Yellow River Conservancy in the Late Qing: A Look at Bureaucracy, Finance, and Engineering

Gavin O. Grisham

History 499: Creating Modern China

March 11th, 2015

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The Yellow River flows through six Chinese provinces on its way to the Bo Hai sea in

North East China, its real name is the Huang He. Huang means yellow in Romanized Chinese,

given to the river due to its high sediment count and yellowish color. My goal is to look

specifically at the river and its management in the late Qing. Each province faced varying issues

with the river, and each was affected by another’s actions on the river. This play between

province and river, and province and empire, provides a larger context with which to view

Yellow River conservancy. The structure affecting river conservancy can most easily be broken

down into three parts, bureaucracy, finance, and engineering. First, Bureaucratic structure

informed the availability of financing for much of the work along the river. Secondly, the

financial system dictated the engineering projects that could be undertaken. Thirdly, the

engineering of river controls was a reflection of the bureaucratic and financial restraints that

bound it. Often, insufficient funds produced poorly engineered embankments and run off canals

that did not provide permanent, or even reliable protection from the river. This approach will

also provide insight into state and society in the late Qing, through the lens of river conservancy.

Historiography:

Work on river conservancy in the late Qing is scarce, as it is not a topic focused on in the

widely accepted history of the Qing. Randal A. Dodgen's Controlling the Dragon: Confucian

Engineers and the Yellow River in Late Imperial China, is the only major work. This text takes a

historical approach, looking at the river through time. Dodgen's early interpretation is followed

by a second part that looks at flooding along the river in the 1840's. He too found that financial

issues plagued the conservancy system, yet he does not explore river conservancy explicitly in

the late 1880's and early 1890's. In his analysis of the floods in the 1840's, he focuses specifically

on a serious of floods and on the politics, environment, and technology surrounding them. While

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he looks at some similar causes as I, his focus is on a period almost fifty years prior to mine, and

does not include finance, or specifically the bureaucratic structure as main topic points. The state

of river conservancy in the 1880's and early 1890's reflected a system that had been neglected for

an additional fifty years past Dodgen's focus, and in a time when China faced much greater

pressures from abroad.

The Yellow River and its conservancy has been an area of great issue and debate. During

the late Qing, the river proved hard to control. Regional boards such as the Yellow River Works

had some oversight, however much of the river conservancy undertaken in the late Qing was

uncoordinated. Provinces that experienced major flooding from the Ho were key to Chinese

success, as well as the success of the dynasty. For if the Qing could not protect its people from a

natural and internal threat like the Yellow River, how could it stop the ever advancing external

threat of European imperialism? Historically, the Yellow river was the “cradle of Chinese

Civilization,” the mother river. It provided rich soils for farming and waters for travel and trade.

It is also the main waterway in six Chinese provinces. The provinces around it thrived as the

Chinese civilization grew. The erratic course changes taken by the Huang He proved hard to

control, and flooding along the river was common. The combination of silt build up through the

river’s course, as well as a relatively high population density, lead to increased flood danger in

Shantung. About 300 miles of the Huang He’s 3,000 mile journey lies in Shantung, making it a

good place to look for answers in understanding the larger issues of river controls along the

Huang He. Because there are 600 miles of river bank in Shantung, it’s flooding was partially

affected by provinces upstream, and due to this, had to work inter-provincially. The amount of

primary information available about flooding in Shantung is relatively high, and gives us a

glimpse into life along the river in the late Qing.

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BEREAUCRACY

The Bureaucratic structure present in the late Qing provided a mix of coordinated and

uncoordinated river conservancy efforts that lead to both success and failure. Each province was

affected by the actions of their governors, local and municipal leaders, and the favor the imperial

authorities. If it was decided that a portion of the river should dredged in Honan, the silt could

make its way down river into Shantung where some portions may not have been flowing at an

acceptable rate. This could increase the sedimentation rate, shallow the river bed, and make

embankments inadequate. In other words, there was a trickle down affect when it came to river

conservancy. In a show of provincial cooperation In April of 1889, “Wu Ta ch’eng, who was

then director general, Governor-General Li Hung-chang, Ch’ang Yao Governor of Shantung, and

he himself the Governor of Honan, joined in asking the Emperor to send officers to survey and

map out the course of the Yellow River, in Shantung, Chihli, and Honan.”1 The Emperor

approved the plan, and “I-shun-tang, Expectatnt Taotai, was detailed to superintend the work.”2

The work was completed, and the maps and other details were signed by Li Hung-chang and

Chang Yao (governor of Shantung), and sent back to the Emperor. This is an important marker,

It showed high ranking officials from three large provinces pooling their collective sway in order

to convince the Emperor to carry out a mapping of the Yellow River. This also points to the

power governors had over the river's course through their province. In other words, a province

could suffer greatly in the hands of a disinterested governor. In this case, provincial cooperation

lead to imperial action. The Bureaucratic structure was successful at effectively garnering

attention from the Emperor, even if it was not for the construction of any physical embankments.

1 “The Yellow River” The Chinese Times, 1890.2 Ibid.,

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In another memorial, the governor of Shantung speaks to flaws in the bureaucracy,

showing that cooperation between government entities often didn't occur at all. Chang-Yao

described the Yellow River as manageable. “At His-ning where the river enters China Proper,

and from thence to Ninghsia, its waters are quite manageable and are carried off by canals and

used for irrigation purposes.”3 Yet he goes on to say, “the natural result of all this accumulation

of water during its long course is the turbulent and raging river which causes such damage in

Shantung. This damage is to the insufficiency of human efforts and the lack of material resources

which have hitherto been employed in averting it.”4 The accumulation of water, according to

Chang-Yao, is natural, and not due to provincial shortcomings further up the river. However, he

feels that the naturally swollen and raging river in Shantung does damage to the people due to

negligence. Here is an example of a lack of provincial, and even imperial cooperation. Chang-

Yao is blaming a lack of human effort for the flooding, a phenomenon that cannot be contained

by divided interests. The fractured bureaucracy was not operating in a way that could provide a

structure with which to inform comprehensive river management. The issue of a faltering

bureaucratic structure can again be seen in a dispute involving the transport of salt after flooding

in Shantung.

A flood in Shantung caused the salt “heaps to be overflowed and ruined”5 Salt was an

important tool in cooking, in preservation, and in trade. The merchants had to petition the

governor to ask for permission to buy from other provinces, which they had been doing in the

past, as flooding was common. The merchants of Chihli had been selling salt to Shantung,

however they felt that their own supply was in jeopardy, and that damage would be done to the

3 “Chang-Yao on the Yellow River,” The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, 9th and 10th of February, 1890, 123.4 Ibid.,5 The Chinese Times, Local and General from Shih Pao, Jan. 15th, 1887, 165.

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Chang-Lu salt business, and the people. These Chihli merchants petitioned the salt

commissioner in hopes to resolve the issue.6 This article tells us a flood in Shantung ruined salt

stores, and that it was not the first time this had occurred. When short on salt, Shantung would

petition to buy from merchants in Chihli, yet it seems there was no standardized protocol on how

to trade the salt, and a number of petitions to different commissioners had to be made. the

governor had to be called on to approve the buying, then the numbers in the reserve were called

into question, and the commissioner of salt had to be called upon.The salt commissioner, in this

case, was the highest authority on the matter. This is telling in the movement of a resource like

salt between provinces in a time of emergency during and after flooding. There was not a solid

system in place to deal with the issues, no command structure that informed procedure. Further

inefficiencies in the bureaucracy can be seen in an edict from the same year, 1890.

The need for validation from the imperial level slowed the rate at which decisions and

actions could be made at the provincial and local levels. Censor Chou Tien-lin of Chihli

suggested that breaches be opened along the river so as to drain water from the capital. His

suggestion was to be looked over by the Board of Works, the Metropolitan Governor, and the

Municipal Board.7 Furthermore, theses three entities were to "report before taking any action."8

That is, they were to report to the throne what they had decided was best, and to wait for an ok to

go ahead and execute their plan. Here, the Censor made a suggestion to the throne, which then

called upon the three different boards to decide on a plan of action. The decision making power

lay in the hands of the imperial government, attempting to fix problems at the provincial level. It

seems that because the flooding had reached the city, the metropolitan and municipal authorities

were called on. The imperial authorities called on the Board of Works to provide their

6 “The Yellow River,” The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, July 30th, 1887, 635.7 Ibid.,8 Ibid.,

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engineering capabilities, in cooperation with the urban authorities. Edicts from Shantung, Chihli,

Kiangsu, and Honan all mention actions by the Board of Works. The Board of Works was an

entity that spanned provinces, and clearly served a great purpose in dealing with river

infrastructure. This tells me that imperial authorities would call upon the board to address issues

in cooperation with local and urban officials, all under the larger umbrella of imperial authority.

The involvement of multiple agencies, and constant sign offs from the imperial level slowed

down the process of actually completing the works. The need for validation from the imperial

level showed downsides in the bureaucratic structure. In a contradictory approach, a report from

1890 showed a hands off, single entity approach to river conservancy that relied on strong

initiative from provincial Governors.

Shantung had experienced major flooding throughout the 1880's, and was suffering a

similar fate in 1890. The Emperor responded with vigor, declaring that "he had been much

troubled in spirit by the repeated floods which have occurred in the region."9 Chang Yao was

urged by the Emperor to use the spirit and knowledge acquired over his years looking after the

river to complete the works decided upon. Putting full faith in Chang Yao, the Emperor asked

him to do what he felt was best, and to report to the supreme Government with the estimated

costs incurred.10 Instead of signing off before the work started, the Emperor gave the go ahead.

"His action will be in no way fettered by instructions from Peking..."11 In contrast to the edict

from Chihli demanding multiple government agencies to work in tandem, the Emperor wished

that "in order to avoid the evils of divided responsibility, no officer will be sent from the capital

to join him in the superintendence of the undertaking."12 The only request from Peking was that

9 Ibid.,10 Ibid.,11 Ibid.,12 “A fresh Budget for the Yellow River Works,” The Chines Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, November 15th, 1890, 731.

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Chang Yao must clear and open the river channel, dredge the main bed, and place embankments

along the North shore.13 These requests were inline with the most practiced conservancy

techniques. Here, the Emperor stepped back and allowed Chang Yao to operate somewhat

autonomously, not asking for specific budget requirements or oversight, while relying on him to

diligent and honorable in his tasks.

Further evidence points to provincial governors as leaders in actually organizing and

completing the river works. In an abstract from the Peking Gazettes, there is a dispute in Kinagsu

as to whether a dam should be removed and placed further down the river. Those above the dam

had their irrigation canals choked by silt build up, while those below the dam did not want the

silt to move into their canals.14 It was decided that new sluices would be built to mitigate the

issues, and a new dam would be built in a more favorable position. "In conclusion memorialist

states that the plans for conservancy...will be left to the Governor of Kiangsu."15 Again, once the

imperial authorities gave the ok, the coordination and completion of the work was left up to

Provincial leaders. In these cases, the bureaucratic structure started with the Emperor, but flowed

directly to provincial leaders instead of an imperial entity like the Board of Works, or the Board

of Revenue. It also shows the reliance from the Imperial level on hard working, diligent

governors. The system relies on the governor of Kiangsu to be fully engaged in the project.

The bureaucracy of the late Qing began with the Emperor, as he was the financial center.

Provincial and municipal governors, local leaders and gentry could petition to the Emperor. In

terms of river conservancy, all of the petitions shared the characteristic of needing something.

This need shows that the power to fund and approve projects did in fact largely come from the

13 The North China Herald, . S. C. & C. Gazette, June 18th, 1886, 639.14 Ibid.,15 Ibid.,

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imperial level. Directly below this upper crust were the regional boards, the Board of Revenue

and the Board of Works. They were funnels from which the imperial authorities spread funds and

materials. They also relied heavily on provincial level officials to manage and complete the

works. The Board of Revenue had to be reported to, and could not hand out funds, it seems,

without imperial permission, their power limited by that of the Emperor. Chang Yao relied on

the Board of Revenue to supply the funding, which placed a limit on his power. In between these

powerful regional boards and provincial governors like Chang Yao, was the Yellow River

Works. It had a yearly budget, and could spend it as it saw fit. The Yellow River works acted as

a distribution point of funds from the Board of Revenue to provincial level projects along the

Yellow River. However, this neat bureaucratic structure did not always function as such. It is

clear provincial Governors carried great responsibility in completing conservancy works along

the river. The Emperor controlled the Board of Revenue, which gave funds to the Yellow River

works, both of which informed the financing available to provincial governors. The bureaucracy,

starting with the Emperor and the political and economic climate, dictated the amount of money

set aside for river conservancy.

Finance:

The Yellow River Works was not unlike the Board of Works, or the Board of Revenue. It

spanned provinces with the goal of managing river conservancy along the Yellow Rive. However

it did differ in that it was informed by the two larger boards. In an edict from 1890, we can see

how the Board of Revenue influenced the Yellow River Works. The Board of Revenue realized

that each year the Yellow River Works was spending more then it was provisioned. Hsu Chen-

wei, commissioner of the Yellow River, "proposed that the sum of Tls. 600,000 and Tls. 75,000

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extra for current expenses, should be made a yearly grant, irrespective of the state of the river.."16

The extra 75,000 Taels were to be granted regardless, even if actual expenses were far lower, or

far greater. From my research it is clear that Tls. 75,000 hardly made a difference when millions

of Tls. were what was needed. The Yellow River Works was greatly underfunded, its budget

decided upon at the imperial level.

The funding issues from the imperial level hindered the province’s abilities to build

conservancy works large enough to be greatly effective. Many in China did not see the river

works as hugely important issues. A Minister Chang Tze-wan, wrote to the throne complaining

of the Yellow River commissioner Hsu and his overly large expenditures.17 “Hsu’s account of the

river work expenses was rather large; it is a great deal to spend Tis. 600,000.”18 Minister Chang

Tze-wan also requested that the amount of 600,000 never be surpassed again. His complaint was

directed towards a regional entity that looked over the provinces in which the Yellow River runs.

In the opposite of how western onlookers, and Chang Yao felt, Tze-wan felt that the river works

were too great an expenditure, even though the floods continued. His request was a response to a

rescript titled, “A Fresh Budget for the Yellow River Works”, published a month prior. Chang-

Yao and his allies, fighting for larger budgets, faced those in the bureaucracy who did not see

the money as well spent. It is possible that this was the reason that some of the relief funding was

given in the form of loans.19 In a report from the Peking Gazettes, an official in a flooded town

“asks the loan from the Board of Revenue of Tls. 81,000, to be repaid in instalments extending

over 8 years, and commencing next spring.”20 Loans for relief efforts points to a cash strapped

16 Ibid.,17 Ibid.,18 Arthur William Hummel, Eminent Chinese of The Ching Period: 1644-1912, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Offic: 1944-1945), 723-724.19 “The Yellow River”, The North China Herald: (s, C & C Gazette, Outports), 10th of February, 1886, 146. 20 Ibid.,

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Qing government, or an official that was unsuccessful at convincing the Emperor or the Board of

Revenue to grant funds outright.

In an 1890 memorial, Chang Yao discussed the discrepancy between needed, and

procurable funds. Once again, Chang-Yao asked for the raising and strengthening of the

embankments along both sides of the river. He also called for “excavation of canals between the

dykes and embankments for the purpose of draining off the surplus waters into the T’u-hai

river.”21 This memorial also called for the construction of embankments, and the dredging of the

river at the point of its entering into the sea. This was important to Chang-Yao, and to Shantung,

because if the outlet was allowed to silt up enough, the mouth would change direction and cause

more problems. The river needed to be controlled, but the expense of such works was again a

factor. Yao estimated the “funds required for this year’s operations amount to Tls. 2,885,000.”22

A number that far exceed the funding given to the Yellow River Works each year. This is in line

with our understanding of underfunding, and the ability of provincial governors to attempt to

bypass most of the bureaucracy and appeal directly to the Emperor. The funds were urgently

needed, even though it was unclear “whether the present increase in the height of the

embankments [would] enable them to withstand the force of the stream, and render further

additions unnecessary.”23 Because of this uncertainty, Yao estimated the costs for 1891 to be Tls

1,400,000.24 The massive outlays were hard to pass by the Board of Revenue, and Chang-Yao

asked the throne directly to order the Board of Revenue to pay out at least part of the sum

needed.25 These requests came in a year when the Board of Revenue gave an outlay of Tls.

21 “River Works”, The Chinese Times, Abstract of Peking Gazettes, December 13th, 1890, 793. 22 Ibid., 23 “ A Fresh Budget for the Yellow River Works,” The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, November 15, 1890, 731.24 Ibid.,25 "Yellow River Works Entrusted To Chang Yao", The Chinese Times, abstract from the Peking Gazettes, February 1st, 1890, 73.

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600,000 to the Yellow River Works, a fraction of the estimated costs.26 The urgency of his

requests both in 1886, and in 1890, point towards a dire situation. The Yellow River, despite

Chang-Yao’s best efforts, was overcoming the improvements to the works surrounding it in

Shantung. The budget constraints placed on the river works meant that each year’s insufficient

sum was wasted due to its inability to effectively stem the river. 1887 saw massive flooding from

the Yellow River that lead to the loss of over 900,000 lives, and the displacement of additional

two million Chinese.27 And yet, even in 1890, procuring sufficient funds required appeals

directly to the Emperor. Shantung was suffering from an inability to properly fund its river

works.

The Yellow River was not the only one to experience major flooding, the Yungting also

flooded regularly. A brief look at the Yungting gives a glimpse into the tactics that were used to

procure emergency funds when financing was absolutely critical. In an article from the Local and

General, titled, "calling for more Money", the throne reported on its actions.28 In response to the

call for more money, the throne ordered Tls. 100,000 to be taken from the Kiangsu customs

revenues, and be sent to the Yungting River Commissioners.29 The Lieut. Governor was called

on to procure the funds from the Kiangsu customs, so that it could be transferred to the river

Commissioners. The report notes that this was at great dismay and cost to the government, and

that the money would have been spent in other areas. This want for funds in emergency

situations showed that funds needed to permanently avoid such situations were hard to come by.

26 "Clearing out of the Yun Tsao River", The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, July 26th, 1890, 474.27 “Proposed Yellow River Works in Shantung,” The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazette, 21st of March, 1890. 28 Ibid.,29 Ibid.,

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Chang Yao's decree to the throne in February of 1890 shed light on why funds needed for

conservancy could not always be procured. "If the most complete measures of precaution have

failed to ensure the safety of the river in the past, it can scarcely be expected that an economical

policy, which trusts to weak and slender embankments...will meet with much success."30 With

past economic policy not favoring heavy river conservancy spending, how can the throne expect

their weak embankments to hold? Chang Yao is pointing to a fundamental problem in financing,

that extends from the bureaucratic need for the imperial government to control funds. This

control, and lack luster policy towards river conservancy made Chang Yao feel that "he had been

greatly hampered by want of funds, and [only] able to carry out absolutely necessary repairs."31

Financing, or the lack there of, was almost always a direct consequence of bureaucratic policy. In

all cases, provincial leaders like Chang Yao felt there were never enough funds for river

conservancy. The Yellow River Work's annual budget of Tls. 600,00 was not sufficient enough

to cover outlays, that just in Shantung, were estimated to be Tls. 1,400,000 in 1891 alone. The

discrepancy between the want of funds, and the provision of funds, began at the imperial level.

Chang Yao believed, as was mentioned above, that the perpetuation of unfavorable economic

policy held funding back. In my own analysis, its easy to see that a regions productivity, and

ability to provide tax revenues were severely hindered by the destruction of floods. This positive

feedback loop made the issue worse, as emergency funds were transfer payments from one form

of tax revenue to another. The financial climate surrounding river conservancy along the Yellow

River dictated the engineering projects capable of being built.

ENGINEERING:

30 "Calling for more Money", The Chinese Times, Local and General from Shih Pao, January 14th, 1891, 57. 31 Ibid.,

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In order to tackle the issue of river conservancy, we must understand the most used river

conservancy engineering techniques at the time. Embankments seemed to be the most popular

form of river control under the late Qing. Most often the embankments were large earthen

structures that required vast amounts of dirt. To accomplish the formidable task of forming such

embankments, vast amounts of labor were needed. A memorial from 1891 in Shantung depicts

one of the undertakings. 6,000 laborers were engaged, and Tls. 20,000 worth of stone had to be

brought in.32 In another memorial from 1891, Chang-Yao, the then governor of Shantung,

reported that the building of embankments along the Yellow River had seen one billion, three

hundred million square feet of earth moved since they had been originally constructed in 1881.

This volume of dirt speaks to the labor, time, and financing needed to build such massive

structures. An article from 1887 gives us a glimpse at how breaches in these embankments were

shored up. A breach 300 feet wide and 30 feet deep was patched with “20,000 willow piles and

30,000 jute stalk bundles.”33 The materials available for the construction of the embankments

were often less than favorable. “Stone must be brought from a great distance, and willows and

other trees of which fascines might be made are not grown to any extent, so there are only millet

stalks to be had.”34 In China at this time labor was plentiful, technology and expert knowledge

was not. Furthermore, the use of cheap, stop-gap materials reflected the financial and political

climate of the time.

Shantung was an especially susceptible province in terms of flooding, making the

engineering of river controls especially tricky. Here the flow was swollen with water from

tributaries. In Honan, the portion of the river which flows through it is only 300 li long (a li is

roughly 1/3 of a mile). Along those 300 li were seven guard stations. These stations functioned

32 Frederic Wakeman, The Fall Of Imperial China (New York: New York, The Free Press, 1977), 190.33 Ibid.,34 “destruction by floods”, The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazette, 1887, 586.

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as lookouts for breaches along the river. The faster a breach could be responded to, the less

damage it could cause. Along with the guard stations were stores of “millet stalks, poles, ropes,

and other materials managed by the river authorities.”35 The stores provided the materials with

which to help the lookout stations mitigate flood damages. With budgetary restraints a constant

factor, Honan had a relatively small area of river to patrol. In Shantung, the Yellow River flowed

for over 300 miles. Shantung also relied on each lookout station to oversee 50 to 100 li of river,

where as in Honan, the maximum one station had to overlook was 42 li.36 There were also “only

three depots for the storage of materials.”37 Similarly backwards, “the annual sum allotted for the

maintenance of the Shantung portion of the river, which is 900 li in length, is Tls. 380,000, while

for the Honan part, which is only 300 li in length, an annual outlay of Tls. 500,000 is allowed.”38

The outlay for Shantung proved insufficient In 1886, and an additional Tls. 110,00 was granted.

The embankments were all raised, and “fifteen million catties of millet stalk [had] already been

used.”39 (a cattie is roughly 1.1 pounds). In order to do such work, 3,500 additional hands were

hired, amounting to Tls. 9,000 monthly in wages.40 In 1887, Shantung was busy trying to shore

up its banks, spending large sums and employing thousands to complete the task. Their efforts

were strong, however the use of cheap resources and labor once again proved to be inadequate.

For calls in 1890 for even larger outlays of money were made.41 Shantung experienced some of

the worst flooding, as it carried a large portion of the Yellow River. Its governor from 1886-

1891, Chang Yao was an important figure in River conservancy. Shantung’s experience with the

Yellow River provides a closer look at one province’s efforts to skirt financial limitations.

35 Ibid.,36 Ibid.,37 Ibid.,38 “The Peiho Floods,” The Chinese Times, August 2nd , 1890, 483. 39 Ibid.,40 "A Fresh Budget For the Yellow River Works, 7th of November 1890, The Chinese Times, 731.41 "Chang Yao on the Yellow River" The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, February 9th, 1890, 123.

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In an 1886 memorial, Chang Yao laid out an ambitious plan to save Shantung, and other

provinces from the destructive forces of the Yellow River. This memorial demonstrates that

tactics used at the time. Chang Yao, who had no formal training in any water science, was

unsurprisingly tasked with weighing conservancy options. In 1886 Chang Yao surveyed the

river. “…He found that the action of the water had cut away at the banks during the last three or

four years, still the channel [was] from 500-600 feet wide, with a varying depth of from 20 to 40

feet.”42 He also examined the T’u- hai, “into which the overflow from the breaches that occur

year after year in the bank of the Yellow River emptied itself.”43 He found that areas of the T’u-

hai were too narrow to contain the water. This allowed flooding to spread eastward, the result

being that “half the population had migrated.”44 In order to remedy the situation, Chang-Yao and

other memorialists agreed that most important goal was to distribute the water. “This it is

proposed to do by connecting the Yellow and the T’u-hai rivers, at a place below Ch’I river, by

building embankments 10 li in length, and then forming a connection between the two

rivers…”45 In order to clear the channel for use, it was proposed that the T’u-hai be dredged for a

distance of 280 li, and to a uniform depth of 15 feet, and to a width of 240 feet. In addition, 12

sluices would need to be built. The connection between the Yellow River and the T’u-hai was

supposed to help mitigate Yellow River flooding. By channeling excess water into the T’u hai,

which itself would receive embankment improvements, water would be siphoned off. The area

around the mouth of the T’u hai was uninhabited, making it a better place for flooding to occur.

Chang Yao “…came to the conclusion that while Shantung would be relived of its troubles were

42“Closing a Breach,” The Chinese Times, 1887, 587. 43 "Floods in Chihli", The Chinese Times, abstract from the Peking Gazette, August 1st, 1890, 540.44 “The Director of the Yellow River Works,” The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, January 10th, 1891, 23. 45 Ibid.,

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the Yellow River brought back to its old course, there [were] inoperable difficulties in the

way.”46

Again in 1890 Chang Yao proposed further engineering changes to the Yellow River in

Shantung. He asked that the Lin-ho embankment, which ran along the North end of the river,

and protected "three district cities and over 1,100 villages,"47 be properly repaired and

strengthened. In addition, the Chin embankment, which ran for 114 li and protected thirteen

district cities in Chihli and Shantung needed great repair.48 Because the flooding could reach the

Grand Canal, which was a highly important trade route, he also proposed the construction of a

new embankment 23 li in length that would act as a buffer against flood waters. These were

minor proposals compared to the repairs needed along the 330 li long main embankment.49

Because these embankments could only handle so much water, Chang Yao proposed the

construction of "20 locks and water gates for carrying off a portion of the water during the

freshet seasons."50 In all, Chang Yao wanted virtually the whole length of the river's

embankments to be worked on, not to mention the widening of the river so as not to be below, or

exceed 95 chang in width.51 Keeping the river within these width parameters was a way of

controlling the speed of the water. If the river was allowed to widen too much, the flow rate

would decrease enough to allow sediments to precipitate out. The techniques employed to

manage the river were diverse, yet they all relied upon the political will to finance their

construction and maintenance.

46 Ibid.,47 Ibid.,48 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Huang He floods", accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1483621/Huang-He-floods.49 Ibid.,50 "Chang Yao on the Yellow River" The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, February 9th, 1890, 123.

51 Ibid.,

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Ting Pao-chen held the post of Governor of Shantung from 1867-1876.52 He too was

known for his hard work in preventing floods, having seen the destruction they caused. In one

case, an out port from the North China Herald described the journey of a general Mesny,

depicting the destruction that occurred in 1874 in Shantung. The correspondent describes flooded

villages, houses filled with silt, and destroyed city walls. The flooding had been devastating, and

governor Pao-chen was hard at work fixing the breaches. “…laborers [were] busy preparing

immense bundles of millet stalks..”53 The author describes the millet stalks as being driven into

the breach with sand bags and loose soil. This source is writing eleven years after the incident,

however his descriptions are backed up by evidence from Chang-Yao’s memorials and abstracts

from the Peking Gazettes describing the closing of breaches. Shantung’s champion of water

conservancy before Chang-yao was Ting Pao-chen. Using similar tactics employed by Chang-

yao, even Pao-chen’s efforts, that he was later memorialized for, did not serve as long-term river

controls. Ting Pao-Chen and Chang Yao's efforts were separated by 20 years or more, yet they

were very similar. This speaks to the lack of change in the area of river conservancy during the

late Qing, engineering had barely progressed, as well as the political climate towards river

conservancy. Both faced the same bureaucratic problems, having to on their own initiative

propose sweeping conservancy improvements.

State and Society during the late Qing:

River conservancy tells us a lot about state and society in the late Qing. The state was

crumbling, its inadequacies set the stage for the 1911 revolution. The 1911 revolution was the

creation of something radically new in China, a form of government, an organization of society

that was far different than any before it. The late Qing was a society and a state caught between

52 Ibid.,53 Ibid.,

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the ancient and the new, a orientation that did not serve either purpose well. As populations

grew, and urban centers became more important, river conservancy techniques did little to meet

new challenges. The same earthen constructions poorly designed lined river banks that

threatened to overflow. Those in the upper crust of the Qing bureaucracy failed to create a

political or economic climate that was conducive to effective river conservancy improvements.

There was no incentive system to bring in knowledge in conservancy, as provincial leaders like

Chang Yao, with no formal scientific training, had to as best they could meet the challenges

presented by controlling the Yellow River.

The state's power came in its ability at the imperial level to control the distribution of

funds. The inability of the state to properly fund river conservancy projects was reflective of its

stagnate tax base. This highlighted the Qing state's inability to recognize that proper spending on

river conservancy would create stability in regions that could provide a large stream of tax

revenue. The lack of political will at the top stymied the financing available for river

conservancy, which halted the growth of engineering capability, a positive feedback loop of

inadequacy was formed. The Sino-French war of 1884-1885 perfectly illustrates the inadequate

response by the Qing state. A fractured military structure failed to provide enough war ships in

defense of Canton and the main arsenal in Foochow, as military leaders disagreed on the right

course of action.54 The Qing state was unable to organize, finance, and execute on a scale large

enough to respond to the wholly internal threat of a raging Yellow River, let alone the wholly

external threat of a European aggressor. A state incapable of responding to its countries growing

needs could be seen in the society of the time.

54 Ibid.,

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Societal norms under the Qing still championed traditional Chinese learning. The prestige

of gaining a widely coveted government position was entrenched in the society. This

incentivized the studying of classic works, pushing the best and the brightest away from the far

less prestigious pursuits of western engineering, technology, and state building. River

conservancy techniques of old were being recycled and reused, the incentives for society to

change were not adequate. The plugging of breaches in river banks with bundles of dry millet

stocks is a metaphor for the societal woes of the late Qing. The millet stalks were largely

ineffective, providing fleeting protection that lasted long enough for more earth to be piled

against the bank. Social unrest was driven by the people's ability to see that the Qing were

faltering. China was not roaring ahead like Japan, and it was conceding to the West. The Qing

society held onto old ways as the future crept in.

Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources:

“The Yellow River” The Chinese Times, 1890.

This report by Ni Wen-wei, director general of the Yellow River, is a report to the throne. It reports that their efforts the previous April had been met with Imperial approval, and a survey map of the Yellow River had been created. It is informing the throne that the work had been followed through on, and the officials that singed the survey maps.

Grisham 20

“Chang-Yao on the Yellow River,” Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, 9th and 10th of February, 1890.

This is a memorial directly from Chang Yao, Governor of Shantung. This memorial consists of a number of suggestions for repairs along the portion of the Yellow River that lies in Shantung. This source offers good information on the Governor's wishes for river conservancy in Shantung, and gives a glimpse at some of the engineering employed. This report discusses in depth the issues that plague the river, and possible fixes.

The Chinese Times, Local and General from Shih Pao, Jan. 15th, 1887, 165.

This article is an untitled piece from the Local and General. It discusses the ruin of salt heaps due to flooding. These salt heaps appear to be the way salt was stored, as it mentions that Shantung had to purchase salt from Chihli. The short blurb discusses the process of retrieving more salt, and the consequences faceted by Chihli if it sold too much of its own stores.

"Floods in Chihli", The Chinese Times, abstract from the Peking Gazette. August 1st, 1890, pg. 540.

This is an Edict from the abstracts of the Peking Gazette. It is the reporting of a receipt of a memorial from Censor Chou Tien-lin, in which he suggests the opening of breaches to allow flood waters to drain. It shows the different government entities called upon to reach a decision in the matter of flooding.

"Yellow River Works Entrusted To Chang Yao." The Chinese Times, February 1st, 1890, pg. 73.

This article discusses the trust put in Chang Yao to complete the furnishing and repairing of river banks along the Yellow River in Shantung. It gives detail on the Emperors feelings towards the matter, and gives information on how the works were divvied up. It is also an example of an article that points to the shuffling of responsibility from Imperial, to provincial authorities.

"Clearing out of the Yun Tsao River", The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, July 26th, 1890, Pg. 474.

This article gives further evidence to the shifting of responsibility onto the shoulders of provincial officials. The memorial states the that Governor of Kiangsu was to be left with the responsibility of carrying out the conservancy work. It also gives detail on the kind of works being undertaken on rivers other than the Yellow River.

"A Fresh Budget For the Yellow River Works, 7th of November 1890, Chinese Times, page 731.

This report is a good source of data on the kinds of finances available to the Yellow River Works. It gives figures in yearly totals that are to be given to the Yellow River Works on behalf of the Board of Revenue.

“River Works,” Abstract of Peking Gazettes, The Chinese Times, December 13th, 1890. 793.

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This short blurb from the Peking Gazettes is a complaint by a Minister Chang Tze-wan on the budget given to the Yellow River works. He finds the amount of Tls. 600,000 to be too much, an instance where an official did not see money spent on river conservancy as well used.

“Destruction by floods,” Abstract from the Peking Gazette, The Chinese Times, 1887, 586.

This short report indicates that a loan payment is being negotiated between a local official of a recently flooded town and the Board of Revenue who is the lender. The official was attempting to push back loan payments, giving a good description of what occurred between the Board of Revenue and local officials upon disasters like flooding.

“Proposed Yellow River Works in Shantung,” The Chinese Times: Abstract from the Peking Gazette, 21st of March, 1890.

This report is written by Chang Yao. It gives great detail on proposed works along the Yellow River in Shantung. He lays out a plan of dredging, embankment building, and more. A rich source for types of projects being proposed at the time, and the work of Chang Yao specifically.

"Calling for more Money", The Chinese Times, Local and General from Shih Pao, January 14th, 1891. page 57.

This piece from the Local and General gives insight, and further evidence of the struggles with financing. In this case, it is for the Yungting river, not the Yellow River. It provides detail on the kind of money that was called in upon emergency circumstances, and where the funds came from. In this case money flowed from import revenues to the flood disaster relief.

“The Director of the Yellow River Works,” The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, January 10th, 1891, 23. This article gives good data on the size of the works along the Yellow River, including information on the materials and labor used in building and repairing an embankment. It is from the Director of the Yellow River works on an embankment in Shantung.

“Closing a Breach,” The Chinese Times, 1887, 587.

This is another rich source of material that provides good data on the materials used in closing breaches. It also provides the amount of materials in hard numbers, which gives insights as to how materials were used, and how much of each were needed to complete the task of plugging breaches of a certain size.

“The Peiho Floods,” The Chinese Times, August 2nd , 1890, 483.

This is actually a western source reporting on floods in Peiho. I have simply extracted some of the data from the westerners report, and have left out their own opinions. Some of the western sources on flooding and river conservancy, like this one, provide good data here and there in a mix of opinion pieces.

“The Yellow River,” The Chinese Times, Abstract from the Peking Gazettes, July 30th, 1887, 635

Grisham 22

This is a report from Chang Yao on the works in Shantung that are approaching completion. He also asks for additional money to cover costs, and provides a plethora of valuable numbers as to distances and finances. He includes the length of the Yellow River flowing through Shantung, the purpose and use of guard tours, the budgets of Shantung compared to Honan, among others. A rich source of data on river conservancy.

The North China Herald, . S. C. & C. Gazette, June 18th, 1886, 639.

This is an article written by a westerner that is a repot on a Chinese report on repairs to the Yellow River. It provides good data from the Chines report, and does not offer western opinion, simply a blow by blow of the Chinese account. A good source for more data on repairs to engineering projects along the river.

Secondary Sources:

Randall A. Dodgen, Controlling the Dragon: Confucian Engineers and the Yellow River in

Late Imperial China (Hawaii: Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2001)

This work focuses conservancy in ancient times in the first half of the book. The second half of the book focuses specifically on a series of floods in the 1840's, and the technology, environment, and politics surrounding them. Arthur William Hummel, Eminent Chinese of The Ching Period: 1644-1912, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Offic: 1944-1945), 723-724.

A glossary of eminent statesman and influencers. Provides details on Ting Pao-Chen's career and notable causes. He was known for his advocacy and work towards river conservancy, since he was a governor of Shantung, a region that experiened great flooding.

Frederic Wakeman, The Fall Of Imperial China (New York: New York, The Free Press, 1977), 190.

An overview of Imperial China and its struggles to modernize, quell inner strife, and find a stable form of rule that could unite the country. Specifically the section on the Sing-French war of 1884-1885 gives a good overview of the events and chronology of the battle, and the reasons why China was unbable to stop the European aggressor.

Grisham 23