BOOK REVIEW -1

Hetu-bindu of Dh81711aki rti.Sanskrit text, English translation, Introduction and detailed Notes by Pradcep P Gokhale. Sri Satguru Publication/Indian Books Centre, Delhi, 1997; pp. i-xxxv, l -146.

The original Sanskrit text of Dharmakl r t i ' s Hctu-binduis lost in the antiquity. Rahula Sanskrityayana and Ernest Steinkellner have brought out independently two versions of the text in Sanskrit using the available Tibetan materials. Pradeep Gokhale's edition is a reconstruction of the text based on Rahula Sanskrityayana's and Ernest Stcinkellner's versions supported by his own independent research on the authenticity and correctness of the text. Gokhale's is the first English t r a n slation of Hetu-bindu. The work is enriched further with his 20 page Introduction, 45 page extensive Notes, and 4 page Glossary of technical terms. All this makes the book really an impressive production, and I am sure it will certainly become a proud possession of the scholars of Buddhist logic and epistemology the world over.

Gokhale's English translation is literal and readable, although at places it seems to do violence to the common sense. For instance, "Hctu-bindu "i strans I a ted as "A Point on Probans", and "svahtii va " is rendered as "self-nature". I am not a Sanskritist, but given a choice I would have translated "Hetu-bindu" as "The Nature of Arguments" and deleted "self' as redundant serving no useful communicative purpose form the rendering of "svablii va" as "self nature". However, literality of the translation preserves textual fidelity of the work, and this itself is worth having.

Apart from the text, Gokhalc's extensive Introduction and detailed Notes contain rich material on Dharmakirti's theory of hetu(argumcnts, justification) and also on his theory of knowledge and reality.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.4

October 1999

s;qq

590 VIJA Y BHARADW AJA.

In the Introduction and the Notes Gokhale's intcllJretation of Dhannaki r t i 's trairiipyamakes me much uncomfortable. He seems to hold thatka rya-he t u and anupalabdhi-hctuare "explainable in terms of s v a blii va (-hew) "(p.xxiii). He appears to use the expression "explainable" in the strong sense in which his view turns out to be a reductionist interpretation of trairiipya, a reductionism of kii r y a and annupa/abdhi to svabhi va-hetu. I do not know why he suggests this. His gloss on it (pp. xxiii-xxv) docs not help much; for it requires acceptance of another set of assumption, e.g., (p. xxiii) uniformity and indivisibility (svabhi va) of a thing, which themselves arc in need of clarification and substantiation. I believe that Gokhalc's motivation to explain trairiipya in terms of s v a bh'i va-hetu lies in his ambitious program to show that the "doctrine of s v a bm v a (self-nature, essence) is central to Dharmaki rti's philosophy", that Dharmaki rti "presents his doctrine of momentariness in terms of this concept" (p.xxii). He adds: "One of the important features of Dharmaki rti's acceptance of s \{j bha va w da is that he accepts it in a logical sense and not a metaphysicl sense (p.xxv). On. Gokhale's construction, s 14 bha va l{j da in its logical sense takes the form of the law of identity and double negation ..... "Every thing is such that it is what it is ..... symbolically, "All A is A". The other side of the same coin is "Everything is such that it is other than what it is not", symbolically, "All A is not not A" (p.xxv). Thus. on his view, "s w bha va \{j d a as accepted by Dharmakirti, can be called logical essentialism". (p.xxv). One need not go into the argument for this thesis. One would like, however, to remark that this thesis does not go well with Dharmaki rti's Buddhist world view of sarvam anti yam and sarvam k,aiJikam. Dharmaki rti defines vastutvam jn terms of k$a1Jikatvam (Yet sat tat K$a{likam) p. l l ), and not the other way round. The principle ofk$a1Jikatvam is conceptually primitive to Dharmaki rti's philosophical framework, and the principle of sauvam is derivative within the framework. This quotidian understanding of Dharmaki rti is quite recalcitrant to accepting Gokhale's interpretation that Dharmaki rti presents his doctrine of momentariness in terms of s vJ bm va (logical essentialism). In effect, his interpretation turns out to be antiBuddhist and equally false of Dharmaki rti' overall theoretical framework and its intuitive presuppositions.

Again,Iam not sure if Dhannaki rti formulatessvabhl va -hctuas the law of identity "A is A", or as the law of double negation. "A is not not- A". I am

Book Review -I 591

afraid he does not do this. Not in Prama Q a wi rti k a not inN ya-bindu, not even in Hetu-bindu For him, hctu has to be synthetic and significant statement. It is conceptually significant as insvab/ii va-hetu, causally significant as inK.EI rya-hetu, and contrafactually significant as in anupalabdhi hctu. A law of logic, e.g., identity or double negation, may not be synthetic; and as such it is of no use to Dharmaki rti, particularly when he regards anumana explicitly as an instrument of knowing facts in and about the world.

Dharmaki rti clearly specifies the meaning of s v a b Iii v a when he speaks of s v a blii va-hctu. We haves v a blii va-hetu whens a dhya-dharmasya vastutas -tadblii v a t a)4I si dhana-dhlrma-blii vanii tra-nubandha-siddhih (p.l 1). Thus, the conceptual relation between kaQikatvam and vastutvam instantiatess v blii v ahetu (antitye kasminscitsi dhye sattvamiti(p.l4). To show that something is anityam, one cites the hetu (argument) that it is kaQikam ( or s a t tva mwhere s alt vam is defined in terms of Ka1ikam ). Alternatively, we haves v a blii va-hetu when there is tii dii tmya relationship between sa dhanaand s1 dhyaas between 'being a simsip1 'and 'being a tree'. To justify that something is a tree one has only to show that it is asimsapi .

From what I have said so far it follows that Gokhale' interpretation of s va blif va-hetuis quite at variance with Dhannai

5Y2 VIJA Y BHARADW AJA.

explain the relevant argument structure involving a contrafactual conditional. The argument, then, would read like this: Something is not the case. (Thesis). All the .conditions under which this wouid be the case are satisfied, and yet this is not the case.(Het. (Therefore. that thing is not the case). If I am right in this thinking, it follows then that Gokhalc's attempt to show that trairiipyais explainable in terms of svabhiiva-hetu alone is not only tenuous but it is false of Dharmakirti's account of it.

In his Notes, Gokhale comments at length on a n u palabdhi a n d anupalabdhi-hetu. H e observes that Dharmakirti rejects the Nyaya-Vaise!?ika view that non-existence (a b h ii v a) is a separate category, and also the Mimamsaka thesis that non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) is an independentprariliia. I believe that Gokhale is right in this observation. But, then he adds: "Non-existence is the existence of the other and non-apprehension is apprehension of the other. So, basically, non-apprehension (i.e., non-perception) is a kind of perception, a kind of pratyak$a : (p. 124). Thus, on Gokhale's view, Dharmakirti "reduces 'perception of non-existence' to 'perception of existence (of the other alone)" (p.124). I'm afraid Gokhale invites an argument here. If I am reading him right, he appears to suggest that, for Dharmakirti, anupalabdhi is indeed a matter of perception (pra ty ak!f, although it is perception of the existence of the other. If this is so then Gokhalc's interpretation becomes, more or less, akin to the Nyaya-Vaiseika position. Dharmakirti would be the last person to buy this argument. It seems to me that Gokhale unwittingly isolates anupa/abdhifrom its natural context of justification of negation asserting statements, and he gives in to the temptation of treating it as a metaphysical category. But, he need not do this if he keeps in focus the context of justification in which Dharmakirti discusses anupalabdhi. Dharmakirti regards anupalabdhi as a type of hetu which a Buddhist of Dharmakirti's persuasion cites for theses like "there is no vase on this table", "the table is not brown", "the soul is not eternal," "there docs not exist a sky-flower". He does not consider it as an item on the list ofpadartba-sor asonc of thepramii{la-s. Heexaminesanupalabdhi as a type of hetu, an argument. We would do pretty well if we consider it in the justification context, and do not make it a part of pratyak$a as the Nyaya and Vaisq;ikas do. Making it one or the other form of pratyaksa would be simply false of Dharmakirti theory of anupalabdhi, it may well be true of Nyaya-Vaise!iika,

Book Review -1 593

though.

In discussing trairilpya, Dharmakirti considers the questions of justification (pramli!Ja) and how these can be answered within his theoretical framework. He defines the different kinds of hetu-s (arguments) in support of different types of theses- one to whichsvabhava-hctu applies; second, to whichklirya-hetuis relevant; and third, for which anupalabdhi-hctu alone is acceptable. In his statement of trairilpya, he legislates the kinds of hetu which could be said to be relevant and acceptable justification within his methodological framework. How the hetu statements themselves arc validated and why these and no others are acceptable are questions at a different level of empirical and conceptual inquiry. The questions, e.g, how v yapt i-s (generalities) are reached, what arc the conditions to formulate them, and what are the criteria by which we accept them as reliable for purposes of anumana are questions asked at this higher level. Dharmakirti examines these and other related questions in his discussions on the methodology of an vaya and vyatireka. But that's another issue, and. I need not go into it in this short review.

Despite some of these difficulties, the careful reader will find Pradeep Gokhalc's book very rewarding in widenil'lg one's perspective on and understanding of Dharmakirti's theory of reasoning epistemology and metaphysics.

VIJA Y BHARADW AJA

BOOK REVIEW -II

Svablii va, Svablii vahetu etc.: A clarification

I am thankful to Prof. Vijay Bharadwaja for his compassionate and careful reading of my work on Hetubindu. I take this opportunity to clarify my position on some of the points raised by the reviewer.

While translating the Hetubindu of Dharmaklrti I was always in search of apt words and even today I cannot say that I am fully satisfied with my translation. I can very well understand the dissatisfaction of Prof. Bharadwaja. So far, I have not been able to convince myself of any better translation of the tide 'Hetubindu' than the one I have provided. (For my reasons vide pp. 95-96 of the book.) 1be translation of's v a b hi v a 'as ' self-nature ' could be reconsidered, though translating it as 'natwe' can be misleading if we compare 'svabm v a 'and 'Parabhi va '.

Bharawaja's objections to my treatment of Dbarmaklrti's doctrine of s v a b h a v a, however, seems to rest on some misunderstanding. I have said that the concept ofs v a bha v aoperates as a central concept in both ontology and epistemology of Dharmakirti. I have also pointed out that according to him not only s vabhi va-hetubut alsoKa rya-hetuandanupalabdhi-hetuare explanable in terms of s v a b hi v a-(-not in terms of s v a b Iii v a -hetu as misquoted or alleged by Prof. Bharadwaja in his review). Here my approach is not reductionist. I have never wanted to suggest for instance, thatKa rya-hetuaccording to Dharmakirti is reducible to s v a blii va-hetu. My simple claim is that the notion of .Ka ryahetu when analysed, can be seen to contain the notion of svabm va . It is not reducible to s vablii va -hetu because it is more complex than that. Apart. from the notion of s v a blii v a,the notion of Ka ryahetu contains another notion as its essential element viz. cause -effect relation. Secondly s va blii va-hetu is concerned with the inferential knowledge of an aspect of a thing based on the knowledge of another

Indian Philosophical Quarruly. Vol. XXVI No.4 October I 999

596 P. P. GOKHALE

aspect of the same thing. Karya h e tu on the other hand is concerned w i t h the knowledge of one thing or event on the basis of the knowledge of another thing or event which is caused by it. A basic variety of :mupalabdhi viz.svabhavanupa/abdhi, it may be urged, can be considered as a special variety of s v a b h ii v- het u, because it is concerned with two (negative) aspects of one and the same thing. But we need not dilate on this point here.

In my Introduction to Hetubindu of Dharmakirli, I have maintained the distinction between what I calls vabhava vada (The doctrine ofs v a bhii v a) and ascribe to Dharmakirti andsvabhava-hetu (self-nature as probans) which Dharmakirti talks about. That Dharmakirti upholds a general theory o f s v a b h a v a is clear from many of his statements. It is clear formPramli!Ja vart ika(svarthanumana-paricceheda, 40) and also Hetubindu (Vide section 4.11 of the book and my note on it -p. 128). Dharmakirti's s v a blii va-hetu can be understood as an application of s v a blii v a - ld da, where the Jaw of identity, involved in the latter is applied in one direction, i.e. in the form of partial identity. But I have no where identifieds vabm v a w1 da which is a general theory ands vablii vahetu which is an application of it. I don't know what gave Prof. Bharadwaja such a wrong impression.

Prof. Bharadwaja also seems to think that sa 1 for Dharmakirti is defined as k.a!Jika. This, I think, is a wrong interpretation of the statement viz. 'Y,11 sa(tat K..a!Jikam' which is not a definition but a thesis which Dharmakirti tries to prove. Sat according to Dharmakirti is defined as arthakri kii r i ( i.e. that which has a concrete function) from which Dharmakirti tries to derive momentariness. What I have observed is that Dharmakirti's essentialism which is not metaphysical like the one which etemalists hold, but is logical, is compatible with his doctrine of mementariness.

Prof. Bharadwaja is also unhappy about my statement that non-apprehension ( i.e. non-perception) is a kind of perception, a kind of p r a 1 y a Icy a_ I only urge him to concentrate on Dharmakirti's own explanation of a nupalabdhi-hctu . Why should otherwise Dharmakirti say : " The absence of a thing is proved by the very proof of the existence of the other, because the exclusion of the other thing is proved by the same means of knowledge which establishes the thatness of the thing" (p.61 )? 'The potless table ' ( ' the other thing'), for example, is established by perception which does nothing but establishes the absence of a pot from the table. The absence of a pot from the table is not a separate entity from 'the potlt:ss table' . Similarly the non-perception (i.e. absence of perception)

Book Review -II 597

of the pot on the table is not a separate entity from the perception of a pot-less table. So non-perception ( which is a kind of perception) does not act as a probans( i.e. means to indirect knowledge) for the absence of a pot from the table (i.e. for the potless table) but as a means to direct knowledge. This is the reason why Dharmakrrti maintains that svabhcvanupalabdhi is a probans not for provingabhava butabhl va vya vam ra, as the former is directly and the latter is indirectly known by it. This is not a place to go into more details. But Prof. Bhardawaja's fear that my explanation of non-pereception as a kind of perception is akin to Nyiiya-Vaiseika position, is baseless, because Nyii y aVaiseikas do not reduce 'absence of a thing' to 'existence of another thing' as Buddhists do. Nor do they identify non-perception with a kind of perception as the latter do.

Prof. Bharadwaja seems to be hesitant to appreciate this epistemology of perception and non-perception as found in He/ubindu, because Dharmakfrti, according to him, was concerned in this work with justification and not with cognitive epistemology. Though, I admit, Dhamakfrti isprimarilyconcerned with the problem or justification in this work, he is not isolating this problem from that of cognition. His views on perception and non-perception as explained above may be taken as a part of his cognitive epistemology which is at the background of and hence inseparable from his justificatory epistemology.

PRADEEP. P. GOKHALE

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