history of modern greece (by s. petmezas)

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HISTORYOFMODERN GREECE

by S. Petmezas

Assistant Professor, University of Crete

THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT

AND THE HELLENIC NATIONAL

REVIVALThe rise of theOttoman Empire as-sociated together, for the last time,southeastern Europe, the BlackSea, and theMiddle East into a sin-gle political realm governed by thelawof Islamand theDecrees of theSultans. The realmaterial benefitsof a pacified and unified larger im-perial economy and society in the14th-18th centurieswere soonoblit-erated bymilitary hemorrhage, fis-cal pressure, authoritarian rule,absence of any coherent state pol-icy to support theactive commercialandproductive classesand last, butnot least, complete exclusionof thenon-Muslim majority of the popu-lation in the Balkans and AsiaMinor from the bodypolitic. Duringthat time theEuropeanworldunder-went the experiencesof the Renais-sance, HumanismandReformationand reached the era of Enlighten-ment, a newphaseof social and in-tellectual development thatmeant

the full recognition of individualityas the pivotal value of themodernworld, the complete dissociation ofscience from dogmatic theologyand the legitimizationof thepursuitof progress andhappiness as a po-tentially possible and desirablegoal. The peoples of southeasternEurope, except for a smallminorityof thenon-Muslimelite, didnotpar-ticipate in or even have knowledgeof these intellectual developments.

Greek-Orthodox Christians, as anyother non-Muslim religious com-munity in the Ottoman Empire,constituted a corporate body thatwas protected by theMuslim com-munity but was also juridically in-ferior and subjugated to it. TheGreek-Orthodox “Romeoi” wereled and represented by their spir-itual leader: the Patriarch of Con-stantinople or, on a local level,their bishops in each diocese.The peoples in southeastern Eu-ropemainly construed their group-and self-identity through their re-ligious affiliation. Since the local

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Balkan aristocracies had been al-most completely annihilated, noparamount Christian elite was leftto dominate the social and politicalsphere. Local notable families,Church prelates, and the richestmerchants and financiers in the bigcities substituted themselves forthe extinct aristocrats as politicalintermediaries and social leaders.Since the end of the 17th century,the Phanariots, a small number ofrich and well-educated familiesthat served as official translatorsfor the Sublime Porte and Admiral-ty and later as rulers in the Danu-bian principalities, rose on thetop of this dominant group. Thiscorporative socio-political structuredelegated, on the level of local self-government, authority in religious,familial and even civil affairs to theGreek-Orthodox elite and institu-tions. Nevertheless, such a powersystem was as authoritarian andpatrimonial as the one in functionon the top of the empire.

The second half of the 18th centurywitnessed a whole new range ofdevelopments in the Ottoman Eu-rope. Successive defeats in thehands of the Russian and the Aus-trian armies had made clear thatthe once formidable Muslim Em-pire was about to collapse. The oldChristian elite was now less in-clined to accept unquestionablyOttoman domination. These exter-nal threats were combined, first,with a unique process of politicaland state-financial fragmentationof power and decentralization thatwas felt in literally all Ottomanprovinces and, second, with apowerful drive towards the trans-formation of the land tenure sys-tem and the subsequent deterio-ration of the position of the peas-

ants, especially the non-Muslims.The state of oppressive anarchyand economic deprivation felt bya large part of the peasant and ur-ban strata made them less reluc-tant to challenge openly the rule oftheir lords. Finally, new opportuni-ties for enrichment through tradewith the European economiesweregiven to many Balkan and Anato-lianmerchants and craftsmen, al-most exclusively non-Muslim, andmainly Greek-Orthodox. Theseformed a new Diaspora of mer-chants, ship-owners and artisansin Europe, which was closely relat-ed to the old Greekmerchant Dias-pora in the Middle East and theBlack Sea. This new and dynamicsocial group challenged the dom-inant position of the old Phanariot,Church and civil aristocracy in theGreek-Orthodox community.

Even though many of these men,merchants, notables, Church andcivil magistrates were not of Greekdescent, they considered them-selves Greek-Orthodox “Romeoi”,they used Greek as their commer-cial, cultural or administrative lan-guage, and they would be the firstto espouse the cause of the Hel-lenic national revival. Close com-mercial or educational relationswith the enlightened western andcentral Europe exposed them,along with the Phanariots andtheir administrative and commer-cial subordinates and employees,to the influence of the late 18thcentury Enlightenment. Further-more, all along the 18th century, anew group of intellectuals, teach-ers and authors, many of themclergymen, most of whom hadstudied in Italy or in Germany,wereacquainted with the latest Euro-pean intellectual development and

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THE HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE

had the ambition to participate init and “transmit” its achievementsto their cultural kin. The Greek En-lightenment proved to be a power-ful intellectual surge, which almostentirely reconfigured, in less thana century, the personal self-percep-tion and the collective world-viewof the leadingGreek-Orthodoxelite.

Until the French Revolution, themost timid versions of central-Eu-ropean Enlightenmentwere usual-ly echoed and various projectsfor a Greek-Orthodox enlightenedMonarchy were conceived amongthe highest spheres of the Churchand Phanariot magistrates. TheFrench revolutionary example and,later, the Frenchmilitary presencein Dalmatia, Egypt and the IonianIslands changed radically the po-litical and the intellectual agenda.The French liberating messagewas propagated by such men asRigas of Velestino (1757-1797) –who produced a loyal Greek ver-

sion of the 1793 French Constitu-tion – and Adamantios Koraes(1748-1833), the celebrated scholarwho was universally respected inGreece. Some of the best educatedyoungmen, themost active patri-ots and the bravestmilitary leaders(brigands or local militia men) es-poused this radicalmessage alongwith amore coherent view of theiridentity: nomore as Greek-Ortho-dox “Romeoi,” but as “Hellenes,”heirs of the republican and enlight-ened tradition of classical Hellas.The new Hellenic identity was notmeant to be construed upon ethnicor religious characteristics butupon participation in the commonrepublican and democratic bodypolitic and adoption of the enlight-ened classical intellectual tradi-tion. In spite of official ecclesias-tical censure, obscurantist preach-ing, political persecution, and final-ly the reactionary diplomacy ofthe Holy Alliance and the militarymight of the Ottomans, in less

“The Oath” of a member of the Philiki Etaireia. Oil-painting by Dionysios Tsokos, 1849

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than a quarter of a century a ration-al revolutionary and republicanprojectwas conceived andwon theadherence of the youngest andmost active members of all socialgroups. Secret societies, themostimportant and influential beingthe Philiki Etaireia, were formedand the idea of an imminent andnecessary revolt was propagatedamong the peasant and urbanpopulation, although some of themost respected and fervent patriotslike Adamantios Koraes and Ioan-nis Kapodistrias (1776-1831), formerRussian deputyMinister of ForeignAffairs, felt that any revolutionarymovement would be premature.

1821-1832

THE HELLENICWAR OF

INDEPENDENCE AND THE

REVOLUTIONARY REPUBLICIn spite of the faltering of themost important political figures ofthe Greek-Orthodox communityand the negative political situationin Restoration Europe, a revolt in-stigated by the Philiki Etaireiabroke out, first in Moldavia in Feb-ruary 1821 and then inMarch 1821in many parts of mainland Greecefrom the Peloponnese toMacedo-nia. It was initially led by patrioticactivists strongly influenced bythe European liberal and national-istmovement. From the very begin-ning the revolutionary authoritiesadopted a liberal republican dis-course and the first Constitutionsof the young Hellenic State (1822,1823, 1827) were clearly drawnupon the ideas of the Americanand the French Revolutions. Theidentification of revived Hellenism,democracy, and national sover-eignty propagated by these men

found an impressive echo not onlyin the country itself but in Europeas well. A large movement of sol-idarity sprung among European in-tellectuals and liberals, whothought that the Greek Revolutionwas both the champion of Euro-pean liberalism in an era of Aristo-cratic Restoration and the sublimerevival of the purest classical ma-trix of Democracy and Enlighten-ment. The Philhellenicmovementactively supported the Greek Rev-olution and the great romanticEnglish poet Lord George GordonByron (who died inMissolonghi in1824) is only themost emblematicfigure among a large number of Eu-ropean Philhellenes who foughtand died “so that Greecemight stillbe free.”

Even though the large number offightingmilitia men, sailors, peas-ants, and other commoners hadonly a confused and rudimentaryview of the democratic and liberalproject of the Philiki Etaireia, theystill adopted its call for an inde-pendent Hellenic Republic and aConstitution that would guaranteetheir political and social emanci-pation,meaning freedomand landfor all. These ideals, however ill un-derstood, mobilized the greatma-jority of the Greek-Orthodox pop-ulation in mainland Greece andgalvanized them to undertake analmost desperate fight againstthe Ottoman armies. It was esti-mated that in twelve years of fight-ing the population of southernGreece decreased from940,000 to753,000. In the big urban centersof the Empire, fromConstantinopleto Smyrna and Larissa, the Greek-Orthodox population and clergysuffered enormously from the ex-tortions of the undisciplined janis-

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saries that the Sublime Porte hadlet loose. The Patriarch Gregory Vhimself, the same man who hadcondemned the GreekRevolution,was hanged by the janissary mobalongwithmanyGreeknotables ofConstantinople who had also beenhostile to the revolt. Thus, in spiteof the resolute condemnation ofthis revolt, as well as of any previ-ous one, by the Patriarch and theHoly Synod, the revolutionaryWaracquired a religious connotationdue to the massive, cruel andblind Ottoman repression; this at-titude forced the Greek-Orthodoxpopulation as a whole to identifyitself with the revolutionaries andwith their radical cause.

After the first two years the revolu-tion was crushed everywhere ex-cept in the Peloponnese, centralGreece, Crete, and some of theAegean Islands likeSamos. TheOt-toman armies committed ferociousatrocities but were unable to over-come Greek resistance. Even theintervention of the modernizedEgyptian army that resulted in thedesolation of the countryside andlarge-scale massacres in Creteand the Peloponnese proved un-able to suppress the revolt. Mean-while, the concert of conservativeEuropean Powers as to the neces-sary subjugation of the Greek re-volt was undermined. Influencedby the liberal European Philhellenicmovement and public opinion,the governments of Great Britain,France, and Russia tried to reachan agreement that would ensurefor Greece an autonomous statusin the Ottoman Empire. The Sub-lime Porte refused any compro-mise and thus forced the interven-tion of the allied fleets of thethree European powers. The de-

struction of the Ottoman andEgyptian power in the naval battleof Navarino (1827) bent the Ot-tomans to reason. In the next fewyears fighting continued, but itwas only a matter of time beforeGreece was recognized as an inde-pendent sovereign kingdom.

During theWar of Independence allefforts for the implementation ofmeritorious, efficient and central-ized administration of the political,financial andmilitary systemwereundermined by the rival factions ofthe provincial notables andmilitarychiefs that were brought up inand had adopted the manners ofthe late Ottoman corrupt, decen-tralized and patrimonial adminis-tration. Since 1823 civil strife wasalmost endemic and, as a conse-quence, the Third National As-sembly in Trezina (1827) chosethe Corfiot Count Ioannis Kapodis-trias, a charismatic and interna-tionally respected personality, asgovernor of the Greek Republic,hoping that he would be able to

Lord Byron (1788-1824) as a boy

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overcome the fragmentation ofcentral power and impose thenecessary reforms. This proved tobe impossible for him to obtain be-cause he did not command the in-dispensablemilitary and financialresources. His projects for a largeland distribution program, for theestablishment of a modernizedand centralized administrative, fi-nancial, judicial, ecclesiastical,educational, and military systemwere never implemented. He wasassassinated in September 1831,and the civil conflict that followedcame to an end only when the“Three Protective Powers” (GreatBritain, France and Russia) se-lected and imposed a young Ger-man prince as King of Greece. Itwas Otto of the House of Wittels-bach, son of Ludwig, King ofBavaria. The institution of an ab-solute Monarchy instead of a Re-public was the price Greeks had topay for their inability to acceptcompromises. It was at the sametime the guarantee offered to theconservative powers of the Holy Al-liance that Greecewould not provean example to the peoples ofRestoration Europe. But theMonar-chy was also the key-institutionthroughwhich the protective pow-ers, and especially Great Britain,exercised their influence upon theGreek government and interferedin national politics. As a result, thedynasties and their entouragesidentified themselves with theagents that curtailed smooth insti-tutional development.

Furthermore, only a fragment ofGreece, the poorest and econom-ically less developed south, wasliberated: in total 47,516 km2 and753,400 inhabitants, who wereoverwhelmingly Greek-Orthodox

except for two small communitiesof Roman-Catholic Greeks andGreek Jews (romaniotes). The largerpercentage of Greeks still lived inthe Ottoman Empire in Thessaly,Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, Crete,Cyprus and the other islands, andin parts of AsiaMinor. As a conse-quence, from the very start allGreeks, living either in the Kingdomof Greece, or in the Ottoman Em-pire, or in theSeptinsular Republic(whichwasunder British protectionsince 1814) considered the new in-dependent state just the first steptowards the unification of all Hel-lenes in a sovereign constitutionalpolity. A powerful, if somewhatutopian (in view of the paucity ofGreece’s resources and the de-clared opposition of all Europeanpowers), irredentistmovementwascreated that dominated Greekpol-itics until the interwar period.

1832-1862

FROM ABSOLUTIST

TO CONSTITUTIONAL

MONARCHYOtto was still aminor when hewaselected King of Greece and thus hisfather chose a tripartite Regency torule in his name. In the followingyears a flood of Bavarian militaryand civil officials came to imple-ment a policy of power centraliza-tion, institutional modernizationand social reconfiguration. Theywere mainly assisted by idealisticPhilhellenes and byGreek intellec-tuals, most of whomwere born inlarge urban centers outside thefrontiers of the small independentGreece. Foreign and insensitiveto the particularities of the coun-try’s social and political life, theywere soon to be seen as “arrogant

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intruders” monopolizing the ad-ministration and depriving localnotables andmilitary chiefs (whowere lacking the credentials andknowledge that were necessary fora career in the new bureaucraticadministration) of all political in-fluence and power. The BavarianRegency and its successive govern-ments followed the policy alreadyinitiated by Kapodistrias, but thistime they commanded the neces-sary military and diplomatic sup-port to impose their will. A newcentral and local administration, aregular army, and judicial and ed-ucation systems following the cen-tral European standards were im-posed. The Church was soonforced to cut itself off the Patriar-chal administration and it wasput under the complete control ofthe royal prerogative. In 1837 theUniversity of Athens, the first suchinstitution in southeastern Europeand the Middle East, opened itsgates. In spite of continuous fac-tional strife among Bavarian bu-reaucrats, Philhellene andGreekof-ficials, and local notables andmil-itary chiefs, the novel centralizedadministration and its institutionsproved solid enough and survived.

Unfortunately the new politicalstructures, those of an absolutistGerman monarchy, were far fromthe initial project of a constitutionalRepublic conceived during theGreek War of Independence. Thedemand for a Constitution andfor the distribution of the formerOttoman landed estates (alreadyunder effective control by thepeasants) by the state becamequickly a powerful drive and led,on September 3, 1843, to a revoltthat forced the King to grant aConstitution. The elected National

Assembly worked out the 1844Constitution that was in line withthe other conservative constitu-tional charters of Europe. Accord-ing to this Constitution the electedParliament shared its legislativepower with the Monarch and theSenate, whose members werechosen by the Monarch himself.The latter had the power to choosehisministers. In spite of its conser-vative character, this Constitutionestablished the independence ofJustice and guaranteed all humanand civil rights. Due to the predom-inance of small peasant owner-ship, suffrage was almost univer-sal. Since 1844, Greece became aconstitutional state whose mainproblem remained the distance be-tween themodernity of its institu-tions and the relative archaism ofits economic and social structure.Representative institutions andalmost universal suffrage werecrippled by lawlessness and polit-ical clientelism in the countrysideand, in the long-term, by the lackof funds that would permit the cre-ation of the infrastructure that

Otto, King of Greece (1833-1862),at an early age.

Oil-painting by Petter App

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was necessary for the grandioseprogram of institutional and socialmodernization.

The Wittelsbach era was one ofslow economic development andof politics dominated by three par-ties that were nothing more thanconfederated factions of local no-tables and potent military chiefs.Each political partywas influencedand sponsored by one of the threeProtective Powers that thus exertedan unusually decisive influenceon the domestic and foreign policyof Greece. In spite of this, a vivid in-tellectual life sprung in the few bigcities. The educational systemgrew rapidly, numerous bookswere printed, newspapers werepublished and, in less than a gen-eration, a newwell-educatedpublicwas created. The political systemwas rapidly growing obsolete.

A very strong patriotic sentimentwas built during the long andbloodyWar of Independence and,since the majority of Greeks stilllived unhappily along with theother subjugated Christian popu-lations under the authoritarianOttoman rule, every diplomaticcrisis of the Eastern Question andevery revolt, however insignificant,mobilized the Greek citizenry andbecame an important domesticissue. The successive revolts inCrete, Epirus, Thessaly andMace-donia initiated strongmovementsof solidarity and demanded Greekmilitary assistance. The NationalQuestion thus dominated andhaunted Greekpolitics until the in-terwar period. An active policy ofsupport for the integrity of the Ot-toman Empire, led by themajor Eu-ropean powers, was as a conse-quence resented bymost Greeks.

Otto proved to be a fervent patriotbut could not distance himselffrom daily party politics and soontried to impose his will upon allgovernmentmatters. He was thuscredited with the few successesand all the failures of the youngstate. After a brief period of pop-ularity during the Crimean War,when British and French troops oc-cupied Athens and Piraeus to pre-vent Greece from taking part in thewar, Otto chose to fully assume thereins of the state. The disfunctionof the institutional system hadalienated the young generationof notables and politicians and thegrowing middle classes, whichwere better educated than theirforefathers. The strong liberalmovementmade its presence clearduring the last years of Otto’s ruleand led to two military revolts (inJanuary and October 1862) thatwere both strongly supported bylarge numbers of dissatisfied cit-izens and officials.

1862-1893

THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF A LIBERAL

PARLIAMENTARY REGIME

AND ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENTThe short period of anarchy andcivil turbulence that followed theOctober 1862 revolution endedwith the election of a new King,George I of the Danish GlόcksburgHouse. The government of GreatBritain weighted heavily on thischoice and, once satisfiedwith theadvantageous solution of the cri-sis, bent to the old and obstinatedemand of the population of theSeptinsular Republic, then offi-cially under its protection, to unite

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with Greece. The Union took placeinMarch1864,and theHeptanesianrepresentatives took part in thedeliberationsof theNationalAssem-bly that voted the new liberal Con-stitution of 1864. The executiveand the legislative powers werenow totally separated. Aone-cham-berparliamentwaselectedwithuni-versalmale (until 1945) suffrage.Hu-man rights and civil liberties wereguaranteedandmeticulouslyguard-ed against state arbitrariness.

The King’s exclusive right tochoose theministers of his govern-ment and the strong tendency ofevery royal government to interferein the elections for parliament,soon led to a bitter political strifethat ended with the imposition ofthe “principle of parliamentarism”.Since 1875, the head of the GreekState asks the political leader whoenjoys the majority in Parliamentto form a government and thisleader and all hisministers are re-sponsible to parliament. In the fi-nal quarter of the 19th centurypolitical life was dominated by astable two-party political systemled by influential political figureslike the liberal Charilaos Trikoupisand the democrats AlexanderKoumoundouros and TheodoreDeliyannis. Trikoupis governedthrough most of the period 1880-1895 and associated himself withthe sweepingmodernizing reformsof the Greek administration, jus-tice, army and education systems.

Institutional maturity was associ-ated with rapid economic growth,initiated in the late 1860s by thefoundation of the firstmechanizedmills and factories in Piraeus, Her-moupolis and other Greek cities.Meanwhile, new banks were

founded and the prosperousGreekDiaspora started investing in inde-pendent Greece. The export ofcurrants, olive oil, tobacco and oth-er products of intensive arboricul-ture financed the rapidly increasingimports of wheat and manufac-tures. The growing anticipation ofa still more rapid economic growthwas fuelled by the incorporation ofThessaly and the Epirotan provinceof Arta to the Kingdom in 1881. Theextensive plains of Thessaly wereseen as the future Greek granarythat would alleviate pressure forwheat imports and savemoney forinvestment in more productivesectors of the economy. Unfortu-nately, the sharecropping systemin use in the extensive and archaicThessalian and Epirotan largefarms (tchiftliks) owned by richmerchants and financiers of theGreek Diaspora tended to restrictproduction at subsistence level.Trikoupis, a staunch liberal, led apolicy favoring absentee landown-ers, most of whomweremembersof the wealthy Greek Diaspora.On theotherhand,healienated thenewly liberatedGreeksharecroppers

Charilaos Trikoupis

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andopened theway for intensepo-litical and social unrest in ThessalyandArta. Economically, the incorpo-ration of these provinces provedmuchmore a liability thananassetfor the emerging Greek industry.

Apart from bureaucratic modern-ization, Trikoupis envisaged andobstinately followed a policy of ex-pensive public works: railroads,highways, ports, and lighthouses.In order to obtain the funds need-ed he engaged Greece in a largeprogram of public borrowing in theinternational capital market. Theunexpected diplomatic crisis of1885-1886 and the heavy militaryexpenses initiated by the growingrivalrywith the newBulgarian stateoverMacedonia andThraceweight-ed further upon the Greekbudget.Since the epic Cretan revolt of1866-1869, every new crisis of theEasternQuestion (1875-1881, 1885-1886, and 1896-1897) inflatedpublic expenses to evenhigher lev-els. In spite of the imposition ofnew indirect taxes, public receiptsnever covered the growing expens-es and new loanswere contractedto pay the interests of past loans.Finally, in December 1893, unableto find new loans, Trikoupis wasobliged to cease servicing theGreekpublic debt, causing a unan-imous international reprehension.

1893-1909

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

CRISISThe budgetary crisiswas combinedwith a devastating agricultural cri-sis due to the imposition, in 1893,of protective tariffs on Greek agri-cultural exports by France. Thesetariffs literally closed the French

market to currants and were thecause of a long-term income crisisthat hit the greater part of peasantsin southern Greece. The acuteeconomic and financial difficultiesexacerbated the social frictioncaused by heavy indirect taxationand the “Agrarian Question” inThessaly. The most visible symp-tom of the adverse results of thechronic income crisis in the agrar-ian sector was the rapidly growingtransatlantic emigration that liter-ally drove away, mainly to theUSA, a very large number of Greekpeasants. The annual rate of de-mographic growth, which was ashigh as 1.5% in the 19th century,was halved, during the 1896-1920period, to 0.8%.

This was only one reason of thepessimistic mood in Greece atthat time. The severe ethnic strifein Macedonia and Crete weightedheavily upon the intellectual andmoral climate, leading to the for-mation of aggressive nationalistprivate societies, like the EthnikiEtaireia, which called for an activemilitary intervention on behalf ofthe “oppressed national kin” inCrete and Macedonia. The Cretanrevolt that broke out in 1896 hada dramatic effect on public opinionin Greece and the bungling man-agement of the following diplomat-ic crisis by the Deliyannis govern-ment compelled Greece to a warwith the Ottoman Empire that itwas not prepared for and secretlywished to avoid. The interventionof the Great Powers helped thecountry transform amilitary disas-ter into a diplomatic draw. Greecepaid a heavy financial indemnity totheOttomans, but Crete becameanautonomousprincipality under Ot-toman suzerainty with a Christian

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governor chosen by the Greekgov-ernment. Prince George of Greecewas appointed as its first governorand since then Cretewas all but of-ficially united with Greece.

The foreign creditors of Greecewere those who really profitedfrom the outcome of the Greek-Ot-toman War of 1897. During peacenegotiations, the Greek govern-ment consented to the creation ofan International Financial Com-mittee that would have the powerto control Greek revenues fromspecific tariffs and monopolies.The IFC would ensure the serviceof the public debt and exert aright of inspection on Greek fi-nances for many years. Contrary towhat was thought at the time, theIFC, that lasted until the end of thesecondWorldWar, had a beneficialinfluence on Greek finances sinceit helped Greece put public ex-penses in order and rationalize theuse of revenues.

The Greekmilitary defeat was nev-ertheless perceived as a symptomof national decay and as a strongomenof forthcomingnationaldisas-ters.Manysoughtsolutions in issuesthey considered tobe the source ofnational regeneration, like religionor language.Theso-called“languagequestion” sharply divided Greekintellectuals in two parts: themoreconservative onescontinued toup-hold thatkatharevousa, a “purified”artificial versionofGreekconceivedby scholars like Koraes in the early19th century, should remain theonly language in use in Greek edu-cation and administration, whileyounger radicalsbelieved thatmod-ern Greekdemotike, the “popular”vernacular language, should besubstituted for the inanimate

kathareuousaatall levelsofuse.De-moticists were either romantic na-tionalists, who believed that theGreek language constituted theba-sicelementofGreeknational identityand an animated medium for thetransmission of the “eternal” spiritofHellenic tradition, or socialists forwhom the use of the vernacularwould assist the educationanden-lightenmentofpopular classes. Theintellectual and the political realmsplit into two bitterly opposedgroupsand,onlyaftermany intellec-tualmutations, educational reformsand political reconfigurations, thiscontroversial issue closed in 1976whenamildversionof theDemotikewasofficially accepted as the stan-dard language in use.

The development of the nationalconflict in Ottoman Macedoniawas the most urgent subject ofconcern for the Greek state andpublic opinion. The “Schism” ofthe Bulgarian Exarchate, that is,the arbitrary secession of the Bul-garian dioceses from the Greek-Or-thodox Patriarchate of Constan-

Eleftherios Venizelos

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tinople in 1871, and the BerlinTreaty that concluded the war be-tween Russia and the OttomanEmpire in 1878, had planted theseeds of later imperialist inter-ventions and national conflictsand wars in the Balkans. Greeks,Bulgarians, Serbs, and Albanianswere opposed in a fight for eccle-siastical, educational, and finallymilitary control of the Ottomanprovinces in Europe. Christian vil-lagers, poor sharecroppers, small-owners and transhumant shep-herds, were soon compelled tochoose their ecclesiastical andeducational affiliation under thepressure of militias of irregularsarmedby all the parties concerned.The Bulgarian komitadji bandswere the first to exert this kind ofarmed propaganda and were suc-cessful until the reckless Ilindenuprising in 1903, which ended ina bloodshed perpetrated by theOt-toman army. This defeat led to in-ternal friction among the Bulgariannationalists and later to a series ofintrigues and bloody retaliationsbetween the “supremacists,” whowere unconditionally loyal to theBulgarian national cause, and the“federalists,” who were consider-ing the possibility of an au-tonomous Slav-Macedonian na-tional entity. The cautious Greekpolicy wasmuchmore successfulin expanding the influence of itsnational educational system inMacedonia and later in ensuring,with the use of armedmilitias, thesecurity of those villages that opt-ed for the Patriarchate and againstthe Bulgarian Exarchate. Whenthe “Young-Turk Revolution” wonpower in 1908, Greeks and Serbswere in an advantageous positionin Macedonia at the expense ofBulgaria.

The Young-Turkmilitary revolt hadpromised the re-enactment of theOttoman Constitution of 1875 andthe end of all political, national,and religious oppression in the Ot-toman realm. After a short periodof inter-communal fraternity andgreat liberal and national expecta-tions of all the nationalities in theOttoman empire, the aggressiveTurkish nationalism of the Young-Turk leaders and their centralizingpolicy alienated not only the Chris-tian nationalities but also the Al-banian and Arab nationalists. TheGreeks of theOttoman Empire andthe affluent Greek Diaspora weresoon to understand that there waslittle room for them in the newYoung Turk nationalist order.

InGreece theYoung-Turk revolutionwasseenasthe last inaseriesofna-tional humiliations since a reinvig-oratedTurkeymighthave invalidatedanyhope for the liberation of thoseGreekprovinces thatwerestill underOttoman rule. Growing dissatisfac-tionwith thepoliticalparties,distrustagainst the dynasty and a sense ofmoral decline led a group of youngofficers to follow theYoung-Turkex-ampleand forma“Military League”which called for the reorganizationand modernization of the GreekArmyandNavy, thedismissalof roy-al princes from any post of militaryauthority and, finally, the reformand “moral sanitation” of thepolit-ical system.Thehesitant reactionofthe government precipitated themilitary coup in August 1909 thatwasacclaimedby thepublicopinionthat was tired from the perceivedgovernment inability to solve theur-gent national and social problemsand irritatedby thecontinuous royalinterference in politics. Soon ayoung Cretan liberal, Eleutherios

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Venizelos (1864-1936), was invitedto formagovernmentand toorgan-ize theelection foraNationalAssem-bly thatwould amend theConstitu-tion of 1864.

Contrary to the opinion of contem-poraries, Greecewasnot decliningin the beginning of the 20th centu-ry. The extraordinary growth of theGreekmerchantmarine, the relativereinvigoration of Greek light indus-try, the tamingof the agricultural in-come crisis and the expanding re-mittances coming from Greek em-igrants, sailors, and employees ofthe affluent GreekDiaspora boost-ed the economy, helped the drach-ma to reach parity with the goldenfranc in 1904, and financed a hugeprogram of rearmament. TheVenizelos government in 1911 wasstanding on a very firm base.

1909-1924

VENIZELOS

AND THE LAST PHASE

OF NATIONALUNIFICATIONThe amended Constitution of 1911,proposed by Venizelos and hisfollowers, protected civil libertiesbetter and enhanced the inde-

pendence of justice and public ad-ministration frompartisan politics.Furthermore, Venizelos embraceda policy of institutionalmoderniza-tion and reform of the central andlocal administration, justice, andeducational systems. New spe-cialized ministries were created;policies of rational legal modern-ization and a limited state inter-vention in the economy wereadopted. More urgently, the armyand navy were better armed andmodernized, while an active diplo-matic campaign succeeded in ex-tremis to incorporate Greece intothe hurried alliance of Balkanstates against theOttoman Empire.

The Balkan alliance of Greece,Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgariaproved strong enough to win thefirst Balkan War (1912) againstthe Ottoman Empire, but it was un-able to reach an agreement as tothe partition of the liberatedprovinces whose Christian popu-lations were ethnicallymixed. TheBulgarian government, overconfi-dent of itsmilitary superiority, de-cided to launch a surprise attackagainst its former allies, Greeceand Serbia. This was a grave mis-

Warship Averof, Balkan Wars 1912-1913

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THE COUNTRY

calculation that led to the secondBalkan War, which proved to bevictorious for Greece and its allies.During the two BalkanWars (1912-1913) Greece had doubled its ter-ritory and population but incorpo-rated for the first time an ethnicallymixed population of ChristianSlavs andVlachs, Albanians, Turks,Roms and PomakMuslims as wellas Sepheradin Jews, while a largenumber of Greeks still remainedoutside the country’s frontiers.

Meanwhile the division of Europeinto two camps in the comingWorld War influenced Greek poli-tics as well. The liberal and mod-ernizing Venizelos, representativeof the now overconfident urbanbourgeoisie and of the wealthyGreek Diaspora, was a staunchproponent for Greek participationin the war on the side of theWest-ern allies. The old political elite,which felt betrayed by the 1909coup and resented the acceleratedreforms brought about by theVenizelos governments, found itschampion in the person of thenew King Constantine I (1868-1922), the popular commander-in-

chief of the Greek army duringthe victorious Balkan Wars. Con-stantine, who studied in the Pruss-ian military academy and wasmarried to a princess of the Pruss-ian Royal House, was known for hisGermanophile feelings and hisstrong conservative views. Sinceactive participation in the war onthe side of the Triple alliance wasimpossible, he opted for strictneutrality and found unexpectedallies in the pacifist GreekSocialistmovement. The conservativesmall-owner peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie of the old Kingdomstrongly supported his policywhileVenizelos, a strong supporter ofLand Reform, was especially pop-ular among the sharecroppers andlandless peasants of Thessaly andamong all the newly liberatedprovinces. But it was among unre-deemed Greeks, both poor peas-ants and opulent bourgeois thatVenizeloswas popular to the pointof inspiring a real personality cult.Greece was thus rigidly divided onthe important issue of participationin the newwar and no compromisewas sought. It was also a socio-po-litical cleavage between an author-

Asia Minor disaster, August 1922

about GREECE 31


itarian conservative and a liberalmodernizing perspective in Greeksociety. The so-called “NationalDissension” (ethnikosdichasmos)between liberalsandconservatives,Venizelists and anti-Venizelists,Royalists and Republicans, lasteduntilwell into theSecondWorldWar.

The King tried to impose his policyand forcedVenizelos, whohad justwon theAugust 1915elections, to re-sign fromhispost asPrimeMinisterinOctober 1915. A fewmonths latera “Revolutionary government” ledbyVenizeloswas formed inThessa-loniki. The national dissensionhadtaken the formofa low-intensity civilwar. In June 1917, theVenizelistsoc-cupiedAthens, oustedConstantineand put his second son Alexanderin his place. Greecewas one of thevictors of the First World War andhad the opportunity almost to im-plement itsmore ambitioushopesof national unification. TheTreatiesofNeuilly (1919) andSevres (1920)were apersonal triumph forVenize-los.Western Thrace,whichwasun-der Bulgarian rule since 1912, wasincorporated intoGreecealongwithOttoman Eastern Thrace, exceptConstantinople. The regionofSmyr-na, partly inhabitedbyGreeks,wasunder a Greek protectorate andwould be allowed, after a period offiveyears, todecide ina referendumon its future union with Greece.Venizeloswasalsoobliged tomakeconcessions: the disputed, since1912, self-declared autonomousprovince of Northern Epiruswas tobe incorporated intoAlbania,whilethe international treaties ratifiedthe status of the Dodecanese is-lands, under Italian rule since 1911,andofCyprus, ruledbyGreatBritainsince 1878andofficially annexed in1914, as legitimately under the sov-

ereignty of these Europeanpowers.The priceGreece had to pay for thistriumph was active participationin all the post-war military opera-tions of its allies in Crimea (1919)and Asia Minor (1919-1922).

This price proved too high for acountry thathad lost its internal eth-nic homogeneity,wassharplydivid-edpolitically, andhadapopulationtiredof constantwarfare since 1912.At hindsight it is not surprising thatVenizelos lost the November 1920elections. KingAlexander hadacci-dentally died a month before theelectionsand thenewAnti-Venizelistgovernment imposed his father,the old King Constantine, as hissuccessor. To curb the Turkish na-tional resistance, ledby thebrilliantgeneral Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, tothe implementation of the Treatiesof Sevres, the Greek army, withopen British support, launched inthesummerof1920anunsuccessfulattack against Ankara. Greece wasrapidly isolated from its former al-lies, who did not trust Constantineandhad, except forGreatBritain, al-ready come to an understandingwith the Kemalists. Tired from tenlong years of fighting, the Greekarmy succumbed to the massiveTurkish attack in August 1922. TheGreek-OrthodoxandArmenianpop-ulationofAsiaMinor thathadopen-ly taken the part of Greece paid a

Treaty of Lausanne, July 1923

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THE COUNTRY

heavy penalty in lives lost andproperties dilapidated. The mil-lenary Hellenic presence in AsiaMinor ended in blood, destructionand forcedemigration, anevent thathas since then haunted collectivememory in Greece and has beencalled the “Asia Minor disaster.”

In the Treaty of Lausanne (July1923), negotiated by Venizeloshimself, Greece was forced to ac-cept the conditions of the victori-ous young Turkish Republic. AsiaMinor, Eastern Thrace and the is-lands of Imvros and Tenedoswereconceded to Turkey. All Greek-Or-thodox populations in Turkey andall Muslim populations in Greecewere to be forcibly “exchanged”.This last harsh clause, in combina-tion with a comparable provisionincluded in the Treaty of Neuilly(1919), which arranged a voluntary“exchange of populations” be-tween Greece and Bulgaria, led tothe complete reconfiguration of theethnological characteristics of thecountries concerned. Not onlyGreeks but also Turkish-speakingChristians of inner Anatolia wereforced to leave their ancestrallands, while Cretan and otherGreek-speakingMuslims of Greecefollowed Turkish Muslims andmoved in the opposite direction.Only the Turkish and PomakMus-lims of Eastern Thrace remained inGreece as a counterpart for thelarge Greek-Orthodox populationof Constantinople thatwas allowedto remain in Turkey. The Treatyguaranteed the rights of both mi-norities to unprejudiced justice,free exercise of their religion, ed-ucation in their national languageand, of course, enjoyment of all civ-il rights and full security of their lifeand property. Seventy-five years

later the Muslim community ofGreece continues to live in its an-cestral lands enjoying all the rightsof Greek citizenry and all the addi-tional rights granted by the Lau-sanne Treaty. On the contrary, theGreek community of Istanbul grad-ually dwindled under the continu-ous and undisguised discrimina-tory measures of successive Turk-ish governments.

1924-1935

THE SECOND HELLENIC

REPUBLICThearmy,whichevacuatedAsiaMi-nor and returned to Greece, wasrancorous against what it consid-ered high treason by the royal gov-ernment. The Venizelist officerseasily tookpower and forced, again,King Constantine to leave the coun-try. Soon afterwards, a Venizelistmilitary court condemnedsix formerministers and generals to death fortheir role in the Anatolian cam-paign, thus exasperating partisanfeelings. The radical factions intheVenizelist campwere influentialand, in March 1924, the NationalAssemblydeclaredGreeceaRepub-lic. A few weeks later the decisionwas ratified by a referendum. Theyoung Republic, consecrated inthe Constitution of 1927, was ex-tremely fragile not only because itfaced the adamant repudiation ofthe strong royalist minority butalso because the republican campitself, in the absence ofVenizelos,was internally divided into variousopposing factions.

An impoverished countrywasover-burdened bymore than one and aquartermillionofdestitute refugeeswhoarrived fromAsiaMinorand the

about GREECE 33


Balkans, compared to 420 thou-sand Muslims and Slavs whoforciblyorvoluntarily left thecountry.Asa result, Greecewasagain trans-formed into a nationally homoge-nous country, although inter-com-munal relationswere strained sincethe refugees and the indigenouspeasants were competing for landwhile, in the industrial sector,refugees offered a miserably lowpaidworking force. It tooka gener-ation before refugeeswere fully as-similated intoGreeksociety, amajorachievement in itself given thepaucity of financial resources.

Land reform tooka radical turn andbecame a sweeping movementtransformingGreece into a countryof small-owners and permanentlybinding the former sharecroppers tothe Venizelist side. The newly an-nexedprovincesofnorthernGreecedisposed large plains but werepoorlyequippedandurgentlyneed-ed funds for large-scale land im-provement and drainage. Morefundswereneeded for theestablish-ment of the refugees in the cities. Inconsequence, Greek efforts toachieve thesocio-economic integra-tionof refugees through large-scalepublicworksand rapideconomic re-covery dependedheavilyon foreignloans thatwerepartly contractedun-der the custodyof the LeagueofNa-tions. The important institutionaland economic reforms of the earlyinterwar period were largely im-posedby the international commu-nity andhadapositive long-term in-fluence in the modernization anddevelopmentof theGreekeconomy.

Nevertheless, in the short-term,the economic and social situationin the 1920swas extremely severeand widespread economicmisery

and social insecurity were exacer-bated by the abrupt end of transat-lantic emigration that had earlierproved to be an indispensablesecurity valve for the overpopulat-ed agrarian sector. Social unrestand widespread discontent withthe functioning of political institu-tions, combined with explosiveinternational diplomatic disputes,opened the way to violent politicalcontroversies and to a coup bygeneral Pangalos (1925-1926).Only the return of Venizelos, whowon a sweeping victory in the1928 elections, temporarily stabi-lized the political climate and cul-tivated high hopes once again.

During his last term in office,Venizelos took some impressiveand long lasting steps in securinggood and constructive relationswith Kemalist Turkey, easing the cli-mate of diplomatic confrontationin the Balkans and trying to give areal boost to the ailing Greekecon-omy. The world economic crisisthat was only felt in Greece in1931 swept his efforts away. EveryEuropean economy tried to closeitself in a protective autarchicshell andGreecewasno exception.As a result of this introverted inter-national context, a notable indus-trial development was observedbut, since the country’s economicstructure was strongly dependanton international commercial andmonetary flows, the standard of liv-ing stagnated. The growing labormovement and the fear of increas-ing communist influence amongworkers led Venizelos and his suc-cessors to takemeasures severelycurtailing civil liberties.

The Venizelos government lost the1932 elections and, for the first

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THE COUNTRY

time since 1922, a royalist govern-ment led by P.Tsaldaris was in of-fice. The next years were years ofeconomic austerity, political insta-bility, and social unrest. Venizeloswas self-exiled in Paris, leaving thepolitical arena empty of his dom-inating presence. In the interwarperiod both Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists had been reduced to in-ternally disintegrating blocs of in-triguing politicians and militaryconspirators, forming secret polit-ical and military leagues andpreparing military coups. The ulti-mateVenizelist coup inMarch 1935proved to be adisaster and generalKondylis, a formerVenizelist officerturned into a royalist, had no diffi-culty in bringing it down.

1935-1941

THE END OF THE REPUBLIC

AND THE ROYAL

DICTATORSHIP OF METAXASIn the fewmonths that succeed theabortive Venizelist coup rapid po-litical developments followed. Theroyalists in power radically eradi-cated the army of all Venizelist anddemocratic officers. King George II(1890-1947), unlike his father, re-turned as a final resort of socialand political stability. By that timea large part of the urban bour-geoisie, that had once been theresolute advocate of Venizelos,scared off by bitter social unrestand by the fictitious “Communistdanger,” had become an uncondi-tional supporter of royalist conser-vative order. Finally, in August1936, the prime minister JohnMetaxas (1871-1941) revoked theConstitution with the active sup-port of the King and imposed a dic-tatorship (1936-1941). Overall po-

litical and ideological oppressiontooknew excessively harsh forms,especially against political, social,and ethnic groups. Inane propa-ganda and stiff but ludicrous cen-sorship were introduced in Greekpolitical and intellectual life.

Metaxas’ inspiration originatedfrom the Italian Fascist dictatorshipbut lacking the enabling socialstrata and socio-political ideologyupon which to found a fully oper-ative Fascist regime, he settled foran authoritarian and ruthless per-sonal dictatorship with a surplusof Fascist ritual and kitsch. Com-munists and socialists were sav-agely persecuted, tortured andinternally exiled. All liberal anddemocratic politicians, scholarsand writers who ventured to ques-tion the “Supreme Leader” and hisdeedswere equally, though less in-humanely, maltreated.

1940-1949

THE SECONDWORLDWAR,

RESISTANCE AND CIVILWARTheMetaxas Dictatorship, closelymonitored by King George andhis British patrons, tried to keepGreece out of the Second WorldWar, but the Italian Fascist govern-ment chose Greece as its easyvictim. An aggressive policy ofprovocation reached its peak in Au-gust 1940, when an Italian subma-rine torpedoed a Greek destroyerthat was harbored in the port ofTinos, where it participated in re-ligious festivities. Finally, in Octo-ber 28, 1940,Mussolini presenteda humiliating ultimatum whichMetaxas had no choice but to re-ject. The Italian dictator gravelymiscalculated his actions and, af-

about GREECE 35


ter sixmonths of fierce fighting, theGreek army occupied the greaterpart of south Albania, a country un-der Italian rule since early 1939.

In April 6, 1941, Hitler decided tohelp his ailing ally and invaded Yu-goslavia and Greece. The Greekarmy could not match the Ger-mans, who were superior in num-bers and equipment, and GeneralTsolakoglou, disobeying royal or-ders, capitulated in April 24, 1941.In Crete, the Greek and Britishforces, with the active participationof the local population, gave a lastand desperate battle in May 1941.TheNaziswon a Pyrrhic victory andlost the blossom of their airbornepower. The impending attackagainst the Soviet Union was de-layed for a few fateful months.

The King, the Greek governmentand what was left of the GreekArmy, Navy and Air force followedthe retreating British in Egypt andcontinued fighting until the finalvictory of the allies. Recruits weredrawn from the Greek Diaspora

and from those young men thatcontinued to break away fromGreece. The country itself was oc-cupied for the first time since theOttoman period and distributed asspoils to the victors. Thrace andEastern Macedonia were underBulgarian occupation. The rest ofGreecewas under Italian rule whilethe Germans occupied Athens,Thessaloniki and the rest ofMace-donia, the greatest part of Creteand the Greek-Turkish frontier.The Bulgarians and the Italianstried to dismember Greece and, inorder to do that, they supportedseparatist movements of smallethnic groups that were living nearthe frontier. Thus the Italians usedtheminuscule group ofMuslim Al-banian Tchams in the Epirotanfrontier and unsuccessfully tried toform a Vlach Legion in the PindusMountain range. The Bulgarianthreat wasmuchmore serious, be-cause it used excessive physicalbrutality and engaged forciblepopulation movements. ManyGreeks were driven out of Bulgar-ian-occupied eastern Macedonia

Nazis’ occupation of Athens

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THE COUNTRY

and replaced by Bulgarian immi-grants. Slav-speaking Greek citi-zens were incited or forced to de-clare themselves as Bulgarians.When verbal solicitations did notsuffice brutal forcewas used, as faras in German- and Italian-occupiednorthern Greek provinces.

The first year of occupationwasex-tremelyharshsince theNazi admin-istration had confiscated all ali-mentary stock in a country thatwasdeficient inbasic foodstuffsandunable, due to the allied navalblockade, to import the necessaryfood. The winter of 1942 was a pe-riod of famine for the urban popu-lations. Thepoorer, the feebler andtheunprotected,maybeasmanyas250 thousand, starved to death inthe streets of a European capital. Awhole year passedbefore anagree-ment, sponsored by the SwedishRed Cross, permitted the import ofbasic foodstuffs. In spite of thedesperate economic situation ofthe country, the collaborationistgovernment was forced to loanhuge sums of money to Germany,money that was never paid back.

Greek resistance was organizedever since the firstmonthsof occu-pation. The left-wingNational Liber-ation Front (EAM), themost impor-tant of all resistance organizations,was founded inSeptember27, 1941.The resistancemovementbegan totake massive proportions in 1942.Armedgroupswere formedsuchasthe EAM-sponsored ELAS, EDES,EKKA, etc.Massiveprotestsand ral-lies inMarch 1943weredeterminateandstrongenough toannul theGer-man plans to forcibly conscriptGreek workers to work in Germanfactories. Sabotage and armed at-tacks were growing in spite of the

fact that Nazi retaliation to any actof resistancewasbrutal, savageandout of any proportion. The mascu-line populations of the small townof Calavryta and of numerous vil-lages like Komeno, Kleisoura, Dis-tomoetc. were inhumanely slain insuch blind retaliation operations.That did not stop the armed resist-ance groups frommanaging to con-trol, by 1944, a large part of themountainous countryside.

The ultimate horror was the almostcomplete destruction of the JewsofGreece. Thessaloniki had since thebeginningof the 16th centuryan im-portant Sephardic Jewish commu-nity andwasoneof themost impor-tant centers of Jewish culture in theMediterranean. Its populationwasexpatriatedandexterminatedby theNazis. The same was true for mostof the other ancient communities,like those of Corfu, Jannina, etc. InThrace and easternMacedonia theBulgarians,whohadprotected theirown national Jewish community,closely collaboratedwith theNazis.Only those Jewswhoparticipated inthearmed resistanceor those livingin large population centers (as inAthens) were relatively spared.Some small communities (Zante,Katerini andVolos)were successful-ly evacuated and saved with thehelp of the Church, resistancegroupsor local officials. Others stillwere savedby their Christianneigh-bors.Nevertheless, the final tollwasincrediblyheavy:more than58,800Greek Jews (82 % of their totalnumber) were exterminated.

Greece suffered during the war aheavy penalty in lost human livesandeconomicdilapidation.Totalde-mographic losses are estimated at687,000 dead, to whom some

about GREECE 37


60,000 un-born should be added.TheGreekeconomic and transportinfrastructure was destroyed fromfighting, bombing, sabotage andplain pillage. But the worst wasstill to come. Even since 1943 itwasevident that the resistance groupswere divided along political cleav-ages and armed clashes occurred.In 1944 the British and the Greekroyal governmentwere contemplat-inganarmedconfrontationwith theleft-wing resistance organizationEAM that had, by them, been em-braced by the majority of Greeks.

In October 1944 Athens was freeagain and the Greek and Britisharmieswerewelcomedby an over-joyed nation. Unfortunately, verysoon a bitter antagonism becameapparent between the leftist re-sistance organization EAM, whichwasalmost completely dominatingthe countryside andmostof thebigcities, and theBritish-backed royal

government. Despite compromiseefforts fromboth sides, armed con-flict broke down in Athens, on De-cember 3, 1944. After a month offierce street fighting EAM, whichnever used its full power, and theGreek government reached anagreement in Varkiza (in February1945), whose enforcement wasguaranteed by the British govern-ment. The settlement provided forthe disarmament of the resistancegroups, the “democratization” oftheGreekarmed forces, police andadministration, and theunobstruct-ed preparation of a fair referendumon the monarchy and elections.

None of the articles of this agree-ment was effectively and fully im-plemented, except for the partialdisarmament and demobilizationof the largest part of the left-wingresistance groups. The oldVenizelist liberals were used andabused by the King and his conser-

The liberation of Athens, October 1944

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THE COUNTRY

vative followers while in the coun-tryside the white terrorism of theroyalists exacerbated political pas-sions. The left-wing oppositionwas slowly pushed towards civilwar or political marginalization.The Communist Party, under its oldleader Zachariadis, who returnedfrom Dachau, assumed the role ofthe major opposition force butwas unable to follow a comprehen-sive and steady political strategy.Itsmajormistakewas to call for ab-stention from elections precipi-tated in March 1946. Thus, Com-munists marginalized themselvesin the political arena. The contin-ued provocation and humiliationof former resistance fighters, thereconstruction of an authoritarianadministration and army, the com-plete dominance of royalist and ex-treme-right wing political forces onthe non-communist side, all led

the left-wing opposition to civil warthat began in late October 1946.

The civil war was as destructive inlives and economic resources asthe previous war, yet more bitter.It was part of the larger Cold Warraging all over Europe and it re-tarded normal democratic politicalevolution in Greece for thirty years.The USA had taken over, from de-crepit Great Britain, the role ofsponsor of the royalist govern-ments. After the final defeat of theCommunist revolt in August 1949,a large number of its survivingmembers and sympathizers, whowere not self-exiled in EasternEurope, were detained in concen-tration camps on small islands,imprisoned, persecuted, etc. Sym-pathizers or those suspected to besuch, possibly two out of threeGreeks, were discriminated

Ηoist of the Greek flag, Acropolis, October 1944

about GREECE 39


against, ousted from their work inpublic administration or in educa-tion, personally humiliated, etc.Some of them choose to emigrate,others had to accept the completedepredation of their life.

1950-1974

THE “INCOMPLETE”

PARLIAMENTARY REGIME

AND ITS COLLAPSEAfter the end of the Civil War theCommunist party was banned, itsleftist substitute (EDA) sufferedstrong political discrimination andthe various post-Venizelist liberalcentrist parties, which had sup-ported the royalist side in the CivilWar, were always suspected for re-publican proclivities. The King wasnow in complete control over thearmy and high administration andwas thus dominating the politicalsystem. The Greekpublic adminis-tration, justice, education, andarmy were headed and, in theirhigh echelons, staffed in priority bythe same individuals who servedunder Metaxas or even under thecollaborationist governments; theywere resolutely royalists, anti-Communists, conservatives withanti-parliamentarian and author-itarian beliefs.

After a short-term liberal interlude(1950-1951), a strong conservativegovernment lead by Papagos cameto office. Successive right-winggovernments lasted until 1963.Strongly influenced by the Kingand his powerful entourage, thesegovernments were responsible forthe setting up of a “lame” parlia-mentary system, biased against alarge part of Greek citizenry. TheArmy, truly Royal, totally escaped

political control while its officerswere forming secret and less secretleagues closely knittedwith groupsof obscure politicians and ultra-conservative civil administratorswho thought themselves as thetrue protectors of the King, Faithand Country. Effective power wasslipping out of the hands of its in-stitutional possessors.

In spite of the harsh political cli-mate, and after a period of eco-nomic reconstruction, the Greekeconomy started to exhibit highgrowth rates, associated with arapid productivity growth,massiverural depopulation, rapid expan-sion of the GreekMerchantMarineand a real increase in the share ofindustry in the GDP. The govern-ments led by the young premierConstantine Karamanlis were in-strumental in this rapid process ofgrowth that was certainly connect-ed to the rapid amelioration of theinternational economic environ-ment, the modernization of thecountry’s transport and communi-cation system, and the growing in-tegration of Greece into westernEuropean structures. In 1952Greece became a full member ofNATO and, later, signed an Asso-ciation Agreement with the Euro-pean Common Market (Treaty ofAthens, July 1961). Rapid growthcontinued unimpeded until the1970s and permitted Greece tocatch up partly with other econom-ically advanced Europeaneconomies and become able tojoin the European Union in 1981.This rapid economic developmentwas not without its bleak sidesince, between 1960 and 1972, alarge part of the agricultural pop-ulation that left the countrysidewas not absorbed by the urban

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THE COUNTRY

economy and was forced to emi-grate to those European countrieswhich needed extra labor.

Thesocial andpolitical environmentof the sixties was not less tumul-tuous. Karamanlis followedan inde-pendent policy thatwasnot alwaysfavorably received by the royal en-touragewhile, at the same time, hehad to competeagainst thegrowinginfluence of the Left. The fear of aleftist victory in the 1961 electionsled to gerrymandering andelectoralfraud that adulterated the final re-sults, although the precise respon-sibility of every individual actorhas not yet been established.

Very soon a countrywide outragemobilized large sectors of theGreek citizenry against the govern-ment. Themovement was headedby George Papandreou, the elderlyleader of the “Union of the Cen-ter”, a loose confederation of oldliberal Venizelists and dissatisfiedconservatives, who finally suc-ceeded in toppling the govern-ment. George Papandreou, whotriumphed in the February 1964elections, had been able to garnerconsiderable support from liberaland leftist voters whowere discon-tent with the authoritarian royalgovernments and had beenwrongly perceived by the youngKing Constantine II as the mainthread to his dynasty. Time andagain the young and obstinatemonarch disavowed openly thePrimeminister, while his personalentourage undermined the cohe-sion of the elected government.The split of the Union of the Centerbrought Papandreou’s govern-ment down in July 1965 but provedunable to stop his growing popu-larity.

The political climate was poisonedby actions of the unofficial nexusof power that was under royal pro-tection and beyond the control ofthe legal government. This and oth-er smaller secret right-wing ex-tremist leagues, increasingly fol-lowing their own aims since 1961,were intimidating political oppo-nents, discriminating against thecentrist and leftist parties, andwould soon seize the opportunityto implement what they consid-ered as the only solution to polit-ical instability and to democracy ingeneral, that is, a dictatorship. Agroup of colonels won the raceagainst the King’s generals andstaged a coup on April 21, 1967, amonth before projected elections.The colonels were unknown to allexcept to the royal conspirators.The eclipsed King tried to regaincontrol of the situation, stagedan unsuccessful amateurish coupin December 1967, and when hewas beaten left the country.

The military junta followed thesteps of all previous dictators,adopting a policy of spendthrifteconomic paternalism, authori-tarian brutality, imprisonment ofliberal and leftwing politiciansand intellectuals, and censorship.The dictator Papadopoulos himselfbecame infamous for an excessive-ly ridiculous language he used. Agrowing popular discontent be-came manifest in 1972 throughcontinuous student protests thatled to massive and peacefuldemonstrations in November 1973,when the dictatorship tried to le-gitimize itself through a controlledand limited transfer of power to oldconservative politicians. The armywas called to “restore” order inAthens, which it did leaving more

than forty citizensdead. Aweek lat-er Papadopoulos was ousted bybrigadier Ioannidis, his chief of theMilitary Police and the last strong-hold of power in Athens.

The new dictatorship was totallyisolated internationally aswell as inthe country itself. Its only memo-rable action was the disastrousdecision to use the Greek contin-gent in Cyprus in order to stage acoupagainst ArchbishopMakarios,the President of Cyprus. Cyprushadwon its independence in 1960,after an obstinate struggle againstthe British colonial authorities.ArchbishopMakarioshadacceptedindependence asa secondbest so-lution after full union with Greece.According to the 1960ZurichTreaty,Greece, Turkey and Great Britainwere collectively guaranteeing thesmooth functioning of the CypriotConstitution and the country’s se-curity. Britain had sovereign rightson its two bases on the island,while Greece and Turkey had twosmall armed contingents. The twocommunities lived side by sideand relations were fair until 1964.Deteriorating intercommunal rela-tions influenced Greek-Turkish re-lationsnegatively. Cyprus’ neutralitywas poorly accepted by the USA,whose policy aimed at incorporat-ing Cyprus into NATO, possibly en-suring apeaceful partition of the is-land between its two allies, Greeceand Turkey. George Papandreouand Archbishop Makarios werestrongly against this outcome andsuccessfully blocked it in 1964.Later, theGreekmilitary junta useda nationalist rhetoric to cover up itsabsence of determination duringthe 1968Greek-Turkish crisis. Final-ly, on July 15, 1974, a coup wasstaged. TheGreekarmy contingent

and the Greek-Cypriot militia werebusy chasing their internal enemywhen, on July 20, the Turkish armyinvaded the unguarded island, pre-tending to unilaterally fulfill itsright as guarantor of the security ofthe Turkish Cypriot community.After the immediate collapse ofthedictatorship and the restorationof democracy, a truce was negoti-ated andanagreement of the threeguaranteeingpowerswassought invain. The Turkish army, which hadtotal superiority in numbers andequipment on the island, violatedthe truce and engaged in a secondround of military operations onAugust 15, 1974. It thus reached itstrue aim to divide firmly the islandinto two ethnically cleansed areas.The fighting and the voluntary bru-tality of the Turkish army chasedmore than 200,000Greek-Cypriotsaway from their houses in the northof the island. The majority of theTurkish-Cypriots, urged by theircommunal leadership, abandonedtheir houses later on and movednorth to theTurkish-occupiedareas.Since that time, Turkey illegally oc-cupies the northern part of the is-land and has since engineered anextensive policy of colonization byTurkish citizens with the intentionofmaking the ethnic separation ofthe island permanent. Nicosia is aphysically divided capital, the last

about GREECE 41


Technical University of Athens,snapshot of the rebellion, November 1973

about GREECE42

THE COUNTRY

in Europe after the fall of the BerlinWall. The Turkish-Cypriot economycommands themost fertile areasofthe island, but extensivemisman-agement and corruption has re-duced it to the status of an under-developedcountry,while theGreek-Cypriot economyhasbeen growingrapidly. Disappointedby the lackofpolitical freedom and economicopportunities,manyTurkish-Cypri-ots emigrated to theUK.TheRepub-lic of Cyprus is among the tencountries that newly acceded to theEuropean Union.

THE THIRD HELLENIC

REPUBLIC SINCE 1974The disastrous coup in Cyprusdemonstrated beyond any doubtthe incapacity of themilitary dicta-torship to prepare Greece not onlyfor peace but for war as well. Thenational disaster causedby the dic-tatorship was a natural conclusionof the extreme-right wing culturewhich, in close identification withthe monarchy, had dominatedGreekpolitical and intellectual lifesince 1935. The monarchy and itsanti-parliamentary political en-tourage were both clearly delegit-imized along with any anti-liberaland anti-socialist rhetoric.

Constantine Karamanlis, self-exiled

in Paris since 1963, was sum-moned to form a government andput some order to the mess thedictators left behind. His secondperiod of office (1974-1980) islinked with the impeccable refer-endum that restored a Greek Re-public. His government took creditfor securing further economic de-velopment, consolidating demo-cratic institutions, legalizing theCommunist party, ending politicaldiscrimination against the Leftand, finally, resolving the famous“language question” by legalizingthe use of amixed Demotike in ed-ucation and administration. OnJanuary 1, 1981 Greece became thetenth member of the EuropeanCommon Market and has sincebeen a country whose populationhas shown the highest percent-ages of identification with a futurefederal Union, which is the avowedaim of all political parties from theliberal conservatives of Nea De-mocratia to the Socialists and thenon-communist Left.

Since 1981 the Socialist Party, ledby its leader Andreas Papandreou(1919-1996), has won successiveelectoral victories and dominated,with the exception of a short-terminterlude (1990-1993), Greekpolit-ical life. Papandreou’s greatestachievementwas to build awelfare

The return of Constantine Karamanlis toGreece, July 1974

Accession of Greece in the E.E.C.,Athens, May 1979

about GREECE 43


state, modernize the educationsystem, put a definitive end to allforms of political and social dis-crimination that had persisteduntil the late 1970s and finally, withthe concurrence of the leadershipof all Greek political parties, put adefinite end to the symbolic legacyof the civil war. In the 1990s thegreatest achievement of the social-ist governments, led by KostasSimitis, was the smooth adoptionof the common European currency,the Euro, in January 2002, the Na-tion finally reaching the apex in itslong process of modernizationand incorporation into the Euro-pean institutions. The inclusion ofthe Republic of Cyprus into the Eu-ropean Union in January 2003,and the net amelioration of the bi-lateral Greek-Turkish relations havealso given new confidence to theGreek citizenry.

Greece was not well prepared forthe rapid dislocation of the ColdWarmilitary and diplomatic blocs.Having an uneasy relationshipwith its eastern neighbor, militaryally and potential danger, it felt asan isolated island of the EuropeanUnion until the dramatic events ofthe 1990s. Economicmisery, polit-ical instability, low or high-intensitycivil wars in its northern and east-ern neighbors from the Balkans to

the Caucasus suddenly demon-strated to all Greeks the valueand fragility of democratic institu-tions, inter-communal toleranceand economic affluence. A countryof emigrants, Greece turned into acountry of immigration, legal orclandestine. Once consideringthemselves immune from xeno-phobic intolerance, Greeks havenow to adapt themselves to theirnew environment and accept thefact that they no longer live on a“European” island. Nonetheless itseems that, after the difficult timeof first encounters, the countryhas been able to positively re-spond to the challenge. The immi-grants themselves offered theirhard and diligent labor to the na-tional economy, while Greek in-vestments in the larger South-eastern European and EasternMediterranean area soared, givingnew impetus to the developmentof these countries. Common pros-perity and development in thelarger easternMediterranean areaare once again within our reach,provided that all the parties sharetheir commitment to peace and in-ternational cooperation.

USEFUL LINKS

Foundation of the Hellenic Worldwww.e-history.gr

Ex-Prime Minister Costas Simitis receivesthe first euro banknotes celebrating thecountry’s introduction in 12 “euro zone”members, 01-01-2002

President of IOC, Mr Jacques Roggeat the closing ceremony of

Athens’ Olympics 2004

history of modern greece (by s. petmezas)

Documents