historical notes on graft and corruption in the...

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Philippine Journal 0/Public Administration, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 8 & 4 (July-October 1979)

Historical Notes on Graft and Corruption

in the Philippines

JOSE N. ENDRIGA·

The phenomenon of graft and corruption in the present Philippine bureaucracy r.ould be traced to the Philippine colonial experience, especially duringthe Spanish period, but certain features in the culture of pre-conquest Philippines could be described as amenable to corrupt behavior. It was during theAmerican period that public service was very much improved because (1) adequate compensation was given to. those in the civil service; and (2) the civilservice law was effective in punishing guilty officials. The climate of rectitudewas maintained throughout the Commonwealth period.

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Historical interpretations of graftand corruption in the Philippinesattribute the phenomenon to thecolonial experience. In this view,corrupt practices in contemporarysociety constitute part of a repertoire of behavior learned from thecolonial masters. Reinforced bypresent-day conditions, institutionsand values, such aberrant behaviorpersists as part of an unfortunatelegacy of the colonial period.

This is of course a question thetruth of which can be demonstratedby examining the historical record.Is it, in fact, the case that the history of the Filipino, as far as thequestion of graft and corruption isconcerned, can be described assome kind of descent from a condition of innocence before colonialcontact to one of political savior

•Associate Professor, College of PublicAdministration, University of the Philippines.

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faire-manifested in, among others,graft and corruption-since then?

In attempting to answer thisquestion, this paper deals with adescription and analysis of threethings:

(1) what constituted corrupt behavior during the various periods inPhilippine history;

(2) the political and social conditions that gave rise to, and probablysustained, corrupt behavior; and

(3) the attempts made to curbcorrupt practices.

This paper covers only three historical periods-the pre-conquest,the Spanish and the Americanperiods.

Pre-conquest Philippines

Nationalist Philippine historians,in an understandable effort at presenting a glorious picture of pre-

242 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

conquest Philippines, usually describe it as an idyllic time and thepeople as akin to the-noble savageof legend. If this perspective wereaccepted, corrupt behavior becomesa complete import, part of the baggage of the colonizers. Historically,there is some truth to this assertion,especially if one were to focus onthe Spanish period. However, a historical examination of graft andcorruption in the Philippines shouldproperly include a description ofpre-conquest society. Of course, tothe basic question of whether therewas bureaucratic corruption at thetime, one answer would simply beto dismiss it since the absence of aformal bureacracy logically precludes the existence of the phenomenon. But that is merely tautological. Our concern here is to findout whether, given the characteristics of Philippine pre-conquest society, there were customary definitions of corruption, and corollarily,whether there were occasions tocommit corrupt practices. Thi~

needs a closer look at the nature ofPhilippine society at the time, morespecifically at its political aspects.

The Philippines at the time ofSpanish contact can be described aspolitically undeveloped. Despite theclaims of some contemporary Spanish observers and some Filipinohistorians that kings and large political confederations existed, it is theaccepted view that there were nopolitical communities larger thanthe barangays. These were groupsof from 30 to 100 families, bound

by customs and occupying smallterritorial units usually along thesea or rivers.' One early Spanish account described the politicalsituation in the following manner:

There were no kings or lordsthroughout these islands who ruledover them as in the manner of ourkingdoms and provinces; but in everyisland, and in each province of it,many chiefs were recognized by thenatives themselves. Some were morepowerful than others, and each hadhis followers and subjects, by districts and families and these obeyedand respected the chief. Some chiefshad friendship and communicationwith others, and at times wars andquarrels.t

As a political organization, thebarangay had two functions: (l) tomaintain its existence as a community by resisting and repelling invasion by outside enemies; and (2)to preserve peace and order withinits authority," The latter functionwas undertaken through methodsof mediation and conciliation ofdisputes, or through the preventionor redress of wrongs through publicauthority exercised by the datu.The latter situation occurred in thepolitically integrated barangayswhere the datu had "achieved cohesion through a firm consolidationof his authority."? This seems to

lAntoniq de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Fihpinas," in Emma H. Blair andJames A. Robertson (eds.), The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 (Cleveland, -Ohio,The Arthur H. Clark Company, 19031909), Vol. 16, pp. 117·120.

'lIbid., p. 119.3Perfecto V. Fernandez, Custom Law in

Pre-conquest Philippines (Quezon City:U.P. Law Center, 1976), p. 45.

"Ibid.

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HISTORICAL NOTES ON GRAFT AND CORRUPTION 243

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have been the case with the datuswith whom the Spaniards had theirfirst contacts in the island of Cebuand in Manila. These were communities which had come under theinfluence of Islam. In such communities the datu had been describedas possessing almost absolute authority, and he exercised the functions of judge as well as of legislater." In these communities adistinct system of law had arisen,distinguishable from the customarylaw of the larger society and consisting of interpretations by theauthorities of the barangay as wellas the rules legislated by the particular datu to meet local conditionsor particular problems," In otherbarangays where there was onlypartial political integration the datumerely functioned as leader of hispeers. He did not legislate, but onlyexecuted the received law. He wasnot a judge and could not compelthe parties to a suit to his judgment.In such communities, his role wasthat of mediator and conciliator.He had no power to resolve disputes, except when the partiesagreed to submit the matter to hisfinal determination"

Despite such differences in thedegree of political integration of thebarangay, it was the political unitat the time of conquest. Its politicalcharacter derived from the fact that

"Morga, op. cit, p. 121; also, Miguel deLoarca, "Relacion de las Yslas Filipinas,"in Blair and Robertson, Vol. 5, pp. 175177.

GFernandez, op. cit., p. 7.uua.

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each household in the communityrecognized the authority of the datu.The public power was reposed inhim. There was a clear recognitionof community interest in the secur..ity of persons and property. Certain grave offenses, such as murderand theft, were considered publicoffenses, and as such were amenable to redress by public authority,exercised by the datu. The acknowledgment of the datu's power andthe legitimacy of its exercise wasgoverned by established custom.Tradition was reinforced by physical strength and other personalendowments of the datu. His authority rested not merely on custom,but more important, on the possession of leadership qualities. Thus,although the position was customarily hereditary, the loss of suchposition was frequent among thosewithout the ability to sustain it."

Pre-conquest Philippine societythen had advanced politically to thestage where there was already theconception of public interest, together with the person and themeans to uphold it. However, thestate of that development did notinclude even the beginnings of specialized agencies to carry out publicfunctions. The nature of the societyand its technology precluded such aformation. In the first place, sinceeach household was virtually selfsufficient, there was little that it

RJuan de Placencia, "Relatior.. of theCustoms which the Indians were Accustomed to Observe in these Islands,"in Blair and Robertson, Vol. 16, p. 322.


needed from the general community.Other reasons have to do with theprimitive technology available. Theabsence of adequate technology forexample, explains the absence of the.monopoly of force characteristic ofmodern governments. Thus, neitherthe datu nor any entity could compel obedience or exact compliancefrom the public.

In a society characterized by theprevalence of customary law and itsconcomitant weaknesses, the essentially voluntary nature of theassociation seems to completely exclude tne possibility of graft. Forexample, a member of a barangaywho was not willing to accept ajudgment of a particular datu simply had to move to another toescape it. Although there were customary laws governing inter-barangay movements of people, the publicauthority as such did not have theadequate means to enforce its will.

It remains to examine one otheraspect of pre-conquest Philippinesociety which could possibly be asource of corrupt practices. This isthe system of obligations derivingfrom the fact that the society wasstratified into various classes. Atthe apex was the datu and hishousehold which was subordinateto no other household. The lowerclasses are described by a Spanishchronicler:

In addition to the chiefs, who corresponded to our knights, there werethree classes: nobles, commoners andslaves. The nobles were the free-bornwhom they call mah.arlica. They didnot pay tax or tribute to the datu,

but must accompany him in war, attheir own expense. The chief offeredthem beforehand a feast, and afterward they divided the spoils. Moreover, when the datu went upon thewater, those whom he summonedrowed for him. If he built a house,they helped him, and had to be fedfor it. The same was true when thewhole barangay went to clear up hisland tillage,"

Such obligations, however, were notone-way,for in the manner of feudalpractices, the chiefs were obligedby custom to provide protection,security and assistance to the households attached to it. Such noblesseoblige is described by a contemporary Spanish account:

For this service the chief is underobligation to defend the timagua(commoner), in his own person andthose of his relatives against anyonewho seeks to injure him withoutcause; and thus it happens that, todefend the timaguas, fathers fightagainst their sons, and brothersagainst one another. If the timaguagoes to any other village and thereis wronged, the chief will endeavor,with all his forces, to avenge him tothe same extent. Thus the timaguaslive in security, and are free to passfrom the service of one chief to thatof another, wherever they so desire,and without any obstacle placed intheir way.tO

Corresponding to his public andprivate roles, the datu, was entitledto two kinds of services: those required in the interest of the cornmunity and those pertaining to hisperson and his household:

What the chiefs received from theirfollowers was to be held by them in

'Placencia, "Custom" of the Tagalogs,"in Blair and Robertson, Vol. 7, p, 174.

I°Loaro::l., op. cit., p. 149.

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great veneration and respect; andthey were served in their wars andvoyages and in their tilling, sowing,fishing and the building of theirhouses. To these duties the nativesattended very promptly, wheneversummoned by their chief. They alsopaid the chiefs tribute (which theycalled buiz), in varying quantities, inthe crops that they gathered. I I

In his role as preserver of thepeace the datu performed the taskof adjudicating disputes among thehouseholds in the barangay, Generally, the datu took cognizance ofdisputes upon the petition of theaggrieved party for various reasons:protection from violence, redress ofan injury, the enforcement of aclaim, such as an unpaid debt. Itwas also probable that the datutook the initiative in bringing theparties together. Generally, he endeavored to have the parties agreeon a settlement; if none was arrivedat, an investigation was conductedand the judgment based upon theevidence. In criminal cases, a finewas usually imposed; in civil cases,the payment of the obligation wasrequired. In serious offenses wherethe penalty was death, the condemned could ask for commutationto servitude. The fines imposed,although governed by custom, couldalso be arbitrary.

The chiefs are accustomed to impose the taxes; but there is no fixedamount for these, save what theproper judge decrees shall be paid. 1 2

Since customary law left a greatdeal of discretion to the judge and

11 Morga, op. cit., pp. 119-120.12Loarca, op. cit., p, 177.

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executer of the law, this is the areawhere corrupt behavior could conceivably have arisen. Examples ofthese opportunities are the finesimposed as penalties for crime andthe tributes that the lower classeswere supposed to pay. In this regard, we have only the value judgments of contemporary Spanishobservers, and an example of this isthe following:

The superiority of these chiefs overthose of their barangay was so greatthey held the latter as subjects; theytreated these well or ill, and disposedof their children, and their possession, at will without any resistance,or rendering account to anyone. Forvery slight annoyances and for slightoccasions, they were wont to kill andwound them, and to enslave them.It has happened that the chiefs havemade perpetual slaves of persons whohave raised their eyes to look at themless respectfully and for other similar causes.w

Such an observation, however,shows definite European and Christian biases. To the Spaniards therewere many aspects of local culturethat were objectionable becausethey were not derived from theChristian tradition.

It is, of course, entirely possiblethat such value judgments were notreflective of local sentiment. To thenatives such "abuses" as the Spaniards saw might have been considered well within the customaryprerogatives of their leaders. Sucha question, however, can only besettled if there were recorded opinions of the natives, favorable or

laMorga, op. cit., p, 120.


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*not, regarding such practices. But.historical sources, being written bythe conquerors, contain no suchevidences.

At any rate, this discussion ofpre-conquest Philippine society atleast provide us certain features ofthe culture amenable to what wouldbe defined under another system oflaw as corruption. As will be seenlater on, one of the colonial practices used by the Spaniards wasthe employment of the pre-conquestnobility as the lowest class ofbureaucrats (above whom wereSpaniards) thus reinforcing theirposition in the society.

The Spanish Period

The Spanish regime in the Philippines, which lasted for over threecenturies, is generally regarded as aperiod characterized by the prevalence of graft and corruption. Infact, conventional wisdom regardsthe regime and corruption as synonymous. While that may sound likea caricature, especially consideringthe longevity of the regime, the generalization is historically accurate.Its only weakness is that it does notsay enough.

We are concerned here not onlywith the definition of bureacraticcorruption, but more important.with the context that gave rise to,and nurtured, it. As far as definition is concerned, corruption duringthe Spanish period can be broadlydefined as deviation from the idealistic, high-minded norms containedin legislation of various forms.

Being derived from Roman law tradition, Spanish political philosophywas very much steeped in the ideaof law determined by the authorityof will (or the imperium of thepeople delegated to the monarch),as contrasted with the authority ofcustom or usage of the community."

We can refer, first of all, toexpressions of colonial objectiveswhich, fortunately, were numerousand clear enough to leave no doubtas to the aims of Spanish colonization. In 1636, Philip IV declared ina law that:

... we desire nothing more than thepublication and spread of the Evangelical Law and the conversion of theIndios.1s

The viceroys and governors wereenjoined to hold the service of Godand the extension of His sacred lawas "their first and principal concern.'?"

Another law, first decreed in 1542and reenacted five times until 1841declared that:

... one of the most principal thingsin which our Audiencias of the Indieshave to serve us, is to have specialconcern of the good treatment of theIndios and of their conservation.i"

Still another law commanded theviceroys and superior officials to:

l4Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy inthe Philippines (Manila: Institute of Public Administration. University of the' Philippines, 1957), p. 11.

15 Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reina!de las Indias, ley 8, titulo 2, libra ii. Citations referred to in this source will be byley. titulo, and libra.

IflIbid., ley 2, titUlo 3, libra iii.l'Ibid.. ley 83, titulo 15, libra i1.

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HISTORICAL NCTES ON GRAFT AND CORRUPTION 247

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...aid, protect and defend [-the Indios] from whatever injuries, ... punishing their oppressors with specialand rigorous public demonstration.w

Moreover, the natives were placedunder the protection of the bishopsas well as under an official designated protector and defender, whowas appointed by the governor ofthe islands."

Such noble aims, however, werecounterbalanced by a practical objective. This concerned the increaseof the royal estate through theraising of public revenue in theform of tributes, fees, fines, etc.For example, the laws commandedthe viceroys, governors and officersof the exchequer to :

... devote supreme attention in bringing about the profits, and the increaseof all that belongs to us in the provinces of their governments, and shallapply all their attention and diligenceto the development of the mines, thecollection of our royal fees, and theremittance to these realms [to Spain]of the proceeds thereof,. " with strictpunctuality, and permitting no withhoi din g nor retention of anyamount.?"

Another law, however, commandedthat:

The tributes shall be collected withthe least possible harm to the Indios,and to the hacienda real. 21

Thus, the contradictory nature ofthe objectives not only made administration difficult, but also providedbureaucrats enough leeway for dis-

1RIbid., ley I, titulo I, libro vi.10 Ibui., ley 34. titulo 18. libro ii.2°Ibid., ley I, titulo I, libro viii.21Ibid., ley 16, titulo 8, libro vii.

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cretion. Since no scheme of priorityamong the objectives was ever laiddown, in practice the bureaucratsdecided matters on an ad hoc basis.Depending on their motivation theycould resolve things in the directionof one objective or another.

Such confusion of aims is mani..fested in two contradictory formulas: one was "no se haga novedad,"which strictly commanded highcolonial officials not to make anyinnovation on royal prescriptions.The other was "obetiezco pero nocumplo," or "I obey but do notcomply." This formula was basedon the theory that the prince couldnot will any wrong if he knew thelocal situation. High officials, invoking the injunction, could setaside or postpone the execution ofa law.

Thus, what emerged from theexistence of contradictory colonialobjectives was a compromise between idealism and expediency."Conflicts were often resolved infavor of the latter, a tendency thatcan be explained in terms of otherfactors.

An important one was the philosophy. regarding public office duringthe Spanish regime. Such philosophy derived from the theory thatthe colonies were the king's personal kingdoms, and he therefore coulddispose anything in it, from lands

22See for example, John L. Phelan,"Authority and Flexibility in the SpanishImperial Bureaucracy," AdministrativeScience Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1 (June1960), pp. 47-65.


to public offices in any manner hepleased. In the sixteenth centurypublic office was regarded as agrant or favor (merced) from theking. Claimants of such favors werenot lacking: those who participatedin the conquest and pacification ofthe colonies, including their descendants, who did not only expect,but asked for, such grants. We are,in fact, told of a rather heavy trafficof people waiting for royal favor, asituation which forced the king tosend such persons to the Indieseven when no offices were waitingfor them, thus, passing the burdento the colonial officials.

There were two ways of disposingof public offices: by appointmentand by purchase. Belonging to theformer were positions that carriedjudicial functions. The highest colonial positions of viceroy, governorgeneral, members of the Audiencia,and provincial executives were supposed to be filled by royal appointment. Spanish law strictly prohibited the sale of such offices, butin practice many of them wereacquired through those means.

Saleable offices were of threeclasses, and varied according to. the.type of income or reward which thepurchasers hoped to receive: (1 )The first and largest class comprised those offices which carriedthe right' to charge fees for thework done, such as notarial offices,or escribanias; (2) The secondclass, which was also very large,consisted of those which entitledthe holders to little or no salary,

and few, if any, fees, but whichwere sought after because of theinfluence that they conferred. seatsin the municipal councils, or regimientos, belonged to this class; (3)Salaried offices, which were few innumber because in general onlyhigh positions carried regular stipends. Judges always received salaries, and their positions could notbe lawfully sold. However, economic necessity forced the Crown tosell such offices repeatedly."

Contemporary critics of the system of sale directed their criticismagainst two things: the incompetence of the officeholders and theirrapacity. The first one resultedfrom the fact that, although one ofthe requirements for a bidder wasthat he be qualified for the position,in practice the office was generallyawarded to the highest bidder because the Crown was more interested in raising revenue than inmaintaining a fiction. As a matterof fact, acquiring an office by appointment was no guarantee that'the holder was more qualified thanone who purchased his. Such expectations carry the modem bias ofobservers who are steeped in thetradition of the merit system. InSpain in the sixteenth, and even wellinto the nineteenth century, therewas no tradition of a salaried civilservice and no recognized principlein the selection and promotion ofofficials. Offices were regarded

23John Parry, The Sale 0/ Public O/fic~s

in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs (California: University of CaliforniaPress; 1953), p. 5.

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HISTORICAL NOTES ON GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

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as places of profit rather than asposts of responsibilities. 24

The rapacity of officeholders,which contemporary as well asmodem observers denounced withsuch passion, can be explained, firstof all, in terms of the conditionssurrounding the system. An officecould be bought only at great financial sacrifice of the buyer. In general, buyers borrowed the moneythey used, and they therefore lookedupon it as an investment, to berecovered as quickly as possible andat a profit. Many bureaucrats actually treated the transaction as abusiness-selling an office at aprofit and buying a more lucrativeone, and so on, until they amassedenough fortune to invest in land andother more profitable ventures."

If corruption was abetted by sucha condition, it is nevertheless truethat the temptation was present inany public office, no matter how itwas acquired. In a situation whereofficeholders received very little orno salary and were expected notonly to augment but to raise theirown compensation themselves, thedistinction between fees and tips,and between perquisites and bribeswas difficult to draw. There was, ofcourse, repeated legislation againstbribery and detailed scales of legitimate fees, but the climate of corruption, bribery and criminalityprevailing in Spain and in the colon-

24Ibtd., p. 69.24lIbid., p. 70.

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ies at the time rendered corruptiontolerable.

Another reason that might beadvanced to explain the unmitigatedgraft and corruption of the regimeis that it was a colonial bureaucracy.As such, it was ruling over a subjectpopulation that was completelypowerless to affect the colonizers'intensions and actions. In theory,Spanish colonization took the perspective of a master taking care ofimmature wards. Thus, the nativeswere to be protected and defended;they were to be settled in towns,converted to Christianity, and theirspiritual welfare monitored bypriests." Politically, they were givenminimal participation. The onlyoffices which Filipinos could occupywere those at the lowest levels: theposition of gobernadorcillo, or pettygovernor, who was the town executive, and the cabeza de barangay,the tribute collector of the baran-gay. It is generally considered amaster stroke of colonial practicethat the Spaniards made use of localnobility in carrying out colonialobjectives at the lowest level. '!'hisdid not only solve the immediateproblem of not having enough Spaniards to perform administrativefunctions, but also took advantageof the local nobility's closeness tothe population to "do the dirtywork" for them. For the gobernatiorcillo, this included enforcing the

2UPhelan, The Hispantzation of the Philippines, Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565·1700 (Madison, Wisconsin:University of Wisconsin Press, 1959),pp. 3·14.

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polos y servicios, or labor servicesrequired of all tribute-payers, collecting the tributes, seeing to it thatthe townspeople did not live inidleness, that they lived by someemployment, etc. He was also expected to provide, out of his ownpocket, for the maintenance of themunicipal guards, the upkeep of thetown jail, the food of the prisoners,and to allocate funds for desks,paper, and personnel. For performing such duties and many more, hereceived the incredibly low compensation of two pesos per month."If Spanish philosophy was to beconsistent, the native officials weresupposed to augment their incomethrough one form of abuse or another, the opportunities for whichwere adequate.

The net effect of corruption onthe local level was the loss of prestige of the native nobility beforethe natives. The contrast with thepre-conquest situation is marked:where in traditional culture theywere respected leaders of their ownpeople, now they were merely agentsof a foreign regime for whom tlJ,eYperformed menial tasks. The localnobility thus underwent a significant transformation, and wereplaced in the position of beingcaught between the exactions of theSpanish regime and the abhorrenceof their own 'people.

It seems, therefore, that the generalization with which we startedthis section, namely, that the Span-

27Corpuz, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

ish regime was graft-ridden, isborne out by even a cursory reviewof historical conditions. One question that can be asked at this pointis whether there were any remediesat all to wrongdoing. How was itpossible for there to be such a widegap between law and performance?

As a matter of fact, there were anumber of control devices in Spanish colonial practice. One of thesewas the »isita, an investigation ofthe high officials in the colonieswhich was undertaken at no specified time." A visitador general wassent to the colonies vested withinvestigatory, judicial and executorypowers. His pun i t i v e powersagainst errant officials included removal, suspension, and impositionof fines.

The other institution was theresuiencia, which required the bureaucrats in the colonies to render,at the end of their terms, an accountof their conduct while' in office.This was a requirement for officialsbefore they could leave the colonyor assume new office. In the investigation conducted by a judgespecially commissioned for the purpose, superiors, colleagues, as wellas private persons could file chargesagainst the official. It could, therefore, become a severe ordeal andthe proceedings lasted from a fewmonths to several years. Moreover,some residencias led to financialruin since the one undergoing it was

28Recopilacion, ley 34, titulo 2, libro ii.

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supposed to spend for the proceedings.

Therefore, theoretically at least,the residencia was an effectivecheck upon bureaucratic wrongdoing. In practice it was not. Therewere several reasons for this. Inthe first place, the regime did notwant to risk the security of theSpanish community by periodicallyrending it with the factionalism andbitterness that the investigation engendered. Then, bearing in mindthe manner in which bureaucratsacquired their offices, it was a common practice for decisions in thecolonies to be overturned in Spainthrough the intercession of a sponsor or relatives who were close tothe court. Because of its ineffectiveness the residencia was used only,sparingly, and by the end of theeighteenth century the institutionwas not mentioned any more?'There was one other effect the institution had on official behaviorthat of increasing the tendency towards graft to enable the bureaucrat to amass enough wealth to payfor his residencia.

The American Regime

The bureaucratic system that theUnited States introduced in thePhilippines represented' a drasticchange from that of the Spanishboth in philosophy and practice.The new philosophy concerned the

~"Nicolus Zufra, "The Residenci:.l in theColonial Administration System in thePhilippines," Philippine Historical Bulletin (March 1963), pp. 14-33.

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concept of a public office being aposition of trust and responsibility,and the practice upheld variousdimensions of the merit system.Both of these were embodied in oneof the first legislative acts of theregime, entitled "An Act for theEstablishment and Maintenance ofan Efficient and Honest Civil Service in the Philippine Islands."Certain features of this law may bementioned. First of all, the coverage of the civil service was broad:it applied to all positions in the civiladministration, national as well asprovincial, and even to the government of the city of Manila. Exceptfor certain unclassified positions,entry into the service was to be bycompetitive examination, to be eonducted in both Spanish and inEnglish. Such examinations wereto be "practical" and were supposedto ascertain "the relative capacityand fitness of applicants." Inmaking appointments, when qualifications were equal, first preference was to be given to Filipinos,next to discharged soldiers of theUnited States, and only third toother American citizens. An appointee was placed on probation fora period of six months, after whichretention was equivalent to finalappointment. Regularly appointedemployes could be removed onlyfor cause, for which an investigationwas to be conducted by the Bureauof Civil Service."

The civil service positions wereclassified into 21 classes, based on

:l°Corpuz. op. cit., pp. 166-167.


annual salaries of the occupant.The lowest class comprised of persons receiving less than four hundred eighty pesos, and the highestclass six thousand pesos. Personsappointed contrary to the civil service law were not entitled to receivea salary, and the appointing officialswere supposed to pay them out oftheir personal funds.

Another important feature of thecivil service law was that it closedthe door completely to the spoilssystem. In this regard it was superior even to the American civilservice system, a feature that contemporary observers praised tulsomely." It was, however, a characteristic that ran counter to Filipinoculture, experience and, in somecases, personal interests, and therewere initial objections to such provisions. The Filipinos were supported in this sentiment' by manyAmerican officials.a~ There were, infact, some features of the civil service law which may be labelled asvestiges of Spanish colonial practices. One of these barred public officials from engaging in privatebusiness, unless they first first obtained permission from the governor-general. Many public officialsseemed to have taken advantage ofthis provision, which resulted inseveral instances of scandal. In1912 such permission to trade

aIJoseph R. Hayden, The Philippines:A Study in National Development (NewYork: The MacMillan Company, 1942), p.89.

3~Ibid., p. 90.

was removed by the governorgeneral." Another early prOVISIonwas also reminiscent of Spanishpractices. 'This concerned. the position of justices of the peace in thetowns, all of whom were Filipinos.Through a curious oversight, theywere not paid salaries but werepermitted to collect fees for theirservices. 'this group of officialsbecame the perpetrators of pettycorruption, Another group of publicofficialS who a 1s 0 committedpetty graft were civilians anddischarged soldiers who had enteredthe civil service without any examination: Such cases of wrongdoing,however, were promptly dealt withand the perpetrators were punishedaccordingly,a I

SUch aberrations in bureaucraticbehavior were not confined to theearly years of the American regime.Some random samples of later casesof graft and corruption may bebriefly described.

(1) Some famous cases inv.olved.high-ranking American officials.One of them, William CameronForbes, who was Secretary of Commerce and Police, and later onbecame Governor-General, was accused of purchasing "the best site"in Baguio City, the summer capitalof the country for which he paid aridiculously low price. In his capacity as Secretary of Commerce and

aaphilippine Commission Report, 1914.pp. 30-31.

:l'Reports 01 the Philippine Commission,the Civil Governor. etc; 1900·1903, pp.522-529.

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r,.HISTORICAL NOTES ON GRAFT AND CORRUPTION 253

Police, Mr. Forbes had under hisjurisdiction the Bureau of PublicWorks, which had charge of theexpenditure of large sums of publicmoney in the city of Baguio.

Another official was Dean C. Worcester, the Secretary of the Interior,who made a purchase similar toMr. Forbes, and was also involvedin many ether deals that earned himnotoriety.

Still another official, ExecutiveSecretary Frank Carpenter, boughtone of the friar estates at a very lowprice and took advantage of hisposition to have the roads to theestate improved, thus raising thevalue of the real estate.

All these high-ranking officialsbecame the subject of an extensivecongressional investigation in theUnited States, and although nopunitive measures were imposed onthem, they were exposed to publicopprobrium."

(2) In 1924 the Report Of theGovernor General carried itemsabout local officials being foundguilty for numerous offenses: 31elective municipal officials werefound guilty of abuse of authority,maladministration, neglect of duty,gambling, and Ciisobedience; 45treasurers were found guilty of illegal exactions, malversation offunds, nepotism, falsification ofpublic documents, neglect of duties,etc."

35The Friar Land Inquiry, passim.3(1Report of the Governor General, 1924,

p.59.

1979

The Report of the Governor of thefollowing year also contained itemsabout 12 municipal treasurers beingremoved, 50 being reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined, and 10 deprived of legal privileges. In thesame year 29 chief clerks werereprimanded, suspended, or disciplined, 3 chiefs of police were removed, and 7 were reprimanded,suspended or disciplined." Suchstray Examples of wrongdoing andthe manner they were dealt withmayor may not indicate a trend. Butwe are concerned here with twofacts: namely, that there seems tohave been numerous cases of corruptbehavior despite the institution ofa completely different civil servicesystem; and, probably more important, the fact that the law governing the civil service was effectivein punishing guilty officials. TheFilipinos, used to the corruption ofthe Spanish regime and the totalineffectuality of their punitive measures, were astonished at the promptprosecution of public officials.

Although it is difficult to makecomparisons between the bureaucratic performance of Spain and theAmericans, some explanations haveto be offered for the fact that theCivil Service Law was upheld inpractice almost to the letter. Theattitude of the American officialstowards the civil service seems tobe crucial here. Without exceptionthe various governors-general of theperiod and especially the directors

37Report of the Governor General, 1925,pp. 260-261.


of the Bureau of the Civil Serviceexpressed, sometimes with eloquentpassion, their support for the principles of the new system and followed them in practice. One hasonly to read the annual reports ofthese officials to get an idea of howmuch they were committed to thisenterprise.

It can also be observed that thesituation of public service duringthe American regime was very muchimproved, in many ways. To mention some, the service was not onlyprofessionalized, but it also guaranteed adequate income to civil servants. This change, therefore, removed one very fruitful source ofthe corruption that existed duringthe Spanish regime, namely, thenon-existent or wholly inadequatecompensation of public officialswhich forced them to fend forthemselves. In other words, thenthere was an inherent temptation tomake money. During the Americanregime, much of the necessity tocommit graft had been removed,not only by adequate compensationand the effectiveness of legal sanetions, but also by the fact that theeconomic conditions in the UnitedStates afforded Americans chancesto earn more outside of governmentservice. This was one reason, forexample, why the Filipinization of

the civil service was undertaken-atsuch a fast pace (it was practicallycomplete by 1919). In other words,there was no longer the situation ofpublic officials amassing wealth inthe public service.

What about the Filipinos? Fearswere expressed by many Americansthat once the civil service becamecompletely Filipinized, the undesirable Filipino propensity for nepotism, the spoils system and corruptbehavior "learned" from the Span.iards would take over. They weresurprised that by the time of theCommonwealth government (from1935 to 1946), when a Filipino President tock over from the AmericanGovernor General, instead of watering down the Civil Service Law, theFilipinos strengthened it throughmany innovations some of whichwere even written into their newConstitution." Nor was the bureaucracy clean only on paper. Exceptfor some instances of graft and corruption, the image of the civil servoice in the Philippines remainedmuch in accord with the conventional picture: clean and prestigious.It remained for another period inPhilippine history to tarnish that,an image it still has to recoverfrom.

3SHayden, op. cit., pp. 104-122.

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