ho, ho, hoax the case against santa claus

7/22/2019 Ho, Ho, Hoax the Case Against Santa Claus

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Ho, Ho, Hoax:The Case against Santa Claus

1. The Question Refined

Is it wrong for parents and other adults to lie to children b telling the! Santa

Claus exists" The fre#uenc with which it is raised b itself shows this is an i!portant

#uestion. $lthough !ost parents in the %nited States continue to tell children about St.

&ic', no Christ!as passes without public #uestions about doing so. Indeed, the intuiti(e

case against telling children about Santa is strong. )ing is generall wrong.1Telling

children there is a Santa Claus is ling. Therefore, telling children there is a Santa Claus

is wrong.

The #uestion would ha(e an eas answer if ling is alwas wrong. $lthough

I!!anuel *ant fa!ousl e!braced this extre!e position +1-/, few other philosophers

ha(e been able to sto!ach it. Children, in fact, are a!ong the pri!e candidates to be

(icti!s of per!issible ling. $ oung child !a be lied to about the exact extent of her

se(ere illness0 she !a be lied to about the se(erit of her parents financial troubles0

and for !an other reasons. If ling to children about Santa Claus is wrong it is not

because ling is alwas wrong. There !ust be so!e further argu!ent that telling

children about Santa falls in the categor of the i!per!issible rather than the

per!issible lie.

The #uestion, to be clear, is not what parents and other adults should do vis a vis

the childs prospecti(e belief in Santa Claus. Should parents specificall discourage

belief" Should the atte!pt to persuade the child one wa or another" I do not propose

to exa!ine all of the (arious alternati(es and deter!ine which is !orall best. 2ur

1In section 3.4, I explain what I !ean b this.


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#uestion is onl whether leading4children to belie(e in Santa is !orall appropriate.

$nd to do so one need onl deter!ine whether there is so!e alternati(e that is superior

to deceit. $ccordingl, alternati(es to telling children about Santa will be i!portant

insofar as, in general, one can onl reasonabl deter!ine whether a certain course of

action is 5ustified when co!pared with other a(ailable courses of action. In considering

whether it is per!issible to tell children about Santa Claus, I will be weighing the

ad(antages and disad(antages of that choice as co!pared with the ad(antages and

disad(antages of the alternati(es. $lternati(es are also i!portant since, if it is wrong to

tell children about Santa it is natural to as' what children should be told, in light of the

fact that !ost oung children in the %nited States do belie(e in hi!. 6hat, for exa!ple,

are non7belie(ing children to sa to their belie(ing peers" If the !oral conse#uences of

not telling ones children are pernicious enough as the relate to other children, then of

course ones children should be told.

Since there is e(identl a great deal of (ariet in the circu!stances in which

parents and children find the!sel(es, differences a!ong which are often !orall

significant, it is not to be expected that telling children about Santa Claus would be

always!orall wrong or alwaysper!issible. 2ur #uestion is whether telling children

about Santa Claus in the tpical $!erican circu!stances is !orall per!issible.

The #uestion !a be further refined b considering who it is telling the child

about Santa Claus. 8 !ain concern will be with parents. The reason for this is that

parents are the ones who tpicall tell children about Santa Claus in the first instance. It

!ust be noted that b focusing on parents the !oral bar is altered so!ewhat. 2n the

one hand, parents are felt to ha(e a special obligation to pro(ide for their childrens

48ost parents do not in so !an words tell their children Santa is real, but the do and sa !another things9e.g., gi(ing gifts fro! Santa;9that are intended to lead the child to belief.

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welfare. This !ight suggest a particularl strong presu!ption against ling to the!. 2n

the other hand, parents appear to ha(e special authorit to deter!ine their childrens

beha(ior and belief sste!. This !ight suggest a wea'er presu!ption against ling to

their children. Still, the do!ain of a parents authorit is restricted b the ai! of raising

children who are, a!ong other things, intelligent, wise, and disposed to do the right

thing. The #uestion is whether suggesting belief in Santa Claus is a wa to pro!ote

(irtue, wisdo!, and happiness in children.

4.


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=ut is telling children about Santa a lie" Tales fro! fiction, ad!ittedl, are not

lies. $dults +tpicall/ do not lie in telling children about Red Riding Hood or

Huc'leberr @inn. =ut the descriptions of Santa Claus are not fiction, in the sense that

tpical descriptions of Red Riding Hood are. The difference between a fictional stor

and a lie is in the intention of the spea'er. $ fictional stor in(ol(es pretending that

so!ething is the case: i!agining that Red Riding Hood is wal'ing through the forest, or

!a'ing belie(e that Huc'leberr @inn is riding down the 8ississippi. If the intention is

successfull recogni>ed, the audience does not belie(e that Red Riding Hood is wal'ing

through so!e forest. The audience !erel i!agines this. The intention of a person who

lies is not to get the hearers i!agination to wor', but to get her beliefs to wor'. The

assertion of ? is a lie when the person who asserts ? intends for her audience to belie(e

what is being said, e(en though the spea'er does not belie(e ? herself. The parent who

tells the child about Red Riding Hood does not belie(e Red Riding Hood is wal'ing

through the forest. =ut the parent does not lie since she has no intention that the child

will co!e to belie(e this either. The parent who tells a child about Santa Claus also does

not belie(e in Santa Claus. =ut in the case of Santa, unli'e the case of Red Riding Hood,

the parent does intend that the child will belie(e there is a 5oll, fat, bearded !an who

will be co!ing with presents. Since the parent does not belie(e what she sas et

intends for the child to belie(e, the parent lies.

There are so!e adults who purport to belie(e +in a sense;/ that there is a Santa

Claus +Clar' 1A/. This attitude, !ost ro!anticall expressed in the fa!ous editorial b

@rancis Church,Bcalls into #uestion whether telling children about Santa Claus

constitutes ling in all cases. Those adults who belie(e there is a Santa Claus would

B?opularl 'nown b its !ost fa!ous line: es, Dirginia, there is a Santa Claus.;

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see! not to lie to their children when telling the! about his existence and acti(ities. =ut

the (ast !a5orit of the adults who belie(e in Santa Claus certainl do not thin' of hi!

as ha(ing the tpical properties often associated with hi! b children. These adults do

not thin' of hi! as being fat, 5oll, bearded, and so forth. The thin' of hi! as so!e

!ore ethereal being, perhaps the spirit of generosit.; ?arents who belie(e Santa is the

spirit of generosit; and still lead their children to belie(e Santa has such properties as

being fat, 5oll, etc., do lie about these things, e(en if the do not lie to their children in

affir!ing Santas existence.

Returning to the tpical parent who denies the existence of Santa Claus, the

difference between her intentions in describing Santa and creatures of fiction is borne

out b the beliefs of children. $lthough oung children generall ha(e a difficult ti!e

distinguishing real things fro! !a'e belie(e, research suggests that their attitudes

toward Santa Claus are significantl different fro! their attitudes toward storboo'

entities +6oole and Sharon 4EEB/. oung children disco(er the truth about the

unrealit of Super!an !ore #uic'l than the do the truth about Santa Claus. This

suggests that children pic' up on the difference between adults attitudes toward Santa

Claus and other storboo' entities. Children apparentl notice that their parents do not

lea(e coo'ies and !il' out for Red Riding Hood or the Teenage 8utant &in5a Turtles.

$t a (er oung ageFcertainl before the are oneFchildren are capable of

belie(ing but not pretending. ?retending is a sophisticated cogniti(e attitude onl (er

rarel found a!ong e(en intelligent ani!als. To that child, Santa Claus and Red Riding

Hood !ust ha(e the sa!e doxastic status. =ecause of this, I will not consider the

#uestion whether it is per!issible to tell such credulous children about Santa Claus. I

restrict !self to those children who can distinguish realit and !a'e belie(e, which

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includes !ost children in an case. Children are certainl capable of discerning real and

!a'e7belie(e beings b fi(e or six ears of age.

3. The 8oral Status of )ing to Children

In this section, I first consider and re5ect an argu!ent that ling to children is

alwas per!issible. Then I outline the theoretical fra!ewor' I will use in deter!ining

the per!issibilit of ling to children about Santa Claus.

3.1 $utono!

So!e things that are generall wrong to do to adults are not generall wrong to

do to children. It would be generall wrong to re#uire of an adult9a guest to ones

ho!e, sa9that she eat her broccoli. It would not in general be wrong for a parent to

re#uire her oung children to eat their broccoli. It would be generall wrong to re#uire

an adult to go to school, while it would not in general be wrong to re#uire the sa!e of a

oung child. The co!!on thread a!ong these actions is that it is thought to be !ore

tpicall appropriate to act paternalisticall toward children than toward adults. That is,

it is thought to be !ore tpicall !orall 5ustified to act in a wa that is thought to be

good for the child or adult, whether the child or adult consents or not. ?aternalis! is

indeed a li'el 5ustification for the Santa Claus lie. It !ight be argued that it is

appropriate to tell the child about Santa because it is good for the child to belie(e. 2ne

!ight infer that e(en if ling to adults is generall wrong, ling to children !a not be.

$nd it does see! it would be !ore clearl wrong to perpetrate the Santa Claus lie on

adults than children. G(en if the decei(ers had their (icti!s best interests in !ind, it

would be difficult to 5ustif such a lie. =ut what are the differences between adults and


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children that 5ustif the different !oral re#uire!ents of our relationship toward the

!e!bers of each group"

2ne popular suggestion is that adults +generall/ ha(e while children +generall/

lac' autono!.A$utono! has e(en been fingered as the feature that !a'es ling to

people !orall proble!atic. $utono!; is a ter! of art that has co!e to be used in a

large (ariet of different was. Der broadl spea'ing, autono! is the capacit in

(irtue of which so!eone is a !oral agent. $!ong the #ualities that see! to be re#uired

to engage in !oral +or i!!oral/ action are the capacit to propose ends to oneself !ore

or less independentl, the capacit to choose rationall a!ong a(ailable options, and the

capacit to act and choose freel. It see!s clear that those who ha(e these capacities to a

lesser degree9ani!als, the insane, and, significantl, children9are understood not to

re#uire of others the sa!e !oral treat!ent as those who ha(e these capacities to a

greater degree. $nd it see!s that it is generall !ore per!issible to act paternalisticall

toward those who ha(e lesser degrees of autono! than those who ha(e greater

degrees.

G(en if the degree of autono! !a'es a difference to the degree of !oral

consideration deser(ed, it would be a !ista'e to suppose the lac' of autono! is a

!oral blan' chec'. Robert &oggle argues that children generall lac' the capacities that

are supposedl necessar for full !e!bership in the !oral co!!unit,; the

co!!unit of indi(iduals acting in according with !oral principles +4EE4/. Still, he

insists that children are not entirel beond the scope of !oralit. The are special

agents; who are pro(isional and probationar; !e!bers and applicants for full

!e!bership in the !oral co!!unit. So far fro! being an excuse for otherwise

A8 co!!ents here are influenced b =eaucha!p and Childress +1: /.

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i!!oral beha(ior, according to &oggle, the difference between the !oral status of

adults and children i!plies a dut on the part of careta'ers to help children ac#uire

those deliberati(e and other characteristics that are necessar for belonging to the !oral

co!!unit. In a si!ilar (ein, Ta!ar Shapiro has argued that it isprima facie!ore

appropriate to beha(e paternalisticall toward children because the lac' the capacities

associated with autono! +1/. Since the cannot deter!ine on their own a principle

to go(ern their actions, children do not warrant the sa!e deference as adults. =ut, again,

rather than a blan' chec' for paternalistic beha(ior of an sort, Shapiro e!phasi>es that

the !oral purpose of our beha(ior toward children should be to create beings who ha(e

the rational capacities in(ol(ed in !oral agenc.

=ecause children will in the natural course of things ac#uire autono!, the

#uestion of what paternalis! allows for the! is so!ewhat easier than the sa!e #uestion

concerning the insane or infir!. The (er point of paternalistic action is to do things that

are in the interests of the ob5ect of the action. In the case of children, their interests

in(ol(e present food and children, a satisfing and co!fortable life, and lo(e. =ut their

interests certainl also include the future possession of such capacities as rational

deliberation on alternati(es, the abilit to propose an end to oneself, and free choice,

a!ong !an others. Thus part of the purpose of paternalistic interference of children is

to !a'e the! into beings who are not fit sub5ects of paternalistic interference.

=ut, the !ention of food and shelter !a'es clear, autono! is not li'el to be the

onl purpose of treating children paternalisticall. $lthough a good parent ought to ai!

to raise children who are capable of the sophisticated capacities in(ol(ed in !oral

agenc, the also want to raise children who eat, ha(e children, and 5ust plain en5o

the!sel(es. Therefore, deter!ining whether ling to children about Santa Claus is


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!orall appropriate re#uires !ore than 5ust ascertaining whether the child is

autono!ous. $nd it re#uires !ore than 5ust ascertaining whether ling to the child is

conduci(e to her future autono!. It re#uires a consideration of all the factors that are

rele(ant to appropriate interaction with a child.

The !oral fra!ewor's I describe for deter!ining the !oral status of ling to

children about Santa Claus ha(e the benefit of being congenial to the idea that autono!

has so!e !oral (alue. It should not co!e as a surprise that the #uestion of the

per!issibilit of ling to children about Santa Claus cannot be settled on the basis of the

single #uestion whether children are autono!ous. 6hether the Santa Claus ritual is

per!issible surel depends to so!e extent on the conse#uences for those in(ol(ed. I

turn accordingl to two ethical theories that ta'e such considerations into account.

3.4 ?ri!a @acie


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Conse#uentialists hold that whether an action is !orall appropriate is

deter!ined b the (alue of the conse#uences of the action. To deter!ine whether ling

is wrong in a certain circu!stance, the conse#uentialist weighs the positi(e and negati(e

(alue of the conse#uences of the action. 2n conse#uentialis!, the wa to deter!ine

whether ling to children about Santa Claus is per!issible is to co!pare the o(erall

(alue of the conse#uences of the Santa stor as opposed to that of plausible alternati(es.

Conse#uentialists also differ significantl a!ong the!sel(es on what 'inds of states are

(aluable. So!e include onl pleasure as intrinsicall good and onl pain as intrinsicall

bad. 2thers include beaut and 'nowledge as intrinsicall (aluable features. @or the

!ost part, the choice of intrinsicall (aluable states will not !atter for the consideration

of our #uestion. @or exa!ple, the (alue of 'nowledge on the (iew that it is intrinsicall

(aluable is li'el to be si!ilar to that on which it is onl instru!entall so, since it see!s

clear that in the tpical situation 'nowledge is li'el to be conduci(e to other (aluable

states. I will note those contexts where the choice of intrinsicall (aluable properties

!a'es a difference.

$nother wa to understand the general wrongness of ling is with the concept of

aprima faciedut. 2ne has aprima faciedut to do J when, other things being e#ual, one

has a dut to do J. So!ething is aprima faciedut, in other words, when it tends to

!a'e our action a dut. $ccording to 6. e an specific action. The

prima faciedut of beneficence re#uires that we do things that pro!ote the o(erall

The Right and the Good, 41. Ross belie(es the dut not to lie falls under the !ore general categorof the dut not to brea' pro!ises. This is because, as Ross sees it, entering a con(ersationin(ol(es an i!plicit pro!ise not to lie.

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welfare. Theprima faciedut of non7!aleficence re#uires that we a(oid har!ing others.

The !oral presu!ption against ling can be9and so!eti!es is9outweighed b the

!oral significance of these otherprima facieduties. $ccording to this conception, ling is

generall wrong insofar as there is a negati(e weight associated with each lie, albeit a

weight that can be tru!ped b other !oral considerations.

This is one difference between the conse#uentialist and non7conse#uentialist

conceptions of the wrongness of ling. @or the +tpical/ conse#uentialist, ling as such

has no negati(e !oral (alue, e(en if !an lies are all things considered !orall wrong.

@or the non7conse#uentialist in #uestion, e(en if a certain lie is !orall acceptable or

obligator, there is still so!e negati(e !oral weight attached to the act si!pl in (irtue

of being a lie.

The 'inds of considerations that are rele(ant to deter!ining whether a particular

lie is per!issible fro! a Rossian or conse#uentialist perspecti(e are largel the sa!e.

@ro! the conse#uentialist perspecti(e, a lie is wrong when it leads to distrust, suffering,

or disappoint!ent. @ro! the Rossian perspecti(e, a lie is wrong when the presu!ption

against it is not outweighed b theprima facieduties of beneficence and non7!aleficence.

$ lie !a be per!issible fro! the Rossian perspecti(e because it tends to pro!ote the

o(erall welfare or pre(ents so!e har!. So the factors I consider with regard to the Santa

Claus stor are congenial to either a Rossian or a conse#uentialist wa of thin'ing about

the wrongness of ling.

=efore in(estigating these factors, one !ore theoretical issue !ust be addressed.

$lthough I ha(e referenced research on the conse#uences of Santa beliefs abo(e, and

continue to do so below, such studies are rather li!ited. There is no research, for

exa!ple, on such crucial #uestions as how Santa7belie(ing children co!pare with non7

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Santa7belie(ing children +of (arious sorts/ with respect to a nu!ber of interesting

characteristics: trust0 deceitfulness0 critical reasoning. &or is there an e!pirical research

on the a!ount of happiness experienced b belie(ing children as co!pared with the

a!ount of happiness experienced b children who do not belie(e but pretend Santa

exists. This would see! to be a significant handicap to our argu!ent, since it is !ainl

concerned with the li'el conse#uences of belief in Santa Claus.

6hat is to be done in circu!stances where the li'el conse#uences of so!e

course of action ha(e not been the sub5ect of scientific research" This is a #uestion not

onl about what course of action if an a theorist ought to reco!!end, but also about

what action if an an agent ought to choose. It cannot be plausibl !aintained that there

is so!ething illegiti!ate about acting on the basis of the best a(ailable e(idence, e(en if

that e(idence does not include scientificall respectable data. )et us stipulate, charitabl,

that scientificall respectable research has been a(ailable since the 1th centur. Is it to be

clai!ed that no action before that ti!e was !orall acceptable, since no action was

based on infor!ation arising fro! scientificall respectable research" Is it to be clai!ed

that e(en since then all actions not based on such infor!ation ha(e been !orall

suspect" The rightness of an action has so!ething to do with the #ualit of ones

e(idence concerning the circu!stances and the conse#uences. =ut the e(idential bar is

set far too high if it is re#uired that !orall per!issible action or illu!inating !oral

ad(ice be based onl on scientific research.

It cannot be de!anded that the parent do nothing. G(en in the absence of

scientific research, the parent !ust either encourage or not encourage her child to

belie(e. 6here there are e!pirical factors that ha(e not been ade#uatel scientificall

tested, the agent !ust base her decision on the best infor!ation a(ailable. This

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infor!ation will in(ol(e ordinar obser(ation, the co!!on sense principles of hu!an

pscholog, and plausible inferences fro! these. This is of course a fallible !ethod since

our beliefs about these principles are corrigible and the inferences are underdeter!ined

b the e(idence. =ut there is no plausible alternati(e to acting and reco!!ending !oral

action in light of the best infor!ation a(ailable in the absence of rigorous e!pirical

research. 2ne !ust si!pl adopt a health !odest about ones conclusions, in the

'nowledge that the inferences fro! obser(ed patterns !a not hold in the cases to be

discussed. $nd e(identl those who ad(ocate the per!issibilit of telling children about

Santa are no better off than those who ad(ocate its i!per!issibilit, since the for!er

group is as lac'ing in sste!atic scientific research concerning the effects of their

reco!!endation as the latter is about its reco!!endation.

B. The 2ptions

$s I !entioned, whether the Santa Claus tale is per!issible depends on the (alue

of the plausible alternati(es. There are a nu!ber of +co!patible/ alternati(es open to a

parent who decides not to encourage belief in Santa:


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deter!ined 5ust how !uch further infor!ation to di(ulge. 2ne !a, for exa!ple, tell a

child that other parents encourage their children to belie(e and that these children en5o

the ritual. 2ne !a thereb discourage children fro! spoiling the fun for other children.

= &eutralit I !ean a polic whereb, pending a childs in#uiries, the parent neither

affir!s nor denies the existence of Santa Claus. This is a ha>ardous option because of the

li'elihood that the child will be exposed to belief a!ong other children. It is aw'ward to

co!bine &eutralit with the i!portant infor!ation that other children belie(e. The

child will ine(itabl want to 'now whether the other children belie(e accuratel or not.

&eutralit is li'el to lea(e the child at a loss in the face of other childrens belief.

The option I consider in !ost detail is ?retense. The thought is that the parent

in(ites the child to pretend that there is a Santa Claus. @or children who ha(e a clear

grasp of the distinction, one !a co!pare Santa to other exa!ples of fictional beings in

the childs experience. The pretend Santa !a be held to include whate(er

characteristics of the traditional Santa one feels to be attracti(e. $s the child is in(ited to

pretend there is a Santa Claus, she !a also be told that !an other fa!ilies encourage

their children to belie(e Santa is real. It see!s one can !ini!i>e the li'elihood of the

childs spoiling the fun for others b encouraging the child to respect the differing

beliefs of other fa!ilies and therefore not challenge their beliefs. I !aintan that in(iting

to pretend there is a Santa Claus is !orall superior to encouraging to belie(e.

A. Short7Ter! ?leasure and ?ain

)ets begin our in(estigation of the costs and benefits of the Santa Claus lie b

considering the short7ter! pain and pleasure in(ol(ed in the experience for the rele(ant

parties. The short7ter! includes the ti!e during which children belie(e until 5ust after

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the cease belie(ing.


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'now she is fictional still deri(e great en5o!ent fro! the pretense that Cinderella is a

real person with real hopes. $nd, it is eas to replicate the gift7gi(ing aspect of the Santa

experience, which is surel a significant factor in the childs en5o!ent.

6e 'now that pretending can bring about pleasure. Is it li'el to bring about

happiness for children and parents in the case of Santa Claus" $nd is it li'el that

whate(er happiness is brought about will e#ual the en5o!ent associated with belie(ing

in hi!" In the absence of e!pirical research, it !a see! that the reasonable choice

between pretense and deceit is the safe choice. It is 'nown that encouraging children to

belie(e there is a Santa Claus leads to a significant a!ount of satisfaction for children

and parents. It is not 'nown whether encouraging children to pretend there is a Santa

Claus leads to significant satisfaction for children and parents. Therefore, other things

being e#ual, the right thing to do is to continue with the deceitful tradition.-

=ut it see!s that it is 'nown that pretending there is a Santa Claus leads to

significant satisfaction for children and parents. Since far fewer fa!ilies ha(e atte!pted

the experi!ent of pretending, there is !uch less actual experience of the conse#uences,

although there is so!e testi!onial e(idence. &onetheless, there is a!ple experience of

the pleasures of pretending. $nd there is a!ple reason to belie(e that these pleasures

are li'el to be associated with Santa Claus. Still, I concede that there is no si!ilarl

co!pelling argu!ent for the conclusion that pretending is li'el to lead to the sa!e or a

larger a!ount of pleasure for children and parents. In the short ter!, as concerns onl

pain and pleasure, it would see! that telling children there is a Santa Claus is !orall

superior to the strongest alternati(e, in(iting children to pretend there is one.

-This does not follow fro! the Rossian perspecti(e. G(en if it leads to !ore happiness than thebest co!peting alternati(e, and thus satisfies theprima faciedut of beneficence, ling aboutSanta Claus !a et be wrong. This is because there is still the presu!ption against ling.

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&onetheless, it is clear that the per!issibilit of the Santa Claus lie cannot be

accounted for solel in ter!s of the en5o!ent children and parents experience while

children belie(e. It is fairl eas to get children en5o!ent0 cand, cartoons, and hide7

and7see' please the! easil enough. The a!ount of pleasure a child gets fro! belie(ing

in Santa Claus could li'el be replicated b using the ti!e presentl de(oted to Santa to

plaing innocent ga!es the child en5os. 2ne reason the 5ustification of the lie cannot be

a !atter of the short ter! pleasure is that the purpose of parenting is not onl or e(en

pri!aril to !axi!i>e childrens happiness and !ini!i>e their suffering. $ !a5or

purpose of proper parenting is to foster the childs !oral and cogniti(e de(elop!ent.

8uch !ore i!portant than whether Santa belief is conduci(e to happiness in the short

ter! is the #uestion whether it is conduci(e to a childs !oral and cogniti(e

de(elop!ent.

. 8agic and I!agination

2ne supposed cogniti(e benefit can be dis!issed #uic'l. It is often clai!ed that

the Santa Claus stor is beneficial for children because it enhances their i!agination and

their abilit to engage in fantas +for exa!ple, =reen 4EEB/. There is no doubt so!e

benefit in i!pro(ing a childs capacit to i!agine, but it is #uestionable whether parents

encourage it through the Santa Claus experience. $s I ha(e argued, there is a

funda!ental distinction between belie(ing so!ething is the case and i!agining it is.

6hen parents tell their children about Santa Claus the encourage belief, not

i!agination. The features children suppose to characteri>e Santa Claus are not i!agined

to be true of hi!, the are belie(ed to be. Children do go on to fill in further

characteristics of Santa Claus not contained in the original stor, but this is no !ore an

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exercise of their i!agination than their efforts at filling in characteristics of China that

are un'nown to the!. G(identl, insofar as increased i!agination is supposed to be

what is gained through the Santa Claus experience, this can be !uch !ore effecti(el

pursued b ha(ing the child pretend that Santa is real, rather than belie(e he is.

?erhaps belief in Santa Claus is beneficial in that it fosters a sense of !agic; and

!agical . . . thought; +=reen 4EEB/. $ !agical occurrence, in the sense in #uestion,

would see! to be one which (iolates the laws of ordinar realit. Santa Claus is a being

#uite unli'e an other the child encounters in her life. Santa !a see! to the child all7

powerful, all7'nowing, and enor!ousl bene(olent. @ling around the planet on

Christ!as night deli(ering gifts to each and e(er child easil #ualifies as (iolating the

laws of ordinar realit.

To see whether belief in !agical happenings is as such beneficial, one !ust

separate it fro! the belief in a bene(olent being responsible for these happenings.

G(identl, Santas !agical acti(ities are carried out in the ser(ice of an end that is

percei(ed to be worthwhile. It is doubtful whether the belief in a !agical occurrence is

beneficial when se(ered fro! the connection with so!e bene(olent purpose. 6h

should it be beneficial for a child to belie(e that there are things that wor' in unheard of

was" That belie(ing in !agic as such has no benefit for the child !a be seen b

i!agining the child is told about so!e (alue7neutral re!ar'able entit. 2ne !ight tell a

child for exa!ple of the co!pletel non7bene(olent photons, two of which can be in

exactl the sa!e place at the sa!e ti!e. 2r one !ight tell a child about the re!ar'able

but (alue7neutral fact that whether two e(ents are si!ultaneous depends on ones fra!e

of reference. These tales are !agical fro! the childs perspecti(e, since the (iolate what

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the child ta'es to be the laws that go(ern realit. et belief in the unusual character of

protons or ti!e is not li'el to be held to ha(e cogniti(e benefits for children.

G(en if belief in !agical beings or occurrences is not as such beneficial, it !a be

that so!e !agical beliefs are. Still setting aside the bene(olence of the central !agical

entit, it !a be that belief in li(ing beings that do not age and reindeer who fl is

beneficial. =ut it is clear that if Santa Claus and the reindeer were not supposed to ha(e

so!e i!pact on the li(es of hu!an beingsFand especiall on the child hi!selfFthe

belief would not be held to ha(e an beneficial i!pact. 6hat could be the cogniti(e

benefit of belie(ing that reindeer fl"

2ne !ight co!plain that I ha(e been focusing on the wrong aspect of !agical

belief. $n occurrence is !agical when it does not fit ordinar experience. ?erhaps it is

precisel this lac' of fit with ordinar experience that !a'es belief in Santa cogniti(el

worthwhile. This is of a piece with the suggestion that belief in Santa is beneficial

because it is belief in the absence of e(idence. I turn next to these suggestions.

-. Gpiste!ic Character

2ne of the pri!ar goals of proper parenting is to so!ehow induce children to

be episte!icall (irtuous adults. So!e people9the !orall (irtuous ones9are !ore

li'el to perfor! !orall appropriate actions than others. Si!ilarl, so!e people9call

the! episte!icall (irtuous9are !ore li'el to for! episte!icall 5ustified beliefs than

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children" In the sa!e wa as there is doubt about 5ust what dispositions count as

(irtues, so there is disagree!ent about what tendencies count as episte!ic (irtues.

@ortunatel, these disputes can be a(oided because I belie(e the tendencies I discuss are

uni(ersall accepted to either encourage or under!ine episte!ic (irtue.

2ne purported episte!ic ad(antage of belief in Santa in(ol(es the thought that it

is belief in the absence of e(idence, a conception of the belief cha!pioned e(en b

scientists. $nthropologist Cind


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again the rese!blance between the episte!ic character of faith and the childs attitude

toward Santa is li!ited. If religious con(iction is essentiall belief in the absence of

e(idence, then the childs attitude toward Santa is not religious con(iction. $gain, the

child has a!ple testi!onial and other e(idence for the existence of Santa. +Recall the

coo'ies and glasses of !il' Santa apparentl consu!es during the night./

@rancis Church, the author of es, Dirginia,; e!phasi>es these religious aspects

of Santa belief. ?art of the benefit of belief in Santa is supposed to in(ol(e the fact that he

is unseen and unseeable.; In this he does rese!ble the tpical supernatural entit, who

is not held to be obser(able in e(erda life. Santa differs fro! the tpical supernatural

entit in being apparentl flesh and blood li'e other ordinar things. The fact that

people do not see Santa see!s a !atter of cos!ic accident, rather than an ine(itable

conse#uence of his nature. The reason Kod is not tpicall seen, on the other hand,

see!s to follow fro! the fact that he is not concei(ed to ha(e ordinar phsical

properties.

The final (erdict on the cogniti(e !erit of belief in Santa Claus !ust include both

the ti!e during which children belie(e and the ti!e when the disco(er the truth. If

belief in things unseen is episte!icall beneficial, belief in Santa would be to that extent

worthwhile. =ut the tendenc of belief in Santa to encourage belief in things unseen in

general is counteracted b childrens disco(er that this particular unseen thing is

unreal. $ plausible inference for the child to draw fro! the entire experience is a certain

s'epticis! about clai!s of the existence of unseen things: once bitten, twice sh. $nd

insofar as encouraging belief in Santa encourages belief in the absence of and contrar to

perceptual e(idence, the supposed ad(antage !ust be weighed against the tendenc of

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the child who disco(ers the truth to infer that belie(ing in things in the absence of

e(idence is a ha>ardous affair.

. Santa Claus and 8oral Character

$!ong the pri!ar goals of proper parenting is to induce a child to beco!e a

(irtuous adult. 2ur #uestion in this section is whether the Santa Claus ritual increases

the li'elihood that the child will be (irtuous.

6hat (irtuous tendencies is the Santa experience supposed to induce in the

child" 6hat !orall significant lessons is the child !eant to learn" )et !e begin b

setting aside an aspect of the tradition that li'el once had a significant !oral i!pact but

which is #uite rare toda. $lthough Santa is still supposed to obser(e whether children

are naught or nice, this acti(it is rarel e!phasi>ed. $nd, i!portantl, it is extre!el

rare for parents to follow through on the traditional threat that Santa will not gi(e

presents to naught children. Hardl an $!erican child in the last twent ears has

found a lu!p of coal in his stoc'ing fro! Santa Claus. This is, interestingl, one of the

few aspects of the tradition that has earned the conde!nation of childhood

pschologists. Since it plas so little role in the conte!porar tradition, I will not

consider the practice further.

2ne thing children are supposed to learn through the Santa experience is the

i!portance of generosit. Santa Claus is single7!indedl co!!itted to fulfilling the

childs wishes0 Santa Claus is ad!ired0 therefore, the child herself will beco!e !ore

concerned with i!pro(ing the welfare of others.

)ets grant for the !o!ent that children do gain an increased tendenc to

generosit through the ritual. How !uch this 5ustifies the Santa lie depends on the

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extent to which one is li'el to achie(e the sa!e increase through non7deceitful !eans.

2ne non7deceitful thing that !ight be done to encourage the child to be generous is to

tell the child about the i!portance of generosit. 2ne !ight encourage the child to gi(e

things to others. 2ne !ight reward the child for doing generous things. In the right

circu!stances, such encourage!ent is 'nown to lead to greater degrees of the tendenc

encouraged. Indeed, such a direct !ethod pro!ises a !uch higher li'elihood of success

than the roundabout !ethod of encouraging the child to adopt Santa as a role !odel.

8oreo(er, efforts to find a connection between belief in Santa Claus and

generosit ha(e pro(ed fruitless. 6h should one expect a child to beco!e !ore

generous as a result of the Santa Claus experience" &othing in the experience

encourages the child to gi(e. The childs pri!ar role in the ritual is as recipient. Indeed,

a child who !ight otherwise feel inclined to do a generous deed for other children is apt

to thin' that Santa will ta'e care of their needs. The tradition does include the coo'ies

and !il' for Santa. =ut this is a rather li!ited generosit, appling as it does onl to

so!eone who has done (er nice things for the child. &othing in the beha(ior points to

the i!portance of being generous to people in general.

The fact that Santa Claus is a not7#uite7natural being would see! to further

under!ine an tendenc to encourage the child to be !ore generous. $ child who sees

generous acts perfor!ed b another child !ight well infer that such actions are possible

for her as well. $ child who sees an adult perfor! generous acts !ight well infer that

such actions are possible for her as well. $ child sees other children as (er !uch li'e

herself. $ child sees adults as still (er !uch li'e herself. The beha(ior of fellow

children and adults is li'el to be seen as a plausible !odel for a childs own actions.

The beha(ior of a supernatural entit such as Santa is !uch !ore li'el to be seen as

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beond the childs reach. Indeed, Santa perfor!s his generous deeds in wasFfling to

e(er corner of the earth in one nightFthat are entirel beond the childs reach. The

association of such generosit with these co!pletel fantastical perfor!ances !ight well

ha(e the pernicious effect of !a'ing a uni(ersal generosit see! co!pletel unrealistic,

e(en before the child disco(ers the truth about Santa Claus.

$nother (irtue the child !ight be thought to ac#uire is discretion. 2nce the child

disco(ers there is no Santa Claus, she is tpicall encouraged to go along with the

deception. The child !ust then exhibit so!e concern for the welfare of others b not

telling belie(ing children the truth, and e(en b decei(ing those children. $gain how

!uch this counts toward the per!issibilit of the Santa Claus lie depends on the extent

to which this supposed benefit can be replicated without decei(ing the child in the first

place. $n parent who decides not to encourage belief in Santa faces the #uestion of

how the child ought to discuss the issue with children who belie(e. If it is possible to

teach for!erl belie(ing children the i!portance of discretion concerning Santa belief,

then it is si!ilarl possible to teach children who ne(er belie(e the i!portance of

discretion concerning belie(ers. Children who are not told there is a Santa can easil be

told that other children are told and that it is i!portant not to ruin their fun b dening

his existence.

)ets sa that while the are under Santas spell children do !a'e significant

progress toward beco!ing !ore generous. 6hat happens when the find out that there

is no Santa Claus" How does that i!pact their progress" It certainl cannot help. If

belie(ing that there is an ad!irable generous being is supposed to encourage the child

to be generous herself, disco(ering9abruptl and without an explanation9that there is

no such being after all, !ust under!ine the childs !oti(ation to be generous.

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. The Case against Santa

So far I ha(e #uestioned a nu!ber of reasons often offered in support of the

per!issibilit of ling to children about Santa Claus. It !a see! that I ha(e onl

undercut the case for ling to children, rather than arguing against it. 6hat reason is

there to thin' telling children there is a Santa is wrong" In fact I ha(e done !ore than

5ust respond to pro7Santa argu!ents. In responding to those argu!ents, I ha(e shown

that insofar as it is plausible to suppose that the Santa deceit is beneficial, the benefit can

in al!ost e(er case be achie(ed to the sa!e or greater degree through non7deceitful

alternati(es. If ling isprima faciewrong, then in showing that a non7deceitful alternati(e

is 5ust as beneficent as the deceitful alternati(e, I ha(e ipso factoshown that the non7

deceitful alternati(e is superior. The one di!ension where I conceded deceit had the

ad(antage was with respect to pleasure, where it see!ed unreasonable to belie(e that

pretending Santa is real would lead to the sa!e degree of pleasure for parents and

children as belie(ing.

The !ain proble! with ling to children about Santa Claus is that it encourages

children to lie. The encourage!ent happens because children ine(itabl disco(er that

there is no Santa Claus. $nd although apparentl so!e children at first belie(e that

parents are si!ilarl under the !isi!pression that there is a Santa Claus, e(entuall

children disco(er that the ha(e been decei(ed. $s latel noted, when the disco(er the

truth children are encouraged not to di(ulge the truth to other children and also to lie to

the!. $lso when children disco(er that the ha(e been lied to, the reasonabl infer that

such ling is held to be per!issible b their parents and other adults whose opinion

the hold in high regard.

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It !ight be co!plained that encouraging post7belief children to lie to other

children is no part of decei(ing children about Santa Claus. The parent could tell the

child who disco(ers the truth to be honest with other children, or to exercise her own

5udg!ent, or an nu!ber of other things. =ut its eas to see wh it would be aw'ward

for the decei(ing parent to reco!!end an course of action other than ling. The parent

herself, after all, has 5ust concluded so!e ears of ling to the child about the (er sa!e

issue in the (er sa!e situation. 6hat 5ustification could such a parent gi(e for

reco!!ending the child ta'e so!e different course of action fro! the parents own" It

would be scandalousl hpocritical for the parent to discourage the child fro! ling

about Santa while continuing to do so herself.

The !ere disco(er b the child that she has been decei(ed b her parents and

the rest of the adult world b itself encourages a child to lie. The first step in(ol(es the

childs disco(er that the parent has lied. It cannot be seriousl !aintained that children

do not disco(er that deceit has ta'en place. Children of se(en or eight understand what

is in(ol(ed in ling. $nd e(entuall children understand that although their parents

told the! otherwise, the parents do not belie(e there is a Santa Claus. Children therefore

beco!e aware of two facts, both of which tend to encourage the child to lie. @irst, their

parents +and !an other adults/ lie. 6hether children i!itate Santa Claus is

#uestionable, but the undoubtedl i!itate their parents. Since the obser(e and are

aware of their parents ling, the are !ore li'el to lie the!sel(es. Second, their parents

+and !an other adults/ belie(e that it is !orall appropriate to lie. Children notice that

their parents feel no !oral #ual! about ha(ing decei(ed the children about Santa Claus.

It is e(ident to the child that the parent belie(es so decei(ing the child was !orall

appropriate.

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It !ight be ob5ected that the childs increased tendenc to lie extends onl to the

existence of Santa Claus hi!self. The child !ight be thought to infer onl that her

parents belie(e ling about Santa Clausis per!issible, and therefore co!e to belie(e

herself that ling about Santa Clausis per!issible. $nd si!ilarl the child beco!es aware

of the fact that her parents lie about Santa Claus, and therefore co!es to ha(e a greater

tendenc to lie about Santa Claus. It would be #uestion7begging to clai! that an increased

tendenc on the part of the child to lie about Santa Claus is what !a'es ling about

Santa Claus wrong. This would be to argue that ling about Santa Claus is wrong

because it has tendenc to !a'e children lie about Santa Claus.

2ur #uestion then is whether ling to children about Santa pro!otes ling b

children in other areas. &otice first that in the usual practice no effort is !ade to ensure

that the child draws onl the narrower inference about ling about Santa Claus rather

than the !ore general one about ling. Second, notice that the deceit about Santa Claus

is part of a larger pattern: the Gaster =unn and the Tooth @air, being the two !ain

other culprits. Together with these other incidents, the child is li'el to draw the

inference that ling is thought to be per!issible in !an cases beond the Santa Claus

situation.

@inall, the costs of ling about Santa Claus !ust be co!pared to the costs of the

alternati(es. Garlier I conceded that the safe option with respect to producing pleasure is

to lie about Santa Claus, since that is the option with the successful trac' record. Here I

would argue that the safe option is to not lie about Santa Claus. &ot ling to the child

about so!ething has no tendenc to encourage t he child to lie in areas beond the !ere

Santa Claus case. In(iting the child to pretend there is a Santa Claus in(ol(es no ele!ent

of deceit whatsoe(er. It therefore has no danger of leading the child to lie !ore

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fre#uentl in other areas. Since ling in general is wrong, it would be wrong to ta'e the

chance of increasing the tendenc of a child to lie when another option is a(ailable

without this tendenc and with !an of the sa!e ad(antages.

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References:

$nderson, Carl and ?rentice, &or!an. Gncounter with Realit: Childrens Reactions on

ho, ho, hoax the case against santa claus

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