heather thesis final
TRANSCRIPT
Border Security: An Examination of Visa
Overstays Through the Lens of Complex Systems
By: Heather MacDonald (37833)
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Public Policy
2016
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy
University of Erfurt
First Reader: Prof. Dr. Heike Grimm
Second Reader:
Erfurt, July 8, 2016
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Abstract
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government implemented a series of
policy reforms to address areas of vulnerability in the U.S. border security system. Among these
reforms was a move to implement a biometric entry-exit system to help monitor individuals who
entered the country on both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas. As of 2016, this system does not
exist. In fiscal year 2015, the United States reported over 500,000 nonimmigrant visa overstays,
sending a wave of concern through Congress over the inability of law enforcement agencies to
properly track and detain individuals who overstay their admission. The aim of the following thesis
is to analyze the current visa security system from a complex systems perspective. This paper
examines the elements, interconnections, and functions of the current visa security system in order
to determine the variables contributing to the current visa overstay rate. More specifically, the
research examines both inter- and intra-agency communication to see if interactions between
agencies are influencing the visa overstay rate. By identifying the nature of the relationship
between agents within the visa security system, this thesis proposes a series of policy
recommendations for the United States to mitigate the rate of visa overstays and in turn improve
security for U.S. citizens. These recommendations are made within the confines of the current
system and take into consideration possible barriers to implementation. Ultimately, the research
aims to put forth a more effective visa security system that would simultaneously improve security
while also maintain the United States’ image as an open, immigrant-friendly nation.
Word Count: 22,387
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Kurzfassung
Infolge der Terroranschläge vom 11. September 2011, hat die US-Regierung eine Reihe von
politischen Reformen durchgeführt, welche sich auf anfällige Bereiche des US-
Grenzsicherungssystems beziehen. Zu diesen Reformen gehörte ein Vorstoß zur Einführung eines
biometrischen „entry-exit“ Systems, welches helfen soll, Individuen zu beobachten, die das Land
mit Visa für Immigranten und solcher für Nichtimmigranten betreten haben. Stand 2016 existierte
dieses System aber noch nicht. Im Fiskaljahr 2015 haben die Vereinigten Staaten über 500 000
Fälle von überzogenen Visa für Nichtimmigranten gemeldet. Dies hat im Kongress zu einer Welle
der Besorgnis über die Unfähigkeit der Vollzugsbehörden, Individuen, die ihr Visa überziehen,
ordentlich zu verfolgen und zu inhaftieren, geführt. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, das aktuelle
Visa-Sicherheitssystem von einer komplexen Systemperspektive aus zu analysieren. Es sollen
hierbei die Elemente, Querverbindungen und Funktionen des momentanen Visa-
Sicherheitssystems untersucht werden, um die Variablen zu bestimmen, welche zur momentanen
Quote der überzogenen Visa beitragen. Genauer gesagt betrachtet die Untersuchung sowohl die
inter- als auch die intrabehördliche Kommunikation, um zu erschließen, ob die Interaktionen
zwischen den einzelnen Behörden die Quote der überzogenen Visa beeinflussen. Durch die
Feststellung der Art und Weise der Beziehung zwischen den Akteuren innerhalb des Visa-
Sicherheitssystems gibt die vorliegende Arbeit eine Reihe von Politikempfehlungen für die
Vereinigten Staaten, welche der Verringerung der Quote der überzogenen Visa dienen und somit
die Sicherheit von US-Bürgern verbessern soll. Diese Empfehlungen werden im Rahmen der
bestehenden Grenzen des momentanen Systems getroffen und berücksichtigen mögliche Hürden
für deren Implementierung. Letztlich zielt die Arbeit darauf ab, zu einem effektiveren Visa-
Sicherheitssystem beizutragen, welches gleichzeitig die Sicherheit verbessert und das Bild der
Vereinigten Staaten als offene, einwanderungsfreundliche Nation aufrecht erhält.
Gesamtzahl der Wörter: 22.387
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADIS Arrival and Departure Information System
CA Bureau of Consular Affairs
CAS Complex Adaptive Systems
CCD Consular Consolidated Database
CBP Customs and Border Patrol
CIS Center for Immigration Studies
CTCEU Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DS Diplomatic Security
EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review
ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations
EBSVERA Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FY Fiscal Year
GAO Government Accountability Office
HSI Homeland Security Investigations
HSIP Homeland Security Innovation Programs
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICA Immigration and Checkpoints Authority
INA Immigration and Nationality Act
INS Immigration and Naturalization Services
ITI International to International
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NGI Next Generation Identification
NSS National Security Strategy
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NSC National Security Council
NTC National Targeting Center
OBIM Office of Biometric Identification Management
ODT Organizational Design Theory
OIF Operation Iraq Freedom
PATRIOT Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations
Team Initiative
POE Port of Entry
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System
TSC Terrorist Screening Center
TWOV Transit Without Visa
USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
US-VISIT The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology
VSP Visa Security Program
VSU Visa Security Unit
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Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 1
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS ......................................................................................................................... 2 B. THESIS OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................................ 2 C. IMPORTANCE ..................................................................................................................................................... 3 D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS ............................................................................................................................ 3 E. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................ 4 F. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1. What is a Visa Overstay? .................................................................................................................................. 5 2. Visa Security Issues........................................................................................................................................... 7 3. Organizational Design Theory ........................................................................................................................ 11 4. Systems Thinking, Complexity Theory, and Complex Adaptive Systems ........................................................ 12 5. Strategy Development Using CAS ................................................................................................................... 16 6. Whole of Government Planning ...................................................................................................................... 17 7. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 18
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE VISA SECURITY SYSTEM ................................................................................... 20
A. ELEMENTS ....................................................................................................................................................... 20 1. Federal Agencies ........................................................................................................................................ 20
A. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) .............................................................................................................. 20 B. Department of State (DOS)..................................................................................................................................... 22 C. Department of Justice (DOJ) .................................................................................................................................. 22
2. Political Elements ...................................................................................................................................... 23 A. Legislative .............................................................................................................................................................. 23 B. Executive ................................................................................................................................................................ 23
3. Private Elements ........................................................................................................................................ 23 A. Airlines ................................................................................................................................................................... 24
B. DYNAMISM/INTERCONNECTIONS..................................................................................................................... 24 1. The Visa Security Program (VSP) .............................................................................................................. 25 2. The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) .............................................................................................................. 25 3. Biometric Collection .................................................................................................................................. 26 4. Training ...................................................................................................................................................... 26 5. Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team Initiative (PATRIOT) ............... 27 6. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) .................................................................................................... 27 7. Overstay Enforcement ................................................................................................................................ 27
C. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................... 28
III. VISA SECURITY – A LOOK AT THE HISTORY ........................................................................................ 29
A. VISA SECURITY POLICIES BEFORE 9/11 ........................................................................................................... 29 B. VISA SECURITY POLICIES AFTER 9/11 ............................................................................................................. 30
IV – ANALYSIS – EXAMINING THE SYSTEM .................................................................................................. 34
A. PREVENTING VISA OVERSTAYS ....................................................................................................................... 34 1. Strategy Formulation ................................................................................................................................. 34
A. DHS Strategy .......................................................................................................................................................... 36 B. DOS Strategy .......................................................................................................................................................... 37 C. Convergence of Strategy ......................................................................................................................................... 38
2. Inter-Agency Programs .............................................................................................................................. 39 A. Visa Security Program (VSP) ................................................................................................................................. 39 B. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) ................................................................................................................................. 41 C. System Limitations ................................................................................................................................................. 42
B. TRACKING VISA OVERSTAYS .......................................................................................................................... 44
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1. Biometric Exit System ................................................................................................................................ 44 2. Overstay Enforcement and Prioritization .................................................................................................. 46 3. System Limitations ..................................................................................................................................... 48
A. Intra-Agency Fragmentation ................................................................................................................................... 48 B. Political Limitations ............................................................................................................................................... 50 C. Lack of Consensus .................................................................................................................................................. 50
D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................... 51
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANTICIPATED BARRIERS ..................................................... 53
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 53 1. Whole of Government Strategy .................................................................................................................. 53 2. Merge CBP and ICE .................................................................................................................................. 54 3. Continue to Develop DHS-DOS Relationship ............................................................................................ 55 4. Joint DHS-DOS Strategic Plan .................................................................................................................. 56 5. Support from the Administration ................................................................................................................ 56 6. Commitment to Enforcement ...................................................................................................................... 57 7. Continue Development of a Biometric Exit System .................................................................................... 58 8. Implement more Automated Lanes of Communication .............................................................................. 59 9. Fines for Visa Overstays ............................................................................................................................ 60 10. Continue to Improve VWP Information-sharing and Compliance ......................................................... 60
B. ANTICIPATED BARRIERS ................................................................................................................................. 61 1. Bureaucratic............................................................................................................................................... 61
A. Barriers ................................................................................................................................................................... 61 B. Solutions ................................................................................................................................................................. 61
2. Political ...................................................................................................................................................... 62 A. Barriers ................................................................................................................................................................... 62 B. Solutions ................................................................................................................................................................. 62
3. Funding ...................................................................................................................................................... 63 A. Barriers ................................................................................................................................................................... 63 B. Solutions ................................................................................................................................................................. 63
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................... 64
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................................................................................................... 64 B. FUTURE RESEARCH AND A WAY FORWARD .................................................................................................... 66
APPENDIX 1: FY 2014 NON-VWP OVERSTAY TABLES ................................................................................. 68
APPENDIX 2: DHS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART ............................................................................................. 73
APPENDIX 3: CURRENT VSP HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE ................................................................... 74
APPENDIX 4: TIMELINE OF EVENTS RELATED TO BIOMETRIC ENTRY AND EXIT SYSTEM ....... 75
APPENDIX 5: EXPERT INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................ 76
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................... 77
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Table of Figures
Figure 1: B1/B2 Visitors Visa Issuance Rate ............................................................................................ 9
Figure 2: Operating Environments, Decision Requirements and Design Considerations ................. 12
Figure 3: System Structure ...................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 4: Departmental Interconnections in Visa Security System ..................................................... 28
Figure 5: Visa Application Process .......................................................................................................... 33
Figure 6: Sample of U.S. Government Strategies................................................................................... 35
Figure 7: VSP Performance Measures, Reporting Mechanisms, and Data Limitations ................... 40
Figure 8: DHS Programs and Responsibilities ....................................................................................... 49
Figure 9: Visa Overstay Causal Loop ..................................................................................................... 52
Figure 10: U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) Reported Percentage of Homeland
Security Investigations Field Office Investigative Hours Dedicated to Overstay Investigations,
Fiscal Years 2005-2012 ............................................................................................................................. 57
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I. Introduction
In fiscal year (FY) 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that 527,127
individuals who had entered the United States on a nonimmigrant visa, or approximately 1.16
percent, had overstayed their admission. DHS released this information as a result of increasing
pressure from Congress to improve tracking of foreign visitors who overstayed their deadline to
leave. The November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, coupled with the December 2015 shootings
in San Bernardino, further swayed policymakers to demand stronger efforts by law enforcement
agencies to improve visa issuance security, national screening procedures, and tracking of visa
overstays.
The discussion of visa security is not new among policymakers in the United States. Today’s
visa policies date back to 1924, when the U.S. Congress passed legislation delegating the consular
officers of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in embassies as the responsible parties to approve
or deny visas. In addition, immigration officers were required to check the papers of aliens upon
entrance into the country. From the very beginning of visa issuance policies, multiple government
agencies have been involved in the process.
Since September 11, 2001, border areas and ports of entry (POE) have been marked as potential
sources of vulnerability. In order to counter this vulnerability, there has been a remarkable
transformation in visa issuance security. The most notable change accompanied the Homeland
Security Act of November 2002, which brought together more than twenty federal agencies under
the umbrella of DHS. (Iyer, 2011) At this point, both DHS and DOS became jointly responsible
for visa issuance and enforcement policy. With the creation of DHS, the Bush administration
endeavored to create a “smart border”, with a goal to “integrate actions abroad to screen goods and
people prior to their arrival in sovereign US territory,…allow extensive prescreening of low-risk
traffic, thereby allowing limited assets to focus attention on high-risk, [and] use…advanced
technology to track the movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals.” (Koslowski,
2005, p. 1) The creation of DHS also ushered in multiple new levels of complexity within the visa
security paradigm.
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The U.S. government relies on its ability to communicate at both the inter- and intra-agency
level to implement effective policies at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels. This requires
cooperative and effective communication between government agencies, including members of
the diplomatic, intelligence, security, and defense communities. However, these lanes of
communication do not exist in a linear realm; complex systems create multiple interrelations in
which different agents often compete to pursue conflicting goals. It is the government’s
responsibility to design a framework that enhances cooperation, communication, and information-
sharing between all levels.
This thesis evaluates complex systems and interagency cooperation. More specifically, it will
seek to find out if inter- and intra-agency communication has had an influence on the number of
individuals who have overstayed their temporary nonimmigrant visas in the post-9/11 era. By
exploring how inter- and intra-agency lanes of communication are executed, the research seeks to
offer comprehensive policy recommendations to address the problems of visa overstays in the
United States.
A. Major Research Questions
This analysis focuses on answering the following research questions:
To what extent has inter and intra-agency communication between U.S. government
agencies and organizational complexities affected the visa overstay rate in the United
States?
Is it possible to create a more effective visa security system that would reduce the visa
overstay rate in the United States, and what are the roadblocks for the establishment
of such a system?
B. Thesis Overview
Five main chapters follow a logical sequence in order to answer the research questions listed
previously. Chapter II lays out the framework of the current visa security system. This chapter
takes a comprehensive look at the elements and interconnections within the system. This chapter
also gives a brief overview of the organizational structure of DHS and DOS – the departments
most involved in visa security processes. Chapter III provides an overview of the history of the
visa security process. The chapter primarily focuses on the post- September 11 policies, as these
are most relevant to this paper. Chapter IV offers a comprehensive analysis of the cause of visa
overstays using the theoretical framework provided in the Literature Review section. Finally,
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chapter V introduces proposed policy solutions to address the problem of visa overstays in the
United States and the anticipated barriers to implementation. The thesis concludes with chapter
VI, where future areas of research are suggested.
C. Importance
This research is particularly relevant in light of recent terrorist attacks and the specific attention
policymakers are now placing on visa security policies. Since 1996, there has been a congressional
mandate to create a system for tracking individuals who enter and exit the country. (Committee on
the Judiciary, 2007, p. 1) Nearly 20 years later, a reliable and comprehensive way to measure who
leaves the country still does not exist. Contributing to this policy problem are a myriad of variables:
budgeting, political will, organizational complexities, culture, strategy development, and
administration changes, to name a few.
The research attempts to see if there is a correlation between certain variables and the
dependent variable - the rate of visa overstays in the United States. Both the U.S. government and
the citizens of the United States have a stake in this issue, as it falls under the category of improving
national security. What this thesis hopes to accomplish, if successful, is to offer a way forward to
increase the effectiveness of the departments and agencies responsible for visa security in the
United States.
D. Problems and Hypothesis
The research conducted raises some important issues that might be inhibiting the current visa
security system. The most anticipated issues are bureaucratic resistance to change, cultural gaps
between agencies responsible for the oversight of visa security policy and implementation, and
politicking. The more explicit challenge is to come up with a feasible way to improve visa security
policies in the United States.
Two hypotheses were developed to address the two research questions of the thesis. The first
hypothesis is that organizational complexity and communication methods are impeding the ability
of the agencies responsible for visa security policy in the United States to implement a system that
most effectively addresses the problem of visa overstays. The alternative hypothesis to this is that
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by having multiple agencies involved in visa security policy, effectiveness is enhanced through
increased oversight. The hypothesis to the second research question is that a more effective visa
security system is possible, but highly partisan cultural environments within government agencies
will make it difficult to implement these more effective visa security policies.
Regardless of whether or not a more effective visa security system is implemented, the
research conducted in this paper raises a few important questions. What is the goal of U.S. visa
security policies? Against the backdrop of a complex system, how can the government conflate
the goals of different agencies within the security network of the United States? More specifically,
how can the United States promote tourism and other important economic transactions while
simultaneously ensuring the safety of its citizens by providing a safe and secure border? In order
to do so, the current framework of visa security policies must be assessed. The research will
analyze which agencies play a role in visa security and how these agencies interact with one
another. This assessment will bring to light the organizational complexity and
compartmentalization that exists in the current system. It will highlight the problems that arise by
having multiple agencies involved in different parts of the visa security process in the absence of
a coherent national security strategy that addresses the issue of visa overstays. While the United
States does in fact have a written National Security Strategy (NSS), the published strategy does
not touch on visa security policy. Furthermore, the research will touch on how different
stakeholders and actors involved in visa security want the system to evolve; highlighting how
divergent and conflicting goals can have an influence on the effectiveness of a system.
E. Methodology
This thesis is a policy analysis that looks at policy processes and formulations in order to
examine the current visa security apparatus. This policy analysis uses a systems approach, and
focuses on the elements, interconnections, and functions within the visa security system.
Furthermore, the analysis examines the bureaucratic, political, and financial factors that are
currently influencing the visa security paradigm.
There is a lack of consensus in regard to the success of border security strategies, and in turn
visa security strategies. Policymakers and scholars have a large range of views on how to evaluate
the success of current policies affecting visa security. For this reason, the thesis combines a
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collection of legislative reports, oversight reports, literature, interviews, and Congressional
statements in order to evaluate the effectiveness of current policies. The research employs a
qualitative approach to analysis instead of a quantitative approach. A qualitative approach is
important, as the purpose of the paper is to examine the motivation behind current visa security
policies. This research lies heavily in understanding the feelings, values, and perceptions that
influence the behavior of visa security systems, which is appropriately addressed using qualitative
research methods.
F. Literature Review
The intent of this literature review is to establish an understanding of the concepts that will
be applied throughout the research, beginning with a look at visa overstays in the United States as
of 2016. The chapter then examines a common assessment as to why visa security policies are not
working as effectively as they could. It then takes a more holistic look at Organizational Design
Theory (ODT), systems thinking, complexity theory, and complex adaptive systems (CAS).
Following this, there will be an in-depth look at strategy development, as this also plays a role in
organizational design and complex systems.
1. What is a Visa Overstay?
Written protocol for visa issuance is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Visas are classified into two categories: immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visas.
Immigrant visas are issued to aliens who to come to live permanently in the United States.
Some of the qualifiers for immigrant visas are:
a spouse or minor child of a U.S. citizen
a spouse or minor child of a legal permanent resident
a winner of a visa in the diversity lottery
a refugee or asylee determined to be fleeing persecution
a parent, adult child, or sibling of an adult U.S. citizen (Wasem, 2011, p. 2)
Nonimmigrant visas are given to aliens seeking to come to the United States for a
temporary visit. As of 2016, there are 24 major nonimmigrant visa categories, and over 70 specific
types of nonimmigrant visas. (Wasem, 2011, p. 2) Visas are commonly referred to by the letter
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and number that indicate the subparagraph of the INA. The most common nonimmigrant visas fall
into the following categories:
B-2: tourist visas
F-1: foreign students
H-1B: temporary professional workers
J-1: cultural exchange participants
M-1: student visa for vocational and technical schools
A visa overstay occurs when a foreign national who is legally admitted to the United States
for a specific authorized period remains in the United States after that period expires, unless an
extension or a change of status has been approved. (Wasem, 2014, p. 1) DHS identifies two types
of overstays: individuals whose departure from the United States has not been recorded (Suspected
In-Country Overstays) and those immigrants whose overstays have been recorded, but who
departed the country after the legal admissions period had expired. (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2016, p. iii)
By 1996, the estimated number of illegal immigrants in the United States was
approximately 5.8 million. Of these 5.8 million, about 2.1 million (41%) were estimated to be
immigrants who had overstayed their visas. The remaining 3.7 million were believed to have
entered the country through illegal means. (Wasem, 2014, p. 1)
In January 2016, for the first time since the creation of the department, DHS released an
official report analyzing the rate of visa overstays in the United States. While Congress has been
demanding such a report since 1996, DHS repeatedly contended that such a report could not be
compiled. This report studied nearly 45 million travelers who entered the United States through
both air and seaports using business and pleasure visas in FY 2015. The findings of the report are
highlighted below. (Gomez, 2016)
The report determined that there were a total of 44,928,381 nonimmigrant admissions
through air or sea ports to the United States for either pleasure or business purposes that were
expected to depart in FY 2015. The report admits that challenges remain with integration of
systems used for reporting on visa categories beyond business or pleasure. Of this number, DHS
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calculated that 1.17 percent, or 527,127 individuals overstayed their visas. (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2016, p. iv) The report further breaks this number down to determine that by
January 4, 2016, the number of suspected overstays had dropped to 416,000, or 0.9 percent. For
details on the rate of overstays by country, see Appendix 1.
The report emphasizes the importance of identifying overstays for national security, public
safety, immigration enforcement, and immigration benefit application processing. (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2016, p. 15) Furthermore, it stresses the relevance in building
partnerships in both the private and public sector in order to improve data and information-sharing.
The report concludes that DHS has made significant progress in its ability to accurately
communicate the number of visa overstays in the United States.
While DHS followed through on the request by Congress to provide reliable data on visa
overstay statistics, the program still does not suggest solutions for the overt problem in the system;
the lack of a viable exit processing system at air, land, and sea POEs. This will be further discussed
later in this paper.
2. Visa Security Issues
Current literature focuses on a number of factors influencing the visa overstay rates in the
United States. One school of thought looks at the interaction between DOS and DHS. This school
of thought contends that employees working for the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) tend to have
a diplomatic rather than a law enforcement mindset. This leads to the proclivity for officers to
issue visas to foreign nationals who might overstay a visa. DOS is responsible for issuing visas
and DHS plays the role of overseer and inspector. Congress floated an idea for DHS to take control
of all visa issuance functions in the post-9/11 era, but DHS opted out of this. Rather, DHS chose
to assign staff to consular posts abroad to conduct, review, and advise investigations on visa
applicants. (Wasem, 2011, p. 1) Some policymakers, scholars, and other government officials have
expressed the view that DOS has maintained too much control over the issuance of visas, with
emphasis on diplomacy outweighing the necessity for security.
The INA specifically gives consular officers the sole responsibility to adjudicate visas. And
over the years, courts have maintained that consular decisions are not appealable. (Wasem, 2011,
p. 4) Under current legislation, all foreign nationals applying for a visa must undergo admissibility
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reviews (interviews) by DOS consular officers abroad. This process includes a face-to-face
interview, submission of photographs and fingerprints, as well as proof that the individual does
not have any of the following criteria:
Criminal history
Security and terrorist concerns
Public charge (e.g., indigence)
Seeking to work without proper labor certification
Immigration law violations
Ineligible for citizenship
Aliens previously removed (Wathem, 2010, p. 1)
Consular officers also use the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), which stores records
of all visa applicants dating back to the mid-1990s. This database allows consular officers to input
special notes pertaining to specific applicants and also links with other federal databases to flag
problems that may influence the issuance of a visa. (Wasem, 2011, p. 7) Despite seemingly
stringent protocol for the issuance of a visa, many believe inherent problems within the system
still exist.
Seminara (2008) argues that the percentage of nonimmigrant visa requests that are accepted is
shockingly high. (p. 1) Despite public perception that visa regulations have tightened since 9/11,
obtaining a nonimmigrant visa still remains relatively easy. He looks at the living standards in the
home countries of many visa applicants, and notes that the relatively high performance of the
United States economy serves as a pull-factor for nonimmigrants to overstay their visas. A table
supporting this data can be seen on the next page.
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Figure 1: B1/B2 Visitors Visa Issuance Rate
Source: (Seminara, 2008, p. 4)
Seminara argues that the cause of the high issuance rate of visas and in turn, visa overstays, is
largely the fault of consular officers, who tend to have a more diplomatic rather than a law
enforcement mindset. Seminara contends that the nature of visa adjudication is highly subjective.
Therefore, one consular officer could have an issuance rate of 40 percent for a set of applicants,
whereas another officer might have an issuance rate of 60 percent. (Seminara, 2008, p. 5) Thus,
the politics, experiences, and history of each visa officer has an unduly large effect on visa issuance
rates. Furthermore, with the limited resources of DOS, it is almost impossible to oversee each
officer to ensure objectivity and close adherence to protocol. Seminara builds upon this argument
by emphasizing the difficulty visa adjudicators have when saying no to applicants. (Seminara,
2008, p. 6) Consular officers interview dozens, if not hundreds of applicants every day, and saying
no to an applicant requires a lot more paperwork, confrontation, and emotional investment than
saying yes. (Seminara, 2008, p. 6)
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Seminara further contends that management in consulates across the globe does not place an
emphasis on security measures. Instead, visa adjudicators are assessed on how many applicants
they can interview in one day and how courteous they are to their customers. (Seminara, 2008, p.
8) He then notes that very limited validation studies are run at consulates to determine overstay
rates, as these studies are time-consuming and managers do not want results to reflect poorly on
them. In addition, visas are sometimes used to improve bilateral relations with another country,
once again reflecting the tendency of DOS to place diplomatic priorities over security measures.
(Seminara, 2008, p. 10)
Seminara concludes his argument by looking at policies in the United States that are preventing
consular officers from accurately performing their duties. Most notably, the lack of a reliable entry-
exit system to track visas in the United States limits consular officers from knowing whether a visa
applicant has previously overstayed a visa. Likewise, if a consular officer is suspicious of a given
applicant, it can sometimes take weeks to get a response from DHS on previous entry-exit records
for the applicant, if they even exist at all. (Seminara, 2008, p. 13) The lack of this system will be
touched upon in other sections of this paper. He recommends that visa adjudications be taken away
from DOS and instead placed in the hands of law enforcement. This would allow DOS employees
to focus on their more important mission of building diplomatic relations with partners around the
globe, and would cut needless duplications of work done by both DOS and DHS employees.
Hernandez, in his work Visa Diplomacy vs. Visa Security, offers a similar perspective to
Seminara. He notes that DOS is responsible for ensuring security while simultaneously facilitating
legitimate travel. Like other scholars, he indicates the importance of promoting potential laborers,
students and other citizens who could prove advantageous to the competitiveness of the United
States economy. And while he emphasizes the importance of diplomacy as necessary for strategic-
level security, he argues that security at both the operational and tactical level suffers as a result.
(Hernandez, 2013, p. 10) Hernandez argues that post-9/11 policies ultimately only created one
department that sets policy (DOS) and one department that is responsible for oversight (DHS). As
a result, large gaps have formed between information-sharing and collaboration at the strategic,
tactical, and operational levels. (Hernandez, 2013, p. 8) While a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between DOS and DHS was signed on September 28, 2003, the then-Assistant Secretary
of State for Consular Affairs Mura Harty stated “DHS officers assigned visa duties abroad may
provide input related to the evaluations of consular officers doing visa work, but the evaluations
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themselves will be written by State Department consular supervisors.” (Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, 2003) Hernandez
fervently argues that moving the visa issuing function under the control of DHS would mitigate
gaps in the US immigration process, while simultaneously would ensure the right balance of
security and diplomacy. Making visa issuance security-centric versus diplomacy-centric would
protect the lives of American citizens and prevent further attacks similar to 9/11. (Hernandez,
2013, p. 8).
3. Organizational Design Theory
The above arguments and criticisms highlight one school of thought on visa security
policies and are grounded primarily in the organizational structure of the visa security paradigm.
Therefore, it is important to look at ODT. ODT has been extensively studied in relation to the
structure and decision-making of government departments and agencies. While there are many
schools of thought on ODT, there is a general consensus that much of the design of an organization
depends on the decision-making processes within the structures. In Gregory F. Treverton’s (2010)
work Addressing “Complexities” in Homeland Security, he applies two criteria to decisions: How
fast are they, and how comprehensive are they? (p. 12) Fast decision-making is normally
associated with a decentralized organizational structure and fewer hierarchical levels between
strategic and tactical levels of decision makers. Priority is placed on reducing the hierarchal
structure to promote decision-making at the operational level. Fast decision-making is often suited
for highly dynamic environments. By contrast, if decision-making follows the comprehensive
path, a hierarchical structure should be maintained. By preserving the hierarchy, this organizational
design ensures that information is thoroughly processed and vetted at all levels. However, these
systems should also implement mechanisms that can rapidly process and use new information as
it is acquired. (Treverton G. F., 2010, p. 12) In a complex environment, organizations need to
implement a decision-making process that is both fast and comprehensive. Treverton (2010) uses
the example of the homeland security intelligence enterprise, which requires partners, competitors,
and stakeholders of varying points of view and in different geographical locations to synergize
their perspectives in order to effectively make decisions. (p. 14) To successfully implement this
process, vertical specialization of hierarchy should be maintained, while decision-making should
12
be decentralized in order to keep decision speed high and at the operational level. (Treverton G.
F., 2010, p. 13) A table depicting the different organizational designs can be seen below.
Figure 2: Operating Environments, Decision Requirements and Design Considerations
Source: (Treverton G. F., 2010, p. 14)
The nature of the process for visa security policies and visa overstays fits most soundly in
the high complexity/fast and comprehensive category. However, the challenge the U.S.
government faces in this respect is implementing the correct mechanisms to facilitate effective
visa security policies in a highly complex environment.
4. Systems Thinking, Complexity Theory, and Complex Adaptive Systems
Government bureaucracies and departments function in a non-linear, complex manner.
Essential to the complexity of government bureaucracies is effective communication at both the
intra- and inter-agency level. Literature on systems thinking, complexity theory and complex
adaptive systems (CAS) can be used to explain these functions and can also be applied to the
framework of visa security policy.
The methods of systems thinking help both private and public institutions understand
management, communication, and complexity problems. This approach has been developed for
over thirty years and looks at organizations not as a series of events and their causes, but rather as
a system comprised of interacting parts. (Kirkwood, 1998, p. 1) Kirkwood (1998) describes a
13
system as an interdependent group of items or units that form a cohesive pattern. (p. 1) However,
rather than look at the system as a series of events (i.e. event A leads to event B), one must instead
look at the internal structure of the system. Likewise, with a systems thinking approach, the internal
structure of the organization, rather than external events, is seen as the root cause for the majority
of problems. In short, systems tend to produce their own behavior. Kirkwood argues that by
observing and determining a pattern of behavior within a system, one can look for the system
structure that was the ultimate cause of a given problem. (p. 3) In addition, it is possible to
permanently eliminate a pattern of behavior by modifying the system structure. Donella Meadows
added to the discussion on systems in her work Thinking in Systems. She maintains that all systems
must contain the following three components: elements, interconnections, and a function/purpose.
(Meadows, 2008, p. 11) The elements of the system are the actors and the interconnections are the
relationships that hold the elements together. (Meadows, 2008, p. 13) Functions are not as easily
defined, but this can sometimes be deduced by examining an organization’s strategy or mission
statement. These three components will be examined in depth throughout the research in this paper.
In order to understand the above systems, one must first understand the concept of complexity.
Complexity is not very easy to define and can mean different things in different situations. In his
work Simple Complexity – A Clear Guide to Complexity Theory, Neil Johnson defines complexity
by using the common phrase “Two’s company, three is a crowd.” (Johnson, 2007, p. 3) In other
words, complexity can be defined as the study of the phenomena which come about from a
collection of objects that interact with one another. (Johnson, 2007, pp. 3-4) In their work
Understanding the Non-Linear Event: A Framework for Complex Systems Analysis, Sarah Miller
Beebe and George S. Beebe go on to describe complexity science as what happens when a group
of objects (factors/agents) interacts (dynamism). (Beebe & Beebe, 2012, p. 510) In addition, these
systems usually arise in the absence of any kind of “invisible hand” or controlling unit. In other
words, a complex system usually is self-generating and lacks a singular point of contact that
controls the interactions. (Johnson, 2007, p. 13) Complexity is used to explain the behavior of a
myriad of factors in order to anticipate emergent phenomena (non-linear outcomes) in a number
of different realms. (Beebe & Beebe, 2012, p. 501) Likewise, Treverton (2010) describes
complexity as a “wicked” problem that should be tackled through organizational and procedural
“sense-making and “mindfulness.” (p. 7) The notion of wicked problems first appeared in urban
planning in Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber’s work Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.
14
Wicked problems are juxtaposed to “tame” problems. A tame problem is normally comprised of
the following criteria:
Has a relatively well-defined and stable problem statement.
Has a definite stopping point, that is, we know when a solution is reached.
Has a solution which can be objectively evaluated as being right or wrong.
Belongs to a class of similar problems which can be solved in a similar manner.
Has solutions which can be tried and abandoned.
Comes with a limited set of alternative solutions. (Treverton, 2008, p. 8)
In comparison, a wicked problem has the following symptoms:
The problem isn’t understood until a solution has been developed.
Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong.
Every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel.
Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one shot operation.’
Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions. (Conklin, 2005, pp. 7-8)
In short, it is impossible to look at wicked problems with a linear purview as each component
of a wicked problem has a complicated, compounding effect on the system. From the concept of a
wicked problem, Joseph Conklin derives the notion of fragmentation. Fragmentation suggests a
condition in which stakeholders see themselves as more separate than united, and in which
information and knowledge-sharing is both chaotic and disjointed. (Conklin, 2005, p. 13)
Fragmentation is caused by a combination of a wicked problems and social complexity. In social
complexity the number of players involved in a project complicates the situation. The more parties
involved in a collaboration, the more socially complex the issue is, (Conklin, 2005, p. 13) making
effective communication extremely difficult. Conklin uses an example in which multiple
government agencies struggle over the mission statement simply due to a terminology difference:
each agency has its own term for a core concept, and by choosing one term over the other, one of
the agencies would be disenfranchised. (Conklin, 2005, p. 14) Conklin argues that by excluding
certain stakeholders from the decision-making process in complex projects, members of the social
15
network may try to undermine or even sabotage the project. (Conklin, 2005, p. 3) This model aptly
reflects the competition seen between DHS and DOS.
Complexity theory has most recently been complemented by and merged with complex
adaptive systems (CAS). A CAS contains the following elements: a large number of independent
elements; high levels of interdependence and levels of connectivity; diffuse arbitrary boundaries;
dynamic emergence; and non-predictability. Finley, in his work Communications and Strategy
Development, uses the example of the security structure of international relations to highlight a
CAS. Over time, the collection of sovereign nations on earth have produced a myriad of
organizations and processes to improve overall prosperity and limit the negative consequences of
divergent interests. While various states and agents have exercised leadership over parts of the
development of the international system, no single nation or organization has ever had absolute
control. (Finley, 2008, p. 2) The combination of the elements within the CAS leads to the creation
of feedback loops. These feedback loops are also referred to as causal loops. A feedback loop is
“a closed sequence of causes and effects, that is, a closed path of action and information.”
(Richardson & Pugh, 1981, p. 7) What one agent within a feedback loop does will have
compounding effects on other agents within the loop and in turn their decision-making processes.
There are two types of feedback loops: positive (reinforcing) and negative (balancing) loops.
Positive loops reinforce change within a system with even more change. This type of loop results
in exponential growth, as there is no counterbalance to the loop. An example of a reinforcing loop
is depicted below.
Figure 3: System Structure
Source: (Kirkwood, 1998, p. 9)
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In his work System Dynamics Methods: A Quick Introduction, Craig W. Kirkwood uses a
simple example of a bank balance to introduce readers to the idea of a reinforcing system. In short,
the more money one stores in the bank, the more interest the money accrues. The interest accrued
in turn increases the holdings in the bank, which leads to more interest. This is an example of
exponential growth. Without a counterbalance, the bank balance will continue to grow indefinitely.
Such a system can easily be applied to the visa security system and the rate of visa overstays in
the United States.
Negative loops seek a goal. If the current level of the variable being studied is above the goal,
then the loop framework will push the value down, and vice versa. Negative loops can be useful
in providing stability, but they can also add to the tendency for organizations to resist change.
(Kirkwood, 1998, p. 10) Kirkwood argues that many government agencies and departments face
external environments that require the organization to change, but continue on with the same
behavior.
While on paper these loops might appear rather simple, in the real world they can be very
complex. Real world loops often involve multiple agents, and significant time delays in observing
the effects of a given action, making it very difficult to determine causes and effects in a system.
(Finley, 2008, p. 3) Therefore, in a linear system it is relatively easy to affect system behavior, but
in a CAS, the changes that policymakers introduce to a given system often result in the opposite
of the intended effect. Furthermore, as a result of the complications found within CAS, it can be
argued that many problems organizations face are not a result of external forces, but rather a
product of their very own policies.
The real world of security policy involves multiple agents, along with time delays and gaps
in communication between agencies. This model will be very useful when examining the causal
loops found within and between the government agencies responsible for oversight and
implementation of visa security policies.
5. Strategy Development Using CAS
Effective strategy development is important for a CAS. While there are countless works and
theories on strategy development, more recent thinking has begun to shift towards looking at
strategy as less of a semi-rigid path towards an end goal, and more as an ever-changing set of
17
guidelines for policies aimed at positively influencing the behavior of a complex adaptive system.
(Finley, 2008, p. 3)
Strategy formulation should not follow a linear development of “observe, orient, decide, act”,
but rather should be part of a process of simultaneous actions that include the following processes:
formulation and socialization; execution and modification; and strategy exploitation. (Finley,
2008, p. 3) Integral to each level of strategy development is effective communication. According
to Finley, because there is no focal point within a CAS, deciding where to place focus is critical to
strategy formulation. Understanding the structure of the system and how to approach the system
are both equally important when determining its focus. Approaching the system depends on the
perspective of an organization, or how the organization chooses to “frame” the situation. Finley
uses the example of the “North Korean Problem”, which can be viewed from a number of
perspectives: human rights issue, political or economic development issue, a nuclear proliferation
issue, and so on. (Finley, 2008, p. 4)
“Framing” the issue is very important for the development of visa security policies, as the
choice of the preferred frame is often contingent on who, or what institution, is doing the
assessment. A mathematician will most likely choose a mathematical frame; a politician, a political
frame, etc. Therefore, when looking at the conflation of frames within the visa security network,
there are more than likely going to be areas of disagreement. Thus, finding a dominant, or common,
frame among the majority of the key stakeholders within a system is very important. Once again,
effective communication is imperative for this. In addition, the way an issue is framed shapes what
is considered to be a plausible solution to a problem. (Finley, 2008, p. 4) Using the example of
North Korea again, Finley notes that if the problem were to be framed as an economic development
problem, economic sanctions would be considered counter-productive.
It follows that by using framing in strategy formulation, it is essential to have a collective
vision and interests.
6. Whole of Government Planning
In order to successfully formulate and implement a strategy, it is necessary to properly
execute a whole of government (WoG) approach. National security throughout most of the 20th
century has focused primarily on military affairs. However, Daniel S. Papp writes in his work The
18
Whole of Government Approach to Security, and Beyond that the 21st century has ushered in a
more comprehensive way of approaching national security that goes beyond dangers posed by
traditional causes of war. (Papp, 2012, p. viii) This WoG approach recognizes that security,
political, economic, cultural, and social spheres are highly interdependent and significant
cooperation between spheres is necessary in order to properly execute missions and strategies.
(Franke & Dorff, 2012, p. 2) Frank and Dorff note that while the WoG approach has been lauded
by many academics, policy observers, and military experts, there are nonetheless critics who
believe the WoG approach does not work due to lack of sufficient funding and personnel,
competition between agencies, cultural differences, and unclear mission objectives. (Franke &
Dorff, 2012, p. 5) Habeck (2012) goes on to support this argument by noting that while the WoG
approach is an ideal situation, there is often a lack of necessary desire for reform and sponsors who
would be able to implement it. (p. 86) As the visa security system involves multiple agencies,
missions, and strategies, the effects of a WoG approach on the system will be examined during the
research.
7. Conclusion
The literature highlights the lack of collaboration and coordination preventing the
formation of an effective visa security policy framework to prevent the rate of visa overstays
currently seen in the United States. Much of this is due to the complexity of the system in place
for the oversight of visa policies. Political will to transform this system to a more streamlined
framework notwithstanding, actual operational capacity versus desired operational capacity still
varies greatly. The works examined in the literature review introduced many of the important
concepts that show the difficulties both governments and private entities face when undergoing
organizational restructuring.
Visa security policies need to be examined through a systems behavior lens, which is
intrinsically related to both complexity theory and CAS. Important to remember in all of the
aforementioned frameworks is that making a change in the system can have lasting and
compounding effects. Therefore, it is important to approach a system with caution and thorough
evaluation. The nature of the visa security institution in the United States has undergone many
changes in the last fourteen years, but by approaching the system from a WoG perspective, policy
and processes might be improved to provide a more effective paradigm. However, implementing
19
such a framework is often easier said than done. The following sections will further build upon the
framework developed in the Literature Review in order to delve deeper into this issue and offer a
better understanding of the problem.
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II. FRAMEWORK OF THE VISA SECURITY SYSTEM
This chapter introduces the departments and agencies that have the most impact on visa
security policies: DHS, DOS and the Department of Justice (DOJ). By approaching these
departments and agencies from a systems perspective, the shape of the system will be
acknowledged and in turn suggestions can be made for improvements. Following an introduction
to each of the departments and agencies, there will also be an overview of the evolution in visa
security policies since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, as these have been the most transformative in
the history of visa security.
Both CAS and a systems analysis should be used to evaluate the visa security paradigm.
In order to effectively complete this evaluation, borders must be drawn around each element in
the system. The high level of interconnectedness in the visa security system makes this difficult
to accomplish. For the scope of this paper, borders will be defined around the individual federal
departments: DHS, DOS, and DOJ. In addition, other public and private actors who have a stake
in the system will be examined. As previously mentioned, a system contains three key
components: elements, interconnections, and a function/purpose. This chapter will look at the first
two components – elements and interconnections. The following chapter will then look at the
purpose and function of each element and give a detailed analysis on the effectiveness of each
function.
A. Elements
1. Federal Agencies
A federal agency is a division within the government specifically assigned to serve under
the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of the U.S. government. This paper will examine the
agencies responsible for national security, and more specifically visa security.
A. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Under current law, two departments – DOS and DHS – are responsible for the admission into
and monitoring of aliens in the United States. DHS’s U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services
21
(USCIS) is responsible for approving immigrant petitions. DHS’s Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) oversees the inspection all individuals who enter the United States. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency tasked with enforcing immigration law in the
interior of the United States. DHS consists of 22 agencies and employs over 250,000 employees.
For an organizational chart of the department, see Appendix 2. With so many agencies and
employees, it follows that the organization is highly complex and employs many methods of intra-
agency communication.
1. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
USCIS is responsible for administering green card applications, U.S. citizenship, and
applications for extensions and changes of temporary visa status. The purpose of the agency is to
provide accurate and useful information to immigrants, grant immigration and citizenship benefits,
and ensure the integrity of the immigration system.
2. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
CBP is the primary law enforcement branch of DHS. It is responsible for regulating and
facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. regulations, including
customs, trade, and immigration. (Shusterman, 2016) While CBP focuses its main efforts on
preventing the spread of terrorism and deterring terrorists from entering the country, it also plays
a pivotal role in preventing immigrants from entering the country illegally.
There are 329 official POEs in the United States, and all foreign nationals must provide CBP
officers with a valid visa and/or passport upon entry into the country. (Wasem, 2014)
3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
ICE is primarily responsible for the intelligence and investigative functions of DHS. The
mission of the department is to protect national security, public safety, and the integrity of U.S.
borders through civil and criminal enforcement of federal laws governing customs, immigration,
and trade. (Shusterman, 2016)
A subcomponent of ICE is the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) unit. HSI is a critical
investigative arm of DHS and it oversees the departments work in visa security. Part of this process
22
is the Visa Security Program (VSP), which deploys special agents with immigration law
enforcement expertise to diplomatic posts worldwide to carry out visa security activities. These
activities include, but are not limited to: examining visa applications for fraud; initiating
investigations; coordinating with other law enforcement officers; and providing law enforcement
training and advice to DOS consulate employees.
B. Department of State (DOS)
DOS is the federal department responsible for both international relations and the
implementation of foreign policy of the United States. The mission of DOS is to “shape and sustain
a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress
for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere.” (U.S. Department of State, 2016)
The bureau within the Department of State responsible for visa services is CA. Employees in the
Office of Visa Services in CA carry out the following functions: 1) serve as liaisons with DHS; 2)
serve as liaisons between DOS and U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad on visa matters; 3)
interpret visa laws and regulations; and 4) act as a point of contact for the public. (U.S. Department
of State, 2016) There are five pillars of visa security that DOS adheres to in order to ensure visa
security: innovations, technological advances, personal interviews, data sharing, and training.
(Donahue, 2016, p. 1) Consular officers are responsible for facilitating legitimate travel while
simultaneously preventing ineligible aliens from entering the United States. CA has the sole legal
authority to adjudicate visa applications. (Roth, 2014, p. 5)
C. Department of Justice (DOJ)
DOJ is the federal department responsible for the following: enforcing the law and defending
the interests of the U.S. according to the law; ensuring the safety of the public from foreign and
domestic threats; providing leadership in controlling crime; seeking punishment for those guilty
of crimes; and ensuring fair and impartial administration of justice for all U.S. citizens. (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2016) DOJ’s role in visa security policy is executed by the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). This office administers judicial issues on immigration
decisions made by DHS or appeals made by immigrants or foreign national criminals. (Hernandez,
2013, p. 5) More specifically, EOIR conducts immigration court proceedings, administrative
hearings, and appellate reviews. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016)
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2. Political Elements
Other elements apart from federal agencies play a role in the development of visa security
policies. Given the debated nature of visa security policies, the majority of these elements are
political in nature.
A. Legislative
Congress is responsible for creating the laws that govern visa security policies and the
agencies tasked with their enforcement. Furthermore, various committees, such as the
Committee on Homeland Security, are responsible for oversight of programs and agencies
to ensure they are functioning properly. DHS is a prime example of the role Congress plays,
as this department was created by Congress in response to security deficiencies in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an integral
arm of Congress, charged with the auditing and evaluating of Government programs and
activities.
B. Executive
As prescribed in the Constitution, the executive branch is responsible for the execution of
law. The president is in charge of the executive branch, and consults with the heads of
departments in order to coordinate policy and accomplish goals. The executive office is
responsible for drafting the NSS, which outlines the major national security concerns of
the United States and how the given administration plans to tackle these problems. In
theory, visa security policies should fall in line with the overall framework and objectives
of the NSS.
3. Private Elements
Players and stakeholders in the private realm can also play influential roles in the field of visa
security. As the government continues its trend to outsource capabilities, the role the private sector
plays in almost all facets of government activities will continue to expand.
24
A. Airlines
In accordance with the code of federal regulations, all airline carriers, both foreign and
domestic, are responsible for providing CBP with a passenger and crew manifest. This manifest
must be electronically transmitted to CBP prior to the departure from the last foreign port or place.
The travel itinerary for each passenger and crew member needs to be included in this manifest. Of
particular importance is whether a passenger is transiting through the United States or if the United
States is the end destination. The manifests provided by private airlines are crucial for tracking
nonimmigrant aliens and whether or not they overstay the allotted time on their visas.
For departing travelers, both air and sea carriers are also required to provide biographic
manifest data for all passengers and crew members before departing the United States. By law,
carriers are required to provide certain data, including names and passport numbers, and will be
fined if they fail to produce the given data. This data is then matched again biographic material
collected from individuals arriving in the country to determine whether or not there are visa
overstays amongst the manifests. CBP maintains a system to monitor this.
B. Dynamism/Interconnections
Dynamism refers to the interconnectivity within a complex system. This interconnectivity
frames the interactions between agents and holds them together. Interactions between agents arise
because agents are physically close together, because they might be members of the same group,
or because there is information-sharing between the agents. (Johnson, 2007, p. 13) Once agents
begin to interact with one another, either intentionally or unintentionally, they form a network.
This network tells us who is connected to whom, and in turn who is interacting with whom.
(Johnson, 2007, pp. 97-98) Furthermore, these interactions can be viewed as either formal or
informal. A formal interaction is expressed through stated procedures and processes. On the
contrary, informal interactions, which arise from unstated cultures, values, and independent
personalities, often circumvent and destabilize the formal processes. (Meadows, 2008, p. 13)
The agents within the visa security network are highly interconnected and complex. Even the
website that explain visa processes states “defining the different roles and responsibilities of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State can be confusing.” (U.S.
25
Department of State, 2016) The following section will explain the dynamism within the visa
security network and how the federal agencies work together to ensure visa security by
highlighting some of the cooperative programs.
1. The Visa Security Program (VSP)
VSP is considered by DHS to be the first line of defense in the visa process against terrorists
and criminal organizations. VSP is currently operating in 28 high-risk locations in 20 countries.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS responsibility for visa policy. Specifically,
it established that DHS agents overseas should: 1) provide training to consular officers; 2) review
visa applications at the request of either DHS agents or consular officers; and 3) conduct
investigations with respect to consular matters. VSP is located within the HSI directorate and is
divided between International Operations (IO) and the National Security Investigations Division.
See Appendix 3 for details of the structure. VSP agents work with DOS officers on a daily basis to
screen and vet visa applicants and in 2012 VSP special agents screened over 1.3 million visa
applicants. DHS uses the Visa Security Program Tracking System-Network (VSPTS-Net) to
identify applicants for U.S. visas who are ineligible to enter the United States due to terrorism
associations, criminal history, or other security-related reasons. (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2013, p. 2) This information is shared between both ICE and CBP agents. In addition,
DHS and DOS work together on a regular basis to expand the VSP program to additional overseas
locations or initiate new visa security policies. (Roth, 2014, p. 5)
2. The Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was established in 1986 to facilitate the legitimate travel for
business and tourist visitors to the United States. (United States Government Accountability
Office, 2016, p. 1) This program allows citizens from certain countries - for example, France,
Germany, and Hungary - to travel to the country for business, tourism, or other reasons for 90 days
without having to obtain a visa. As of 2016 there are 38 countries participating in VWP. Both DHS
and DOS work with host countries to enhance bilateral cooperation on critical counterterrorism
and information-sharing initiatives, expand tourism to the United States, and support business
opportunities in the United States. In response to increased security threats around the globe, the
program now also requires VWP countries to enter into bilateral agreements with the United States
26
to report information about the theft or loss of passports, establish enhanced law enforcement
cooperation, share watch list information pertaining to known or suspected terrorists, and to share
information on the criminal history of VWP applicants. This program allows DOS to allocate more
resources to posts in countries with higher-risk applicant pools. In FY 2013, there were nearly 20
million traveler admissions to the United States under the VWP. (United States Government
Accountability Office, 2016, p. 4)This program requires significant information-sharing not only
between DHS and DOS, but also between the United States and the VWP country.
3. Biometric Collection
Fingerprint scans are collected from nearly all visa applicants by consular officers. These
fingerprints are screened against two databases: 1) DHS’ IDENT database, which contains
biometric information for wanted persons, suspected terrorists, and previous immigration
violators; and 2) the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Next Generation Identification (NGI)
system, which maintains more than 75.5 million criminal history records. In conjunction with
fingerprints, all visa photos are also screened against a facebook of photos of known or suspected
terrorists from the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). (Donahue, 2016, pp. 2-3)
4. Training
In order to facilitate information-sharing and mitigate duplication of efforts, ICE and DOS
undertake collaborative training and orientation before deploying overseas. Furthermore, ICE and
DOS personnel work together in meetings, trainings, briefings, and working groups. In addition,
ICE and DOS employees work together to identify embassies for potential expansion of the VSP.
When establishing a Visa Security Unit (VSU) at an overseas post, ICE agents also work closely
with consular officials to determine how to integrate VSU activities into the visa application cycles
while simultaneously minimizing their effect on visa issuance procedures. (Roth, 2014, p. 7)
When stationed at an overseas consulate, ICE agents are required under Section 428(e)(2)(A)
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide training to consular officers in regard to specific
security threats relating to the adjudication of visa applicants. This training includes briefings on
terrorist groups that might pose a threat to homeland security, interview techniques used to detect
27
persons who may be a threat, intelligence gathering, and other general law enforcement topics.
(Roth, 2014, p. 15)
5. Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team Initiative
(PATRIOT)
The PATRIOT program is used to conduct automated screenings of visa application
information against other DHS holdings, as well as records kept by other U.S. agencies, prior to
the applicant’s interview at U.S. Consulates participating in the VSP program. This robust vetting
process determines whether an applicant has prior derogatory information or has previously been
barred from receiving a U.S. visa. The PATRIOT program highlights the interconnectedness
within the visa security sector, as it uses interagency resources from ICE, CBP, DOS, and other
members of the intelligence community when conducting analysis. (Saldana, 2016, p. 4)
6. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
In January 2011, ICE signed an MOU outlining responsibilities, roles, and collaboration
between CA, ICE, and DOS’s Diplomatic Security (DS). (Saldana, 2016, p. 6) The MOU also
details certain procedures, including the ability for the consular chief to ask VSP to expedite certain
cases, and that VSP agents can request cases to be put on hold for additional investigation. This
MOU builds upon the 2003 joint DHS-DOS MOU and a 2008 cable released by DOS. The 2008
cable and 2003 MOU directed VSP posts to develop standard operating procedures (SOP) for a
number of areas, such as chain of command, specific coordination procedures between ICE agents
and consular officers at post, and dispute resolution practices. (United States Government
Accountability Office, 2011)
7. Overstay Enforcement
In order to prevent visa overstays, ICE analyzes system-generated leads matched against
biographical entry and exit records stored in CBP’s Arrival and Departure Information System
(ADIS). The ADIS system supports the ability of DHS to identify nonimmigrants who have
remained past their planned date of departure from the United States and are in violation of the
conditions of their visas. (Saldana, 2016, p. 7) After it has been determined if an individual has
28
overstayed a visa, an investigation is then made, in cooperation with other agencies, to determine
whether the individual has adjusted their visa to a lawful status or if enforcement action should be
taken.
HSI’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is responsible for the
investigation of nonimmigrant visa violators who might be a threat to national security. CTCEU
analyzes data from a number of interagency systems, including ADIS and the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). (Saldana, 2016, p. 7) SEVIS is a program run by
ICE that monitors all students and exchange visitors traveling to the U.S. on F, M or J visas.
C. Conclusion
It is very clear that elements and interconnections within the visa security paradigm are very
complex. As a result of this complexity, it is difficult to determine which department or agency
should take the lead on certain issues. Not only are there three different departments responsible
for visa security oversight, these are further complicated by a multitude of agencies within each
department. The figure below illustrates the various agencies, departments, and systems that are
in constant communication over immigration issues. As illustrated, information-sharing between
agencies is inevitably complex with so many overlapping responsibilities.
Figure 4: Departmental Interconnections in the Visa Security System
EOIR
CBP
USCIS
ICE
TSA
Consular Affairs
Diplomatic Security
VSP MOU
CTCEU
SEVIS
TECS
IDENT
ADIS IDENT
ADIS
29
III. Visa Security – A Look at the History
This chapter looks at the development of visa security policies in order to determine patterns
that have shaped the system as we see it today. In this case, the system we are examining is the
visa security network and the actors/elements and interconnections that comprise the system.
Meadows notes that the best way to determine a system’s purpose is to observe the system for an
allotted period of time to see how the system behaves. (Meadows, 2008, p. 14)
As the visa security system was dramatically changed in response to the 9/11 attacks, most of
this section will look at visa security policies implemented after the terrorist attacks. The objective
of this section is to determine the purpose and priorities of the visa system, keeping in mind that
these priorities are ever-changing and are largely affected by elements both within and outside the
system.
A. Visa Security Policies Before 9/11
Prior to 9/11, DOS was nearly exclusively responsible for the issuance of visas and the
security that corresponded with these processes. After World War II, administration of visas was
placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. As the name
indicates, the government agency was responsible for both consular and security functions.
(Hernandez, 2013, p. 1) Given the Cold War climate, emphasis was placed on identifying potential
spies and communist party members applying for visas. In the 1980s, with the development of
détente politics, the security function was officially separated from consular operations in order to
promote travel to the United States. (Hernandez, 2013, p. 1) While the 1993 World Trade Center
Attacks highlighted the vulnerabilities of the pre-9/11 visa processes, priority remained on making
the travel process as easy as possible as visa waiting lines continued to grow across the globe.
Consular officers began to feel the political pressures as ambassadors began to notice the long
waiting lines, and the visa function transformed from a security screen to a service. (Tkacik, 2002)
The streamlining of the visa process was not only implemented to facilitate travel to the United
States, it also had a number of underling policy objectives. Managing visa flows with an open
mind highlighted the U.S. commitment to nondiscrimination, delivered enormous economic
benefits, and also exposed foreign nationals to American society. Through this exposure,
30
policymakers hoped to mitigate proclivity for terrorism by lessening anger directed at the United
States by foreigners. The issuance of visas falls under the heading of “public diplomacy”; one of
the main priorities of DOS that seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through
informing, influencing, and understanding foreign audiences. (Department of State, 2016) While
strong public diplomacy ties and the relative access of another country’s citizens to the United
States highlight the strength of a bilateral relationship, this relationship can also be exploited. Prior
to 2001, Saudi Arabia was one of the United States’ closest allies. Saudi Arabia enjoyed a “visa
express” program, which allowed visa applicants to submit their visa applications through pre-
approved travel agents without having to visit a consulate. All but two of the terrorists involved
in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi. (Yale-Loehr, 2005) Hani Hanjour, the pilot of the plane flown into
the Pentagon, entered the United States on a student visa from Saudi Arabia. During interviews
with consular officers, he claimed he would be attending an English language program in Oakland,
but never attended the program upon his arrival in the United States. Despite violating the terms
of his visa, and a speeding ticket received a month after his arrival, law enforcement agencies
never had him on their radar. This case and numerous other cases highlight that by placing too
much emphasis on diplomacy, security measures at both the tactical and operational level were
insufficient, allowing terrorists to exploit this weakness. (Hernandez, 2013)
B. Visa Security Policies After 9/11
A reexamination of immigration laws and controls was inevitable in the wake of 9/11. The
U.S. government overhauled the entire visa system in order to place more emphasis on security
measures. Post-September 11 changes to visa policies and regulations have primarily followed two
simultaneous objectives: a change in the priorities and goals of visa issuance to focus more on
security, and a corresponding push to reform visa procedures to achieve these goals. (Yale-Loeher,
2005) Since early 2003, both DOS and DHS are responsible for visa policy in the United States.
These policies are defined in the INA, and while the details of this act are expansive, this section
will highlight the components of the act relevant for the paper.
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) was signed on October 26, 2001. The
PATRIOT Act authorized additional funding for a foreign student tracking system as well
31
as moved up the deadline for countries participating in the VWP to have passengers submit
machine-readable passports. (Hernandez, 2013) Two of the terrorists involved in the 9/11
attacks changed their visa statuses to become students after entering the country. Also
important to this paper is Subtitle B of the PATRIOT Act. This contains enhanced
provisions to boost law enforcement’s ability to prevent suspected terrorists from entering
the United States. The provision specifically calls for the need to expedite implementation
of an integrated entry and exit data system for all airports, seaports, and land border POEs.
Furthermore, emphasis was placed on technical developments, with the act calling for the
implantation of biometric technology and tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of
entry. (United States Senate, 2001, p. 216)
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA) signed on May
14, 2002 by an overwhelming bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress, required
consular officers to send electronic versions of visas to INS as well as immigration officers
at POEs in the United States. The Act also required INS to make interoperable all of its
internal databases, ensuring that all information pertaining to a particular alien could be
accessed in a single search. In addition, the act necessitated biometric indicators for
passports by 2004. Finally, EBSVERA required all commercial vessels and aircraft that
transport people to a U.S. airport or seaport from outside the United States to provide
border officers with a manifest containing information on each passenger and crew member
being transported. (Jenks, 2002)
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act was signed on December 17, 2004.
This act enforced the required visa interview process at all consulates around the globe,
and also allocated more resources to DOS to hire more consular officers. Face-to-face
interviews with all visa applicants, apart from diplomats and certain individuals working
for specific international organizations, is now standard protocol enforced by DOS. It was
necessary to increase the manpower at consulates in light of the more stringent interview
processes.
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
program was implemented and created a nation-wide entry-exit reporting system that
32
requires specific foreign travelers to the United States to provide photographs and
fingerprints to customs agents at the borders. The ultimate goal of the US-VISIT program
was to “deploy end-to-end management of processes and data on foreign nationals to the
United States covering their interactions with U.S. officials before they enter, when they
enter, while they are in the United States, and when they exit.” (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2003) In short, the program mandated biometrics for many foreigners
traveling to the United States on both temporary and long-term visas. The US-VISIT
program has since been replaced with the Office of Biometric Identity Management
(OBIM), whose mission is to “help federal, state and local government decision makers
accurately identify the people they encounter and determine whether these people pose a
risk to the United States.” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016)
As part of CBP’s pre-departure strategy, CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC)
continuously vets and analyzes passenger information, which includes visas and VWP
ESTA authorizations. NTC also conducts vetting of nonimmigrant U.S. visas and ESTA
authorizations that have been revoked, issued, and/or denied.
Another aspect of visas investigated by the U.S. government in the post-9/11 environment
was transit visas. Prior to September 11, transit passengers partook in the Transit without
Visa (TWOV) and International to International (ITI) programs. While these programs
required passengers to undergo inspections at the border, they did not require passengers
to obtain a visa before entering the country. All passengers who would normally need a
visa to enter the country must now also obtain visas if they plan on transiting through the
United States.
The last form of security scrutiny a visa applicant has to undergo is performed by CBP at
United States POEs. This inspection consists of an interview with a CBP inspector, a check
of the traveler’s documents, and a brief query in various law enforcement databases.
(Hernandez, 2013, p. 4) If a traveler appears suspicious for any given reason, they will then
be referred to a secondary inspection. This system complements the previous work
33
performed by DOS. The figure below shows a simplified version of the immigration
process.
Figure 5: Visa Application Process
Source: (Hernandez, 2013, p. 4)
Finally, the Department of Justice (DOJ) also plays a role in the visa process through
immigration review. (Hernandez, 2013) The DOJ plays a very limited role in dealing with
appeals by immigrants and foreign national criminals.
The above section highlights the evolution of the perception of immigration and visa security.
Prior to 9/11, immigration was primarily seen as a matter of economics, whereby easing the
process for both nonimmigrants and immigrants to enter the country resulted in an increase in
economic activity in the United States. Furthermore, immigration was used as a tool for public
diplomacy by improving foreign audiences’ image of the United States. After 9/11, immigration
began to be viewed as a matter of national security and resulted in a bureaucratic restructuring of
the system. One of the main priorities of the post-9/11 visa security reforms was to implement
more efficient ways to track and prevent visa overstays in the United States. These reforms as of
2016, however, have not been fully implemented.
34
IV – Analysis – Examining the System
This chapter examines today’s visa security paradigm through the lens of a complex
system. The ultimate goal is to examine whether the elements and interconnections of the visa
security system examined in chapter II are working well together to achieve objectives. This
analysis will also highlight the purpose of each element in the visa security system. In the wake
of 9/11, Congress created new security institutions and integrated these institutions into the
already-existing visa security framework. The expansion of this framework into an even more
complex paradigm created a system in which diffuse agents with differing goals often compete
against one another. Meadows classifies this phenomenon as an escalation trap. Mentioned earlier
in the paper, escalation is a form of a feedback loop. More specifically, it is a reinforcing feedback
loop. In the case of visa security, escalation occurs when separate agencies (DHS, DOS, and DOJ)
compete against one another for power, funding, authority, etc. Escalation not only results in a
reinforcing loop of conflicting priorities, but it can also lead to the creation of even more
departments and agencies, prohibiting effective cooperation and coordination. Each department
and agency has its own strategy (both implicit and explicit), culture, and objectives that inhibit the
formulation of a coherent system. This chapter is broken down into two sections to evaluate system
effectiveness: 1) Preventing Visa Overstays and 2) Tracking Visa Overstays.
A. Preventing Visa Overstays
1. Strategy Formulation
The analysis starts by taking a look at the goals –or the purpose– of the visa security system.
The NSS and strategies of both DHS and DOS are examined, as these seminal documents reflect
explicit plans of action to achieve a major or overall goal. Meadows notes that even people within
systems don’t always recognize the whole-system goal they are trying to achieve. Notionally, there
should also be larger, less obvious, higher-leverage goals that the entire system is trying to achieve.
Since 1986, it has been a requirement for U.S. Presidents to submit a biannual NSS written
by the National Security Council (NSC). During the Cold War era, this strategy primarily focused
on deterrence. While overall strategic objectives looked at deterrence, in the run-up to 9/11 there
was no government-wide procedure, organization, or leadership to direct strategic planning across
35
agency lines. (Habeck, 2012, p. 70) In the post-9/11 era, transnational terrorism has become a focal
point of national security, with “border security” playing a very important role in preventing the
spread of terrorism throughout the world. In the Bush administration’s 2002 NSS, the report placed
explicit emphasis on preventing and combatting terrorism before it reached America’s borders.
(The White House, 2002, p. 6) Deterrence was no longer relevant in the face of seemingly less
risk-adverse foes. Along with a change in the priorities of the NSS in the aftermath of 9/11, a
number of other public strategies stating the missions and goals of varying agencies were also
publicized. These documents not only state the goals and missions of the individual agencies, they
also state how these will be achieved, and how the agency’s goals will advance the overall national
security strategy. The table below shows just a small selection of the surfeit of strategies currently
existing in the United States.
Figure 6: Sample of U.S. Government Strategies
Source: (Doyle, 2007)
The assumption is that all of the strategies listed above, represent a singular strategic
template. Yet, there is no common definition for planning across all levels of the U.S. government,
making it difficult to coordinate and implement diverse plans into an overarching strategy that
every agency would adhere to. (Habeck, 2012, p. 67) The various agencies that make up the U.S.
government often believe they are communicating the same message, but in fact, are talking about
36
very different things. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which suffered from
coordination and communication mishaps, the administration took steps to improve coordination
between the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOS, creating incentives for interagency
cooperation, and establishing frameworks for the planning of joint operations. (Habeck, 2012, p.
68) While successful to some extent, other national security operations also require interagency
planning and cooperation. Furthermore, these strategies merely portray the explicit values of the
given agencies, with implicit strategies often straying from what is stated on paper.
Building on themes developed by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, the NSS
published in May of 2010 was the first strategy to explicitly incorporate a WoG approach. (Dunlap,
2012, p. 185) The most current NSS, released by the Obama administration in 2015, lists four
strategic policy areas under which supplementary objectives are formulated. These four policy
areas are: security, prosperity, value, and international order. The security policy includes a section
on homeland security. The foremost priority of homeland security is to protect the American
people. In order to do so the country must guard against terrorism, as well as other hazards and
threats, through information-sharing, border and aviation security, and international cooperation.
(The White House, 2015, p. 8) The strategy emphasizes preventative security measures, but also
conflates security with economic objectives through its commitment to travel, commerce, and
tourism. (The White House, 2015, p. 8) As such, the Obama administration seeks to find the
strategic balance between protecting the lives and civil liberties of its citizens through measures
such as border control, while concurrently fostering the image of the United States as a country
open to foreign investment, tourism, and travel.
The Obama administration has touted WoG management since 2011, but one must take a
look at the individual strategies of both DOS and DHS to see if their explicit strategies coincide
with this WoG vision.
A. DHS Strategy
DHS released a Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2014-2018 in 2013. Bear in mind that different
agencies within DHS - ICE, CBP, Coast Guard, USCIS, etc. - also have their own strategies, but
for the purpose of the scope of this paper, only DHS’s strategy will be examined. The plan
highlights the five-mission structure of DHS:
37
Prevent terrorism and enhance security
Secure and manage the borders
Enforce and administer immigration laws
Safeguard and secure cyberspace
Strengthen national preparedness and resilience (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2013, p. 6)
Under this five-mission structure, DHS also emphasizes: inclusive senior leader discussions and
forums that provide an environment of trust and transparency; a focused, collaborative
departmental strategy that emphasizes more effective DHS-wide decision making processes and
operations; enhanced coordinated operations; stakeholder engagement; and cross-agency priority
goals. Cross-agency goals refer to the challenges the department faces in horizontally addressing
issues across vertical organizational frameworks. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013,
pp. 6-7)
B. DOS Strategy
DOS has differing goals from DHS, which is to be expected, as the two departments have divergent
missions and visions. DOS released a strategic plan for fiscal years 2014-2018 in 2014. The DOS
plan, similar to that of DHS, also highlights a five-mission structure:
Strengthen America’s positive economic impact
Strengthen America’s foreign policy influence on strategic challenges
Promote clean and sustainable energy
Protect U.S. interest by advancing democracy and strengthening civil society
Modernize the ways of diplomacy and development (U.S. Department of State,
2014, p. 1)
Visa security policies fall primarily under the first objective in the strategic plan:
strengthening America’s positive economic impact. According to the report, the State Department
promotes educational and professional exchanges and prioritizes the visa applications of students,
scholars, and exchange visitors by regularly expediting appointments and maintaining short ques
38
for priority travelers. (U.S. Department of State, 2014, p. 11) In addition, DOS emphasizes
increasing the scrutiny given to visa applicants, while reducing operating costs, boosting
collaboration, and improving security to counter extremist threats. Through September 30, 2015,
DOS publicized a performance goal to maintain a 99 percent process rate for all passport
applications and a maximum of a three week wait for 80 percent of all nonimmigrant visa
applicants. (U.S. Department of State, 2014, p. 12)
C. Convergence of Strategy
An analysis of the 2014-2017 DOS strategic plan shows the department is carefully trying
to find the strategic balance between security and diplomacy. Meadows notes that one of the most
powerful ways to influence the behavior of a system is by setting a purpose or goal. (Meadows,
2008, p. 138) However, what happens when there are different goals competing within the system?
If the goal is defined badly, or if it doesn’t measure what it’s supposed to measure, then the system
doesn’t produce a desirable result. (Meadows, 2008, p. 138) Meadows also aptly uses the example
of national security, which she defines as the amount of money spent on military. Regardless of
whether or not money is thrown into the national security apparatus, it does not necessarily enhance
national security. In fact, national security may be undermined as money is now being taken away
from critical investment in other sectors such as education and the economy. (Meadows, 2008, p.
138) In regard to the convergence of DHS’s and DOS’s strategic plans, or goals, on paper it does
appear that both agencies are trying to conflate different strategies in order to accomplish the
overarching goals of the NSS in some areas. Namely, both departments pursue goals to protect
U.S. interests. However, both strategies still diverge on how to define U.S. interests. DOS focuses
on strengthening diplomacy efforts, undertaking projects to improve positive economic impact,
and reinforcing civil societies. In contrast, DHS emphasizes strengthening borders, enforcing
immigration laws, and preventing terrorism. Both agencies pursue largely different strategies, but
must come together to oversee visa security policies. As such, it follows that at the strategic level
the departments disagree on how to oversee certain visa security operations. Despite the consistent
call to strengthen interagency operations, planning within and between agencies still largely
remains independent and develops with linear, short-term objectives in mind. After speaking with
representatives from both DHS and DOS, it would appear that friction between and within
agencies, a lack of a lead agency to make crucial decisions on visa security policies, and the
39
difficulty to horizontally integrate vertically diverse and complex networks is contributing to the
rate of visa overstays in the United States. Despite the Obama administration’s WoG approach to
management, emphasis still remains on short-term goals, with strategy planners not taking
advantage of existing knowledge bases in order to thwart long-term problems. Namely, short-term
emphasis has been placed on the prevention of terrorism and terror-related attacks versus risks that
might emerge as a result of visa overstays.
2. Inter-Agency Programs
Meadows notes that problems occur when perceived linear problems are solved in such a way
that is not meant for complex issues. This section will take a look at two inter-agency programs –
VSP and VWP – to see if such programs have been effective in increasing the security of American
citizens while simultaneously achieving overarching strategic goals.
A. Visa Security Program (VSP)
As mentioned earlier in this paper, VSP was implemented in 2002 in order to add an additional
layer of law enforcement oversight to the visa application process in consulates considered to be
in “high-risk” geographical locations. Prior to 9/11, there was a considerable gap in information-
sharing between departments, and VSP was one of the programs implemented in order to bridge
this gap.
Fourteen years after the implementation of the program, there are now VSUs at 28 consulates
around the world. Conversations with employees at DOS and reports issued by the GAO and the
Inspector General of Homeland Security highlighted program successes, but also showed areas for
improvement. Shortcomings in the program have largely been due to a lack of reliable metrics to
properly measure the outcomes of the program. Some results of the program have been
summarized below.
1. While metrics are supposed to be implemented in order to gauge the success of VSP,
these have, to date, not been successfully executed, making it difficult to determine
whether VSP is operating as intended.
2. It appears that ICE agents are not always providing training to consular officers as
required.
3. In addition, it cannot be determined how much time ICE agents assigned to VSUs at
overseas consulates are actually spending on visa security issues.
40
4. It appears that the use of temporary duty ICE agents at consulates inhibits the continuity
of the program.
5. While there have been recommendations to extend VSP to other locations, these have
not been implemented due to differing opinions between DHS and DOS that primarily
revolve around spacing and staffing issues.
The table below, taken from a recent report released by the Office of the Inspector General
of DHS, also summarizes issues found within the VSP program.
Figure 7: VSP Performance Measures, Reporting Mechanisms, and Data Limitations
Source: (Roth, The DHS Security Program, 2014, p. 10)
An examination of the information found in the table shows that data limitations are
primarily a result of inconsistent reporting or no reporting at all. Further investigations also found
that consular officers do not have access to the Treasury Enforcement Communications System
41
(TECS) database. TECS is a DHS system that contains law enforcement, immigration, border, and
lookout records used to determine whether or not a visa applicant has a terrorism or criminal
background which would preclude them from eligibility for a visa under federal law. (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 3) This system automatically exchanges information
with the DOS Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). This has been a small point of
contention between ICE agents and Consular officers. DOS officers do not have access to the
database as the system contains sensitive law enforcement information, including information
related to ongoing investigations. (Skinner, 2008, p. 11) However, an ICE agent interviewed for
this paper noted that Regional Security Officers (RSO), the law enforcement agents of DOS, do
have access to the system. (S. Briseno, personal communication, June 22, 2016) DHS officials
have noted there would be sensitivity and disclosure issues involved with giving unrestricted
access to DOS officers. Additionally, CBP, not ICE, controls access to the TECS system.
Therefore, DOS would need to work with CBP to gain TECS access for consular officers, and in
turn would create another layer of complex communication between departments and agencies. As
such, ICE agents at VSUs provide information, as well as interpretation of the information from
the TECS system, which assists consular officers in making adjudication decisions.
While ICE agents bring valuable resources to posts and add a layer of security to the visa
process through VSP, the program is still not functioning at full capacity due to a lack of reliable
metrics and comprehensive information-sharing. This could be a contributing factor to the rate of
visa overstays in the United States, as DOS and DHS are not working as effectively as possible to
prevent possible individuals who will overstay their visas from entering the country.
B. Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
As mentioned earlier in this paper, VWP requires comprehensive information-sharing not only
between DHS and DOS, but also between the United States and the VWP country. All 38 countries
participating in the VWP have entered into three types of information-sharing agreements with the
United States, but not all countries are sharing information correctly with the United States. More
specifically, according to a report released by the GAO in May 2016, as of December 2015, about
a third of VWP countries were not sharing identity information about known or suspected
terrorists. (United States Government Accountability Office, 2016, p. 11) In addition, as of
December 2015, only two-thirds of VWP countries had shared information pertaining to criminals
42
with U.S. agencies. (United States Government Accountability Office, 2016, p. 15) DHS has also
been remiss in sharing reports on VWP countries with Congress. Nearly a quarter of DHS’s most
recent reports to Congress about VWP countries were submitted five or more months after their
intended due dates. (United States Government Accountability Office, 2016, p. 19) Failure to meet
deadlines means that Congress may lack timely information needed to conduct oversight of the
program and consider whether or not adjustments should be made to the enhance the VWP. During
this delay, visa applicants could potentially exploit the system. As such, the inability for
participating VWP countries to share critical information with the United States, along with DHS’s
slow reporting to Congress might not only be contributing to visa overstay rates in the United
States, but also subjecting U.S. citizens to possible security threats.
C. System Limitations
The two programs examined above highlight some of the difficulties of implementing policies
meant to improve a system. Meadows classifies these difficulties as “traps”. She notes that some
systems are structured in such ways that produce truly problematic behavior. (Meadows, 2008, p.
11) When such systems arise, standard solutions for fixing problems do not apply, thus resulting
in traps. In the framework of the visa security apparatus, and more specifically the aforementioned
VSP and VWP programs, a number of system “traps” can be seen.
1. Policy Resistance/Divergent Goals
Meadows views policy resistance as a phenomenon that occurs when, despite policy “fixes”, a
system seems to be intractably stuck, producing the same outcomes every year. (Meadows, 2008,
p. 112) Policy resistance occurs when integral actors within a system are set on pursuing their
own goals. The more inconsistent the goals are with one another, the more ineffective the system.
In the VSP, the two main actors pursuing their own goals are DHS and DOS. Although
specific guidelines are in place to ensure the functionality of the program, both actors continue to
pursue some of their own objectives. ICE agents at consular posts continue to conduct work outside
the parameters of their job descriptions as VSU agents, do not provide the proper amount of
training to consular officers, and are not properly recording their activities. Similarly, some DOS
officers at consulates are not enamored with the program. Dan Cadman, a retired ICE agent with
43
thirty years of government experience and a current fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies
(CIS), noted that senior leaders in both CA and DS felt threatened by the encroachment of DHS
on their territory, and would do what they could to impede the establishment of the program.
(Cadman, 2014) Resistance from Consul Generals to authorize the expansion of VSUs highlights
this trend. However, on a more operational and personal level, Cadman also notes that there has
been an increase in trust between DHS and DOS. As an example, in the Saudi Arabia VSU, once
the consular officers began to realize that ICE agents were not there to peer over anyone’s shoulder,
they began to accept the agents as part of the larger team. (Cadman, 2014) In addition, they
developed a keen interest in how the immigration system worked on the domestic level. Thus,
personal relationship development can be used to overcome systems traps. This will be discussed
further in the policy recommendations portion of the paper.
In VWP, conflicting goals between DHS and VWP participant countries has also led to
policy resistance. As mentioned earlier, approximately one third of VWP countries are not sharing
identity information about known or suspected terrorists and criminals with the United States; a
requirement mandated by VWP policy guidelines. Some of the countries included in this number
say they do not have the equipment in place to do such exchanges. It can be deduced that while
countries want to participate in the VWP, they might not necessarily be pursuing the steps or goals
to ensure the functionality of the program. Additionally, there is always pressure from the U.S.
administration to streamline the visa process, making it more difficult to stringently enforce VWP
policies with noncompliant countries. Congressman Randy Forbes recently stated in response to
shortcomings in the VWP program that “there is tremendous pressure on federal authorities to
green light visas despite the inability to fully vet foreigners.” (Forbes, 2016) Divergent goals of
the administration, Congress, DHS, and VWP countries are inhibiting full functionality of the
program. In the absences of a common language and culture, communication and information-
sharing between agencies becomes more difficult.
2. Funding
VSP and VWP also bring to light another system trap: competition for funding. Escalation
occurs as departments and agencies compete for funding from Congress. Law enforcement is
arguably easier to sell than diplomacy, as results of law enforcement are more tangible than those
of diplomacy. For this reason, DOS consistently finds itself scrambling for funds. As noted by the
44
Hart-Rudman Commission, DOS has become weakened as many of its core functions have been
partitioned off to other agencies. For varying reasons, Congress has lost faith in the department,
resulting in severe underfunding. (The United States Commission on National Security, 2001, p.
53) The adjudication and issuance of visas by DOS is almost one hundred percent funded by
service fees. While growth in funding for VSP has not been particularly robust, the program
nonetheless receives significant funding from Congress – in FY 2011 it received $29.5 million.
(Wasem, 2011, p. 16) Large disparities in funding for different departments creates friction, which
in turn lessens the ability of programs like VSP and VWP to operate effectively.
B. Tracking Visa Overstays
The rate of visa overstays in the United States is not only affected by policies that prevent
suspicious individuals from entering the country. It is also largely influenced by policies and
systems that track nonimmigrants once they have entered the country. The next section will
analyze some of the mechanisms in place to track nonimmigrants if they overstay their designated
length of time in the country. More specifically, it will look at intra-agency mechanisms that track
this. The paper will then look at how individuals who overstay their visas are prioritized through
a risk assessment. Finally, the section will also look at system traps that are hindering the full
functionality of the system. This will be done through the lens of a complex system.
1. Biometric Exit System
Since 1996, Congress has passed seven separate laws requiring biometric entry-exit screening
for foreign nationals entering and leaving the United States. In 2004, following the 9/11 attacks,
Congress, under the recommendations of a bi-partisan 9/11 commission, became more earnest in
its demands, and once again recommended the implementation of biometric entry-exit screening.
While the “entry” part of the system has largely been successful, with almost all foreign nationals
applying for a visa submitting biometric information (fingerprints and a digital photograph),
foreigners still face no biometric exit screening when leaving the United States. (Beck, 2016) For
a comprehensive look at a timeline of events relating to biometric entry and exit system, see
Appendix 4.
45
According to DHS, infrastructural limitations largely inhibit a functional biometric exit system.
The United States did not build its border, aviation, and immigration infrastructure with exit
processing as a priority. As a result, United States airports do not have specific areas for travelers
leaving the country. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016, p. 1) These infrastructural
barriers are preventing the expansion of exit lanes at international airports. Installing such a system
would require recapitalizing airports in order to establish sterile physical areas, and would require
significant limitations in the number of gates that airlines could use for international departures.
(Healy, 2016, p. 10) Furthermore, U.S. airports do not have secure and designated exit areas for
passengers to wait in prior to departure, nor are there existing checkpoints where departing
passengers are inspected and recorded by immigration officers. (Healy, 2016, p. 10) Compounding
issues is the reticence of international airlines to approve such a system, as they fear it would make
international flights less affordable as departure space would be reduced significantly. DHS could
pursue a solution within the constraints of existing infrastructure. In order to do so, DHS would
need to hire thousands of new CBP officers to biometrically verify departing passengers. But the
department argues this would result in significant travel delays and would cost millions of dollars.
(Healy, 2016, p. 11)
Yet, having a biometric entry-exit tracking system would largely reduce DHS’s inability to
accurately measure the number of visa overstays in the United States. In place of an exit system,
foreigners leaving the country are recorded through passenger manifests provided by commercial
carriers. In most cases the government relies on the good faith of the foreign nationals to leave the
country. However, it is estimated that 40-50 percent of illegal immigrants in the country entered
the United States legally and did not leave the country when lawfully required. (Beck, 2016) The
current manifest system has a large margin of error due to the highly variable nature of manifests
and misspelled names still remain an issue writ large. The 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks
had over 300 spellings of their names collectively. (Kephat, 2013) Additionally, Tamerlan
Tsarnaev, one of the two individuals involved in the Boston Marathon bombing, was able to
successfully leave the country without detection by the FBI before the bombing because his name
was misspelled by the airline. Therefore, without biometrics, or simply a check of a passport by
CBP agents upon exiting the country, it is impossible to accurately verify who is on an airplane.
As a result of inaccuracies, ICE agents investigating overstays are often referred to high priority
leads who have already left the United States. Likewise, ICE agents have to deploy overseas
46
resources or go out into the field to verify the departure of an individual. (Myers Wood, 2013, p.
6) Kephat suggests that a set of monitored kiosks, unmanned gates, or handheld devices could be
used to match passport data against biometric information collected upon entry into the country.
While the “hits” might not result in the denial of departure, the program would confirm departure
and help immigration and law enforcements officers more accurately monitor and asses visa
overstays in the United States. Another feasible option would be to place a biometric checkpoint
at the front of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint, which would create
a better-informed and more secure aviation environment. (Kephat, 2013) However, this policy is
also not in place as of 2016.
This is not to say that DHS is not experimenting with new technologies to implement a
biometric exit system. A 2009 DHS report studied data from two airport biometric pilot programs.
This report concluded that the Air Exit Pilots were highly successful at two large U.S. international
airports. (Healy, 2016, p. 11) More recently, biometric exit mobile air tests have been run in the
top 10 airports in the United States: Chicago/O’Hare, Atlanta/Hartsfield, New York/JFK, Newark,
Los Angeles/LAX, San Francisco, Miami, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Washington/Dulles, and
Houston/George Bush. This system collects biometric exit data using mobile fingerprint devices
on selected flights departing from U.S. international airports. The success of this program has yet
to be determined as it was only recently launched, but results from pilots like these will influence
the future biometric exit solution.
2. Overstay Enforcement and Prioritization
ICE identifies and initiates enforcement action on overstay violators using a prioritization
framework based on those who pose national security or public safety worries. (Healy, 2016, p. 7)
HSI is responsible for determining those overstay violators to be investigated. In order to do so,
HSI analyzes system-generated leads stored in CBP’s ADIS. (Healy, 2016, p. 7) Once these leads
are received, HSI prioritizes cases through a risk-based analysis. CTCEU of HSI oversees the
investigations carried out on overstay violators, and determines those cases that warrant field
investigations. (Healy, 2016, p. 8) CTCEU looks at individuals who pose a risk based on travel
patterns, intelligence reports, and in-depth criminal analysis. Investigations and analysis are also
developed in close consultation with other law enforcement and intelligence communities in the
U.S. government. Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), a division of ICE, also
47
complements CTCEU’s work. CTCEU refers cases to ERO when derogatory information has not
been found. This division is responsible for identifying and apprehending aliens who are subject
to removal from the country, detains these individuals when necessary, and removes them from
the United States. (Government Accountability Office, 2011, p. 12) Because ERO does not
separately track overstay cases though, the agency cannot reliably quantify the results of its in-
country overstay enforcement efforts. In addition, CTCEU does not refer cases to ERO in an
automated process, relying on email and other methods that require manual input from agents.
CTCEU relies on a prioritization framework established through interagency cooperation and
partnerships. This framework incorporates programs and includes: DHS’s Overstay Projects;
Absent Without Leave (AWOL) Program; INTERPOL leads; and individuals on watch lists, such
as the terrorist watch list. (Healy, 2016, p. 9) In FY 2015, CTCEU reviewed 971,305 compliance
leads. After determining the relative risk of each case, 9,968 leads were sent to HSI field offices
to be investigated. (Healy, 2016, p. 9) From these cases, 3,038 were deemed viable for
investigation. The other 4,148 were closed as being in compliance. In FY 2015 HSI agents made
1,910 arrests, and secured 86 indictments with 80 convictions. (Healy, 2016, p. 9)
USCIS also plays an important role in determining visa overstays. The agency is responsible
for processing nonimmigrant benefits, including an extension of a visa or a change in a visa status.
When a CTCEU agent reviews an overstay lead, the agent checks the USCIS electronic
information system to see if the suspected overstay has filed a benefit application. However,
USCIS systems are very slow and antiquated and often don’t reflect the current status of the
individual under investigation. This information is also important for CBP officials, who are
responsible for determining the status of an individual upon entering and leaving the country. In a
2011 GAO report, USCIS identified ineffective information-sharing with government partners as
one of the agency’s challenges, and acknowledged that information shared with other agencies is
sometimes difficult to obtain, incomplete, or not current. This dilemma will be addressed in the
policy recommendations.
DHS has a prioritization system that determines the risk of each visa overstay case, but is this
significant enough to mitigate safety risks to U.S. citizens? In a hearing held by the Senate
Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest on January 20, 2016, Senator David
Perdue (D-GA) asked Craig Healy, the Assistant Director of ICE’s National Security
48
Investigations Division, if the 3,000 individuals investigated in 2016 could have come into the
country in any one of the past 20 years. Healy responded yes to this question, indicating DHS’s
less than perfect system for investigating visa overstays. Perdue went on to emphasize that 3,000
seemed to be a rather insignificant number of the up to 5 million individuals who had overstayed
their visa in the past 20 years. He further noted, “[The United States] has a monumental issue here.
Even if the [United States] were to put biometric in, and have all of the 100% accurate information
on exit, [the United States] has this huge, built up issue.” (Perdue, 2016) Perdue’s line of
questioning indicates Congress’ unease with the number of visa overstay investigations in
comparison to the much larger number of visa overstay cases. With such a large number of cases
and limited manpower and resources, it is impossible to effectively investigate all cases.
3. System Limitations
Just as the systems to prevent those from entering the country with the proclivity to overstay
their nonimmigrant visas have some limitations, or traps, so do the systems that track visa
overstays. These system traps are discussed below.
A. Intra-Agency Fragmentation
Contributing to DHS’s inability to implement a functioning biometric entry-exit system at U.S
airports and seaports is fragmentation within the department at both the strategic and operational
levels. As mentioned earlier, fragmentation occurs when stakeholders within a system see
themselves more as individual entities than as part of a greater whole. In the wake of 9/11, the US-
VISIT system was developed in order to eliminate passport and visa fraud at both consular offices
overseas and U.S. ports of entry. (Beck, 2016) Over time, the US-VISIT program took on more
operational responsibilities to include oversight of identifying visa overstays, determining visa
overstay rates, and developing and implementing a biometric exit program. In 2013, overwhelmed
with too many responsibilities, US-VISIT was divested of the two aforementioned responsibilities,
which were taken over by CBP. CBP is now solely responsible for the development of a biometric
exit program, with ICE acting as the key agency to enforce immigration law against foreign
nationals. In 2013, the US-VISIT program was also reshuffled into the Office of Biometric Identity
Management (OBIM) in order to provide a more secure nation through advanced biometric
identification, information-sharing, and improved analysis. The biometric system OBIM utilizes
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is the IDENT system, previously mentioned in this paper. A table is provided below to show the
respective responsibilities of each agency within DHS in both the biometric entry-exit system and
investigating visa overstays.
Figure 8: DHS Programs and Responsibilities
Agency/Program Area of Responsibility
CBP Developing a biometric exit system and
inspection of individuals who enter the country
OBIM (Previously US-VISIT) Providing biometric identification services
ICE
ICE CTCEU
ICE ERO
Tracking and identifying nonimmigrants who
overstay visas
Investigating a wide range of domestic and
international activities arising from the illegal
movement of people and goods in the United
States
Identifying and apprehending aliens who are
subject to removal from the United States
As both the information and table above illustrate, there has been an evolution in the
responsibilities and oversight assigned to different agencies within DHS in both tracking visa
overstays and implementing a biometric exit system. In order for a strategy to be successful, a
clear problem needs to be addressed. US-VISIT was initially designed to prevent the use of
fraudulent visas and passports. Over time, emphasis evolved to address not only fraud issues, but
also identifying visa overstays and implementing a biometric exit system. Once DHS realized this
was beyond the capacity of the program, resources and responsibilities had to be reshuffled. A lack
of a coherent and consistent framework of responsibilities for actors involved in the development
of a biometric exit system has created an unavoidable trap.
The current relationship between CTCEU and ERO also highlights difficulties in intra-
agency communication. ICE is working hard to improve lanes of communication between the two
agencies, but an automated system still does not exist. In addition, USCIS’s inability to accurately
process immigrant benefits in a timely and effective manner due to antiquated systems and
resources prevents both CTCEU and CBP agents from properly addressing visa overstays.
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B. Political Limitations
Politicking is seriously inhibiting the development of an effective exit system in the United
States. Embedded within the U.S. political process and legislation system are some inherent flaws.
Firstly, Congress made an unreasonable demand in its mandate to implement a biometric
entry-exit system in such a short amount of time. The public sector functions in a manner that
produces very slow outcomes because of bureaucratic limitations. Congress needs to consider
these limitations when it sets forth mandates.
Secondly, there is incoherence in the approach of Congress to achieve its goal. Calculating
the optimal allocation of funds is a complicated exercise, and it is difficult to distribute funds
effectively in order to mitigate security risks in the complex security apparatus of the United States.
Historically, Congress has been known to spread money around, even at the expense of efficient
pursuit of the legislation’s goals. (Cohen, 2007, p. 714) This can be seen in appropriations granted
to DHS. Funding has been a serious impediment to the implementation of the entry-exit system.
While funding issues have recently been resolved with the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2016, which created a dedicated stream of revenue to implement the biometric entry-exit system,
(Federation for American Immigration Reform, 2016), goal distortion obstructed this allocation of
appropriations for many years.
Finally, there are many opportunities to veto legislation during the legislative process.
While this phenomenon is not unique to visa security policy issues, it nonetheless creates hurdles
for the smooth passage of legislation.
The cumulative result of political limitations to visa security policies is a system that cannot
achieve its goals.
C. Lack of Consensus
A lack of consensus on the merits of a biometric exit system is also hindering the effectiveness
of visa overstay enforcement policies. As mentioned earlier, DHS cites both financial and
infrastructural issues as the main inhibitors of a comprehensive entry-exit biometric system. Some
argue that the biometric system would do very little to enhance security and prevent visa overstays.
In an op-ed piece written by Steven P. Bucci, the Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center
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for Foreign Policy Studies, he argues that that a biographic system – based on names, country of
citizenship, date of birth, and other details of individuals’ background – akin to the system in place
today, would be just as effective as a biometric system, but at a much smaller price tag. (Bucci,
2013) Current legislation requires all commercial airlines to submit passenger manifests of
individuals physically on the airplane and not just the names of those who made reservations or
were scheduled to be onboard. DHS reports that compliance by airlines is near 100 percent. (Healy,
2016, p. 4) Therefore, the current system is functioning well enough to maintain it as it is. Some
senators in the “Gang of Eight”, the bi-partisan group of eight United States Senators who wrote
the 2014 comprehensive immigration reform bill, also agreed that the marginal benefit of a
biometric entry/exit system was not worth the extreme costs.
Yet, other stakeholders do not agree with this school of thought. There are serious flaws in the
current system that users can exploit: name fraud and documentation fraud to name a few.
Furthermore, with over 500,000 cases of visa overstays in FY 2015, this causes a huge strain on
ICE, the agency responsible for tracking and investigating visa overstay cases. In regard to
overstay enforcement and prioritization, the administration has the authority to determine which
individuals should be investigated, and therefore inconsistent policies from the administration
result in confusion. Ultimately, a lack of consensus on how to approach the issue is stalling the
development of a solution to the problem. Policy solutions for this will be discussed in the next
chapter of the thesis.
D. Summary
This chapter showed how the current visa security system has fallen into a number of system
traps: divergent strategies, policy resistance, funding, intra-agency fragmentation, political
limitations, and a lack of consensus. The stakeholders in the visa security system view themselves
as separate units, which results in chaotic and disjointed knowledge-sharing. Traps prevent the
system from functioning at full capacity. In order to help visualize some of the elements and
interconnections contributing to the visa overstay rate, a causal loop has been drawn below.
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Figure 9: Visa Overstay Causal Loop
The figure above highlights how miscommunication at the strategic level can lead to an
increase in visa overstay rates. This can be seen in the reinforcing loop on the left side of the
diagram. However, it also shows that an increase in the visa overstay rate might lead to the
implementation of more innovative technologies, which could in turn reduce the visa overstay rate.
This is highlighted in the balancing loop on the right side of the diagram. Chapter V introduces ten
policy recommendations that have the potential to increase visa security policies and in turn
decrease the rate of visa overstays in the United States.
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V. Policy Recommendations and Anticipated Barriers
A. Policy Recommendations
Current visa security policies operate in a very complex system, with effective inter- and
intra-agency communication essential for their success. Chapter IV highlighted some of the
problems confronting the current system. As systems produce their own behavior, it is possible to
permanently eliminate the pattern of a behavior by modifying the system structure. This chapter
proposes ways to modify the system behavior through policy recommendations that could enable
the visa security system to function more effectively. The suggested policy recommendations will
be presented in the following order: strategic, followed by tactical, and finally operational.
1. Whole of Government Strategy
The U.S. visa security system is comprised of primarily three distinct departments, and a
multitude of different agencies within each department. Departments compete with one another
for funding and pursue divergent goals and strategies. The Obama administration’s push for WoG
management notwithstanding, this approach has not been actualized in administration of visa
security policies. Instead, changes to visa security policies have been piecemeal and
compartmentalized rather than systematic. A systematic WoG approach to increase the
effectiveness of visa security policies would consist of the following components: a section of the
NSS dedicated to visa security issues; a shift to strategic, long-term planning; a development of
metrics and reporting to determine the success of programs; and an agency to oversee all visa
policies.
The most recent 2015 NSS does not include improving visa security policies as part of its
objectives. An explicit reference should be made to visa security policies. The NSS is the umbrella
under which all other security strategies are crafted. By including visa security in this executive
document, other departments would be more apt to include visa issues as well when developing
their strategies. In addition to the NSS, documents need to be developed to specifically detail the
ways and means by which each department will achieve its objectives.
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Today’s security infrastructure is shaped by both short- and long- term objectives. Due to the
often virulent nature of isolated attacks, (e.g., terrorist attacks, cybersecurity breaches, shootings)
long-term objectives are often superseded by reactionary responses to short-term threats. Security
agencies become entrenched in focusing on the immediate. Strategy development should mirror
Treverton’s fast and comprehensive decision-making model, and should include long-range policy
forecasting and contingency plans that can be implemented in case of conditional changes.
Programs such as VSP and the development of a functional biometric entry-exit system have
been waylaid by a lack of reliable metrics and reporting. In fact, before December 2015, senior
DHS officials stated that the department had not reported overstay rates because it did not have
confidence in its overstay data, and therefore could not reliably estimate overstay rates. (Myers
Wood, 2013, p. 4) While GAO exists to ensure accountability of government departments and
agencies, stakeholders in the visa security paradigm need to take proactive steps to follow up and
report back on both the successes and failures of programs. A WoG approach stresses that
divergent agencies not only conflate their strategies, but also that they follow-up on the
implementation of strategies.
Finally, an agency needs to be developed to oversee all visa security policies. These policies
would include those that transcend department barriers, such as visa adjudication, VSP, and visa
overstay enforcement. A logical place for this agency or organization to reside would be within
the confines of the NSC. This could be implemented under the guise of a directorate. Directorates
are set up to address either geographical or functional areas; the new directorate would be called
the Visa Security Directorate. This directorate would be charged with developing horizontal
strategies, long-term policy forecasting, and follow-up plans for visa security programs. The
formation of such a directorate would guarantee that all visa security policy issues and questions
reported to one institution, mitigating the tendency for messages to be lost in inter- and intra-
agency lanes of communication.
2. Merge CBP and ICE
The motion to merge the CBP and ICE arms of DHS has been considered for many years. This
is not surprising given the overlap in the responsibilities of the two agencies and their close
working relationship. In fact, CBP and ICE were originally created by splitting Customs and
55
Immigration and INS and recombining them into CBP and ICE under the Homeland Security Act
of 2002. With the formation of CBP and ICE, the responsibility for customs and immigration
enforcement was divided between two agencies, with no sole agency responsible for the full scope
of customs and immigration enforcement. Notionally, the creation of DHS was meant to mitigate
overlaps and redundancies between agencies responsible for border enforcement, investigations,
and internal enforcement. However, some believe the creation of DHS merely reshuffled resources
without streamlining processes. CBP and ICE rely heavily on each other’s assistance. Specifically,
enforcement efforts are normally initiated by CBP, and are completed by ICE. ICE also is
responsible for investigating case referrals from CBP inspectors. The two agencies today operate
using many of the same systems, including ADIS, TECS, and SEVIS. Yet, there are clear
institutional barriers between the two agencies. Though there has been a notable effort to improve
coordination and information-sharing between the two parties, there is still room for improvement.
CBP and ICE should continue to work together to improve coordination and cooperation. If a
merge of the two agencies is not possible, as they have operated separately for the past 15 years,
there should be a tangible push to create a DHS-level oversight committee for CBP and ICE.
Likewise, the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Border Enforcement could be created for
oversight. Both the committee and Deputy Assistant would be responsible for overseeing and
arbitrating issues of overlap and dispute between the two agencies and would simultaneously
streamline processes to enhance information and intelligence-sharing.
3. Continue to Develop DHS-DOS Relationship
Cooperation between DHS and DOS is essential for a functioning visa security system.
Pursuant to this goal, the two departments should continue to foster healthy working relationships
at the operational level. As such, VSP should continue to expand its operations while maintaining
reliable metrics and regularly reporting back to headquarters. In the higher levels of management,
there is still some resistance to VSUs from the DOS side. However, on the operational level, the
program seems to be functioning quite well. Speaking with an HSI agent who has spent
considerable time in VSUs, he highlighted the balanced approach and atmosphere VSUs create.
The blending of minds between DOS officers and DHS agents has enabled a system that prevents
individuals of high-risk from entering the country. In addition, there have been cases where HSI
agents uncovered derogatory information about an individual that might not have been discovered
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before, thus increasing the layer of security for U.S. citizens. (S. Briseno, personal communication,
June 22, 2016) Dan Cadman, a retired ICE agent who now works as a fellow at CIS, noted “the
personal contact between consular officers and ICE agents was one of the very best things that the
VSP established because mutual respect became the baseline from which effective cooperation
developed.” (Cadman, 2014) Likewise, the program promoted mutual respect for one another’s
roles both domestically and abroad. Ultimately, departments should eschew isolationism in favor
of inter-agency cooperation.
4. Joint DHS-DOS Strategic Plan
As highlighted in policy recommendation number three, while operational cooperation
between DHS and DOS is improving, information gaps and conflicting goals still remain at the
strategic level. A joint DHS-DOS Strategic Plan should be drafted in order to more explicitly lay
out the strategic goals and objects for DHS and DOS in overlapping areas of responsibility.
Currently, an MOU exists between the two departments, but this document targets operational
activities relating to VSUs. The goal of this plan would be twofold: 1) to strategically map
overarching visa security objectives and relative responsibilities of each department; and 2) to
explicitly highlight which agency or department was responsible for oversight of programs and
databases contributing to visa security. Upon speaking with DOS representatives, it became clear
the department sometimes does not know which agency within DHS to consult when certain
questions arise. A joint DHS-DOS Strategic Plan would give each department a blueprint from
which each of their respective visa security objectives would stem.
5. Support from the Administration
The complex nature of the visa security system in the United States is inherently shaped by
top-down oversight from the executive office. Given this structure, it is essential for an
administration to make pursuing individuals who overstay their visas a priority. The decision to
initiate an overstay investigation is determined by the security risk of the individual. Current
policies direct ICE agents to focus on individuals convicted of major crimes or suspects involved
in terrorist activities, allowing the majority of visa overstays to go uninvestigated. Prioritization
schemes should be altered to more broadly pursue overstays and budget requests made by the
administration should be robust enough to support such efforts.
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6. Commitment to Enforcement
Not only should DHS continue to develop its biometric technologies, ICE should also devote
more resources to overstay enforcement as it is not enough to merely identify individuals who
overstay their visas. According to a report released by GAO in 2013, ICE reported allocating a
relatively small percentage of its resources to investigative work spent on overstay investigations.
This numbers ranged from 1.8 to 3.4 percent from FY 2005-2012. The figure below highlights
these numbers.
Figure 10: U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) Reported Percentage of
Homeland Security Investigations Field Office Investigative Hours Dedicated to Overstay
Investigations, Fiscal Years 2005-2012
Source: (Government Accountability Office, 2013, pp. 39-40)
ICE has a very broad mandate, and must distribute its funds among numerous initiatives and
task forces. By increasing the efficiency of the entry-exit systems, resources could be more
58
efficiently devoted to overstay enforcement. In addition, the visa overstay rate would decrease,
thus minimizing the workload for ICE agents currently dedicating hours to CTCEU investigations.
7. Continue Development of a Biometric Exit System
Congress has mandated the development of an exit-tracking system in eight separate statutes
since 1996. While no comprehensive exit-tracking system exists today at POEs, CBP is
nonetheless coming up with innovative ways and new technologies to facilitate a transition from
a biographic to a biometric system. Some of these pilot projects are listed below:
A. Biometric Exit Mobile Air Test (Be-Mobile): Since July 2015, CBP has been
experimenting with the collection of biometric exit data through mobile fingerprint
collection devices used on randomly selected group of non-U.S. citizens on selected flights
departing from 10 U.S. international airports. (Healy, 2016, p. 12)
B. Departure Information System Test: Starting June 13, 2016, CBP has begun to test how
the integration of data sources and information system can process departure data at
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. CBP is testing the ability for information systems
to compare traveler images in real time to images previously acquired to determine if this
is in scope for biometric collection in an automated fashion. (Healy, 2016, p. 12)
CBP should continue to develop and test innovative measures through which biometric
information can be obtained from departing travelers in a cost and time effective manner.
Furthermore, the agency should continue to incorporate and partner with private sector entities.
Private sector security firms have more funding and manpower to devote to developing new
technologies to be used by the U.S. government. For example, Disney Amusement Parks have
been using biometrics at entrance gates for years. These systems were developed with an emphasis
on ergonomics, accuracy, and speed. As longer waiting times is a primary concern when discussing
the implementation of a biometric exit systems at U.S. POEs, the private sector should be consulted
on how to develop streamlined and innovate systems. In addition, DHS should also look to best
practices developed by DOD as DOD has been developing and implementing technologies to be
used at gate entrances to bases. Many of the technologies being developed by DOD are biometrics
collected using handheld devices, which could easily be implemented in U.S. POEs. Ultimately,
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the goal of the system should be to maximize speed and minimize costs through the use of proven
technologies.
Financial costs and infrastructure limitations notwithstanding, developing an effective
biometric system at U.S. POEs would greatly increase DHS’s ability to track visa overstays.
Today’s technology is improving at an exponential rate and DHS should capitalize on this. Not
only would it reduce the ability for fraudulent documents and names to make it through the system,
it would enable DHS to shift resources currently dedicated to determining whether or not an
individual has overstayed a visa to other law enforcement efforts. The successful system would be
overseen by OBIM and merged with the ADIS, which would significantly help streamline the
workload of the following agencies and departments:
USCIS uses ADIS to verify individuals applying for immigrations benefits, including
asylum and refugee status.
DOS uses the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) to screen visa applicants. CCD is
linked with a number of other systems, including IDENT, which stores biometric
information of individuals who have previously obtained visas. An accurate biometric exit
system would help consular officers more effectively determine visa applicants who had
previously overstayed a visa.
DOJ relies on information provided by IDENT when conducting immigration court
proceedings, administrative hearings, and appellate reviews
8. Implement more Automated Lanes of Communication
Since 2001, the U.S. government has increasingly improved its ability to share information
between agencies and within agencies. DHS and DOS should continue to incorporate new
technologies and systems that more efficiently facilitate communication and information-sharing.
As a concrete example, USCIS continues to spend more than $300 million per year shipping,
storing, and handling over 20 million paper immigrant files. (Roth, 2016, pp. 13-14) The 19,000
employees working for USCIS are required to enforce highly complex law, regulations, and
policies when determining immigrant benefits. They are often forced to complete these functions
with an antiquated system of paper-based files. (Roth, 2016, p. 13) DHS has launched the
Electronic Immigration System (ELIS), a platform through which customers can electronically
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submit applications. However, a July 2015 GAO report noted that using electronic files in this
system took twice as long as using paper files. As a result, customers are forced to wait longer for
adjudication decisions, which ostensibly raises the rate of visa overstays in the United States. DHS
should focus its efforts on developing systems and methods of communication that would mitigate
the need for employees to resort to paper files. Doing so would allow USCIS to more swiftly
determine the eligibility of a nonimmigrant for benefits and would reduce the number of reported
visa overstays in the country.
9. Fines for Visa Overstays
Human beings respond to incentives. DHS should take this into consideration and develop a
fine system for individuals who choose to overstay their visas. As of 2016, such a system does not
exist. The United States should look to its partners in Europe, where overstaying a Schengen visa
can result in a hefty fine. The United States needs to develop a system to disincentive individuals
from overstaying their visas. Current systems are in place to fine individuals for expired licenses,
not possessing car insurance, and not maintaining proper health insurance. Therefore, the U.S.
should also look to existing systems in the United States as models. Repercussions for a visa
overstay include being barred from returning to the U.S. for a number of years, restriction from an
extension of stay or change of status, and the possibility of being barred from applying for a visa
at a U.S. consulate in the individuals’ native country. Adding a fine to this list of repercussions
would only enhance the system. Furthermore, the purpose of the fine could be twofold: 1) act as
an incentive to prevent individuals from overstaying a visa; and 2) go towards funding to develop
a functioning biometric entry-exit system. Monetary incentives are highly effective and would not
only dissuade individuals from overstaying a visa, but also increase funding for other DHS
projects.
10. Continue to Improve VWP Information-sharing and Compliance
DHS must continue to ensure the compliance of VWP countries in line with the rules and
regulations of the program. As noted earlier in the paper, the U.S. government requires all VWP
countries to report information about lost or stolen passports, share watch list information on
known or suspected terrorists, and enhance law enforcement cooperation by sharing criminal
61
history information with the United States. More than a third of VWP countries are not complying
with the latter two agreements of VWP. DHS has not established time frames for instituting the
aforementioned requirements in VWP countries. In order to strengthen DHS’s credibility in the
program, as well as enhance the department’s ability to respond to non-compliant VWP countries,
timeframes for the implementation of requirements should be established. Given the past lethargy
in implementation of information-sharing agreements, both DHS and Congress should also
continue to promote and monitor these agreements. The PATRIOT system established to help ICE
agents in the VSP is a prime example of a fast and efficient information-sharing system and should
be looked to as an example of best practices. DHS should continue to deepen its relationship with
INTERPOL and other intergovernmental agencies that promote information-sharing. With better
information-sharing, more individuals with the proclivity to overstay a visa will be prevented from
entering the country.
B. Anticipated Barriers
Implementing the policy recommendations above would improve the visa security system
and in turn reduce the rate of visa overstays in the United States. However, traps are inherent in
the system and will try to prevent the implementation of new policies. These anticipated traps, or
barriers, are primarily bureaucratic, political, and financial.
1. Bureaucratic
A. Barriers
The formation of an effective, streamlined visa security system in the United States will
face bureaucratic resistance. This is largely due to competing interests, cultures, and purposes
among agencies in the bureaucratic system and the government’s broad inability to adapt how it
manages problems.
B. Solutions
Many problems in the public sector stem from the constant change in leadership of agencies.
Therefore, a leader normally has a limited amount of time to see the results of a policy. This can
lead to a tendency for leaders to focus on reforms in the short run, as they are less time-consuming
62
and can be enacted quickly. In order to circumvent this tendency, a conscious effort must be made
to focus on long-term goals, and a smooth transition between leadership must be pursued. Agencies
are also highly specialized, which inhibits the transfer of knowledge within the government.
Specialization within agencies leads to broadly different cultures. Highly diverse cultures within
government agencies in turn causes competing interests. Furthermore, the longer an agency is
around, the more entrenched in its ways it becomes. Finally, Congress and the legislative process
also ultimately confine agencies.
In order to overcome these barriers to implement the policy suggestions, the system ultimately
needs to win over the internal stakeholders. This can be done by producing clear and articulated
mission goals. Furthermore, agencies must place an emphasis on tangible results. A conscious
effort must also be made to maintain the cultural identity of each agency while promoting a
confluence of strategy. Change is hard in any organization, but within the complex organizational
design of government agencies, it becomes even more difficult. Highlighting tangible results and
improvements will make stakeholders within the government less resistant to change.
2. Political
A. Barriers
Politics ultimately play a role in the visa security system and can easily change how it is
shaped. Politics primarily influence the system through the following outlets: the executive branch,
the legislative branch, private stakeholders, and public opinion. Overall, self-interest drives
politicking, and by overcoming self-interest, a system can be fixed.
B. Solutions
As mentioned previously, the executive branch shapes the framework of the overall NSS.
In order to overcome self-interest, administrations need to become more willing to focus on long-
term goals. Members of Congress are also limited by the interest of his or her constituents and
their own political parties. In order to avoid this trend, there needs to be a hard push for Congress
to pass solid legislation and appropriate funds not along party lines, but rather in a manner that
will increase security for American citizens. One of the largest private investors with a stake in
visa security policies is the airline industry. DHS should hold comprehensive and open dialogues
63
with airlines to discuss the merits of a biometric exit system. Furthermore, the department should
incorporate airlines to develop new biometric technologies that could limit infrastructural change.
Finally, government agencies and Congress must convince the public that visa security issues are
important. Once the American public is involved, demand for policy reforms will increase.
3. Funding
A. Barriers
The majority of the policy recommendations laid out in this paper require funding. Drafting a
budget is one of the most contentious yearly activities Congress must see through. As such, it often
results in a standoff along party lines.
B. Solutions
On the Congressional level, policymakers need to start budgeting for the long run. Current
budgeting processes overlook long-term issues and focus only on short-term matters. A
comprehensive overhaul of the visa security system requires long-term planning and spending.
Both DHS and DOS need to carefully analyze current budgets and spending as well. More effort
needs to be put into researching how to best allocate spending to improve safety. Furthermore,
consistent and accurate metrics need to be in place to monitor spending within the departments.
By cutting fraud, waste, and abuse, both DHS and DOS will be able to put more funds towards
programs that improve the visa security system.
64
VI. Conclusion
This thesis used policy analysis to examine the current visa security system and visa
overstays. This approach allowed the reader to understand current limitations of the system, and
how policymakers can improve the system in order to make it more effective. By approaching the
research from a complex systems perspective, system traps were discovered and ways to feasibly
improve the system within the confines of a highly dynamic organization were suggested. The
research broke the components of the system down into three parts: elements, interconnections,
and purpose. By deconstructing the system, it was much easier to distinguish the internal structure
from external events. As such, it was determined that internal communications, divergent cultures,
and divergent goals were contributing to the level of visa overstay rates in the United States. In
addition, short-term, piecemeal strategies that result from external events are circumventing and
clouding the vision of long-term objectives.
This chapter will summarize the findings to answer the research questions posed in Chapter
I, the policy recommendations put forth in Chapter V, and the overall outcomes of the research.
A. Research Questions
1. To what extent has inter- and intra-agency communication between U.S.
government agencies and organizational complexities affected the visa overstay
rates in the United States?
Chapter II highlighted the interconnectedness between government agencies and chapter
III analyzed the purpose and effectiveness of inter- and intra-agency communication. The initial
hypothesis was that that organizational complexity and communication methods were impeding
the ability of the agencies responsible for visa security policy in the United States to implement a
system that most effectively addressed the problem of visa overstays. In order to assess this
hypothesis, it was important to look at changes in visa security policies since 9/11. After a careful
assessment and an examination of multiple programs that rely on inter- and intra-agency
communication, it was concluded that inter- and intra-agency communications were are in fact
inhibiting the ability for visa security policies to function at full capacity. In addition, divergent
strategies, policy resistance, funding, intra-agency fragmentation, political limitations, and a lack
65
of consensus were a result of the complex visa security system, and were also creating
inefficiencies within organizations. However, the research also discovered that cooperation on the
operational level, namely in VSP, allowed DHS and DOS to better understand one another and
also broke down cultural barriers between the two agencies.
2. Is it possible to create a more effective visa security system that would reduce the
visa overstay rate in the United States, and what are the roadblocks for the
establishment of such a system?
After carefully analyzing the current visa security system, the paper then looked at an
alternative system that would more effectively mitigate and monitor the number of individuals
who choose to overstay their visas in the United States. The initial hypothesis was that a more
effective visa security system is feasible, but highly partisan government agencies would inhibit
the implementation of such a system.
The proposed system was broken down into the policy recommendations set out in chapter
V. These recommendations were listed in an order starting at the strategic level and then moving
down to the operational level. The following were the proposed policy recommendations: WoG
management; merging CBP and ICE; continuing to develop the DOS-DHS relationship; a joint
DOS-DHS strategic plan; support from the administration; a commitment to enforcement; the
continued development of a biometric entry/exit system; implementation of more automated lanes
of communication; a fee system for individuals who overstay a visa; and a continued commitment
to improve information-sharing and compliance. The policy recommendations focused on
improving internal communications and constructing more explicit long-term objectives. As such,
this minimizes the risk for internal escalation and system traps, which are both prevalent in highly
complex systems. These recommendations, if implemented, would increase the functionality and
effectiveness of the visa security system. Chapter V also examined the barriers that must be
overcome in order to establish a more efficient visa security paradigm. Partisan politics were found
to be a barrier to the implementation of the proposed system. In addition, political and financial
barriers would also inhibit the system. More specifically, the executive branch, the legislative
branch, private stakeholders, and public opinion hold sway over the entire system. Furthermore,
the budgeting process that takes place on a yearly basis in Congress makes it difficult to garner
enough funds to support specific policies. A number of solutions were put forward, including the
66
development of long-term strategic goals, winning over public support for improved visa security
policies, and the implementation of reliable metrics to measure the success of programs and
policies. Being aware of anticipated barriers is intrinsically important for any policy
recommendation. Ultimately, a more effective visa security system is possible, but it requires
willingness and support from all stakeholders within the system.
B. Future Research and a Way Forward
The research conducted in this thesis used a policy analysis approach to determine the
elements, interconnections and functions within the visa security system. It was determined that
the majority of elements within the system are government agencies. Yet, there are a number of
additional actors that could play a critical role in visa security policies.
Further research should be conducted to determine how to involve more private sector
industries and elements in the system. The public sector still does not readily employ innovations
and technologies coming out of California’s Silicon Valley. DHS created the Homeland Security
Innovation Programs (HSIP) in 2015 to establish a presence in Silicon Valley to cultivate
relationships with technology innovators, but this program is still very young. New technologies
would substantially improve automated methods of information-sharing between and within
agencies. Furthermore, bridging the gap between the innovation sector and public sector would
create jobs and lay the foundation for relationships that could be utilized in future projects.
The United States should also examine the best practices of other countries that have
implemented a biometric entry-exit system. Singapore is one such example. Biometric systems are
already used at sea and land ports and will soon be introduced at airports in the coming months.
Singapore’s Immigration & Checkpoints Authority (ICA) engaged NEC, a private company, to
design an advanced biometric system. NEC developed a system whereby a traveler can present a
passport and a fingerprint without having to see an officer face to face, thus minimizing travel
delays. The false acceptance rate for this technology is 0.001%. (NEC, 2016) The United States
should work closely with other countries like Singapore to develop similar technologies.
This thesis examined the U.S. visa security system in order to determine the agents and
elements affecting the visa overstay rate. By taking a holistic approach, the research not only
discovered the important players in the system, but how their interconnections and communication
67
influenced the system. This is particularly important in light of increasing levels of security threats
across the globe. While advancements in technologies can improve systems, they are also
enhancing the ability of individuals to exploit certain systems. For example, in a report released
by DOS, it was noted that in a country like Greece, between five and seven percent of all Greek
passports stem from fake ID cards or birth certificates. Likewise, in a country like Sweden, one
can both lose and receive four to six passports in one year. In Sweden alone, there are believed to
be at least 20,000 duplicate passports. (U.S. Department of State, 2016, p. 4) The United States
must remain vigilant in the face of increasing security threats, and improving the visa security
system is an essential step in doing so. The rate of visa overstays in the United States will remain
the same, or worsen, if policies are not implemented to deter individuals from overstaying their
visit. As this is a matter of national security, both the U.S. government and citizens have stakes in
this objective and will benefit from improvements in the system. Ultimately, the United States
should strive to improve security and simultaneously maintain its image as an open society by
implementing a functional and vetted visa security system.
68
Appendix 1: FY 2014 non-VWP Overstay Tables
Source: (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016, pp. 8-14)
For all tables, “Expected Departures” is the number of travelers from each country that were admitted to
the United States as a nonimmigrant and whose expected departure date occurred in FY 2015. “Out-of-
Country Overstays” are cases in which DHS received a departure record for a traveler, and the record
indicates the traveler departed after their authorized visa expired. “Suspected In-Country Overstays” are
cases where there are no records supporting that the traveler departed the United States in 2015 or
transitioned into a lawful immigration status.
FY 2014 Overstay rates for nonimmigrants with B1/B2 visas admitted to the United States
for business or pleasure via air and sea POEs for non-VWP Countries
69
FY 2014 Overstay rates for nonimmigrants with B1/B2 visas admitted to the United States
for business or pleasure via air and sea POEs for non-VWP Countries
70
FY 2014 Overstay rates for nonimmigrants with B1/B2 visas admitted to the United States
for business or pleasure via air and sea POEs for non-VWP Countries
71
FY 2014 Overstay rates for nonimmigrants with B1/B2 visas admitted to the United States
for business or pleasure via air and sea POEs for non-VWP Countries
72
FY 2014 Overstay rates for nonimmigrants with B1/B2 visas admitted to the United States
for business or pleasure via air and sea POEs for non-VWP Countries
73
Appendix 2: DHS Organizational Chart
Source: (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016)
74
Appendix 3: Current VSP Headquarters Structure
Source: (Roth, The DHS Security Program, 2014, p. 35)
75
Appendix 4: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit System
Source: (Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 30)
76
Appendix 5: Expert Interviews
Authorized Interview:
1. Interview: Salvador Briseno. Date and nature of interview: 22.06.2016, personal. Length
of interview: 35 minutes.
Name of Interview Partner: Salvador Briseno
Name of Institution: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
National Security Investigations Division (NSID)
National Security Integration Center (NSIC)
Position: Unit Chief
Anonymous Interviews:
2. Interview: Date and nature of interview: 08.06.2016, personal. Length of interview: 60
minutes.
3. Interview: Date and nature of interview: 29.06.2016, personal. Length of interview: 25
minutes.
77
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