam Azad, he says, recently stated that the

Indian Army should become a truly national organisation to which the public, and presumably the

political leaders, could have free access leading Wavell to conclude that there is no doubt that the

Congress Party wish to establish influence over people who are capable of fighting.136

Morale in the British Indian Army during the Second World War was, on the whole stronger and

performance was better than metropolitan armies, at least in some theatres in the age of Total

131Sir Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves: The Story of the Last Two Years of British Rule in India (London:

Cassell, 1950), p. 65132

CWC resolution on Instructions, Bombay, 22 June, 1945, inINC: The Glorious Tradition, Texts of the

resolutions passed by the INC, the AICC and the CWC, ed. by A.M. Zaidi, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Indian Institute of

Applied Political Research, 1988), p. 205133

Kuracina, p. 837134

CWC resolution on Congress Goal & the Means of Its Attainment, Benares, 30 July, 1934 in INC: The

Glorious Tradition, Texts of the resolutions passed by the INC, the AICC and the CWC, ed. by A.M. Zaidi, Vol. 3

(New Delhi: Indian Institute of Applied Political Research, 1988), p. 267.135Telegram No. 39 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 October, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 157, p. 375

136Ibid. pp.375-6


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War.137

Speaking in general terms, Tarak Barkawi argues that even in the face of nationalist

challenges such as Quit India and the INA, by and large, it remained loyal and fought effectively

with the exception of the INA itself...138

However, after the fighting had ended and the sepoys

returned to India, the wartime method for ensuring loyalty and boosting morale through adequate

supply of food, drink, sex and qualitative and quantitative superiority in military hardware, the

crucial components of in-combat motivation,139

was no longer good enough and old grievances

began to be raised. Racial discrimination, the slow progress of Indianisation, disparities between

the treatment and pay of British and Indian soldiers and the apparent aloofness of the British

authorities to their conditions were all preconditions for a growing sense of unrest among the

jawans and indeed some Indian officers.140

The culmination of this discontent came with the Royal

Indian Navy mutiny and the various copycat mutinies it inspired in February 1946, an issue which will

be explored in greater detail further down, along with additional analysis of longstanding grievances

within the armed forces.

It was a toxic mix of INC subversion tactics, growing political awareness amongst the troops, the Red

Fort trials which had brought the army closer to the people141

and widespread public support

for the INA which prepared the stage for a surge of nationalism which swept the armed forces. It is

also important to note that many Indian military men had, or were developing, sympathy for the INA

and their cause. Following their capture, many INA men had been shipped back to India for

detention via Rangoon. In Rangoon, the Indian soldiers, airmen and seamen of the British armed

forces had had their first non-military encounters with the INA. There had been time to discuss

motivations and ideologies, to make friends and swap stories, and in the months following there was

137Kaushik Roy, Discipline and Morale of the African, British and Indian Army units in Burma and India during

World War II: July 1943 to August 1945, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 6 (November 2010), pp. 1255-

1282138

Tarak Barkawi, Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War, in Journal

of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 2006), pp. 328-329139

Roy, p. 1281140Ghosh, p. 225

141Jawaharlal Nehru, Interview to the press, Delhi, 2 December, 1945, in Collected Works, p. 363


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widespread fraternisation between the men from both camps.142

Also, in many cases close contact

could not be avoided even if the British had tried to prevent it; the men were kith and kin, they came

from the same villages and families.

Britains response

British conceptions about the armys attitude towards the INA were somewhat nave and ill-

informed. Since the end of the war, Auchinleck and High Command had been labouring under the

illusion that most men wanted to see justice brought upon the traitors.143

They were slow to

recognise the changing patterns of thought within the ranks and were happy to believe that the

Indian army was kept in a watertight compartment, away from the taint of politics.144

That is not

to say that they were not careful about the potential subversive influence of the former INA men -

the greys from Boses army were to be discharged as services no longer required because they

posed a danger to the integrity of the Army145

but they were perhaps too ready to believe what

the sepoys told them. The enclosure to Wavells telegram to Pethick-Lawrence on 2 November,

written by Auchinleck, states that the majority opinion amongst the serving British Indian Army

members is that the INA men are all traitors and therefore ought to be put on trial. According to

Auchinleck, the army would accept the policy of limited trials, dismissals and discharges, but would

resent any measure which allowed the INA men to stay in the army for any reason.146

142Toye, p.170

143Note by Military Intelligence No. 10005, South East Asia and India Command Weekly Security Intelligence

Summary No. 189, in TOP, Vol. 5, No. 512, p. 1128-9144

Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech at Patna, 24 December, 1945, in Collected Works, pp. 279280.145

Telegram No. 10234 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 11 August, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 16,

p. 51146Enclosure to Telegram No. 1141 from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 2 November, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6,

Enclosure to No. 185, p. 436


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On 27th

November, Wavell received a letter from Sir George Cunningham, Governor of the North-

West Frontier Provinces. In this, he expressed his reservations about the reliability of such

testaments from Indian Army men:

Some Army Officers of great experience with whom I have discussed the matter Dick OConnor was

one have said that leniency [towards the INA detainees] at this stage would have a disastrous effect

on the Army. I do not believe that this is true. Some Indian officers and soldiers, whose relations or

close friends have suffered under the INA leaders, are no doubt thirsting for their blood. But I am

certain that they are comparatively few and that their resentment at any clemency shown now would

not affect Army discipline as a whole. Most Indian soldiers who have said to me, Hang the lot have, in

my opinion, said so because they thought it was what I wanted to hear...147

Three days before, Auchinleck had sent a telegram to Wavell revising his opinion regarding army

loyalty and the INA. He no longer believed, as he had just three weeks ago, that the majority opinion

was that the INA were traitors. He drew on the diversification of recruitment areas and the growth

of nationalist feeling amongst the armed forces as reasons for it now being quite impossible to

isolate the Armed Forces from the rest of the country, a problem which went some way to

explaining as to how there was no general resentment towards the INA men.148

Three key factors had caused his appraisal of the situation to change. In the weeks since, a strong

current of opinion was coming in from the Punjab. The Punjab region was vital to gauging the

opinions of the army as the majority ofsepoys originated in the region, more even than the regions

of UP, Bihar and Bengal combined.149

Bertrand Glancy, Governor of the Punjab, predicted that if

death sentences were carried out, then the government would be facing a level of revolt far greater

than the 1942 disturbances or the Amritsar massacre fallout. Most people in the Punjab did not take

the allegations against them seriously and their regaling with the title of traitors only increased

147

Wavell, p. 188148Telegram from General Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 233, p. 532

149Fay, p. 511


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their popularity.150

Secondly, the first trial had commenced and judging by the strong public reaction

it would have seemed likely that there was a swathe of sympathy for the INA, particularly amongst

the impressionablejawans. This suspicion was proved somewhat by the growing trend in the armed

forces, as well as in other quarters of society, to use the INA slogan Jai Hind as a mode of

greeting.151

Thirdly, and in light of this, Auchinleck had commissioned a Special Organisation to try

to gauge the real attitudes of the officers and men towards the INA. Its findings are reflected in his

telegram to Wavell of the 26 November, wherein he states that he does not think that any senior

British officer today knows what is the real feeling among the Indian ranks regarding the INA... there

is a growing feeling of sympathy for the INA and an increasing tendency to disregard the brutalities

committed by some of its members as well as the foreswearing by all of them of original

allegiance.152

This rise in sympathy towards the INA went hand in hand with a rise in nationalist sentiments

amongst the members of the armed forces. On the 11 November, the opening day of the trials,

Royal Indian Air Force members stationed in Calcutta sent a message to the Bengal Congress

Committee offering their appreciation of the noble ideal of the INA and their commendable and

inspiring efforts. They recorded their strongest protest against the autocratic action of the

Government of India and, in effect, that of the British Government in trying by court martial these

brightest jewels of India.153

The President of the INC at the time, Abdul Kalam Azad recalls a time in

late 1945 when he visited Karachi and a group of naval officers came to see me. They expressed

their admiration for the Congress policy and assured me that if the Congress issued necessary

orders, they would come over to us. If there was a conflict between Congress and the Government,

they would side with the Congress and not with the Government. Hundreds of naval officers in

150Ibid.

151

Singh, Rediscovering Bose and the Indian National Army, p. 305152Telegram from General Auchinleck to Wavell, 26 November, 1945, in TOP, Vol. 6, No. 241, p. 545

153The Hindustan Standard, 11 November 1945, p.5


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Bombay expressed the same feelings.154

Gandhi also received declarations of loyalty from Indian

servicemen: There was hardly a day when a group of Indian military men did not contact him. They

met him during his morning walks, they were at his evening prayer gatherings. We are soldiers,

they said apologetically and added, but we are soldiers of Indian freedom.155

By 11 February 1946,

the Indian armed forces had an openly de facto nationalist alignment; Colonel Himmat Singh, the

officer representing the Indian Army in the Indian Central Assembly, stated that every officer and

man is just as anxious for the freedom of this country as you in this house or outside.156

On the 6 November 1945, Wavell had despaired at the deteriorating political situation in India. As

described in the previous chapter, the increasingly violent rhetoric of Congress leaders and the

effect it was having on the volatile masses had led him to warn HMG to be prepared for a serious

attempt by the Congress... to subvert the present administration in India.157

The upcoming INA

trials had been the catalyst for this. Before Congress appropriation of the cause, they had had no

political programme to rejuvenate the country.158

The people were indifferent; there was nothing to

excite popular indignation, no Jallianwalla Bagh nor anything remotely resembling it.159

Congress

had managed to rekindle the spark of nationalism by using the INA cause to win political leverage

and support. With the INA, which seemed to represent a non-communal, violent and popular

alternative path to independence, they were in a position to subtly threaten the British with a

popular uprising. Wavell saw it as enough of a threat to ask Whitehall to issue an une

how accurate was clement attlee in his assertion that the indian national army was the principal...

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