history, lessons, and the kosovo force mission...militar revie online exclusive auust 2018 1 gun...

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · AUGUST 20181

Gun Devils in KosovoHistory, Lessons, and the Kosovo Force MissionCapt. James M. McCabe Jr., U.S. Army

Unbeknownst to many, the United States maintains a significant contribution to the NATO mission in Kosovo. While the original 50,000-member coalition has been reduced to just over 4,500, the U.S. Army still provides over 10 percent of those soldiers in the twenty-eight-nation mission.

The Kosovo War was initially a conflict between Serbian and Yugoslav security forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an ethnic Albanian guerrilla group (identified by some as terrorists), seeking seces-sion from the former Yugoslavia. By 1998, Western

interest had increased and the Serbian authorities were compelled to sign a unilateral cease-fire and conduct a partial retreat. Under a UN agreement, observers moved into Kosovo to monitor the cease-fire, while Yugoslav military forces partially pulled out of Kosovo. However, the cease-fire was broken shortly thereafter by the KLA, which again provoked harsh counterat-tacks by the Serbians. The Serbians then began to esca-late the conflict using military and paramilitary forces in another ethnic cleansing campaign, this time against the Kosovar Albanians. An estimated 300,000 refugees

Soldiers conduct an air assault January 2018 during the Operation Bowie Strike training exercise in Zhegoc, Kosovo. (Photo by the 39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs Office)

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were displaced during the winter of 1998.1 Many refu-gees left without adequate food or shelter, precipitating a humanitarian crisis and calls for intervention by the international community.

NATO intervention between 24 March and 10 June 1999 combined with continued skirmishes between Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav forces resulted in massive population displacement in Kosovo. During the conflict, roughly a million ethnic Albanians fled or were forcefully driven from Kosovo. In total, more than 11,000 Albanian deaths were reported.2

After the war ended, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which placed Kosovo under transitional UN administration and authorized Kosovo Force (KFOR), a NATO-led peacekeeping force. Resolution 1244 also stated that Kosovo would have autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (today’s legal successor to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the Republic of Serbia).3

Some 200,000 to 280,000 ethnic Serbians, the majority of the Serbian population, left when the Serbian forces left. There was also some looting of Serbian properties and even violence against some of those Serbians and Roma who remained. The current number of internally displaced persons is disputed, with estimates ranging from 65,000 to 250,000.4 Many displaced Serbians are afraid to return to their homes, even with UN protection. Around 120,000 to 150,000 Serbians remain in Kosovo but are subject to occasion-al harassment and discrimination.

On 17 February 2008, the Kosovar Assembly ap-proved a declaration of independence. Over the follow-ing days, several countries (the United States, Turkey, Albania, Austria, Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Republic of China [Taiwan], Australia, and others) announced their recognition, despite pro-tests by Serbia to the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council remains divided on the question; of the five members with veto power, the United States, United Kingdom, and France recognized the decla-ration of independence, while Russia and the People’s Republic of China consider the declaration illegal.5

The European Union has no official position towards Kosovo’s status, but has decided to deploy the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) to ensure a continuation of international civil presence in Kosovo. Of Kosovo’s immediate neighbor states, only

Albania recognizes the declaration of independence. While Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, all neigh-bors of Serbia, announced in a joint statement that they would recognize the declaration.6

Kosovo was originally intended to serve as a vehicle with which to tamper down ethnic nationalism and separatist movements from within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under its late dictator and communist revolutionary, Josip Broz Tito.7 However, Kosovo today serves as an example of both national-ist and separatist movements in the postwar western Balkans. The greatest challenges to KFOR’s objectives of maintaining a safe and secure environment (SASE) and freedom of movement (FOM) are (1) ethnic ten-sions between the majority Albanian population and the minority Serbians, (2) organized criminal groups that permeate every level of social and economic life, and (3) international political interests from Serbia, Albania, and Russia.

The current U.S. footprint consists of an in-fantry brigade combat team (IBCT) headquarters serving as the Multinational Battle Group–East (MNBG-E) headquarters element and an aviation task force serving as the southern command post, each from the National Guard. An active-duty battalion serves as the forward command post (FCP). The 3rd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (AFAR), Division Artillery, 82nd Airborne Division received the mission to assume the respon-sibility of the FCP for MNBG-E, KFOR from June 2017 until March 2018.

While this is a non-standard mission for an airborne field artillery battalion, the team

Capt. James Mitchell McCabe Jr., U.S. Army, is an Advanced Civil Studies Program graduate student at Centenary College in Shreveport, Lousiana. He served in Kosovo as the S-2 of 3rd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat team, 82nd Airborne Division. He a distinguished military graduate from Texas A&M University Central Texas. His deployed service includes Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003-2004 and 2007, Operation Enduring Freedom 2011-2012, and Kosovo Forces 2017-2018.

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embraced the opportunity. The remainder of 3-319th’s supported brigade—the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division—and many of the fire support teams, radar crews, and a firing battery from the battalion deployed to Afghanistan.

“Before we got this mission, I couldn’t even point out Kosovo on a map,” Lt. Col. Kevin Taylor, com-mander of the 3-319th, “Gun Devil 6,” said in his end-of-deployment speech in March 2018 while still in Kosovo prior to returning to the 3-319th Airborne Field Artillery’s home station at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. “Now I have a real understanding of the complexity of this environment and see the value of our role here.”

This article serves as both a log of the Gun Devils’ experience in Kosovo and a mechanism for present-ing lessons learned. It outlines the U.S. footprint in Kosovo in support of KFOR, the stable but fragile status quo in Kosovo, KFOR’s policy of neutrality, daily operations, and recommendations for future KFOR rotations.

The Layered, Iterative Training Process

The 1st BCT dedicated the first months of 2017 to an intensive training cycle in preparation for the deployment to Afghanistan. The 3-319th AFAR

participated in all of these events including artillery certification, small-arms ranges, situational training ex-ercises, and a home-station culminating training event. This training focused on the Afghanistan mission but did provide 3-319th the opportunity to hone and train its core competencies.

Prior to any formal Kosovo-centric training event, the battalion S-2 (intelligence) shop focused intelli-gence reporting around Kosovo and the Balkans. The weekly intelligence summary, published to all com-manders and primary staff, centered on current open source intelligence about Kosovo. This was particu-larly relevant as the battalion learned that Kosovo’s parliament had voted “no confidence” and the govern-ment had dissolved in the weeks leading up to the de-ployment. This meant that the 3-319th would have to contend with a Kosovo-wide election process during the rotation. In addition to the weekly intelligence summary, the battalion S-2 and S-3 (operations) offi-cers presented a road-to-war predeployment lecture series that focused on the history of the conflict, the current situation, rules of engagement, tactical ques-tioning, and Joint Multinational Readiness Center ( JMRC) preparation.

Polish infantry automatic weapon team members observe their sur-roundings from a support-by-fire position 19 January 2018 during the assault portion of the Operation Bowie Strike training exercise in Zhegoc, Kosovo. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Nicholas Farina)

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To prepare for the FCP mission, 3-319th AFAR had to first complete a KFOR scenario at JMRC in Hohenfels, Germany. The training event at JMRC focused on the nuances of the FCP’s role and relation-ship with the multitude of allied partners, to include their respective roles. These allied partners included the joint regional detachments, the liaison monitor-ing teams, the various entities within MNBG-E, S-7 (information operations), S-9 (civil affairs), addition-al staff, and, of course, the personalities within the Kosovo municipalities.

The JMRC was the first contact between the ma-jority of the 3-319th AFAR (henceforth, FCP) and the 39th IBCT (Arkansas National Guard, henceforth, MNBG-E). Both teams met the challenges of the rota-tion in an aggressive manner. Within a few days, each headquarters synchronized operations effectively to meet the demands of the JMRC rotation.

The JMRC was a terrific training opportunity for the maneuver elements as well as the staff. The situa-tional training exercise lanes were a new experience for the paratroopers with fire phobia and crowd riot-con-trol training. Fire phobia training involved the ap-propriate reactions to attacks by incendiary weapons. Expert trainers threw Molotov cocktails at soldiers’ feet and the trainees reacted with foot stomping and shield waiving. The crowd riot-control instruction trained soldiers in proper escalation of force procedures, shield and baton handling, crash-line formation, and work-rest cycles during a crowd riot-control event. This was also the first experience in working alongside other nations, which prepared leaders for the challenges of navigating different organizational cultures.

The five-day exercise was presented as “the worst five days in Kosovo.” Each day gave rise to new chal-lenges including protests, violence, roadblocks, illegal smuggling activities, and all-out riots. These external challenges, coupled with the challenges of integrating into a new organization with an unfamiliar mission, proved daunting. Yet, the FCP persevered and the whole of the MNBG-E coalesced into a synchronized and cohesive organization—ready to accept the task of the Kosovo Force.

Of note, a Kosovo deployment provides an excellent opportunity to train. There are opportunities to qualify on individual and crew-served weapons, conduct digital sustainment training, and conduct monthly leadership

professional development sessions. Once the initial learning curve flattens out, the predictability of the operational tempo makes it easy to schedule a thor-ough training plan across most warfighting functions; however, issues exist with resourcing. There is only one range at Camp Bondsteel: a 25 m range that only supports paper targets. The FCP used this range for close-quarters marksmanship, M4 zero and qualifi-cation tables, and limited crew-served weapon firing. The Kosovo Police (KP) and other nations have ranges throughout Kosovo; however, using those ranges re-quires additional steps for coordination.

There are local nationals who allow training on their private land to facilitate air assault and other training. The battalion S-3 can coordinate with the local land-owners to obtain a usage agreement; this precedent exists because of the work of previous KFOR rotations. The private land provides open areas and urban struc-tures to assist training in dismounted maneuver and air assault operations.

One example of partnered training was Operation Bowie Strike, a company-level air assault operation. The exercise was a great training event from an oper-ational readiness and interoperability standpoint—a multinational and multicomponent success story. The Polish commander and his team did an excellent job providing mission command for both the U.S. and Polish platoons. A big win for all involved was incorpo-rating Puma unmanned aerial vehicle flights to support the Polish Recce (reconnaissance) platoon, which great-ly enhanced interoperability objectives.

Task Organization and Mission Requirements

The original assigned peacekeeping sectors, based upon the German model of individual national sectors, have undergone continual changes and consolidation to meet the needs of the changing security environment in Kosovo. Currently, Kosovo is principally divided into east and west areas of intelligence responsibility (AoIR) under the charge of MNBGs East and West. MNBG-E is commanded by a U.S colonel while MNBG-W is commanded by an Italian colonel. MNBG-E is further subdivided into north and south AoIRs, each headed by a respective forward/southern command post op-erating along the administrative boundary line which borders Serbia and Macedonia.

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Interestingly, four of the partner countries within the KFOR alliance (Armenia, Greece, Moldova, and Romania) do not recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Under the UN mandate, KFOR is officially status neutral. Because of multinational partnerships with-in KFOR and the inclusion of nonrecognizing states, KFOR refers to the governing body of Kosovo and associated ministries as institutions in Kosovo (IiK) instead of the government of Kosovo. This ensures that partner nations do not contradict their national policies and instead remain neutral.

The battle groups work closely with the joint re-gional detachments to share intelligence and resources. Understanding the complete intelligence situation informs the FCP’s ability to react to disturbances of SASE and FOM. The KFOR has placed itself as a tier-3 (third responder in line of reaction, with the first being

IiK, second being EULEX) response force for such dis-turbances behind the KP and the EULEX Kosovo.

Kosovo: Stable but FragileThe FCP’s intelligence operations focused on sourc-

es of instability in the AoIR. These sources of insta-bility include infrastructure, Association of Serbian Municipality formation, organized criminal groups, religious extremist elements, Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) transformation to the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF), and the so-called Specialist Chambers.

Infrastructure as a source of instability. Significant infrastructure include the Trepca Mines and the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) coal power plant. The mines are a source of instability because the mineral rights to the mines are contested between Serbia and Kosovo. Furthermore, allegations of ethnic bias in hiring practices at Trepca are fueled by the per-ception that ethnic Albanians receive hiring preferenc-es over ethnic Serbians.

The KEK power plant, on the other hand, contin-ued its threats and warnings of brown-outs due to a reported coal shortage. KEK is known to make these assertions and claim that power and coal availability will decrease. However, these statements proved false, as there is an assessed fifteen-year surplus of coal im-mediately adjacent to the plant itself. However, these threats remain as a means of political blackmail.

Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities as a source of instability. The Zajednica srpskih opština (Association of Serbian Municipality, or ZSO) is a planned self-governing association of municipalities with majority Serbian population in Kosovo. The proposal of the KSO formation came as a result of the 2013 Brussels Agreement signed by the governments of Kosovo and Serbia. In accordance with the competences given by the European Charter of Local Self Government and Kosovo law, the participating municipalities would be entitled to cooperate in exercising their powers collectively through the association. The ZSO would have full overview of the areas of economic develop-ment, education, health services, and urban and rural planning.8 Kosovars expected official establishment of the Community within Kosovo’s legal framework by 2015, but the Community is indefinitely postponed over conflicts about the extent of its powers.

A U.S. Kosovo Force soldier talks on the radio while a Polish infantry soldier pulls security 19 January 2018 during the assault portion of the Operation Bowie Strike training exercise in Zhegoc, Kosovo. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Nicholas Farina, U.S. Army)

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On 9 November 2015, Kosovo’s proposal to become a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) member-state failed, due to having less than the two-thirds of votes in favor at the UNESCO General Conference.

On 10 November 2015, the Government of Kosovo froze the previously signed agreement to establish the Community of Serbian Municipalities. This decision was condemned by Serbia’s minister of foreign affairs, Ivica Dačić, who called it a “threat to regional stabil-ity” and a “major blow to the Brussels dialogue.”9 In December 2015, the Constitutional Court of Kosovo proclaimed parts of the 2013 agreement unconstitu-tional. Since then, the realization of the agreement was put on hold and Kosovo has since fallen into the current political crisis.10 The constant clashes between Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serbian parties in the government, with the Albanians saying that Kosovo Serbians would be “privileged” if the agreement was implemented, restricts overall governmental function. Even though the Community was meant to improve the life of Serbians who live in harsh conditions in Serbian-majority enclaves, it is a tremendous source of friction between the ethnicities. The ZSO is effectively a means for Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, to control the ethnic Serbian majority municipalities. There are legal precedents and mandates for the implementation of the ZSO; however, the Albanian majority munici-palities and the Kosovo parliament both strongly resist the ZSO’s formation. In the September 2017 Kosovan parliamentary election, the Serbian List political party agreed to form the Government of Kosovo led by Ramush Haradinaj of Alliance for the Future of Kosovo under the main condition that the government establish the Community of Serbian Municipalities. The current assessment is either (1) Serbia will claim that IiK are unable to appropriately govern or protect the Kosovo Serbians and thus instruct the Kosovo Serbian municipal mayors to begin implementing ZSO rules and structure without the express approval of the

Kosovo government or (2) Serbia and Kosovo agree on a direct path to ZSO implementation during bilateral dialogue. As of August 2018, no final implementation has taken place.

Organized criminal groups and religious ex-tremist elements as sources of instability. Organized criminal groups are deeply entwined into the fabric of Kosovo. They provide a gray (otherwise legal, but smuggled in) and black (expressly illegal) market for goods and services and transcend ethnic trade lines. Furthermore, the Serbian-aligned organized criminal groups “enforce” Belgrade’s political decisions at the street level through intimidation.

Smugglers take advantage of mountainous ter-rain and inadequate security at the ABL in order to smuggle gray market and illegal goods from Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania into Kosovo, including some high-value materials. Indications of this smuggling was one of the primary drivers of the FCP’s tactical information collection and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning. The KFOR J2 ( joint intelligence officer) took the situational template that the MNBG-E and the FCP produced and present-ed it to the commander of KFOR. This intelligence informed the commander’s decision to increase patrolling on the ABL as a deterrence line of effort. Furthermore, the FCP shared this information (as appropriate) with local security forces that resulted in some arrests and detentions of smugglers and facilita-tors of organized crime.

Religious extremist elements are of particular interest because Kosovo has the highest per capita number of radical Muslims that have gone to fight for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.11 With the defeat of the Islamic State on the horizon, many of these foreign fighters returned to Kosovo. The FCP assesses that re-ligious extremist elements will continue to use Kosovo as a logistical and planning hub but will not directly attack within the region; religious extremist targets are likely in western Europe.

Religious extremist elements are of particular interest because Kosovo has the highest per capita number of radical Muslims that have gone to fight for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

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Kosovo Security Forces to Kosovo Armed Forces transformation as a source of instability. The KSF is a professional, multiethnic, lightly armed and uni-formed security force that is subject to democratic civilian control. Its mission is to conduct crisis re-sponse operations in Kosovo and abroad, conduct civil protection operations within Kosovo, and to assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies.

Such duties include search-and-rescue operations, explosive ordnance disposal (demining and unexploded ordinance removal), the control and clearance of haz-ardous materials, firefighting, and other humanitarian assistance tasks. The KSF represent and protect all the people of Kosovo.

Opinions of the KSF among ethnic Serbians in Kosovo appear to be extremely negative. Much of the distrust of the KSF appears to be rooted in the violence committed against Kosovo Serbians during and after the war from 1998 to 1999. There is a per-ception among many Kosovo Serbians that the KSF is simply a continuation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who they blame for many of the

alleged crimes committed against Serbians in the past, and that it will discriminate against Serbians or even possibly attempt to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of Serbians. Furthermore, according to a threaten-ing pamphlet uncovered during a routine patrol, in January 2018, leaders in the Kosovo Serbian mu-nicipality of Zubin Potok warned that any Kosovo Serbian that joined the KSF would experience ex-communication from the Serbian Orthodox Church and treatment as persona non grata from Serbian communities.

As part of its bid to join NATO, Kosovo re-quires an armed forces. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement that establishes international presence in Kosovo, the only armed force authorized in Kosovo is KFOR. On 5 March 2014, then Prime Minister (now president) Hashim Thaçi declared that the Kosovo government would establish a defense ministry by 2019. The KSF would then transform into the Kosovo

A U.S. Kosovo Force soldier and a Polish infantry soldier take a tac-tical pause 19 January 2018 during the assault portion of the Op-eration Bowie Strike training exercise in Zhegoc, Kosovo. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Nicholas Farina, U.S. Army)

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Armed Forces (KAF) to meet all the standards of NATO states with the aim of joining the alliance in the future.12

The new army will have a €98 million annual bud-get and will be five thousand strong with another three thousand reservists.13 The KAF would be comprised of land forces, a national guard, logistics, and training commands. Kosovo’s security forces minister Agim Çeku stated that the KAF’s mission will be “to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo, its people and their property, and protect the interests of the Kosovo Republic.”14

Kosovo’s ambassador to Turkey, Avni Spahiu, stated that the “decision to establish an army has been taken in consultation with NATO and our partners … [and] the army will have a defensive character as Kosovo has no territorial aspirations.”15 On 28 May 2014, President Atifete Jahjaga told the UN Security Council that the creation of the Kosovo Armed Forces would be a long process, requiring the support and participation of all ethnic communities in Kosovo; Jahjaga added that its purpose would be to contribute to overall security in the Balkans and called on all ethnic communities to take part in the process. In November 2014, Agim Çeku, minister of security forces in the Republic of Kosovo and former prime minister, stated that the Kosovo army was run-ning behind schedule “because of the delay in the con-stitution of the Kosovo parliament,” but the decision

to transform the KSF into an army will be confirmed “at one of the first sessions upon its constitution”; he also noted that this transformation enjoys nationwide support and he doesn’t expect any complaints from the political opposition.16

Specialist Chambers as a source of instability. In 2001, Swiss politician Dick Marty authored a Council of Europe report in which he noted war crimes committed by the KLA. Partly based on that report, the prosecutor of the Special Investigative Taskforce

of the EULEX Kosovo concluded sufficient evidence existed for prosecution of “war crimes, crimes against humanity, as well as certain crimes against Kosovan law.”17 The court is located outside of Kosovo on request of the prosecutor to provide adequate protec-tion to witnesses.

The Specialist Chambers, or Specialist Courts, is an international court located in The Hague that is charged with the prosecution of former KLA mem-bers with war crimes. Many of the suspected war criminals are current members of the Kosovo par-liament and IiK. Their indictment would certainly disrupt SASE.

Source of instability—conclusion. The FCP monitors these sources of instability through open source intelligence and information collection activi-ties (e.g., patrols). Aggregating reports related to each source of instability provides a volatility assessment for Kosovo and determines a readiness condition for the FCP. When volatility is high, the notice-to-move readiness condition shortens and the FCP remains ready to react to any threat against SASE and FOM. The intelligence section generated this concept with the operations section during JMRC and fine-tuned it during the deployment to Kosovo itself.

Synchronizing intelligence with operations is the most effective way to predict threats against SASE and FOM.

Monitoring these sources of instability assists the

FCP in maintaining awareness of strategic changes in the AoIR, and conducting tactical-level opera-tions. On more than one occasion, the FCP shared information gathered during patrols with the Kosovo Border Police (KBP), and this shared information led to twelve opened investigations against smugglers and two additional investigations against corrupt KBP officers. These successes continued to bolster KFOR’s credibility and enhanced the partnerships between NATO and the IiK.

Synchronizing intelligence with operations is the most effective way to predict threats against SASE [a safe and secure environment] and FOM [freedom of movement].

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Operational Success: Kosovo Election Coverage

The FCP provided support to the Kosovo municipal elections on 19 October 2017 along with several runoff elections held on 22 November throughout the coun-try. The FCP’s mission was to support MNBG-E and KFOR in providing a safe and secure environment for the elections as well as freedom of movement through-

out the operation. Both rounds of elections presented no major security concerns. Cooperation and inte-gration among multinational partners, KP, KBP, and nongovernmental organizations proved critical to the success of the operation.

In terms of the operational environment, political influencers from the Kosovo parliament and from the government of Serbia each supported proxy candi-dates throughout the municipalities of Kosovo. Serbian influence focused on ethnic Kosovo Serbian population centers, while the influences from Pristina focused on maintaining power in Kosovo Albanian enclaves and preventing the Vetevendosje Party from expanding its power base. Understanding the operational environ-ment and critical influencers and stakeholders shaped the FCP’s planning efforts to ensure that paratroopers on the ground did not cast KFOR in a bad light. The sensitive nature of this mission made it vulnerable to competitor information operations campaigns.

Kosovo remained stable throughout the elec-tions due to the KP’s strong presence, international support from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and third-party support from KFOR. Through this unified effort across all thir-ty-eight Kosovar municipalities, the elections were a resounding success for the IiK and further enhanced their legitimacy.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe provided administrative oversight and polling support for Kosovo’s elections by establishing polling

locations in public buildings such as schools and post offices. The KP provided on-site security and security escorts for ballot transportation. The KP’s patrolling presence in each municipality, regardless of ethnic makeup, was the decisive operation. Just as important, host-nation security remained in the lead at all times.

Coordination between KP and KFOR at the nation-al and the municipal levels made for effective security

coverage. This coordination ranged from rehears-al-of-concept drills at KFOR headquarters to munic-ipal Kosovo police chiefs discussing coverage plans during the election.

Planning for potential flash points ensured that all partners understood their role in ensuring security at the polling centers. To ensure shared understanding for all partners, key stakeholders from the European Union Election Observation Mission briefed a combined au-dience of Joint Regional Detachment-North and FCP leadership on their plan for the municipal elections. This brief included their planned polling locations, timelines for voting activities, threats, and potential flash points. This was important in synchronizing all of the FCP’s efforts during the elections, including in the four Kosovo Serbian municipalities assessed as poten-tially volatile.

MNBG-E and FCP collaborated with other KFOR entities including the Kosovo Tactical Reserve Battalion and both Polish and Slovenian army units to provide simultaneous static and roving security patrols. The open dialogue between the KP and FCP ensured that all forces under the tactical control of the FCP understood their area of responsibility during the coverage, thus synchronizing all efforts.

Poland and the United States have consistently partnered during the KFOR mission, and colocation with the Kosovo Tactical Reserve Battalion made for easy integration. The Slovenian partners were a cross-attached company from MNBG-W but quickly

Planning for potential flash points ensured that all part-ners understood their role in ensuring security at the polling centers.

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integrated into the planning and rehearsal timelines. Their knowledge of the area, coupled with the fact that they share a common language with Kosovo Serbians, proved extremely helpful in their seamless integration into FCP operations.

The municipal elections were a great success for Kosovo and helped to strengthen the legitimacy of the IiK. Multinational, multicomponent, and multia-gency cooperation at all levels was the key to KFOR’s successful support to the elections. This operation exemplified the execution of a rapidly developed plan among unified action partners, which simultaneously tested interoperability with numerous NATO part-ners. Placing IiK in the lead proved vital to the success of the mission.

Lessons Learned: Equipment and Opportunities

At the midpoint of the deployment, FCP leadership developed a list of best practices and recommendations for the KFOR FCP mission. This resulted in the follow-ing conclusions:

FCP Headquarters. Having the One System Remote Video Terminal, Raven unmanned aerial vehicles, and other organic equipment that can train mission-essential task list tasks and support intelligence collection is a substantial boon to training and opera-tions. As a field artillery headquarters, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems for training exercises and digital gunnery proved useful in maintaining indi-vidual proficiencies.

S-1 (personnel). The focus for predeployment and the JMRC should be standard operating procedures refinement for documents, trackers, emergency leave, and schools. It is essential to establish mutual under-standing on the context, purposes, and attention to detail behind the deployment manning document, personnel status reports, and leave trackers. An S-1 synch between the FCP, MNGB-E, G-1 at Camp Film City, 21st Theater Support Command or U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) would be beneficial in order to synchronize these efforts. Utilizing the defense theater accounting system (DTAS) will streamline account-ability for all soldiers, Department of Defense civil-ians, contractors, and multinational personnel; ensure DTAS training is completed early in the deployment and the S-1 begins to utilize this system as a daily

battle rhythm event. Furthermore, the tracking of multinational personnel needs some refinement and would improve if KFOR introduced a joint personnel status and casualty report at a multinational/J1/ad-ministrative conference (understanding multination S-1 functions will aid in proper multinational account-ability). The initiation of an administrative conference, similar to the medical conference at Film City, would greatly increase interoperability and enhance the over-all understanding of each nation’s role

S-2. Any form of low-level voice interception would greatly enhance collection plans. Distributed Common Ground System-Army was brought from home station, but there was no Tactical Entity Database access, and such limited SIPR capability at the FCP (two termi-nals) prevents its use. The S-2 cell instead databased information manually. Establishing a good relationship with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance battalion and National Intelligence Center-Pristina extended the breadth and depth of intelligence collec-tion and analysis. Additionally, incorporating a more substantial organized criminal group influence into the AoIR would present a more accurate scenario for train-ing. The organized criminal group actions could still lead to crowd riot-control events and meet theater re-quired training objectives, but the operational context would be more in keeping with Kosovo’s complexity.

S-4 (logistics). Early establishment of battle rhythm proved vital to sustaining the FCP. Dining facility re-ports, combat power reports, and boots-on-ground re-ports are each due weekly to different parties. Meeting the reporting requirements to the correct organization required forging relationships with appropriate liaisons at each. Furthermore, the maintenance challenges of a legacy fleet of vehicles presented additional difficulties. As of August 2017, the average vehicle was eighteen years old and had been driven 234,000 kilometers. The fleet currently sits at 18 percent nonmission capable and periodic breakdowns cause readiness to dip to 30 percent nonmission capable. Progress toward “life-cy-cling” these vehicles slowly continues, and should be prioritized every rotation until the fleet has been com-pletely updated.

S-6 (communications). Due to the existing com-munications architecture, 3-319th AFAR deployed minimal organic automation systems or tactical radios forward. Currently, as part of an active-duty unit

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required to be ready for a no-notice deployment, many of our communications systems have been upgraded to the most recent variant. Getting the organic equip-ment to work in conjunction with provided NATO

equipment can cause many issues unless operated at their most basic level of functionality (single chan-nel, plain text; open-source documents; lower-range frequencies; squelch; etc.). Every layer of security or functionality introduced an increased level of difficulty in regards to interoperability. Methods to overcome this difficulty needed to be planned well in advance and vetted through each organization to ensure full interoperability. The focus for communications was the use of NATO-provided equipment (local cell phones, commercial radios backed by an extensive repeat-er network, and basic older-model military mission command systems) in order to effectively communi-cate across the entirety of MNBG-E. This caused us to adapt to a more simplified primary, alternate, contin-gency, and emergency plan but allowed us to remain effective in our communications. The lack of extensive modern communications did not deter from achieving training objectives with our newer organic equipment. The FCP is the first unit to fully field and use the CS-17 Warfighter Information Network-Tactical INC 2 equipment package within USAREUR. Establishing the INC 2 systems during KFOR will allow future rotations to easily and more effectively integrate their equipment as well. While Kosovo units may only be able to utilize the INC 2 systems on a unit internal level, hopefully in the near future the steps taken to es-tablish INC 2 within USAREUR will allow for a more effective expansion of the communication architecture throughout Kosovo.

Unit ministry team (UMT). The predeployment focus should be scrubbing the Religious Preference Profile, enabling proper time to source and allocate the appropriate religious support for each low-density

faith group. Regional chaplain coverage for Protestant soldiers at Camp Film City is best executed with direct support from the MNGB-E UMT instead of the FCP UMT to ensure even distribution. This is due to the

displacement of FCP personnel between Prizren, Camp Bondsteel, Camp Marechal de Lattre De Tassigny, and Camp Nothing Hill that falls under the FCP chaplain care. The S-6 provision for connectivity to the Religious Support Office would enable the UMT to accomplish administrative tasks instead of burdening other sec-tions for use of theirs. The UMT-led cultural trips were vital in early stages of the deployment as it provided each participant more purpose for the FCP mission in KFOR. Each trip focused on three aspects of Kosovo: local history, area religions, and modern culture and customs. Special care was taken in choosing interpret-ers (Serbian versus Albanian) when visiting holy sites (e.g., monasteries) and locations because of the local tensions that exist.

Chemical. There is limited potential for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations while in Kosovo. Utilizing this time to create and refine CBRN standard operating procedures and conduct classes on detailed troop decontamination or detailed equipment decontamination will enhance the battal-ion’s overall readiness. Ensuring all soldiers deploy with an M-50 mask and joint service lightweight integrated suit technology will aid in completing CBRN training objectives. Be prepared for a heavy additional duty load; unit safety representative, tactical operations cen-ter officer-in-command, historian, etc. The unit status reports can be challenging due to limited SIPR access at Camp Marechal de Lattre De Tassigny (CMLT); reports will need to be completed at Camp Bondsteel.

Medical. The predeployment focus should be ensuring that all provider credentialing is complete. Start working provider credentialing through Landstuhl Regional Medical Center prior to deployment, this is

Special care was taken in choosing interpreters (Serbi-an versus Albanian) when visiting holy sites (e.g., mon-asteries) and locations because of the local tensions that exist.

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crucial for getting U.S. European Command privileges. Gaining access to Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application/Composite Health Care System is another important task; work access through Application Virtualization Hosting Environment in order to have medic and provider access prior to arrival. All patient documentation will need to be completed on paper forms due to the lack of connectivity in the aid station at the CMLT Role 1 facility. The process of providing NIPR access to the Role 1 should be followed up by the inbound FCP units by working with their S-6. Leverage Task Force MED as much as possible; they of-fer pharmacy, x-ray, behavioral health, class VIII supply, laboratory testing, and patient administration. Patient administration is the link to all medical assets available within Kosovo; they are responsible for all scheduling and resourcing any medical need that Task Force MED does not offer. Establishing a combat lifesavers (CLS) battle rhythm will be beneficial in keeping the battalion current and CLS qualified. Inviting partner nations to participate in CLS classes enhances interoperability.

Planning Considerations for Future Efforts in Kosovo

When planning for KFOR, education is a must. This is a rich environment for intelligence collection and knowledge sharing. Understanding the history of Kosovo and the 1999 conflict is important, but equally important is understanding the contemporary environment. Where ethnic tension was a signifi-cant friction point in the past, there is now a Kosovo Nationalist versus Albanian or Serbian Nationalist agenda. Where basic services and utilities were a con-cern five or ten years ago, now there is concern about

political corruption and organized crime. The constant evolution of the Kosovo problem set requires flexibil-ity and adaptability in thinking and in execution of planning efforts.

Despite the complexity of the operational environ-ment, there is ample time for individual and collective training. Depending on the organic mission-essential task list of the FCP headquarters unit, it is possible to maintain currency in many collective tasks. There are small-arms ranges and military operations in urban terrain areas that are available for use as well as an Engagement Skills Trainer at Camp Bondsteel.

The JMRC establishes a great baseline for familiar-ity with some of the fundamentals of peacekeeping in Kosovo, however the focus of the FCP’s daily missions vary widely from that baseline. Leadership at all levels is required to keep soldiers engaged and motivated.

The KFOR provides an excellent proving ground for junior leaders. Squads and platoons may take advan-tage of Kosovo’s permissive environment in planning operations or training exercises. Junior leaders have the freedom to plan and to make mistakes with very limited risk.

This mission, partners, allies, and people in Kosovo present a unique and often overlooked mission for the United States Army. The serene landscape and grow-ing infrastructure make Kosovo seem like a modern country—and in many ways this is true. However, the deep-rooted complexity of the environment have chal-lenged military and political leaders for nearly twenty years. As Army leaders who may be the next ones tapped to lead a forward command post or battle group for KFOR, it is imperative to understand the delicate nature of the stable, but fragile Kosovo.

Notes1. “UN Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal, January–Decem-

ber 1999” (New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs, December 1998), 28, accessed 27 July 2018, https://relief-web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FYU99.pdf. Around five hundred thousand refugees from the 1992–95 war in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina faced “extremely difficult circumstanc-es” in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The country was ravaged by war and economic sanctions, and at least half of the refugees required humanitarian assistance. In Kosovo, the fighting had displaced about three hundred thousand persons, most of whom received some form of assistance. The UN High Commissioner for Refugee’s 1999 planning budget for Yugoslavia totaled US$60

million dollars, with US$35 million designated for Serbia and Mon-tenegro, and the rest for Kosovo.

2. “Kosovan Death Toll Is Its Argument for Independence,” The Telegraph, 30 Nov 2009, accessed 6 August 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6692257/Kosovan-death-toll-is-its-argument-for-independence.html

3. UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999) [The situation relating Kosovo], 10 June 1999, accessed 27 July 2018, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1244.

4. “The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo’s Serbs” (report, Berlin/Pristina: European Stabili-ty Initiative, 7 June 2004).

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5. Kosovo Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Infor-mation and Developments (updated reprint, Washington, DC: Business International Publications, 2016), 56.

6. “Serbia’s Neighbors Accept Kosovo,” BBC World News, 19 March 2008, accessed 10 July 2018, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7304488.stm.

7. “Kosovo: The Jerusalem of Serbia,” Washington Post (web-site), last updated July 1999, accessed 10 August 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/over-view/kosovo.htm?noredirect=on.

8. “Serbia’s Neighbors Accept Kosovo.”9. First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization

of Relations, Kos.-Serb., 19 April 2013, http://www.kryeminis-tri-ks.net/repository/docs/FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCI-PLES_GOVERNING_THE_NORMALIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_2013_BRUSSELS_en.pdf. It is commonly referred to as the 2013 Brussels Agreement.

10. Ibid.11. Carlotta Gall, “How Kosovo Was Turned Into Fertile Ground

for ISIS,” New York Times (website), 21 May 2016, accessed 10 August 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/world/europe/how-the-saudis-turned-kosovo-into-fertile-ground-for-isis.html.

12. “Kosovo Freezes Key EU Deal on Autonomy for Serb Communities,” Deutsche Welle, 10 November 2015, accessed 26 July 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/

kosovo-freezes-key-eu-deal-on-autonomy-for-serb-communi-ties/a-18842213.

13. “Kosovo to Form Army 15 Yrs after War, Serbia Reacts,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 11 March 2014, accessed 10 August 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20140313024305/http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/164319/kosovo-to-form-army-15-yrs-af-ter-war-serbia-reacts.html.

14. “Kosovo to Have Army by 2019,” noinvite.com, 5 March 2014, accessed 26 July 2018, https://www.novinite.com/articles/158657/Kosovo+to+Have+Army+by+2019.

15. Edona Peci, “Kosovo to Have Armed Forces by 2019,” Balkan Insight, 4 March 2014, accessed 10 Au-gust 2018, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-decides-to-form-kosovo-armed-forces.

16. Ibid.17. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken [Netherlands Ministry

of Foreign Affairs], Memorandum to the president of the House of Representatives of the States General, “Betreft Nederland gastland voor de Kosovo rechtbank [Regarding Netherlands as the host country for the Kosovo court],” 15 January 2016, accessed 10 August 2018, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/01/15/kamerbrief-over-ned-erland-gastland-voor-kosovo-rechtbank/kamerbrief-over-neder-land-gastland-voor-kosovo-rechtbank.pdf.

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