1

Heartland, Contender and Periphery: a Critical Analysis of Chinese Foreign Policy

Abstract

This study attempts to make a critical analysis of the Chinese Foreign Policy in period

between 1989 and 2012. In other words, this study tries to examine the post-1989 Chinese

Foreign Policy to figure out if China, as a contender state, is challenging the existing US-led

world order. In the study, it is argued that China’s policies in the previous twenty-five years

show that instead of changing the existing world order with a completely new one, China is in

a struggle for reforming and making it more democratic and multilateral. However, its

criticism against the existing order and proposals for a more democratic and multilateral one,

and its balancing behaviour against the US contribute to the de-legitimization of the existing

order and help counter-hegemonic movements in their ‘war of position’. This is done by first

providing a brief theoretical framework on the heartland/contender structure of the world

order. Second, a historical background on the transformation of Chinese domestic and foreign

policy in the post-Mao era is provided. Third, China’s post-1989 relations with the US, Russia

and Central Asia is examined. Finally, in the conclusion, an assessment of China’s post-1989

foreign policy and its contribution to counter-hegemonic forces is made.

Key words: China, US, Russia, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, hegemony

Introduction

Since its entrance to the discipline in the 1970s as a part of the debate on the ‘decline

of the American power’, hegemony has been a contested concept in International Relations

(IR) and it seems that it will be debated in the future, as well. Throughout the 1970s and

1980s, realism being in the first place, many different theories suggested explanations that the

US was in decline and a new, post-US international system was emerging. However, at the

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end of the 1980s it became clear that this was not the case and in fact, throughout the decade

the US was quite successful in increasing its strength relative to others and securing its central

place in the world order.

As it became clear that realism and other theories were insufficient in explaining the

ongoing change in the world order, new approaches were introduced into the discipline with

alternative hegemony conceptualizations. One of those approaches, Gramscian or Historical

Materialist Critical Theory (CT), aims to overcome the weaknesses of these approaches by

analysing change from a historical perspective with the overall goal of transcending the

prevailing order by revealing potential alternatives.

Since the end of the 1990s, as China has received almost all titles one by one, biggest

trading nation1, biggest exporter of goods, largest holder of foreign exchange reserves and

largest lender state2 and became the candidate for others by becoming the second largest

economy3 and military spender

4 in the world, hegemony debate was again brought up to the

agenda. As in the 1980s, this debate has also been dominated by mainstream theories,

especially by realism, which aims to maintain the prevailing world order via existing power

relations. This study, by contrast, tries to offer an alternative analysis of China’s ‘rise’ by

focusing on its relations with the US and Russia, and with Central Asian states through the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the post-1989 period. Each of these case studies

represents a place in the division of labour in the world order: heartland/core, contender and

periphery. The year 1989 represents an important break in Chinese domestic and foreign

1 Bloomberg News, “China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation”, Bloomberg, Feb. 10, 2013,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-to-become-the-world-s-biggest-trading-

nation.html (accessed 19 July 2014). 2 Linda Yueh, “China’s Ambitious Plans for its Huge Reserves”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-

22567974, and CRI English, China’s Forex Reserve to hit $4 Trillion: Report,

http://english.cri.cn/6826/2014/05/19/2361s827255.htm (accessed 19 July 2014). 3 Andrew Bergmann, “World’s largest economies”, CNN Money,

http://money.cnn.com/news/economy/world_economies_gdp/, (accessed 19 July 2014); World Bank GDP Data,

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed 19 July 2014). 4 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database

(accessed 22 July 2014).

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policies and show how national and international/transnational social forces are related to

each other. This is why ‘1989’ has been selected as the starting year. Through this analysis,

this study aims to provide a holistic assessment of post-1989 Chinese Foreign Policy (CFP).

Unlike (neo)realism and other mainstream problem-solving theories, this study aims to

reveal if China’s foreign policy behaviour enables the creation of an alternative world order

by delegitimizing the prevailing post-hegemonic world order. China’s policies in the previous

twenty-five years show that instead of changing the existing world order with a completely

new one, China is in a struggle for reforming and making it more democratic and multilateral.

However, its criticism against the existing order and proposals for a more democratic and

multilateral one, and its balancing behaviour against the US contribute to the de-legitimization

of the existing order and help counter-hegemonic movements in their ‘war of position’.

In this direction, in the first part, in order to provide a theoretical framework, the

heartland/contender structure of the world order will be analysed. In the second part, a

historical background on the transformation of Chinese domestic and foreign policy in the

post-Mao era will be provided. The aim of this part is to examine transformations in Chinese

political economy and foreign policy directions. In the following three parts, China’s post-

1989 relations with the US, Russia and Central Asia will be examined. In the conclusion, an

assessment of China’s post-1989 foreign policy and its contribution to counter-hegemonic

forces will be made.

Theoretical Framework

Since its entrance into the discipline in the 1970s as a part of the debate on the ‘decline

of the American power’, hegemony has been a contested concept in International Relations

(IR) and it seems that it will be debated in the future, as well. Throughout the 1970s and

1980s, realism being in the first place, many different theories suggested explanations that the

US was in decline and a new, post-US international system was emerging. However, at the

4

end of the 1980s it became clear that this was not the case and in fact, throughout the decade

the US was quite successful in increasing its strength relative to others and securing its central

place in the world order. Finally, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the US emerged as the sole

superpower in the world.

As it became clear that realism and other theories were insufficient in explaining the

ongoing change in the world order, new approaches were introduced into the discipline with

alternative hegemony conceptualizations. One of those approaches, Critical Theory, aims to

overcome the weaknesses of these approaches by analysing change from a historical

perspective with the overall goal of transcending the prevailing order by revealing potential

alternatives.

Critical and Historical Materialist Approach

In order to make a historical analysis of how the world operates, CT applies

Gramscian notions of hegemony to the international/world level. So, instead of following the

mostly used meaning of hegemony as the dominance of one state over other states, CT

applied the concept of hegemony to world orders in the Gramscian sense. For CT, the former

usage does not reflect a hegemonic order, but a non-hegemonic order that can be named as

‘dominance’. Dominance of a powerful state may be a necessary condition but it is not

enough for building hegemony. In order a hegemonic order to be established, the consent of

subordinate classes is sine qua non. Historically, hegemonies have first established at the

national level and then expanded to the global level. After a social class establishes its

hegemony at the national level, this national hegemony with its institutions, culture and

technology is expanded to the transnational level with the consent of other societies. While

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core countries adapt themselves to new order smoothly, emulation of hegemony in peripheral

countries takes the form of a passive revolution.5

Heartland vs. Contenders

Kees van der Pijl, following Gramsci, made an important contribution to CT by adding

the idea of the emergence of the ‘heartland/contender structure of the global political

economy’. He states that it is possible to define two distinct state/society complexes: the

‘Lockean Heartland’ and ‘contender’/’Hobbesian’ states. While the former reflects the

Anglophone West where a strong and self-regulating civil society exists under the rule of law,

the latter stands for states where a Hobbesian ‘state class’ organises the civil society from

above through coercion and central planning. In other words, the main difference between

these two state/society complexes is that liberal states base their rule first on consent and then

on coercion, whereas contender states base their rules mainly on coercion.6

Thus, in

Gramscian terms, while the former is a hegemonic state form, the latter is generally a non-

hegemonic one with fragile legitimacy.7

The Atlantic ruling class, which maintains top seats of the global political economy,

aims to transform contender states by replacing the state classes from power with a governing

class that is compatible with the neo-liberal global governance. At some point, these external

pressures combine with the pressures coming from domestic liberal capitalist forces that aim

to gain power at the expense of the state class. Contender states, on the other hand, try to

maintain and even strengthen their positions by increasing their control on state apparatuses

5 Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”, Millennium: Journal of

International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1983, p. 170-174; Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders:

Beyond International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, p. 139-140; Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008,

p. 54. 6 Kees van der Pijl, “Capital and the state system: a class act”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.

20, No. 4, December 2007, p. 619-620; Kees van der Pijl, “Is the East Still Red? The Contender State and Class

Struggles in China”, Globalizations, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 2012, p. 504. 7 Gill, op. cit., p. 34

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and substantial sectors of the economy, so that they can retain their ability to control the pace

of change and decide on the development priorities, and ultimately challenge the supremacy

of the Lockean West.8

The Rise of a New Contender: Post-1978 China

The Chinese State Class

China initiated the contender state model with the Dengist ‘opening up and reform’

policy in the post-Mao period. The thirty-year long period before the reform era, on the other

hand, witnessed a struggle between Maoist and statist forces in the CPC9. Mao initiated

campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward, anti-revisionism campaign and the Cultural

Revolution to confront the contender state posture of the statist groups in the CPC.10

However, these policies could not achieve the intended results and the post-Mao leadership

had to implement another kind of policy. They were either to democratise the decision-

making process by involving mass participation or to follow a contender state model.11

After Deng Xiaoping gained power in the CPC he initiated market reforms without

democratising the decision-making processes. As a result, the Chinese state-class gained the

upper hand in policy-making and by creating a state socialist economy China started its march

towards becoming the new leading contender state. Chinese economic reform policy can be

seen as a “straight imitation of the Western model. This was pursued through a resumption of

the revolution from above, keeping the Hobbesian state in place.”12

Since its initiation, the

state class has controlled the development policy.13

This is why the Tiananmen Incidents of

1989 shocked the CPC. It has been the most important attempt from the Chinese civil society

8 van der Pijl, “Is the East...”, p. 504-505 and p. 512. 9 Acronym used for the Communist Party of China. 10 van der Pijl, “Is the East…”, p. 507. 11 Kees van der Pijl, Global Rivalries from the Cold War to Iraq, London, Pluto Press, 2006, p. 300. 12 Ibid., p. 301. 13 Idem.

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to alter the dominance of the Chinese state class and push for liberal democracy. Thus, this

was a movement from below. The state class considered this movement as a threat to its

existence and cracked down the movement. After the Tiananmen, the leftists/conservatives

took control of the CPC and Deng, with his famous ‘Southern Tour’, could only change the

power balance in the CPC again in 1992. In order not to face a similar demand from capitalist

social forces the CPC took measures in the next decade. In October 1993, China declared that

it was now a ‘socialist market economy’, which can be regarded as another type of the Asian

export oriented development models. Finally, in 2001, the CPC made one of its most

important moves and opened its doors for private businessmen. By absorbing capitalist social

forces, the state class created opportunities for the private entrepreneurs at the expense of

subordinated groups and in return, these capitalist forces withdrew their push for political

reform. This way, a new deal on elite-based democracy was achieved.14

At the same time,

during the 1990s, the state class initiated economic policies to strengthen its control on the

economy by reversing the entrepreneurial capitalist policies of the 1980s with state-led

capitalist policies.15

Foreign Policy in General Terms

The post-1949 CFP can be divided into two general periods as pre- and post-1978. In

the first era, the foreign policy decision-making process was mainly under the control of Mao

and decisions reflected his thoughts and changes in domestic politics and in the world

political economy. In the post-1978 period, China left its ideologically biased foreign policy

aside and mainly followed a pragmatic foreign policy compatible with its aim of transforming

itself into a modern and powerful contender state.

14 Ibid., p. 301-302; van der Pijl, “Is the East…”, p. 508-513. 15 Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: entrepreneurship and the state, Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 237.

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After 1978, in line with the main goal of economic modernization, China prioritized

its relations with the US and tried to maintain good relations with it. A major breakthrough in

Sino-American relations came with the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the collapse of the

Soviet Union in 1991. These events dragged the CPC into an identity crisis. Immediately after

the Tiananmen Incident, by imposing all-out sanctions that included suspension of loans,

FDIs and arms embargo the US and other states of the West isolated China. Furthermore, with

the end of the Cold War, in the eyes of the US policy makers, China lost its value as a card

against the Soviet Union. Due to these developments and not to draw attention, in 1990, Deng

formulated his famous ‘24-character strategy’16

of keeping a low profile in foreign policy.

Jiang Zemin, China’s third generation leader followed Deng’s advice and in the early 1990s,

China continued a low profile foreign policy that was based on Jiang’s four principles. The

only exception of this policy was China’s Taiwan policy.17

At that time, while China was

implementing a low profile policy, Chinese scholars and officials regarded these early post-

Cold War years as transformative years to a new multipolar world order.18

Since the end of 1990s, however, China changed its attitude and established a more

active and constructive ‘win-win’ foreign policy. First of all, Chinese realised that the world

order was still dominated by the US.19

Another reason for this change was the 1997/8 Asian

Financial Crisis. During the crisis, China gained respect from regional states by emerging as a

stabilizer in the region and this altered the Cold-War in Asia. 1997 was also the year when the

16 "Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good

at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership." Globalsecurity.org, “Deng Xiaoping’s “24-Character

Strategy””, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-character.htm, (accessed 14 July 2014). 17 Chi-Kwan Mark, China and the World since 1945: an International History, New York, Routledge, 2012, p.

98-119; Weiqing Song, “Feeling safe, being strong: China’s strategy of soft balancing through the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization”, International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 5, p. 666. Jiang’s four principles were “enhancing

confidence, reducing troubles, expanding coopreation and avoiding confrontation.” Rosemary Foot, “Chinese

Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging”, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No.

1, January 2006, p. 84. 18 Foot, op. cit., p. 80. 19 Idem.

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new guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation20

were put in place. In response to these

developments, in 1998, China issued its new security policy, 'National Defence White Paper,

which stressed the need to replace the Cold War mentality of alliance building with a new

mutual security approach that involved peaceful resolution of problems, mutual trust and

cooperation.21

This new security concept has been emphasized by China’s all following

National Defence White Papers and reflected in future foreign policy concepts.22

Moreover,

China increased its interaction with the outside world economically by initiating the ‘Going

out Strategy’ in 1999 and politically and socially by participating to multilateral agreements

and regional and international organizations.23

This was an attempt by Beijing for improving

its ties with the Third World in addition to the heartland states.24

van der Pijl interprets this

strategy as “signalling the ambitions of a true contender, the Chinese state class is not content

with being the recipient of investment. China aims to become a major foreign investor

itself.”25

Even though, until the 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis, China’s assertiveness was

seen much in terms of cooperation rather than challenging the existing order,26

its improved

visibility in world affairs and fast growing economy sparked a debate on its intentions and

20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee

Completion of the Review of the Guidelines”, New York, 23 September 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-

america/us/security/defense.html, (accessed 24 July 2014). 21 People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense”, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm, July

1998, (accessed 24 July 2014); People’s Republic of China, China’s Position Paper on the New Security

Concept, http://www.china-un.org/eng/xw/t27742.htm, (accessed 24 July 2014). 22 For example, in National Defence White Papers published in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 and in

other white papers like China’s Peaceful Development Road 2005 and China’s Peaceful Development 2011,

http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/, (accessed 24 July 2014). 23 Chi-Kwan Mark, op. cit., p. 118-119 and 130-132; Foot, op. cit., p. 86; David L. Shambaugh, “China Engages

Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order”, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004/05, p. 69; Hongying

Wang, “Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization”, Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 3,

May/June 2000, p. 479-484; Kerry Brown, “China’s soft power diplomacy in the 21st century”, in Shaun Breslin

(ed.), Handbook of China’s International Relations, London, Routledge, 2010, p. 87-88. 24 Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy”, Political Science

Quarterly, vol. 116, No. 3, 2011, p. 359. 25 van der Pijl, Global Rivalries From…, p. 318. 26 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy”,

Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011, p. 55-56.

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gave rise to theories like the ‘China threat’27

. In order to keep the focus away from itself and

continue its long time goal of economic development in a stable environment, during Hu

Jintao’s term, China formulated the concepts of ‘peaceful rise/development’ and ‘building a

harmonious world’, which stressed a more democratic and multilateral world order where

different civilisations coexist peacefully.28

In the post-crisis period, in July 2009, as a sign of

transformation in CFP, President Hu declared China’s core interests as a ‘red line for others

not to cross’. Accordingly, CFP was redefined as to protect the interests of sovereignty,

security and development.29

Furthermore, China initiated a new policy of engaging with new

institutions like the BRICS30

and the G2031

that make proposals for establishing a multilateral

new international order by reforming the existing order, not replacing it.32

Challenging or Accommodating

In the post-1989 period, Sino-American relations have been undulated. In order to

grasp this fluctuated character of bilateral relations, this period can be divided into five sub-

periods: June 1989-October 1997, October 1997-May 1999, May 1999-September 2001, 9/11-

2008, and the post-2008 years.

27 For one of the most influential of studies of the ‘China threat’ school see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of

Great Power Politics, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. 28 At the UN Summit in September 2005, Hu stated: “We should endeavor to preserve the diversity of

civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness, make international relations more democratic and jointly

build towards a harmonious world where all civilizations coexist and accommodate each other. Let us join hands

and work together to build a harmonious world with lasting peace and common prosperity.” H. E. Hu Jintao,

“Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity”, New York, September 15,

2005, http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15/china050915eng.pdf. 29 Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way”, Foreign Affairs,

March/April 2011, p. 71; Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “Debating China’s assertiveness: Taking China’s power and

interests seriously”, International Politics, Vol. 49, No. 5, p. 639-640. 30 BRICS is an acronym used for defining a group of states consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South

Africa. For more information see http://www.brics5.co.za/about-brics/. 31 “The Group of Twenty (G20) is the premier forum for its members’ international economic cooperation and

decision-making. Its members comprise 19 countries plus the EU.” These 19 countries are Argentina, Australia,

Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia,

Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. https://www.g20.org/about_G20 32 Mingjiang Li, “Rising from within: China’s Search for a Multipolar World and Its Implications for Sino-US

Relations”, Global Governance, Vol. 17, Bo. 3, July-September 2011, p. 333-336.

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Early years started with the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and followed by the collapse of

the Soviet Union in 1991. After Tiananmen, the US led Western heartland isolated China by

placing economic, financial and military sanctions.33

The US carried a step further and ceased

bilateral summits between the leaders of two countries which lasted until October 1997.34

However, being aware of the importance of China on both economic and political issues, the

George H. W. Bush administration took some steps to improve bilateral relations like lifting

some aspects of the embargo and maintaining cross-state relations through official and

unofficial visits. Deng was also aware of the need to improve relations with the US both to

continue the economic modernisation process and to re-establish his power in China’s

decision-making mechanisms. As a result, economic ties recovered quickly.35

In 1994, by

pegging its currency to the US dollar China showed its willingness to improve ties with the

US and to be a part of existing order.36

However, as mentioned above, this accommodation

policy did not include Taiwan. Both as a reaction to the pro-independence stance in

Taiwanese politics before the March 1996 elections and to Washington’s Taiwan policy, from

July 1995 to March 1996, China implemented a coercive policy against Taipei. In response,

the US intervened militarily and deployed two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait.37

In

September 1997, Japan and the US adopted the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines that

expanded the role of Japan’s military in maintaining security in the region. Furthermore, the

following year, they announced the initiation of a joint research programme on establishing a

33 Gregory J. Moore, “Less beautiful, still somewhat imperialist: Beijing eyes Sino-US relations”, in Shaun

Breslin (ed.), Handbook of China’s …, p. 130. 34 Yan Xuetong, “The Instability of China-US Relations”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3,

No. 3, 2010, p. 267. 35 Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy, New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 96; Mark, op. cit., p. 111-112. 36 van der Pijl, Global Rivalries From…, p. 302. 37 Mark, op. cit., p. 115-116.

12

theatre missile defence (TMD) system.38

Unsurprisingly, China interpreted these moves as a

sign of containment and reacted negatively to the enhanced role for the Japanese military.39

To overcome this confrontational relationship, both sides agreed to improve ties to a

level that can be defined as ‘neither-friend-nor-enemy’. As a result of both sides’ efforts to

improve the relationship, on 29 October 1997, Jiang and Clinton held a summit and issued a

joint statement in Washington in which both sides agreed that a stable Sino-US relationship

“is important to fulfilling their common responsibility to work for peace and prosperity in the

21st century.”

40 In return, in June/July 1998, Clinton made a state visit to China where he, for

the first time, announced the ‘three nos’ in US-Taiwan relations.41

When everything seemed all right, ‘accidental’ US bombing of the Chinese embassy

in Belgrade on 8 May 1999 reversed the upward trend in bilateral relations that could only be

improved after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. After the Kosovo crisis, Chinese analysts

started defining Sino-American relations in negative terms.42

Still, during this period, the

Chinese government avoided introducing a confrontation policy against the US that would be

counterproductive and costly. As soon as George W. Bush took office in 2001, Sino-

American relations deteriorated rapidly. On 1 April 2001, a US EP-3 aircraft collided with a

Chinese navy fighter. The US blamed China for the incident and interpreted it as China’s

intention of challenging the US primacy in the Pacific. However, the incident happened in

38 Benia Xu, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 July 2014,

http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437, (accessed 30 July 2014). 39 Yong, op. cit., p. 353. 40 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “China-US Joint Statement”, 29

October 1997, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t36259.htm, (accessed 25 July 2014). 41 Three nos: “…” Yan, op. cit., p. 267-268, Mark, op. cit., p. 118. 42 Yong, op. cit., p. 356.

13

China’s airspace and at the end, the US had to send a letter to express their ‘regrets’. As a

result, China-US relations, since 1972, were at all-time low.43

9/11 terrorist attacks changed the course of Sino-US relations. Improvement in

bilateral relations was in favour of both sides. The US needed China’s support in its ‘war

against terror’ and did not want to be distracted by China. China, on the other hand, could

continue its economic modernisation and ‘rise’ without being disturbed by the US.

Furthermore, they were also economically interdependent. While China needed the US market

for its goods and also the FDI coming from the US, the US needed Chinese foreign currency

reserves for financing its debts. Thus, as China supported the war in Afghanistan and shared

intelligence with the US, Sino-American military relationship was re-established. In return,

the US supported China in its fight against ‘terrorism’ in Xinjiang.44

Furthermore, after a long

and painful negotiation process, as China accepted to make important concessions to the US,

in December 2001, it became a member of the WTO. China’s concessions can be defined as a

policy of ‘throwing a sprat to catch a mackerel’. While the WTO was vital for China’s

economic modernization, membership was also seen as a step in becoming a playmaker and

reforming the global economic governance.45

China’s entrance into the WTO improved its

place both in world trade and Sino-American trade. In the following eleven years, China’s

total trade increased more than six-fold from $620.8 billion to $3867.1 billion and Sino-US

trade increased almost five-fold from $118.7 billion to $571.2 billion.46

43 Mark, op. cit., p. 126; Jonathan D. Pollack, “Asia’s Shifting Strategic Landscape: China and the United States

Post-9/11”, Orbis, Fall 2003, p. 617; Peter Hays Gries, “China Eyes the Hegemon”, Orbis, Summer 2005, p.

402. 44 Pollack, op. cit., p. 620; Gries, op. cit., p. 402-403. 45 Mark, op. cit., p. 123; Randall L. Schweller and Hiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of

International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, p. 54. 46 WTO International Trade Statistics 2013, “Merchandise Trade by Region and Selected Economies, 2002-2012

- China”, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its13_appendix_e.htm, (accessed 18 July 2014).

14

The positive momentum in relations was again disturbed by the 2003 Iraq War.

However, this did not create tensions between the two states and good relations continued in

the post-2003 period, as well. Hence, while China was critical about the invasion it let other

states like Germany and France to take the lead and never challenged the US directly. This

was also the case in other grounds such as in criticising the US during WTO Doha

negotiations.47

In the rest of the sub-period, China responded positively to calls from the US

to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the global order and took a positive stance on issues

such as the North Korean nuclear programme.48

The positive momentum in Sino-US relations was again lost in the aftermath of the

2008/9 Global Financial Crisis by reciprocal moves from both sides. In 2009 and 2010, China

left its cooperative policy on the North Korean nuclear programme aside and provided support

to Pyongyang regime; it did not participate to sanctions against Iran; and in 2010, the

Diaoyu/Senkaku islands problem re-emerged following China’s harsh reaction to the

detainment of a Chinese fishing boat by Japanese authorities.49

US moves also contributed to

worsening relations. Only after a few weeks Obama and Hu issued a joint declaration on

respecting the core interests of each other, the US agreed to sell weapons to Taiwan and

Obama met with Dalai Lama in early 2010. These two moves were clearly against China’s

core interests, which meant crossing the red lines.50

Furthermore, China, with Russia, tried to

stop US attempts to realise a regime change in Syria by vetoing UN resolutions related to

Syria.51

47 Foot, op. cit., p. 87. 48 Christensen, op. cit., p. 55-57. 49 Ibid., p. 57-58; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?”,

International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4, Spring 2013, p. 21-23. 50 Yan, op. cit., p. 280. 51 Kai and Huiyun, op. cit., p. 634.

15

Some of China’s post-2008 moves such as announcing the East China Sea Air

Defence Identification Zone in November 201352

can be regarded as defensive moves as a

response to US moves, especially in China’s neighbourhood. Actually, Obama

administration’s policies towards Taiwan and Dalai Lama and support for the remilitarization

efforts of Japan as a part of deepening Japan-US alliance and the US ‘Pivot/Re-balancing to

Asia’ was seen by Beijing as efforts to contain its ‘peaceful development’.53

Furthermore,

statements such as ‘America’s Pacific Century’, ‘American leadership well into this

century’54

and ‘The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay’55

by top US

officials, strengthening of the US military presence in the region and defining China as a

potential threat in 2012 Defensive Strategic Guidance56

have only exacerbated China’s fears.

To overcome the problematic relationship of the last few years, during his visit to the

US in 2011, Xi Jinping, then the vice President of China, offered establishing ‘a new model of

major country relations’ with the US. This model included a relationship with ’no conflict or

confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win.’ The main reason for Xi’s offer was his intention

of focusing on China’s long-term goal of economic development by furthering reforms and

the stable environment needed for that goal. The Obama administration, on the other hand,

responded Xi’s proposal positively so that it could continue its own economic reform process

52 BBC News, “China establishes ‘air-defence zone’ over East China Sea”, 23 November 2013,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25062525, (accessed 22 August 2014). 53 Ross, “The Problem With the Pivot”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2012,

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138211/robert-s-ross/the-problem-with-the-pivot; Michael D. Swaine,

“Chinese Leadership and the Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot” China Leadership Monitor, No. 38, p. 5;

Ling, “Rebalancing or De-Balancing: U.S. Pivot and East Asian Order”, American Foreign Policy Interests: The

Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, No. 35, Vol. 3, p. 152; David A. Beitelman,

“America’s Pacific Pivot”, International Journal, Autumn 2012, p. 1087-1089. 54 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century, (accessed 22 August 2014). 55 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament”, Canberra, Australia, 17

November 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-

parliament, (accessed 22 August 2014). 56 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense, January

2012, p. 2, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, (accessed 22 August 2014).

16

at home and make the most of good relations with China while again being distracted by

developments occurring in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.57

Demanding a Multilateral Order

China-Russia relations have been one of the most salient topics of international

politics since the mid-1990s. Some regard improving relations between the two as an

‘authoritarian axis’58

whereas others as an ‘axis of energy’59

challenging the Western

liberalism. Even though both states prefer a more ‘democratic world order’ in which they

have more voice, and cooperate in important issues from energy to security, it is not possible

to claim that a Sino-Russian ‘axis’ is forming. Still, both consider the other as an important

actor on regional and international issues. While Russia mainly tries to use the ‘China card’ as

a leverage against the West60

, for China Russia is important in securing its northern and

western borders, modernizing the PLA/PLAN/PLAAF61

, securing the flow of raw materials,

and balancing the excesses of the US dominance in the era of post-hegemony.

57 Wang Yi, “Toward a New Model of Major-Country Relations Between China and the United States”, 20

September 2013,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/9/20%20us%20china%20foreign%20minister%20wang%20yi/

wang%20yi%20english%20prepared%20remarks.pdf, (accessed 10 July 2014); Liu Jun, “Toward a ‘New

Model’ of Major Power Relations between China and the United States: Feasible or Fallacious?”, ISD Working

Papers in Diplomacy, March 2014, p. 1-4. 58 William C. Martel, “An Authoritarian Axis Rising?”, The Diplomat, 29 June 2012,

http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/an-authoritarian-axis-rising/, (accessed 15 June 2014); William C. Martel,

“Grand Strategy of the Authoritarian Axis: How Will the West Respond?”, The Diplomat, 24 July, 2014,

http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/grand-strategy-of-the-authoritarian-axis/, (accessed 15 June 2014). 59 Flynt Leverett and Pierre Noel, “The New Axis of Oil”, The National Interest, No. 84, Summer 2006,

http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-new-axis-of-oil-1145, (accessed 15 June 2014); Flynt Leverett and Hillary

Mann Leverett, “The Sino-Russian Hydrocarbon Axis Grows Up”, The National Interest, 21 May 2014,

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-sino-russian-hydrocarbon-axis-grows-10508, (accessed 15 June 2014). 60 While Peter Ferdinand, following Wang Shuchun, claims that both sides use the other as a ‘card’ in their

relations with the West, Bobo Lo states that only Russia uses China as a ‘card’ against the West, not the other

way around. See Peter Ferdinand, “Sunset, Sunrise: China and Russia Construct a New Partnership”,

International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, September 2007, p. 866-867; Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow,

Beijing and the New Geopolitics, Baltimore, Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p. 42-43. 61 Acronyms respectively used for People’s Liberation Army, People’s Liberation Army Navy and People’s

Liberation Army Air Force.

17

At the end of 1980s Sino-Russo relations were re-established from rock-bottom. After

almost a thirty-year long break relations were normalized in 1989 and improved since then.

The burden of history always had an important influence on bilateral relations. To overcome

this burden and improve bilateral relations, in 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev offered a territorial

concession on the eastern part of the Sino-Soviet border and stated his country’s readiness to

discuss ‘any issue’ ‘at any time’ with China. Beijing, on the other hand, expected Moscow to

satisfy the three prerequisites that China specified previously for the normalization of

relations.62

As the Soviet Union have taken steps for meeting them, relations improved

accordingly and in October 1988 they reached an agreement on the eastern part of the border

and for the continuation of talks about the western border. Later on during Gorbachev’s

famous visit in 15-18 May 1989 relations were officially normalized.63

In line with developments in the post-1989 period the pace of improvement in Sino-

Russo relations slowed for more than three years until China recovered from the post-

Tiananmen isolation and Boris Yeltsin felt the need to change Russia’s Western-centric

foreign policy towards a multidimensional one and made his first state visit to China in

December 1992.64

In the period following this visit, China and Russia signed important

declarations and treaties to improve ties and to show their demands for a multilateral world

order. At another visit by Yeltsin to Beijing in 1996, Russia and China declared their intention

of establishing a “strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual

coordination directed towards the 21st century.”

65 In the following April, this time in Moscow,

62 These prerequisites were the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border, ending

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ending the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Mark, op. cit., p. 105. 63 Ibid., p. 105-106; Lo, op. cit., p. 27-28. 64 Lo, op. cit., p. 29; Gilbert Rozman, “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: How Close? Where to?”, in

James Bellacqua (ed.), The Future of China-Russia Relations, Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky,

2010, p. 13. 65 Ferdinand, op. cit., p. 844; United Nations, “Joint Declaration by the Republic of China and the Russian

Federation”, Beijing, 25 April 1996, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/plenary/a51-127.htm, (accessed

10 August 2014).

18

Jiang and Yeltsin issued a joint statement on ‘a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a

New International Order’ where they declared their desire of leaving power politics and

hegemony aside and for “the establishment of a peaceful, stable, just and rational new

international political and economic order.”66

This joint statement reflected both the Five

Principles of Peaceful Co-existence67

and the principles of China’s new security concept that

was issued in 1998. Three years later, on 16 July 2001, Jiang and Vladimir Putin signed the

‘Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation’ which was based on equality,

mutual benefit, respecting national unity and territorial integrity, respecting differences in

political, economic, social and cultural development, mutual coordination in all fields and ‘the

maintenance of peace, security and stability in Asia and the world’. Furthermore, both sides

stressed their willingness to cooperate in the UN and in strengthening the UN as the central

organisation in maintaining stability and balance in the world order.68

In 2002, the strategic

cooperative partnership was defined by the two states as “a new type of state-to-state relations

based on non-alignment and non-confrontation, and which are not directed against third

countries.”69

The way this partnership was defined demonstrates China’s rejection of the Cold

War minded alliances and its request for the creation of a new type of relations based on its

1998 security concept.

In line with their requests for a multipolar world, during this period, they both opposed

unilateral moves of the West such as NATO’s enlargement to Eastern Europe, NATO

66 Federation of American Scientists, “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the

Establishment of a New International Order”, Moscow, 23 April 1997, http://fas.org/news/russia/1997/a52--

153en.htm, (accessed 10 August 2014). 67 People’s Daily Online, “The Five Principle’s of Peaceful Coexistence”, 28 June 2004,

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/28/eng20040628_147763.html, (accessed 10 August 2014). 68 Voltaire Network, “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic

of China and the Russian Federation”, Moscow, 16 July 2001, http://www.voltairenet.org/article173177.html,

(accessed 10 August 2014). 69 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, “Joint Declaration by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic

of China”, Beijing, 2 December 2002,

http://www.mid.ru/bl.nsf/900b2c3ac91734634325698f002d9dcf/9d22082391597d6443256c85005303e1?OpenD

ocument, (accessed 10 August 2014).

19

intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the 1972

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its plans for developing a theatre missile defence

(TMD) system in Asia-Pacific.70

However, this ‘solidarity’ did not last long and despite their

2001 commitment to consult on important foreign policy decisions, Russia’s moves like its

casual acceptance of the US withdrawal from the ABM, approval of US military presence in

Central Asia and the conclusion of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002

without prior consultation with China thought a lesson to Beijing on the reliability of

Russia.71

In the post-2003 period, as a response to the unilateral attempts of the Bush

administration, Sino-Russian relations again gained pace. Both sides opposed to the 2003 Iraq

War but China, instead of openly criticising the US, let Russia, with France and Germany, to

take the lead.72

On 1 July 2005, Hu and Putin signed the ‘China-Russia Joint Statement on

21st Century World Order’, which reflected Hu’s idea of ‘building a harmonious world’ by

calling for a bigger role for the developing world and respecting diversity in a multilateral

world order.73

In fulfilling their calls for a multilateral world order, China and Russia went beyond

official statements and collaborated in international organisations such as the UNSC and the

BRICS grouping. Their cooperation in the UNSC dates back to old times, but especially since

2000 they have taken similar positions against the UNSC resolutions from imposing sanctions

to Iran, Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan to military interventions in Cote d’Ivoire, Syria

70 Yong, op. cit., p. 359; Lo, op. cit., p. 50. 71 Lo, op. cit., p. 51-52. 72 Foot, op. cit., p. 87. 73 Free Republic, “’Full text’ of China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World Order”, 1 July 2005,

Moscow, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1436001/posts, (accessed 10 August 2014).

20

and Libya.74

By collaborating in the UNSC, China and Russia tried to achieve similar

objectives that were reflected in their above mentioned joint statements/declarations:

protecting sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, protecting security through

maintaining stability and balance in the world order, building their international images as

important players, and promoting their own economic and political interests.75

Furthermore,

in the last few years, they started following more assertive, but at the same time status-quo

oriented voting behaviours both to reach their objectives and to oppose the revisionism of the

heartland.76

Together with Russia, China also collaborates with other emerging states in different

international institutions and groupings. One of the most salient of these is BRICS. Since

BRICS is formed of important economic partners and these partners, despite their differences

and conflicting interests on many issues, share many common interests in international

political economy, China thinks of BRICS as an important mechanism for reforming the

world order.77

Same is also true for other members of BRICS. That is why since 2008, before

G20 meetings they convene to coordinate their positions. For example, in September 2009, at

the G20 meeting, BRICS succeeded in convincing the G7 members both for elevating the G20

as the premier forum for economic coordination and for reforming the IMF quotas.78

74 Peter Ferdinand, “The Positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the Light of Recent

Crises”, European Parliament Policy Department DG External Polices Briefing Paper, March 2013, p. 6-7;

David Kerr, “Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on China’s Strategic Emergence”, International Affairs,

Vol. 86, No. 1, January 2010, p. 131. 75 Ibid., p. 13-15. 76 Joel Wuthnow, Xin Li and Lingling Qi, “Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral

Diplomacy”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 17, 2012, p. 279. Barry Buzan, on the other hand, claims

that since China is a rising power, it is not comfortable with its place/position in the Western-dominated

international society and demands a more democratic international society. Thus, it cannot be viewed as a status-

quo power. Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?”, The Chinese Journal of

Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 17. Writers note: Here, the word ‘status-quo’ is used in the sense that China and Russia

try to overcome the marginalization of the UN system in the global decision-making by bringing the UNSC back

to its previous central position. 77 Mingjiang, op. cit., p. 335. 78 Wuthnow et al., op. cit., p. 283-284.

21

However, the IMF quota reform has not realized yet and as a response, in July 2014, BRICS

announced the creation of a New Development Bank to finance infrastructure and ‘sustainable

development’ projects both in BRICS countries and other developing countries.79

Although

this is an important step from BRICS in fulfilling their demand for a multilateral world order,

this bank should not be regarded as against to the Bretton Woods institutions, but as a

complement to them.

Notwithstanding many shared interests, Sino-Russian relationship also involves

important (potential) problems that may create frictions in the future. First, while Russia is

declining China is rising and the power gap between the two is widening. Second,

demographic differences between the two countries make Russians worry about a future

Chinese takeover of Russian Far East. Third, qualitative and quantitative imbalances in

bilateral trade, which is in favour of China, disturb Russians. Forth, Russia is worried about

China’s rapidly increasing military expenditures which is the second largest in the world after

the US. Fifth, Russia’s unilateral moves to intervene in internal affairs of its neighbours as in

the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 conflicts with China’s

sensibility to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Finally, the struggle

between China and Russia in Central Asia is intensifying.80

Despite these potential problems, recent events in Ukraine and the sanctions

implemented against Russia by the West strengthened the Sino-Russian relations, especially

79 Daniel Runde, “The BRICS Bank, Bretton Woods, and U.S. Disengagement”, Foreign Policy, 20 July 2014,

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/07/20/the_brics_bank_bretton_woods_and_us_disengagement,

(accessed 21 July 2014); Raj M. Desai and James Raymond Vreelan, “What the new bank of BRICS is all

about?”, The Washington Post, 17 July 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-

cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-about/, (accessed 21 July 2014); The Economist, “The

BRICS bank: An acronym with capital”, The Economist, 19 July 2014,

http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21607851-setting-up-rivals-imf-and-world-bank-

easier-running-them-acronym, (accessed 21 July 2014). 80 Ferdinand, “The positions of…”, p. 20-24; Rozman, op. cit., p. 15-22; Russell Ong, “China’s Security Interests

in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 2005, p. 434; Kerr, op. cit., p. 131.

22

China’s position in bilateral relations. As these sanctions disturb Russia’s economic ties with

the West and access to Western financial sources, China becomes the only major alternative

economy to meet Russia’s economic and financial needs in return for concessions from

Russia like opening some sectors of its economy to China’s access.81

The $400 billion

natural-gas deal and unreported foreign-policy coordination agreement signed between Xi and

Putin in May 2014 mark an important turning point in Sino-Russo relations. Such that, these

developments deepened bilateral ties but also, shifted the balance in China’s favour.82

Still, in

order to sustain their strategic partnership China and Russia must overcome their differences

and establish a strong and stable bilateral relationship and moreover, have compatible

approaches to their common neighbourhoods, especially to Central Asia.83

Experiencing Regional Leadership

China, in parallel to its deepening relationship with Russia, strengthened its relations

with Turkic republics of Central Asia. Similar to the Russian case, resolving the border issue

played an important role in strengthening China’s relations with the region. For China,

securing the old Soviet border and maintaining the stability of Xinjiang meant that it could

direct its attention to securing its core interests of economic development, national unity and

territorial integrity. Since Russia had been the most influential actor in the region since the

mid-19th century, engaging with the region through Russia was critical in providing security

and stability in the region.

81 Dmitri Trenin, “China’s Victory in Ukraine”, Project Syndicate, 31 July 2014, http://www.project-

syndicate.org/commentary/dmitri-trenin-says-that-only-one-major-country-stands-to-gain-from-russia-s-conflict-

with-the-west, (accessed 16 August 2014). 82 Jamila Trindle, “Gas Deal Could Complicate Sanctions Threat Against Russia”, Foreign Policy, 21 May 2014,

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/05/21/gas_deal_could_complicate_sanctions_threat_against_russia,

(accessed 2 August 2014); Erica Downs, “In China-Russia gas deal, why China wins more”, Fortune Magazine,

20 June 2014, http://fortune.com/2014/06/20/in-china-russia-gas-deal-why-china-wins-more/, (accessed 2

August 2014); Dimitri K. Simes, “How Obama is Driving Russia and China Together”, The National Interest, 24

June 2014, (accessed 2 August 2014). 83 Kerr, op. cit., p. 131.

23

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

were involved in the negotiations and all together these five states were named as the

‘Shanghai Five’ after signing the 1996 ‘Agreement on Strengthening Mutual Military

Confidence in the Border Region’ in Shanghai that included the creation of a 100-km-wide

military-free zone in the border. The success of these states in demarcating the border opened

the way for establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 with the

participation of Uzbekistan.84

As a security organisation the principle aim of the SCO is to fight against the three

evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism, which are cross border and non-traditional

security threats that cannot be countered by a single state.85

Even though it was founded

mainly as a security organisation, other aspects like economic, political and social/cultural

relations are also taken into account by its members. This is especially true for China.86

While

Russia focuses more on security domain, China also gives importance to trade, energy and

economic relations and tries to strengthen its influence in the region by creating a stable

environment based on cooperation. This way it aims to secure energy flows from the region,

gain access to Central Asian markets and contribute to the development of both its western

parts and the region in general.87

Since its establishment, China has been on the driver’s seat in the SCO and this is the

first of its kind in which China has taken the lead. Even though generally Russia and China is

seen as sharing the leadership in the SCO, Russia mainly remains aloof and prefers engaging

with the region through the Collective Security Treaty Organization where China is not

84 Lo, op. cit., p. 105; Ferdinand, “Sunset, Sunrise: China...”, p. 854. 85 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”, 2002,

http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69, (accessed 12 August 2014); Weiqing, op. cit., p. 667; 86 Lo, op. cit., p. 104. 87 Ferdinand, “Sunset, Sunrise: China...”, p. 854; Weiqing, op. cit., p. 668; Weiqing Song, “Interests, Power and

China’s Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”, Journal of Contemporary China,

Vol. 23, No. 85, 2014, p. 88.

24

included and Russia plays the leading role. However, this does not mean that China enjoys a

sole leadership position in the SCO. Russia is still there as the long time leader of the region

and competes with China for regaining its dominant position of the pre-2001 period. By

increasing options, this struggle creates opportunities for other members to maximise their

benefits by manoeuvring between the two.88

China’s leadership role can be viewed as a learning process where Beijing has been

gaining experience in improving its leadership skills, engaging in multilateral diplomacy and

stabilizing its neighbourhood via a non-collective security regime that is not directed to any

third party.89

Thus, similar to learning by doing process of the early years of its economic

development, in the SCO China is following the ‘crossing the river by feeling for stones along

the way’ approach.90

Furthermore, the SCO can be regarded as a reflection of China’s

‘harmonious world’ approach. Throughout the process, China has been successful in

generating new institutional norms and concepts like ‘the Shanghai Spirit’ and ‘New Outlook

on Security’ and promoting them as the institutional norms of the SCO. Such that, principles

reflected by these concepts are included both in the Charter of the SCO and SCO declarations

like the June 2006 declaration. By this way, China aimed to create solidarity among the SCO

members so that they will share common perceptions.91

China’s efforts in the SCO show its

eagerness in creating new institutions which suit its core interests of security, sovereignty and

development.92

Even though China seems to be successful in creating solidarity, at least in

rhetoric, in practice it has not been an easy process and there are still problems among

members.93

For instance, the problem which Chinese name as “warm politics, cold public” is

88 Lo, op. cit., p.117-113; Rozman, op. cit., p. 22; Weiqing, “Interests, Power and…”, p. 89, 93-94. 89 Ferdinand, “Sunset, Sunrise: China...”, p. 855; Weiqing, “Feeling safe, being…”, p. 668. 90 Weiqing, “Feeling safe, being…”, p. 668. 91 Ibid., p. 675; Elizabeth Wishnick, “Why a ‘Strategic Partnership’? The View from China”, in James Bellacqua

(ed.), The Future of…, p. 70. 92 Weiqing, “Feeling safe, being…”, p. 675; Wuthnow et. al., op. cit., p. 281. 93 Wishnick, op. cit., p. 70.

25

an important problem that China has to overcome if it has an intention of leading the region.

China hopes to tackle this “good elite relations, negative public opinion” problem by initiating

a public policy that will strengthen China’s soft power in the region.94

Even though Central

Asian politics have been dominated by the ruling elites, without the consent of the ruled

China cannot play a leadership role in the region.

It has not been easy for China to get the support of others on many issues regarding

the region, especially in the early years. For example, in the post-9/11 period, the US was

welcomed by most SCO members including Russia and managed to set up military bases in

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, one of which was close to the Chinese border. Even though

China also supported the ‘war on terror’ and shared intelligence with the US, it was not happy

with these bases. Since China had no capacity to challenge the US presence alone, it preferred

‘soft balancing’ through the SCO. However, China could not convince other members to

challenge the US existence until the ‘colour revolutions’ in 2005. Only then the SCO issued a

joint declaration calling for the withdrawal of US troops from its members. Two years later at

the Bishkek summit, the SCO stated that the security in the region has to be provided by

regional states.95

Attempts for forcing regime change in some Central Asian states were more

influential than China’s policies in changing the attitudes of others members towards the

presence of the US troops. SCO’s such statements and declarations and joint military

exercises such as Peace Missions were regarded by many in the Western heartland as the

formation of an anti-US alliance.96

However, such labelling is an exaggerated description of

the organization. First of all, the SCO is not an alliance and since it is against Cold War

minded alliances at least China has no intention of transforming the organization into an

94 Kerr, op. cit., p. 136. 95

Weiqing, “Feeling safe, being…”, p. 670-673. 96 Yeongmi Yun and Kicheol Park, “An Analysis of the Multilateral Cooperation and Competition between

Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Issues and Prospects”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 27, Noç

1, April 2012, p. 77-79.

26

alliance. Furthermore, neither China nor the SCO have any intention of challenging the US

directly by establishing military or political alliances. It can be stated that the SCO operates

not against the US, but without the US.97

In other words, the members of the organization try

to get things on going in the region on their own.

Other than the regime change threat, China’s economic power was also influential in

gaining other members’ support for its leadership role. China, by focusing on long-term gains,

has financed infrastructure projects such as the building of highways between Central Asian

states and provided loans for cooperative and economic projects, especially in the post-2008

crisis period.98

However, China’s economic relations with the SCO member states were

mainly driven by bilateral agreements, not multilateral agreements. Moreover, the pace of

improvement in economic cooperation between China and regional states has been slower

than expected.99

On the other hand, even though China offers considerable amounts of

financial support and makes investments to Central Asian states due to qualitative and

quantitative imbalances in trade relations between China and regional states some in the

region fear that China tries to re-establish the old tributary relations with the region.100

In

order to play its leadership role China has to overcome this feeling and prove to Central Asian

people that it aims mutual development and prosperity, not exploitation of the wealth in the

region.

Conclusion

In the post-1978 period, by applying the state contender model and avoiding demands

from the Chinese civil society for democracy, China transformed itself into an economy based

97

Kerr, op. cit., p. 148; Weiqing, “Interests, Power and…”, p. 94.. 98 Weiqing, “Feeling safe, being…”, p. 678-679; Ferdinand, “Sunset, Sunrise: China...”, p. 854. 99 Weiqing, “Interests, Power and…”, p. 96-97. 100 Kerr, op. cit., p. 140.

27

on the export oriented Asian development model, and has become the second largest economy

and the leading contender state in the global political economy.

This transformation sparked a debate among IR scholars on the intentions of China.

While some claimed that following the footsteps of previous rising powers China will

eventually challenge the US centred international system, some others argued that since China

benefits enormously from the system this may not be the case. Since the 1980s, CT has also

involved in the hegemony debate but different form mainstream IR theories, by focusing its

attention on the processes of change, it tried to reveal and practise alternative world orders.

In the last twenty-five years, Sino-American relations experienced fluctuations.

Throughout this period, China has never challenged the US directly. On the contrary, it has

financed the US budget deficit and will do so in the foreseeable future. It only took a firm

stand against the US moves only if they concerned its ‘core interests’. On other issues such as

the invasion of Iraq, in line with the view of van der Pijl that through international institutions

an ideological struggle can be fought both within and between these institutions,101

Beijing

preferred balancing excesses of US policies through multilateral platforms and international

institutions like the SCO, BRICS and UNSC by letting others to take the lead. However,

especially in the post-2000 period, China’s increasing interaction with the world through the

‘Going out Strategy’ and its calls for respecting differences in development strategies and a

bigger role for the Third World in the world order limit the policy options of the US in

dealing with problems in different parts of the world.

Unlike the claims of some realist thinkers that China is going to challenge the

international system overtly, there is a huge power gap (both in terms of material power and

soft power) between China and both the US in particular and the Western heartland in general

101 Kees van der Pijl, “Two faces of the transnational cadre under neo-liberalism”, Journal of International

Relations and Development, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2004, s. 201.

28

and Chinese leaders are aware of this fact.102

Since it has been the biggest beneficiary of the

existing world order since 1978, unlike previous challengers/contenders, China has no Grand

Strategy for challenging the existing world order and establishing a new one. Thus, even if in

the medium term China will replace the US as the largest economy in the world, unlike the

claims of offensive realists, it does not seem likely that China will repeat the mistakes of the

Third Reich and challenge the US militarily.

However, China is not happy with the Western-centric characteristic of the world

order and on all occasions, Chinese leaders call for democratizing it by transforming it into a

non-hegemonic world order. China’s calls for multilateralism, respect for different

civilisations and ways of development and emphasis on ‘with Chinese characteristics’ help

counter-hegemonic movements in creating an alternative ‘universal common’ based on

multiculturalism against the ‘one-civilisation vision’103

of the US, which argues for

standardized political and economic policies under the ‘universal’ (neo)liberalism. In other

words, China, by promoting new concepts like ‘Harmonious Society’ and demanding a

multilateral world, facilitates counter-hegemonic forces in their struggle to delegitimize the

established order via creating a new counter-society based on norms and principles

contradicting and challenging those of the (post-)hegemonic order.

102 Beitelman, op .cit., p. 1076; G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West; Can the

Liberal System Survive?”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008,

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63042/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-future-of-the-west,

(accessed 20 February 2014). 103 Robert W. Cox and Michael G. Schechter, The Political Economy of a Plural World, New York, Routledge,

2002, p. 191.

29

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