heidegger, martin - essence of truth, the (continuum, 2002)

8/12/2019 Heidegger, Martin - Essence of Truth, The (Continuum, 2002)

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TH E ESSENCE O F T R U T HO n P l a t o ' s C a v e A l l e g o r y a n d T h e a e t e t u sMartin He id e g g e rTransla ted byTedSadler

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ContinuumThe Tower Building 80 M aiden Lane11 YorkRoad Suite 704London SE 17NX New York,N Y 10038

www.cont inuumbooks .comOriginallypublishedas V o m We se n de r W a h r h e i t V ittorio Klosterman n G mbH,Frank fur t am Main,1988D ieHerausgabe dieses W erkes wurdeau sM ittelnvon INTER NATIONES,BonngelordertA llrights reserved.N opartofthis book may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted,in any formo rby any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,or otherwise, without the written permission ofThe Co nt inuum Publ ishing Company.

ThisE nglish translation Co nt inu um 2002First publ ishedbyCo nt inuum 2002Impactedition2004Reprinted2007, 2009British Library Cataloguing-in-PublicationD ataA catalogue record forthis book isavailable from th e British LibraryISBN-10 :0-8264-7704-6 (paperback )ISBN-13:978-0-8264-7704-0(paperback)LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataHeidegger, M art in ,1889-1976.

[Vom WesenderW ahrhei t. E ngl ish]Theessenceoft ruth :o nPlato's parableof thecave allegoryand Theaetetus/M art in

Heidegger;translatedby TedSadler,p. cm.

Includesbibliographical refere nces and index.ISBN0-8264-7704-6

1.Truth . 2.Plato. Theaetetus. 3.Know ledge, Theoryof. I.S adler, Ted,1952-II .Title.B3279.H47 E5 2002c121dc21 2002023392TypesetbyR efineCatch Limited, Bu nga y, SuffolkPrintedand boun d in Great Britain byCPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire
http://www.continuumbooks.com/http://www.continuumbooks.com/


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Translator 's F o r e w o r d xiiPRELIMINARY CONSIDERA TIONS

1 TheQuestionworthinessof Our 'Self-Evident'Preconceptions Concerning'Essence' andTruth' 1

2 History of the Concept of Truth: Not HistoricalConfirmation ofPreconceptions,ButReturntoth e OriginaryGreek ExperienceofdtXf|0eia(Unhiddenness) 6

PART ONETHE CLUETO THE 'ESSEN CE' OF 'AAH0EIAInterpretation of theAllegoryof the CaveinPlato's

Politeia

CHAPTER1TheFour Stagesof the OccurrenceofTruth 17A . TheFirst Stage:the Situationof Man in the

UndergroundCave 18 3 TheUnhiddenin theCave:theShadows 19

B. The Second Stage: a'Liberation'of Manwithin theCave 23

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4 N ewFeaturesof& Xf)6eia Revealedby theUnsuccessfulAttemptatLiberation 24

C. TheThirdStage:theGenuine Liberationof Man tothePrimordialLight 29

5 TheAscentof Man from the CaveTowardstheLightof the Sun 31a) LevelsofUnhiddenness outsidethe Cave 31b)Four Questions Concerningthe Visible

Connectionsof& Xf|0eia in the OccurrenceofLiberation 336 IdeaandLight 35

a)TheSeeingofWhat-Being 35b)TheEssenceofBrightness: Transparency 39c) TheFundamental Accomplishment of theIdea: Letting-throughtheBeingofBeings 42

7 Lightand Freedom. Freedom as Bond to theIlluminating 43

8 FreedomandBeings.TheIlluminatingViewasProjection ofBeing(E xemplified byN ature ,History,Art andPoetry) 44

9 TheQuestion ConcerningtheEssenceofTruthasUnhiddenness 47a)GradationsofUnhiddenness.TheIdeasas the

PrimordiallyUnhiddenandMost BeingfulofBeings 48b)TheIdeasasWhatIsSightedby aPre-modellingPerceivingwithintheOccurrenceofUnhiddenness 51c)Deconcealmentas the FundamentalOccurrenceof theEx-istenceof Man 53

D . The Fourth Stage: the Freed Prisoner's Return to theCave 58

10 The (piXoaocpoqasLiberatorof thePrisoners.HisA ctofViolence,HisEndangermentandDeath 58

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11 TheFulfilmentof theFateo fPhilosophizingas anOccurrenceofd^fjO eia: Separation andTogethernessof the Manifest and theHidden(BeingandIllusion) 63

CHAPTER2TheIdeaof the GoodandUnhiddenness 69 12 TheIdeaof the Goodas theHighest Idea:

Empowerment ofBeingandUnhiddenness 69 13 Seeingas6pdvandvoew.Seeingand the Seeable

in the Yokeof theLight 73 14 TheGood: Empowerment ofThatuponWhich

A llDepends 77 15 TheQuestion ConcerningtheEssenceofTruthas

theQuestion Concerning theHistoryofMan'sEssenceand HiHGJHG81

CHAPTER3TheQuestion Concerning theEssenceofUntruth 85 16 TheWaningof the Fundamental Experience

of& X,f|08ia.The Philosophical Obligation toRe-awakenIt: theAbiding Originof OurExistence 85

17 TheNeglectof theQuestion Concerning theEssenceofHiddenness. Transformation of theQuestion Concerningth eEssenceo fTruth intoth eQuestion ConcerningtheEssenceofUntruth 89

18 Justificationof the'Detour'.PreliminaryClarification ofFundamental Concepts:ii/euSog,^f|6r|and d->jf|9eia 95

19 Summary: Unhiddenness andBeing;theQuestion ConcerningtheEssenceofUntruth 104

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CONTENTS

PART TWOA N INTERPRETATION OF PLATO'S THEA ETETUS WITHRESPECTTO THEQUE STION OF THEE S S E NC E O FUNTRUTHCHAPTER 1PreliminaryConsiderations 109 20 TheQuestion ConcerningtheEssenceof

^7ciaif||iT|:Man's Attackon theSelf-evidencesofHisSelf-understanding 109

21 Fundamental Contentof theGreek ConceptofKnowledge: FusionofKnow-howand SeeingHaving-PresentofThat WhichIsPresent 114

CHAPTER 2Beginning of the DiscussionofTheaetetus' First

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B. Step Two: Inq uiryintoW ha t Perceives the Excessinthe Perceived 136

27 TheSense-O rgans:NoPassage-wayto theCom mon in E verything Perceived 136 28 TheSoulasWh at Viewsthe K O I V O Iin8iavoeiv 140C. Step Three:TheSoul's Relation toBeingasStriving

forBeing 144 29 The Priority of Striving for Being in the Soul as

Relationshipto thePerceived 14530 HavingandStriving 147

a)ApparentIncompatibilitybetween Strivingand Perception 147b)Losing O neselfinImmediatePerception 148c) Non-regarding andNon-conceptualPerceiving 149d)Free Possession of Truth (Kn ow ledge) Only inth e Relationship ofStriving towards W hat IsStriven for;InauthenticandAuthenticHaving 152

31 Inauthenticand Authentic Striving.Theepox;asStrivingforBeing 154

32 M ore D eterminate C onception of Striving forBeing 156a)More E ssential Unf oldingof theDeterminationsofBeinginAttunedness 157b) TheT aking-in-View of the ConnectionsofBeing 159c)InterpretationofConnectionsofBeing in thedi)M,oyian6


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D . Step Four: Being-HumanasHistoricalin Stakingand Stance(rcaiSeia) 167

34 TheRootingof 'A bstract 'C haractersofBeinginth e Uni tyofBodily Existence. Their Differencefrom 'Self-less'Nature. BeingoutBeyond OneselfinPrimordialY earning 167

35 Inadequacy of Theaetetus' First Answer.Perception Still More Than Perception.BroadenedExperienceofaiaOriau;as theConditionof thePossibilityofUnhiddenness 171

CHAPTER4TowardsaDiscussionofTheaetetus'Second Answer:^Tuaifinri Is < M .r |0 i i< ;86a.The VariousMeaningsofSo^a 176 36 The Emergence of the Second Answer out of theQuestion ofUntruth 176 37 Double-Meaning of86a (View):Look and

Opinion 180 38 Two More Faces of86a:The Wavering between

Letting-Appear (elSoc;)andDistorting (\j/8u6o


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c) Third Perspective: The v|/eu8r|(;86 aasAo8oia (Substitution instead of Confusion) 197 40 Resultof the Preliminary Investigation:Axvyoc;-Characterof the86a;I tsA poria:

Suppression of the Phenom enon throug hthe Gu iding Perspectives 202

B. M ain Inv estigation: Sav ingth e Phenomenon of the\l/ei)8f|c; 86a 203

41 Retractingthe Gu iding Perspectivesof thePreliminary Investigation inFavou ro fPreviouslyDeniedIn termediate Phenom ena 203

42 N ew Ch aracteristics of the Soul: Tw o Similes 208a) Simile of the W ax; Kee ping-in-M ind 209b)A n E xample: the F eldberg Tower; H aving -PresentandM aking-Present 210c) Simileof the A viary; M odes ofR etaining 2 1 5

43 Conf i rmat ionof theC onnect ion betweenata9r|ai(;andSictvoia through BroadeningtheField of the Present 218

44 Clarificationof the D ouble-MeaningofS6a:ItsForkingintoH aving-Presentand Making-Present 219

45 EnablingofMis-taking throug h the ForkingoftheSo^a 223

46 TheShiftingofO ntological F ailureintotheIncorrectness of the Proposition. W hatRemainedU n-happenedin the Historyof theConcept ofTruth 226

APPENDIXSupplemen tary M ateria ls from Heidegger's N otes 230

itorEnglish-German Glos s ar y 242Greek-English Glos s ar y 251

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Translator's Foreword

Thisbook is a translation of V o m W e s e n d e r Wa hr he i t : zu Platans H o h l e n g -leichnis un d Theatet , first published in 1988 as volume 34 of MartinHeidegger's Gesamtausgabe.The text is based on a lecture course deliveredbyHeideggerat theUniversityofFreiburgin thewinter semester1931-32. PartO ne of thecourse providesadetailed analysisofPlato's allegoryofthe cave in the Republic,whilePart Two gives a similarly painstaking exe-gesisand interpretation of acentral section ofPlato's Theaetetus .A salwayswith Heidegger's writingson the Greeks, the point of his interpretativemethod is tobringtolighttheoriginal meaningofphilosophicalconcepts,especially to free up these concepts, which in the subsequent traditionhavebecome overlaidbysecondaryandeven quitedifferent meanings, totheir intrinsic power.Inthis regardthepresent text must count as one ofHeidegger'smost important works,fornowhere else doeshegiveacom-parablythorough explanation ofwhat isarguablythemost fundamentaland abiding theme of his entire philosophy, namely th e differencebetween truth as the 'unhiddenness ofbeings' andtruth as the 'correct-ness ofpropositions'. F orHeidegger,it is byneglecting the former p r i m -o r d i a lconcept oftruth in favour of the latter derivativeconcept that West-ern philosophy, beginning already with Plato, took off on its 'meta-physical 'course towards th e bankruptcyof the present day. In the lec-tures here translated, Heidegger is not concerned to demonstrate thislargerthesisassuch,but to clarify th e aforesaid dist inctionupon whichit isfounded. This he does through hischaracteristic combination ofphilo-logical acumen and philosophical incisiveness, or, more precisely, byemploying philologicalexpertise in theservice o fphilosophicalinsight.

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Heidegger himself often emphasizes that the results or constituentthesesof aphilosophical discourse cannotbe separatedfrom itsmethod,indeed that the latter, asprecisely what makesagenuine 'showing' pos-sible, is ultimately more important than theoretical conclusions. Thisapplies toPlato's dialogues or the closely argued treatisesofAristotlea smuchas to thepresent lecture coursebyHeidegger.In the followingpagesthereader willencounterthe 'artofgoingslowly'broughtto the highestconsummation, alwaysfor thepurposeo fthoroughly comprehending themattera thand. Indeedit isHeidegger's conviction that philosophy, genu-inely undertaken and carried through, subverts the impatient 'hungerforresults' socharacteristico f themodern age.Thehunger fortruth, on theother hand, which is how Heidegger understands th e Platonic eras,eschews nothing so much as the half-digested theories of the academictradesman,orjournalist,who isalwaysintenton'situating'ideas withinaf ramework ofreceived opinion. Thus,b yperseveringin thepresent text,the reader will discover not just'Heidegger'sideas' but a method for phil-osophizingingeneral.

Informat ion on the originof theGerman text asprinted in the Gesam-tausgabecan be found in HermannMorchen'sAfterword to the originaledition(pp.238-41of this volume). Here it is necessary only to underlinethe factthat Heideggerdid nothimselforiginally intend,letalone prepare,this lecture course forpublication. TheGerman text doesnot have thesmoothness of apolished work,butcontains many irregularities suchasare to be expected from manuscripts prepared for teaching, and fromtranscriptsoflectures.In mytranslation Ihave triedtoremain faithful tothis unfinished characterof theGerman text,at thesame time givingdueattention to readability.

The longer Greek quotations from Plato are translated byHeideggerimmediately afterwardsin thetext,and Ihave translatedhistranslations,only occasionally making concessions for the sake of fluent reading. Ihave throughout consulted standard English translations ofPlato. Themany shorter quotations of Greek words and phrases are also either trans-lated or paraphrased byHeidegger in the adjacent portion oftext andshould present noproblemfor thereader; theGreek-English glossary atthe end of the volume may help with the central and most f requent lyrecurringGreekwords.A s fo rHeidegger's German, which includes manycomplexandunusual constructions,Ihave sometimes placedtheoriginalinsquare brackets immediatelyaftermytranslation.Ingeneral, however,Ihave restricted this practicetophilosophically operative expressions,and

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towords whose etymological interrelations Heideggerisseekingtohigh-light.AnEnglish-German glossaryhasalso beenprovided,which, whilenot an infallibleguide (givennecessary variationsinrendering the sameGermanword), should answer most queriesas towhat wordofHeideggerisbeing translatedat anyparticular point.

A f ewtranslational matters requirespecific comment:1. The standard English translation of 'Wesen' as 'essence' has been

retained throughout. It should be noted, however, that in contextsrelating to truth and the human being Heidegger does not intend'Wesen'in the senseof theLatin'essentia',which refersto the 'what-ness' or 'essential nature' of a thing. Instead, in such contextsHeidegger wants the original verbal meaning of 'Wesen' to come tothe fore; thus the 'essenceoftruth'does not refer to anything static,but to an 'occurrence' within which the human being is activelysituated.

2. TheGerman word 'Dasein ' ,which normally means 'existence',but inHeideggermostoftenmeansthe 'wayofbeing'(ontological character)of th e human being, hasusually been left untranslated. This is nowcommon practiceinEnglish translationsofHeidegger.

3. 'Sein' hasbeen rendered as'being'and not as'Being';the differencebetweenthe nominalization of theverb'tobe'on the onehand, and'being'in the senseofthingorentity ('Seiende')on theother hand,isinevery case clearfrom thecontext. Another standard practiceIhaveadopted (inmost cases) is thepluralized rendering of'das Seiende'as'thebeings' or 'beings'.E specially difficult ornoteworthy occurrencesof 'Sein', 'Seiende' and their cognates have been placed in squarebracketsimmediately followingmytranslation.

Ihave inserted asmall number offootnotes giving English translations(andsources)ofHeidegger's Greek quotations, e.g. fromParmenides andDemocritus. Where Heidegger discusses, in Part Two,Schleiermacher'sGerman translation of specific words of Plato, I have given, for com-parison, the English translations ofFowler and Cornford.My footnotesaremarkedby'Trans.';otherwiseallfootnotesare from the editorof theGerman edition (see Afterword), who, in addition to providing philo-logical and bibliographical information, sometimes puts supplementarymaterial fromHeideggerat thebottom of thepage.

Everything insquare brackets stems fromHeidegger; this occurs mostoften in his translation of Platonic passages. The approximate page

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numbering of the German edition appears at the bottom of the page insquare brackets.

Forherexpert assistanceincheckingand commenting onthis transla-tion I would like to thank Dr Marnie Hanlon. Valuable comments havealsobeen received from Professor ParvisEmad and Professor F.-W.vonHerrmann.

T e d S ad l e rA u g u s t 2001

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1. TheQues t ion w or thine ssof Our 'Se l f -Evident 'Preconcept ions C o n c e r n in g 'Essence1andTruth'

W ewishtoconsider the essence o ftruth.'Truth':what is that? The answer to the question'whatisthat?'bringsus to the 'essence'of a thing. 'Table': what is that? 'Mountain', 'ocean','plant';in each case the question'whatisthat?'asks about the'essence'ofthese things.We ask - and yet wealreadyk n o wthem Indeed,m u stwe notknow them, inorder afterwardtoask,andeventogiveananswer, aboutw h a tthey are?

What,forexample,is atable? Just what makesitwhatit is,what appliesto everything that is atable. What allactualand possible tables have incommon is the universa l the 'essence':what something is'ingeneral'.

But wediscover what isuniversalto a llonlybycomparingpart icularthings and observingthe sameness of what they have incommon.Wealreadyknowparticular tables,and allkindso fparticular things, when w eask about their 'essence'.Thus too in the case of our question 'whatistruth?'(Aswillbeshownin the following,this'thus'may be our undoi ng .}

What is the 'essence' of truth? We know particular truths; e.g. that2+ 1 = 3,thattheearth revolves aroundthesun, that autumnisfollowedbywinter, thattheWorldWarbeganinearly August1914,that Kantis aphilosopher, that it is noisy on the street outside, that this lecture room isheated, that there is a light on here, and so on. These are 'particulartruths';we call them this because they contain 'something true'.Andw h e r e i n is the true 'contained'?Whatis itwhich so tospeak'bears'this[1-2] 1 1


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truth? It is the proposit ionsw ejust enunciated.Eachparticular propositionistrue, is'somethingtrue', 'atruth'.We now ask: what is truth as suchand in general? What makes each of these propositions true? Justthis:that what they say corresponds with th e facts about which they saysomething. Therefore the being-true of the proposition means suchcorrespondence. Whatthen istruth?Truth is correspondence . Such cor-respondenceobtains becausethe propositionisdirectedto the facts andstates of affairs about w hi ch itsays something. Truthis correctness [Richtig-keit]. So truth is correspondence , g r o u n d e d in correctness, between proposit ionan d t h i n g .

W ethus encounter something rather peculiar:not onlydo weknowpart iculartruths, but wealso already know what truth is .Therefore w ealready k n o wtheessenceo ftruth.It is notjust thatweknow accidentallyandincidentally,aswellasparticular truths, alsotheessenceoftruth, butclearly wemust necessarilyalready know the essence.For how otherwisecouldweknowhow torespondto therequesttonametruths?Wecouldnototherwise bring forward whatisstatedandclaimitasatruth.

Inthisway weknowthe essenceoftruth,whatit is,i.e. correspondence,correctnessin thesenseofdirectedness-to ... Wealso knowthatby the'essence'of a thing we mean the universal, and we know what essence isasessence: essence-hood, that which makes essence whatit is. Whythendo we still inquire into th e essence oftruth andmake this question th etopic of a long series oflectures? Especiallysince what wehave statedaboutessenceisquite obviousandcomprehensibletoanyone?

Something is 'intelligible' to us if we understand it ,1i.e. if we can setourselves before the thing and have it smeasure, if we can survey andcomprehend it in itsbasic structure. Iswhat w ehave just called 'self-evident' (truth as correspondence and correctness, essence as the uni-versal, th ewhat-being) reallyintelligible?

1. W esaid that correspondence is the essence oftruth. The propositioncorresponds with that about which it speaks.'Herein the room a light ison.'That about which something is said in this proposition, that towardsw h i c h it isdirected, must alreadybe g i v e n as the measure for the prop-osition, for how otherwise could the proposition be directed towards it?Sowemust already know what and how the thing isabout which wespeak.W eknow that alightis onhere. Such knowing [Wissen] canonlyarise from knowledge [Erkenntnis], andknowledge grasps the true, forfalseknowledgeis n oknowledgea tall.A ndwhat isth e true?Thetrueisw h a t isknown.It isjust what corresponds with th e facts. Theproposition

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corresponds with what is known in knowledge; thus with what is true.The true? So does the correspondence of the proposition amount tocorrespondence with something corresponding? A fine definition Truthis correspondence with a correspondence, th e latter itself correspondswith a correspondence, and so forth. And the firstcorrespondence towhich we revert? Must what is given first of all resemble somethinggiven, therefore itselfbe necessarily acorrespondence? What creeps inbetween here, and why? Since everything is discussed in a groundlessand formal way, we obtain nothing at all intelligible with the concept oftruth as correspondence. What presents itself as self-evident isutterlyobscure.

2. W esaid that what istrue is the proposi t ion . But wealsocall 'true'athing or a human being.We say'truegold', 'a true friend'. What does'true' mean h e r e ? What does true gold correspond with, ifbeing-truemeans correspondence? With a proposition perhaps? Clearly not. 'True' isat any rate ambiguous. How does it happen that, as well as propositions,wealso call thingsandhuman beings'true'?Does'true'mean somethingdifferent asapplied topropositions and tothings? Whatthenis the p r o p e rmeaning of 'true' - that which applies to propositions or that whichappliestothings?Ordoesne i th e rofthesetwomeanings have priority overtheother?B ut do wethen haveacommon der ivat ion from a n o t h e rmean-ing of 'true' which is not expressed in the concept of truth ascorrespondence?

Truth as correspondence (characteristic of the proposition) is thusambiguous,insuf ficiently delimitedin itself ordeterminedin itsorigins.Itisthereforenot intelligible, itsself-evidence isillusory.3. The essence oftruth, we said, is that which determines particulartruths ing e n e r a l, inrespect ofwhattheyare.W ecalled'essence' the uni-versal, thewhat-being.W eproceededb yclarifyingthis concepto fessencein terms ofwhat we mean by the essence of a table. N ow clearly th eessenceof'table'a ssuch,and of'truth'a ssuch,arequite incomparableintermsofcontent,but is the essence-hoodofessence alsodifferent in the twocases?O r is the essence-characterof the essenceoftableand theessence-character of the essence oftruth th esamelA re truths like tables, whichjus tstand around, such that one can askabout them in thesame way?W asour procedure justified when,without fur ther ado,we transposedour conceptionof the essenceoftable, chairand letter-box(thequestionofessencewedirectat things)on to ourconception of theessenceoftruth?

Even if wegrant that the essence-hood ofessence is inboth cases the[3-5] 3


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sameandgivesthegeneral what-beingof athing,whatdo weunderstandbywhat-being, what does being [Sein] mean there? Do wereally under-stand that? We donot. Wespeak in such aself-evident fashion aboutessence, the question ofessence, the concept ofessence, and thus tooabout the essence of truth, yet at bottom what we are asking aboutremains unintelligible.

4. Inoutliningtheessenceoftableand oftruthit wasindicated thatnotonlydo weknow particular tablesand truths,but also,in so far as weknow them a ssuch (preciselyaswhat they are)w ealready know them intheiressence, indeed thatwemust already know this essenceinadvanceinorder torecognize anything encountered a stable, a smountain, a struth.Whatare we tomakeofthis peculiarityofessence, thatit m u stalreadybeknown inadvance? What kind ofnecessityisthis?Why is it so? Is it anaccident, simply afactthat we register and submit to? Do we understandtheessence-hood ofessenceif westand helplesslybeforethis peculiarity?N otatall. Essenceandessence-hood arealsointhisrespect unintelligible.

5.But even assuming what we proposed concerning the essenceoftruth, namely correspondence between proposition and fact, and con-cerning essence as what-being (as the same, i.e. the universal governingallparticulars), even assumingallthat isquite intelligibleand lackinginanyth ingunintelligible,may wetake thisself-evidence without fur ther adoas thefoundationfor ourinvestigation,asvouchingfo ritself and assome-thingsecureandtrue?How do weknow that whatisunderstoodinthisway is reallysecured ?How do weknow that whatis self-eviden treallyissoandist rue?How do weknow thattheself-evidenceof something-assum-ingthat this does obtain- is ag u a r a n t e eforthetruthof therelevant thingorproposition?Istha talso self-evident?H owmuchhasbeen self-evidentand obviousto ushumans and yetlater turned out to beillusory, theoppositeoftruthandsound knowledge Thusourappealtoself-evidenceastheguaranteeoftruthisungroundedandunintelligible.

6.Something thatis'ofitselfevidentorintelligibleiscalled this becauseit'entersintous'withnodoingon our ownpart.It isself-evidenttous,wefindi tso. Who are wethen?How is itthatwecometoregard ourselvesasthe court ofappealfordeciding what is or is not self-evident? That weapparently do not need to add anything for the self-evidence to beacceptedby us:does that prove thatwecannot,andthatwereally mustnot,addanything?We, as weexistin our dailyproblemsandpleasures,we who are nowoccupied with the question concerningthe essenceoftruth (becauseitappearson the registeroflectures),arewe,andwhatis

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self-evident to u s ,theultimateandprimary criterion?Do we in theleastunderstand why that must be so, and indeed, why that cannot be so? Wehumans,do weknowwho we are and who orwhatthehumanis? Do weknowwhetheringeneral, within which limits,andwith which deficien-cies, the self-evidentcan and may be astandardfo rhuman beings?W hotellsus who the human being is? Is this not all completely unintelligible?

W ebeganbydefiningthe essenceoftruth ascorrespondenceandcor-rectness. This seemed self-evident, and therefore binding. Now, alreadyafter a few crude steps, this self-evidencehas emerged as thoroughlyincomprehensible: the concept of the essence of truth in two respects (1and 2),theconceptof the essence-hoodofessencein tw orespects(3and 4),theappealto self-evidence as themeasureandguaranteeofsecure know-ledge again in two respects (5 and 6). Theseemingly self-evident hasbecome incomprehensible. But this means, in so far as we want to lingerover and fur ther examine this incomprehensibility, that it has becomew o r t hy o f quest ioning .W emust first of all ask how itcomes aboutthat wequite naturally move and feel comfortable within such self-evidences.Howis itthattheapparently self-evident turns out, upon closer examin-ation, to beunderstood least? Answer: becauseit is toocloseto us andbecausew eproceed inthisw aywith everything close.W etake care,f orexample, that thisandthatis inorder, thatwecomeherewithpen andexercise book, and that our propositions, ifpossible, correspond withwhat we intend and talk about. We know that truth belongs in a certainw ayto ourdailyaffairs,and weknow quite naturally what this means.Itlies so close to us that we have no distance from it, and therefore nopossibilityofhavinganoverall viewof it and comprehendingit.Sothe firstthing mustbe todistance ourselvesfrom this self-evidence,tostep backfromit sothat whatwe soreadily conceiveastruthcan be leftstandingandrestinginitself.But w h e r eare we tostep backto,f r om w h e r eare we toobservetheself-evident? From whathasearlier been saidaboutallthis, backto the w ay inwhich truthw ase ar l ierconceived; thereforebylooking aroundin the history of theconcept oftruth Yes:but isthatnot auselessundertaking,to dig upearlier opinions about thingsand gointothem at length? Is thisfruitlessbusiness, notwithstanding all the enthusi-asmsurroundingit, no tultimatelya flightfromwhatistoday requiredofus? Arethese safe promenades in the oldgardensofearlier conceptionsand doctrines not a comfortableavoidanceofresponsibilityin face of thedemands of the day, a diversionary spiritual luxury to which we no longerhaveanyright (todayleasto fal l)?2[6-7] 5


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2. History of the Concept of Truth:N otH istorical C onfirma tion o f Preconceptions, But Return to the OriginaryG reek Experienceo f A,f|0sia (Unhiddenness)

Butlet us for a mom ent accede to the wish f or historicalorientation Howwaswha twe self-evidently referredto as the essenceoftruth,and as theessence ofessence, previously conceived? In the M iddle A ges and later thedefinitionwas:veritase s t ada equat io re i e tintellectus siveenun t iationis ,truth isth e bringingo f the thought orproposition into alignm ent w ith th ething,i.e. into correspondence with the latter, c o m m e n s ur a tio ,the m easuring upto, or the measuring against , something. And how was essence con-ceived?Asquidditas,asw hat-ness,the what-beingof athing- itsgenus:th e universali tyof the genus.

A nd how werethe conceptsoft ruthand essence conceived still earlier,in antiquity? Truth was there defined as 6noi(oai(; (6noieo|ia) T O W7ta6r|ncna)v T f j q v|/i)xf|


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atdistancing ourselvesfrom thepresent through historicalreflection leadto? Tothis: that whatiscurrent todayisconfirmed asitselfancient

But have w e really enacted th e historicalreflection? Did we reallyg oback?Beginning from our present definitiono ftruth, w elooked for theway it had earlier been conceived, and we found it was the s a m e .Isthishistoricalreflection, or is itjustanhistorical recordingofearlier conceptsand names? Have we really gone back to what happened at the beginningofWestern philosophy, and towhat isperhaps stillhappening?N o. Maywethenwonder thatweencountered thepast onlyas thepresentand notas itself, which might perhaps be something quite different? May wewonder that we did not attain detachment and distancefromthe present?Perhaps historical reflection is quitedifferent to reporting on the past andfleeingfrom the present?

Butevenifthat wereso: is thepresentnot socorrupt thatin the end itisworthwhile fleeing fromit, really fleeing, in order that one should notbedestroyedonaccounto f it,thusin the end to be in apositionto trulyovercome it? Foring e n u in ehistorical reflection we take just that distancefrom the present which allows us room to leap out beyond our ownpresent, i.e. to treat itjust asevery present as present deserves to betreated, namelyassomethingto be o v e rc o m e .Genuine historical returnisthe decisive beginning of authentic futurity. No one has ever leapt outover themselves fromand at the place where they presently stand.3Andwhat happens when we do not learn to understand this, everyoneknows.

In the end it is historicalreturn which brings us into what is actuallyhappening today. In the end it isalso only aself-evidentand thereforedoubtfuleverydayopinionwhich takes history as something'past'.

But what is itabout historical return?Instead ofspeaking about it ingeneral terms, we want to attempt it, or in any case a step thereto (we areonly concerned with the history of philosophy).

Letus leave aside the indicated long-standing definition of the essenceoftruth and ask how at the beginningofWestern philosophy truth w asconceived, i.e. how the Greeksunderstood what we call'truth'.Whatw or ddid they haveforthis?TheGreekwordfortruth- one canhardly remindoneself of this too often - is d^fjGeia, unh i dde nne ss [Unverborgenhei t] .Something true is d A , r j 6 e < ; , unhidden. What do weglean first of all fromthis word?

Wediscovertwothings:1.TheGreeks understood what wecallthe true,as the un-hidden,as

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meaning, w emust still bear in mind that the word fortruth, d-Xfj6eia,does not stand forsome arbitraryand irrelevant thing,but is aword forwhatm anwantsandseeksin thegroundof hisessence,aword, therefore,for something ultimate and primary. A nd could the word for this beunimportant, its formation accidental, especially when it shows the pecu-liarity towhich w ehave drawn attention? Instead, mustn otthis word,ifit is aword forwhat constitutesth egroundofhuman Dasein, derive fromaprimordial experienceofworldand self? IsdA ,f|6eiathen not abasicandprimal word?Whowould dispute that Butjustforthis reasonwemust demandto beshown w h e t h e rand h o wtheword arisesfrom the fundamenta lexperienceofancient man. If there w a ssuch afundamental experience, what t e s t i f i e stothis?If the 'true'for theGreeks meanstheunhidden, that whichisfreefromhiddenness, then the experienceof thetrueasunhidden must alsoinvolve experience of the h i d d e n in itshiddenness.

Whatlhen do the Greekscall d^r|0e


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happenings. Beingsas such, i.e. in what they are asbeings, holds sway.KpuTTteciOai c p i X e T :Heraclitus does not saythatbeings as amatter of facthide themselvesfromtimetotime,but c p i X e t :they lovetohide themselves.Itistheir proper innermost drivetoremain hidden, and ifbroughto ut ofhiddenness, to return to it. Wecannot discuss here how this sayingofHeraclitusrelates to his fundam en ta l conception ofbeing.Thegodheadbuilds th e world playfully, countless times, and always as somethingdifferent.

It suffices that this saying of Heraclitus expresses th e fundamentalexperienceinwhich a n df r omwhich is awoken an insight into the essenceof truth as the unhiddenness ofbeings. This saying is as old asWesternphilosophy itself, giving expression to thatfundamental experience andorientation of ancient man from which philosophy begins; & -Xf|0ta,unhiddenness, into which philosophy seeks to bring the hidden, is noth-ingarbitrary,and isespeciallynot apropertyof aproposition or sentence,nor is it aso-called'value'.I t israther that reality,thatoccurrence [Gesche-h e n ] , into which only t hatpath ( f j 686c;) leads of which another of theoldest philosophers likewise says: 'it runs outside the ordinary pathofmen', < X T I ' d v G p c tm c o v K T O < ;Tidiou cruiv (Parmenides,Fr. 1,27).

Y etanother reservation occurs to us. W e canadmit that this sayingofHeraclitus, and theword A X - r j O e ia , areancient,andbelongto theperiodofthebeginningofWestern philosophy;butdoesn't this show thatweneednot paymuch attentiontothem? For'thebeginning' isstill 'primitive',awkwardand unclear,halforfully 'poetical'.Philosophy has in the mean-time progressed and become science, yet at a very early stage it thor-oughlyabandoned the idea of unhiddenness. It is indeed true that the ideaofunhiddennessw asgivenup. B ut is itreallyth e case that th ebeginningisprimitive,ha lf-baked,groping,andunclear?O r is thebeginning whatisgreatest? N otalways, to besure. Ineverything inessential and withoutpurpose the beginningiswhat can be and isovercome;therefore in theinessential there is progress. In the essential, however, where philosophybelongs,thebeginningcanneverbeovercome.Notonlynotovercome:itcannolongerbeattained.In theessential,thebeginningis the unattain-ableandgreatest,and it isprecisely because w ecan nolonger grasp any-thing of this, that with us everything is sodecayed, laughable, withoutorder,and full ofignorance.Today,peopleregardit as amarko fsuperior-itytophilosophize without this beginning. Philosophyhas its own law;what people think aboutit issomething else.

Alreadywe are nolonger confrontedby asimple word (& A,f|0eia)and its10 [14-15]


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dictionary meaning, but by what the word refers to: the reality fromwhichandinto which thiswordw as firstspokena nd formed.To be sure,wehave some in t im at ion (on the basisofHeraclitus' saying) that some-thing must have happened with man; a history which initially appears asjustanarbitrary seriesofevents.On noaccount shouldw einterpret whathasbeensaid to mean that the fundamental experience of the hiddennessofbeings is a'personal experience',which the philosopherthenexpressesin a poem or proposition. We mean that with man himself somethingoccurredwhich isgreaterandmore primordial than hisusual activity;anoccurrenceand ahistorytowhichwemust return,andwhichwem u stre-enact if wewanttograsp somethingof theessenceoftruth.6

But are we equipped forthis return? What do we already h a v e ? Theword dXfiOsta, its(perhapsstrange)meaning, and the sayingo fHeracli-tus. Thisis not much; and if weseek fur ther witnesses, wequickly con-vince ourselvesof thescantinessof oursourcesfor the oldest Greek phil-osophy.Is notsuchareturn therefore uncertainandindefinite?

One thing is certain, namely that what has been transmitted and pre-servedof theauthentic materialo fPresocraticphilosophyissmallincom-parisonwith th e extent ofPlato's and Aristotle's works. So one iseasilytempted tothink thattheolderandoldest philosophers, because theyareunquestionably superior to Plato and Aristotle, must have written at leastasmuch, or even more. But perhaps the reverse is true. Human beingswrite andtalkall themore, theless they have anything essentialtosay.Thisisclear today.A lready the sayingofHeraclitussuffices toshow that th e Greek wordfo r truth, 'unhiddenness', isnothing accidental. Such evidence does notbecome more convincing through further enumeration ofcases.

Thereturn to the Greek beginnings ofWestern philosophy is difficultnot becauseoursourcesarescanty,but becauseourDaseinisimpover-ished, becauseitdoesnotmeasureup to theclaimandpowerof thelittlewhichhasbeen transmitted. For even where we have a great deal, as withPlato andAristotle- what have wemade out ofthis? Aperhaps dis-tinguished but nevertheless groundless scholarship, and a diligent butrather tasteless enthusiasm. Or one thinks it isactuallypreferable nolongertoknow anything whatever aboutit.

H o ware we supposed to initiate this return? Should we not return toth epast through what iscloser to us, bypassing through what ismorerecent? Do not Plato and Aristotle treat the essence of truth more com-prehensively, frommore pointsofview,a ndmore reflectively?Could w e[15-17] 11


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that providesahintorclue.Theimageisnever intendedtostandforitselfalone,but indicates thatsomething is to be understood , providinga clueastow h a tthisis. Theimage providesahint- itleads intotheintelligible, intoa region of intelligibility (the dimension within which something isunderstood),intoasense(hence sensory image). However,it isimportanttobear inmind: whatis to be understood is not asense, but rather anoccurrence.'Sense' [Sinn] saysonly:it is amatterofsomething intelligible.Whatisunderstood isnever i t s e l f sense;w e do not understand somethingas sense, but always only 'in the sense of. Sense isnever the topicofunderstanding.

Thepresentation of anallegory,of asensory image,isthereforenothingelsethanaclueforseeing (aprovision of aclue through something whichispresented sensuously). Suchaclueleadsus towhat simple description,be iteversoaccurateandrigorous,cannever grasp. Thereisthusaninnernecessityto the factthatwhenPlato wantsto saysomething fundamentalandessentialinphilosophy, healways speaksin anallegoryandplacesusbefore asensory image.N otthat he isunsure about what he isspeakingof;on thecontrary,he isquite surethatitcannotbedescribedo rproved.Inallgenuine philosophy thereissomethingin the faceofwhich alldescrip-tion and proof, however brilliantly scientific, fails and sinks down intoempty business. This fact alone, that Plato speaks of dXf|6eia in anallegory,givesus thecrucial clueas towherewemust search,andwherewe must stand, if wewant to come closer to the essence oftruth. Thisindescribable and unprovable something, however, iscrucial - and tocometothisiswhat thewholeeffortofphilosophizingisabout.7

W ethuscloseour introductory remarks. Whetheryou are to under-standourinterpretation doesnotdependonwhetheryouhaveapoorornon-existent understanding of Greek, also not on whether you havemuch or little understanding of philosophical doctrines, but only onwhether youhave yourselves experienced, or arereadytoexperience, anecessityto beherenow - whether,inthis allegory, something unavoid-ablespeaksin and toyou. Without thisallscience remains mere outwardshowand allphilosophya facade.

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Notes1 Cf.belowp. 45.2 See Supplement 1.3 Cf.below 15.4 Precisely'correctness'isnecessary,but simultaneouslyin thepossibilityofd e -

railing and free-floating.5 HeraclitusF r.123,in ThePre socraticPhilosophers,ed. G. S.Kirk,J. E .Raven and

M.Schofield, Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1983p. 192, translatedin this volum eas'The real co nstitution isaccustomedtohide itself. [Trans.].

6 SeeSupplement2.7 Theun-sayable [das Un-sagbare]; silence, language.

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PART ONE

TH E CLUE T O T H E'ESSEN CE' O FAAH0EIAINTERPRETATION O F T H E ALLEGORY O F T H ECAVE IN PLATO'S POLITEIA


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1The Four Stages of the Occurrence of Truth

W eshallnowtreat theallegoryof thecaveinPlato'sJloXusia (BookVII,514a-517a), understanding it as a clue to the essence of unhiddenness(d^f|0eia).We divide the text into four sections (A-D), corresponding tothe f ou r stagesof theoccurrence asdepicted in theallegory.W eproceed with the interpretation byclarifyingeach stage in turn, atthesame time recognizing thattheindividual stagesare not the essentialmatter, which israther the transi t ions from onestagetoanother, thatis,th e wh ole pa th consisting ofthese transitions. When the first stage hasbeen discussed, therefore,w ecannot put it aside assomething over anddone with, but we must draw it into the transition and thus take it overintoall thesucceeding transitions.We do notunderstandthe firststageatalluntilwegraspitfrom th esecond, and, strictly speaking,from the finalstage.

Platointroducestheallegorybyhaving Socrates enter into conversationwith Glauconandrecountit tohim. W ecouldeasilyfollow thecommonpractice and briefly summarize the content of the allegory, likewiseattaching a short explanation, without, however, being touched by any-thing essential, and without following up the clue to the decisive ques-tion. This usual hackneyedway ofproceeding wouldnot assistus atall. Ifwewishtoavoid thisthe firstthingwemustdo is togive ourselves totallyover to the text. Only in this way are we perhaps also moved by the powerofPlato's presentation- which inunderstanding philosophyis not at allincidental,not at all anaesthetic addition.

A teach point I give the Greek text first,1then the translation, which canonlybe anaid.[21-22] 17


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A The F irst Stage(514a2-515c 3):the Situationof Man in the Underground C a v e

(W epass overthe firstsentence,towhichweshall returnat theend.)

Ma Af O O K E y c o y , E ^ T J .'Picturepeople dwelling in an underground chamber like a cave, with a long

entrance open to the light on its entire width. In this chamber people areshackled attheir legs and necks from childhood, sothat they remain in thesamespot,andlook onlya twhat is in front ofthem, atwhat ispresent beforethem. Becauseoftheir shackles theyareunabletoturn their heads. However,lightreaches them from behind, from a fireburning higher up and at adis-tance. Between the fire and the prisoners, behind theirbacks, runs apathalong which a small wall has been built, like the screen at puppet shows

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betweenthe exhibitorsandtheir audience,andabove which they,thepuppe t -eers, show their artistry/

'Isee/he says [Glaucon].' Imagine fur ther that there are people carrying all sorts of things alongbehind th e screen, projecting above it , including figures of men and animalsmade ofstone and wood, and allsortso fother m an-m adeartefacts.N aturally ,some of thesepeoplewould be talking among themselves, and o thers would besilent/

'A peculiar picture you have draw n, and pecu liarprisoners 'They are very much like us N ow tell me, do you think such people could

see any thing, w hether on their own acco unt or with the help of their fellows,except the shadow s throw n by the fire on the w all of the cave oppositethem?'

'How could they seean yth ing elsei fthey were preventedalltheir livesfrommov ing theirheads?'

'And what aboutthe things carried about behind them? Doesnot the sameapply (that they see only sh adow s)?'

'How couldit beotherwise?''Nowiftheywere abletotalk w ithoneanother aboutwhat theysee, don't

youthink th ey w ould take thisf orreal beings?'' Inevi tably/'And if the wall oftheir prison opposite them reflectedsound,don't you

think that they would suppose, whenever one of the passers-byon the roadspoke, thatthevo ice belongedto the shadow passingbeforethem?'

'O f course,byZeus 'Whatisthisfirststageof the allegory steering towards, this descriptionofthe situation of the prisoners in the cave? We can learn this withoutdifficulty from the finalsentence, whichismeantas adecisive summary:

FlavTCiTcaai 5f|, f j v 8ya), oi T O I O U T O I O U K av aXXo T I vojai^oiEv TO dXr|0< ; f jia


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features of this image, gathering together everything to do with theunhidden.1.However strange this situation remains, andhowever peculiar thesepeople, in this situation too man alreadyhas TOd^Gec;, th e unhidden.

Platodoesnot sayanunhidden but theunhidden. This means that man,from childhood on and already in hisnature, is setbefore th e unhidden.W h a t thisis ineach case, what inparticular cases presents itself asunhid-den, isanother question. Evenin this strange situation in the cave, thehuman being is not sealed offfrom everything else as a simple I, but is7 i p o < ;TO rcpoaGev,directed to wha t is b e f o r e him: TO & X r | 9 e < ; . It belongs tobeing human- thisisalready indicatedat thebeginningoftheallegory-to stand in the unhidden,or as we say,in the true, in the truth. Beinghuman means,and may the situationbeeversopeculiar,not only, butamong other things: toc o m p o rt oneself to the u n h i d d e n .

2 . A ndjustforthis reason thequestion can beraised (bywhom?)as tow h a t ,inthis situation,isunhidden toman. Answer: what isimmediatelybeforehim, without anydoingon hispart,as itgivesitself;here thereforeth e s h a d o w softhings whicharecaston thewallinfront of him by thelightof the fire behind. Y etthis description of the unhidden requires a moreprecise determination.

3.Theprisonersdoindeed se ethe shadowsbut not a sshadows ofsome-thing. Whenwe saythat,tothem,theshadowsare theun-hidden, thisisambiguous and already says to omuch.It isonly we, privy to the wholesituation,who callwhattheprisoners face 'shadows'.Whycouldn't theysay this themselves? Because they do not know anything about a firewhich givesoffaglow,and inwhose luminosity something like shadowscan first of all be cast. Thus, when (under 2) we said it could beasked' whatthatis'whichisunhidden there, thisis not aquestiontheprisonersthemselves could raise.F or theessenceoftheir beingissuch that,tothem,precisely thisunhidden beforethem s u f f i c e s - somuchsoindeed that theyalsodo notknow tha titsuffices.Theyareentirely given overtowhat theyi m m e d i a t e l y encounter.

4. Plato expressly remarks: q > o ) < ; 8e aircoic;rcupo*;avooOev mi rcoppooOevKaonevov O7uo9ev airaov. There is indeed brightness, 'light', inside thecave, but frombehind.Theprisoners havenorelationship tolighta slight,for neither do they see the fire that casts the light. Here, and for theunderstanding of the whole allegory, it isnecessary to understand th edifference between i c O p , fire (the source oflight),and


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1) th e candle that burns,the sourceofbrightness;2) light, the oppositeofdark .T hecave-dwellers havenorelationshiptolight,theya recompletelyunfamiliarwith the distinction between light and dark. Thus they also donotunderstand things like shadows, which (through brightness)arecastby another body. A ll this, things that cast shadows, fire that makesshadows possible, is drciaGev, behind their backs, as distinct fromTO7ipoa0ev, what they see before them. Only the latter isunhidden; theformerremains hidden. Here, therefore, being human alsomeans, amongotherthings: tostandwithinthe h i d d e n ,to besurroundedby thehidden(withinthe unhidden to comport oneself to this; at the same time to besurrounded by thehidden,so much so that also the unhidden is not at allunderstood a ssuch).

5. The cave-dwellers do notconsider what they have before them asunhidden to be a semblance of something else. Instead,they would nothesitate toacknowledge what isbeforethem as T C I O V T C I , as beings(assum-ingthat they could talk among themselves about what isgiven).2I notherwords, man straightforwardly takes whatever presents itself before him asun-hidden, to bebeings; indeed man isnothing else but th ebeing thatcomports itself towhat ittakes asbeings (an animal, plant, even lessastone,never comports itselftobeings).

But th ecomportment ofthese prisonersto the unhidden is sodistinct-iv e that as yet we have not sufficiently grasped it . Something else isrequired:

6. The prisoners see only shadows of themselves and their fellowprisoners, they see only what is set over against them.They have norelationship tothemselves atall. Theydo notknow any I-myself or anyyou-yoursel f . In the condition described they are entirely ensnared inwhatlies befo rethem.Plato calls what they have beforethemTOdXt|0ec;,the u n h i d d e n .But we must now add that this unhidden is not encounteredbytheprisonersasunhidden.Theprisoners knowthedistinction betweenhiddennessandunhiddennessassuch justaslittleasthey knowthedis-tinction between shadowsandthings that cast shadows,or thedistinctionbetween light and dark. This absence of the distinction makes the cave-dwellers, as we say, 'utterly removed' [ganz we g ] , ensnared by and insomething, shackled. But as we see, even tothis condition ofshackled-ness, even to this complete removedness, there belongs, in the end,unhiddenness, light, beings.

I t istherefore not surprising that Glaucon, to whom this allegoryi srecounted, finds it O I T O T C O V : something having no place within the[27-28] 21


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ordinary ,something extra-ordinary that ispeculiarand removed fromanything everydayand normal (the obvious, hearsay, gossip). A ndyet,Socratesassuresus, theallegory depicts preciselyth eeveryday situationofman, who, in so far as hedoesnotpossessanystandard o therthan every-dayness, cannot see its strangeness. H ow this provides a clue to theessenceof thetruthofeverydaynesswillb eshown later. Perhapswehaveanintimationofthis, without being ableto see thedetails.

Inso far as the firststage, taken on its own account, is the stageof anallegory,asensory image, this already providesuswithaclue, admittedlynot onethatitselfamountstoinsight intoth e essenceo funhiddenness, buta clue thatsomehow in this situation there isunhiddenness. This meansonlythat th eunhiddenness ofsomething, tow hi chm an comports himself,belongsto thebeingof man (as an indicat ionof hissituation). Just h o wthisunhiddennessis to becomprehended in itsessenceremains obscure.Wedo not obtain aviewof the essence ofman. For us, it is firstly amatterofseeing that and ho wf from th e very beginning, & Xf|6eia stands in thecentre.

To this purpose we can in the first place collect together everythingwhich, in this situation, show s itself simultaneously with e\X r|8e< ;. We wanttoenumerateall the essential moments havingarolein the remarkablefact that these human beings, however peculiar theirsituationmay be,havetheunhidden, or, as weinappropriately say,the true, before them.These moments are:

1 .TO d X r j G e q , the unhidden;2.aKiai,shadows;3.8eano)Tai,prisoners:thehuman condition ofbeing shackled;4. T c o p and (pox;, fire andlight: brightness;5.the prisoners have no relationship to the light and to the things,

drciaOev,which remain hidden behind them;6.the prisoners have no relationship to themselves and each other;

theyseeonly shadowsofthemselves;7. the unhidden istaken straightforwardly forbeings, T C I6vTa;8.thereis no distinction between hidden and unhidden, shadowsandrealthings, lightanddark.A rea llthese only accidental moments, whichw erefertojustfo r amore

vivid depiction of the situation, or are they constitutive elements as itwere, which have a role in building up the essence ofdXiiOeg truth asunhiddenness? Are all these elements bound togetherby an inner con-

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nection? Indeed, is the unity of this interconnection, that which holdseverything together, nothing elsebut d X r j G e c ; , unhiddenness?

Butbeforew e put this q uestion , let us place ourselve s once again in th esituation of the prisoners, which basically is not difficult to do. If werestrict ourselvesto the first stage, submit t ingto it so to speak,we see nosuch interconnection, indeedwe do not even recognizethe enumera tedindividual moments; instead, caughtup in our misapprehension, we seeonly what isplayed off on the wall. The latter is, as it were, th e wholeworld.The condition ofmisapprehension isindicatedby the fact tha t th eprisoners, in their situation, could not describe what we are n o wable tosee. Indeed,the prisonersdo noteven know that theyare in a 'situation'.When questioned, they always talk about shadows, which, however, theydo not know a sshadows. They kno w their w ay around their ow n properabode, and are not to be dissuaded from what they recognize straight-forwardly as beings. They would regard any such presumption as per-verse. But w hat they tak e as beings is still called (this cannot be said toooften) TO d A - tj O e c ; , and there is nothing here about resemblance, correct-ness, or correspondence.

B.T heS econdStage (515c4-515 e 5):a 'Liberation1 of Manw ithinthe C a v e

'Nowimagine what would happenif theprisoners were releasedfrom their[28-31] 23


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to d X r j O e c ;,4 become clearer, and whether thereby d A r j O e c ; itself, theessenceofunhiddenness,becomes clearer.

W eanswer byagain outlining th e featuresof the image presented byPlato,graspingthe second stage preciselya ssecond, thus in itsrelation-shipto the first,which inthisway isitself fur therilluminated.

1. W eencounter d X t j O e c ;notonly (as in the firststage)ingeneral terms,but now the talk is ofd>,r|0ecn;epa (inpure linguistic terms acompara-tive),ofwhat is m o reu n h id d e n .Theunhidden canthereforebe m o r eo r lessunhidden. This doesnotmean moreorlessinnumerical terms (thatm o r eshadowsareunhidden),butthatthe things themselvesa remore unhidden,the things which the now unshackled prisoner,as he turns around, issupposed to see. Unhiddenness, therefore, has gradations and levels.'Truth'and 'true'is not something in itself,such that foreveryoneit is inevery aspect unchangeable andcommon. It is not thecasethateveryone,without fur therado,has thesame rightandsame strengthtoevery truth.A ndevery truthh as itstim e .In the end it is asigno feducationtowithholdcertain truthsfrom knowledgeand tokeep silent about them. Truthandtruthis notsimplythe same.2. Theprogression from the firststageto the second involvesaseconddifferentiation. It is a transi t ion. In so far aswhat was initially seen (theshadows) are leftbehind and the freedprisoner turns awayfrom them, adivorce occurs between what was first seen and what is now s h o w n (thetext makesthesharp distinction:idloie 6po>neva- id vuv 8eiKv6neva).Theunhidden separates out: there the s h a d o w s ,here th e th ings.Tw ospe-cies of the unhidden, but connected by the fact that each isaccessible(manifest) .3.Butthese tw o (shadowsandreal things), thatnowseparateout fromeach other, are assessed differently. The former prisoner holds theshadows, i.e. what immediately shows itself, id T O T S 6pob|ievadA,t|06CT8pa, to bemore true, more unhidden, more clear, more present.O nthe other hand,he whoremoves theshackles says that whatis nowrevealed,id v O v SeiKvu^eva,thethings themselvesand thehuman beings,are ndAAovovia, a reto agreater degree [ m e h r seiend], are m o r e beingful[seiender] beings. What isadmitso f degreesl Beingand beingis not neces-sarily the same. And not onlyis the assessmentofwhat w aspreviouslyseen,andwhatis nowshown, different,but the way inwhichtheassess-ment ism a dealsodiffers: there thepreviously seen ism o r eu n h id d e n ,whilehere what is now shown is th em o re beingful. There more unhiddenness,here more being. D o both belong together? Clearly. F orwhat iscalled[32-34] 25


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unhidden isth e beingsand istaken assuch (cf.the first stage) . Themorethe unhidden is unhidden, the closer do we come to beings (^aXXovyyi)T8po)tou ovioq). Socoming closer tobeings goes together with th eheightening ofunhiddenness andvice versa. Closeness tobeings, i.e. thebeing-withwhat isthere [das Da-bei-seind e sDa-seins]f the inner proximityor distance ofbeing-human to beings, the degree of the unhiddenness ofbeings,and the he ighteningofbeings themselvesasbeings-thesethreeareintertwined. Aboveall we must be clear that beings separate out intothose thataremoreandthose thatarelessbeing ful. Thereare'beingsthataremore beingful'. Closeness and distance tobeings changes the beingsthemselves.

4. Theproximity tobeings, asthis isclaimed for the second stage, hasstill another characteristic result: 6 rcpoc; naAAov 6via Teipa^evog6p6oT6pov pXeTiei. 'Whoever [liketh e formerprisoner] isturned towardsmorebeingfulbeings [towardswhatismorebeingfulthan somethingelse,thus to more genuine beings] sees more correctly.' Thus 6p96


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5.But,as stated,whatthe more true and the morebeingfulis, has noty etbeen settled.O n thecontrary, judgementsandestimationsruncoun-ter to one another. Why i sthisso?What kind ofstandard does thepris-oneremployinwantingtoreturnto theshadowsand inclaiming t hemasthe more unhidden? There in the cave, turned to the shadows, he has noinklingofwhat will happen whenhemustsee in thelight;he has nopainin hiseyes,andabove all,thereamidsttheshadowshemoves withinthatwhich, a86vaiai, he iscapableof,which demandsn ogreateffort ofhim,andhappens of its ownaccordso tospeak. There amidstthe shadows, inhisshackles,he finds hisfam iliarground, wherenoexertionisrequired,where he is unhindered, where nothing recoils upon him, where there isnoconfusion, andwhere everyoneis inagreement.Themain standardforhis estimation ofhigher or lower unhiddenness ispreservation of theundisturbedness of his ordinary activities, without being set out to anykindofreflection,demand, orcommand.

6.On the other hand, what does turning around to the things them-selves require?Releasefrom the shackles; but this isonly the beginningofemancipation. Whatissupposedtoeventuateis aturning around to thelight. This liberation fails; itdoes not come to fulfilment. Proof: he whohasbeenunshackled wantsto go back to hisformer situation Forwhatreason? W hydoes this attempted liberation fail?7.Since the unshackling, the standing up, the turning around, the look-ing into th e light, all happen suddenly (ai(pvr|povr|aic;is lacking,where everything, worldand self, isshadow-like, thereis norelationshipto the ge nui ne ly true and unhidden, dcppoauvrj is the absence ofcircum-spection and insight,whereman is in every respect removed from truth,where he has no familiaritywith the world and no insight into himself.There, man islacking something. He issick,and healingisnecessary.Buthealing presupposes the correct diagnosis of the illness. This does notoccurthrough release from the shackles.T hereleased prisoner does notrecognize what he previously saw a s shadows. Instead, he issimplyremoved fromwhathe formerly saw and placedbeforethings glimmering[35-36] 27


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in the light.F orhim, these latterc anonlybethings whichare somehowdifferent from what he formerlysaw. Through this baredifference therearisesnothingbut confusion.Whatisshownto himdoesnottakeon anyclarityanddefiniteness.For this reason he wants to return to his shackles.

8. Removal of the shackles isthus not genuine emancipation, for itremainsexternal and fails topenetrate to man in hisownmost self.Thecircumstancesof theprisoner change,but hisinner condition,hiswilling[Wollen] ,does not.Thereleased prisoner does indeed will,but hewillstore turnto his shackles. Thus willing, he willsnot-willing:he does not wantto beinvolved himself. H eavoidsandshrinks backfrom the demand tofullygiveup hisprevious situation.He isalsoalongwayfrom understand-in gthatm an truly isonlyin so far as hedemands thisof him self.

Thesecond stage ends with this thwarted emancipation. The emancipa-tionfailsbecausethe one to befreeddoesnotunderstand it .Liberationisonlygenuine when he who isliberated thereby becomes free forhimself,i.e. comestostandin thegroundof hisessence.

W erepeatourguiding question: what doesthesecond stagesayaboutA X f j O e i a ? D o w eexperience anything positive about th e essence oftruthasunhiddenness?Havewe made any progress beyond what was shown inthe first stage, namely that various other moments go together withd X r j G e c ; ? Do wealreadysee aninnerconnection between these?

Inthe second stage what happens is a failure,namely that he who hasbeen unshackled fails to encounter unhiddenness assuch. H edoes notcome to it. But doesnot Platosaythat the prisoners are set before theunhidden, before d^rjGe*;, from childhood on? Certainly, but not beforetheunhiddenasunhidden. Theydo notknow thatand how the unhid-d e n , to which they are delivered over, assuch is , that such a thing asunhiddenness occurs.Thisoccurrence ofunhiddenness is not present forthe former prisoner, for he cannot distinguish between shadows andthings, between their respective kinds of unhiddenness. To be sure, thedifference between shadowsandthings announces itself, but the formerprisoner does not enact this difference, cannot grasp it as such, cannotbring thedistinguished things into relationship. But the differenceoccursin the e n a c t m e n t of the differentiation. Tobring th e differentiation toenactment wouldbebeing-human[M enschsein], existing [Existieren].

Why is i t that the difference only a n n o u n c e s itself? This we cannotimmediatelysay.W e canonly seethat the firstattempt atemancipationfails.From thiswe canonly conclude thattheoccurrenceandexistenceofunhiddenness assuch isconnected with th e l iberationofman, more pre-

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cisely with the s u c c e s s of liberation, i.e. with genuine being-free. And wecansuspect something else, na m ely thatthe successofliberation m ustliein the opposite direction to itsfailure.The failure isshown in wanting togo back to the shackles, away from th e light . The opposite direction, inwhich liberation attains itsgoal, is thereforeamatter ofmoving towardsthe light, of becoming free as facing the light. In this turning aroundtowards the light, beings are to become more beingful, th e unhiddenmore unhidden

It isclear, theref ore, th at the essence oftruth asunhiddenness belongsin the context offreedom, light,and beings, more precisely in the being-free ofman, th e looking intoth e light,andcomportment tobeings. Free-dom, light, beings, unh iddenness: these a re not related to one ano ther likeisolated things. But what is the interconnection that we are seeking? Thesecond stage has not yet shown this, but it becomes visible in the thirdstage o f the allegory.Isthere an answer?

C The T hirdStage (515e5-516 e 2):the Genuine Liberationof Man to the Primordial Light

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'A nd if he were forcibly draggedup the steepand rugged ascentof the caveand not let gotill he had been draggedout into the sunlight, would he notexperiencepain, and sostruggle against this?Andwouldhenot,assoonas heemerged into the light, his eyes dazzled, be un able to see any of the things hewasnowtold wereunhidden?''No,atleastnot at first/

'H ewo uld need, I believe, to first become accustom ed to the light bef ore hecould see things in the upper world. Firsthe would find it easier to look atshadows, nextat the reflectionsof men andotherob jectsinwater,and lateronatthe thin gs themselves. After that he wou ld find it easier to observe the sky atnightand the heavenly dome, and to lookat the lightof the moon and starsrather th an at the su n an d its light byday/

'O f course/'Finally,Ibelieve,hewouldbeabletolook directlyat the sun itself, andgaze

at it as it is initself, without using reflectionsinwateror anyother medium/'Necessarily/'Lateron hewould cometo the conclusion thatit is the sun which produces

the changing seasons and yearsand controls everythingin the visible world,and tha t it was also at bottom responsible fo r wh at he and hisfellow prisonersusedto see in thecave/

'That is the nextconclusion hew ould obviouslyreach/'And when he remembered his firsthome, and what passed for wisdomthere, and hisfellow prisoners,don'tyou think he wouldfeelhimself f ortuna te

onaccountof hischangeofcircumstance, and besorryforthem?''Verymuchso/'And if the cave-dwellershad established, down there in the cave, certain

prizes and distinctions for those who were most keen-sighted in seeing thepassing shadows,and whow ere best ableto remember what camebefore, and

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'unhidden'in the first two stages, analyse what isnowspoken of as theunhidden. What most characteristically occurs here?

1. The transition to w ha t is now (outside the cave, in the condition off reedom) unhidden happens pig (withforce). Liberation, in the senseo fturning around towards th e light of the sun, is violent .A tta ining what isnow unhidden involves violence, thus dyavaKteiv, resistance, such thatthe one to befreed isforced upalongarugged path.Theascent demandswork andex ertion, cau sing strainand suffering.

2. Nei ther release from the shackles, nor mere exit from the cave, isenough. What is also unavoidable is the auvf |6ia: as distinct from th ekindofliberationin the second stage,thereoccursasudden ripping loose,followed by ,outsidethe cave,aslo wadaptat ion , not som u c hto the thingsas to il lumination and light itself. At first the eyes are dazzled by thebrilliance of the sunlight; only slowly do they unaccustom themselves todark ness. Desp ite the illum ination, ind eed because of the illum ination,the released prisoner initially sees nothing at all ofwhatis nowunhiddenin the light,andclaimedto be unhidden .

3. This adaptation of vision from darkness to light occurs in variousstages.A t first, the vision w hich loves darkness and shadows searches forev ery thing outside the cave wh ich is most closely related to darkness, forw ha t here to odoes not give th e things themselves, but only shadows orreflections. Af ter this, vision arrivesat thethings themselves, butthen thereleased prisoner still sees better by night, where vision slowly growsaccustomedto the illuminated things- thesmoothlight,the unblindinglightof the stars and the m oon. W he n he gets used to this, he is able to seethingsby day in the lightof the sun,thenthe lightitself.F inallyhe isableto see the sun asw ha tg iv esthe light,asw hat gives ti m e ,aswha t rules ov e reverything, and which is the ground even ofwha t isseen in the cave ,oftheshadowsand the lightand the fire.

4. The genuine liberation does not only depend on an act ofviolence,but req uires persistence and courage to end ure the individual stages ofadaptationto the light,the strident courage that canalso wait, tha tis notdeterred by reversals, that k nows that , in all genuine becoming and grow-ing,nostagecan be leapt over,thatempty busy-nessisjustasuseless anddisastrous asblind enthusiasm .

5. He who in his ownmost self has adapted in this way, secures forhimself, bybecoming free for the light, i.e. through familiarity with andtow ards light, a new standpo int. N o longer does he w ant to go back, for henow sees through the shadowy character of hiswholecave-existence, of

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thehustleandbustle which thereprevails,and of thehonours whicharethere conferred.

A llthisisclear i n t h epicturepresented. Butwhat does this picturep o in tto? Thepurposeof the allegoryis notstated. Whatare we to u n d e rs t a n dconcerning this stay of the released prisoner outside the cave, if indeedcave-existence standsfor theeveryday activityandbusinessofman, thusprecisely what takes placein the sunlight?

A talater point (51 7b f f . ) , Plato himself givesth e interpretation of thewhole allegory. The cave, he says, is the earth under the heavenly dome(rememberthat the Greeks conceived the earth as a flat disk over whichthe heavensarevaulted,sothatmanactually does move about withinacave).The fire in the cave is the sun, the light of the fire is the sunlight.Theshadowsarebeings,thethingswe seeunderthe sky andwith whichwe commonly have dealings. We, the prisoners, are bound to self-evidence,and topeoplewho areguided onlybythis. Whatisoutside thecave, over andabovethis, T C Iavco,is the placeof the ideas, aurcepoupdvioc;T O T I O < ; ,overthevaultof theheavens (above thevaultof the cave) .A nd thesunthat shines outsidethe cave symbolizesthehighest idea,the 18eaT O Ddya0oi),whichonehardly darestoview directly:noyic;6pda6ai ( 5 1 7b).

b) Four QuestionsC oncern ingthe Visible Connections of d X f jG e i a in theOccurrence of Liberation

Does this Platonic elucidation allow us to u nde r s t and the essence ofdXf|0eia?Do wethereby obtainan insight into what necessarily occursinthe everyday existence of human beings?Do we, in addition, compre-hend what occurs with or to oneof these human beings?Do we under-stand that tow h i c hman can be freed in this violent way, and how he issupposed to adapt in order to arrive at the unhiddenness of beings? Ideas,the idea of the good: what does this mean? What do ideas have to do withtruthandwith everything elsewehave encountered concerning dXf|0eiaandfreedom, light, beings, gradationsofbeing?

However clearly the allegory may be presented, however simple andclearthePlatonic interpretationmayappear- do weunderstand much,orevenalittle,of allthis?Itdoesnothelpto ask howPlatohimselfinterpretsthe allegory. We find only that he redescribes the situation, i.e. heexplainsth epositionof the freedprisonerb ysaying thathis locationisoverthe heavens, that in this location there are ideas, and among these ahighest idea. Whatallthis meanswe do notknow. Initiallyweunderstand[43-45] 33


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nothingatall,especially whenweconsider thatit is astory about some-thingthat happens withman.With man? Who is that? We ourselves andonlywe,every selfin so faras, through Plato,it is now placedbefore thisallegoryand lets itselfbeplacedbefore thiso c c ur r e n c e .Therefore notthosewho are now listening to a lecture by Heidegger.A f te ra few weeks theywill already have had enough and sowilldisappear just as they havecome.Butsupposingonesits here untilthe finalsessionofthesemester -would that prove that one has allowed oneself to be placed before thisallegory? No, and leastof all canthisbeproven throughan examination.I t therefore cannot beproven at all - but a u t he n t i ca t e d , yes How,andbeforewhom,andwhen andwhereand how far: that isknown onlybyeach individual. Thisiswhat themysterious 'effect ' of aphilosophy con-sistsin -whenit iseffectiveatall.

Initially weunderstand nothing atall, and forthis reason we ask.Weaskfirstly (not only with respect to the third stage, but also with respect tothe previousstages):whatisthis allegorys ayi ng What doesitmeanforman, i.e.for ourDaseinand itsrelationtotruthasunhiddenness? Unhid-denness in connection withfreedom, light, being, ideas, the highest ideaofthegood?Asmany questionsastherearewords

Weattempt to get our bearings here by singling out and clarifying theindicated connections and thephenomenatowhich they refer.Weposef ou rquestions:1. What is the interrelation between idea and light? ( 6)2. Whatis theinterrelation between lightandfreedom? ( 7)3. Whatis theinterrelation betweenfreedomandbeings? (8)4. Whatis theessenceoftruthin thesenseofunhiddenness as itemerges

f rom theunityofthese interrelations? (9)Byanswering these f ou rquestions, and thus presenting an interpret-

ationof thethird stage,weattempttofeelour wayforwardto theessenceoftruthasunhiddenness.As you cansee,for themomentwedeliberatelyleave asideanydiscussionof thehighest idea (the ideaof thegood).Platotoo does not discuss the highest idea more closely within the allegoryitself, because he has already treated it at length in the closing partofBookVI.Later, after thecomplete interpretationof the allegory,weshallreturn to the relation between dXf|6eia and I6ea TO OftyaOou,not in thesense of amere addition but inordertogainan overviewof the wholeproblemoftruthand toorient ourselvesatthis pinnacleofPlatonic phil-osophy (thisisnothing elsebut thestrugglebetweenthe twoconceptsof

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t ru th) .F rom herew ealsofirstobtainthegroundfor the fur ther questionsraisedby the Platonicdefinition of the essenceoft ruthasd^fiGeia, thatis,for the debate with Plato himself and thus with the whole Westerntradition.7

6.Idea andLightTo the first question: what is the interrelation between idea and light?Tobeginw ith:what does'idea'refer to ?Wehave already said tha t w e m ust alw ays retain the preceding stages inview; so now it is im portan t to look m ore closely at the first stage.

Led along by the apron strings of the everyday, we are forced intow ha t is ordinary and accepted. In such a situation, w hich looks to us likefreedom, we experience only beings. How can we say 'only'? What issupposed to be still lacking, where we soberly behave according to thebusiness of the day, as functionaries, as itw ere,of thepresent situation,not dreaming, not fallinginto outlandish plans and unrealizable wishes,but just pursuing th e everyday and contributing to itsendurance?Canwe do m o rethan to hold to beings, to w hat is actual? Y et in the allegoryPlato describes precisely these beings, the everyday, as shadows, there-fore indicating that the beings around us, however much we take themas such, are n o t the genuine truth of beings, not the beings in theirunhiddenness. But is there then something e l s e over and above thebeings?a)The Seeing of What-BeingTo be sure, the beings we encounter in our everyday life might notencompass everything thatisvisibleandthatis .There might exist thingswe do not yet know and shall never know. But these unknown beings,just because we do not know them, are not for this reason different towhat isknown to us. Instead, according to Plato's symbolism, they alsomustbecounted amongsttheshadows, nam ely those which hav enot yetpassed across the wall, those which will show themselves only in thefuture, those which are predicted and discussedin advance.Y esindeed.But Plato does not say that we should come to know m o r e shadows.Rather , what we should com e to k now is som ething different from thebeingswhich daily occupy us, i.e. jus t w ha t the person (the prisoner) who[47-48] 35


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isrestrictedto theexisting thingsintheir infinite varietyisnotabletosee.A ndwhatisthis?Thehistorical interpretation says:it is the ideas .

Nowadays , we have long become suspiciousof 'ideas'; we find theminteresting only in gossip aboutIdeologyVlSeais what givesitself,whatistherefor and in I5etv,inseeing.Toseeing there corresponds whatisseen,what issighted.Yetwhat kind 0/seeingisthis, inwhich ideas come intoview? Obviouslyitcannotbe the seeingof ourbodily eyes,forwith thelatter we see precisely the beings that Plato calls shadows. Ideas aresupposed to be o t h e rthan these beings.

Butnot sofast.Do we se ebeings withourbodily eyes? Doubtlesswe doIdo indeed see this book. And when someone who does not know hiswayaround this lecture room islookingfor the exit,we say to him 'seethe door here',and he 'sees'the door. W i t h whatdoeshe see the door?Whatkindofquestionisthis? Withhiseyes,ofcourse,and not withhisears

Withhis eyes? Let us make the attempt We want to see this book here'withoureyes'.Wedon'tneedto trythis,wealreadydo it Whatare wesupposedtostillwanthere?I see thebook. Thisis thesimplest thingin theworld.

D owese ethebook withoureyes? W h a tdo we seewithoureyes? Thisiseasierto answer if we consider what we hear with our ears. In both cases,seeingand hearing, we hold ourselves in a perception, we register some-thing that is presented to us. We hear tones, sounds, we see colours,coloured things.We can alsoseeglowing, sparkling, glittering, illumin-ation, brightnessanddarkness. Certainly,but wealsoseem o re ,suchas theform ofthis desk,ofthis door.W ethusseespatialfo rms (figures)witho u reyes.

Yet here we must already ask if spatial form is something specificallyvisible, whether we can encounter it only as something visible. Clearlynot, becausewe canalso perceive spatial forms, e.g.the surface of thisdesk,by tou chin g .On the other hand, one colour cannot be distinguishedf rom anotherbyeverso fine atouching.Wecertainly cannot touch bril-liance and illumination. Extended things can be touched as well as seen.Likewise, not only can we see movement, but we can hear it, e.g. theapproach of a car or its moving offinto the distance. Movement andmoving thingsare not specifically visible. Seeing withtheeyesinevery caseprovides colourandbrightness: something visiblethatisonlyaccessiblebysight, that we sense h e r e . Seeing with the faculty of sight is a sight-sensation. Suchasensationofcolourwecallacolour-sensation.

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Againwe ask: do we see with our eyes, which now means: do wesense[empfinden] the book? What the eyes give, conveyed to us as a sensorysomething, is the reddish brown book-cover,thegreyish white pattern,the black inscription. How does this happen? Do we sense the book-cover, th e pattern, th e inscription, with o u r eyes? Is there, just like thesensation of red, also the sensation ofbook-cover?N o. What is sensedwith our eyes is not the book, but the reddish brown, greyish white,black, and soforth. Thebookcan nomorebe'seen'than it can beheardand smelt. And yet we quite naturally sa y'we see the book'. Clearly,seeing and seeing is not thesame. More precisely, seeingis aperceiving[ V e r n e h m e n ] 'with' the eyes; but what 'with the eyes' means isambigu-ous. Firstly it could mean that what sees, what gives th e visible, a r etheeyes.Thus understood, w e cannot saythat 'our eyes' seecolours, but,strictly speaking, wemust saywithoureyes, meaning that they assistus.So we come to the second meaning: with the assistance of our eyes, bym e a n s o f t h e m , we perceive something, and so 'see' it, for example abook.

Strictlyspeaking the eyedoes not yetsense thecolour. With sensationtoo the eye isonly th eorgan into which th e faculty ofsensation isbuilt,but it is not this faculty itself.The eye as instrument strictly sees nothingat all; at best the sense of sight [G esichtssinn] does this with the he lp of theeyes. The sense ofsight 'sees' colours in the manner ofsensation[Emp-finden},but never anything likeabook; only through the sense ofsightdo we'see'abook. Here'seeing'means perceiving something,aperceiv-ing inwhich th esense ofsight,but not italone,isinvolved, and inwhichthis is not even the g e n u i n e perceiver. When we say that 'we see thebook', we use 'see' in ameaning which g o e sbeyon d perceivingth eobjectbymeans of the sense ofsight with th e helpof oureyes. However sharpand highly developed our toolsfor seeing, however excellent our senseof sight, we cannever see abook through our sense ofsight. W ewouldnever seeanything likeabook werewe not ableto see inanother m o r ep r i m o r d i a l sense. To this latter kind of 'seeing' there belongs an u n d e r -standing [Verstehen] ofwhat it isthat one encounters:book, door, house,tree. W e recognize th e thing as abook. Thisrecognition registersth e lookthat isgivento us: of thebook, table, door.W e seewhatthe thingis fromthe way it looks: we se eits what-being. 'Seeing' is now a pe rc e i v i ng;ofsomething, to besure, namely thisas abook,but no longer through oureyes and sense ofsight; it is a looking whose object does not have thecharacter of colour, an object that cannot be attained through any[49-51] 37


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constellationofcolours,an object thatis nolonger sensoryatall.And yetwe see(perceive), in the sense that we comport ourselves to what ispresented to us.When we so naturally say'wesee thebook',we use'see'in a meaningthat is quite obvious and normal, and about which we become suspiciousonlywhen someone makesus paycloser attention.Thelatterispreciselywhat Platodidwithhisdiscoveryof the so-called'ideas'.This discoverywas not some fa r - f lung speculation on the part ofPlato,but relates towhat everyone sees and grasps in comportment to beings. Plato justpointed this out with previously unknown power and assurance. Forwhat we see there, a 'book', is clearly something different to 'black','hard', 'soft 'etc. Whatissightedinthis seeingis the i8ea,the eiSoc;.'Idea'is thereforethe l o o k [Anblick] of something a ssomething. It is throughthese looks that individual things p r e s e n t themselvesasthisand that, asb e i ng - p r e s e n t . Presence [Anwesenhe i t ] for the Greeks is rcapoixria,short-enedasouoia,andmeansb e i n g .That somethingismeans thatit ispresent[ e s ista n w e s e n d ] , orbetter: that it presences [wes t a n ] in the present [Geg en-wa rt ] .Thelook,i8ea,thus giveswhatsomething presencesas,i.e. whatathing is,its b e i n g .

AccordingtoAristotle thisis the Seuiepaouaia,but the sparer)iswhatism o r e present, the KaO5;e'Kaaiov.8

Wesaid: accordingtoPlatothereis,overandabovetheparticular things( t h e shadows),s o m e t h in g else,namely th e ideas. I f we have carefullyfol-lowed the above considerations, something must have dawned on us. Atleast until a few moments ago, we ourselves belonged to those whothought they sawonly the various particular things:book, door, house.Wedid not suspect that in order to see this book, door, and so forth, wemust already understand what 'book' and 'door'mean. Understandingwhat such things meanisnothing elsebut theseeingof thelook,thei8ea.In the ideawe seewhatevery beingis and howit is, inshortthe beingofbeings [ d a s Sein d e s S e i e n d e n ] .

Thisseeingof the I8eaPlato also callsvoetv,perceiving,or vou


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Within the realmof the visible, brightnessand darkness are not at thesame levelascolour and brilliancebut possess a priority: they are thecondi t ions o f th epo ssibility ofexperiencingth e visiblein thenarrower sense.But do we thereby know what brightness, light, and darkness a re ?Brightnessand darkness are first and originary; they cannot be explainedintermsofanything else.But we do notthereby cometo aconceptionofthe essent ialnatureofbrightness anddarkness. Brightnessand darknessare visible, are seen 'in the firstplace'.But how is what is visible to bedefined?Forcolourisalso something visible.Sowhenwe refertovisibil-ity,the visibleassuchis not yetcharacterized.Wemustaskwhat bright-ness and darkness are in themselves. Wh

heidegger, martin - essence of truth, the (continuum, 2002)

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