hizballah terrorism, national liberation, or menace pub184

8/7/2019 Hizballah Terrorism, National Liberation, Or Menace Pub184

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HIZBALLAH: TERRORISM, NATIONAL

LIBERATION, OR MENACE?

Sami G. Hajjar

August 2002


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*****

Theviews expressed in this report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This reportis cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Authors Note: There are many English spelling variations of Arabicnames such as Hizballah (Hezbollah; Hizbullah, Hizbollah); Shiite(Shia, Shii); Shaba (Shebaa, Cheba); al-Qaida (Al Qaeda), and so on.In this monograph, I will use one consistent spelling throughout unlessthe term is part of a direct quote, in which case the original spelling willbe retained.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this reportmay be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133,FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected]

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Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

dissemination. SSIs Homepage address is: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm

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The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on the research ofour analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcomingconferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides astrategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you areinterested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-097-4

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FOREWORD

The Lebanese Hizballah, or the Party of God, has been aplayer in Lebanese and regional politics since 1982. Itgained international notoriety as a result of the 1983 suicideattack that claimed the lives of 241 U.S. Marines, thenstationed in Lebanon. Hizballah was also responsible for aseries of kidnappings of U.S. and Western hostages duringthe 1980s, and attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in

Argentina during the 1990s. Since its inception, Hizballah

has been engaged in a prolonged fight against Israel and itsSouth Lebanon Army (SLA) ally, and took credit for theIsraeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and thedismantling of the SLA. It remains at odds with Israel overits continued occupation of an enclave in the Golan Heightsalong the Lebanon-Syria border. Hizballah is a strongsupporter of the Palestinian cause.

In his State of the Union address in January 2002,President George W. Bush specifically mentioned Hizballahas part of a terrorist underworld that threatens U.S.interests. Hizballah has been on the Department of States

list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations since 1997.

The author of this monograph, Dr. Sami Hajjar, reviewsthe history of Hizballah since its inception in 1982, andexamines its role in the recent political turmoil of Lebanonand the region. Not only is Hizballahs role central in thedispute over the Shaba Farms enclave between Lebanonand Israel, it is part of an entangled set of linkages involvingSyria, Iran, the United States, the European Union, and thePalestinians. The challenge that Hizballah poses to U.S.policy in the Middle East involves complicated strategicissues, not merely problems of terrorism that could be dealtwith by countermeasures.

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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

monograph as a contribution to the national security debateon this important subject as our nation engages in a war onterrorism with diverse international manifestations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

SAMI G. HAJJAR was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He waseducated at the American University of Beirut where heobtained a B.A. and M.A. in Public Administration, and theUniversity of Missouri-Columbia where he obtained a Ph.D.in Political Science in 1969. He was a Professor of PoliticalScience at the University of Wyoming from 1966-1987where he taught a variety of courses including Middle EastPolitics and Islamic Political Theory. Hajjar was also

assigned for 2 years to the Wyoming Governors Office andworked on international trade promotion. In 1987 he joinedthe U.S. Information Agency and served in Saudi Arabia asCultural Affairs Officer, and in the United Arab Emirates asPublic Affairs Officer, before returning to Washington in1992 as Gulf Desk Officer. In 1993 he resigned the ForeignService to become consultant to the Emirates Center forStrategic Studies in Abu Dhabi. In September 1994 until hisretirement in January 2002, Dr. Hajjar served at the U.S.

Army War College as Professor and Director of Middle EastStudies in the Department of National Security andStrategy. He is currently on assignment with the StrategicStudies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Dr. Hajjar is theauthor of numerous professional articles in Middle Eaststudies, public administration, and political science.

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SUMMARY

In this monograph, the author advances the thesis thatthe conditions that give rise to acts of terrorism must bedealt with as urgently as combating those responsible forsuch acts. In the case of Hizballah, those conditions areessentially political. The situation contributing to the rise ofHizballah involves the political, economic, and socialcircumstances of the Shiite community of Lebanon as thecountry began to experience civil strife in the mid-1970s.

The immediate cause for the creation of the organizationwas the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, resulting in theprolonged occupation of south Lebanon.

T h e m o no g ra p h e x am i ne s t h e f o rm a ti o n a n ddevelopment of Hizballah in the context of the Lebaneseconfessional political system that rests on a delicate balancebetween the countrys religious sects. Historically, thesystem favored the Christian and the Muslim Sunnicommunities, but as the Shiite community became thelargest sect in Lebanon, it demanded a greater share of thenations pie. Hizballah has its roots in this larger Shiite

insurrectionist movement.

As a religious party, clerics occupy a central role inHizballahs leadership structure. The party organization ishierarchical with a definite link to Iran, since Iranianreligious and political leadership is an important source ofguidance. Several organizational entities direct and controlthe partys functional and regional activities, includingsocial services and military wings. Additionally, Hizballahsideological culture rests on a Manichean view that dividesthe world between oppressors and oppressed. Politically,the United States and Israel are viewed as having asymbiotic relationship, and regarded as oppressors and evil.

Hizballahs work on the behalf of its constituency and itsresistance activities against the Israeli occupation of South

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Lebanon earned the party a respectable bloc of seats in the

Lebanese Parliament, and the admiration of many Arabsand Muslims. In the dispute between Lebanon andIsraelalso involving Syria and the United Nations(U.N.)over the Shaba Farms enclave located on theeastern slopes of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights,Hizballah plays a pivotal role. Even beyond the ShabaFarms border dispute, the entire Lebanon-Israel borderissue is made complicated for lack of clear documentationsdating to the French and British mandate period, positionadjustments made by Israel during its occupation of southLebanon, and U.N. involvement in demarcating the border

to certify Israeli withdrawal.For the United States, Hizballah is regarded as a

terrorist organization. The Arabs, on the other hand, viewHizballahs activities as legitimate national liberationefforts. Both views are supported by objective evidence.Utilizing a geographic context, the author assesses thethreat of Hizballah at the Lebanese, regional, andinternational levels. Lebanon remains a fragile body politic,and events on the Lebanon-Israel border involvingHizballah and possibly Palestinian refugees in the areacould rekindle civil strife. At the regional level, Hizballahs

efforts on behalf of the Palestinians and the quest to liberatethe Shaba Farms could trigger a wider regional conflictespecially because of the intimate involvements of Syria andIran in these efforts. Finally, no credible evidence existslinking Hizballah to recent international terroristincidents.

The author concludes with several observations:Hizballah is a complex party firmly grounded in the cultureof its constituency and is part of Islamic national liberationmovements, it is engaged in guerrilla warfare againstI s ra e li o c cu p at i on , a n d d e sp i te i t s i d en t if i ab l e

organizational structure, has a mercurial center of gravity.His recommendations: The United States should not engageHizballah militarily, should encourage Israel to vacate theShaba Farms, and should give priority to the Syria-Israel

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track in the peace process. The menace of Hizballah is

related to what is fundamentally a strategic challenge toU.S. Middle East policy that cannot be resolved throughtactical measures.

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HIZBALLAH: TERRORISM, NATIONAL

LIBERATION, OR MENACE?

In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002,President George W. Bush informed Congress and the

American public that one of the goals of his administrationis to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening

America or our friends and allies with weapons of massdestruction. He went on to name the regimes of NorthKorea, Iran, and Iraq as the culprit states, and with their

terrorist allies, that constitute an axis of evil. . . . They couldprovide these arms to terrorists, giving the means to matchtheir hatred.1

The Department of State, pursuant to the Immigrationand Nationality Act as amended by the Anti-Terrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act of 1996, designates certaininternational organizations and groups as ForeignTerrorist Organizations (FTO). These designations arevalid for 2 years, after which they expire. The Secretary ofState can redesignate an organization if it has beendetermined that the organization has continued to engage

in terrorist activity.2 The Lebanese organization Hizballah(literally, Party of God) has been designated as FTO in theState Departments reports for its involvement in severalanti-U.S. terrorist attacks in the 1980s, and attacks on theIsraeli Embassy and other Jewish targets in Argentina inthe 1990s.3

Given the symbiotic relationship between Iran andHizballah, the U.S. concern about Hizballah garners addedsignificance following the Presidents inclusion of Iran inthe axis of evil triumvirate. This monograph examinesHizballah as a challenge to U.S. policymakers in planningthe war on terrorism. It delineates the threats posed byHizballah and their political ramifications for Lebanon, theregion, and U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.

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The circumstances that gave rise to Hizballah, the

precarious nature of the Lebanese political system in thewake of that countrys civil war, and the volatile nature ofthe region in light of the unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict arecomplicating factors for U.S. policymakers in confrontingthe challenge of Hizballah. My primary thesis is that theconditions that give rise to acts of terrorism must be dealtwith as urgently as combating those responsible for suchacts if the war on terrorism is to be won. In the case ofHizballah, those conditions, as will be demonstrated, areessentially political. This thesis explains why the war onterrorism will be unconventional and a long ordeal.

Formation and Development of Hizballah.

The principal cause of Hizballahs creation was theIsraeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The invasion took placein the context of momentous regional political and securitydevelopments in which Lebanon became a focal point. Amajor development in the modern history of the region wasthe Arab-Israeli war of 1967 that brought Sinai, Gaza, andthe West Bank under Israeli occupation. While Lebanonwas not directly involved in the war, the impact of Arabdefeat was to reverberate in Lebanon a few years later and

seriously threaten its unity and independence.

The Arab response to the Israeli occupation was the warof attrition that Egypt waged between 1967-70, and Syriasprompting Palestinian commandos to infiltrate Lebanonand wage attacks on Israel. This military strategy led thePalestinians to conclude that Arab armies were incapable ofconfronting Israel in conventional warfare, and theyadopted guerrilla warfare tactics as means for liberationand eventual statehood. Their main base of operations afterthe 1967 war was in Jordan whose majority population

consisted of Palestinian refugees. Shortly thereafter,Palestinian guerrilla organizations found themselves in astruggle with the government of King Hussein over controlof the country. In September 1970 the king got the upper

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hand, and scores of Palestinian fighters were forced to leave

the country.4

It was the influx of large numbers ofPalestinian refugees into Lebanon and the reality of thePalestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by Yasir

Arafat, becoming a government within a government thatcontributed directly to Lebanons prolonged civil strife,which began in earnest in mid-1970. Lebanon became thelaunching site for Palestinian guerrilla activities againstIsrael and for Israeli retaliations. Ultimately theseskirmishes led to the eruption of full-scale civil war betweenleftist Muslims supported by Syria and the PLO, andconservative Christians supported by Israel. As the civil

war progressed, the authority of the central government ofLebanon collapsed in 1976, with the Army breaking downalong sectarian lines, and Syria and Israel interveningdirectly to defend their interests. The Israeli 1982 invasionthat expelled the PLO leadership to Tunis and resulted inthe prolonged occupation of south Lebanon was the singled ir ec t e v en t t ha t g av e r is e t o H iz ba ll a h, b u t t heorganization was spurred by the general unsettled regionalpolitical environment following the 1967 war.5

Because of Lebanons confessional political system thatallocat es major polit ical offices and bureaucratic

appointments along religious sectarian lines, significantdemographic shifts could destabilize the very foundations ofthe system. These foundations were based on the 1943National PactLebanons unwritten constitutionamongthe countrys traditional leaders at the time. It establishedthe representation ratio of 6/5, whereby the Chamber ofDeputies (parliament) would be made up of six Christiandeputies for every five Muslim deputies, the president of therepublic would be a Maronite Christian, the Speaker ofParliament would be a Shiite, and the prime minister wouldbe a Sunni Muslim, and so on, accounting for all senior

positions in government. The logic of this arrangement wasbased on the countrys 1932 census in which the MaroniteChristians constituted a plurality of the population, and allChristians comprised a slight majority of the Lebanese.6

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Consequently, system survival favored the status quo and

meant that the delicate balance between the Christian andMuslim communities had to be preserved. This is whyLebanon has never had an official census after 1932.7

The same system that gave political advantages to theChristians also gave them relative economic advantagesover time. But also over the years, the Shiite community,traditionally concentrated in the rural Beqa valley andsouth Lebanon by virtue of its heavy involvement in theagricultural sector, began to increase in numbers due tohigher birth rates common among rural communities. Theeconomic gap between the Shiites and the Christians, as

well as between the Shiites and the commercially orientedSunni community, began to widen.8 Since the politicalsystem was inelastic, the Shiite community was beinggradually transformed from a passive and marginal groupto a more activist group demanding a greater share inLebanons pie. The transformation was largely due to agifted cleric, Musa al-Sadr, who was born in Iran to a familywith some roots in Lebanon. He arrived in south Lebanon in1959 to lead the Shiite community of the coastal city of Tyre.He rapidly rose to become the acknowledged leader ofLebanons Shiites on the strength of his educational

background as a lawyer and religious scholar, religioustraining and tutelage under leading Ayatollahs in Iran andIraq, charismatic personality, and oration skill.9 Utilizingtraditional Shiite symbols and institutions, Al-Sadr wasable to energize the Shiite community by virtue of his rise tothe position of chairman of the Shiite Higher Council. Heurged the community to become more assertive and to seekemancipation from economic deprivation that had beenassociated with the communitys agrarian traditions. Thishe attempted to accomplish within the existing Lebanesepolitical system, considering the Shiite community an

existential part of the Lebanese mosaic.10

Approximately 3 years into the civil war, and a fewmonths following the Israeli invasion in March 1978 todestroy Palestinian bases and establish a security zone in

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the south, Musa al-Sadr accepted an official invitation to

visit Libya. On August 31, 1978, al-Sadr, along with twocompanions, disappeared, and their whereabouts and fatesremain a mystery to this datehence the title of Fouad

Ajamis book, The Vanished Imam.

Al-Sadr has become a larger-than-life figure among theShiites of Lebanon. No comparable personality has comeforward to replace him, although Nabih Birri, a lawyer bytraining, not a cleric, and currently Speaker of Parliament,took over the leadership position of Afwaj al-Muqawamahal-Lubnaniya(Legions of the Lebanese Resistance), knownby its acronym AMAL (Amal) which means hope, that

al-Sadr created in 1975 as a Shiite militia. Initially, al-Sadr,it seemed, intended his militia to fight Israel in the southand to be an auxiliary to the Lebanese Army. However,

Amal became but one of several armed groups representingmajor Lebanese religious factions and various Palestiniangroups that dotted the Lebanese landscape as civil strifebegan to rage.11

Radical members of Amal formed Hizballah. Theyobjected to Amals moderate policies and Nabih Berrispresumed willingness to seek political accommodationrather than military confrontation in the wake of the 1982Israeli invasion. These members were previously associatedwith other various Shiite groups. Prominent among themwas the Lebanese al-Dawa (Call) movement whoseintellectual roots were based on the 1960s Shiite revivalmovement in Najaf Iraq, and with Islamic Amal, thebreakaway faction of the main Amal movement. The partysformation was aided by the fact that Syria permitted at thetime some 1,000 members of the Iranian Pasdaran(Revolutionary Guard) consisting of military and civilianinstructors to locate in the Beqa valley. The Iraniansprovided funds and training that directly contributed to the

rapid rise of Hizballah and its anti-Western and anti-Israelistances that were in line with Syrian and Iranian policies.12

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Ideologically, Hizballah was inspired by the two

prominent ayatollahs associated with Shiite revivalismthe Iraqi Baqir al-Sadr and the Iranian Ruhallah Khomeini.Baqir al-Sadr founded the Iraqi al-Dawa party in 1968,whose purpose was to organize Muslim believers to seizepower and create an Islamic state as a prelude to spreadingthe Islamic dawa to the rest of the world. Ayatollah Baqiral-Sadr, executed by the regime of Saddam Hussein in 1980for his support of Irans Islamic revolution, was a majorsource for Hizballahs radical ideas. The other principalsource was Ayatollah Khomeini, who for many years was inexile in Najaf where he masterminded the 1979 Iranian

revolution and became that countrys Supreme Leader.From Khomeini, Hizballah adopted the theory that areligious jurist (Vali-Faqih) should hold ultimate politicalpower. The authority of this jurist, both spiritual andpolitical, may not be challenged; he must be obeyed.Hizballah sees itself fulfilling the messianic role of turningLebanon into a province of Islam.13 The hardened politicalrealities of Lebanon, however, led Hizballahs leadership toreevaluate the partys ideological basis and politicalstrategy.

Professor Magnus Ranstorp points out, in his extensive

study on the party, that its establishment with Iranianassistance occurred in three phases.14 The first phase is areference to the initial arrival of Iranian Pasdaran intoLebanon immediately after the 1982 Israeli invasion. Theyprovided the radical Islamic Amal with military trainingand embarked on the systematic recruitment andideological indoctrination of radical Shiites in the Biqaaarea.15 Their successful recruitment efforts were aided bysubstantial Iranian funding that paid for military trainingcenters and a number of community services such asschools, clinics, hospitals, and cash subsidies to the poor.

During this early phase, the founding Shiite clergy draftedHizballahs charter and constitution, calling for theestablishment of an Iranian-style Islamic republic inLebanon. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufaili, a founding member, was

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declared in the Biqa city of Baalbek, in December 1982, as

president of the envisioned Islamic republic of Lebanon.The next phase involved Hizballahs activities in the

southern outskirts of the capital city of Beirut where largenumbers of Shiites lived in desperate conditions, mosthaving been displaced from their farms and homes in thesouth because of the Israeli invasion and occupation of thatregion. In addition to the partys ability to recruit membersdue in part to the assistance of prominent clergy ofal-Dawalike Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah (who rose later to theposition of secretary-general and oversaw the Israeliwithdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000), it was able to

attract Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, aleading Shiite personality. Ayatollah Fadlallah was acentral figure in the Lebanese Shiite community as head ofthe Council of Shiite Religious Scholars, and his associationwith Hizballah gave the party a major boost and a spiritualguide aligned with Iran.16

The last phase was associated with Hizballahsexpansion into southern Lebanon. A number of factorsconjoined to propel the party to prominence in the south.The ouster of the Palestinians from the region by the Israelin 1982; the failure of Amal to challenge the Israeli presencein the region; the success of Hizballahs attack on the U.S.and French contingencies of the Multinational Force onOctober 23, 1983, in Beirut; the relative successes of suicideattacks against Israeli targets in south Lebanon; and theinflux of Iranian aid and influence through such local clericsas Sheikh Ragib Harb (assassinated by Israeli agents in1984)all helped to raise the militancy fervor of the party.Consequently, Hizballah created a military wing in themid-1980s under the name Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah(Islamic Resistance) whose purpose was the liberation ofsouth Lebanon from Israeli occupat ion. All t hese

developments contributed substantially to the prominenceof Hizballah and presented a serious challenge to Amal asthe major representative of the Lebanese Shiite community.

As Ranstorp observed:

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The rapid growth and popularity of the Hizballah in these three

regions was achieved not only by a successful combination of

ideological indoctrination and material inducement by

Hizballah through the infusion of Iranian aid and military

assistance. It was also achieved by the ability of the Hizballah

leaders to mobilize a destitute Shii community, disaffected with

the continuing Israeli occupation, and unite it within the

framework of an organisation with clearly defined and

articulated political objectives. This was achieved through the

provision of concrete and workable solutions to the fundamental

political, social, and economic needs of the Shia community in

the absence of any central Lebanese authority and in the

presence of the civil war.17

Organization and Ideological Evolution.

As a party and movement whose ideology is grounded inreligious thought, clerics occupy a central role in theleadership structure. The religious character of theleadership results, furthermore, in a party organizationalhierarchy with emphasis on the role of ulema (clerics) insociety that is in line with Shiite practice. Authority flowsfrom the top, and control of party members is enhanced bythe fact that the lines of authority are traced back to andsanctioned by religious ulema. Such an organizational

philosophy means that [t]he highest authority in theHizballah clerical hierarchy is not only allotted to the mostlearned practitioners of Islamic jurisprudence, obtainedonly after many years of religious training and scholarlyactivity, but is also based on the number of students andfollowers belonging to each cleric.18 Furthermore, and asRasnstorp goes on to explain, the link that Hizballah haswith Iran contributes further to the control the leadershiphas over the organization. This is because the Iranianreligious and political leadership is a source of ultimate(final) guidance on issues that otherwise might be a cause of

dissentions or disagreements. It would be incorrect todeduce, however, that Hizballahs leadership is totallysubservient to Irans ayatollahs. For instance, HizballahsLebanese spiritual guide, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah,

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is critical of the Velayate Faqih (guardianship of the

jurisconsult) concept as practiced in Iran, and regardshimself as much a grand ayatollah with independentstanding among the broad Shiite community. This isespecially significant for, since the death of AyatollahKhomeini, there has not been an acknowledged Vali-Faqihin Iran. Khomeinis successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, holdsthe title of Supreme Leader (Rahbar), not the prestigiousdesignation Vali-Faqih. The net result was that Fadlallahsinfluence as Hizballahs spiritual mentor has increasedsince the death of Khomeini. Still, Irans status as theleading Shiite nation and its financial contributions to the

coffers give its leadership considerable influence, althoughnot outright control.19

Dr. A. Nizar Hamzeh, who has written extensively aboutHizballah, constructed an organizational chart of the partybased on it s various act ivit ies, publications, andnewspapers reports. For purposes of this monograph, ageneral overview of the partys organizational structurebased on Hamzehs exposition is presented.20

Hizballahs highest decisionmaking entity is a SupremeShura (consultative) Council. Its 17 members arepredominantly clergy but include a group of security andparamilitary leaders. This council makes the partysstrategic decisions in all areas of legislative, executive,

judicial, political, and military affairs. Decisions are by amajority vote, and if need be, matters could be referred tothe Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, in Iran. Thelink to Iran is, therefore, more than tactical or cursory.

The day-to-day activities of the party are supervised byrepresentatives of the partys regional or district heads (thefour districts are Beirut, the southern suburbs, the South,and the Biqa) plus five additional members appointed by

the Supreme Shura Council. The Secretary General is anex-officio member. He and his deputy are entrusted withadministering the affairs of the party and are its mostvisible leaders. Currently the Secretary General is Sayyid

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Sheikh Hasan Nassrallah, a gifted orator and a brilliant

strategist. A supervisory organ of the party is a 15-member

Politburo that coordinates the works of the various partycommittees. The committees, of which there are several,focus on three main functional areas: security issues, socialservices including financial and administrative affairs,and religious activities including propaganda and massmedia. It is generally acknowledged that the socialservices the party engages in have been extremely effectiveand are what endear it to many in the Shiite community ofLebanon. They include assistance in medical needs,

housing, public utilities, and even financial aid to aclientele that numbers in the thousands. Hizballah, in thisregard, performs services that are usually expected of localgovernments.

Lastly, Hizballahs organizational chart includes whatHamzeh labels as a combat organ made up of twosections: t he Islamic Resistance (al-muqawamahal-Islamiyah) whose members are combatants whenm o b i li z e d; o t h e rw i s e t h e y h a v e n o r m al c i v il i a noccupationsa fact that makes them a difficult target forenemy forces. The second section is the Islamic Holy War(al-jihad al-Islami), and, together with the first section, itcomes under the direct supervision of the Supreme ShuraCouncil. Furthermore, the first section was in charge ofsuicidal attacks against Western and Israeli targets, thesecond one leads more conventional attacks against Israelitroops in the south.21

Ideologically, we have already noted the associationthat Hizballah has to Iran. This link guided the Hizballahleadership to develop basic radical ideological stancesinvolving beliefs regarding the nature of conflict, the

character of the ideal state, relations to other Muslims,and views of the Western world.22

Hizballah adheres to a Manichean notion of the worldas being divided between oppressors (mustakbirun) and

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oppressed (mustadifin). The relationship between the two

groups is inherently antagonistica conflict between goodand evil, right and wrong. This is a central concept inHizballahs ideology, which, if rigidly applied to the realmsof regional and international politics, would allow littleroom for compromise. The conflicting relationship cannot beresolved by some mechanism leading to a win-win situation.Rather, the meek shall inherit the earth, not in the lifeafter, but here and now through their activism. Also,oppression takes economic, cultural, political, and socialforms, and oppressors transcend any particular nationalityor religion. Consequently, in the context of Hizballahs

immediate political reality, the economic circumstances ofthe Shiites in Lebanon and Israeli occupation of southLebanon, a region inhabited primarily by Shiites, identifiesthem as oppressed. Political activism is required to rectifytheir economic condition, and military resistance isessential to deal with the occupation.

As for the conception of the state, readers familiar withthe Shiite notion of the Hidden Imam recognize that anideal government cannot be established until the return ofthis divinely-anointed Imam.23 In the absence of the ideal,Hizballah adheres to a concept of an Islamic state akin to

the one preached and practiced by Iran. Being an Islamicmovement, Hizballah regards it imperative to establish anIslamic state as a religious duty, and because it is the bestform of government capable of bringing about the politicalideals of justice, equality, and freedom until the return ofthe Hidden Imam (Mahdi). In the words of Husseinal-Musawi, founder of Islamic Amal,

we are faithful to imam Khomeyni politically, religiously and

ideologically. In accordance with Khomeynis teaching we

strive to fight all manifestations of corruption and vanity in

this world,and all who fight the Muslims. . . . Our struggle is in

the east as well as the west. . . . Our goal is to lay thegroundwork for the reign of the Mahdi of earth, the reign of

truth and justice.24

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The creation of an Islamic state means, in more concrete

terms, that such a state will be based on Sharia law (Islamiclaw). Sharia, however, has multiple sources, and each issubject to different interpretations by the various sects andscholars, not to mention that there is no unanimity on theauthenticity of all the acknowledged sources. In the contextof the Lebanese confessional mosaic, it is not surprising thatHizballahs scheme for an Islamic state is opposed by theChristian community, Sunni Muslims, Druze, and even amajority of Shiites who prefer the laxity of a secularLebanese republic. Aware of this reality and based on theQuranic verse Let there be no compulsion in religion

(2:256), Hizballah does not include the establishment of anIslamic state as part of its political program, although theconcept remains central to the partys ideology.

Also ingrained in Hizballahs ideology is a complexnotion of Islamic universalism deduced from yet anotherexpression of the Manichean vision. It is a vision akin to St.

Augustines dichotomy that groups humanity into a City ofGod and a City of Satan. In Hizballahs construct, Muslimbelievers, presumably all Muslims regardless of sect,constitute the Party of God in a general sense. They arethe umma islamiyyah (Islamic nation) and that binds

them together. The antithesis of this group would be,obviously, the Party of Satan or the multitudes ofunbelievers.25

The regional implication of this ideological outlook isthat Hizballah regards Palestinians as members of theParty of God or umma whose plight concerns the entireumma. Additionally, Jerusalem, which contains Islamsthird holiest site, is not the exclusive concern of thePalestinians, but its liberation from Israeli occupation is theresponsibility of all Muslims. Thus, it is the martyrdom,imprisonment, displacement, and overall struggle of the

oppressed Palestinian nation to liberate its land from theoppressor, Israel, which earns it Hizbullahs utmost respectand camaraderie.26 To provide aid and comfort to thePalestinians becomes an article of faitha religious duty to

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come to the assistance of fellow Muslims. As a matter of

principle, Hizballahs leadership was loath to sit idly byduring the Israeli incursion into Palestinian-controlledareas in April 2002. Israeli threats of massive retaliationagainst Syria and Lebanon, however, const rainedHizballahs military activities against Israel along theborder. Hizballah was pragmatic enough to confine itsacross-the-border muscle-flexing largely to the disputedShaba Farms region that it regards part of its Lebanesenational duty to liberate, as will be explained below.

How Hizballah views the West and its civilization at theideological and pragmatic levels is of special interest to this

inquiry. Ghorayebs analysis of these points reveals thecomplexity and sophistication of Hizballahs viewsespecially about the United States.27 Samuel Huntingtonstheory of clash of civilizations appears valid insofar asHizballah believes in a cultural conflict between Islam andthe West. It is a conflict far deeper than any political orideological conflicts that separate them as two distinctcivilizations. Ever since the rise of Islam and its contactwith the West through the centuries, including contactswith the Crusaders and later with European colonists,relations have been a civilisational struggle in which each

side believes in the superiority of its culture. Leading theWestern charge in this struggle is the United States thatHizballah regards, as the Islamic Republic of Iran had, asthe Great Satan. Other Western countries such as Britainand France are considered simply evil. Operationally,Hizballah believes that the struggle takes the form ofWestern conspiracies against the Muslim World. In theMiddle East, the United States and Israel are the mainconspirators. In this symbiotic relationship,

According to Fadlullah and Hizbullah, the US regional policy

is not based on real US interests but on Israeli interests.

Therefore, the US does not have an American policy in the

Middle East, but an Israeli policy, which stems from the US

ideological commitment to Israel. So closely intertwined are

Israels and the US interests that the two states are deemed

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identical and are alternately cast as being the others

instrument. On the one hand, Israel is depicted as the US

spearhead in the region, while on the other, the US is

portrayed as Israels tool.28

More recently, Fadlallah, not unexpectedly, accused theU.S. administration of being a full partner in Sharonsincursion into Palestine in April 2002. Fadlallah believesthe entire episode of the Israeli incursion was based on apre-agreed upon U.S.-Israeli plan, and Secretary of StateColin Powells visit to the region was part of this plan to givepolitical support to Sharons campaign.29

Given this perception of the United States and itspro-Israeli policies in the region, Hizballah believes that theUnited States is in fact the lead terrorist state in the world.On the basis of these deeply-held convictions, Hizballah

justifies acts of violence, including suicide bombing, againstthe oppressor enemy. In an interview with CBS anchor DanRather, Hizballahs Deputy Secretary General SheikhNaim Qasim referred to suicide bombing as martyrdomoperations:

We dont call them suicide operations because suicide comes out

of a loss of hope in life, while martyrdom is a love of life . . .

[These] operations are the only power the Palestinians haveagainst the sophisticated Israeli military machine. Balance

cannot be reached unless these operations are carried out in the

heartland of the enemy.30

Also in this interview, Qasim declared that Hizballahdoes not believe in the legitimacy of the state of Israel for itwas established at the expense of Palestinians, and that thecurrent partys plans have nothing to do with Americansbecause of their support of Israel. But in a veiled warning,. . . what happens in the future has to be decided in thefuture.31

Interestingly, however, and despite its negative image ofthe West, Hizballah does not reject everything Western asevil. Hizballah, it appears, places high value on western and

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especially American education in the fields of science and

technology. Many of its members are graduates of Westernschools and use their knowledge in the service of the partyssocial, medical, and information activities.

From this general sketch of Hizballahs organizationalstructure and ideological constructs, it is possible toconclude that the party is a sophisticated movement deeplyrooted in its environment. Its appeal and popularity areenhanced by regional developments whereby the UnitedStates and Israel increasingly appear as enemies of Islamand the Arabs. And despite the fact that Hizballah wascreated as a reaction to Israels 1982 invasion of Lebanon,

the party is now far from being an issue party likely to fadeas political circumstances change. Hizballah has managedt o a d a pt s u c ce s s fu l l y a n d a c c o mm o d at e e v o lv i n g circumstances, becoming in the process an active player inLebanons political system, and an admired symbol ofanti-Israeli resistance throughout the Arab and Muslimworld.

The ability of Hizballah to adapt successfully andaccommodateread moderateand still retain itslegitimacy with its constituency is because of its link to Iran.It was primarily the struggle between the moderate andhardliner leadership in Iran following the death ofKhomeini in 1989 and the emergence in the same year of themoderate regime of President Ali Akbar HashimiR af sa nj an i t ha t c au se d a s hi ft i n H iz ba ll ah sorientation.Rafsanjani, interested in rebuilding the Iranianeconomy, began to chart a course based on normalinternational behavior. Influenced by the new Iranianorientation of openness, Sheikh Fadlallah urged Hizballahto become more open and involved in the Lebanese politicalsystem. The ideological implication was that the notion ofan Islamic Republic in Lebanon had to be abandoned, if only

for tactical political reasons.32 Fadlallahs push for theLebanonisation of Hizballah, as Nizar Hamzah explained,was reflected in 1991 in the election of Sayyid AbbasMusawi, considered a member of the partys moderate

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faction, as Secretary General. After Musawis assassination

in February 1992 by the Israelis, his successor, SayyidHasan Nasrallah, continued the policy of rapprochement bypositioning the party to participate in the Lebaneseparliamentary elections and to close the western hostagesfile by completing the release of all hostages in 1992.Hizballah members won eight parliamentary seats in the1992 elect ions, wit h four additional seat s won bynonmembers affiliated with its electoral list. As a result,Hizballah constituted the largest single party bloc inParliament. In the 1996 elections, the party did not fare aswell and was represented by seven members and three

affiliates. But in the 2000 elections, it improved its showingand won nine seats and three affiliates due to its popularityeven with Christian voters who credited it with forcing theIsraeli withdrawal in May. By its active participation in theelectoral process, the party

was clearly admitting not only the realities of the Lebanese

system but also that the road to the Islamic state could be a

model of participation in elections rather than the revolutionary

approach. Thus, evolutionary and not revolutionary approach

has become the main feature of Hizballahs new policy.33

Under Nasrallahs leadership, Hizballah continues topursue a strategy of pragmatism, accommodation, andengagement in the Lebanese political system and causes.The one cause that propelled Hizballah into prominenceregionally and internationally was the liberation of southLebanon from Israeli occupation. The partys early historyof attacks against U.S. and western targets in Lebanon,34

military operations against Israeli forces and their SouthLebanese Army (SLA) ally, and continued efforts to liberatethe Shaba Farms enclave, have earned the party the scornof the United States and Israel as a terrorist organization,but the admiration of most Lebanese and Arabs as heroes ofnational resistance fighting for a legitimate and just cause.

And even the understandings that Israel reached withHizballah, which will be detailed below, added to the

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legitimacy of Hizballahs cause and image as a pragmatic

and responsible actor.35

The discussion thus far suggests that the enigmaticHizballah was born of insurgency, reared in violentcircumstances, and matured with seemingly greater senseof realism and pragmatism. The next section discusses theissue of the Shaba Farms that is the current focus ofHizballahs military operations. These operations and theLebanese claim that the Shaba Farms enclave is occupiedLebanese territory are feared to be by the United Nations(U.N.), the United States and other western nations aflashpoint that could trigger a major war engulfing the

entire region.36

Shaba Farms Dispute.

The Shaba Farms dispute is the last major remainingterritorial dispute between Israel and Lebanona disputethat began with the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in1 97 8 ( Op er at io n L IT AN I) a nd t he s ub se qu en testablishment of a security zone in a border enclavecontrolled jointly with its SLA allied militia. The Shabaissue is more than a legal question involving the right of

sovereignty over the disputed area; it is the hook used byLebanon and Syria to link the Lebanon-Israel track to theSyrian-Israel track in the Middle East peace process. Itinvolves the larger question of a peace settlement to end theIsraeli occupation of Lebanese and Syrian lands leading to acomprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.Hizballah is the tactical instrument contributing to thatend. Understanding the complexities of these relationshipsis critical to finding a resolution of what the United Statesand Israel regard as Hizballahs terrorism.

During his second term of office, President William J.

Clinton became personally involved in the Middle Eastpeace process. As U.S. diplomatic efforts intensified to movethe process forward, Syrian President Hafez al-Asadbecame apprehensive about the possibilities of separate

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deals between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and

the Lebanese, leaving Syria isolated. The late PresidentAsad had always preferred a comprehensive approach to thepeace process whereby all of the tracks would be settledsimultaneously rather than individually.37 This approach,he reasoned, would give the Arab side greater bargainingweight in negotiations with Israel. Consequently, when thePalestinians signed the Oslo Agreement with Israel in May1994, which appeared to have paved the way for a separatePalestinian-Israeli deal, the coupling of the Lebanon andSyrian tracks became that much more important for theSyrians. The disproportionate political influences that

Syria had over a wide-spectrum of Lebanese institutions,groups, and personalities, not to mention the reportedly35,000 troops deployed there, ensured that Lebanon hadlittle room to maneuver on the issue of coupling the twotracks. From a Syrian perspective, furthermore, the linkageserves its interest in the peace process and prevents itsbeing isolated. Syria gains an important cardtheLebanon card, which includes Hizballah and potentiallythe Palestinian refugeesto play at the negotiation tablewith Israel that possesses overwhelming advantages ineconomic, technological, and military terms, not to mentionU.S. support. Without the Lebanon card, Israel could notbe induced to give away much in negotiations with theSyrians.38

Specifically, the coupling of the tracks meant thatnegotiating peace with Israel involved the issues ofsimultaneous Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebaneseand Syrian lands. Hence, when Prime Minister Ehud Barakdeclared his intention to unilaterally withdraw fromLebanon by July 2000, President Lahhoud of Lebanoncomplained:

[I]t is no longer a secret that Israeli maneuver including the

proposal for unilateral withdrawal without a comprehensive

and just peace, is a proposal that does not seek peace but a

security arrangement for Israel at our expense and is designed

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to shift all other burdens on us, foremost of which is the

Palestinian problem.39

What was interesting about Lebanons position onIsraels unilateral withdrawal, which took place in May2000, was the fact that U.N. Security Council (UNSC)Resolution 425 called for such a withdrawal; i.e. unilateraland unconditional, which was what Lebanon had beencalling for all along. On the other hand, by agreeing to linkits track with Syria, Lebanon involves itself in the peaceprocess based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 adopted inthe wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war that called on theparties to exchange land for peace. All along, the Lebanese

have considered that these U.N. resolutions, and hence theland for peace formula, do not apply to them since noLebanese lands were occupied in the 1967 war. For theLebanese, Israel was to comply with UNSC resolution 425and withdraw unconditionally to the international border.But herein lies the problem; how to define the internationalborder?

The recognized border between Lebanon and Israel isthe international boundary line agreed upon by France andGreat Britain in 1923 when Lebanon and Palestine were

under their respective mandates. This exact line wasrecognized in 1949 by independent Lebanon and the newlycreated State of Israel in Palestine as the ArmisticeDemarcation Line t hat remained undisputed anduncontested by either country until Israeli incursions intosouth Lebanon beginning 1978. During Israels prolongedoccupation of south Lebanon, border issues began tosurface, and when Israel withdrew unilaterally, a newdimension to the border definition was added to the debate,namely the border line between Lebanon and Syria in anarea in the Golan Heights that is under Israeli occupation.This is the area known as the Shaba Farms.40(See Map 1.)

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One issue of concern to the Lebanese was that Israel had

shifted the international border to the west (in an area alongthe Armistice Line separating the Lebanese village of KafrKilla and the Israeli town of Metulla in the north andrunning south to the vicinity of the Lebanese town of Maysal-Jabal) in order to control eight high-ground strategicpositions or outposts. The border adjustments atLebanons expense were for security considerations; Israelmoved the 1923 line away from cities and villagescontiguous to the border in order to make up for that whichBritish and French surveyors did not attach importance inthe 1920s: the military defense of the border with

Lebanon.

41

Ultimately, Israel withdrew to a line set by theU.N. in 1978 that, from an Israeli viewpoint, left no outpostson Lebanese lands. The 1978 line, in the estimation of theU.N., corresponded as closely as possible to the 1923-49 linebased on available cartographic documentation. Hizballah,however, took issue with this view, arguing that there areIsraeli border positions that remain on Lebanese soil.42

Another border issue was the question of the Lebaneseseven villages, known collectively as the Hounine villages,which were incorporated into Palestine as a result of theFrench-British 1923 compromise that delineated the border

between the two countries. In 1999, Lebanons PrimeMinister Salim al-Huss acknowledged that U.N. Resolution425 did not apply to the seven villages since they were notpart of the area occupied by Israel in 1978, but that theirrecovery was a Lebanese objective. Probably Lebanonsraising of the issue of the seven villages was to signal thatthe entire Lebanese-Israeli border demarcation can becomethe subject of entangled legalistic debate in future peacenegotiations if, as they suspected, the Israelis were seekingland swap and border adjustments.43

The Lebanese-Syrian border along the western edge of

the Golan Heights, known as the Shaba Farms region, isthe subject of dispute between Lebanon and Israel as towhether Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon incompliance with U.N. Resolution 425. It is the flashpoint

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region where Hizballah concentrates its military operations

against Israeli occupation forces.The disputed area lies on the western slopes of Mount

Hermon that has been under Israeli occupation since June1967. The exact size of the area is not clear; western sourcesdesignate it as being approximately 25 square kilometers,while Lebanese sources believe it to be over 100 squarekilometers. Both sources agree that the Shaba Farmsenclave begins at a point north on the slopes of MountHermon facing the village of Shaba and runs in asouth-western direction for about 16 kilometers to near thefarms of Al-Noukhaylah and Mughr Shaba in the vicinity of

the Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli border line. The discrepancy inestimating the size is apparently due to disagreement onhow far eastward the farms extend along various points onthe north-southwestern line. Essentially, the exact size ofthe area is unknown.44 Furthermore, the Lebanese claimthat the area in question consists of 14 farms, 13 of whichare Lebanese while one, Mughr Shaba, is Syrian, and theenclave is home to some 1,200 families. Also, sinceoccupying the area, Israel has established four settlementsand expropriated vineyards to supply a winery that thesettlers built there (by some accounts, there are no

vineyards in t he Shaba Farms), erect ed milit aryobservation and listening posts, benefited from the groundwater of the area, and developed a ski resort that yields abillion dollars per annum from tourism.45The dispute iscentered on the question: Should Israel vacate this areaaccording to the terms of Resolution 425 or is this areasubject to a final settlement based on Resolution 242?

Maps of the tri-border region between Lebanon, Syria,and Israel place the Shaba Farms enclave in Syria, but thevillage of Shaba (also Chebaa on some maps) that gave itsname to the farms is clearly in Lebanon. Still, the exact

demarcation line of the Lebanese-Syrian border in that areais unclear. According to Dr. Issam Khalifeh, LebaneseUniversity professor of modern history, there was aFrench-British agreement on February 4, 1935, which

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considered the Lebanese and Syrian border to follow the

watershed running down the side of Mount Hermon so thatthe western slopes of Mount Hermon are Lebanese whilethe eastern slopes are Syrian.46 On the other hand, Pradosnotes that with regard to Lebanon and Syria, France,which had mandates for both countries, did not define aformal boundary between the two, although it did separatethem by administrative divisions.47 This viewpoint wassubscribed to by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, whonoted that with respect to Israeli withdrawal from asegment of joint Lebanese-Syrian border area, there seemsto be no official record of a formal international boundary

agreement between Lebanon and Syria on the basis ofwhich the border could be easily delineated to ascertain thewithdrawal.48

U.N. Resolution 425 (1978) called on Israel immediatelyto cease its military action against Lebanese territorialintegrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from allLebanese territory. It established a United NationsInterim Force for Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) for thepurpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces . . .,and requested the Secretary General to report to theCouncil within twenty-four hours on the implementation of

the present resolution. The withdrawal requirement didnot come into play until 22 years later, following thecompletion of Israeli forces pullout on May 24, 2000. Inpursuing the mission of certifying Israels withdrawal, aU.N. survey team, in consultation with appropriateLebanese and Israeli officials, determined a virtualLebanese-Israel border lineor a line of withdrawalcommonly referred to as the Blue Line. (See Map 2.) TheSecretary General

emphasized that the U.N. was not establishing a border, but

rather was drawing a line for the purpose of confirming Israeli

withdrawal in compliance with Resolution 425. It was the

intent of the Secretary General, however, that the line should

conform as closely as possible to the recognized international

border.49

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24

Map 2.


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The Blue Line was largely based on the 1949

Lebanese-Israeli Armistice line with minor adjustmentsto accommodate terrain and other features. However, theportion of the Blue Line along the Syrian occupied GolanHeights and Lebanon was based on the line separating theareas of operations of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon(UNIFIL) and U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (theU.N. force in Golan). The result was to place the ShabaFarms in Syria. The U.N. decision was based on Syrian andIsraeli maps submitted in connection with the 1974 GolanHeights disengagement agreement (which created aUNDOF Zone) that placed the Shaba Farms within

UNDOFs area of operations, and hence within Syria. TheLebanese rejected this conclusion, and their official positionwas summed up by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Hammoudwho said, the Blue Line, or withdrawal line or with anyother name, should not impede our right to take backoccupied lands, especially the Shabaa Farms.50

Lebanon argues that the Lebanon-Syria border alongthe Golan Heights was demarcated and agreed to by bothcountries in 1943, and in 1951 the Shaba Farms weretransferred to Lebanon. There does not seem to be proof onwhether this agreement was in a form of a written

pactcopies of which are alleged to be found in the U.N.archivesor an oral agreement. Perhaps a strongerevidence is deeds showing ownership of the land belongingto Lebanese citizens. Interestingly, Syria supportsLebanons claim. Finally, and more recently, the Israelischolar, Dr. Asher Kaufman of the Truman Institute at theHebrew University, reported on the basis of his research atthe Cartographic Institute in Paris, that documents datingto the French Mandate period support Lebanons claim tothe land.51 Still, the U.N. rejected the Lebanese claim butwithout prejudicing any future border agreement between

Syria and Lebanon.52

The ambiguity of the Shaba Farms identity impacts theimplementation of U.N. Resolutions 426 (1978) adoptedtangentially with Resolution 425. UNIFIL, established by

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Resolution 426, had the mission, in addition to confirming

the withdrawal of Israeli forces, of restoring internationalpeace and security and assisting the Government ofLebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority inthe area. . . . Because Lebanon does not regard that Israelhas completed its withdrawal, it has thus far refused todeploy the Lebanese Army to the south to bring the areaunder its control. Consequently, the entire Lebanon-Israelborder remains a potential flashpointa Red Line as isoften referred to in the Lebanese press.

We should note that a segment of the Lebanesepopulation, which follows the political line of General

Michel Aoun, the exiled former Army Commander and headof state, subscribes to his argument that the Shaba Farmsare not Lebanese, the issue is a lie . . . let Syria give us adocumentation that the farms are Lebanese lands and wewill liberate them. . . . 53 This viewpoint is propagated in theUnited States by a pro-Israeli lobby organization known asUnited States Committee for a Free Lebanon (USCFL).

An article in the organizations monthly bulletin stated,The Shabaa Farms dispute is a figment of no onesimagination, but a deliberately-crafted Syria pretext forsponsoring paramilitary attacks against Israel and a

justification for its continuing occupation of Lebanon.54

Issues surrounding the Lebanon-Israel border boil downto the following: an internationally recognized border linebased on the 1923 French-British agreement; an Armisticel i n e t h a t l a r g e l y c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e 1 9 2 3 l i n e ; aLebanon-Syria line along the Golan Heights whose legalstatus is questioned by the U.N.; a Blue line drawn by theU.N. that the Lebanese dispute; and an imaginary Red linecorresponding to the Blue line, which, if violated, could leadto acts of violence with serious implications to the peaceprocess. Actors directly involved in these issues are, of

course, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, the U.N., and Hizballah.Indirectly involved actors are the countries and entities(Palestinians) with interest in the wider Middle East peaceprocess including the United States, some European

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countries, and Iran. Hizballah, then, is a unique bead in a

string of beadseasily identifiable but difficult to separatewithout consequences. How should the United States dealwith the challenge of Hizballah? The answer to thisquestion, as should be obvious by now, is not simple, for theissues surrounding the challenge are complex and theirunderlying concepts are elastic and subjective. Thefollowing section will address these points.

Issues: Heads and Tails.

The 2001 Department of State report on terrorism notedthat although,

Hizballah has not attacked US interests in Lebanon since

1991, it continued to maintain the capability to target US

personnel and facilities there and abroad. During 2001,

Hizballah provided training to HAMAS and the Palestine

Islamic Jihad at training facilities in the Bekaa Valley. 55

The report goes on to accuse Hizballah of exportingweaponry to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza foruse against Israeli targets. Addionally, the report notes thatthe Lebanese government condones Hizballahs actionsagainst Israel considering them resistance activities; itfailed to hand over to U.S. authorities three seniorHizballah operatives wanted for terrorist activities, refusedto freeze the organizations assets, and concluded that TheUnited States and Lebanon did not agree on a definition ofterrorism. . . . 56

Hizballahs reaction to the report was swift, coming aday after its release by the State Department. It issued astatement in which it referred to the United States asorganizer and manager of evil in the world, rejected theaccusations levied on it, and declared that the United States

seeks the surrender of the citadels of rejection andopposition to its and its Zionist allys schemes to subject theregion to their security, economic, and political interests.The statement concluded, we clearly state that American

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threats will not deter our legitimate efforts to regain [our]

rights and to free our lands from the shackles of occupation,hegemony and dependency.57 In a nutshell, Hizballahbelieves that its portrayal as a terrorist organization isbecause of U.S.

persistent attempts to de-legitimize Hizballahs right to resist

the Israeli occupation . . . the US criteria for terrorism are the

rejection of its domination and the refusal to succumb to Israel. .

. . In this way, the brute is made to appear innocent and the

victim is made to appear brutal, a perversion of the truth which

constitutes an act of political and intellectual terrorism. . . .58

Lebanon did not comment immediately on the StateDepartments report, but Syria, which the report listed as astate-sponsor of terrorism and accused of providingsafehaven and logistical support to a number of terroristgroups including Hizballah, reacted through its foreignminister. He rejected the accusation and claimed if we areto be fair about the issue of terrorism, then Israel should beplaced on top of the list.59

The difference between the United States and the Arabson the subject of terrorism in the Middle East is like thepopularized difference between the sexesthey come from

different planets. The core of the problem is the lack of auniversally agreed upon definition. The endeavor to delimitthe concept inevitably leads to related discussion oflegitimate and illegitimate acts of violence, war crimes,terrorist organizations, terrorist states, state-sponsoredterrorism, and so on. As a conference on the topicsummarized:

Terrorism is a term of elastic definition that historically has

been applied to a wide variety of phenomena. Key debates

center on who qualifies as a terrorist, what methods terrorists

employ, what their motives are, and who their victims are.

Particularly contentious is the question of whether state actorscan be considered terrorists, and whether terrorism should be

viewed as personally motivated crime or politically motivated

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war. We are unlikely to reach a consensus because the

ambiguity of the term is politically useful.60

Despite the improbability of a widely accepted definition ofterrorism, the concept, to have any meaning whatsoever,must include violence inflicted on innocent people forpolitical objectives. To the extent that Hizballah inflictedviolence on innocent people for political ends, it did engagein terrorism (as have a host of other actors in the region).

Also, to the extent that Hizballah conducted (conducts)military activities against Israeli forces occupying Lebanon,it did (does) engage in national liberation. More importantthan what label to sew on Hizballahterrorism or national

liberationis how to assess objectively its threat andconstructively to contain and, eventually, end it. Aprerequisite of such an objective, however, is a clearunderstanding of the threats and their ramifications.

Threats Analyses.

One way to theoretically analyze the issues and threatsemanating from Hizballah is to utilize a geographic context.The applicable levels of analyses include the local (Lebanonand the immediate border area involving Israel and Syria),

regional (Middle East countries and entities involved in thepeace process), and international (other nations especiallythe United States and European countries involved in thepeace process). It should be emphasized that, in reality, thet hreat s and related issues at t he t hree levels areintertwined and directly impact one another.

At the local level, the primary threat is the potential forescalating violence between Hizballah and Israel that couldlead to a wider conflict involving Israel, Syria, Lebanon, andpossibly other states in the region. Since its founding in1982, Hizballah, as already noted, had engaged in acts of

violence against a variety of targets, but mainly againstIsraeli forces in Lebanon and their surrogate, the nowdefunct South Lebanon Army. The exchanges betweenHizballah and Israel often led to civilian causalities and to

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accusations and counter accusations of terrorism. In April

1996, and in response to an increasingly intolerablesituation involving repeated attacks on northern Israel byHizballah Katyusha rockets, the Israeli government, facingupcoming elections, launched Operation GRAPES OFWRATH. The operation involved heavy bombardment ofsouth Lebanon and resulted in an attack on April 18 on theUNIFIL compound near the village of Qana whereLebanese civilians had taken refuge. The outcome was amassacre in which over 100 Lebanese civilians, includingwomen and children, were killed.61 A U.N. report statedthat the Israeli attack on Qana was deliberate, a claim that

Israel rejected, arguing that stray rounds were responsiblefor the hit.62

Concerned about the rise in civilian casualties on bothsides of the border, then U.S. Secretary of State WarrenChristopher brokered an understanding on April 26, 1996,between Israel, Lebanon, Hizballah, and Syria thateffectively ended the Israeli Grapes of Wrath Operation.The key item of what has become known as the AprilUnderstanding was that the two parties (Lebanon andIsrael) commit to ensuring that under no circumstances willcivilians be the target of attack, and that civilian populated

areas and industrial and electrical installations will not beused as launching ground for attacks.63 The application ofthis understanding was the responsibility of a MonitoringGroup consisting of the United States, France, Syria,Lebanon, and Israel.

Strictly speaking, Hizballah was not a party to the AprilUnderstanding since the Israeli official position wasrefusal to negotiate, and hence enter into an agreement,with terrorists. In reality, however, Hizballah was theintended party to the agreement, albeit indirectly. Thereference to Lebanon in the April Understanding was pro

forma, and the inclusion of Syria was in recognition that itexercised a measure of control over Hizballah and theLebanese government. The implication of these facts meantthat Hizballah was gradually acquiring recognition as a

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legitimate resistance movement and an organization that

could be counted on to uphold its end of the deal. Since then,Hizballah leaders, and especially the partys SecretaryGeneral Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, have gained a measureof international respectability and credibility. Nassrallahhas met with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Europeanofficials, and with other party leaders, and grantednumerous press interviews, including ones to major U.S.networks.64 The meeting in July 2000 with Kofi Annanprompted a pro-Israel Lebanese-American group tocomplain that the meeting justified and legalized thepolitical entity of Hizballah in Lebanon to the international

community,

65

while the more sympathetic American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee viewed the meeting asreinforcing Hizballahs status as a legitimate politicalmovement and genuine liberation force, universallyrecognized outside the US and Israel.66

Despite the United States having sponsored the AprilUnderstanding, the distinction between terrorism andresistance is what separates it from its European allies withregard to Hizballah. This was clearly evident following theevents of September 11, 2001, when the United Statespressured European countries to include Hizballah on the

E u ro p e an U n io n s l i st o f t e rr o r is t o r ga n iz a ti o n s.Ultimately, however, Hizballah was kept off that list,largely because of the role played by France insisting thatHizballah was not a terrorist organization.67 Still, whileHizballah remains on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations,Bushs national security advisor recognized the social andpolitical roles of Hizballah but suggested that it cleanseitself of its terrorist wing that is largely responsible for theproblems we face in regions such as the Middle East.68

Reading between the lines, the United States is seeminglywilling to live with a rehabilitated Hizballah perhaps in

recognition of the organizations position in the delicatebalance in Lebanons body politic. This is a soberingapproach to the challenge of Hizballah that minimizes the

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potential threat of renewed civil war in Lebanon, which

would destabilize the region further.69

Hizballah, like most Muslim political organizations, hasbeen supportive of the Palestinian intifada more by wordthan deed. Its television station, Al-Manar, broadcastinganti-Israeli rhetoric and pro-Islamic and Arab themes, is apopular station with Palestinians as it reinforces their pathof resistance to occupation. In his speeches, Nassrallahoften reminds his Arab and Muslim audiences thatresistance is a spirit that cannot be annihilated and callsfor supporting the Palestinians.70 The partys spiritualguide, Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, had even

issued afatwa (religious opinion) that condoned martyrdomoperations (suicide missions) equally by men and women.71

As Palestinian-Israeli relations deteriorated and tensionsrose due to increased incidents of suicide bombing,Hizballah showed willingness to provide material supportto the Palestinians. It provided weapons to the Palestiniansand declared that it assists the Palestinian fighters inobvious and not so obvious a manner.72 When Israelinvaded the West Bank in March 2002, Hizballah offered torelease an Israeli captive it holds in exchange for the releaseof Palestinian fighters besieged in Jenin. Israel, however,

ignored the offer.73

Hizballah also attempted to respond tothe Israeli siege of Ramallah where Palestinian AuthorityPresident Yasser Arafat was holed up in his compound byincreasing its shelling of the Shaba Farms and attackingseven Israeli posts in the region.74 Those actions, however,had no military impact on Israels operations in the WestBank, although they bolstered Hizballahs image in theregion as true to its ideological commitments.

Still, and since the Israeli invasion of the West Bank,there has been a trend of escalating tension on theLebanon-Israel border.75 Israeli intelligence sources

anticipate that Hizballah is preparing to carry out qualityattacks, thus causing an escalation.76 Possibly inanticipation of such an attack, Israeli troops were reportedto be reinforcing their positions along the western side of the

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Shaba Farms enclave while Hizballah was constructing

new positions in the front-line area.These activities gaverise to two conflicting speculations. One was that theIsraelis were planning on evacuating the occupied ShabaFarms and their construction activities were for the purposeof establishing a new line of defense. The withdrawal wouldbe part of a deal sponsored by the United States incoordination with Germany in exchange for which Syria andLebanon would secure the border area, disarm Hizballah,and transform it into a regular political party.77 Addingcredence to this interpretation is that Israel-Hizballahcontacts through German mediators over prisoner

exchange issues have been on-going for some time. Evidenceof this was the release in June 2002 of a Hizballah prisonerheld by Israel in exchange for information about Israeliprisoners held by Hizballah.78

The opposite interpretation was that the constructionactivities on both sides of the border are in anticipation of amajor showdown between the two sides. And with Hizballahreportedly in possession of long-range rockets that couldreach Israels industrial complex in Haifa, flare-ups in theShaba Farms area could have serious consequences if Israeldecides to respond with a major military assault.79 A

showdown has been made possible for Syrias PresidentBashar al-Asad does not understand the strategicsignificance of his actions vis--vis Hizballah. . . . He isgiving free rein to Hizballah, and in the end a flare-up willbe inevitable.80 The threat at this level would be Syriapermitting Hizballah to cross the Red Line, and thuspropelling a chain reaction that could result in a generalwar between Syria and Israel.81An otherwise low intensityconflict could spiral out of control if the brinkmanship gameplayed by Hizballah, Syria, and Israel is not managedcautiously.

At the international level, the main concern centersaround Hizballah having a global reach to conductterrorist acts against U.S., Israeli, and other Westerntargets on its own or in consort with other groups such as

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al-Qaida. While there is in the open literature clear

evidence linking Hizballah to acts of terrorism in the past(kidnappings of Westerners, attack on U.S. Marines inLebanon, hijacking of TWA flight in 1980s, and attacks onJewish targets in Argentina in 1990s), no credible andconvincing evidence has been published connecting it tocontemporary acts of international terrorism.

The most serious accusation is an alleged link toal-Qaida. Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezerstated at the United Nations that al-Qaeda is enteringHizballah in Lebanon, and if they work together, this is nota great thing for the free world.82 The Lebanese have

dismissed such statements as lies and maliciousallegations coming from a single source, namely Israel.83

Lebanons Information Minister Ghazi al-Uraydi alsodenied an ABC News report of al-Qaida presence inLebanon, and Hizballah asserted that it has no links toal-Qaida.84 Most knowledgeable observers would seriouslydoubt any such links, if not for ideological reasons, thenb e c a u se H i z ba l l a h s c u r r e nt l e a d er s h i p i s m o r esophisticated strategically than to venture down such avolatile and losing path.

There have also been reports of Hizballah ties to NorthAmerica. Hizballah cells were suspected of being active inCanada and the United States primarily to raise fundsthrough sympathizers, and possibly through links tomafia-style groups engaged in illegal trafficking such asmoney laundering and cigarette smuggling.85 It should notcome as a surprise that among North Americas Muslimcommunities, some groups sympathize and providefinancial support to Hizballah, nor that some individualsare engaged in illicit money-making ventures. No openconvincing evidence exists that these groups are cellsorganized and controlled by Hizballah in Lebanon. The

post-September 11 security environment naturally leads tozealous speculations and open willingness to err on the sideof extreme caution. These and similar reports such asHizballahs attempt to set up a terror cell in the 1990s in

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Singapore to blow up American and Israeli ships86 were

strongly denied by Hizballah.87

On the other hand, the partyhas not been shy to confirm its support of the Palestinians.The preponderance of evidence is that Hizballahs focus isprimarily centered on Lebanese occupied lands andsecondarily on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It has nooperational interests, other than diplomatic, beyond thesespheres.88 The party may indeed have a global reach, but foralmost 2 decades that reach has not produced crediblethreats outside the Lebanon-Israel theater linked to it. Inthe concluding section that follows, I will offer someadditional general observations and policy recommenda-

tions.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

This monograph examined at length the origin,structure, and goals of Hizballah. To a degree, it alsoalluded to Hizballahs modus operandi involving the use ofpolitical, diplomatic, and military means to achieve itsgoals. What is critical in this concluding section is tospeculate on the future and its implications for U.S.policymakers as they fashion an antiterrorism strategy.

It is my contention that a U.S. strategy premised on thesimplistic assumption that there is no difference between agood terrorist and a bad terrorist, and no distinction shouldbe made between terrorist organizations, is highly risky.Using the analogy of a disease, the object is to correct theabnormalitynot to destroy the disease by destroying thepatient. Lebanons stability, and potentially that of thewhole region, hinges on how the United States decides toexecute the war on terrorism beyond the effort in

Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaida.

An initial observation is that Hizballah is a complex

party that is firmly grounded in the culture and the politicalexperience of its Lebanese Shiite constituency. It is not aone-issue party that will wither away once that issue isresolved. Nor is it likely to disappear once its current goals

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of liberating Lebanese occupied territories, seeing

Palestinians achieve their aspiration of independence, andthe return of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem to Arabsovereignty are reached. It is a powerful voice for the Shiitesin Lebanese affairs and their link to the larger Shiitecommunity in the region, especially Iran.

What this observation implies, furthermore, is that,while Hizballah is a religious-based organization like

Al-Qaida and other Islamic groups in the area, it differsfrom Al-Qaida in a very fundamental way. Al-Qaida, withits Wahhabi heritage, adheres to a messianic vision thatwould make the world safe for Islam, so to speak. In

seeking to please Allah, al-Qaida takes anti-Western,anti-Jewish and anti-Christian stances, and its foremostmission is to rid the land of Islam of nonbelievers. Also, itviews itself as aJihad movement fighting external enemiesof Islam who must be dealt with more urgently than localenemies.

By contrast, Hizballah is part of Islamic nationalliberation movements, like Hamas, that come aboutbecause of circumstances affecting their countries. Theyhave little interest in operations outside their immediateenvironment. Additionally, Hizballah, grounded in thehistory of repressed Shiism (Shiites having been arepressed and often despised minority in the Sunni-dominated Islamic world), pursues a less lofty vision thatwould make Shiites safe in the world. In seeking to please

Allah, Hizballah does so by pragmatically attending to thepolitical, social, and economic needs of its constituency.Such pragmatism to satisfy the immediate needs of thecommunity has also been manifested on many occasions byIrans Ayatollahs as they attempted to steer the ship ofstate. Khomeinis accepting a ceasefire in 1988 to end theIran-Iraq war that began in 1980 when continuation of

hostilities would have threatened the Islamic Revolution,Rafsanjanis attempts at liberalization in the 1990s, andcurrent President Khatamis attempts to institute socialand political reformsall indicate flexibility in response to

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changing circumstances. This is a strategic culture that is in

stark contrast to the Taliban or the al-Qaida who wouldrather perish than modify their rigidly held beliefs.

The second pertinent observation is that the exactlocation of the Lebanons borders with its neighbors, andespecially in the Shaba Farms region, is uncertain. Certain,however, is that the Shaba Farms enclave is a territoryoccupied by Israel. Hizballahs paramilitary operationsagainst Israeli occupation forces in the area cannot belabeled terrorism. In this regard, Hizballah could be said tobe engaged in guerrilla warfare, not terrorism. This,however, does not mean that Hizballah is not tainted by acts

of terror, either unprovoked or in response to specific Israeliactivities such as assassinations or abductions of Hizballahleaders. Therefore, pinning t he exclusive label of resistance or terrorist organization on it is not possiblewith any degree of objectivity.

The third general observation is that Hizballah is a fluid or umbrella organization. Although it hasidentifiable leadership structure, it is sufficientlydecentralized and dispersed, enabling its mission-orientedmilitary units to generate command and control structuresto accomplish their goals. The experiences Hizballah hashad battling the Israelis and their allied SLA militia, theiraccess to Syrian supply lines, and ties to Irans Pasdaranand their weapons caches, make Hizballah a risky militarytarget. Its center of gravity is mercurial, and its patrons arestate actors capable of triggering a serious regional conflict.

In his June 24, 2002, speech on peace in the Middle East,Bush minced no words in labeling Hizballah a terroristorganization, along with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for its ee ks t he d es tr uc ti on o f I sr ae l. T hi s a nd t headministrations doctrine of preemptive action may lead to a

U.S. precipitous military action against Hizballah withcounterproductive results. My policy recommendationsfollow:

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1. The United States should not engage Hizballah

militarily. The option of either sending the Marines orSpecial Forces to tackle Hizballah is unrealistic. Its endresult will not amount to more than a feel-good mission. Ifthere was a military solution to Hizballah, then Israel,experienced in dealing with it and knowledgeable about itsarea of operations, would have exercised it. Furthermore,U.S. military intervention would be opposed by a majority ofLebanese, convinced that Hizballah is struggling to liberateoccupied Lebanese lands.

2. The United States should encourage Israel to vacatethe Shaba Farms. This strip of land has limited tactical and

strategic value to Israel, which will eventually withdrawfrom it as part of a peace deal involving the Golan Heights.The argument against this suggestion is that unilateralwithdrawal under pressure from Hizballah would give hopeto Palestinian groups that pressure works against theIsraelis. This argument, however, is fallacious since Israelhad withdrawn unilaterally from south Lebanon whilePalestinian resistance was already underway.

More important, ceding the Shaba enclave to Lebanesesovereignty would deny Hizballah its principal justificationto be involved in guerrilla war operations against Israel. Itwill eliminate the major catalyst for border fighting. To besure, Hizballah will continue to argue that Israel has notfully withdrawn from Lebanon as there remain otherdisputed areas along the Israel-Lebanon border, but theseare small swathes of land that Lebanon would want toresolve diplomatically with Israel as part of a final peacesettlement. Israeli withdrawal from the Shaba Farmsenclave would place the Lebanese government underintense international pressure, as well as domestic pressurefrom several quarters, to rein in Hizballah and deploy theLebanese Army to the border region.

3. The United States should give priority to theSyria-Israel track in the peace process. The old adageconcerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, there can be no

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Arab-Israeli war without Egypt, and there can be no

Arab-Israeli peace without Syria remains true today. Asettlement between Syria and Israel will lead to asimultaneous peace between Israel and Lebanon. Syriawould no longer have any cause to use the Lebanon andHizballah cards against Israel. Hizballah would lose itsability to operate militarily against Israel without Syriasassistance and will be transformed into a regular Lebanesepolitical party.

None of the above policy recommendations addressHizballahs rejection of the legitimacy of Israel and thedesire to seek its destruction. In this ideological stance,

Hizballah seems to parallel the Iranian position. TheIranian Ayatollahs, and Hizballah likewise, have oftenacted more Palestinian than the Palestinians with respectto the peace process and Israel. At the same time, theIranian leadersh

hizballah terrorism, national liberation, or menace pub184

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