higher education appropriations in alabama: selected dimensions of politicized funding (1975–1984)

HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATIONS IN ALABAMA: SELECTED DIMENSIONS

OF POLITICIZED FUNDING (1975-1984)

Jesse C. Brown I1

In recent years there has been much discussion in Alabama about the allocation of state resources to the senior institutions of higher learning. Two issues or sets of issues have generally dominated these discussions; these issues are: (1) higher education's share of total educational expenditures by the state government and (2) the distribution and utilization of appropriated funds within the state's "non-system" of higher educati0n.l This research focuses upon the latter issue and attempts to address empirically some of the frequent assertions made by media, administrators of higher education, state legislators, and other participants involved with the appropriation of state revenues to public higher education in Alabama.

Even a casual observer of the appropriation's process in Montgomery would conclude initially that the very decentralized governance structure of Ala- bama higher education seems ripe for intense political battles among the colleges and universities, especially in a state with limited public funds for education.2 Fourteen state colleges or universities offer bacca- laureate or advanced degrees pursuant to the legal authority of eleven largely autonomous governing boards. Included within this relatively large number of institutions is a diverse mixture of comprehensive universities, former teacher colleges, recently developed and somewhat specialized urban institutions, and traditionally black college^.^ Moreover, the Alabama Commission on Higher Education (ACHE) is not a central governing body, but a planning agency with very little legal authority or political clout.4

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In addition to the complexities associated with institutional diversity and decentralized governance, funding for Alabama higher education is also perceived as a highly politicized fffree-for-allf' because of the st ate's legislative environment. Legislative service is part-time; the number of professional staff is very limited and most lack subject matter special- ization; joint budget hearings conducted annually by the finance committee of each chamber are "pro formalf sessions held only a few days before com- mencement of the regular session. The cumulative effect of these conditions are alleged to make legislative decision-making based upon a professional model or objective allocation of higher education resources very unlikely, even for the conscientious legislator espousing statewide rather than purely parochial interests.

Higher Education Funding-The Consequences of Inter- institutional Conflict

Although most participants familiar with state appropriations to Alabama higher education agree that the process is very politicized, there is substantial disagreement regarding the consequences of this condition. In essence, which institutions "win" and which institutions "lose" as a result of perhaps the most complicated political and legal environment within southern higher education? Participants in the ongoing debate about this issue typically espouse one of four scenarios or schools of thought.

Big Boys. Some actors in Alabama's arena of higher education endorse the "big boy" explanation of resource allocation. They believe that Auburn Uni- versity's main campus and the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa, t h e state's most comprehensive institutions in programmatic terms, are the principal "winners" in the very politicized appropriation's process. Historically, these institutions have maintained

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the largest student bodies and well organized alumni associations. The statewide scope of their alumni contacts, the benefits accrued from highly publicized athletic ' programs, and the presence of longstanding graduate and professional degree programs (most notably law, business and agriculture) are deemed to provide these institutions with enormous advantages in an amateur legislative setting.6 They are viewed as Alabama's only institutions of higher learning which can exert influence upon legislators from every geographical region of the state.

Urban Shift. The second school of thought is based on the notion of "urban shift." Some participants in the appropriation's process contend that the four predominately white urban universities in Bir- mingham, Mobile, Huntsville, and Montgomery are the principal beneficiaries of politicized funding. These four institutions reside within Alabama's largest metropolitan areas, which compromise 45 percent of the state's p~pulation.~ The cities are increasingly the centers of much political and financial clout in Alabama, and contain the major outlets for print and electronic media. These four institutions, created in the post-World War I1 period, have experienced dramatic enrollment growths during the last ten years, and some have developed specialized research thrusts directly associated wi th the economic development goals of their respective cities8 Their large urban delegations, "easy" media opportunities, and contacts with executives of major businesses combine to make them the dominant force in current higher education politics, according to adherents of the "urban shift" scenario.9

Intense Parochial Interests. A few actors in the appropriation's process allege that the current environment benefits the former teacher colleges, which attained university status in the 1960's. Ad- herents of this school of thought conclude that the advantageous position of these institutions is a result

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of a coalition among "intense parochial interests." According to this scenario, several of these smaller regional schools, unlike the larger universities, do not engage in serious competition among themselves. Individually, they focus their resources upon a small geographical area of the state and subsequently develop strong political bases and alliances within a few counties. They supposedly are able to coalesce these political bases on budget issues as a byproduct of several factors, including an absence of overlapping spheres of geopolitical influence, similar institutional histories and development goals, and common ene- mies, such as the established "big boys" and growing urban institutions.

Political Stalemate. The fourth school of thought or explanation of higher education funding in Alabama is based on t h e notion of "political stalemate." Proponents of this idea contend that the complexity stemming from a nonprofessional legislative setting, and the numerous forces associated with decentralized governance, reinforce the typical pattern of budget incrementalism.11 Consequently, substantial adjustments or redistributions of higher education resources will not occur during a period of a few fiscal years, even in light of enrollment changes and development of academic programs. According to the "political stalemate" scenario, the relative posture of an institution in the political battle for state dollars will remain fairly stable, as various forces in the arena of higher education "check11 or counterbalance each other. "Winners" will remain "winners"; "losers" will stay "losers." Pro- ponents of the "political stalemate" theme suggest that this phenomenon is especially prevalent during a period of limited growth in available funds, as was the situation in Alabama during most of the last few fiscal years.12

Responsibility for Politicized Funding - Governor v. Legislature

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In addition to the basic question of which university "wins" or "loses" in the annual budget battle, there are often related discussions about which institution of state government bears primary responsibility for this outcome. Some participants in the debate argue that the state's governor is princi- pally responsible for funding patterns which deviate from an objective assessment and allocation of resources. Others cite legislative "pork barrel" responses to the governor(s budget as a primary basis for a politicized allocation.

Advocates of the "governor" model cite the budget formulation authority of the chief executive and the relatively weak position of a le islature with very little staff and part-time solons?3 They also contend that a politician becomes governor via a process which necessitates effective appeal to a large number of regional or local interests, such as institutions of higher learning. Therefore, after the election the incumbent must respond positively to those diverse parochial interests.

Advocates of the "legislature" model argue that the governor, as a byproduct of a statewide con- stituency and the personal isolation of the high office, is able to combat or avoid the daily or weekly pressures of each institution. However, part-time legislators at home in their districts are viewed as less likely to be isolated from university lobbying, and may be compelled to respond to parochial pressures by the political realities of electionhe-election in a small district. In essence, the political clout and resources of a particular university may be "small potatoes" for a governor, but an important political commodity for a local legislator. For these reasons, some participants in the arena of higher education credit the legislature with most of the politically motivated deviations from resource allocations based upon a professional assessment of needs.14

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"Political Adjustments" in Higher Education Funding

As noted previously, most participants in the appropriation's process for Alabama higher education assume that the allocation of available resources is very politicized and, in fact, is much more "political" than the budget processes in other states. Either explicitly or by implication, many actors in the higher education arena assert that large distortions in "rational funding" occur because of decentralized governance and the amateur legislative setting. Some participants, including a former governor, advocate rather dramatic reforms, such as greater centraliza- tion of governance via ACHE, the wholesale elimina- tion of certain programs, and institutional mergers, as remedies for the perceived gross misallocation of available resources.

However, to date, the magnitude of these "political adjustments" or deviations from allocations based upon objective needs or a professional model is not defined in any reasonably precise empirical manner. Therefore, this research also presents data concerning the size of the ltgaprr between resource distributions resulting from the political process and an allocation of higher education resources based upon objective or professional assessments of needs for the four teen ins ti tu tions.

Research Design/ Me thodology

This research provides empirical evidence concerning the validity of the four aforementioned schools of thought regarding the interinstitutional allocation of higher education resources, the "gover- nor" and "legislature" models of responsibility, and the magnitude of "political adjustments" in funding.15 Annual legislative appropriations of continuing operating funds to the state's fourteen senior institutions of higher learning, proposed annual budgets of the governor, and ACHE'S annual recommendations con-

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stitute the data bases for this project.

Relevant data from these sources were obtained for each appropriation or budget cycle of the last decade (1975-1984). Only permanent operating monies are included in the analysis; non-recurring funds and capital expenditures are not analyzed. However, all 'permanent operating funds, including those received for regular academic programs as well as those for special projects or line items, are con- sidered an institution's annual allocation of resources. In most fiscal years these permanent operating monies constitute 95 to 100 percent of the state funds for higher education.

Measuring the Consequences of Interinstitu- tional Conflict. To shed some light upon the four schools of thought concerning the consequences of interinstitutional conflict, it is necessary to opera- tionalize a "winning" institution and a "losing" institution for each fiscal year or budget cycle of the last decade. A "winning" institution is defined as a public senior college or university in Alabama which received a proportion of state higher education resources that exceeded the proportion it would have received had extant resources been divided according to an objective assessment of needs or a professional model. A "losingf1 institution is defined as a public senior college or university which received a proportion of state higher education resources which was less than the proportion it would have been allocated had resources been distributed according to an objective assessment of needs or the professional model. A s the definitions suggest , identification of "winners" and "losers" per fiscal year requires a comparison of actual funding for each institution (the political .model) with funding estimates or projections based upon an objective allocation of resources available to the senior public institutions of higher learning.

Although t h e actual distribution of resources

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during the last decade is easily derived from the appropriation's laws of each fiscal year, a projected allocation of resources according to an objective assessment or professional model is more difficult to decipher. For purposes of this research, projected allocations according to objective assessments are based upon the annual recommendations of the Ala- bama Commission on Higher Education. Like most planning or coordinating agencies in higher education, ACHE's recommendations per institution are generally formula-driven and, therefore, are derived in large measure from an evaluation of recent enrollments. The formula "weights" credit hours according to the level of course offering (lower division/ upper division/ master's/ doctorate) and subject matter (engineering/ social sciences, etc.). The formula also reflects research effort, but this factor is a small component of the total calculations.16

ACHE's annual recommendations are designed to advise the governor and legislature about the level of funding needed for the state's colleges and universities to achieve a regional/southern standard in program funding. This "needs-based" recommendation typically exceeds actual appropriations to the fourteen senior institutions by approximately thirty to sixty million dollars per fiscal year. Nevertheless, because ACHE is t h e sole entity within Alabama government created to represent the collective interests of higher education rather than the development goals of a particular institution, its formula recommendations, derived from widely utilized methodology, are employed as t h e basis for projecting an objective allocation of resources.

As noted earlier, t h e professional model or objective allocation of resources distributes available dollars according to each institution's share or percentage of total higher education resources, as reflected in the annual ACHE recommendation. Consequently, each institution's projected annual ap-

propriation (PROJAPP) according to an objective assessment or professional model is calculated as f 0110 w s:

PROJAPP = (Each Institution's percentage (%) of ACHE'S total annual recommendation for t h e fourteen senior institutions of higher learning) * (Total annual legislative appropriations of permanent operating monies to t h e fourteen institutions of higher learning).

For example, if ACHE recommended in a given fiscal year that six of 200 million dollars for higher education be allocated to a certain university, and the legislature appropriated 150 million dollars for all senior institutions, the hypothetical institution should have received three percent (6/200) of appropriated dollars (150 million) or an annual appropriation of 4.5 million dollars, if funds had been allocated based upon an objective assessment or professional model.

An arithmetic comparison of PROJAPP to the actual appropriation (ACTAPP) received by an institution in a fiscal year provides a statistical indicator of "winners" and "losers" for that budget cycle. This comparison or legislative treatment of higher education resources (LEGTR) is derived by calculating ACTAPP as a percentage of PROJAPP for each fiscal year.

LEGTR = ACTAPP/PROJAPP

The resulting figure is a statistical measure of the degree to which an institution received more or less than its "objective" share of dollars appropriated to senior higher education by the legislature. If LEGTR exceeds 1.000, then the institution's actual appropriation exceeded its projected allocation and the

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college or university benefited from the political environment; as LEGTR falls below 1.000 for a given institution in a fiscal year, then the college or university was a "victim" of the appropriation process.

The governor's treatment of higher education resources (GOVTR) is conceptually analogous to LEGTR; i t identifies "winnersf1 and 'llosersl' in the administration's budget proposal for each fiscal year. However, just as LEGTR necessitated t h e computa- tion of a projected allocation of appropriated funds (PROJAPP), GOVTR requires a rojected allocation of

had distributed dollars in the executive budget according to the proportional shares suggested for each institution by the ACHE recommendation. Calcula- tion of this projected allocation in a governor's budget (PROJGOV) for each institution per fiscal year is as follows:

higher education resources as i + the governor's office

PROJGOV = (Each institution's percentage (%) of ACHE'S total annual recommendation for the fourteen senior institutions of higher learning) * (Total annual appropriation of permanent operating monies to the fourteen institutions of higher learning as recommended in the governorls i n F tial budget proposal to the legislature).

As with LEGTR, GOVTR or gubernatorial distribution of higher education resources is calculated by figuring an institution's actual recommendation by the gover- nor (GOVREC) as a percentage of t h e projected r eco rn mendat ion (PRO JGOV).

GOVTR = GOVREC/PROJGOV

If an institution exceeds 1.000 on the GOVTR mea-

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sure, it was a "winner" in the governor's office. If its score for a given fiscal year is below 1.000, then the college or university received less from the chief executive than justified by a strict formula-driven 'heeds" analysis.

Utilization of LEGTR and GOVTR scores not only identifies in a dichotomous manner and

per fiscal year, but also permits a rank ordering of institutions according to the degree of their funding success or failure in the governor's office or legislature. A discussion of these rank orders, which are based upon mean LEGTR and GOVTR scores of the ten year period, provides some evidence to support or reject the previously men- tioned schools of thought.

Measuring Institutional Responsibility and Mag- nitude of "Political Adjustments" in the Professional Funding Model. As noted earlier, issues related to the distributive conseQuences of politicized funding are (1) the extent to' which the- actual legislative distribution or recommended gubernatorial allocation of funds deviates from funding according to the professional model and (2) institutional responsibility (governor v. legislature) for deviations from an objective or professional allocation.

Statistical evidence concerning these two issues necessitates measures of the proportion of total higher education resources which would have to be redistributed in a fiscal year in order that the governor's budget or legislative appropriation of previous years reflect "statistically perfect" funding. "Statistically perfect" funding for a fiscal year requires a gubernatorial recommendation which ac- cords to each institution a share or percentage of higher education funds suggested by the ACHE recommendation of that fiscal year, or a legislative appropriation which grants to each institution a share or percentage of higher education funds suggested by

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the ACHE recommendation for that fiscal year. The GOVDEV and LEGDEV measures for each fiscal year indicate t h e percentage - - of total higher , education funds which theoretically would have to be redistributed in order for the governor's recommendation or legislative appropriation of a fiscal year to have resulted in a "statistically perfect" implementation of objective funding or the professional model.

The measurement of gubernatorial deviation from objective funding in a fiscal year (GOVDEV) is a three step calculation which begins by summing the "absolute value" differences between the actual and projected recommendations (GOVREC - PROJGOV) of the fourteen senior institutions for each fiscal year. This figure indicates the total dollar difference between the actual recommendation of the governor and the projected recommendation of the governor for a fiscal year. Because only one-half of t h e "absolute value" difference would need to be redistributed in each fiscal year to achieve an allocation which would have been Watistically perfect", this figure is divided by two. The resulting figure, which indicates the number of dollars which should have been reallocated among institutions to have achieved a funding pattern according to the professional model, is then divided by the total number of dollars recommended by the governor for that fiscal year (GOVREC). This latter step is necessary to convert the "raw" dollar figure to a percentage of total resources recommended. For example, GOVDEV for 1975 islcalculated as follows:

GOVDEV75 = [ I GOVREC75 - PROJGOV75 I /21 / GOVREC75

A GOVDEV score is calculated for each year of the analysis. A GOVDEV score of .OOOO indicates a "statistically perfect" implementation of the professional model. As the score increases, it reflects a greater deviation by the governor from the pro-

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fessional model. For example, a GOVDEV score of .0300 indicates that three percent of the governor's total recommendation for the senior institutions in a given fiscal year would had to have been redistributed to reflect the professional model.

A conceptually analogous measure is calculated to assess the magnitude of a legislative deviation (LEGDEV) for each fiscal year. For example, LEGDEV for 1975 is computed as follows:

LEGDEV75 = [ I ACTAPP75 - PROJAPP75 I /21 / ACTAPP75

A discussion of the GOVDEV and LEGDEV measures for each fiscal year of the analysis indicates institutional responsibility for deviations from funding according to an objective allocation of resources. Also, they provide statistical measures of the proxi- mity or distance of actual gubernatorial recommendations or legislative appropriations from those distributions suggested by the ACHE recommendation, and may suggest trends in Alabama's higher education funding toward or away from the professional model. In a nutshell, how large are the so-called "political adjustments" in higher education funding; are the deviations increasing or decreasing; and who's to "blame" for these "political adjustments"?

Findings

The Consequences of Interinstitutional Conflict. From a perusal of the GOVTR scores on Chart I, one finds very little statistical evidence to support most of the various scenarios concerning the distribution of higher education resources among individual insti tutions or groups of institutions. There is certainly no confirmation of the idea that the "big boys" are able to dominate the appropriations process and thereby become systematic "winners" in the governor's office. During most of the fiscal years of the last decade,

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both Auburn and U A fell below the 1.000 mark. Moreover, their institutional rank orders (RO), based upon the arithmetic mean of GOVTR for the ten years, are eleventh and eighth respectively.

The data of Chart I also do not support an "urban shift" theme or scenario. While t h e UAB and Auburn-Montgomery campuses maintained "winning" positions from 1975 through 1979, there is no evidence that any of the four recently developed urban institutions have been consistent llwinners" in the governor's office. None of the urban institutions, with the possible exception of Auburn-Montgomery, rank near the top in the rank orders, and one of the urban schools, UA-Huntsville, ranks (12th) near the bottom.

The notion of "intense parochial interests" co- alescing to win the budget game in the governor's office is also without statistical support in Chart I. The data indicate wide disparity in the annual treatment among the former teacher colleges with strong regional bases. The smaller schools of Liv- ingston, Athens State, and Montevallo rank within the top half of the institutional rank orders, while t h e larger institutions of Jacksonville State, Troy State, and the University of North Alabama rank tenth, eleventh and fourteenth respectively. Obviously, if a coalition of regional interests had manifested itself during the decade, then it seems reasonable to expect that the largest institutional participants would have received some benefits.

Perhaps t h e most enlightening data of Chart I involve the relative postures of the traditionally black institutions, Alabama State and Alabama A&M universities. Both of these schools possess GOVTR scores exceeding 1.000 for eight of the ten fiscal years. Their institutional rankings of two and three respectively seem surprising in view of the state's history and alleged legacy or vestiges of official

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segregation. However, these data, reflecting activities of the post-1974 period, may indicate the enhanced political representation of blacks in state government and the importance of black voters as a faction in the state's Democratic party.

An evaluation of LEGTR scores provides statistical support for the same generalizations derived from the GOVTR scores. As indicated by the data of Chart 11, the !'big boysf1, UA and Auburn, seldom achieve a "winning" status as a result of legislative treatment of t h e proposed higher education budget. Except for t h e 1984 session, t h e legislature did not place - both UA and Auburn in a "winning" posture during any particular fiscal year. Moreover, the rank orders, according to the means of LEGTR, indicate a marginal decline of Auburn's relative position as the budget moved from the governor's office to the legislative chambers; that institution moved from eleventh position on t h e GOVTR measure to twelfth position on the LEGTR measure. UA's relative position remained unchanged.

Legislative action on the budget also did not alter the basic positions of the urban schools, the former teacher colleges or the traditionally black institutions. The urban schools continued to rank near the middle or bottom of the fourteen institutions; the former teacher colleges or regional universities maintained their mixed pattern of very high rankings or very low rankings. The traditionally black universities remained at or near t h e top of institutional rank orders, with Alabama State being t h e only university with flwinningll LEGTR scores for each fiscal year of the analysis.

- - -- - . - . - __ -

Although the data of Charts I and I1 shed some light upon the "big boy", "intense parochial interest" and "urban shift" schools of thought, there is still no evidence to support or reject the notion of a

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"political stalemate." Assuming that the aforementioned forces associated with Alabama's institutions of higher learning assert themselves in the appropriations process, but have a counterbalancing impact, then rank orders of t h e institutions according to GOVTR and LEGTR should remain stable or highly correlated from one fiscal year to the next one. In the absence of a stabilized environment or political equilibrium among institutions, institutional rank orders of a given fiscal year should not correlate positively or highly with rank orders of the suc- ceeding year.

The Spearman rho correlation coefficients of Chart I11 provide some evidence for t h e "political stalemate" scenario. In general, neither the governor nor the legislature appears to %lice the higher education pie" in a manner which is dramatically different from the previous year. More specifically, they do not make alterations in the budgets of individual institutions which are of sufficient magnitude to substantially reorder the relative positions of "winners" and "losers" within the state's com- munity of universities.

These somewhat high correlations of Chart I11 not only support the "political stalemate" scenario, but also indicate that t h e legislature may be the primary institutional locus of numerous counterbalancing political forces which perpetuate the status quo within higher education. In recent years, as governors on a couple of occasions. recommended a dramatic shift in institutional rank orders (as in 1984, rho = .0901), t h e correlations based upon t h e LEGTR scores for the same years continued to be rather high (as in 1984, rho = .6440). These data suggest that the legislature was less willing to reorder the relative positions of institutions from the previous year, even if dramatic reorderings were recommended by the state's chief executive.

19 6

Chart I11

h CORRELATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL RANK ORDERINCS

I-FX(N) vith FX(N+I) ACCORDING TO LECTR SCORES

LECTR75 with 76: LEGTR76 with 17:

LECTR77 vith 78: LECTR78 vith 79: LEGTR79 with 80: LECTRBO with 81: LEGTR81 with 82: LEGTR82 with 83: LEGTR83 with 84:

(Rho)

.7802

.3495

.6967

.6000

.a286

.7846

.9165

.7145

.6440

( $ i f ! )

( . O P l ) (.110)

(. 003) (.012) (.001)

(.001)

(.001) (. 002)

( .006)

CORRELATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL JUNK ORDERINCS

- /-FY(N) with FY(N+l) ACCORDING TO GOVTR SCORES

(Rho) (Sig)

GOVTR75 with 76: COVTR76 with 77: GOVTR77 with 78: GOVTR78 with 79: GOVTR79 vith 80: COVTRBO with 81: GOVTR8l 4 t h 82:

COVTR82 with 83: COVTR83 vith 84:

.9209

.3978

.6659

.6088

.6879

.2571

.7011

.5253

.0901

(.001) (.079) (.005)

(.010)

(.003)

( . 1 8 7 ) '

(.003) ( .027)

(. 380)

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However, it should be emphasized that while the legislature may reorder gubernatorial "winners" and tlosersft to a slight degree, i t does not change in a fundamental manner the institutional rank orders reflected in the governor's proposed budget. A comparison of institutional rank orders in the gover- nor's budget recommendations of a given year with the rank orders derived from the final appropriation's acts of the legislature for the same year is presented in Chart IV. The very high correlation coefficients (Spearmans rho) indica'te that when the governor identifies and positions "winners" and "loserst' in the higher education arena, his basic preferences remain intact throughout the legislative process.

Chart IV

*RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS OF COVTR SCORES

WITR LEGTR SCORES FOR EACH N (1975-1984)

GOVTR75 with LECTR75 :

COVTR76 with LECTR76: COVTR77 v i t h LECTR77: COVTR78 with LECTR78:

COVTR79 with LECTR79: GOVTRBO with LECTRBO: COVTR81 v i t h LEGTRB1:

GOVTR82 with LECTR82: OVTR83 with LECTR83:

COVTR84 v i t h LEGTRB4:

(Rho)

.7011

.7978 1.000

.8505

.9868

,8505

* 81 10

.7363

.9560

.5560

( S i R )

(. 003)

(.001) (.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.019)

*Spearman's Rho.

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Responsibility and Magnitude of "Political Ad- justments." Which institution of state government (governor or legislature) bears principal responsibility for deviations from the professional model or objective, formula-based allocation of higher education resources? Secondly, how large or serious are these "political adjustments" in the professional model? GOVDV and LEGDV measures for each year, as presented in Chart V, provide statistical information concerning these issues. A s outlined in the methodology section, these measures indicate the percentage of total dollars recommended by the governor or appropriated by the legislature which would had to have been redistributed in a fiscal year, if the governor's budget or legislature's appropriation was to constitute "statistically perfect" funding according to the proportional shares suggested for each institution by the annual ACHE recommendation.

The data of Chart V provide somewhat surprising findings regarding the extent or magnitude of deviation(s) from the professional model, but confirm earlier expectations of the legislature's impact upon the allocation of higher education resources. GOVDV and LEGDV scores indicate that a redistribution of approximately two percent of total dollars each year would have resulted in an objective allocation of resources. This percentage equates to 3.5 to 7.0 million dollars annually, depending upon the fiscal year. If these dollars had been distributed among the fourteen schools strictly according to the professional model, the additions or subtractions from the budgets of individual institutions would have been in most cases so small that the basic character or q u i the institution probably would not have been substantially altered in a particular year. However, t h e cumulative effect of these amounts during the decade has perhaps resulted in funding gains or losses which are of a magnitude to have affected the overall development of several universities.17

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A second generalization derived from Chart V relates directly to the question of gubernatorial versus legislative responsibility for deviations from objective for mula-based allocations. Basically, the governor and legislature have similar records regarding the extent of their deviation from objective funding in a given fiscal year, although t h e governor's allocations were usually closer to the professional model. However, these differences between GOVDV and LEGDV were very small and/or virtually non- existent for seven of the ten budget cycles.

The GOVDV and LEGDV measures for each year also indicate a slight trend in the direction of objective funding. With the exception of 1983, the size of the deviations from the professional model in the last six years has been smaller than in the earlier years. It is especially noteworthy that in 1982 and 1984, the last two years of dramatic growth in available funds, the budget recommendation of two philosophically different chief executives were very proximate to a statistical mirror of the funding proportions suggested by the ACHE recommendations. As unexpected as i t may seem, the state may be allocating higher education resources for its senior institutions according to a professional model in the near future, even in the absence of legislative reform or alterations in the governance structures.

Summary and Implications

-

This analysis, based upon aggregate appropriation's data of the last decade, suggests four generalizations concerning the politics of higher education in Alabama. (1) With the possible exception of the two traditionally black universities, there is little evidence to support assorted scenarios regarding the political dominance of one group of higher education institutions in the budgetary process. (2) The dy- namics of political forces associated with higher education funding in Alabama are apparently not of a

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nature to produce periodic and dramatic reorderings of institutional positions in the quest for state dollars. (3) The governor's budget basically deter- mines an institution's treatment and relative posture in the allocation of higher education resources; the legislature will not reorder to a substantial degree the chief executive's preferences unless his proposals seek a basic shift in institutional positions of the previous fiscal year. (4) "Political adjustments" or deviations in objective funding are smaller in statistical terms than suggested by the rhetoric of some participants in the process. More importantly, the size of these deviations as a proportion of resources available is being reduced.

These findings obviously imply the existence of several conditions or developments which deserve extended analysis. (1) Are the traditionally black institutions receiving their "fair" share of state operating monies, or is the methodology of this study masking certain historical patterns of racial discrimi- nation? (2) Would the state, through a more professional legislative setting and/or centralized governance structure for higher education, be able to - depoliticize the budgetary process to a point where the allocation of available resources would deviate from the professional model by less than the current level of one or two percent per annum? (3) Why is the state apparently approaching in an incremental manner an objective allocation of available resources in the absence of certain overt reforms? Are there subtle forces at work closing the Ilgaptr between politicized and professional funding?

In view of recurring suggestions from legislators and educators about the need for systemic reforms, and in light of ongoing litigation in the federal courts relative to the desegregation of higher education, answers to these questions are of great significance to the future operation of public higher education in

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Alabama. A candid investigation of these issues may refute current assumptions about higher education in the state. Alabama's leaders may be discussing remedies for a policy problem which either is minor in scope, may not be corrected by their remedies, or is perhaps on a self-correcting path.

lAlabama is no exception in this area of public policy. Recurring political issues of American higher education include: (1) funding patterns among units of higher education with different missions, (2) conflicts between higher education and the elementary-secondary sector, (3) the nature and extent of academic freedom, and (4) disputes regarding the relative importance of the university's teaching, research and service roles. See F. Wirt, "Education Politics and Policies" in H. Jacob and K. Vines, eds., Politics in the American States - A Comparative Anal sis, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., + 1976 , pp. 340-348.

2State appropriations for higher education in Alabama are derived from a special trust fund established to support all levels of public education. In recent years the senior institutions have received about twenty percent of the fund. Annual trust fund appropriations per full-time student to t h e senior colleges and universities are substantially less than the national average. This condition stems in large measure from the virtual absence of local property taxes to support the elementary-secondary schools. As a practical matter, the financial demands for all sectors of public education in the state are exerted upon a single state-level funding source.

3The state's most comprehensive institutions of higher learning in terms of degree programs are the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa and Auburn

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University's main campus. Four institutions - Troy State, Jacksonville State, Livingston, and t h e Univer- sity of North Alabama - are former teacher colleges which attained university status in the 1960's. Two institutions are the traditionally black land grant and teacher colleges; they are respectively Alabama A h M University in Huntsville and Alabama State University in Montgomery. Another institution - the University of Montevallo - is the former women's college which became coeducational in t h e mid-1950's. The state also maintains a liberal arts college, Athens State, which was previously a church-affiliated school.

Each of t h e remaining four institutions reside in one of the state's largest urban centers-Birmingham, Mobile, Huntsville, and Montgomery. These urban institutions have generally developed within the last twenty-five years. The principal activities of two post - WWII urban institutions - the University of Alabama a t Birmingham and t h e University of South Alabama in Mobile - are centered around their medical programs. UA-Huntsville is oriented toward science and engineering because of the presence of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center and the U.S. Army's Missile Command. Auburn's Montgomery campus - AUM - is not as specialized as the other three urban schools and operates fewer graduate/professional programs.

4ACHE's limited role is set forth in the Code of Alabama (19751, Title 16, Section 5 (1-10). Many states have centralized higher education by con- solidating institutional boards into a system board. This development was often in response to the adverse consequences of distributing higher education resources to cities and regions in a "pork barrel'' fashion. See T. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 4 th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 19821, p. 178.

5The level of professionalism or institutional development of the Alabama legislature has been well

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documented. In the most often cited evaluation of state legislatures, the Alabama assembly was rated either forty-ninth or fiftieth in three of five func- tional categories. See Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, State Legislatures: Their Effectiveness (New York: 1971).

An Evaluation of Praeger Publishers,

%n recent years the combined enrollments of Auburn's main campus and t h e University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa have equaled almost one-third of the total enrollment among senior institutions of higher learning. See ACHE'S Higher Education Reference Manual - 1983-84 (Montgomery, Alabama).

As the state's first land grant college, Auburn receives much of the state's extension service and agricultural monies. The strong ties between its extensions service, county agents, and the powerful farm bureau federation are well known among Ala- bama politicos.

For many years UA-Tuscaloosa enjoyed a "de facto" monopoly in the area of professional legal education. Its law school graduates frequently serve in positions of local and statewide elective office. Also, UAT's Center for Business and Economic R e search (CBER) is perhaps the most visible research entity within Alabama higher education. I t conducts applied economic research for state agencies and elected officials, including an annual assessment or projection of revenues for the special education trust fund.

See N. Peirce, The Deep South States of America (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), pp. 278-280, and V.O. Key's discussion of the Auburn- Extension Service politics in Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 19491, pp. 55-56.

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lirVarious socio-economic indicators suggest t h e urbanization of Alabama in t h e post-WWII period. See Alabama Department of Economic and Com- munity Affairs, Alabama County D a t a Book - 1983, pp. 24, 26, 69, 7 3 , 81, 84, and 85.

8As of Fall, 1983, t h e four recent ly developed urban institutions (UAB, UAH, USA, and AUM) have 35 percent of t h e total enrollment within senior institutions. Ten years ago t h e Comparable s ta t i s t ic was 26 percent. Since 1972 all four insti tutions have experienced a doubling of their headcount enrollments. D a t a obtained from t h e ACHE Reference Mannual 1983-84.

gFif teen of thirty-five state sena tors and forty- one of 105 state representat ives have all or p a r t of their districts within one of t h e "big four" urban counties. See Alabama Law Insti tute, The Alabama Legislative Directory , 19 8 2-1 9 8 6.

l0For example, the four predominately white former teacher colleges are si tuated in distinctly different geographical regions. All four are at least 60 miles from Auburn's main campus or UA-Tus- caloosa; perhaps more importantly, e a c h is at least 125 miles from another. All four were founded in t h e 1870's or 1880's; each has produced numerous graduates who have tended to remain in their region of t h e state; each school maintains a Division I1 NCAA athletic program which is qui te visible within the university's immedia te service area. Two of t h e schools - Jacksonville State and t h e University of North Alabama - are located within or near small metropolitan areas with m ult imember local legislative delegations.

l lAl though research in this area is very l imited, i t has been argued t h a t t h e level of legislative professionalism and t h e governance s t r u c t u r e for

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coordination of public higher education are the two major determinants of a state's higher education policies. See D. Greer , "State Level Coordination and Policy Implementation.T1 Policy Studies Journal 10 (September 1981): 32-47. However, this generaliza- t ion is open to debate. See R. Peterson, "Environ- mental and Polit ical Determinants of State Higher Education Appropriations Policies." Journal of Hi her Education 47 (September/October 1976 + 523-542.

12During three of t h e last t e n fiscal years , higher education administrators in Alabama have experienced prorated budgets.

13The political resources of most American governors and the insti tutional advantages of tha t of f ice re la t ive to an a m a t e u r legislative se t t ing are discussed in 1. Sharkansky's The Politics of Taxing and Spending (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 19691, pp. 83- 145. See also L. Sabato, Goodbye to Goodtime Charlie - The American . - - Governorship __ - - - Transformed, 2nd ed. (Washington; Congressional Quarterly Inc., 19831, pp. 79-82., I. Sharkansky's "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures." American Polit ical Science Review 62 (September 1968): 1220-1231, and I. Sharkansky and A. Turnbull, "Budget-Making in Georgia and Wiscon- sin: A Test of a Model." Midwest Journal of Political Science 1 3 (September 1969):

14Scholars of t h e legislative process generally assume that much of the "pork" or special projects for local const i tuents in a budget will e m a n a t e f rom legislative leaders and members of t h e "money" commit tees (Ways and Means, Finance and Taxation).

631-645.

See A. RosenthaI's Legislative Life - People, Process And Performance in t h e States (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 19811, pp. 289-292.

15There is a virtual absence of research inves-

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tigating t h e relationship between the distribution of higher education resources in a state and t h e state's political environment. See S. Gove and C. Floyd, "Research on Higher Education Administration: An Uneven Report." Public Administration Review 35 (Januarv, 1975): 111-118. The most notable exception to" this generalization is R. Thompson, llPoliti& and Purse Strings" in D. Garth, ed., An Invis- ible Giant (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 19711, pp. 97-108.

16The formula and weighting scheme are set forth in ACHE'S Plans and Recommendations for Hinher Education - 1984.

17For example, t he cumulative ten-year effect or total amount of "lost" dollars (not adjusted for inflation) to Auburn University's main campus as a byproduct of political adjustments in objective funding was approximately 7.4 million dollars.

Selected References

Alabama Commission on Higher Education. (1984) ACHE Higher Education Reference Manual - 1983-1 984. Montgomery, Alabama.

Alabama Commission on Higher Education. (1984) Plans and Recommendations for Higher Educa- - tion. Montgomery, Alabama.

(1975) "Research on Higher Education Administration: An Uneven Report."

Gove, S. and C. Floyd.

Public Administration Review 35 (January): 111-1 18.

Greer , D. (1981) "State Level Coordination and Pol- icy Implement a t ion in Higher Education." Policy Studies Journal 1 0 (September): 32-47.

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Peterson, R. (1976) "Environmental and Political Determinants of State Higher Education Appro- priations Policies." Journal of Higher Education 4 7 (Sept em ber/Oc tober): 5 2 3-542.

Sharkansky, I. (1968) "Agency Requests, Gubernato- rial Support and Budget Success in State Legis- latures." American Polit ical Science Review, 62 (September): 1220-1 23 1.

Sharkansky, I. and A. Turnbull. (1969) "Budget- Making in Georgia and Wisconsin: A Test of a Model." Midwest Journal of Political Science 1 3 (September): 631-645.

Thompson, R. (1971) "Politics and Purse Strings." in Garth, ed., An Invisible Giant. San Francisco: Josse y-Bass, Inc.

Wirt, F. (1976) "Education Polit ics and Policies." in H. J a c o b and K. Vines, eds., Politics in t h e American States - A Comparat ive Analysis, 3rd ed. Boston: Li t t le , Brown, and Co.

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higher education appropriations in alabama: selected dimensions of politicized funding (1975–1984)

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