hibbing legislative carrers why and how should study them[1]

8/3/2019 HIBBING Legislative Carrers Why and How Should Study Them[1]

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\ LegislaturesComparative Perspectiveson Representative Assemblies

Edited byGerhard Loewenberg,Peverill Squire, andD. Roderick Kiewiet

Ann ArborTHE l.IN.IVERSJTl" OF MIcmGAN PREss

Legislative Careers: Why and How We ShouldStudy ThemJohn R. Hibbing

If suggestions about the appropriate future direction for a stream of research areto have any value, they must be based on an appreciation of the current status ofthat research. Accordingly, I begin this essay on legislative careers by proposing a means of organizing extant research on the topic. For two reasons, however, this "literature review" section is relatively brief. First, accompanying essays by Gary Mon crief and Werner Patzelt do an impressively thorough job ofcataloguing previous research and, second, my main goal is to offer ideas aboutthe topic of legislative careers that might be useful for future research. Thus,my review of the literature will be illustn'ltive, not comprehensive.Classifying Research on Legislative CareersAn obvious way of organizing previous research on legislative careers is toidentify the scholarly purpose or justification for studying the topic in the firstplace. While each researcher is likely to have multiple motivations, fouroverarching goals can be discerned. These goals are to investigate (l ) legislators, (2) a certain legislative body, (3) the larger sociopolitical system of whicha legislature is a part, and (4) generalizable patterns across sociopolitical systems.Understanding Legislator MotivationFor many scholars, a major reason to study legislative careers is to understandthe motivation oflegisl ators and humans more generally. Why do certain peoplerun for legislative office? This question has proven surprisingl y difficult to answer since it implies comparison with a group of people who did not run forlegislative office. But who should be included in this group? AU adults whoReprinted with permission from Legislative Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (May 1999): 149-71.

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276 Legislatureshave never sought a legislative office? Only those who are in occupations frequently leading to legislative careers? Only those who actually considered running? In many parts of the world, the central role of political parties structuresrecruitment, but such matters are largely unresolved in the case of United Stateslegislatures, despite imaginative efforts by Thbin and Keynes (1975), Rosenthal(1981), Maisel (1986, 1987), Fowler and McClure (1989), Canon (1990),Moncrief and Thompson (1992), and Kazee (1994).Outside the United States, recruitment of legislators is usually more structured, thanks to the intrusive role of political parties. Thus, research on legisla". tive recruitment is likely to be seen as research on institutions rather than as" research on individual motivation. For examples, see Byrd (1963) on post-colonial Uganda, Ranney (1965) on the U.K., Czudnowski (1970) on Israel, Agor(1971) on Chile, Pedersen (1977) on Denmark, Mishler (1978) on Canada, andIrwin, Budge, and Farlie (1979) on the Netherlands.Once the legislative career enters the phase of actual legislative service,analysis in some ways becomes infinitely more complicated. Rather than simply studying the single decision of whether or not to try to enter a legislature,decision points involved with the internal legislative career multiply quickly.We may want to know why some members decide to run for one of many higheroffices (for examples, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Brace 1984;Copeland 1989; Rohde 1979; Squire 1988a). Or we may want to know whymembers seek the career track they do within a single legislative body (Fenno1996,21; Hibbing 1993; Loomis 1988; Simon 1987; Squire 1988b). But themyriad combinations and moves make it impossible to cover all eventualities.

The end of legislative careers has been of as much interest to scholars asthe beginning. Just as they have asked why some people run for legislativeoffice while most do not, researchers have also asked why some legislatorsleave office when they are not under the legal obligation to do so. Are mostlegislators driven by a desire for power, fame, policy, promotion, or money?Are they motivated by a desire to "have fun" in their legislative body? Or aremost retirement decisions made simply to avoid the ignominy of an impendingscandal or electoral defeat? Questions such as these have been addressed bySmith and Miller (1977), Frantzich (1978), Cooper and West (1981), Jacobsonand Kernell (1981), Hibbing (1982), Brace (1984), Francis and Baker (1986),Lascher (1993), Kiewiet and Zeng ( l 9 9 ~ ) , Jacobson and Dimock (1994), Mooreand Hibbing (1998), and Theriault (1998).Understanding a Certain Legislative Body

i Another collection of studies on legislative careers has been undertaken withthe hope of discovering something about a given legislative body rather thansomething about the human condition. Usually, the specific goal is to determine

Legislative Careersa legislature's stage of institutionalization, a concept referring to the complexity, boundedness, and stable structure of a body (for general treatments of institutionalization, see Eisenstadt 1964; Huntington 1965; Sisson 1973).

Thus, Cohen (198'0) lias used career information to evaluate the institutionalization of the Yugoslav Assembly, King (1981) and Hibbing (1988) havedone the same for the British House of Commons; Opello (1986) for the Portuguese Parliament; and most famously Polsby (1968) for the U.S. House of Representatives. State legislatures in the United States have attracted special interest along these lines as they present a wonderful array of stages of institutionalization (see Rosenthal 1996; Squire 1992).

Following Polsby, the general idea is that the longer the median career in alegislature. the more lateral entry for leadership positions is discouraged, andthe more careers follow unbending and internally imposed institutional norms.the more institutionalized that legislature can be said to be. For a legislature tobe institutionalized it must have clear boundaries, and for a legislature to haveboundaries, it is thought that members must not be assuming leadership positions without paying dues in the body, must not be moving in and out of thechamber at a breakneck pace, and must not be making up norms as they goalong. In this sense, features of the legislative career become central indicators 1/of the nature and developmental stage of legislatures themselves. //Understanding a Certain SOCiopolitical SystemA great deal of previous research has attempted to identify sociodemographiccharacteristics and prelegislative-service activities that increase the likelihoodof subsequent legislative service. This may seem identical to research descr ibedearlier dealing with the activities in which people would engage in order to beable to enter a legislature, but there is an important difference. Now, the f Q ~ J J S , of attention has shifted to studies l : l t ~ t ! p , ! m i I 1 g to d e t e r m J Q ~ J h e . N a i ~ i : ~ ~ l s t ! q g j p ..a i o d e t y ; a i i d a ~ a y fi.:omthoseatlempting t o , ~ e t e t j i 1 i n e ! h e f a c . . t Q ~ ~ . g r i v i n g legIslators imd potential legislators. If we observe'thiiiO'iiTyelderly, well-to-dobusinessmen of the polity's majority ethnic and religious group find their wayto a legislative career, we have learned something about the nature of power inthat society. Since legislative bodies tend to be sizable and visible, they oftenbecome the main stage on which the public can observe political actors. Thus,if scholarly interest comes to rest on a society'S "circulation of elites," this interest is likely at some point to be directed at major legislative bodies in thatsociety.

The traits and life-experiences of legislators have attracted substantial interest from scholars. This is not surprising given the centrality of the question."who governs?" to an understanding of a sociopolitical system (see Dahl 1961;Michels 1959; Mosca 1939). Just about every national legislature (and many


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29. , " '/i"

28 Legislaturessubnationallegislatures as well) has at one time or anoth er been subjected to ananalysis of how representative it is of the country's people (see Matthews 1984for a good listing).

For some scholars the goal is not to set a legislative body in the context ofthe people of that society, but rath er in the context of other political offices inthat society. Placing legislatures in the larger political opportunit y structure of apolity is made easier by paying attention to legislative careers. Determining thenature of membership flows into an d out of legislative bodies makes it possibleto draw inferences about the bodies in which legislators most p refer to serve.Schlesinger (1966) has done more th an anyone to map out the opportunity structure of a political system (see also S t r ~ m J997). Do U.S. senators leave in orderto run for the U.S. House, or do U.S. representatives happily seek a Senate seatwhenever they think they have the chance to win one? Has the European Parliament finally become a desirable legislature in which to serve? Are people leaving good positions to go to Strasbo urg (Kirchner 1983)'1 Once there, are theystaying? Do leadership positions only go to those with long service in the bodyitself, or is experience in other institutions viewed as an adequate substitute?Data on legislative careers are needed for answering questions such as these.

Tracing the career activities of legislators after they have ceased beinglegislators is particularly useful in understanding the larger society and a givenlegislature's place in it. Is legislative service a stepping-stone to private sectorpositions or are ex-legislators ostracized? What kinds of skills are valued, andwhat s k i 1 1 ~ are perceived to be hon ed by way oflegislative service? Is service ina given legislature so desirable that members will leave it only for high quality,non legislative positions? Sch olars have used legislative career in fonnatio n to [;plumb these questions (see, for example, Borders and Dockery 1995; Herrickand Nixon 1996).Generalizing across Sociopolitical Systems : ~ : ! i :.]In some ways the most ambit ious research is that which seeks to work acrossmany legislatures in a variety of systems in the hopes of drawing general conclusions. Does proportional representation increase the percentage of legislators who are not members of the dominant ethnic, racial, or economic group? Islegislator salary related (presu mably inversely) to the percentage of legislatorswho depart voluntarily? This, of course, is real comparative research with allthe possibilities and all the difficulties that come along with it. Comparabledata across polities have always proven elusive. For this reason and others, thereis less of this kind of research on legislative careers than there should be.

But there is some truly comp arative research on legislative careers. Consider for example the question of why the percentage of female legislators varies so much from country to country. Norris (1985), Rule (1987), and Matland

Legislative Careers(1998) have addressed the matter straight on and have specified a clear set offactors that seem to encou rage women to engage in a legislative career at thenational level. Kim and Patterson (1987) compare a broader range of traits inseveral diverse countries. Loewenberg and Patterson analyze the relationshipbetween legislative salary and membership turnover in countries as diverse asGermany, the United States, Japan, and Kenya (1979, 105-12 ). Welsh (1980)has provided general but useful information about variation in careers withinCentral and Eastern European systems prior to the breakup of the USSR. AndSchultz (1973) is eager to examine legislators in a cross-national fashion. Still,the overall conclusion has to be that research rigorously comparing two or morenational legislative bodies is rare. Compariso n of careers in subnationallegislatures, particularly U.S. state legislatures, is somewhat more common (seeRosenthal 1981 and Squire 1993, for overviews).suggestions for Future Research on Legislative CareersAs is apparent from the foregoing sample, the theoretical bases for studyinglegislative careers are wonderfully diverse. In the interest of brevity and cohesion, I will direct my suggestions for reorienting career research to the goals ofunderstanding t h e ! ! ~ ! ! ! r ~ . - 9 f J ~ g i s l a t u [ e s . , a l l Q , t h ~ .. p . ! m ~ r n s of legisliltlvediange

>-aCfoss l e g l s f a t I ~ ~ " b 2 q , j ~ , J n other words, from this p o i ~ t ~ n ; Iwiffhave iittle to'say abOiif'whyf;';dividual legislators might behave as they do or why certaingenders, races, or occupational backgrounds might be over- or underrepresentedin certain legislatures. This selected focus seems appropriate given the nee d tochait directions for truly comparative legislative research, and since a great dealof recent interest within the community of legislative scholars has centered onthe sources of change in legislatures, particularly when seen from a neo-institutionalist perspective.

Why do legislatures look the way they do? Why have they evolved the waythey have? Are they subject to the same forces that affect the shape and evolution of other institutions? To what extent can the shape and evolution be mani pulated? These are basic questions. For the most part, information on legislativecareers has not been as useful in answering these questions as it should be. Myhope in the final half of this paper is to otTer suggestions that might allow legislative career information to be of more assistance in this regard. But beforeanalyzing how legislative career data might be useful, it is necessary to providesome background on theories {)finstilutions and, particularly, institutional change./" - _--.......... ,.,_..... "Are Institutions Shaped by Outside or Inside Forces?Scholars disagree about the primary source of institutional, and therefore legislative, change. At the risk of oversimplification, some see the shape of leg


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30 31egislaturesislatures as being determined primarily by the desires and preferences of thepeople inside the body; that is, by the legislators themselves. Others see theshape of legislatures as being determined primarily by external forces-technological changes, alterations in the public mood, the activities of other institutions, etc.The view that inside players shap e institutions is usually, though certainlynot always, associated with the rational-choice school of thought (but see Epsteinet al. 1997). This is ,fitting. If people are thought to be preference maximizers,- - . - . - ~ . - . --...,then people in a legislature will set to work creating a body that allows themto maximize their preferences. In other words, they will shape the institutionto their own ends, whatever these ends may be. Of course, even within therational-choice community, serious disagreement persists on what it is that legislators desire. Mayhew takes the goal of (U.S.) legislators to be electoral success,and when he looked at the U.S. Con gress in the early 1970s he concluded thatanyone would be "hard pressed" to design an institution better suited to "members' electoral needs" (1974, 82). He was thinking especially of the weak parties, strong committees, and large staffs that afforded members flexibility inroll-call decisions, authoritative platforms for position-taking, and resourcesfor servicing constituents-all, presumably, useful at attracting votes. Structure-induced equilibrium notions, o n the other hand, emphasize disnibutive policies and describe a Congress adept (largely due to its committee system) atgetting the right kind of pork to the most appreciative districts (see Shepsle1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1987). Still other observers stress the need members feel for accurate information on the long-term policy ramifications of variOliS proposals being considered, and conclude that this need dictates quite adifferent set of institutional features, notably committee arrangements (Gilliganand Krehbiel J987, 1990; Krehbiel 1991).

In effect, we are left to decide whether legislators want to look good(Mayhew), do good (Krehbiel), or ladle pork (Shepsle), with each school claiming Congress has been particularly shaped to meet that objective. The disagreement is disconcerting. If the same feature of the same body (say, standing committees in the U.S. House) can be described as maximizing very different andoccasionally incompatible member goals, can we be confident in the originalassumption that the institution looks the way it does primarily because of member actions? Relatedly, if weak p a r t j e ~ and strong committees were so useful inmaximizing members' preferences in the early 1970s United States, why haveparties since become stronger (see Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991)and committees weaker (Cohen 1990; Ehrenhalt 1986)? Maybe the environment changed such that in order for members to achieve their preferences, certain alterations in the institution had to be made. If his is true, however, legislators become mere automatons and the real variable of interest becomes theenvironment.

Legislative CareersThis is exactly the conclusion reached by those eager to apply organiza

tional theory concepts to l e g i s h l t i ' y ~ ~ v C > . l l l t i . 9 ! \ , most notably Joseph Cooper(1981; see also'C6opefaridBracty 1981). The basic idea is that an organization(in this case, a legislature) is to a great extent a product of the environment inwhich it operates; thus, rather than tracing the connection between membergoals and institutional shape, time is better spent tracing the connection between "facets of [legislative] structure and external determinants" ( Cooper andBrady 1981, 997). But there are problems' here as well. Mo st importantly, theconcept of "the environment" or "external determinant" is so amorphous thatpractically anything coul d be made to fit. Rather than well-operationalized environmental variables, research of this ilk tends to offer post-hoc and analytically casual, environmental explanations for selected legislat ive features or trends(for more on this point, see Patterson, 1981). Often, there is another environ'--- - - " ~ ' - - ~ - ' ~ " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' mental explanation that would have led us to expect a different legislative feature or trend. In effect, the breadth of the concept of "environment" makes itp r a c t i c a ! ! > . ' < , w . Q n j ) J ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ' p ~ ~ , 4 E i i g ~ . ' ' ' ' ' ' "....... ,, ' . ........ ..... ..' . . . . . .. ..... ....... . -'--institutionalizationenters at this point. As it is usually conceived, institutionalization i s . ' ! ~ : ~ _ ~ l l y , ~ _ ? u b s p e c i e s of o r g a n i z a t i 9 . n J h ~ 9 . D ' . For reasorfsTi6tiiIwaysspeciiie


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33egislatures2internal ly- and externally-clriven change schools of thought. Some see lengthening careers as indicative that members have been able to carve Ollt a situationin which the benefits of serving olltweigh the costs (see Black 1972). Otherssee varying legislative career length as a response to oscillating environmentalforces (see Cooper and West 1981). And still others see the generally increasingcareer length (in the U.S. case, at least) as a sign of an institutionalizing body(Polsby 1968).

Legislative career information should not be expected to identify a winnerfrom among these various theories of legislative change, but, used properly, itmay be able to shed some light on a few of the merits and demerits of each. 1will illustrate this point by concentrating on institutionalization, as this is thetheory that has been used most widely in the study of comparative legislatures

for example. the contributors in Kornberg 1973, as welI as several of theessays in Copela nd and P a t t e r ~ o n _ 1 9 9 4 ) . As ~ ~ ~ t i ~ n e d e a r H e r , g ~ ; e r a l i z i n g about trends, patterns, and relationshipsacross legislatures is done all too rarely, so it ill-behooves us to be critical of aconcept like institutionalization that has at least been the basis for attempts atgeneralization. But measurement of the concept of institutionalization needs tobe subjected to serious adjustment an d qualification if meaningful generalization is to occur. My initial contention is not particularly bold but is worth making nonetheless: Using legislative career information to make inferences aboutthe status and evolution of legislative bodies is not as straightforward as is sometimes assumed. The most commonly employed mea'>ure of legislative careers

, (average length), for example, means quite different things in different contexts. More importantly, in some legislatures-indeed in most of the world'slegisl atures- legisl ative car eer length (or, conversely, turnover rates) may noteven be a valid indicator of institutionalization at a11. This assertion goes againstconventional wisdom holding that increasing career length is central to the institutionalization process, so an explanation is necessary.

Institutions Can Have High Membership Turnoverand Still Be Institution-The perfectly sensible assumption popularized by Polsby and employed

by most students of legislative institutionalization is that the longer the typicallegislative career the more institutionalized the legislature, other things beingequal. But there is another way of thinking about the connection between membership turnover and institutionalizatiop. This alternative comes to us by wayof the organizational theory literature. Here, institutionalization is achieved notby minimizing membership turnover but by minimizing the relevance of thatturnover. The goal of many private-sector entities, for example, is not so muchto minimize turnover but to make sure that whatever turnover does occur hasminimal impact on the institution. The phrase "company man" from the pregender-neutml 1950s illustrates these points nicely. When replacing outgoingmembers, the goal of GM or IBM was then (and probably still is) to recruit

Legislative Careerspeople who were roughly similar to the outgoing parties and then to train andsocialize the new recruits until the replacements were virtual clones of the departing members, thus producing minimal disruption to the organization. In ifthis way, institutions were able to reduce one area of potential uncertainty- I:and this outcome is generally pleasing to institutions since they already have ifenough uncertainty in thei r environments. '

The indoctrination of the company man into the dress, mannerisms, comportment, orientation, and behavior desired at the workplace has a ready parallel in many legislative settings, and institutionalization could just as effectivelyoccur via this method as via discouraging turnover at all. In fact, the concept,"minimize the effects of turnover," is probably m()re consistenta l i z a t i o n ~ i ! 1 ~ ~ . !ll)l the, i n d i v i d u a i j ~ ! t : : ! I d ~ r . ~ q j r r e l e v a n t , . b y . , l h e . f Q . r < : : , ~ ..jJLtbeinstItution. The rear measure of institutionalization is not the level of member

'shlpturnover but the net impact of turnover. If the impact is minimal, regardlessof the absolute number of new members, a body should be thought of as rela

institutionalized-at least with regard to this particular aspect of institutionalization. Ironically, if this fonnulation has merit, then long, influential,and memorable careers, far from being the indicators of institutionalizationPolsby takes them to be, actually could be seen as indicators of an absence ofinstitutionalization-an inability of the institution to qua,>h variance in individual members.

The seniority rule, the apprenticeship norm, and Sam Rayburn's oftrepeated exhortation to new memberstltat they "get along by going along" areall mores of the modern U.S. Congress that contribute to member socialization

relatedly, to a muffling of individual variation. Of course, the occasionalrenegade will still be in evidence, but the great majority of members learn howthey are supposed to behave and then behave that way. Even a quick read ofthose studies that have followed the evolution of legislators (see especially, Fenno1996; Killian 1998; Loomis 1988) indicates how members typically learn whatit means to be a member of Congress. Many become less caustic and morecompromising during their stays in Congress. For examples, contrast the earlyand late stages of the congressional careers of Newt Gingrich and Ron Dellums,of David Dreier and Steve Largent, to see how the institution shapes memberbehavior. In a variety of ways, mos t of them subtle but some not, legislatures,like most organizations, are able to minimize the consequences of membershipturnover.

Legislative scholars in many countries outside the U.S. do not see whytheir U.S. colleagues are so concerned with incumbency advantage, membership turnover rates, typical career lengths, and arguments for and against legislative temlli mits. And for their part, U.S. scholars may sometimes be miffed byforeign scholars' apparent indifference to these same variables in their owncountry's legislative bodies. But in most countries outside the U.S., individual
http:///reader/full/individuaij~!t::!Id~r.~qjrrelevant,.byhttp:///reader/full/individuaij~!t::!Id~r.~qjrrelevant,.by


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34 35egislatureslegislative career information is of less moment because new members are likelyto be similar to those they replaced. As such, io most legislatures of the world,raw turnover levels and mean length of stay are inadequate measures of institutionalization. Other career information-for example, mean length of servicein the body before leadership positions become a real possibility, or the percentof members who wish to stay in the body (regardless of whether or not they dostay)-may well prove to be more useful measures (Epstein et al. 1997, for

, example, wisely measure the "regularity" of careers)."" Institutionalized Parties, Not Legislatures. If this were the end of the story,a valid conclusion could be that the level of l e g i s l a t i v ~ , i l l S . ! i t l J . J i Q P . ( ! J J ! i : i J i _ ( ) ! l the world has been u n d e r e s t i m a t e d ( I u e i o i h e h i a y y r ~ 1 i a l 1 ( ; e , Q f ~ c l ! 9 1 ~ S ( ) , Q . J b ~ L _ lengih


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36FIGURE 1

Hypolhesized Rates of Institutionalization

HighlyInstitutionalized Private-sectorHierarchical Body

Legislature in aParliamentary System

NotInstitutionalizedTime

but rather their other main identifyi ng trait (Loewenberg 1971, 4 ) : j ! ) ~ k g r Q ! J n d -ing in a constituency, that is, their representational role. Legislatures are desIgned t ~ 6 e r n t i . l n e w i t I i ilieirenvitonmerii;iiotto develop boundaries cordoning off that environment. tf nstitutionalization is the process of an organizationisolating itself from it.;; environment by developing distinctive norms, idiosyn

.i cratic inside lingo, magnificent infrastructures, and unique career tracks, legis; I ~ latures are simply unable to go very far down the road of institutionalization.jl This is why the curve for nonlegislative organizations flattens out at a higher

level of institutionalization than legislatures, whethe r in parliamentary or presidential political systems. But it nevertheless seems likely that institutionalization even for business organizations must level out at some point. In o ther words,the process of institutionalization cannot continue without an organizationany organization-becoming too complex, too rigid, and too isolated from itsenvironment.

The essential point is that various organizational arrangements are associated with widely different institutionaHzing possibilities. All bodies may institutionalize, but they clearly do not do so in the same fashion or to the samedegree. Our understanding of legislative institutionalization would be greatlyassisted if, instead of being smitten with vague similarities, we would begin to

Legislative Careers 37explore obviolls differences. Thus, the verdict is somewhat depressing. N ot onlyis it the case that legislative career length cannot accurately be viewed as aconstant (across legislatures) indicator of institutionalization, bu t lc::gislativei n s t i t u t i o n a l i ~ I ; I : ! j 9 1 1 j ! ~ , ~ 1 [ b Q ! J l d n Q L ~ e x . p i < C ! c : : g to be identicalaciOis f ~ g T s i ~ -turesin d i f f ~ r ~ ~ J ) , 9 ! ! ! t c , f ! : L Y ~ m s . . . . . . ~ . , .>oc ," "Pf6fe.f.fionalization as Art(ficiallnstitutionalization. To this point I haveescaped the need to distinguish between two terms that are sometimes usednearly interchangeably: institutionalization and professionalization. Legislativeprofessionalization is certainly similar to what I have been calling legislativeinstitutionalization, though the former is the phrase of choice for students ofstate legislatures Kurtz 1990; and many others), and the latter for studen tsof Congress (Polsby 1968). Bu t Squire (1992. 1027) and Rosenthal (1996, 17585) suggest an important difference between the two terms that will be usefulhere. P r o f e s s i o n a l i z a . ~ 2 1 l _ 9 . ~ ! ! . Q ~ ! I : } Q l , ! g h t Q f g ; s j n y o J Y m g c : l . 1 g : t 1 g ~ ~ t J 1 \ l J ~ ~ ~ .Yitht h ~ ~ " ~ ~ y . I ~ ~ ! f . . ~ ~ ~ j ~ ! i t ! r t J : l ~ . ! l f f g ! ! l p ! i ~ b ~ 4 J ~ Y . ~ l ' ! ! ! l J ~ , 0 I . ~ Y . . t C ? g i s l a t i y ~ ~ ~ i ~ t . Included would be session length, membe r compensation, number of staff, otherperquisites, general legislative resources, and committee structures. If money isavailable, these traits can simply be manufactured. Institutionalization. on theother hand, can be t h . 2 ~ a ~ t Q L < ! . ~ j n Y . Q l y j J l g ! ! l 9 r q _ < i m [ t p ! 1 Q ~ I : ; ~ g I ~ , ( ~ ~ Y ~ . ! r a i t ~ ,, ': ' .that are not c a p a 6 I e " ( ) l l J ~ I ! 1 K 9 ~ r . ! * t I Y Q l M v . f ~ Q t l J . r t ; ; 9 : norms ~ m standard operatinifproceiIiires;Tnsiitutional autonomy, leadership positions that require extensive service in the body itself, and extended careers in the body. Though certain: ~ ~ of these features could in theory be decreed (term minimums instead of termmaximums?), this is not usually the case.

Theoretically, this distinction affords the opportunity to determine the extent to which professionalization can induce institutionalization. Perhaps (referring back to Figure 1) a legislature in a parliamentary system could buy itsway to a higher plane of institutionalization than is otherwise possible. (Afterall, mean length of service in a legislative body will go up with reimbursementlevels.) Assuming all measurement problems could be solved (a particularlyheroic assumption), a composite measure of institutionalization for each of severallegislatures could be regressed on a measure of professionalization and theresulting residual could arguably be viewed as an indication of authentic institutionalization. How closely related would these residuals be to the length oftime the body has been in existence? With other possible independent variables? How highly correlated are professionalization and institutionalization inthe first place? Is the relationship spurious? Answering questions such as these Jwould be valuable for understanding institutional change and the manipulabil- iity of that change.

Regardless of what the results of such studies would show, the larger pointis that many variables besides constitutional arrangements will afIect legislative institutionalization. Some ofthese variables could be quite self-consciously


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38 39egislaturesaltered, possibly resulting in high er levels of institutionalization. The curves inFigure 1 might be thought of as means for different types of institutions. Variance around these mean patterns may be produced by varying levels ofprofessionalizatioD as well as by chance and other variables not consideredhere (a conclusion consistent with Squire's [1992] notion that professionalizationoften, but not always, leads to institutionalization).

The Timing and Causes of Institutionalization. Confusion exists regarding the causes of institutionalization and, obviously, a measure of institutionalization (whether corrected for professionalization or not) that could then beapplied to the histories of several legislatures would be useful for furtheringunderstanding of these causes. It seems likely that some movement in an institutionalizing direction is the norm for most organizations, and it also Seemslikely (though certainly this is arguable and largely untested) that the pace ofinstitutionalization decreases with time, perhaps as institutions approach a ceiling. But beyond this, what govems the process and its pace? No one is confidentof an answer. Polsby, for example, only speculates. Perhaps, he says citingDurkheim, institutionalization is connected to the increasing complexity anddivision oflabor within the larger society (1968, 164). Others (see Sisson 1973)imply that institutionalization would occur without increasing complexity. Itsimply r e s u l t ~ from the process by which a new institution settles into a niche inthe environment. Krehbiel s u g g e s l ~ that over time the "abstract egalitariancip1es" of "legislatures in their primitive states" give way to "the emergence ofasymmetries" necessary for a legislature to do its job (1991, 248). This conceptof the nature and reasons for institutionalization flies in the face of Polsby'sconclusion that "increasin g hierarchical structure is not a necessary feature ofthe institutionalization process" (1968, 168).

Substantial insight into the causes of legislative instit utionalization wouldbe obtained ifwe could determine whether the process has been similar in various historical eras or whether institutionalization in any era is simply institutionalization. Should a legislature born, like the U.S. Congress around 1790before the industrial revolution and ot her changes that led to remarkable societal differentiation, be expected to change in the same fashion as a legislature,like the Hungarian National Assembly, bom (or at least reborn) around 1990after differentiation had (arguably) progressed almost as far as it could? Is alengthy institutionalization process ~ v o i d a b l e ? If so, how? Has the processchanged over the years? If so, how? Can a legislature be made more institutionalized by granting it a full complement of professional bells and whistles? Compared to previous centuries. do modem legislatures bave a better chance of becoming fully institut ionalized? Not only are these questions difficult to answer.they imply that institutionalization is universaIly admired, and this is far fromthe case.

Legislative CareersConclusion: Is Legislative Institutionalization Desirable?For Polsby, legislative institutionalization is a good thing. Consistent with structural-functional notions, he believes the institutionalizing process increases legislatures' "viability in the modern world" (1968, 168). The implication seemsto be that those wishing to imbue their politieswith w ( ) r ~ b l e J e g ; ~ l ~ ~ l ; l f e s sll,


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40 LegisJaturcsSo, on the whole, legislative institutionalization is not an unmitigated as

set. Reasonable people can certainly differ on the degree to which it is salutary.For the sake of argument, let us assume institutionalization is desirable. Further, and again for the sake of argument, let us assume the research agendadescribed above makes it possible for us to understand the institutionalizingprocess to the point of being able to manipulate it. Even at this, we still need toproceed cautiously. A common c omplaint with the legislative term-limit movement in the U.S. is that partially de-institutionalizing u single institution in asystem that is otherwise universally institutionalized could lead to biggerproblems. This is why opponents have worried that term limits for legislatorswould only increase the relative power of other institutionalized actors (interestgroups and the executive branch, most obviously). Deinstitutionalizing just oneorganization in a heavily institutionalized system is likely to accomplish littleat best and may evoke serious imbalances.

Similar sorts of dangers could accompany efforts to consciously increasethe level of institutionalization of any legislature around the world without adeep understanding of the social and political context in which that legislatureis operating. A legislature may have followed the pmticular developmental pathit did for a reason, and artificially priming that process without correspondingadjustments to the rest of the polity may do more harm than good. If the constitutional arrangements and general tenor of a society are not condu cive to legislative institutionalization, it should not be forced onto a system, even if wecould all magically agree that institutionalization were generally desirable. Anoverly "viable" legislature in a system not equipped to handle one may be a badprescription.

But this does not mean we should not do all we can to understand theprocess of institutional change. Institutions are such a central aspect of modernlife that understanding the forces to which they are respondin g becomes a primary responsibility of social scientist.'>. And because of their importance .mdopenness, legislative institutions are especially inviting targets for analysis. Butthe research agenda described here has data demands that may be too extreme.Systematic data on norms, standard operating procedures, autonomy, andboundedness, are unlikely to be readily available in the near future. As a result,the best that can be hoped for is likely to be data on legislative careers.And if we are going to use career information to indicate the level of institutionalization, we are going to have to be more discerning and inventive. Wemust begin by acknowledging that the potential for institutionalization is notthe same for all legislative bodies. We must then admit that raw levels of membership tumover or mean length of stay (the ea'liest and most available measures) are poor substitutes for the real variable of interest, which is the institution'sability to steel itself from the effects of membership turnover. Career data canpermit useful generalizations abou t legislative evolution, but in order for this to

Legislative Careers 4Jhappen we need to be willing to conceptualize and operalionalize more subtlecareer features and to be more sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of the polities inwhich careers are unfolding. Used properly, such informatio n should be able tohelp us discover the reasons institutionalized legislatures come to be and whatif anything can be done to stimulate the institutionalization process, shouldanyone want to do so.NOTE

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hibbing legislative carrers why and how should study them[1]

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