higley & moore, elite integration in the united states and australia

8/3/2019 HIGLEY & MOORE, Elite Integration in the United States and Australia

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Elite Integration in the United States and Australia

Author(s): John Higley and Gwen MooreSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Sep., 1981), pp. 581-597Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960954 .

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Elite Integration n the United States and AustraliaJOHN HIGLEYAustralian National University

GWEN MOOREState University of New York, AlbanyTaking its point of departure in the elitist paradigm and the much-discussed relationship betweenelite integration and stable democratic political systems, this article offers a topology of fragmentedand integrated national elites and investigates the structure of the "consensually integrated" elitetype. It is hypothesized that "consensually integrated" elites have largely similar structures consistingof personal interaction networks which are more inclusive and less class-based, and which containmore extensive and centralized connections among all major elite groups, than the plural elite, powerelite or ruling class models of elite structure separately depict. Support for these hypotheses is foundin a comparison of the network structures of two consensually integrated national elites, the Americanand Australian, as these structures are revealed by issue-based sociometric data taken from closelycomparable elite samples and studies in the two countries.

The relationship between elite integration,political stability and democracy is one of the cen-tral questions in political science and politicalsociology. Aron (1950, p. 129) insists that onlywhere there is "true collaboration" and "unity ofopinion and action on essential points" amongotherwise divided elites can democracies functionand societies prosper. Dahrendorf (1967, pp. 229-31) concludes that a national elite which combines"intimate cohesion" with "multiform political at-titudes" is a precondition of stable democraticgovernment. Lijphart (1968) argues that Dutchdemocracy depends on cooperation and "accom-modation" within an elite cartel, a thesis whichhas been used to explain the democratic politics ofseveral other plural societies (Presthus, 1973;McRae, 1974; Lijphart, 1978). Field and Higley(1980) contend that an historically rare kind ofelite integration, which they term "consensualunity," necessarily precedes sustained adherenceto constitutional rules, serious practice of civilliberties, and competitive elections which deter-

The authorsarelistedalphabeticallyo indicate qualworkon thisarticle,whichhaditsgenesis n manyyearsof discussionswithProfessorRichardAlba, of SUNY,Albany,and ProfessorCharlesKadushin f theCUNYCenter or GraduateStudies.Thecomparative etworkdatareportedherewereoriginally nalyzedundera Na-tionalScienceFoundation rant o ProfessorKadushin.Moorewishes o thank he SUNY ResearchFoundationror undingpartof theanalysisand the AustralianNa-ional Universityor anappointment sVisitingFellow.rhe authorsare indebted o ProfessorG. LowellField,University f Connecticut,and to DavidCarrick,Des-ey Deacon, Dr. Terry Hallidayand Dr. Alden Klov-iahl, all at the Australian National University,for(aluable ssistanceand suggestions.

mine government personnel. More generally,Keller (1963, p. 146) claims that "what is requiredfor effective social life is moral accord among thestrategic elites," adding, "As societies becomemore differentiated a considerable degree of cohe-sion and consensus is needed at the top." Review-ing the literature, Putnam (1976, p. 128) asserts,"The argument that elite integration fosterspolitical stability and effectiveness is very preva-lent and very persuasive."Deliberately or not, such contentions exemplifythe elitist paradigmin political and social analysis.This holds, in part, that elite behavior and struc-ture vary independently of non-elite configura-tions, institutional frameworks, political culturesand the like, and that these independent varia-tions in elites are causally related to political in-stability and stability, as well as to different kindsof political systems, including stable democraticones (Field and Higley, 1980). While the elitistparadigm has been largely ignored by social scien-tists in recent years, we contend that it deserves

renewed attention for its ability to explain some ofthe important variations in political systems. Ifone accepts that the elitist paradigm and the con-tentions it generates are worth exploring, a num-ber of questions arise. What are the major varia-tions in elite behavior and structure, and whattypology of elites can be constructed from them?Why and how do these variations occur? Withwhat kinds of political systems are the differingelite types associated? What are the detailed char-acteristics of the elite type that is associated withstable democratic political systems? How accu-rately do the familiar plural elite, power elite andruling class models describe this type of nationalelite?This article addresses these questions. First, we

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582 The American Political Science Review Vol. 75offer a typology of a fragmented national elite,and two types of integrated national elites, indi-cating their different origins, and the most promi-nent examples of each elite type, as well as theirrelationships with different kinds of political sys-tems. We then inquire into the more detailedoperation of the elite type which seems to be asso-ciated with stable democratic political systems,postulating that it involves a distinctive inter-action structure which gives all major elite fac-tions a substantial, and presumably a satisfactory,amount of access to each other and to keydecision-making centers. Next, we compare andcontrast this interaction structure with the struc-tures which seem to be implied by the plural elite,power elite and ruling class models. Fourth, weassess the empirical accuracy of the several modelsby examining the interaction structures of Ameri-can and Australian national elites. Finally, we dis-cuss the implications of our research for thedebate about elite structure in these and similarpolitical systems.

Fragmented and Integrated ElitesUntil recently, the term "elites" was appliedmainly to powerful, high-status groups of busi-ness, professional, political, military, and civilservice leaders (Bottomore, 1964, p. 14)."Counter-elites" was often used to describepolitically dissident, low-status leaders of radicalparties, trade unions, and various other reformand protest organizations. This distinction hastended to fade in recent writing, however, and allsuch powerful leadership groups are now com-monly called "elites" (Parry, 1969, p. 13; Gid-dens, 1973, p. 120; Higley, Field and GrOholt,1976, pp. 13-19; Putnam, 1976, p. 14). Therefore,when we speak of fragmented or integrated na-tional elites, we have in mind the relations andconnections between a large number of institu-

tionally distinct, socially disparate, and politicallydiverse national leaders.Elite fragmentation and integration have anumber of dimensions. Putnam (1976, pp. 107-32) discerns at least six: social homogeneity,recruitment patterns, personal interaction, valueconsensus, group solidarity, and institutional con-text. However, he notes that a national elite maybe integratedeven though not all these dimensionsare positively intercorrelated. In our view, theprincipal dimensions of integration or fragmenta-tion in a national, as distinct from a sectoral, eliteare a consensus on values and personal interac-tion. Thus a national elite may be said to be inte-grated when there is (a) comparatively widespreadvalue consensus, cooperation and trust among thedifferent factions which make it up, and (b) com-paratively extensive and inclusive personal inter-

action ties among all these factions. The absenceof value consensus and interaction ties among fac-tions indicates a fragmented elite.It is fairly obvious that most national elites inthe modern world have been and are fragmented.That is, deep schisms clearly exist between elitefactions, violent struggles for power occur fre-quently and openly, and the members of most fac-tions appear to see political power as resting onone group's personalized access to military andpolice forces. Value consensus and interactionstructures which would knit different factionstogether are conspicuous by their absence. It isequally obvious that where national elites arefragmented, political systems are prone to coupsd'tat, serious crises, and other manifestations ofinstability. For example, fragmented nationalelites and the unstable, usually undemocratic sys-tems with which they appear to be associated arereadily observable in the histories of France, Ger-many, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and mostother European countries down to the middle partof this century, and they are just as observable inmost Third-World countries today.By contrast, integrated national elites appear toexist in about three dozen countries at present.While most of these countries are situated at highlevels of socioeconomic development, some arenot and some others appear to have had inte-grated elites when they were still quite under-developed. This variation of elite types indepen-dent of socioeconomic development levels illus-trates Aron's dictum that "the structure of theelite is not merely a reflection of the structure ofsociety" (1950, p. 130).There are, however, two types of integrated na-tional elites, the separate features of which arewidely recognized. One type, which we shall call"ideologically integrated," is created in the vic-tories of radical forces in revolutionary circum-stances, as in Russia in 1921, Italy between 1922and 1926, Germany in 1933, Yugoslavia andAlbania between 1943 and 1945, China in 1949,North Vietnam in 1954, Cuba in 1959, or it is im-posed on societies which are conquered in war-fare, as in Eastern Europe and North Korea afterWorld War II. Elite integration is effected by atotalitarian party which requires party member-ship and close adherence to party ideology in pub-lic utterances as conditions of elite position-holding (Brzezinskiand Huntington, 1963;Rigby,1968, pp. 412-25). Outwardly at least, there is theappearance of a comprehensive value consensusamong all elite groups. Apparently, there is alsoan extensive, if sharply hierarchical and central-ized, structure of personal interaction among dif-ferent elite factions (Hough and Fainsod, 1979,pp. 518-55). Accordingly, elite disagreements andconflicts occur almost entirely behind the scenes,


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1981 Elite Integration n the U.S. and Australia 583thereby giving the political systems operated bythis type of elite a marked stability. But whileideologically integrated elites appear to supportstable political systems, the requirements of ideo-logical uniformity and centralized interactionamong elite persons prevent any serious practiceof freely competitive elections or civil liberties.In the other type of integrated elite, differentelite groups espouse conflicting ideologies andpolicies, and they operate or are associated withcompeting parties, organizations and movements.As many observers have speculated, integration inthis case appears to depend on an underlying,largely tacit value consensus among elite groups.In effect, elites agree not to push partisan intereststo the point where compromise becomes impos-sible, to obey largely unwritten rules of conduct,and thereby to support and protect existing politi-cal processes and institutions (Prewitt and Stone,1973, pp. 151-56; Putnam, 1976, p. 116). The im-portance of value consensus for this type of eliteintegration makes the term "consensually inte-grated elite" apt. However, by this term we donot want to imply that value consensus is the over-riding dimension of integration, for in a momentwe will consider the personal interaction structurein which this value consensus may itself beanchored.First, it is important to sketch the three ways inwhich consensually integrated elites appear tooriginate. In highly exceptional circumstances thewarring factions which make up a fragmentedelite sometimes achieve consensual integration byvoluntarily settling their principal differences andagreeing to cooperate under existing institutions,as English elites did in 1688 and 1689, as Swedishelites did in 1809, as Mexican elites did in 1933,and as Colombian and Venezuelan elites appear tohave done during the late 1950s. Second, colonialor "native" elites have sometimes achieved con-sensual integration while operating the politicalinstitutions of largely self-governing colonies ordependencies. Further strengthened by successfulstruggles to gain national independence, elite inte-gration formed in this way persisted in the UnitedStates from the end of the eighteenth century, inCanada and New Zealand from the mid-nine-teenth century, in Australia and Ireland fromearly in this century, and it has so far persisted inKenya, India, Malaysia and a few other develop-ing societies from the early postwar years. Third,in countries which reach high levels of socio-economic development with fragmented elites, anerosion of mass support for more radical, usuallyleft-wing, elite factions seems to occur. To retainsuport, these radical factions gradually waterdown their programs and aims, and a consen-sually integrated elite is formed. This is how elitesin Norway and Denmark became integratedin the

1930s, it is one aspect of how Austrian, West Ger-man, and Belgian elites achieved integration dur-ing the 1950s and 1960s, and it appears to be theprocess which French, Italian, Japanese, and pos-sibly Spanish and Portuguese elites have beenundergoing in recent years (Field and Higley,1978).Like ideologically integrated elites, consensual-ly integrated ones are associated with stable politi-cal systems. But unlike the former, consensuallyintegrated elites are also conducive to a substan-tial degree of democratic politics and civil liber-ties. In more formal terms, a consensually inte-grated national elite appears to be a necessary,although not a sufficient, condition for a stabledemocratic political system. A case in point isMexico. According to Purcell and Purcell (1980,p. 195), Mexico's political stability arises from "aconstantly renewed political bargain" among theprincipal Mexican elites. First struck during the1930s, this bargain "was and remains an agree-ment to share power among proponents of quitedifferent interestsand constituencies." Describingthe elite rules of the game which have grown uparound this bargain and how these rules allow dif-ferent elites to assert divergent ideologies andpolicies, the Purcells portray the Mexican nationalelite as, in effect, consensually integrated. How-ever, neither they nor most other students of Mex-ican politics think that the political system is"democratic" in the American, Canadian orWest European sense of the term. Rather, withthe elite condition for a stable democratic politicalsystem seemingly satisfied, the most one can say isthat strong economic growth or other "suffi-cient" conditions may create a significant broad-ening of Mexican democracy.We have taken a good deal of space to distin-guish types of national elites comparatively andhistorically because we think that a global per-spective is necessary if the essential features ofconsensually integrated elites, such as the Ameri-can and the Australian, are to be brought intofocus. This perspective highlights the collectivelydeliberate, always somewhat precarious characterof a national elite's consensual integration. Inkeeping with the elitist assumption that elitebehavior and structure vary somewhat indepen-dently of non-elite pressures and forces, a globalperspective reminds us that there is nothing in-evitable about this form of integration. Created inlargely unique political circumstances, a consen-sually integrated elite persists only so long as itsmembers have the will and the political capacity tocontain potentially deep conflicts and to keep thepolitical and social situation manageable. A keyquestion is thus what prompts and enables the dis-parate persons and factions who make up a con-sensually integrated elite to act in this way.


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584 The American Political Science Review Vol. 75An important part of the answer has to do withthe existence of a particular kind of personalinteraction structure in all consensually integratednational elites.' Constructed in the wake of thecircumstances in which consensual integration is

first achieved, this is an interaction structurewhich enables all major elite groups to defend andadvance their interests satisfactorily. Its most cru-cial feature is a personal interaction networkwhich gives governmental and non-governmentalelites relatively direct, unfettered access to eachother and especially to those elite persons who oc-cupy the most central public and private decision-making positions. Possessing this access, eachelite group can be reasonably certain that onsalient policy questions or national issues it canmake itself heard effectively. Elite factions andgroups which are otherwise diverse and competingthus have a common interest in observing the in-formal rules by which the interaction structureoperates and in upholding the institutions inwhich it is embedded. As Putnam has observed(1976, p. 116), "Elite commitment to 'the system'is doubtless . . . related to the gratification thesystem gives them. Leaders are more likely toagree on the rules of the game, because it is fun-damentally their game." Paradoxically, in otherwords, the only type of national elite that isassociated with stable democratic political systemshas as one of its key features a distinctly elitist(i.e., comprehensively and tightly integrated)structure of personal interaction.If we think of the interaction structure we havebegun to describe in terms of a model, we mightcall it the consensually integratedelite model. Thisfacilitates comparing and contrasting the struc-ture we have in mind with the familiar plural elite,power elite and ruling class models of elite struc-ture. The consensually integrated elite model hasaffinities with, but is also different from, each ofthese familiar models. We propose to show that itis more accurate empirically, at least as revealedby data on American and Australian elite inter-action, than any of the latter. But first, we mustspecify the similarities and differences betweenthe consensually integrated elite model and theplural elite, power elite and ruling class models.Unfortunately, this is not as straightforward atask as one would like because the familiar modelshave always been vague and imprecise about theinteraction structure which they purport to de-

'It is interesting to note that in their analysis of theMexican national elite, Purcell and Purcell (1980, pp.204-08) focus on "the extraordinary stability of eliteinteraction in Mexico in recent decades," a stabilitywhich they attribute to a fluid system of alliances and"personalistic networks" between the major elitegroups.

scribe. It is necessary to infer what each of thempredicts. Additionally, such inferences must belimited to the dimensions of elite interaction forwhich data are available. In the present case, thesedimensions are (1) the inclusiveness of personalinteraction among top position holders and majorelite groups, and (2) the structure of interactioncontacts between these individuals and groups.Consensually Integrated Elite Model. There is aninclusive network of formal and informal commu-nication, friendship, and influence-wieldingamong top position holders in all major elitegroups (i.e., business, trade union, political-governmental, mass media, voluntary association,academic elites, etc.). Location in the interactionnetwork depends on incumbency of prominentformal organizational positions and on involve-ment in national policy making irrespective ofclass, education, or other social background vari-ables. No single elite group predominates in thenetwork. Instead, interaction among all elitegroups is frequent, and it is markedly centralizedin and between a relatively small number of per-sons from all major groups. Because ready accessto key decision makers is the structure's raisondotre, political-governmental elites bulk large asthe targets of elite interaction and as switchingpoints in the interaction network.PluralElite Model. As in the consensually inte-grated elite model, leaders of all major sectors,organizations and interest groups are present inthe interaction network of the plural elite model,and network location depends on positionalprominence and policy-making involvement, noton class membership or other background charac-teristics (Dahl, 1958, 1961, 1967; McConnell,1966; Rose, 1967). Here too, no single elite grouppredominates. However, interaction between elitegroups is not conspicuously centralized in an'inner circle" or "core" group, and while there iscertainly contact between different elites, it isissue-specific and generally less frequent. Becauseof sectoral autonomy and specialization, intra-sector interaction is greaterthan inter-sector inter-action, and the latter occurs mainly with political-governmental elites.Power Elite Model. In this model there is a clearhierarchy of power and influence among elitegroups, with business, political and perhapsmilitary elites located at its apex (Mills, 1956;Hunter, 1959; Porter, 1965). Consequently, theinteraction network is not as inclusive of all majorelite groups as the consensually integrated andplural elite models predict. As a result of positionholders' shared objectives and relatively homoge-


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1981 EliteIntegration n the U.S. and Australia 585nous social and educational backgrounds, thereare extensive positional overlaps, interlocks andinterchanges and, accordingly, frequent interac-tion between the uppermost elites. Among these,the business elite has primacy and its most impor-tant leaders occupy central positions in the inter-action network. The cabinet and other membersof the executive portion of the political elite arealso centrally located, but legislators (or back-benchers) and top civil servants occupy moreperipheral positions in the network, along withmembers of trade union, media, academic, andother non-business elites. Interaction among allthese latter elite groups is mainly concerned withsecondary or non-critical issues, and it occurs inaccordance with the plural elite model.

Ruling Class Model(s). The inclusiveness andstructure of elite interaction are largely incidentalto the much more general imperatives of the capi-talist system in this model, and many configura-tions of elite interaction are compatible with thissystem's operation (Domhoff, 1967, 1970, 1978;Miliband, 1969; Esping-Anderson et al., 1976;Connell, 1977; Therborn, 1978). However, themost probable configuration is roughly that de-scribed by the power elite model, the importantdifferences between the two models arising at thelevel of interpretation rather than of description.We now assess the empirical accuracy of thesemodels by analyzing the inclusiveness and struc-ture of national elite interaction in the UnitedStates and Australia, the only countries in whichclosely comparable studies of national elite inter-action have been carried out. Historically, na-tional elites in these two countries have avoidedthe kinds of schisms, power struggles, and un-stable political systems that mark fragmentedelites, and they have also avoided the tight uni-formity displayed by ideologically integratedelites. Instead, American and Australian eliteshave given many indications of the tacit valueconsensus, trust and cooperation which indicatethe consensually integrated elite type, and bothnational elites have long operated stable demo-cratic political systems.American and Australian societies differ impor-tantly, however, in population size and distribu-tion (225 million spread across a continent, versus14 million concentrated in six coastal cities), inpolitical institutions (a presidential system in arelatively centralized federal structure, versus aparliamentary system in a markedly decentralizedfederal structure), and in the size and organizationof large corporations, trade unions and mostother major institutions. Nevertheless, becauseboth countries appear to have consensually inte-grated national elites, we hypothesize (1) that the

inclusiveness nd structureof elite interactionnboth countriesaccord with the consensuallynte-gratedelite model, and (2) that the pluralelite,powereliteand rulingclassmodelsdo not as accu-rately describe these American and Australianconfigurations.

ResearchDesignOurdataon Americanand Australian lite net-worksare taken from studies having similarde-signs. The Americanstudy, a surveyof 545 topposition holdersin business,trade unions, poli-tics, governmentbureaucracy,mass media, keyvoluntaryassociations,and academicnstitutions,was conducted n 1971-72by the Bureauof Ap-

plied Social Research, Columbia University(Moore, 1979; Barton et al., 1981). In theAustralian tudy, 370 top positionholders n thecorrespondingectorswere nterviewedn 1975byresearchers t the AustralianNational University(Higley, Deacon and Smart, 1979). The studiesused identical or closely comparable nterviewquestionsto obtaininformationon respondents'policy-influencing nd policy-making ctivitiesonmajornational ssues.Extensivedataon attitudesand social backgroundswere also collected. Thestudies'wide coverageof elite sectors,collectionof dataon eliteinteraction, ndfocuson the mostpressing national issues of the time make themuniquelysuited for comparingthe inclusivenessand structureof elite integrationin the twocountries.1. Samples.Both studiesbegan with institutionalsectors assumed to be influential in nationalpolicymaking.The universeof key organizationsin eachsectorand the top positionholders n eachorganizationwere identified. Then a sample oforganizationswas chosen fromeachsectorand itstop official or officials interviewed.Tables1and2 show the sectorsand positionssampled n eachstudy. These positional samples were supple-mented by snowball samples of other personsnamedas interactionpartners n specificnationalissues by threeor more of the Americanandfouror more of the Australian espondents KatzandLazarsfeld,1955;Kadushin,1968).In thisway, 61respondents, ncludinga numberof WhiteHousestaff, academics ndeconomists,entered hefinalAmerican ampleof 545, and 7 persons,most ofwhom were economists, entered the finalAustraliansample of 370. Completed nterviewswere obtainedwith just over 70 percentof theAmericansand 74 percentof the Australians nthe originalcombined positional and snowballsamples.


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586 The AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 752. Interviews. Each respondent was asked toname the one national issue on which he or shehad most actively attempted to influence nationalpolicy and/or public opinion in the past year orso. Reflecting economic crises in each countryduring the interview period, the issue most fre-quently named was economic policy, mentionedby 29 percent of American respondents in 1972and by 42 percent of Australian respondents in1975. Other issues included: foreign policy andtrade (21 percent in the U.S., 3 percent inAustralia), social problems (25 percent inAustralia, 10 percent in the U.S.), race relations(10 percent in the U.S., none in Australia), fed-eral-state relations and other issues of politicalstructure (13 percent in Australia, virtually nonein the U.S.), and ecology, population and re-sources (10 percent in the U.S., 4 percent inAustralia). Most of these were already publicissues, rather than potential or undiscussed ones(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Lukes, 1974), al-though respondents frequently cited legislationand various policies and decisions that they hadtried to prevent.Respondents were questioned extensively abouttheir assessments of, and activities on, the na-

tional issue they specified. Among other things,this involved a series of sociometric questions thatsought the names of the persons with whom theyhad formal or informal interactions over thisissue. While the precise content of these reportedinteractions is unknown, each is important as anindicator of a communication link between elitepersons. All respondents were asked to name themembers of Congress/Parliament, the federal of-ficials/public servants, and the private individualswith whom they had discussed their main nationalissue.2 Similarly, all respondents were asked toname the other persons whom they had lobbied tosupport or oppose legislation on this issue, as wellas those who had said the most useful and inter-esting things to them about it. In short, the twostudies used five identical questions to gather dataabout issue-specific national elite networks.In a further effort to obtain data on these net-works, we specifically asked all Australian re-spondents to name the persons with whom theyhad discussed their main issue in the following

2See he appendix or a list of the sociometricques-tions askedin eachstudy.Table 1. American Elite Sample Sectors and Positions

Sector N Positions (sampled randomly)Politics 180 (a) Congress (N=58): all senators plus representatives in following cate-gories: chairperson and ranking minority member of all committees, allmembers of Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and MeansCommittees; (b)executive branch appointees (N=66): secretaries, assistant secretaries, gen-eral counsel of cabinet departments, heads and deputy heads of independentagencies, plus White House staff identified through snowball sample; (c)parties (N=51): members of Democratic and Republican National Commit-tees, state and city chairpersons of these parties; (d) state and local govern-ment (N=5): governors and mayors identified through snowball sample.Civil Service 54 Two highest civil service grades from all cabinet departments and indepen-dent agencies.Business 132 (a) Industrial corporations (N=49): chief executive officers of Fortune 500largest corporations; (b) non-industrial corporations (N=54): chief execu-tive officers of Fortune 300 largest corporations; (c) centimillionaires(N=29): holders of fortunes worth at least $100 million.Labor Unions .48 Presidents of 76 largest labor unions, plus AFL-CIO officials.News Media 63 Editors of largest-circulation newspapers and public affairs periodicals;syndicated columnists; news executives; broadcasters and commentatorson national television networks.Voluntary Associations 52 Elected heads and full-time directors of major professional, farmers', civilrights, women's, veterans', public affairs, religious and business organiza-

tions.Academic Professions 16 Academics identified through snowball sample.

Total 545Source: Computed from data collected in the American Leadership Study.


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1981 EliteIntegrationn the U.S. andAustralia 587Table 2. Australian Elite Sample Sectors and Positions

Sector N Positions (approximately 75 percent of universe sampled)Politics 80 (a) Federal (N=40): cabinet and shadow cabinet ministers; former primeministers and independent MPs in Parliament; presidents and national

secretaries of Labor, Liberal, National Country, and Democratic Laborparties; (b) State (N=40): leaders and deputy leaders of the two or threemajor parties in state parliaments; full-time state secretaries of theseparties.Public Service 50 Secretaries of federal government departments; chairpersons and managingdirectors of the largest statutory authorities.Business 90 Chief executive officers, board chairpersons and managing directors of the78 largest industrial and nonindustrial corporations; presidents or execu-tive directors of stock exchanges, key business and agricultural pressuregroups.Labor Unions 50 Federal and state secretaries of the largest or most strategically situatedunions; presidents and secretaries of major peak unionorganizations.News Media 40 Proprietors, managers, editors and news directors of the major commercialnews media groups; principal commissioners and top executives ofAustralian Broadcasting Corporation and Australian Broadcasting ControlBoard.Voluntary Associations 40 Presidents, executive directors and coordinators of major professional,women's, public affairs, consumers, veterans', welfare, and conservationistorganizations, plus archbishops of major churches.Academic Professions 20 Vice-chancellors of largest universities; presidents and heads of scholarlyacademies and research institutes; prominent economists identifiedthrough snowball sample.

Total 370Source: Computed from data collected in the Australian Leadership Study.

sectors: business and finance, trade unions, massmedia, state governments, and universitiesand re-search institutes. This sector-specific battery ofquestions was administered only to the Americansnowball sample respondents, however.3. Network analysis. A brief outline of the net-work analytic procedure employed and its ration-ale is necessary before we discuss the compara-bility of the two sociometric data sets. This pro-cedure, developed by Alba (1972, 1973), is wellsuited to evaluating network integration since itidentifies the more cohesive parts of networks,i.e., those regions with extensive interconnectionsamong sets of individuals. Dense interconnectionsmay be face-to-face, as in cliques, or throughshort chains of interaction, as in social circles(Kadushin, 1968; Alba and Moore, 1978). Be-cause cliques involve direct interaction among allof their members, they tend to be small. Socialcircles, with both direct and indirect interaction,may be much larger. We are particularly inter-ested in elite social circles because there are severalreasons for thinking that these are a principalmeans of elite integration.

Unlike cliques, social circles can constitute amechanism for substantial communications andinteraction among large numbers of persons whoare located in otherwise disparate organizationsand sectors. Exactly because they are usually in-formal groups without defined leaders, social cir-cles draw together persons who have similar inter-ests and concerns but who also have differing for-mal affiliations and obligations (Kadushin, 1968).By providing their members with ready access topersons in a variety of other organizations and in-stitutions, moreover, social circles can enhancethe power and influence of their members. Theyare, in short, well structured for the managementof highly complex national societies by differen-tiated and specialized elites.In specific terms, the procedure for identifyingcohesive groups begins with the network of rela-tions formed by all interaction nominations madeby sample members. A connection or link be-tween two persons is defined as present if one per-son reports talking to the other and absent ifneither person named the other as an interactionpartner. The network formed in this way is notlimited to respondents, however. It also includes


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588 The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 75persons outside of the sample who are named asinteraction partners by two or more respondents,thus forming links between them. The full net-work in the U.S. includes 480 of the 545 respon-dents and 396 persons outside of the sample. TheAustralian network is composed of 363 of the 370respondents, as well as 383 nonrespondents. Theinclusion of nonrespondents is important becauseof the impossibility of interviewing all potentialrespondents in studies of national elites.In this way, 876 American leaders and 746Australians formed networks in the sense that allof them were directly or indirectly connected toone another. Neither of these networks is verydense, however. Of the total possible direct linksbetween persons in these networks, only about 1percent actually existed in our data.

The procedure next identifies all cliques (i.e.,groups of three or more persons, each of whom isdirectly connected to all others) in the network.Last, these cliques are used to locate social circlesin the network. Social circles can be thought of aswebs of densely interconnected cliques in whichindirect communication is facilitated because cir-cle members are also members of highly overlap-ping cliques. Thus, those cliques with two-thirdsor more of their members in common are mergedto form social circles in which members are linkeddirectly or through only a few intermediaries.When all highly overlapping groups were merged,the result was 32 cliques and social circles in theU.S. network and 11 cliques and circles in theAustralian.4. Comparabilityof data sets. While the two stu-dies are very similar in design, there are some dif-ferences between them which may affect the rela-tive similarity of the network structures that arefound. One difference is related to sampling. TheAustralian sample is more exclusively focused onthe 50 or 75 top position holders in most sectors,while the American sample is drawn randomlyfrom a larger list of position holders, often at leastseveral hundred in a given sector. For example,the Australian business elite sample is drawn pri-marily from the 76 largest corporations while theU.S. sample covers the 800 largest corporations.Partly the result of somewhat different samplingstrategies, this difference also reflects the largersize of the American elite universe. The differencein universe size means that the sampling density inthe U.S. is somewhat lower, possibly resulting in aless dense network. On the other hand, the U.S.snowball sample partly corrects for this lowersampling density by adding to the final samplepersons designated by several others as influen-tial. In this way, it provides better coverage of im-portant elite persons than a random .sampleallows. The U.S. snowball sample completion rate

of 62 percent indicates that the majority of suchpersons were interviewed.A further difference, as noted previously, isthat all Australian respondents were asked spe-cifically not only about their contacts with per-sons in the political-governmental sectors, butalso with persons in business, unions, media, stategovernments, and universities. Only snowball re-spondents in the U.S. were asked similar ques-tions. With more opportunities to name inter-action partners, therefore, Australian respondentsdesignated a larger number of interaction part-ners, on the average, than did the Americans.Nearly one-third of the total designations inAustralia were in response to questions not askedof positional American respondents. The result isa wider range of nominations of persons in thebusiness, union, media, state government, andacademic sectors in Australia than in the U.S.The effects of this difference on network struc-ture are twofold. First, the American network, aswe describe below, is more focused on thepolitical-governmental elites. While this undoubt-edly overestimates the importance of these elitesrelative to those in other U.S. sectors, political-governmental elites are in fact more central in theU.S. than in the Australian network. Thus,American political and governmental leaders pre-dominate even among persons nominated onsociometric questions which did not ask about re-spondents' contacts with specific sectors. In re-sponse to the question asking who had the mostuseful and interesting things to say on the respon-dent's issue, for example, nearly half of the per-sons designated in the U.S. but less than a third inAustralia, were in the political-governmentalelites.A second effect is that the Australian networkdata are the more comprehensive of the two.However, the larger number of designations ob-tained from Australian respondents does not in-evitably lead to finding a more integrated net-work. The network found might still be frag-mented, with small, disparate groups, if tightlyconnected, highly overlapping social circles do notjoin many of these groups' members. Had moreinteraction questions been asked of all Americanrespondents, a fuller picture of that networkwould have been obtained. The absence of suchadditional questions means that, in comparisonwith the Australian network, the amount of eliteintegration in the U.S. may be underestimated.Nevertheless, the crucial point for this article isthat, because interviews do not produce exhaus-tive lists of all personal connections between elitepersons, our data necessarily underestimate thetrue extent of integration in both national elites;they cannot overestimate it.Overall, these differences between the data sets


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590 The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 75

Table 3. Sector CompositionandIssue or GeographicOrientationof Elite Circlesand Cliques n the UnitedStatesand AustraliaSize OverlapswithGroup (No. of OtherGroupsID No. Members) (ID Nos.) Sector/Location IssueOrientation

UnitedStates1 227 * All All2 3 1 News Media Several3 3 19, 20 Several Several4 3 1 News Media Several5 3 1, 6 News Media VietnamWar6 3 1, 5 News Media VietnamWar7 5 1, 13, 15, 24 Several Defensepolicy8 3 1 NewsMedia Freedomof press9 3 News Media Freedomof press10 3 1 Voluntaryassociations Race relations11 3 29 Voluntaryassociations Agriculture12 5 1 California Ecology13 6 7, 15, 24 Arizona Several14 4 1 New YorkCity VietnamWar15 7 1, 7, 13, 24 Several Defense16 3 Civil service Veterans'affairs17 3 1 Several Urbanaffairs18 3 1, 28, 32 Department f Commerce Economy19 13 1, 3, 20 Several Ecology20 4 1, 3, 19 Administration/Whiteouse Ecology21 3 22 Administration/Whiteouse Healthcare22 6 1, 21 Administration/Whiteouse Social policy23 3 1, 30 Administration/Whiteouse Transportation olicy24 5 7, 15 Congress Defense policy25 3 1, 29 Congress Several26 3 29 Administration/Whiteouse Agriculture27 3 1, 32 Congress Economy28 3 1, 18, 32 Several Laborunions29 19 1, 11, 25, 26 Several Agriculture30 3 1, 23 Several Transportationolicy31 3 1 Laborunions Laborunions32 5 1, 18, 27, 28 Several Economy

Australia1 418 ** All All2 3 1 Academic Superannuation3 3 1 Melbourne Anti-communism4 3 1, 5 Publicservice Women'shealth5 6 1,4 Women's rganizations InternationalWomen'sYear6 3 Churchof England FamilyLawBill7 20 1 Governmentegal associations Legalaid8 5 1 Perth Federalism9 3 1 Several Tradepractices10 6 1 Perth Perth abor11 7 1 Several Consumer ffairs

Source:Computed rom data collected in theAmericanLeadership tudyandAustralianLeadership tudy.*U.S. GroupNo. 1 overlapswith 23 of the smaller irclesandcliques.**AustraliaGroupNo. 1 overlapswith9 of the 10 smaller roups.


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1981 EliteIntegration n the U.S. andAustralia 591tral circle. The most striking similarity betweenthe two circles is the prevalence of political leadersand government officials among central-circlemembers in both countries. Probably becauseAustralian respondents were asked specifically todesignate business, union, media and academicleaders with whom they had discussed their na-tional issues, the prevalence of politicians andcivil servants is somewhat less marked in theAustralian circle (45.6 percent versus 55.9 percentin the American circle). But even though theAustralian study deliberately sought designationsof private sector leaders, the numerical predomi-nance of political-governmental leaders in theAmerican circle is largely duplicated in theAustralian, a finding which reinforces our confi-dence that this is not merely an artifact of the in-terview questions the two studies did or did notemploy. In this context, it is also pertinent to notethat while both studies specifically asked all re-spondents about their interactions with govern-ment officials, there is a major difference in thefrequency with which federal civil servants appearamong the central-circle memberships (only 5.7percent in the American, but 18.4 percent in theAustralian). This difference is undoubtedly aresult of the significantly greater institutionalpower of top civil servants in Australia.In both countries, business elites are alsostrongly represented in the central circle. How-ever, much of this prevalence in relation to othersectors results from the larger numbers of busi-ness leaders interviewed in both studies (132 in theU.S., 90 in Australia). Respondents have the op-portunity to designate large numbers of inter-action partners, and thereby to achieve greaterprominence themselves, while nonrespondentsobviously do not have this ability. Thus, if agreater number of business leaders is interviewed,they are likely to comprise a larger proportion of

the central circle. In fact, Table 4 indicates that, incomparison to their proportions of the sample,business elites are somewhat overrepresented inthe Australian and underrepresented in the U.S.circle. By this measure, most other private sectorgroups are slightly underrepresented in bothcountries' central circles. In sum, all sectors arerepresented in the central circles, but the political-governmental elites are most prevalent.Also relevant to the issue of sectoral represen-tation in the central circles is the question ofwhich persons and groups are most central withinthem. Are government officials at the center ofeach? What is the position of business elites andthose of other sectors? In order to find the moreand less central persons, we computed an index ofcentrality for each individual in the network andthen ranked persons by their score on this index.The index is based on the number of others in thenetwork a given person can reach directly orthrough one intermediary.3 The sector member-ship of the 100 most central persons on this indexis shown in Table 4 as "Top 100." While the cen-trality index is computed for the entire network,rather than for the central circles alone, virtuallyall of the top 100 persons in the network arecentral-circle members: 97 of 100 in the U.S., andall 100 in Australia.

If we designate these 100 most central personsas the core of the central circle, it is clear that thesector composition of the core is similar, thoughnot identical, to that of each central circle as a

3In heU.S. and Australian etworkshemostcentralindividual,by this measure, an reach389and 462 othernetwork members, respectively, either directly orthroughone intermediary. ycontrast, he least centralnetworkmembers can reach less than half a dozenothersas directly.

Table4. SectorCompositionof American ndAustralian amples,Networks,CentralCircles,and'Top 100' Persons Percent)UnitedStates Australia

Central Top Central TopSector Sample Network Circle 100 Sample Network Circle 100Politics 33.0 52.1 50.2 71.0 21.6 28.3 27.2 25.0CivilService 9.9 8.2 5.7 1.0 13.5 17.7 18.4 19.0Business 24.2 13.5 16.3 9.0 24.3 17.3 30.8 37.0LaborUnions 8.8 6.1 7.0 4.0 13.5 8.9 8.9 4.0NewsMedia 11.6 8.1 7.5 2.0 10.8 8.1 8.1 6.0VoluntaryAssociations 9.5 6.5 4.4 6.0 10.8 6.9 4.8 5.0AcademicProfessions 2.9 4.0 7.5 7.0 5.4 10.3 9.8 4.0Other - 1.5 1.3 0.0 - 2.5 1.9 0.0

Totals 99.9 100.0 99.9 100.0 99.9 100.0 99.9 100.0Source:Computed romdata collectedin theAmericanLeadership tudy andAustralianLeadership tudy.


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592 TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 75whole. In the U.S., elites in the political-govern-mental sectors make up over 70 percent of thecore, a considerably higher proportion than of thecentral circle. All other sectors are sparsely repre-sented, generally with less representation in thecore than in the circle. The core of the Australiancircle is more diverse. Members of the political-governmental sectors comprise a little under halfof this group, as they do of the circle itself. But asin the U.S., most other sectors comprise a largerproportion of the circle than of the core. The onereal exception is the Australian business elitewhose members are overrepresented in the core,as compared with the circle, by some 6 percent.While this does not by itself indicate business eliteascendancy, it does suggest that the monopolisticor oligopolistic character of many industries inAustralia's comparatively small economy makesthose who head the dominant corporations morecentral as a group than are their American coun-terparts. Overall, however, the analysis confirmsthat the sector compositions of the American andAustralian networks, central circles, and top 100groups are very similar, with political and govern-mental elites being most prevalent in bothcountries.The core of each circle consists of individualswho are especially well connected, in networkterms. As Table 5 shows, persons in the core ofthe U.S. central circle are able to reach two-thirdsof their fellows directly or through one other per-son, while those outside the central circle canreach only 3 percent of the others who are outsidethe circle this readily. The Australian core is evenmore densely connected, with its members able toreach 86 percent of the others in the core throughno more than one intermediary, while those out-side of the central circle are able to contact only 3percent of their fellows this directly. All membersof both central circles are able to contact oneanother through at most a few intermediaries,butthe connections within the two core groups areespecially dense. In both countries, then, the net-work and the circle within it resemble a wheel-likestructure with the core consisting of a small num-ber of highly central and densely interconnectedindividuals.2. Centrality of political-governmentalelites. Theprincipal difference between the structure ofAmerican and Australian elites thus seems to bethe more pronounced centrality of American poli-ticians and government officials. To be certainthat this is not an artifact of differences in thestudy designs, however, we redid the centralityanalyses with network data limited to responses tothe five identical sociometric questions in the twostudies only. This excluded designations in re-sponse to questions which asked about contacts

with persons in specific sectors other than thepolitical-governmental sectors. In addition, tomake the samples more comparable for this com-putation, we deleted from the U.S. sample 49business leaders who were not in the top 250(rather than 500) industrial corporations or in thetop 25 (rather than 50) in the following categoriesof nonindustrial corporations: banks, insurancecompanies, utilities, transportation, retail chainsand a miscellaneous category. Second, except for20 persons who were members of the Republicanor Democratic National Committees, allAmerican party officials were also deleted on theground that these mainly local politicians had nocounterparts in the Australian sample. Thesechanges, resulting in more precisely comparablesamples and network data, increase our confi-dence that remaining differences in results be-tween the two studies reflect actual differences inthe elite structure of the two societies.Once again, a network of all sample membersplus all nonrespondents designated by at least tworespondents was identified for each country, andthe centrality index was calculated. The revisedU.S. network includes 705 persons, while the re-vised Australian network consists of 553.4 Despitethese changes, however, the prevalence ofpolitical-governmental elites remains greater inthe U.S. network than in the Australian network,and it does not therefore appear to be an artifact.To account for this difference, we speculate thatthe greater size and diversity of American society,plus the more centralized character of the Ameri-can federal system, make Washington's politi-cians and government officials more centralgroups than their Canberra counterparts. Equallyimportant may be the fact that in the absence ofstrong parties and party discipline, Americanpolitical leaders, and especially senators and rep-resentatives are more frequently "policy activists"and "political entrepreneurs" who seize on newissues and mobilize elite support for them(Walker, 1977), thereby looming larger in the na-tional elite network as a whole than do theirAustralian counterparts. In any event, it is clearthat in both countries the political-governmentalelites are key integrators, possessing a networkcentrality and numerical prevalence that are notseriously challenged by any other elite group.This does not in itself render the three familiar

4Toavoidconfusion,we emphasizehat all otherre-sults in this articleare basedon the originalnetworksrather hanthe reducedones. Ourinspectionof the re-ducednetworksdid notrevealpatterns ignificantly if-ferent romthose n theoriginalnetworks.We thereforechose to operatewith the latterin order to retain asmuch informationfrom these unique data sets aspossible.


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1981 EliteIntegration n the U.S. and Australia 593Table5. Proportionof NetworkSegmentsConnectedby Pathsof Two LinksorLessfor UnitedStatesandAustralia

NetworkSegments Percent)CoreofCentralCircle Remainder f Outsideof("Top 100") CentralCircle CentralCircle N

UnitedStatesCore of centralcircle("Top 100") 66 34 14 100Remainder f centralcircle 34 14 6 127Outsideof centralcircle 14 5 3 649AustraliaCore of centralcircle('Top 100") 86 41 16 100Remainder f centralcircle 41 14 5 318Outsideof centralcircle 16 5 3 320Source: Computed rom datacollectedin the AmericanLeadership tudyandAustralianLeadership tudy.models of elite integration inapplicable to thesetwo countries. For all three models focus pri-marily on the connections between political-governmental elites and other elite groups. Thepower elite and ruling class models posit a strongconnection between business and governmentleaders, portraying labor union and variousreform-oriented elites as relatively isolated andperipheral in the national power structure (Mills,1956; Miliband, 1969). The plural elite modelassumes that elite groups are autonomous, spe-cialized and competing, with political-governmen-tal elites playing a brokerage role among them(McConnell, 1966). How accurately do thesemodels describe the connections between elitegroups in the United States and Australia?3. Connections between elite groups. To examinethe connections between and within elite groups,we returned to the original samples and networks,dividing all the direct links between central circlemembers into categories according to the sectorsof the persons they joined. To assess whether cer-tain sectors "prefer" linkages to certain other sec-tors, we compared the actual distribution of linksbetween sectors with what the expected distribu-tion would be if each sector was equally linked toeach other sector. Thus the first column in Table 6shows the percentage of all links between central-circle members that involve each sector elite. Eachof the other columns shows the corresponding dis-tribution of links between all pairs of sector elites.If each circle member's links were distributedamong other circle members independent of sec-tors, then all percentagesin each row would be thesame as those in the first column. We call this theexpected distribution, and by comparing it withactual distributions (all columns but the first), wecan infer each sector's "preference" for, or"avoidance" of, links with other sectors.

Three patterns emerge. First, contrary to theexpectations of Mills, Miliband and others, vir-tually all sector elites are linked to all other sectorelites within the central circle in each country.Thus, not only are the governmental and businesssectors linked, but also nearly all other sectorelites are connected to those sectors and to oneanother. Only the American civil service elite,which is weakly represented in the central circle tostart with, is relatively isolated, having no linkswith union or voluntary association leaders in thecircle, and only scanty links with the other sectorelites. All sector elites are linked in the Australiancircle. Indeed, contrary to pluralist expectations,the bulk of all links within the two national cen-tral circles occur between sector elites rather thanwithin them: 64.5 percent in the U.S. and 74.5percent in Australia. While this is not especiallysurprisinggiven the inter-sector focus of some ofthe sociometric questions, it is noteworthy thatthe proportions of inter-sector links increase asone approaches the circles' core groups. Exclud-ing links between the 71 politicians who dominatethe American circle's core, for example, 96.2 per-cent of all remaining links between the 100 mostcentral Americans go across sector lines. Evenwithout excluding links between politicians, 84.3percent of all links between the 100 most centralAustralians are inter-sector. In short, in bothcountries linkages between sectors are more even-ly distributed than the power elite and ruling classmodels would lead us to expect, and they are morefrequent, especially among the most central per-sons, than the plural elite model seems to imply.

Second, despite the predominance of inter-sector links, elites in all the Australian and inthree of the five American nongovernmental sec-tors show somewhat more intra-sector links thanis expected statistically. This is most pronouncedin the cases of labor union elites in both central


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594 TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 75Table 6. Expected and Actual Distribution of Links within American and Australian Central CirclesAccording to Sector (Percent)

Actual DistributionExpected VoluntaryAcademicDistribu- Labor News Associa- Profes- Civil

Sector tion Business Unions Media tions sions Politics ServiceUnited States:Business 13 11 12 7 1 9 17 5Labor Unions 6 5 is 6 2 3 7 0News Media 4 2 4 7 1 2 5 2Voluntary Associations 6 1 2 1 6 3 8 0Academic Professions 6 5 3 4 4 8 8 8Politics 62 76 63 65 87 71 52 83Civil Service 3 1 0 1 0 4 4 3

Total 100 101 99 101 101 100 101 101N 1990 265 118 85 109 128 1222 63Australia:Business 24* 28 18 14 2 16 32 24Labor Unions 8 6 17 7 7 8 9 6News Media 8 5 8 26 5 6 9 6Voluntary Associations 4 0** 3 2 12 2 6 5Academic Professions 6 4 6 5 3 18 6 8Politics 30 39 34 33 53 27 26 20Civil Service 18 18 14 13 18 23 12 31

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100N 4484 1099 358 374 166 276 1352 827Source: Computed from data collected in the American Leadership Study and Australian Leadership Study.

*Column excludes eight persons in other sectors who account for 62 links.**Less than 1 percent.

circles, and of media, voluntary association, andacademic elites in the Australian circle. There isthus some indication of elite isolation along powerelite lines, or of autonomy and specializationalong plural elite lines. Nevertheless, both unionelites have about as many links with businessleaders as they have among themselves, and bothhave substantially more links with their respectivepolitical elites. Many Australian media and aca-demic elite respondents reported, moreover, thatthey deliberately avoid contacts with other elitesectors in order to protect their professional neu-trality or because their advisory roles committhem to silence on policy issues. There is thus nostrong evidence here for the theses that some elitesare isolated and peripheral or that all elites aremarkedly autonomous and specialized in modernsocieties.

Finally, in both circles the largest proportionsof links involving nongovernmental sector elitesare with the political-governmental elites. This ismost true of voluntary association leaders, whoseextensive lobbying of government occurs,in bothcircles almost to the exclusion of contacts with

other sector elites. Links between non-govern-mental and political-governmental elites aregreater in the United States than in Australia,probably in part because of the American study'sstronger focus on these links. But even in theAustralian data, where the sociometric focus isless concentrated on links with politicians and fed-eral civil servants, there is no question but thatthese two groups are the preferred contacts ofnongovernmental elites. In both circles, prefer-ence is generally for contacts with political-governmental leaders first and with fellow sectormembers second. The general pattern is one inwhich all nongovernmental elites have extensiveconnections to politicians and government of-ficials who are therefore the linchpins of elite in-tegration in the two central circles and elite net-works.

ConclusionsIn general, how do the several models of eliteintegration fare when applied to data on the inclu-


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1981 Elite Integrationn the U.S. and Australia 595siveness and structure of American andAustralian interaction networks? Of the threefamiliarmodels, the plural elite model seems to bemostaccurate, although none of the three is whol-ly inaccurate. As the plural elite model leads us toexpect, elite networks in the two countries are in-clusive of all major elite groups studied, locationin these networks is not related to social class,education or other social background variables,and political-governmental elites are clearly cen-tral in terms of interaction linkages. In each ofthese respects, the power elite and ruling classmodelsdescribe the data much less accurately. Onthe other hand, the plural elite model's depictionof autonomous, specialized elites is not convinc-inglysupported. The existence of a large, denselyinterconnected central circle in each country fitsuneasily with the pluralist image. In addition,thereis extensive interaction between sectors, andinter-elite interaction is strongly centralized incore groups that are themselves so tightly inte-grated as to be incompatible with that model.In these latter respects and in others, there isempirical support for at least the thrust of thepower elite and ruling class models. Consistentwith these two models, for example, is the cen-trality of business elites in both countries, espe-cially in the Australian core group. As well, therelatively solated, peripheral position of top civilservantswhich we find in the American network isconsistent with Mills' thesis (1956, pp. 237-41).InAustralia,where top civil servants hardly occu-py isolated or peripheral network positions, onecouldargue that the triumvirate of political, busi-ness, and civil service elites, which virtuallymonopolize the core positions, comprise a powerelite.5 What emerges in both countries, in anyevent, is a picture of political-governmental andbusiness elites as primus inter pares in networksthat are inclusive of all major elite groups.Whether his should be taken as proof of a powerelite or ruling class, whether it illustrates Lind-blom'sthesis (1977, pp. 170-213) that in "marketsystems" power is necessarily divided primarilybetween political-governmental and businesselites, or whether it indicates that the moderninterventionist state forces business elites intoclose, but essentially dependent relations withthose who control the state apparatus are ques-tionswhich our data raise but do not allow us toanswer,

'Weshouldperhapsadd that while military eaderswerenot interviewedn eithercountry, they receivedalmostno designationsas interactionpartnerson thehundredr so specificnational ssues,including oreignpolicy nddefense ssues,on whicheachset of respon-dentsweremostactive.

We end up, then, with findings that do not con-sistently support or entirely contradict any of thefamiliar models of elite integration. A more accu-rate description is provided by the consensuallyintegrated elite model we have advanced. The de-scriptive and explanatory power of this model forthe data presented here suggest that it ought to beconsidered and tested in further research. Thismodel incorporates aspects of all three familiarmodels, but it portrays the structure of consen-sually integrated elites like the American andAustralian as more comprehensively elitist, in thesense of a tighter integration of more elite groups,than has previously been recognized. In addition,it is a model which makes good theoretical sensein the context of the elitist paradigm. That is, ithelps us to account for the existence of one of themajor comparative and historical variations inelite behavior and structure, the consensually inte-grated national elite. As Kadushin has contended(1979, p. 127), "An integrated, legitimate na-tional elite must and does exist only as a single na-tional power establishment." The consensuallyintegrated elite model and the research reportedhere take us a step closer to understanding howthis is so.

AppendixThe following interaction questions were ad-ministered to all American and Australianrespondents:

1. Have you talked with individual (legislators/Members of Parliament) about your policyposition on this issue? With whom?2. Have you talked with (federal officials/Commonwealth Public-Servants) about yourpolicy position on this issue? Which people?3. Have you tried to get people that you knowto support or oppose legislation on this issue?Who?4. Have you worked with an interest group ororganization trying to influence public policyon this issue? Which persons?5. Of the various people you have talked withabout this issue, who had the most useful andinteresting things to say?

An additional six questions were asked ofAmerican snowball respondents:6. Have you talked with people in business andfinance about your policy position on this

issue?7. Have you talked with labor leaders aboutyour policy position on this issue?8. Have you talked with other interest groupleaders about your policy position on thisissue?


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596 The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 759. Have you talked with mass media peopleabout your policy position on this issue?10. Have you talked with people at the politicalparty organizations about your policy posi-tion on this issue?

11. Have you talked with people in the WhiteHouse about your policy position on thisissue?An additional six questions were asked of allAustralian respondents:

6. Have you talked with anyone in business orfinance about your policy position on thisissue?7. Have you talked with anyone in the tradeunions about your policy position on thisissue?8. Have you talked with anyone in newspapersor broadcasting about your policy positionon this issue?9. Have you talked with anyone in the state gov-ernments about your policy position on thisissue?10. Have you talked with anyone in the universi-ties or research institutions about your policyposition on this issue?11. Is there any person active on this issue whomyou feel we must interview? Who?

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