historia zeitschrift für alte geschichte -'philopoemen's special forces; peltasts and a...

Philopoemen's Special Forces: Peltasts and a New Kind of Greek Light-Armed Warfare (Livy35.27)Author(s): Mary Frances WilliamsSource: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 53, H. 3 (2004), pp. 257-277Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436729 .

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PHILOPOEMEN'S SPECIAL FORCES: PELTASTS AND A NEW KIND OF GREEK LIGHT-ARMED WARFARE (LIVY 35.27)

In 192 BC Philopoemen of Megalopolis, the general of the Achaean Confedera- cy, devised "a new kind of fighting" (improviso genere belli Livy 35.27.4).1 But scholars both of military history and of Philopoemen have neglected this re- markable achievement.2 Philopoemen used light-armed forces in an amphibious landing and in mountainous raids with unusual tactics. Philopoemen's innova- tion is an important use of "special forces" in ancient Greek history: the first example of a deliberate combination of amphibious landings, a mixture of light-

Philopoemen necopinantem eum improviso genere belli adgredi statuit. Livy 35.27.4. The translation of improviso as "new" is that of Evan T. Sage (trans.), Livy (Cambridge, MA, 1935). Translating improviso as "unexpected" does not make sense with genere belli and is redundant with necopinantem. Livy may be translating his Greek source. Plutarch differs from Livy and says that the Spartans "did not expect attack and were careless" (oit xpoa8oicC6nv, akX' 6c?xXvgvot; Plut. Philop. 14.4-5), but he says nothing about the type of warfare. Thucydides has the phrase "unused to this manner of fighting" (adtOeat tota1)11; taX6n; Thuc. 4.34.2), which is closer to improviso genere belli.

2 R.M. Errington, Philopoemen (Oxford 1969) 103-104. There is nothing in F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1957); J.K. Anderson, "Philopoe- men's Reform of the Achaean Army," CP 62 (1967) 104-106; J. Briscoe (ed.), A Commentary on Livy Books XXXIV-XXXVII (Oxford 1981); P. Cartledge and A. Spawforth, Hellenistic and Roman Sparta (London and NY 2002); Y. Garlan, War in the Ancient World. A Social History (1975, translated from the French, La guerre dans l'antiquite [Paris 1972]); G.R. Griffith, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge 1935); K. Grote, Das griechische Soldner- wesen der hellenistischen Zeit (Jena 1913); M.B. Hatzopoulos, L'organisation de l'armie macedonienne sous les Antigonides (Athens 2001 = MEAETHMATA 30); Maurice Holleaux, "Rome and Antiochus," in: S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds.), The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol VIII (Cambridge 1930) 199-240; H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus (Oxford 1933); W.K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek Military Practices. Part I (= The Greek State at War Part I) (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1971); W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War. Part II (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1974); W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State At War. Part V (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1991); W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments (New York 1930, rept. 1966); F. Walbank, "Hellenistic World," in F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds.), Cambridge Ancient History. Vol.VII. I (2nd ed. Cambridge 1984); W. Weissen- born and H.J. Muller (eds.), Titi Livi Ab urbe condita libri (Berlin 1962-1963). A. Aymard, Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la confederation achaienne (Bordeaux 1938) 306-308 says of Philopoemen's pursuit of Nabis: "le remarquable tacticien qu'est Philopoimen." But see George Washington in 1776 at Trenton.

Historia, Band LIII/3 (2004) ? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart



258 MARY FRANCES WILLIAMS

armed troops, a night attack, guenilla tactics, and non-mercenary special forces, and the first time that light-armed troops conducted most of an entire war.

Conflicts between the Spartans and the Achaean Confederacy culminated in 192 BC when Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, began to besiege Gytheum and then ravaged the Achaeans' fields. The Achaeans voted for war rather than waiting for the Romans' assistance since Philopoemen argued that the situation did not permit delay.3 Philopoemen confronted Nabis with "light-armed soldiers, many peltasts (caerrati), armed with slings, darts, and other light ordinance."4 He loaded them in small boats and landed them on a headland near the enemy camp.5 Philopoemen's light-armed troops traveled by night over the headland to Nabis' camp and hurled firebrands upon the huts of the camp, setting them on fire. Many Spartans were killed since no aid could be brought to them; "with sword and fire everything was destroyed."6 After this Philopoemen immediately ravaged Tripolis in Spartan territory, departing before Nabis could send guards from Gytheum. Then he gathered his army at Tegea and called a council of Achaeans and allies.7 He decided to attack Lacedaemon since the enemy was terrified as a result of his raid at Pleiae.8 Philopoemen fought Nabis with only light infantry and cavalry, and then used his caetrati in order to ambush the Spartans.9 He frightened Nabis into abandoning his camp;10 and then again attacked him with caetrati,11 causing the Spartans to flee in fear. After this, Philopoemen shut up Nabis in Sparta and broke his power.12 Philopoemen's raid not only caused great destruction to Nabis' army but also enabled him to attack Spartan territory with impunity and ultimately to defeat Nabis because of the terror that his new method of fighting caused. Sparta was ultimately incor- porated into the Achaean Confederacy and lost its ancestral constitution and laws.

Both Plutarch and Livy report that as a result of these actions, the Achaeans considered Philopoemen to be a greater general in this war than Flamininus and

3 Livy 35.25-26. 4 expeditos milites, caetratos plerosque, cum fundis et iaculis et alio levi genere armaturae

Livy 35.27.5. 5 navigia parva in stationem occultam ... contraxit Livy 35.27.5-6. 6 Livy 35.27.8. 7 Livy 35.27; cf. 31.36.1. 8 quoniam satis hostium conterriti essent Livy 35.27.12. 9 Livy 35.28.11, 35.29.3-7; Plut. Philop. 14.6-10. Philopoemen first used Cretan auxilia-

ries and cavalry against Nabis, leaving other forces in camp, then ambushed him with caetrati (Livy 35.28.8-35.29).

10 perculso metu Livy 35.29.1 1; 35.30.4. 11 Livy 35.30.4-6. Philopoemen again used Cretan auxiliaries and cavalry against Nabis,

then ambushed him with caetrati and then later with light-armed troops armed only with swords (Livy 35.30.1-4, 8-10).

12 Livy 35.30.12.



Philopoemen's Special Forces: Peltasts and a New Kind of Greek Light-armed Warfare 259

he was "beloved and honored by the Greeks in their theaters."'13 This strongly argues for Philopoemen's originality: Philopoemen's previous defeat of the Spartan tyrant Machanidas (and killing of him in hand-to-hand combat) had won him great acclaim but had not elevated him beyond the status of the Roman Flamininus. Philopoemen was admired for his ability to "read the terrain" and lead his troops, and also for his innovative tactics and surprise attacks.

Livy defines caetrati as "what the Greeks call peltasts"14 and says that Philip V of Macedon used caetrati in an ambush in 206 BC.'5 Philip V also used caetrati at Cynoscephalae in 197 where they were stationed in the front of his heavy infantry.16 It has been argued that Philip V's caetrati were hypaspists (a heavy- armed elite corps) but they were more likely peltasts armed with a small bronze shield and the sarissa.17 Philopoemen's caetrati at Pleiae were peltasts with a

13 Plut. Philop. 15.1; cf. Livy 35.30.12-13; Ditt. Syll. 624.10. G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (Firenze 1923), IV.1, 131 credits Philopoemen's "vigilance." But Errington, Philopoemen (as in n.2) 104-105 believes that Philopoemen "failed" since he did not relieve Gytheum and Philopoemen's "expedition achieved little", also Holleaux, Rome (as in n.2) 204. Errington explains the honors for Philopoemen as resulting from Greek pleasure at an action that was independent of Rome (ibid. 106-107; cf. Aymard, Rapports [as in n.21, 313 and n.26; B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea Vol.II [Gotha 1899] 684-685). But why would the Greeks be pleased with a "failed" expedition?

14 Livy 31.36.1; also 42.51.4. The caetra was a small, light shield of hide similar to the pelta (Livy 28.5.11). Livy is translating his Greek source since the Hellenistic peltast did not carry a leather shield (Hatzopoulos, L'organisation [as in n.2] 71). The Romans knew the caetratus as an African, Spanish, or Greek peltast (Caes. Civ. 1.48.7; 1.70.4; 1.39; Livy 21.21.12; 21.27.5). Philopoemen did not use a Roman type of fighting: the Romans relied on heavy infantry and cavalry, although they had velites (light infantry) (Polyb. 6.21; 6.24.3-4; 6.35.5; Livy 26.4.4). The Romans' allies supplied light-armed forces: e.g., Polyb. 3.75.7; Livy 24.34.5. But the Romans did not regularly use light-armed forces (but see Polyb. 1.40.6-13). The Romans preferred face-to-face combat rather than treachery, deception, or ambushes (Polyb. 13.3.2-8; 36.9.9; Livy 42.47.5). Livy does not say velites; thus Philopoemen's troops were not light infantry. Asclepiodotus 6.1 explains that light infantry were different from peltasts but were similarly stationed.

15 Livy 31.36.1-7. Livy distinguishes Philip V's caetrati from his "Cretan auxiliaries" since those were "fast-moving infantry" (velocissimi pedites Livy 31.36.7-1 1).

16 Livy 33.15.16; Polyb. 18.24.1, 8. 17 F.W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge 1940) 291-293; F.W. Walbank, A

Historical Commentary on Polybius Vol. 1 (Oxford 1957) ad 2.65.2 believes that Macedo- nian peltasts were hypaspists. But Hatzopoulos, L'organisation (as in n.2) 71-72 cites inscriptional evidence to show that the Hellenistic peltasts were not hypaspists and carried a bronze shield. But he says that Hellenistic peltasts were the "heirs" of Alexan- der's hypaspists and carried out the same tasks. (See below, n.96.) Cf. Eric Foulon, "Hypaspistes, peltastes, chrysaspides, argyraspides, chalcaspides," REA 98 (1996) 53-62; Id., "La garde A pied, corps d'6lite de la phalange helldnistique," BAGB 1 (1996) 17-31.




Macedonian shield but perhaps without the pike since heavy-armed hypaspists and peltasts carrying the sarissa would have had difficulty on small boats and in hilly terrain,18 but Philopoemen's caetrati easily moved through hills at night.

Polybius' extant text says nothing about Philopoemen's raid at Pleiae. Livy, however, apparently follows Polybius, especially since he mentions that Poly- bius' father, Lycortas of Megalopolis, commanded the cavalry in the subsequent action against Nabis.19 Plutarch says little about Philopoemen's later battles with Nabis but he is aware of Philopoemen's night raid and the firing of the Spartan huts. 20 Both Livy and Plutarch appear to have used Polybius for their accounts of Philopoemen's unusual night raid against Nabis.21

Philopoemen's Reforms of the Achaean Army

When Philopoemen became strategos in 207, he reorganized the infantry of the Achaean Confederacy, changing weapons to the Macedonian style and the method of fighting from the Greek hoplite phalanx to the Macedonian phalanx.22 Before Philopoemen the Achaeans had relied on the Greek phalanx and cavalry; most of them used a lighter armor and shorter spear than the Macedoni- ans and they were limited to fighting on flat ground.23 Despite Plutarch's remark that Philopoemen preferred a "stationary and steadfast" form of military organization in place of "fighting at a run and of peltasts,"24 the Achaeans do

18 Polyb. 12.22.4. J.K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1970) 130-131: the long spear would have encumbered peltasts; Macedonian peltasts possibly used a pike developed by Iphicrates (Diod. 15.44; cf. Nep. lphicr. 11. 1.3-4). A.M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (Ithaca, NY 1967) 119: Alexander's Macedonian hypaspists probably carried a shorter spear than the sarissa.

19 Livy 35.29.1-2. 20 Plut. Philop. 14.4-5; cf. Paus. 8.50.6-10; Zonaras 9.19. 21 But since Zeno of Rhodes wrote about Nabis (Polyb. 16.16-17) and Aristocrates about

Philopoemen (Plut. Philop. 16.4), it is possible that there was another source. 22 Plut. Philop. 9.1-2; Polyaenus 6.4.3. Polybius does mention Philopoemen's reforms in

passing (Polyb. 11.9.4-5; Errington, Philopoemen [as in n.2] 63-64 and 64 n.i). The reforms were in 207 BC (Plut. Philop. 9.1-2; 10.2; Cartledge and Spawforth, Sparta [as in n.21 66-67). Plutarch mentions javelins against Machanidas (Plut. Philop. 10.2), but Polybius does not (Polyb. 1 1.1 1).

23 Philopoemen changed the Achaean armor from a lighter shield and shorter spear to the heavier Macedonian shield and the sarissa and he persuaded the Achaeans to adopt helmets, breastplates, and greaves (Plut. Philop. 9.1-2). Polybius castigates Aratus at the battle of Caphyae in 220 for sending light infantry, cavalry, and hoplites to harass the Aetolians in hills rather than flat ground (Polyb. 4.11.6-4.13).

24 gi6vtjgov Kai eofKiAclav dvti bpoticJi Kcai X?acGtiKT1 gaXi1v aaicetv Plut. Philop.

9.2; Polyaenus 6.4.3. But Plutarch's remark that Philopoemen abolished fighting with peltasts is clearly not accurate.




not seem to have used peltasts in battle before Philopoemen since they are only mentioned in the sources after Philopoemen's reforms.25 Philopoemen aban- doned the short javelin and lighter shield of his hoplites in favor of the Macedo- nian sarissa, Macedonian armor, and the Macedonian phalanx.26 Philopoemen was influenced by Antigonus Doson's success against the Spartans and be- lieved that the Macedonian phalanx and tactics were necessary to combat heavy-armed hoplites in pitched battles.27 But Philopoemen retained some light-armed forces to guard mountain passes and protect his cavalry. He also adopted the Macedonian peltast, which he, like Philip V, used with his phalanx as guards and to protect his flanks, and for ambushes.28

History of Greek Light-Armed Forces

Philopoemen's light-armed innovations at Pleiae must be understood in the context of the history of ancient light-armed fighting. The standard method of warfare in the Classical Period was the hoplite phalanx, which was comprised of citizen soldiers in heavy armor of shield and spear.29 The regular Greek

25 E.g., Polyb. 4.11.6-4.13. Aratus used four hundred "picked" hoplites to climb the walls of Corinth (Plut. Arat. 21.1). The Achaeans levied five thousand foot and five hundred horse in 220 (Polyb. 4.15.3-7). In 219 the Achaeans gathered both infantry and cavalry mercenaries (Polyb. 4.37.6). Plutarch says that Philopoemen used javelins against Machanidas of Sparta in 207 (Plut. Philop. 10.2), but Polybius does not (Polyb. 1 1.1 1). Philopoemen used "picked troops" in an ambush in 201 (Polyb. 16.37.2-7). Arcadian peltasts worked as mercenaries outside the Achaean Confederacy (Xen. Anab. 4.8.18).

26 Plut. Philop. 9.2; Polyaenus 6.4.3; Errington, Philopoemen (as in n.2) 63; Anderson, Reform (as in n.2) 104; Snodgrass, Arms (as in n.18) 115. The Macedonian heavy infantry, despite its excellence, was burdened by heavy armor and the sarissa and was not very flexible (M. Cary, A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C. [2nd ed. London 19511 239-240; Tarn, Military [as in n.2] 28).

27 The Megalopolitians had experience with Macedonian armor since Antigonus Doson had armed them with bronze hoplite shields at the Battle of Sellasia in 220 BC (Polyb. 2.65.3; 4.69.4-5).

28 The Macedonian peltast was different from the hypaspist and the fourth century peltast (who fought with the javelin), and derived from Iphicrates' innovations. The Macedonian peltast fought with the phalanx and carried the sarissa but also had a lighter bronze shield (see Hatzopoulos, L'organisation [as in n.21, 71; Polyb. 22.9.3; Snodgrass, Arms [as in n.18] 123). Archaic and classical peltasts used a leather shield (Snodgrass, Arms [as in n.18] 78). For Philip V's peltasts, see below, n.96. Philopoemen's peltasts were like Macedonian peltasts and carried a bronze shield (see below, n.96). They also acted as guards (e.g., Livy 35.26.16; 35.28.10). But although Philopoemen's peltasts were armed in the Macedonian style, he did not use his peltasts at Pleiae in the usual Macedonian manner - as part of his phalanx.

29 Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 3-4. Cavalry were not important in classical times outside of Thessaly (Tarn, ibid. 4-5); Victor Davis Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical




military force consisted of the heavy infantry phalanx, which was well suited for defending and ravaging level ground.30 Light-armed forces in classical Greece were never important in battle.31 The classical Greek hoplite was a citizen who did not have time for constant mountain training that specialized, light-armed troops required for moving on rough ground.32 As Hanson notes:

Well-organized, if not mercenary, light-armed troops might have stopped hoplites at mountain passes on their initial descent into the plains. But they required constant training, special armament, and careful leadership, and had to be deployed for long periods of time on the border. To the hoplite in the Classical Period who farmned his small plot of ground and left only for the brief campaigning season, such a specialized force smelled of profes- sionalism, meant burdening costs, and spelled an end to his most important obligation as a citizen of his city.33

Classical Greek armies preferred to use heavy infantry, although some mountain communities always used light-armed troops for raiding.34 The light-armed

Greece (Biblioteca di Studi Antichi 40, Pisa 1983) 22-23, 103-107; Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 48-50; Anderson, Theory (as in n.18) 57-58, 125; A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides Vol. 1 (Oxford 1945) 15.

30 Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29) 3-4. Anderson, Theory (as in n. 18) 1 1 1. Tam, Military (as in n.2), 3-4. P. Cartledge, "Hoplites and Heroes. Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare," JHS 97 (1977) 11-27. Heavy hoplite armor was poorly suited for raids, skirmishing, and ambush (Victor Davis Hanson, "Hoplite Battle as Ancient Greek Warfare," in: Hans van Wees fed.], War and Violence in Ancient Greece [London 2000] 201-232, 206-207, 222).

31 Pritchett I (as in n.2) 133; Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 15-16; Snodgrass, Arms (as in n. 18) 89; J.K. Anderson, "Hoplite Weapons and Offensive Arms," in: V.D. Hanson (ed.), Hoplites. The Classical Greek Battle Experience (London and NY 1991) 15-37, 21-22. Hanson, Hoplite Battle (as in n.30) 206-207: archaeological finds of Greek armor indicate that it was overwhelmingly heavy and unsuited for ambush or skirmishing. Cf. Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York 1989) 56-57. Although in the Peloponnesian War there were raids, surprise attacks, and other fights that were not pitched battles, these usually involved hoplites, not special forces or light-armed troops; see e.g., Thuc. 3.94.1; Peter Krentz, "The Strategic Culture of Periclean Athens," in Charles D. Hamilton and Peter Krentz (eds.), Polis and Polemos (Claremont, CA 1997) 55-72, 57; Peter Krentz, "Deception in Archaic and Classical Greek Warfare," in Hans Van Wees (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece (London 2000) 167-200, 171-172 for ambushes.

32 Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29) 4. Gomme, Thucydides I (as in n.29) 12-15. Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 16.

33 Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29) 4. Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 15-16. 34 E.g., Thuc. 3.98.1-2. Other light-armed peoples: Amphilochians (Thuc. 3.107.4; 3.112.6);

Ozolian Locrians (Thuc. 3.95.3; 3.97.2); Acarnanians (Thuc. 7.31.5; 7.60.4; 7.67.2) (J.G.P. Best, Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare [Groningen 1969] 16). Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29) 5, 22-25 says that light-arned forces are not the same as "lightly-armed" or unarmed forces who ravaged fields and were not trained.




soldier was generally despised as unorganized and ready to flee, unlike the hoplite, and Gomme declares, "No well-organized light-armed force was ever formed by any [classical] Greek state."35

What light-armed forces there were in Classical Greece consisted of archers, slingers, javelin-men, and peltasts. These forces were usually non-Greeks, or Greeks from the periphery of the Hellenic world, such as Thracian javelins and peltasts, Rhodian slingers, and Cretan archers.36 Light-armed troops, usually javelin-men, existed but were uncommon.37 They were useful primari-

35 Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29), 13-18; Hanson, Western (as in n.31) 13-17; Thuc. 4.94.1; Gomme, Thucydides I (as in n.29) 15. Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 5: "prior to the fourth century it seems that the light-armed were often only an unorganized force, and it was very rare for them to exert any serious influence on the course of a battle, except in Aetolia. That unconquerable country was always a law to itself." Aetolians had only light armor (e.g., Thuc. 3.94.4; 3.98.1).

36 E.g., barbarians (Thuc. 7.42.1); Acarnania (Thuc. 2.81.8; 7.31.5; 7.67.2; Xen. Hell. 4.6.7); the Balearic Islands (Polyb. 3.33.11, 16; 3.83.3; Livy 21.21.12); Rhodes (Thuc. 6.43; Xen. Anab.3.3.16); Crete (Thuc. 6.25.2; 6.43; Xen. Anab. 3.3.15; 3.4.17); Thrace (Thuc. 7.27.1-2); Scythia (Snodgrass, Arms [as in n. 18] 82-84). Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 21; Anderson, Theory (as in n.18) 112; Tam, Military (as in n.2) 19-21; Parke, Soldiers (as in n.2) 16; Godfrey Hutchinson, Xenophon and the Art of Command (London 2000) 28, 231; Snodgrass, ibid. 78. The Athenians and Spartans used local peltasts with their hoplites when they fought in Thrace and the Chalcidice (e.g., Thuc. 2.79.4; 4.123.4; 4.129.4; 5.6; 5.10), and also peltasts from Olynthus (Thuc. 2.79.3-4; Xen. Anab. 1.2.6), all areas near to Thrace (Best, Peltasts [as in n.34] 13 and n.72). The javelin had a short range and little penetrating power (Anderson, Hoplite Weapons [as in n.31] 21; Adcock, ibid. 15); the sling did not penetrate and was primarily a nuisance. The arrow was more dangerous, but could not penetrate shields and was not popular outside of Crete (Snodgrass, ibid. 80-81; Adcock, ibid. 15; Tarn, ibid. 6). On Cretan archers: Plato, Laws 625D. It was considered unmanly to use the bow (e.g., Eur. Herc. 160-164; Snodgrass, ibid. 80-81; Garlan, War [as in n.21 128; Hanson, Western [as in n.31] 16; Hdt. 9.72.2; Plut. Mor. 234 E46). Archers are not mentioned in pitched battles (Anderson, Hoplite Weapons [as in n.3 1] 22), and archers could not stand against the phalanx (Adcock, ibid. 15-16). Javelins were the primary weapons of Homeric and Dark Age warriors (P.A.L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare [Cambridge 1973] 41, 73). Archaic and classical peltasts used a leather shield (Snodgrass, ibid. 78). Cf. 0. Lippelt, Die griechischen Leichtbewaffneten bis auf Alexander den Grojien (Diss. Jena 1910). The only success of the light-armed, outside Aetolia, was at Sphacteria (Tarn, ibid. 6).

37 Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 4-6. Slingers rarely played a role in classical battles and did not form a standard part of the classical army - except at Himeras in 31 1 (Diod. 19.109.1-2; Pritchett V [as in n.2] 21). The peltast originated in Thrace but was not significant until the Peloponnesian War when the Athenians employed some mercenary Thracian peltasts (Thuc. 7.27.1-2; 4.129.2; Anderson, Theory [as in n.18] 113-114; Best, Peltasts [as in n.34]; Snodgrass, Arms [as in n.181 98). In 408 the Athenian Thrasyllus armed five thousand sailors, probably rowers, as peltasts (Xen. Hell. 1.2.1-9; Anderson, Theory [as in n.18] 114). The Boeotians had ten thousand infantry and five hundred peltasts at




ly in mountain passes where they could shoot down at the enemy, against and with cavalry,38 and on both sides in sieges to protect walls or hinder defenders.39

In the fourth century the mercenary peltast became important.40 He was armed with a light shield41 and a lighter spear or javelin, and was consequently more flexible.42 Light-armed troops were used on the mountain frontiers be-

Delium (Thuc. 4.93.3); and the Syracusans were supplied with Sicilian javelins (Thuc. 7.33.1). Cf. Thuc. 4.123.4; 2.79.4; 4.129.2. Most classical light-armed were javelin-men (Snodgrass, Arms [as in n. 181 78). The Athenian Demosthenes, who "saw that the light- armed infantry were, in some sorts of encounter, the effective answer to the heavily- armed hoplite," usually had a light-armed force of javelin-men available (George Cawk- well, Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War [London and NY 1997] 50; cf. Thuc. 7.31.5; 7.33.4-5; 7.35.1; 7.42.1; hoplites and archers [Thuc. 3.107.2]; light-infantry [Thuc. 4.67.2]; Best, Peltasts [as in n.34] 19-29). Demosthenes used hoplites and light- armed troops to ambush the Spartans at Olpae (Thuc. 3.107.3-108.1). But Thucydides says that the Spartans by custom did not usually use cavalry or archers (Thuc. 4.55.2; 4.40.2). Most references to classical light-armed forces are to non-Greeks, particularly Persians (e.g., Xen. Anab. 1.9.5; 3.3.6-8, 15; 3.4.15-18, 25-26; 4.1.16; 4.2.12, 27) and other eastern tribesmen (Xen. Anab. 5.4.23. Pritchett V [as in n.21 9-13). Darius used twenty thousand slingers and archers with his cavalry on his right wing and six thousand javelin-men and slingers in the front of his line at Issos (Curt. 3.9.1-11). The sling and javelin were traditional Libyan fighting weapons (Diod. 3.49).

38 In 415 BC Nicias was supplied with seven hundred Rhodian slingers (Thuc. 6.43) and Cretan archers (Thuc. 6.25.2; 6.43) for use against enemy cavalry since the stones frightened horses (Thuc. 6.22; 6.25.2). For slingers against and with cavalry, see also Thuc. 6.22; 7.6.2; Arr. 5.13.4. Javelins with cavalry (Thuc. 6.67; 7.11.2; 7.37.3; 7.42.6); archers with cavalry (Thuc. 2.13.8).

39 Mountain passes (e.g., Xen. Anab. 5.4.23-25, 30; Xen. Hell. 2.4.12-16; 3.5.19-20; 4.6.8; 7.1.19; Hutchinson, Xenophon [as in n.36] 75); in sieges (e.g., Thuc. 3.23.3-4; 4. 100. 1; 5.84.1; 7.11.2; 7.43.2; Polyb. 4.61.2; Xen. Hell. 4.7.6; 7.1.15; Aen.Tact. 38.4-8; Diod. 20.85.3; Pritchett V [as in n.2] 7-8, 14-15, 58, 60; Anderson, Theory [as in n.18] 138- 139; Hutchinson, Xenophon [as in n.36] 157). Light-armed marines fought on ships (Thuc. 7.62.2; 7.70.5).

40 A group of these, some of them Thracians, accompanied the March of the Ten Thousand (Xen. Anab. 1.2.3, 6; 3.3.15; 5.6.15; Anderson, Theory [as in n.18], 112, 115; Griffith, Mercenaries [as in n.2] 5). Jason of Thessaly in 374 not only gathered twenty thousand hoplites but also had enough peltasts "to be set in array against the whole world," says Xenophon (Xen. Hell. 6.1.19). But Jason does not appear to have done anything with this force. Mercenaries in general were increasingly important in the fourth century and later (e.g., E.M. Anson, "The Hypaspists: Macedonia's Professional Citizen-Soldiers," Histo- ria 34 [1985] 246-248, 246).

41 The peltast was so called because of his pelta, a light shield of hide (Anderson, Theory [as in n.18] 112; Snodgrass, Arms [as in n.18] 78). But the Macedonian peltast carried a bronze shield (Hatzopoulos, L'organisation [as in n.2] 71).

42 E.g., Xen. Hell. 4.5.13-16; Nep. Iphicr. 11.1.3-4; Anderson, Theory (as in n.18), 129- 131; Tarn, Military (as in n.2), 6-7, 10; Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 22-23.




tween Attica and Boeotia43 and in the passes between Corinth and Sicyon.44 But these examples do not involve specialized training, guerilla tactics, or night warfare.45 Although most fourth-century Greek states used peltasts as a light- armed force with the phalanx,46 there were few attempts to use peltasts in new ways: in fact, two Spartan attacks using peltasts resulted in great defeats at the hands of cavalry.47 Perhaps as a result, the Spartans had contempt for peltasts.48 Only the Athenian Iphicrates, who trained peltasts as a special unit, and later Alexander the Great and Philip V could afford the great expense of drilling special units of mercenary light-armed troops.

Alexander the Great dramatically changed Greek fighting with the Macedo- nian phalanx,49 and he used several kinds of force rather than just heavy infantry. Alexander developed his cavalry into the premier method of fighting in the Hellenistic period and he used heavy-armed hypaspists in battle.50 Alexander also had two special groups of mercenary light-armed fighters with his Macedonian phalanx of heavy infantry, one armed with javelins and the other with the bow (mostly Thracian javelin-men and Cretan archers).51

But after Alexander, the light-armed forces are rarely mentioned and did not play an important role in the battles of the Hellenistic states. Tam remarks:

43 Xen. Mem. 3.5.25-27. Anderson, Theory (as in n.18) 132. 44 Xen. Hell. 4.2.14-16. Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29) 79. 45 Anderson, Theory (as in n. 18) 120. 46 E.g., Xen. Hell. 3.2.16. 47 The Spartan Phoebidas at Thespiae in 378 used peltasts and hoplites against Theban

hoplites and cavalry but was routed (Xen. Hell. 5.4.42-45). The Spartan Teleutias in 382 attacked the Olynthians with mercenary peltasts but was routed by the cavalry (Xen. Hell. 5.3.3-6; Anderson, Theory [as in n.18] 126-128). At Nemea in 394 the Lacedaemonians and their allies had 13,500 hoplites, 700 cavalry, 300 Cretan archers, and 400 slingers; the Athenians and their allies had 24,000 hoplites, 1550 cavalry, and many light-armed, including Acamanians and others (Xen. Hell. 4.2.16-17).

48 Xen. Hell. 4.4.17. Anderson, Theory (as in n.18) 1 10: despite Xenophon's experiences with how hoplites were "ineffective against light-armed troops," he was convinced that "the infantry should be equipped for close combat, not for skirmishing." In the 390s the Spartan king Agesilaus did use peltasts and archers but these were apparently dispersed after Coroneia (Best, Peltasts [as in n.34] 81-85; J.F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army [Warminster 1985] 39).

49 Anderson, Theory (as in n.18) 129-131; Hatzopoulos, L'organisation (as in n.2) 55; Diod. 16.3.1-2. Philip II may have borrowed Iphicrates' innovations with the peltasts' shield (Diod. 15.44; Nep. Iphicr. 11.1.3-4) in his reorganization of the Macedonian phalanx (Anderson, ibid. 128-129, 13 1. Pritchett II [as in n.21 117-125).

50 Cavalry: Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 11. Polybius says that Alexander used peltasts in battle (Polyb. 12.17.7). But Griffith, Mercenaries (as in n.2) 17 and Tarn, ibid. 16-17 believe that Alexander's "peltasts" were really heavy-armed hypaspists.

51 Tam, Military (above n.2) 11, 20-22; Snodgrass, Arms (as in n. 18) 115. Arr. 3.25; 4.7, 25, 26, 29; 5.13.4; 5.14, 20, 23; 6.2, 6. But these were few in comparison to Alexander's forces as a whole (cf. Adcock, Art of War [as in n.2] 24; Griffith, Mercenaries [as in n.2]




In his use of light-armed Alexander was developing a new form of warfare. ... But it seems to have been a line of warfare which underwent no further development after his death, though if we had Seleucid history we might conceivably be able to add something as regards the employment of light- armed in mountain warfare.52

The Antigonids used peltasts and javelins in battle, but they fought with the phalanx and protected its flanks.53 In the east, Antiochus seems to have continued the Persian tradition of employing light-armed archers, slingers, and javelins.54 Yet in the Hellenistic and Roman armies, light-armed javelins, slingers, and archers were rare and were primarily used in the traditional ways: they protected and harassed cavalry and elephants, skirmished, defended walls in sieges, protected the flanks of heavy troops, and fought in mountain passes.55 But they played no major role in battles.56

Nevertheless, light-armed raiding forces were a mountain tradition: although the Spartans relied on their heavy-armed hoplites, they used peltasts on

12-15; Parke, Soldiers [as in n.2] 20-22, 73-132; Pritchett I [as in n.21 59-125). At Issos Alexander used slingers and bowmen in the front of his line (Curt. 3.9.1-1 1; Arr. 3.14). Alexander tried to keep his phalanx as flexible as possible; Tarn believes he planned to replace his middle ranks with archers and light-armed troops (Tarn, ibid. 13 who cites Asclepiodotus 6; cf. Arr. 7.23.3).

52 Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 22-23. 53 E.g., levis armaturae praesidio Livy 35.26.16. The Macedonian peltast was different

from the fourth century peltast: he fought with the phalanx and carried the sarissa, but also had a lighter bronze shield (see Hatzopoulos, L'organisation [as in n.2] 71; Polyb. 22.9.3). Antigonus Doson had 3000 peltasts, 1000 Agrianes, 300 horse, and a phalanx of 10,000 for a total of 28,200 at Sellasia in 222 (Polyb. 2.65.2-5; cf. Hatzopoulos, ibid. 74).

54 Antiochus used 2000 Agrianian and Persian slingers and archers, and 500 Lydian javelins (with 62,000 foot) at Raphia in 217 (Polyb. 5.79.6-13; 5.82.11); archers, slingers, and javelins in 210 when he advanced into Parthian mountains (Polyb. 10.30.5-9); light- armed forces, including slingers at Thermopylae in 191 (Livy 36.18.3-5); and slingers and archers in 190 at Magnesia (Livy 37.41.9-10) (Pritchett V [as in n.21 60, 64-65). Ptolemy used 2000 Boeotian peltasts (with a phalanx of 25,000) at Raphia (Polyb. 5.65.2; 5.82.4; 5.84.9).

55 E.g., against Carthaginian elephants (Polyb. 1.40.6-13); defending Libyan walls (Polyb. 1.43.6); javelins protecting Roman cavalry (Polyb. 3.69.8; 3.72.2; 3.110.6); Romans' javelins skirmishing with cavalry (Polyb. 3.73.3); Antiochus' archers, slingers, and mountaineers expert in javelins and stones were "most useful on difficult ground" (Polyb. 10.29.5); Antiochus' slingers, archers, and javelins were able to advance over rocks and fight on hills (Polyb. 10.30.5-9); Antiochus' archers and slingers protected his elephants (Polyb. 16.18.7).

56 Antigonus Doson's peltasts and Agrianian javelins at Sellasia in 223 played no special role in the battle (Polyb. 2.65.2), and neither did Antiochus III's ten thousand peltasts in Bactria in 208 (Polyb. 10.49.3-4). Tam, Military (as in n.2) 27 says that Raphia was decided by heavy infantry.




their plundering raids into Arcadia and Messenia.57 The Aetolians were known for their javelin-men who had defeated Demosthenes.58 The Aetolians were also notorious for their ability to fight on hills,59 something that was very difficult for heavily armed men.60 The Acarnanians were famous for their slingers6i and they also fought with javelins.62 Xenophon notes the bravery of his Arcadian peltasts, who were commanded by an Acarnanian.63 The Achae- ans and Acarnanians used slingers because of their mountainous terrain,64 and Elian slingers were with the Lacedaemonian army at Nemea in 394.65 The Achaeans and Arcadians knew the light-armed fighting practiced by their enemies and they required light armor to move easily and quickly in mountain passes. But there is no evidence that the Achaean Confederacy used light- armed forces, especially peltasts, in battles or raids before Philopoemen's reforms.66

Philopoemen's originality and special forces in Greek warfare

Philopoemen's originality at Pleiae consisted in his combination of a use of light-armed forces, not only peltasts but also slingers and javelins; amphibious landings from ships followed by an immediate raid; the use of native light- armed troops rather than foreign mercenaries; and use of light-armed forces in a commando-style raid at night against an enemy camp and then in multiple ambushes. This is the first major use of "special forces" (i.e., specialized, rapid,

57 And in Bithynia (Xen. Hell. 3.2.1-2). Parke, Soldiers (as in n.2) 44; Anderson, Theory (as in n.18) 120; Best, Peltasts (as in n.34) 97-101.

58 Thuc. 3.94.4; 3.97.3; 3.98.1. 59 Polyb. 4.11.6-4.12; 4.14.6. Thuc. 3.94-98; Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 17-18. 60 Polyb. 12.22.4; Thuc. 4.33.2. 61 Thuc. 2.81.8. 62 Thuc. 7.31.5; 7.67.2; Xen. Hell. 4.6.7-11. 63 Xen. Anab. 4.8.18. More than half of Xenophon's army consisted of Achaeans and

Arcadians (Xen. Anab. 6.2.10) but they were mostly hoplites. Many of the peltasts were Thracians (Xen. Anab. 6.2.16). But the Acamanians were known for their peltasts (Xen. Hell. 4.6.7; J. Roisman, The General Demosthenes and His Use of Military Surprise [Stuttgart 1993] 29, 3 1-32).

64 Philip V used 300 Achaean slingers at the siege of Ambracus (Polyb. 4.61.2) and Achaean slingers had longer range and greater accuracy than the Balearic islanders (Livy 38.29.3- 8; Pritchett V [as in n.2] 55).

65 Xen. Hell. 4.2.16. Also Cretan bowmen. 66 The Achaean army under Aratus in 217 only consisted of Achaean and mercenary

infantry and horse (Polyb. 5.91.6-7). There is no evidence that the Achaean Confederacy used peltasts in battle before Philopoemen's reforms. Philopoemen in 201 sent "picked troops" (Polyb. 16.37.2-7) against Nabis, but it is not clear if these were peltasts. See above n.25.




and innovative light troops that performed special missions) in ancient Greece and it is the first time that light-armed troops prosecuted nearly an entire war.

Philopoemen's mixture of light-armed peltasts, archers, and javelins in a special raid is unusual. Although Xenophon reports that archers, slingers, and peltasts formed part of the army of Greek Mercenaries in the March of the Ten Thousand,67 these all fought together only when the Greeks attacked a mountain fortress68 and when all the Greeks tried to repel an attack by Mossynoecian slingers in the mountains.69 In 404 Thrasybulus attacked the troops of the Thirty with hoplites, peltasts, javelins, and stones when they were marching up Munichia.70 The Athenians in 403 attacked the Spartan King Pausanias with slingers, javelins, arTows, and hoplites at the Piraeus.71 But these are examples of traditional uses of light-armed troops in mountains and sieges, and they were mostly used with hoplites.

Demosthenes used a combination of light-armed forces at Sphacteria, but they were initially employed in the traditional way, to protect the flanks and rear of his hoplites.72 It was the light-armed troops themselves at Sphacteria who, emboldened by their success, decided on the spur of the moment to act together and charge the Spartans.73 At Sphacteria a group of light-armed troops encircled the Spartans by moving along the precipitous shore of the island and attacking from the rear,74 but these were not a specially trained unit and they did not operate at night or use fire or other guerilla tactics.75 Roisman, indeed, argues that the peltasts on Sphacteria were of little importance compared to the archers and slingers and were no model for Iphicrates.76 The only example77 of

67 Xen. Anab. 5.6.15; Xen. Oec. 8.6. 68 Xen. Anab. 5.2.12-16. 69 Xen. Anab. 5.4.23-25. 70 Xen. Hell. 2.4.12-19. 71 Xen. Hell. 2.4.33. 72 Thuc. 4.32.3-4; 33.1. 73 Thuc. 4.34-35. 74 Thuc. 4.36. 75 Best, Peltasts (as in n.34) 24-25 believes that Demosthenes used guerilla tactics at

Sphacteria and in later raids, but the evidence is weak. Although Demosthenes introduced the ambush to the battlefield at Olpae (Thuc. 3.107.3), Roisman points out that Olpae was "'primarily a hoplite battle" and only 300 Acarnanian light-armed troops were involved, and argues that Demosthenes followed Acarnanian advice and tactics and was himself a "traditional hoplite general," not an innovator (Roisman, Demosthenes [as in n.63], 29, 31-32; contra N.G.L. Hammond, "The Campaigns in Amphilochia during the Archidam- ian War," BSA 37 [1936-19371 128-140, 138 who notes Demosthenes' skill in using light-armed troops against a superior army).

76 Roisman, Demosthenes (as in n.63) 40 and n.76: "the battle on Sphacteria could have taught Iphicrates little. For example, the peltasts who in later years played an important role in land warfare were not distinguished from other light-armed troops on Sphacteria. Most of the damage done to the Spartans was the work of archers, slingers, javelin throwers and plain




several types of light-armed forces used in a special raid occurs in 329 when Alexander the Great with hypaspists, archers, and Agrianian javelins - a mixture of light-armed mercenaries and heavy forces - went through river channels to enter and capture the city of Cyropolis.78

The fourth century Athenian Iphicrates was the first to realize the potential of a specially trained mercenary force of peltasts. Because money from Persia made extensive training possible,79 Iphicrates gathered mercenaries at Corinth and drilled them as a unit of peltasts. Iphicrates became famous80 after his peltasts armed with javelins attacked and destroyed a division of Spartan hoplites at Lechaeum in 390.81 Iphicrates won a second victory with his peltasts against hoplites in 389 when he used peltasts to ambush the enemy.82 Iphicrates experimented with ambushes;83 moreover, in 388 the Athenians landed 800 peltasts and hoplites on Aegina and ambushed many Aeginetans.84 But few others after Iphicrates copied either his methods or his successful use of specially trained peltasts. His achievement was not repeated until Alexander the Great85 and Philip V, who were the only ones able to afford special troops. Moreover, Iphicrates' peltasts primarily fought with the phalanx, not on raids,86

stone shooters." Cf. E.C. Woodcock, "Demosthenes, Son of Alcisthenes," HSCP 39 (1928) 93-108, 101; Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 18. But Lazenby, Spartan (as in n.48) 120.

77 In 389 Acamanian peltasts seeking booty attacked the Spartan Agesilaus with stones and arrows - and about three hundred fell to the Spartan hoplites (Xen. Hell. 4.6.7-1 1). These were pirates, not special forces.

78 Arr. 4.3.2. Alexander the Great usually put his archers, Agrianes, and javelins on his wings in battle (Arr. 5.13.4). Although Philip V in 210/9 sent 1000 peltasts and 500 Agrianian javelins to protect Euboea (Polyb. 10.42.2), these were defensive forces. Antigonus Doson had 3000 peltasts and 1000 Agrianian javelins at Sellasia in 223, but the battle was won by the cavalry and infantry (Polyb. 2.65.2).

79 Pritchett II (as in n.2) 117, 123. Anderson, Theory (as in n. 18) 121. Ar. Plut. 170-173; Lysias 33.

80 Cawkwell, Thucydides (as in n.37) 50; Anderson, Theory (as in n. 18) 129. Pritchett II (as in n.2) 122-124: but "[t]he citizen-hoplite, not the mercenary peltast, won or lost the day at Leuktra, Mantineia and Chaironeia."

81 Xen. Hell. 4.5.1 1-17. 82 Xen. Hell. 4.8.33-39. Little is known about Iphicrates' new type of armament for his

peltasts (Diod. 15.44; Anderson, Theory [as in n.181 129; Pritchett II [as in n.2] 125; Lippelt, Leichtbewaffneten [as in n.36] 64).

83 Xen. Hell. 4.4.15. Demosthenes ambushed the Peloponnesians with hoplites and light- armed Acarnanians (Thuc. 3.107-108), but this was in a pitched battle and did not involve specially trained forces. Cf. Thuc. 3.112.

84 Xen. Hell. 5.1.10. 85 Pritchett II (as in n.2) 117. Parke, Soldiers (as in n.2) 79-80 believes that after Iphicrates,

peltasts merely acted as hoplites. Cf. Diod. 15.44; F. Lammert, "Peltastai," RE XIX. 1.405 (1937).

86 Xen. Hell. 4.4.9; B.B. Rogers (ed.), The Plutus of Aristophanes (London 1907), v. n.l; Pritchett II (as in n.2) 121. Griffith, Mercenaries (as in n.2) 239: in the seventy years after




and at Lechaeum Athenian hoplites followed the peltasts and concluded battle.87

Alexander the Great made innovative use of his light-armed troops in pitched battles.88 He also used heavy-armed hypaspists, some as his bodyguard and others as a special unit that fought with the infantry, in ambushes, and on special expeditions.89 But they were heavy-armed, and Alexander's hypaspists were not peltasts.90 The Macedonian kings also preferred pitched battles to sieges or raids.91 Although Alexander developed some of his hypaspists as special forces, he rarely used them that way and they never were his primary weapon of war.

Philip V continued Macedonian experimentation with light-armed forces: he used a group of "picked peltasts" to ambush pursuing Aetolians in 218 BC,92 and in ambushes in battle in 21593 and 206.94 Philip V's peltasts were an important model for Philopoemen, who in 201 emulated Philip in battle when he sent "picked troops" (but not peltasts) to ambush Nabis' Spartan mercenar- ies95 and in 192 when he ambushed Nabis with caetrati. But Philip primarily used peltasts in conjunction with his phalanx.96 His peltasts were also very few

Iphicrates and before Alexander there is no trace of the Thracian peltast who appears to have been "driven ... from the market" by Iphicrates's peltasts.

87 Anderson, Hoplite Weapons (as in n.3 1) 22; Leonhard A. Burckhardt, Burger und Solda- ten. Aspekte der politischen und militarischen Rolle athenischer Burger im Kriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. (Historia Einzelschriften 101, Stuttgart 1996) 92-93 and n.76. Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-12, 17.

88 Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 19: "[N]o one can read Arrian without realizing that the greatest share in the conquest of Asia, after the cavalry, belonged to the light armed troops. No important State before Alexander, in the Greek-speaking world, had taken the use of light-armed troops in battle really seriously; their business had been scouting or pursuit, and they were essentially the arm of the more backward States." But Alexander did not take many light-armed troops into Asia (Hatzopoulos, L'organisation [as in n.2] 55).

89 E.g., Arr. 2.23.2; 2.24.4; 2.27.1; 4.3.2; 5.13.4. Hatzopoulos, L'organisation (as in n.2) 57-59 cites inscriptional evidence that indicates that the hypaspists were the royal guard in the Antigonid period. Cf. Anson, Hypaspists (as in n.40) 247-8; Theopompus (FGrHist 115 F 348).

90 Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 17) 290. Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 16-17 and Snodgrass, Arms (as in n. 18) 115 say that Alexander's hypaspists were the same as the phalanx. Griffith, Mercenaries (as in n.2) 17 says that Alexander's "peltasts" were probably heavy armed (citing Arr. 3.18.1) and were not his best troops. Griffith, ibid. 12-13 says Alexander crossed the Hellespont with only 1000 Cretans and Agrianes out of 30,000 foot.

91 Polyb. 18.3.4-7. 92 Polyb. 5.13.5-6. Philip also ambushed the Aetolians in 219 (Polyb.4.63.9). 93 Polyb. 8.14. 94 Livy 31.36.1-7. Cf. Livy 33.15.16. 95 Polyb. 16.37.2-7. 96 Grote, Soldnerwesen (as in n.2) 94. Walbank, Philip V (as in n.17) 291-293, citing

Griffith, Mercenaries (as in n.2) 319, says that Philip V's peltasts were really hypaspists




in number and did not play a major role in Macedonian battles.97 Moreover, Polybius' comments about the inflexibility of the Macedonian phalanx98 indicate that the Macedonian peltast was designed to fight with the phalanx, not separately from it.99

Nothing in the history of Greek warfare compares with Philopoemen's night raid by amphibious troops or his use of guerilla tactics, including fire. 10 Amphibious landings from small boats immediately followed by raids are very uncommon in Greek history for the obvious reasons that the phalanx required level ground to fight and was cumbersome to move by ship, and because rowing ships and even small boats required extensive drill.101 Even if troops were moved by ship at night, they regrouped and attacked or ravaged farmland during the day.'02 Amphibious landings were limited to Illyrians and other

- specially trained infantry - and probably were not light-armed. But Hatzopoulos, L'organisation (as in n.2) 71-72 argues that they were peltasts armed with the sarissa and small bronze shields who fought with the phalanx and on missions similar to the hypaspists' (cf. Snodgrass, Arms [as in n. 181 123). Philip's peltasts were sometimes used as royal guards, like hypaspists (Polyb. 5.16.2) but they were usually used to protect the flanks of a column, in pitched battle, or ambushes (4.64.6 [to protect river crossing]; 4.75.4 [with mercenaries and light infantry through mountain d6fil6]; 4.80.8; [with light infantry]; 5.4.9 [through wall]; 5.7.11-12 [with heavy infantry through pass]; 5.13.5-6 [ambush]; 5.22.9; 5.23.3-6 [with mercenaries, cavalry, and Illyrians at the Menelaium]; 5.23.8-10 [to protect river crossing]; 10.42.2 [sent to Euboea with Agrianian javelins]; 8.13.5-8.14 [with light infantry in ambush]). But Polybius always calls them peltasts, not hypaspists, and he would know the difference. He reports that his father Lycortas occupied Messene in 182 with peltasts (Polyb. 23.16.10). Polybius knew that Macedoni- an light-armed forces fought with the phalanx: he quotes a Macedonian saying that the first troops to be exposed in battle and to suffer loss are the "light and most active" but the phalanx and the heavy-armed troops get the credit for the result (Polyb. 10.25.1-2). Philip V's peltasts were not the same as light infantry (e?5ovot). See F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius Vol.3 (Oxford 1979) 789 (Addenda and Corrigenda 18.24.8-9).

97 Antigonus Doson had three thousand peltasts and one thousand Agrianes at Sellasia, out of 29,000 total (Polyb. 2.65.2; cf. Hatzopoulos, L'organisation [as in n.2] 74). This indicates that Macedonian peltasts, however well-trained, did not play a primary role in Hellenistic battles, were part of the phalanx, and were of minor importance. See Hatzo- poulos, ibid. 69 for the numbers of peltasts at Sellasia, Cynoscephalae, and Pydna.

98 Polyb. 18.31-32. 99 As Antigonus Doson's Macedonian peltasts did at Sellasia in 222 B.C. (Polyb. 2.65.2)

and Philip V's peltasts did at Cynoscephalae. See also Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 16-17. 100 The deliberate firing of a camp is almost unparalleled, but there is one example (Thuc.

1.49.5 [empty camp]). The fire on Sphacteria was accidental (Thuc. 4.30.2). Cf. Thuc. 2.77.2-6; 3.98; 4.100.3-4; Plut. Arat. 9.1-2.

101 For naval drills, Pritchett II (as in n.2) 225-229; Hdt. 6.12.3. If Philopoemen's peltasts rowed themselves, they would have required even more training.

102 E.g., Xen. Hell.5.1.10.




pirates,103 with the exception of the Spartans' landing on Sphacteria - a great disaster - and the dawn landing of 800 Athenian hoplites on Sphacteria,104 which was not a surprise attack. 105

It was also extraordinary to lightly arm native troops since light-armed forces required extensive specialized training beyond that of the citizen hoplite. 106 Whether Philopoemen armed his peltasts with many types of ordinance or used many different forces, he had to train his men extensively since only experts could fight on hills.107 Classical armies, Alexander, Antigonus Doson, and Philip V used foreign mercenaries, especially Agrianian javelins'08 and

103 Pritchett 1I (as in n.2) 177-189 cites only four examples of ambush from the sea (Hdt. 6.138.1; Polyaenus 1.39.1; 1.40.2; 5.22.4). But the Corcyraeans once sailed ashore and fired a Corinthian camp (Thuc. 1.49.5). Plato speaks of marines (hoplites on ships) jumping from ships when fleeing battle (not amphibious landings) (P1. Laws 706c). In 233/2 one hundred boats with five thousand Illyrians invaded Aetolia at night and advanced at dawn, but the surprised Aetolians routed them (Polyb. 2.3). But even the Illyrians rarely used amphibious landings (e.g., Polyb. 2.4.7-2.5; 2.9). Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos in 220 sailed from Illyria and attacked Pylos and then the Cyclades but this was not at night (Polyb. 4.16.6-8). For ancient piracy, see Pritchett V (as in n.2) 312-352. Greek states (except the Aetolians) did not practice piracy (Aetolians: Polyb. 9.34.9-11; 4.3.9-4.4.1; Diod. 28.1). (But see Plut. Philop. 4.1.)

104 Thuc. 4.11-12; 4.31.1. The Athenians landed on Sphacteria because of bad weather (Thuc. 4.3.1), although G. Wylie, "Demosthenes the General - Protagonist in a Greek Tragedy?", Greece and Rome 40 (1993) 20-30, 23 argues that the incident was planned (cf. Roisman, Demosthenes [as in n.631). Gylippus landed on Plemmyrium during the sea battle at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.23.1) but this was a spontaneous attack. Demosthenes attacked Ambraciots at dawn with Amphilochian light-armed (Thuc. 3.112.2-5). The Spartans attacked a fort on Salamis at night (Thuc. 2.93.2-4), but the landing was not amphibious and was not against an enemy army or navy.

105 Thuc. 4.30.4. But the Athenian hoplites did surprise the Spartan guard (Thuc. 4.32.1). 106 Diod. 15.85.5; Polyaenus 3.9.32; 3.9.35; Nepos Iph. 2.1-2; Xen. Hell. 6.1.5-6; Pritchett

II (as in n.2) 225, 228-229; Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29) 4. Jason of Pherae contrasted the lack of training of citizens with the training of mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 6.1.5), and light- armed forces were usually mercenaries. Philopoemen spent nearly eight months training Achaean troops to go against Machanidas in 207 (Polyb. 11.10.8-9).

107 Polyb. 4.14.6. Hanson, Warfare (as in n.29) 4. 108 E.g., Polyb. 10.42.2. But the Macedonians may not have used mercenaries as peltasts since

peltasts were a royal guard. Anson argues that Philip II's hypaspists were Macedonian citizens (Anson, Hypaspists las in n.40] 247-8 citing Theopompus [FGrHist 115 F 348] that Philip II's hypaspists were "picked men of the Macedonians"). But this provides no information for the Antigonids. N.G.L. Hammond, "Alexander's Non-European Troops and Ptolemy I's Use of Such Troops," BASP 33 (1996) 99-109, 101-102 suggests that some of Alexander's "hypaspists attending the courts" (Diod. 17.110.1) were from Alexander's regular "barbarian" troops, and there was a Ptolemaic Persian Guard (Hammond, ibid. 107- 109). Later in Egypt, Egyptians were included in the guard (Griffith, Mercenaries [as in n.2] 127). Cf. Tam, Military (as in n.2) 20-22 (Alexander's mercenary Agrianes and Cretans); Snodgrass, Arms (as in n.18) 78, 82-84, 106-107 (classical light-armed mercenaries).




Cretan archers, as light-armed troops, and Iphicrates employed only well- trained mercenary peltasts.109 Mercenaries were very important in the regular Hellenistic armies,110 and Philopoemen himself used mercenaries with his phalanx against Machanidas in 207.111 But when describing Philopoemen's battle against Machanidas, Polybius declares that a tyrant's mercenaries generally prevail because as much as the "civic force of a democracy is more courageous in action than the subjects of a tyrant by so much will a despot's mercenaries excel a democracy's mercenaries." A democracy no longer needs mercenaries when it destroys those who conspire against it, but a tyranny requires even more mercenaries since the despot depends on the strength of his foreign soldiers.112 Machanidas' mercenaries fought with courage while the Achaeans' mercenaries fled.113 Philopoemen's experiences against Machani- das convinced him that a democracy could not use mercenaries, and he consequently used Arcadians, not mercenaries at Pleiae.114 Philopoemen was truly innovative at Pleiae since he was the first to use citizen soldiers as light-armed special forces.

Raids on enemy camps were very unusual, and night warfare was almost non-existent in the Greek world: Thucydides says there was only one night attack in the Peloponnesian War between armies - Demosthenes at the Epipo-

109 Pritchett II (as in n.2) 118, who believes that Iphicrates' mercenaries were a mixture of Greeks and Asians. They were part of an allied force at Corinth (ibid. 120). Cf. Burck- hardt, Burger (as in n.87) 92. The Spartans in the Hellenistic period used mercenary Cretans, possibly archers (Griffith, Mercenaries [as in n.2] 94, 97-98.

110 Tarn, Military (as in n.2) 23-26. Griffith, Mercenaries (as in n.2) 318-319 says that the tendency in the Hellenistic period was to used a "citizen or national phalanx" but mercenaries as the light-armed troops. Cretans were particularly prominent as mercenaries (Griffith, ibid. 245).

111 Polyb. 1 1.1 1.4; Plut. Philop. 10.1. In 217 the Achaeans kept a "picked Achaean force" of 3000 foot and 300 horse, an equal number of Argives, and a mercenary force of 8000 foot and 500 horse (Polyb. 5.91.6-7). Aratus also used mercenaries in 217 (Polyb. 5.92.10; 5.94.1).

112 Polyb. 11.13.3-8. Arist. Eth.Nic. 3, 1116b15; Adcock, Art of War (as in n.2) 24. 113 Polyb. 11.14.1. 114 Paus. 8.50.9. Five hundred Cretans helped Philopoemen against Nabis (Polyb. 33.16.6)

but they were not archers. Philopoemen's "Cretan auxiliaries" that he used with his cavalry (Livy 35.38.8) were "fast-moving infantry" (e.g., velocissimi pedites Livy 31.36.7- 1 1) and don't seem to have been used at Pleiae (Cretensium levis armatura Livy 35.29.1 probably refers to the auxiliaries since they fought with the cavalry). Philopoemen may have drawn upon an Achaean tradition of slingers (e.g., Polyb. 4.61.2; Livy 38.29.3-8. Pritchett V [as in n.2] 55). But since the Arcadians were famous for their bravery and for hiring themselves out as mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 7.1.23), and for their Eparitoi (the Arcadian League's picked force of citizen-hoplites, Xen. Hell. 7.4.22-34), Philopoemen may have used experienced Arcadian mercenaries, who perhaps fought in Crete.




lae. 15 Pritchett concludes that there is no example of a night assault on an enemy camp by a Greek hoplite army.116 Infiltrating a camp was very dangerous and uncommon: Polybius cites one instance in which an Aetolian did this at night and remarks that the action was both brave and ill-planned."17 Dem- osthenes once used hoplites and light-armed Amphilochian javelins to attack an Ambraciot camp at dawn.118 Alexander the Great once led heavy infantry, hypaspists, Agrianes, and archers against an enemy camp at night."19 But in none of these few examples did the light-armed forces consist of specially trained citizens rather than foreign allies or mercenaries, and in none did light- armed fighting form the major part of the prosecution of a war nor did it result in a comprehensive victory over the enemy. Thracian peltasts favored night attacks,120 and they were a raiding technique of the Aetolians but not of regular Greek armies,121 for the same reason that Polybius condemned the ambush: it

115 Thuc. 7.43-44; Thuc. 3.112; Xen. Anab. 3.4.35. In the Peloponnesian War Demosthenes once used hoplites and light-armed troops to ambush the gate at Megara at night, securing it for the hoplites (Thuc. 4.67); Brasidas sent peltasts to storm the gate at Torone when traitors opened it (Thuc. 4.1 10-113). But these incidents relied primarily on hoplites and treachery inside the city. In 426 Demosthenes attacked the Ambraciots at dawn (Thuc. 3.112.3). Other examples all involve heavy-armed troops: Demosthenes unsuccessfully attacked the Epipolae at Syracuse with hoplites at night, with disastrous results (Thuc. 7.43; Roisman, Demosthenes [as in n.63] 59-63). In 215 Antiochus captured Sardis by sending men to seize the gate at night and to scale the walls so that two thousand men could enter the city (Polyb. 7.16-18). Aratus used four hundred "picked men" from his hoplites to climb the walls of Corinth at night (Plut. Arat. 21.1). But the Romans never fought battles at night (Polyb. 36.9.9; Livy 42.47.5). Alexander the Great rejected a night attack (Arr. 3.10).

116 Pritchett II (as in n.2) 171. For surprise attacks, see Pritchett, ibid. 156-176 and Krentz, Deception (as in n.31) 171; night attacks, Pritchett, ibid. 162-171 who includes the night attack on the Thessalian camp by the Phocians (Hdt. 8.27.3); Demosthenes' attack on the Ambraciots (Thuc. 3.112); Demosthenes on the Epipolae (Thuc. 7.43); the Athenians' night landing on Aegina in 388 and their daylight ambush (Xen. Hell. 5.1.10); and a number of attacks on cities at night. Thrasybulus in 404 attacked the troops of the Thirty near Phylae as they were leaving their camp at dawn (Xen. Hell. 2.4.5-7) - probably with hoplites. Cf. Roisman, Demosthenes (as in n.63) 59. Two attacks on cities: twenty Aetolians in 219 at Aegeira (Polyb. 4.57.3-58); Lagoras the Cretan took Sardis in 216 for Antiochus (Polyb. 7.16-18). Scipio sent half his legions in a night attack on the camp of Syphax near Utica while half attacked the Carthaginians. The huts of both camps were set on fire (Polyb. 14.4- 6). But Scipio used regular forces to overwhelm a camp on level ground.

117 Polyb. 5.81.1-7. 118 Thuc. 3.112 (at dawn but still dark); Krentz, Deception (as in n.3 1) 171; Best, Peltasts (as

in n.34) 19; Wylie, Demosthenes (as in n. 104) 22. 119 Arr.1.6.9-11. 120 Pritchett II (as in n.2) 170-17 1; Hdt. 6.45.1; Xen. Anab. 7.2.22; Polyaenus 2.2.6, 8, 10.

Iphicrates once made a night attack (Polyaenus 3.9.33). 121 Pritchett II (as in n.2) 171. Cf. Hdt. 8.27.3; Polyb. 4.25.3. The Cretans favored night

attacks (Polyb. 4.8.1 1).



Philopoemen's Special Forces: Peltasts and a New Kind of Greek Light-armned Warfare 275

was technique used by cowardly Cretans but not by brave Achaeans and Macedonians.122 Philopoemen effectively turned a Greek state army into a powerful and trained Cretan- and Acarnanian-style raiding force.

Polybius explains that the Macedonian heavy-armed phalanx was inade- quate because it was inflexible: the phalanx required level ground with no obstacles, which was almost impossible to find, and even if there was suitable terrain, if the enemy refused to fight on level ground but instead sacked cities and ravaged lands, "what is the use of such a formation?"123 Although the phalanx needed to march and camp in every kind of terrain, it was not able to do so. In most contingencies the phalanx was of little use because "the phalanx soldier is not of service either in detachments or individually."124 Polybius implies that Macedonian peltasts were not accustomed to fight in separate units. No matter how Philopoemen armed his peltasts, his use of them at Pleiae was different from that of the Macedonians. Philopoemen recognized the deficien- cies of the phalanx and created a new kind of army that was flexible, mobile, and able to act in small groups outside the phalanx.

Philopoemen's ideas for his new kind of fighting may be traced to several influences. As an Arcadian, he would have known traditional mountain light- armed fighting'25 and the Achaeans had experienced light-armed raids by their mountain enemies. Philopoemen also closely studied the military methods and tactics of the Macedonian kings who appreciated swiftness and the potential of light-armed troops.126 Philopoemen knew the value of Philip V's peltasts in ambushes in battle and against a line of march: Philopoemen used his peltasts to ambush Nabis in the same way Philip V did in ambushes in 215 at Acrolissusl27

122 Polyb. 4.8.11 who doesn't take into account the use of the ambush by Philip, Iphicrates, and Philopoemen. Cf. Hanson, Western (as in n.31) 13-18. Pritchett II (as in n.2) 177-189 collects examples of ambushes (including four by Demosthenes, two by Iphicrates, and three by Philip V) and concludes that the ambush was primarily used along a line of march or sail or against defenders of a city. Pritchett has only four examples of ambush by marauders from the sea: Hdt. 6.138.1; Polyaenus 1.39.1; 1.40.2; 5.22.4. It was very rare in battle because the phalanx had difficulty beyond level ground (Pritchett, ibid. 184-186).

123 "For by remaining on the ground that suits it, not only is it incapable of helping its friends but cannot even ensure its own safety. For the arrival of supplies will be easily prevented by the enemy, when they have undisturbed command of the open country. But if the phalanx leaves the ground proper to it and attempts any action, it will be easily overcome by the enemy." Polyb. 18.31 (W.R. Paton [trans.], Polybius the Histories [London and Cambridge, MA 1926]).

124 Polyb. 18.32.7-9. 125 The Arcadians were known for working as mercenaries, sometimes as peltasts (e.g., Xen.

Anab. 4.8.18). 126 Plut. Philop. 4.4. 127 Polyb. 8.14. Philip also ambushed the Aetolians in 218 using Illyrians and peltasts (Polyb.

5.13.5-6).




and in 206.128 Iphicrates also influenced Philopoemen not only through his famous victory over the Spartans (the greatest Spartan defeat since Sphacte- ria)129 and Iphicrates' use of peltasts and ambushes, but also because Iphicrates had invaded Arcadia and his peltasts had frightened the Arcadians.130 But although Iphicrates' and Philip's few ambushes with peltasts inspired Philopoe- men's subsequent ambushes of Nabis, they are not models for his night raid at Pleiae.

Demosthenes' efforts, more than two centuries earlier, are more relevant: in 425 he effectively used arrows, javelins, and slingers against the Spartans at Sphacteria,131 and the Athenians' dawn landing, attack, and use of light-armed troops there are somewhat similar to those at Pleiae. But peltasts were unimpor- tant at Sphacteria, and the attack was haphazard rather than a deliberate use of light-armed forces. Demosthenes also made two night attacks, but Epipolae was a disaster and illustrates the difficulties of a hoplite battle at night.

Philopoemen clearly knew the Battle of Caphyae in 220 BC and how the Megalopolitans were 4"compelled to bury the dead" Achaeans because of Ara- tus' folly in fighting on a hill with regular troops while the Aetolians prevailed with only their "cavalry and light infantry."'132 This impressed upon him the potential of light-armed fighting on rugged ground as well as its dangers for regular forces. But above all Philopoemen was influenced by his time in Crete where he learned about guerilla warfare in the land where piracy, raiding, ambushes, and archery predominated and where he adopted "Cretan tricks and wiles, thefts, and ambushes."133

All of these factors gave Philopoemen the impetus to make his reforms, yet none can specifically be cited as his model. An amphibious landing/surprise attack is very rare; fire and night attacks are highly unusual and together are unique; ambushes, especially not against a line of march, are equally uncommon; and non-mercenary, specially trained light-armed forces are exceptional. Moreover, Philopoemen did not just carry out one raid against Nabis but rather

128 Livy 31.36.1-7. 129 Xen. Hell. 4.5.10; Pritchett II (as in n.2) 122. But Iphicrates used hoplites with his peltasts

(Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-12, 17). 130 Xen. Hell. 4.4.16-17. 131 Thuc. 4.32.2-4. The Athenian light-armed kept the Spartan hoplites from advancing by

shooting missiles and were too quick for the Spartans to pursue them (Thuc. 4.33-34). Tam, Military (as in n.2) 6 says that this was the only important use of light-armed troops in the classical period before Iphicrates. Demosthenes' Acarnanians also used the ambush (Thuc. 3.112).

132 Polyb. 4.13.1-4; 4.11.6-4.12; 4.14.6. 133 Plut. Philop. 13.6. Errington, Philopoemen (as in n.2) 28; Griffith, Mercenaries (as in n.2)

104; also Plut. Philop. 7.2; 13.1-2; 14.1; Paus. 8.49.7; 8.50.6; Polyb. 4.8.11. Five hundred Cretans helped Philopoemen against Nabis (Polyb. 33.16.6). The Cretans were known for night attacks (Polyb. 4.8.1 1).




continued to pursue and ambush him with the result that he waged an entire war primarily with light-armed forces (and later, cavalry). There is an enormous difference between casual raiding and waging a major war with light-armed forces against the Spartan army. Philopoemen employed a new kind of fighting in 192 that was not only based on his study of military history and his practical experience in fighting but also his ability to "study the terrain" and consider what weapons and troops would be best in each situation.134 It was Philopoe- men's genius that he realized that using light-armed troops in an amphibious landing with a night raid would "strike terror"135 into the enemy and that additional ambushes by light-armed troops would ultimately lead to victory. Philopoemen, although he did not have the funding of Iphicrates or the Macedo- nian kings,'36 developed a special force that greatly damaged Sparta.

San Mateo, CA Mary Frances Williams

134 E.g., Plut. Philop. 4.5; Livy 35.28.1-7. 135 quoniam conterriti essent Livy 35.27.12; perculso metu Livy 35.29.1 1; paventium Livy

35.30.5. 136 Philopoemen often lacked money to pay his forces (Plut. Philop. 2.3; Griffith, Mercenar-

ies [as in n.2] 103).



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