hirsch, three dimensions of hermeneutics

7/22/2019 Hirsch, Three Dimensions of Hermeneutics

1/18

Three Dimensions of Hermeneutics

Author(s): E. D. Hirsch, Jr.Source: New Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 2, On Interpretation: I (Winter, 1972), pp. 245-261Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468314.

Accessed: 02/05/2014 08:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The Johns Hopkins University Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

New Literary History.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 14.139.86.166 on Fri, 2 May 2014 08:11:19 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/468314?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/468314?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhup


2/18

ThreeDimensions fHermeneutics

E. D. Hirsch,r.

IHow IMPORTANTre thetheoreticalisagreementshatnowdivide erious tudents f interpretation?ow true s theresignedpinion hatour various chools nd approachesare ike multitudefwarringects,achwithts wnuncompromisingtheology?s it thedestinyf thosewhopracticenterpretationeverto achieve n eucumenical armonyftheoreticalrinciples?f thatis ourdestiny,o muchtheworse or heory, hich s thenonly heideologyf a sect, nd so much hebetter or hecommon ense f apractitionerhodisdainsheoryogetonwithhiswork.

Formodes ffaithetgracelessealots ight;Hiscan't ewrong,hoseife s nthe ight.A theorist ouldbe rightoreplyhat herepudiationftheorynfavorof common ense mplies theoreticalosition,nd thatthe

commonaltyfcommonensewould eem o require wide measureof theoreticalgreementboutthenature fa sensible r goodinterpretation.n my opinion, uchimplicit greements notonlypossible utalreadywidely xtant.The appearance fdisagreement,which tself roduces o manyquarrels, an be traced back to atendencyf nterpretiveheoryo ump ogetherothwhat nterpretersagreeonand what nthenature fthecasethey an never greeon.The distinctionnmy itle etween arious imensionsfhermeneuticssuggests yeucumenicalurpose; yseparatinghe eparabletmaybe possible o disclose reasofagreementharedby apparentlyon-flictingheories.As a firsttep, proposehat nterpretiveheorieshouldnot umptogetherhedescriptivend thenormativespects f interpretation;

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/18

246 NEW LITERARY HISTORYthat theorists hould disengage the descriptivedimension of her-meneutics, hich oncerns henature f nterpretation,rom he norma-tivedimension,whichconcernstsgoals. For thegoalsof nterpretationare determined ltimately y value-preferences,nd interpreterso notexhibitmoreagreementn theirvalues than the generality f people.I know it is usual to argue,as Coleridgedid, that certainvalues andtherefore ertaininterpretive orms are permanently ooted in thenatureof iterature,hatthenormatives derivedfrom hedescriptive.I knowwhy Coleridgeand othershave held thisview in the historyof iteraryheory; heyhave desired permanent nd universal anctionforcertainevaluativenormsof literature,nd what morepermanentsanction could exist than the nature of literature ?By the samereasoning,t is convenient o derivepermanent,normativeprinciplesof interpretationrom the natureof interpretation.I find he structurefsuchreasoning ntirelyircular: good litera-ture s thatwhichconformso thetruenatureof iterature; ood inter-pretations thatwhichconforms o the truenatureof interpretation.But what sthis truenature except tautological ephrasingf goodliterature r good interpretation ? re therenot numerous xamplesof bad literature r bad interpretationhich do not conform o thistrue nature? Yet if thesebad examplesare piecesofliterature,ftheyare instancesof interpretation,heymust exhibitthe true natureofliterature r ofinterpretation.he Coleridgean rgument mports henormativento thedescriptive rom hebeginning, y sleight fhand.Stated bluntly, he nature of interpretations to construefromasign-systemfor short, text ) somethingmore than its physicalpresence. That is,thenatureofa text s tomeanwhateverwe construeit to mean. I am aware thattheory hould try o providenormativecriteria ordiscriminatingood frombad, legitimate rom llegitimateconstructionsf a text,but meretheory annotchange the natureofinterpretation.ndeed, we need a normprecisely ecause the natureofa text s to have no meaning exceptthatwhichan interpreter illsintoexistence.We, not our texts, re themakersof themeaningsweunderstand, textbeing only an occasion formeaning, n itself nambiguousform devoid of the consciousnesswheremeaning abides.One meaningofa textcan have no higher laim than anotheron thegroundsthat it derivesfromthe nature of interpretation, or allinterpretedmeanings re ontologicallyqual; they re all equallyreal.When we discriminate etween egitimate nd illegitimatemeanings nLycidas, forexample,we cannot claim merely o be describinghenatureofMilton'stext, or he text ompliantlyhanges tsnaturefrom



4/18

THREE DIMENSIONS OF HERMENEUTICS 247one nterpretero another.Thisontologicalqualityfall interpretedmeaningshows orthn the act hat ermeneuticheoryassanctionedjust about every onceivable orm of legitimacyn interpretation.From hishistoricalact inferhat nterpretiveormsre notreallyderivedromheory,ndthat heoryodifiesxpost acto he nterpre-tivenorms ealreadyrefer.To takea central xample rom hehistoryf interpretation:ytheeighteenthenturyn impressiveictoryad beenwon overcer-tainmedievalmodesofinterpretation,o thatbythen nachronisticallegorizingeemed o be permanentlyepudiated.Underthepost-medieval iew, inceHomer ndVergilwerenotChristianheir extscould not egitimatelye regarded s Christianllegories. chleier-macher,nthe ateeighteenthentury,asmerelyodifyingheworkof his humanisticredecessorshen he statedthe followings auniversalanonof nterpretation:Everythingn a given extwhichrequiresfuller nterpretationustbe explainedand determinedexclusivelyrom he linguisticomaincommon o the author ndhisoriginal ublic. 1Under thisprinciple,hristianllegorizingfthe ncientssdeprivedf ll egitimacy,ndtheway stherebypenedto an interpretationhat s truly istoricalnd scientific.Or,so itseemed oSchleiermacher.ut thehumanisticepudiationof anachronismsannot be upheldon purely ognitive r logicalgrounds.Under chleiermacher'sanon,no text an egitimatelyeanata later imewhat tcouldnothavemeant riginally,ut ogic lonehardly upportshis nference. he medieval nterpreterserewellawarethatHomerandVergilhad beenpaganswhocould not con-sciously ave intended r communicated hristianmeanings.TheexegetesftheMiddleAges mplicitlyeldtoanother rinciple hichcan be stated s follows: Everythingn a given extwhich equiresfullernterpretationeednotbe explainednd determinedxclusivelyfrom helinguisticomaincommon o the author nd his originalpublic. Which rincipleslogicallyhemore ompelling,hismplicitmedieval ne,or thatofSchleiermacher?he answers easy. Themedieval rincipleslogicallytrongerecause elf-evidentlytext anmean nythingt hasbeenunderstoodo mean. If an ancient exthasbeen nterpreteds a Christianllegory,hat s unanswerableroofthat t can be so interpreted.hus,the llegitimacyfanachronisticallegory,mplied ySchleiermacher'sanon, s deducedneitherromx F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg,I959), P. 90. The original reads: Alles was noch einer niheren Bestimmungbedarf in einer gegebene Rede, darf nur aus dem dem Verfasser und seinemurspriinglichen ublikumgemeinsamenSprachgebietbestimmtwerden.



5/18

248 NEW LITERARY HISTORYempirical fact nor logic. His norm of legitimacy s not, of course,deduced at all; it is chosen. It is based upon a value-preference,ndnot on theoretical ecessity.His preferenceororiginalmeaningoveranachronisticmeaningis ultimately n ethical choice. I would con-fidently eneralizefromthis example to assert that the normativedimensionof interpretations always in the last analysisan ethicaldimension.At thispointI shall not digress o take sides in the ethicaldisputebetweenthe anachronists nd the historicists,or wishto deal withthat ssueat the end ofthisessay. But I do pause to observe hattheexegeticalmorality f the medieval allegorizerss not necessarilyessadmirable than their ogic. Indeed, it seems to me thatboth Schleier-macher and those medieval interpretersepudiated by his canon arefollowing accordingto their differentightsthe verysame ethicalprinciple. For anachronisticmeaningand originalmeaninghave thisin common: theyare both attempts o achieve legitimacy nder thecriterion f the best meaning. In the history f interpretationtwould seemto be a constant rinciple hat the bestmeaning s to beconsidered he most egitimatemeaningofa text. The differencesrisein definingbest. An interpreterfthe thirteenthenturyould arguethat Christian llegory s a bettermeaningthan the original,paganone, while a humanist of the Renaissance could respondthat theoriginalmeaning n antiquitys superior o anythat could be imposedby the gracelesscultureof the Middle Ages. In the late eighteenthand early nineteenth enturyRomantics like Schleiermacher ouldextend the humanist traditionwith the argumentthat the originalmeaning s alwaysthe bestmeaningno matterwhat theprovenence fthetext,because every ulturehas infinite alue in itsown right;eachculture s a note in the divinesymphony,s Herder rhapsodized;oras Ranke preached,every ge is immediate o God. Althoughwe nolongershoreup our historicism ithsuch quasi-religious onceptions,the romanticideal of cultural pluralismhas continued to be thedominant thicalnormfor nterpretationuringmostofthenineteenthand twentiethenturies: it is morecomprehensivend morehumaniz-ing to embracethe plurality f cultures hanto be imprisonedn ourown. We ought hereforeo respect riginalmeaning s thebest mean-ing, the most legitimatenorm forinterpretation.Only recently ashistoricismurnedback uponitself o announce thatwe are imprisonedin ourown culturewilly-nilly,nd we musttherefore eturn o a quasi-medieval conceptionof interpretation,amelythatthe bestmeaning(forthatmatter nymeaning) mustbe anachronisticwhetherwe likeit or not. Under thisrecentconception, he best meaning reveals



6/18

THREE DIMENSIONS OF HERMENEUTICS 249itselfs a self-conscious,thical hoice s towhat s best for stodayaccordingo some tandard hat scompellingnourpresent istoricalcircumstances.If the normative imensionf hermeneuticselongs, s I haveargued, o thedomainofethical hoice, s it neverthelessossible odiscoverrulyniversalrinciplesf he ort chleiermachernvisioned,principleshatdo notdependon thevalue-preferencesf individualinterpreters?s therenhermeneuticsn analytical imension hich,incontrastothenormative,s logicallyeductive,mpiricallyescrip-tive, ndneutral ith especto values ndethical hoices?The spiritofthepresentge inclines s skepticallyo assume hat ucha pre-tense fobjective eutralityouldmerelye a maskfor particularset of values. Yet if we couldmanage o find n area ofagreementshared y widely ifferentnterpretiveects,hen herealityfa trulydescriptiveimension f hermeneuticsould come to seem moreplausible.And f theareaoftheoreticalgreementouldbe graduallyenlarged,heremightmerge sense f communityn thedisciplineof nterpretation,sense fbelongingoa commonnterprise.

IIOne example fa purely escriptiveheoreticalonception,nd onethat eems o mepotentiallyruitfuls the distinctionetweenmean-ingandsignificance. hen firstroposedhis istinctionymotiva-tion was farfromneutral; equatedmeaning implywithoriginalmeaning,nd I wished o pointup the ntegritynd permanenceforiginalmeaning.2 his earlier iscussion nowregard s being nlya special pplicationfa conceptionhat s inprincipleniversal. orthedistinctionetweenmeaningndsignificanceandthe larificationsit provides) re notlimited o instances heremeanings equatedwith heauthor's riginalmeaning; t holdsas wellfor nyand allinstancesf anachronisticeaning. 3Thisuniversalityn the distinctions readilyeen fmeanings de-fined out ourt s thatwhich text staken orepresent. o norma-2 The structureof this distinction owe to the writingsof Husserl and Frege,whose influence acknowledge in the earlier piece alluded to, Objective Inter-pretation, PMLA, 75 (Sept. 196o).3 This is a shorthand,not a pejorative term which comprises all non-authorialmeaning,whetheror not such meaning was possible within the linguisticdomaincommon to the author and his original public. I use the termin preferencetonon-authorial meaning because the chief disputes have centered, as Schleier-macher's canon suggests, n the question of historicity.Either term would serve.



7/18

250 NEW LITERARY HISTORYtive imitations re importednto the definition,ince under t,mean-ing s simplymeaning-for-an-interpreter.oreover, hedefinition oesnot (and did not in my earlierdiscussion) limit itselfmerelyto aparaphrasableor translatablemessage, but embraces very spectofrepresentation,ncludingthe typographical nd phonemic,which aninterpreteronstrues.My earlierdefinition fmeaningwas too narrowand normative nly n that t restrictedmeaning o those constructionswherethe nterpreters governed yhisconception f theauthor'swill.The enlargeddefinition ow comprises onstructions here authorialwill is partly r totallydisregarded.

The important eatureof meaning as distinct romsignificancesthatmeaning is the determinate epresentationf a textfor an in-terpreter.An interpretedext s alwaystaken to representomething,but that omethingan alwaysbe related osomethinglse. Significanceis meaning-as-related-to-something-else.f an interpreterid not con-ceive a text'smeaning o be there s an occasionforcontemplation rapplication,he would have nothing o thinkor talk about. Its there-ness, tsself-identityrom ne moment o the nextallows t to be con-templated. Thus, whilemeaning s a principle f stabilityn an inter-pretation, ignificancembracesa principleof change. Meaning-for-an-interpreteran stay the same althoughthe meaningfulnesssig-nificance)ofthatmeaningcan changewith the changingcontexts nwhich that meaning is applied. An interpreterould, for instance,find the following o be variouslymeaningful: The cat is on themat, dependingon whetherthe cat has left the mat, on whetherhe likes ats,and so on. The point s notthat an interpreter ust pplymeaning o changing ontexts,ut that he could do so and stillbe ablein every ase to construe is text s representingn identicalmeaning.Alternative indsof semantic lassificationan, of coursebe made,as the workofIngardendemonstrates,ut I conceivethisdual classifi-cation to be deeplyfundamental nd non-arbitraryecause of thedouble-sidednessfspeech. An interpreters alwaysplaying wo rolessimultaneously-asspeaker (or re-speaker)ofmeaningand as listenertomeaning. Bothmoments renecessary,or fthe text snot spoken(construed) t cannotbe heard, and if t s notheard, tcannothavebeen, for the interpreter,poken. Meaning is what an interpreteractualizesfrom text; significances that actual speaking s heardina chosen and variable contextof the interpreter'sxperientialworld.The mainobjection othisdistinctionetween principle fstabilityand a principle fchangehasbeenthat tfails odescribewhatactuallytakesplace in theprocessofinterpretation.t is said that the distinc-tionproposeswhatis in facta psychologicalmpossibility.f thiswere



8/18

THREE DIMENSIONS OF HERMENEUTICS 251so the objectionwould be fatal,since empiricaltruth s the ultimatearbiter ftheoriesnthepracticaldisciplines.But I doubttheempiricalvalidityof the objection,which impliesthat the interpreter's ind isnot divisible, annot be in two places at once. As I have just sug-gested,the veryfoundationof the distinction etweenmeaning andsignificance s that doubling of the mind which is omnipresent nspeech,and is called by linguists de'doublement e la personalitd. 4Such doubling s not a matterof doubt among students f literature,who knowmyriad xamplesofself-multiplicationithin heboundariesof individual works. When a writer utson a maskfor roniceffect,as in Swift's A Modest Proposal, the interpreter's ind must be intwoplaces at once as he entertains oth theperspective fthe modestproposer nd theperspective fSwift. n every ronicconstruction eentertain woperspectivest once,and there s not, think, ny rigidlimitation n the number of perspectiveswe can entertain t once.Similarly,when an interpretermphatically ejectsthe attitudes f aspeakerorwriter, e also adoptsthoseattitudesn order o reject hem.I have dwelt on meaning and significance ecause I believe thispurely nalyticaldistinctionan helpresolve omeof thedisagreementsin hermeneutics, articularly ertaindisagreementsnvolving he con-cept of historicity.This concept belongs to a third dimension ofhermeneutics-themetaphysical.AdherentsoHeidegger'smetaphysicstakethe view that all attemptsccurately o reconstructastmeaningsare doomedto failure incenot ustour textsbut also our understand-ingsare historical. t is the natureofman to have no permanently e-finednature distinct romhis historicallyonstituted xistence.What-ever we know is decisively ccommodatedto our own historicalworldand cannotbe known to us apart from hatdeterminingontext.Aninterpretermustthereforeearn to live with his historical elf ust asFreud would have him live withhis subliminal elf,not by trying onegate t,which s impossible, utby consciouslymaking hebestofit.Interpretersmake thebestof our historicityotby reconstructingnalien worldfromour textsbut by interpretinghem within our ownworldand making hem peakto us.

IIIThis metaphysical osition, kepticaland dogmaticat once, needs tobe isolatedfrom heanalyticaldimension f hermeneutics.No doubt t4 See Ch. Bally, Linguistique ge'ne'rale t linguistiquefranfaise,2nd. ed. (Bern,1944), P. 37-



9/18

252 NEW LITERARY HISTORYcan be argued that analysis lways carriesmetaphysicalmplications,and no doubt a shrewd ntologistould deducemetaphysical rinciplesfrom heanalyticaldistinction etweenmeaningand significance.YetI would wish to replythat the exercisewould be pointless, ince thedistinctiononcordswitha numberofdifferent etaphysical ositions.Moreover,I would argue that thereis far less danger in ignoringmetaphysicshan n introducingtprematurelyntothepracticalques-tionsofinterpretation. precocious scent nto the realmofontologyis justwhat needsto be avoided in the descriptive,nalytical ide ofhermeneuticheory.

It isa notable rony hatHeidegger'smetaphysicstself ependsupona purely nalyticalprinciple akendirectly romhermeneuticheory--namely hehermeneuticircle. This principleholdsthattheprocess funderstandings necessarily ircular, ince we cannot know a wholewithoutknowing omeof ts constituentarts,yetwe cannotknowthepartsas such withoutknowing hewholewhich determines heir unc-tions. (This principlecan be easilygraspedby self-consciouslyon-struing sentence.) In Sein und Zeit,Heideggerexpandsthe circum-ference f thehermeneutic irclebeyondtextual nterpretationo em-brace all knowing. Everywheren knowledge he whole is priorto itsparts, incethemeaningfulnessfa part s disclosed nly n itsrelationto or functionwithina largerwhole. The priorsense of the wholewhich ultimately ends meaning to any person's experienceis hisspiritualcosmos or Welt. But, since a person'sWelt is always con-stitutivelyistorical,t follows hat any meaningwe experiencemusthave been pre-accommodated o our historical world. We cannotescape the fact hatourhistoricalworld s a pre-givenfourexperienceand is therefore onstitutivef anytextual nterpretation.

This generalizedversion of the hermeneutic ircle seems at firstglance to supportthe positionthat accurate reconstructionf pastmeaning s impossible. t is futile oprojectourselvesnto thehistoricalpastwhereour texts rose, inceourownpresentworld s alreadypre-givenin our attemptedprojection. Our reconstructionan neverbeauthentic ecausewe can neverexclude our ownworldthroughwhichalone thepastwas disclosed. Our ownpresents thepre-givennd theforegone onclusion n any historicalreconstruction. f Heidegger'sversion f the hermeneuticircle scorrect,tfollows hat hetraditionalaims ofhistorical cholarship re largely llusory.The direct pplicationof thismetaphysical rgument o textual n-terpretationeemstome premature n at least twogrounds. First, hemetaphysical rinciple ays nothing bout subtlequestionsof degree.It arguesthat omedegreeof anachronism s necessarily resentn any



10/18

THREE DIMENSIONS OF HERMENEUTICS 253historicaleconstruction,utas towhether particulareconstructionis severelyr triviallyompromisedheprincipleaysnothing.Thehistoryf nterpretationxhibitsemarkableongruitiesetween iewsof, ay,Hamlet nthenineteenthnd twentiethenturies,nd showsremarkableonflictsf interpretationithin he confinesf eitherperiod.Obviously,hepre-givenistorical orld annot e thedecisivefactor hat ccountsnsuchcasesfor he imilaritiesetween ifferentperiods r theunreconcilableifferencesf interpretationithin hesameperiod.A prematureecourseometaphysicsn order oexplainthesenomaliesaneasily ecome facile ubstituteor erioushought,and historicaleconstructionan ceasetobe evena plausible oal ofinquiry. hatisnot,however,he ogical onsequencefHeidegger'smetaphysics.nderhisprinciplesll interpretationsre time-boundand anachronistic,oth thosewhich ttemptccurate econstructionand thosewhichdo not. Yet deliberate econstructionsre differentfrom eliberatenachronisms hetherr not we followHeidegger,and particulareconstructionaybe fairlyccurate ven underhisprinciples. t followshatthedecision o attempt reconstructioninstead fa vital, resent-daynterpretations not, fter ll,governedbymetaphysics.ven fHeideggers right,he twokinds fattemptarebothpossible,nd thedecision omake nekind fattemptatherthan heother emainsn ethical hoice, ot metaphysicalecessity.The second nd more mportantbjectiono carrying eidegger'smetaphysicsirectlynto the theory f interpretations that hisexpanded ersionfthehermeneuticircle s ncrucial espects roba-blywrong.The principlefthehermeneuticircle oesnot ead in-evitably o dogmatichistoricalkepticism.f an interpretationsgroundedn the nterpreter'sntireWelt,twillno doubtbe differentfromnypastmeaning,inceundoubtedly person's ntirepiritualworldwillbe differentromny hat xistednthepast.Yet t sopentoquestion hetherhewhole hatprestructureseaningmust e con-ceived n thiscomprehensiveay. The very ntroductionf his-toricity s a chief haracteristicf Weltmeans hat boundary asbeendrawn, incehistoricitys notthe chief omponentf a person'sspiritualworld. It is, rather, limited omainof shared culturalexperiencepartfrom hebigger omain funsharedxperiencehatmakesup a person'sworld.The Heideggerianoncept fWelt s attimes ndistinguishableromwhatusedtobe calledZeitgeist,nd isjust s problematicals the arlieroncept.To limit he ircumferenceof Welt (afterhaving nsisted pon its expansion)at the vagueboundarybetween hared and private experience s entirelyrbitrary.Nevertheless, boundarys certainlyonvenient.For ifWelt staken



11/18

254 NEW LITERARY HISTORYin itsentirety,heneach person'sWelt s unique, and accurateunder-standingof another'smeaningbecomes impossible. But if I agree todraw a boundary,how do I decide where t shouldbe drawn? I seeonlyone way to avoid arbitrarinessn thedecision, nd it is based ontheobservation hat theWelt whichactively restructuresn interpre-tation s alwaysa highly elective ub-cosmos fan interpreter's orld.For instance, ny personwho is now understandingmypresentdis-coursemustbe excluding armore of hisspiritualworld than everhe isbringing o the exercise. Such excluding s indeed logicallynecessaryto anyact of nterpretation. n logicalgrounds,De Morganhas bril-liantly hown that we cannotinterpret iscoursewithout imiting heWelt or universe thatforms ts context, nd he coined the phraseuniverseof discourse to describethisnecessary imitation.5Sincethespiritualuniverse hatactivelygoverns n interpretations limitedand selective, o inherent ecessity equires his delimitedworldto bedifferentrom nythat existed n thepast.This last objectionto Heidegger's dogmatichistorical kepticisms,I believe, fatal,but the death strugglewill have to take place else-where,conductedby professionalwrestlers,nd not by amateurs ikeme. The implications f theseobjectionsfor the theory nd practiceof nterpretationre thematters wishtostress,nd these mplicationsare to mymindbluntlynegativeon the questionwhethermetaphysicsoffersnything fpracticalutility o hermeneuticheory.First,meta-physical peculationhas notyetbrought o interpretationhepowertodeduce, a priori, ignificantmatters f fact. It does not demonstratethat fairly ccurate reconstructions impossible; it does not, to mymind, even prove that absolutely accurate reconstruction oesn'tactuallyoccur,formetaphysics as no powerto legislatewhat is or isnotthecase intherealmof thepossible. It cannot, herefore,elpus inspecific nstances. Second, metaphysics, eing by nature universal,applies indiscriminatelyo all interpretations,oth thosethat attempthistorical econstructionnd thosethat disdain it. Thus, it providesno basis for choice as betweenvarious aims ofinterpretation. ower-less in decidingmatters f fact,Heideggerianmetaphysicss equallypowerless o dictatewhat oughtto be chosenin the realm of values.We can depend neitheron metaphysics or on neutral analysis nordertomake decisions bout thegoals ofinterpretation.We have toenter the realm of ethics. For, afterrejecting ll-founded ttempts5 Augustus De Morgan, On the Structure of the Syllogismand on the Ap-plication of the Theory of Probabilities to Questions of Argument nd Authority,CambridgePhilosophical Transactions 9 Nov. 1846).



12/18

THREE DIMENSIONS OF HERMENEUTICS 255to derivevalues and goals from hepresumednatureof interpretation,or from he nature ofBeing,what reallyremains s ethicalpersuasion.

IVIn resisting ome claims of current metaphysicalhermeneuticsmust dmitto at least onemetaphysicalssertion: an interpreters notnecessarilyo trapped n historicityhat he loseshisfreedom;he is freeto choosehisaims,and within he context fthose aims and thebroadconventions f anguage,he is free o choosehismeanings. I thereforeunderstand he current ontroversyver historicitys a conflictnotofabstract heories, ut ofvalues. Whenwe areurgedto adoptpresentrelevancerather hanoriginalmeaningas the bestmeaning, we findourselves epeating heold pattern fcontroversyetween hemedievalallegorists the Heideggeriansof an earlierday) and the later hu-manists. While this conflict annot be resolvedby mere analysis, tsissues can be clarified, nd clarificationmay bringunforeseen gree-ment.

Sometimes, or nstance, heconflict etweenproponents foriginaland ofanachronisticmeaning s shownby analysis o be no conflict tall. These arguments bout meaningsometimes riginaten a failureto notice that meaning and significance-two differenthings-arebeing giventhe same name. To take a homelyand simple example,some timeago, while drivingon the New Jersey urnpike,mywifeand I weretryingointerpret signthatkept appearingon themedianstripof the highway. It looked like this:

1000

After onderinghese ieroglyphicsnvain,webegan onotice fea-ture ftheTurnpikehatwas consistentlyssociatedwith he ign;afew econds ftereeing he ign,wewouldpassa gap in themedian



13/18

256 NEW LITERARY HISTORYstripwideenough olet a car cross ver otheotherideof theroad.At this apwe found notherign:

FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY

The problemwas solved. The mysteriousignforetold hat a gapwouldappearin the median trip fterIooo feet. But I was notaltogetheratisfied ithmywife's escriptionf thesign'smeaning,namelyhat officialarswillbe able to turn nto heother ideoftheroad fterIooo feet.No one woulddeny hatmywife'snterpretationas ustified.Myonly oubtwaswhetherhe nterpretationescribedhe ign'smeaning.While t certainlyescribed significancef thesignto drivers fofficialarsand other aw-abiding ersonalities,hat about tssig-nificance o a bank-robber ho is trying o elude official ars?Wouldn'the regard hesignas signallingn opportunityo reversehis direction?What bout strandededestrianra theorist? ouldtheynterprethefirstign s meaning omethingboutofficialars?

1000What wouldhappen o thesign'smeaningfthe authoritiesecidedtotakedown ll the econdaryigns hat estrictedheuseofthegapsto officialars? n thesemaginarynstances,hemysteriousignwouldstillpreserve stable, elf-identicaleaning, amely hata gap willoccur n the medianstrip fter 00ooofeet.I findhis xamplenstructivena numberfways. t suggests,irstof all, thatmeaning annotexceedor arbitrarilyelimit he con-ventionalemanticossibilitiesf the ymbolssed. Afterll,nothing



14/18

THREE DIMENSIONS OF HERMENEUTICS 257in theoriginalignrestrictshemeaningo officialars, lthoughhefollowingign, or xample, ndoubtedlyould:

FOROFFICIALUSE ONLY

hirsch, three dimensions of hermeneutics

Documents