Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing: New Names for an Old Debate

James D. Perry

Overview

• What Is Hegemony?

• Grand Strategies: Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing

• National Goals: Security, Economics, Democracy

• National Willpower: How Badly Do We Want Hegemony?

• Economics: Can We Afford Hegemony?

• Military Power: Are We Strong Enough for Hegemony?

• Strategic Choices: Force Structure Implications

What Is Hegemony?

• History abounds with states whose resources or willpower were inadequate to achieve hegemony or keep it.

• Good reason to question current US resources and willpower – but are we willing to recast our goals and retreat from hegemony?

• Hegemons rarely abandon their goals without a fight.

Elements of Hegemony

Asymmetry of Power You usually get what you want

Goals: security, economics, ideology What you want

National Willpower How badly you want it

Resources: Preponderant Military Power Preponderant Economic Power

Are you strong enough to get it and keep it?

Structure: Organizations, treaties, alliances, etc. that exercise military and economic preponderance to assure the fulfillment of national goals

How you sustain it over the long term

Basic Grand Strategies

Strategy Military Posture Advantages Disadvantages

Hegemony (Containment)

Strong forward presence Full spectrum of capabilities

Greatest US influence Regional rivalries dampened Eurasian hegemons checked Nuclear proliferation reduced Freedom & prosperity flourish?

Most expensive Provokes counterbalancing Must keep challengers down Provokes terrorism

Offshore Balancing (Détente)

Limited forward presence Emphasis on air and sea power

Freedom of action Shifts burden to others Cheaper than hegemony Reduced tension w/ PRC, Russia Avoids “wars of credibility” Less terrorism?

Encourages aggressors “Finlandization” Nuclear proliferation Regional instability Hard for US to return Less influence Less freedom & prosperity?

Isolationism Hemispheric defense plus nuclear deterrent

Cheapest Everyone else may fight and weaken each other

Least US influence We may get drawn in if everyone else fights

Mostly acquired 1947-53 until

NATO expansion 1999-2003

De facto protectorates

We don’t want hostile powers to dominate Europe or Japan – but how much help should these wealthy countries get from us now?

Security Goals

DoD obligated to defend 25% of world population and 65% of world GDP (not including Middle East oil)

Overstretch?

Ideological Goals: Necessary and Affordable?

• American strategy since 1943 has always been about much more than just “security”

• Idealism: We must propagate our values because we are only safe and prosperous in a world in which our values prevail (i.e. democracy and open markets)

• Realism: We do not need to propagate our values, because this leads to overexpansion, unnecessary war, and avoidable hostility. Focus strictly on security, do business with bad guys.

• Difficult to argue that promotion of democracy has succeeded and improved American security since 2001

• If it is necessary to propagate democracy and open markets, are these goals actually achievable, and at what price?

“Promoting Democracy” Lacks Popular Support

POLITICO Poll July 2014 U.S. military actions should be limited to direct threats to our national security

67% As the world’s moral leader, the U.S. has a responsibility to use its military to protect democracy around the globe

22%

Rebuild public support or change strategy

Public and elite at odds:

Decreasing Popular Support for Intervention Abroad

Pew, May 2016 Product of: War fatigue High cost Unattainable goals Bad execution

Rebuild public support or change strategy

Popular Skepticism About Free Trade

Negative views of free trade significantly higher than these totals for people who make under $75,000 / year

General public does not regard Free Trade as a particularly compelling benefit

High Trade Deficits = Jobs Exported

Stagnant Real Wages Since 1973

Significant Unemployment

The average citizen could reasonably conclude that

American foreign policy does not benefit him personally

Realist Foreign Policy: Thwarted Inside the Beltway?

• Free Trade, human rights, promotion of democracy, etc. enjoy very strong support from many in government, academia, think tanks, etc.

• American public is less convinced we should actively promote these ideals and is unwilling to pay much for them

• “Realist” candidate could certainly get elected – but would face tremendous resistance from entire establishment

• Foreign policy elite has a long history of ignoring and mocking what the public wants…

National Morale and Willpower

• National character: energy, ambition, discipline, initiative • National beliefs, myths, ideology, religion • Culture of honor, valor, hardship, self-sacrifice • Internal unity, cohesion • Tradition of victory • Patriotic education • Defeat can motivate (Germany 1918) or demotivate (1945) • Long, costly wars demotivate – especially COIN campaigns • Inspirational leadership • Self-preservation versus existential threat • Sense of “national momentum” • Weary hegemon versus hungry challenger

Vietnam GWOT

Current average trust level is 19% but level is lower among certain groups: Gen X, Boomers (15%) Whites (15%) Republicans (11%) Higher but still not impressive trust levels among Democrats, minorities, youth (26%)

Is an activist foreign policy of any kind – let alone “hegemony” – sustainable with such a low level

of public trust in government?

Economic Factors

U.S. Economy Strong but No Longer Preponderant

Soviet GDP was perhaps 1/3 that of US during Cold War. Not an equal competition. But US versus China…

Completely inexcusable for EU (with 5x population and 12x the GDP) to permit Russia to intimidate it. Inconceivable that Russia will give up nuclear weapons given her economic and geographic situation.

Source: Eurostat, Bloomberg

Share of World GDP

Major Power Demographics, 2010 – 2050

2010 Pop (m)

2050 Pop (m)

TFR 2015 Median Age 2010

Median Age 2050

Age 65+ 2010 (%)

Age 65+ 2050 (%)

USA 312 401 1.87 37 41 13.1 21.4

China 1,360 1,385 1.60 35 46 8.3 23.9

Japan 127 108 1.40 45 53 23.0 36.5

Russia 144 121 1.61 38 42 13.1 20.5

Germany 83 73 1.44 44 51 20.8 32.7

France 63 73 2.08 40 43 16.8 25.5

UK 62 73 1.89 40 43 16.6 24.7

Source: Aging in the U.S. and Other Countries, 2010 to 2050, Pew Research Center, 1/30/14

USA 1950: TFR 3.75, Median Age 30, Age 65+ 8% (only LDCs have these numbers today)

Today’s Major Powers Have Sub-Replacement Fertility and Increasingly Old Populations

• More spending on pensions/health, less on defense • Fewer kids = unwilling to risk them in war = more robots? • Money, technical expertise more important than raw

manpower for air, sea, nuclear force generation • Less capability to do occupation/pacification/COIN:

– Forget occupying any large, poor country 2020 – 2050

• Europe, Japan, Korea weaker and less useful as allies • Russia increasingly weak • Major Powers more threatened by LDCs than each other?

Today’s Major Powers Have Sub-Replacement Fertility and Increasingly Old Populations

Major Power Demographics: Implications

Economic Burden of Defense

Defense as Percentage of GDP

Defense Share of Federal Spending

CBO: Unsustainable Federal spending and debt

Gross Government Debt as % of GDP

USA 106

China 66

Japan 238

Russia 11

Germany 82

France 90

UK 85

Hegemony is Very Affordable!

Unless You Are a Welfare State! (Entitlements Overstretch)

Military Factors

Military Downsizing 1991 – 2016

• US military was deployed forward during the Cold War and backstopped with powerful strategic deterrent

• Military buildup during the 1980s revitalized the strategic deterrent, the Navy, and forward deployed forces

• After 1991, some US forces remained forward but military began transitioning to a CONUS-based force

• Services have been on a “procurement holiday” since 1992

Nuclear Deterrent Forces Smaller, Older than in 1990

Number Entered Service

Minuteman III 450 1970

Ohio SSBN 14 1981

B-52H Bomber 78 1962

B-2 Bomber 20 1993

• Last US nuclear weapon tested in 1992 – no engineers today have tested or designed one

• US nuclear weapons experts aging (40% over 50 in 2009)

• Delivery systems and weapons aging, need replacement

• Weapons rely on tritium, which US has not produced since 1988, and stockpile is decaying

Recapitalization IOC

New ICBM 2027

Ohio Replacement 2030

B-21 Bomber 2030

80%

US Troop Deployments, 1950-2015

Source: Tim Kane, “The Decline of American Engagement,” Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.

Long-Term Trend: Strategic Withdrawal of US Forces from Eurasia

1980-1990: >2m troops

431,000 overseas (21%)

2015: 1.3m troops

201,000 overseas (15%)

1965-1975: >3m troops

782,000 overseas (27%)

Overseas US Troop Deployments, 1950-2015

Source: Tim Kane, “The Decline of American Engagement,” Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.

93% of US troops overseas were in Europe, Japan, and Korea in 2015

Korea

Vietnam

War on Terror

Trend in US Troop Deployments

Source: Tim Kane, “The Decline of American Engagement,” Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.

Zero US troops overseas by 2045 if current trend continues unchanged

US Army in Europe: Currently 13% of 1989 Level

1989: 6 Divisions 1,500 tanks 213,000 troops 41 garrisons (850 sites)

2016: 2 Brigade CTs 0 tanks (250 in POL) 28,000 troops 7 garrisons (90 sites)

Army still operating equipment acquired in the 1980s: Abrams, Bradley, Apache - and plans to keep this equipment until 2050 (!)

60% Reduction in USAF Since 1990 Type 1990 Inventory 2015 Inventory Entered Service

A-10 572 283 1979

F-15C/D 765 245 1979

F-15E 125 218 1987

F-16 1,613 958 1984

F-22 - 187 2001

F-35 - 72 2011

B-52 230 77 1960

B-1 96 62 1986

B-2 1 20 1989

KC-10 59 59 1981

KC-135 559 398 1958

C-5 127 50 1970

C-17 - 222 1992

Other 5,760 1,178

Total 9,907 4,029 (41%)

52% of the current inventory is a legacy of the Reagan-era buildup. Only 21% of current inventory was built after 2000.

Very few current aircraft have the stealth and range needed to fight large enemies

who have advanced air

defenses

USAF Reduction in Europe

Relative to 1986: 56% Decline in Personnel

75% Decline in Aircraft

74,715 personnel 784 aircraft 8 Fighter Wings 14 “other” Wings 32 Main Bases

33,000 personnel 200 aircraft 3 Fighter Wings 7 “other” Wings 7 Main Bases

1986 2016

1980s Navy – Nearly 600 Ships 2016 Navy – Under 300 Ships

1987 2016 2030 2040

Aircraft Carrier 14 11 11 10

Large Surface Combatant 108 87 95 85

Small Surface Combatant 115 22 52 56

SSN 102 53 42 47

SSGN 0 4 0 0

SSBN 37 14 11 10

Amphibious 59 31 36 33

Combat Logistics Force 159

29 29 29

Support Vessels 31 36 32

Total 594 282 312 302

Current Reagan-era Ships: 4 CVN, 18 CG/DD, 15 SSN, 14 SSBN, 10 Amphibs

Attack sub shortfall starting in 2025 and lack of numbers, range and stealth in naval aviation have negative implications for control of the Western Pacific

Declining Overseas Base Structure

DoD Overseas Bases 1990 2015 Reduction

Number Bases 1,669 587 65%

Million Acres 1.7 0.6

Most US Bases are still in Britain, Germany, Japan,

and Korea

Retreating to CONUS

• 55% reduction in forward-deployed force levels since 1990

• 75-90% reduction in troops and airpower in Europe

– We are already in an Offshore Balancing posture there

– Make this “official” and pull the plug in Europe to enable forward defense in Asia?

• US forces are still, to a great extent, living on the legacy of the Reagan-era buildup

• Any strategy selected will require significant military modernization, but with different numbers and with emphasis on different types of forces

• Hegemony clearly requires far larger and more expensive forces than Offshore Balancing

Force Structure Implications

Isolationism Offshore Balancing Hegemony

Army “Small” Support to Civil

Authorities

“Less” 6 Divisions?

“More” 12-18 Divisions?

Defend Allies Fight two MRCs

Air Force Continental Air Defense

Command Sea/Air Emphasis on

airpower, stealth, long-range strike

Deter by Punishment

Sea/Air Control plus punishment plus

support for forward ground forces

Deter by Denial

Navy Coastal Defense Not Power Projection

Strategic Forces Minimum Deterrent Coercive Force Coercive Force plus Extended Deterrence

Offshore Balancing may not save money relative to today, but forces needed to support hegemony would cost a great deal more than that

Strategic forces, stealthy long-range strike especially important to deter Russia, China

Conclusions

• Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing is an extension of the Cold War “containment versus détente” debate

• US has been retreating to CONUS since 1991 – question is whether or not this can and should be reversed

• Offshore balancing with an emphasis on long-range, stealthy land- and sea-based airpower is cheaper than hegemony but still requires military modernization

– Will this inevitably collapse into isolationism?

• Hegemony (engagement in Eurasia) requires:

– Leadership with the will to win

– Economic expansion

– Expanding and modernizing the military