heart and mind in conflict: the interplay of affect and ...heart and mind in conflict: the interplay...

Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplayof Affect and Cognition in ConsumerDecision Making

BABA SHIVALEXANDER FEDORIKHIN'

This article examines how consumer decision making is influenced by automat-ically evoked task-induced affect and by cognitions that are generated in a morecontrolled manner on exposure to alternatives in a choice task. Across twoexperiments respondents chose between two alternatives: one (chocolate cake)associated with more intense positive affect but less favorable cognitions, com-pared to a second (fruit salad) associated with less favorable affect but morefavorable cognitions. Findings from the two experiments suggest that if process-ing resources are limited, spontaneously evoked affective reactions rather thancognitions tend to have a greater impact on choice. As a result, the consumer ismore likely to choose the alternative that is superior en the affective dimensionbut inferior on the cognitive dimension (e.g., chocolate cake). In contrast, whenthe availability of processing resources is high, cognitions related tc the conse-quences of choosing the alternatives tend to have a bigger impact on choicecompared to when the availability of these resources is low. As a result, theconsumer is more likely to choose the alternative that is inferior on the affectivedimension but superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g., fruit salad). The moder-ating roles of the mode of presentation of the alternatives and of a personalityvariable related to impulsivity are also reported.

Men, as well as women, are much oftener ledby their hearts than by their understandings.{LORD CHESTERHELD)

With all its cleverness, however, decision the-ory is somewhat crippled emotionally, andthus detached from the emotional and visceralrichness of life. {GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN 1996,p. 289)

Much of consumer research has been predominantlycognitive in nature, and the role of affect has received

inadequate attention. This aspect of consumer research hasbeen widely criticized by eminent researchers such as Bett-man (1993), Hoch and Loewenstein {1991), and Holbrookand Hirschman {1982). Researchers recently have shownconsiderable interest in redressing this imbalance in various

*Baba Shiv is an assistant professor at the University of Iowa, IowaCity, IA52242'1000, and Alexander Fedorikhin is an assistant professor atWashington State University. Richland, WA 99352. The authors thank JimBettman. Joel Cohen, Cathy Cole, Irwin Levin, Michel Pham. DennisRook, GerTy Zaitman, and the participants of the Judgment and Decision-Making Seminar Series at the University of Iowa, the editor, the associateeditor, and the three reviewers for their invaluable feedback and guidanceat various stages of this project. The authors also thank Suchitra Balasu-bramanian and Angelo Licursi for their help in administering the experi-ments and coding the thought protocols.

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domains such as advertising {see, e.g., Batra and Stayman1990; Edell and Burke 1987; MacKenzie. Lutz. and Belch1986) and consumer satisfaction {Dub^, Belanger, andTrudeau 1996; Dub^ and Morgan 1996; Mano and Oliver1993; Oliver 1993; Westbrook and Oliver 1991). The con-sumer choice literature also has not been far behind inredressing this imbalance, with recent work that has pro-vided both theoretical {see, e.g., Hoch and Loewenstein1991; Loewenstein 1996) and empirical accounts of howaffect influences consumer choices {see, e.g., Garbarino andEdell 1997; Luce 1998; Luce, Bettman. and Payne 1997).The broad purpose of this article is to add to this growingbody of research in the consumer choice literature.

More specifically, as with the articles in the consumerchoice literature cited above, the focus of this work is onchoice as influenced by task-induced affect {i.e., affectivereactions that arise directly from the decision task itself)rather than ambient affect {i.e., affective states that arisefrom background conditions such as fatigue and mood),which has been the predominant focus of work on the roleof affect in decision making {see, e.g., Gardner 11985] andIsen 11997] for reviews of research on ambient affect; seealso Yates [1990] for the distinction between task-inducedand ambient affect). Second, in contrast to empirical workthat has examined the effects of task-induced affect on

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INTERPLAY OF AFFECT AND COGNITION 279

consumer choice (Garbarino and Edell 1997; Luce 1998;Luce et al. 1997). where the focus has been on negativeaffect arising from the structure or difficulty of the task, thefocus of thi.s article is on the effects of positive affect arisingfrom the stimulus (see Fiske and Taylor [1991] for a dis-cussion of the importance of examining both negative andpositive affect due to their differential effects on memory,judgment, persuasion, and decision making; in the rest ofthis article, we use the term "stimulus-induced affect" ratherthan "task-induced affect" to distinguish our work fromprevious work).

Another difference between our work and previous em-pirical work is based on the distinction made by Berkowitz(1993) between lower-order affective reactions, arisingfrom relatively automatic processes, and higher-order affec-tive reactions, arising from relatively more controlled, higher-order processes involved in thinking, reasoning, andconsciousness (see Schneider and Shiffrin [1977] for adistinction between automatic and controlled processes).The focus of our work is on affective reactions that areelicited rather spontaneously by an alternative in the choicetask, and. therefore, one could construe our work as beingcloser to the lower-order end of the continuum. In contrast,(1) Luce (1998) and Luce et al. (1997) focus on affectarising from making trade-offs between attribute values,which implies the use of more controlled processes—as-sessing the attrihute values, comparing values, weighingcosts and benefits, and so forth; and (2) Garharino and Edell(1997) focus on affect arising from high cognitive effort,again implying the use of higher-order controlled processes.

In this article, we develop our conceptualization by inte-grating recent psychological (Berkowitz 1993; Epstein1993; Leventhal 1984) and biological (LeDoux 1995. 1996)theories of affect. Our model proposes that, on exposure toaltematives in a choice task, two types of processes may beengendered, one affective in nature and the other cognitivein nature. The former process is likely to occur in a rela-tively automatic manner (i.e.. less likely to be affected bythe availability of processing resources), resulting in theaffective reactions that could differ on two dimensions,valence (positive or negative) and intensity. The secondtype of process is likely to occur in a relatively moreconirolled fashion (i.e., more likely to be affected by theavailability of processing resources), resulting in cognitionsabout the consequences of choosing the altematives. Fur-ther, according to the model. (I) if the availability of pro-cessing resources is constrained, the consumer's decision islikely to be based on the first, relatively automatic processand. therefore, to be based on affect rather than on cogni-tions evoked by the altematives; and (2) if processing re-sources arc not constrained, the second, relatively controlledprocess is likely to play a more important role, and, hence,cognitions are likely to have a bigger impact on choice thanwhen these resources are constrained.

We test the above conceptual model using a binary choicetask in a context similar to the ones examined by Dhar andWertenbroch (forthcoming). Hoch and Loewenstein (1991).Rook (1987). and Wertenbroch (1998), a context where the

positive affect elicited by one aitemative (chocolate cake) inthe choice task is more intense than that elicited by anotheraitemative (fruit salad), whereas the cognitions associatedwith the consequences of choosing the former aitemativeare predominantly negative. We focus on this specific con-text for two reasons. First, as indicated by Rook (1987),contexts such as the one examined in this article seem to bewidely prevalent among American consumers. Second, byfocusing on this specific context, we attempt to build on theseminal work by Berkowitz (1993), Hoch and Loewenstein(1991). and Rook (1987) in several ways. We build on Hochand Loewenstein (1991) and Loewenstein (1996) by (1)empirically testing some of their key propositions relating tothe effects of affect and cognitions on consumer choices andthe role of presentation mode in moderating these effectsand (2) examining the role of processing resources and of apersonality variable related to impuisivity (Logan. Scha-char. and Tannock 1997) in moderating the impact of af-fective and cognitive reactions on consumer choice. In ourgeneral discussion section we also attempt to extend ourconceptual framework and integrate other elements of Hochand Loewenstein's (1991) model.

We also contribute to Berkowitz's work by focusing onpositive rather than negative affect, which has been thepredominant focus of his research. In doing so, our goal isto demonstrate the generalizahility of some of the keypropositions made by Berkowitz. Finally, we not only pro-vide evidence to further validate the work by Rook but alsobuild on his work by way of operationalizing some of thekey constructs and by examining, in a context involvingactual rather than imaginary choices, how and under whatconditions consumers are likely to give in to the spontane-ously evoked affective reactions.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we first introduce Berkowitz's (1993)theory of how affect and cognition interact to influencebehavior. We then discuss how Berkowitz's theory is con-sistent with other models of affect proposed by experimen-tal psychologists such as Epstein (1993). Hoch and Loe-wenstein (1991), Leventhal (1984), and Zajonc (1980) andhy neuropsychologists such as LeDoux (1987, 1995, 1996).As indicated earlier, our primary focus will be on affectivereactions that occur in a relatively automatic manner ratherthan those that arise from more deliberate processes.

Theories Involving the Interaction betweenAffect and Cognition

Berkowitz (1993) proposes that three types of pro-cesses are likely to occur on exposure to a stimulus event.First, information related to the stimulus is subject to"relatively basic and automatic associative processes"(Berkowitz 1993, p. 10), which occur before the onset ofcognitive processes such as "appraisals, interpretations,schemas, attributions, and strategies" (Berkowitz 1993.p. 12). These "crude and primitive" preattentive pro-

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cesses {see, e.g., Ullman [1984] for a discussion of suchprocesses) occur relatively quickly and may give rise tolower-order affective reactions and action tendencies {ap-proach or avoidance) based on a rapid assessment of theaffective significance of the stimulus. Second, the infor-mation related to the stimulus is subject to more delib-erative, higher-order cognitive processing, the outcomeof which may serve to strengthen or weaken the actiontendencies arising from the lower-order affective reac-tions. For example, in the case of anger, which has beenthe predominant focus of Berkowitz's work, higher-ordercognitive processes might involve social rules regardingthe appropriateness of the action tendencies arising fromthe lower-order affective reactions, which, in turn, mightserve to suppress these action tendencies. Finally, theaffective significance of the outcome of the higher-orderprocessing may result in higher-order affective reactionsand action tendencies that are engendered relativelyslowly compared to lower-order affective reactions sincetbe information is subject to more deliberative processesbefore these reactions can occur.

The model proposed by Berkowitz is consistent withthose proposed by Epstein {1993), Leventhal {1984, 1993),and Zajonc (1980). In line with Berkowitz's theory, Ep-stein's Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory {CEST) pro-poses that two conceptual systems tend to operate in parallelin any given task: an experiential system, which is affectivein nature and is associated with crude and rapid processing,and a rational system, which is cognitive in nature and isassociated with a more refined and deliberative processing.Leventhal similarly proposes that affective reactions canarise from two routes: an "innate route" accompanied bysensory-motor processes that generate primitive or partiallyformed affective reactions and a memory route that involvesschematic and conceptual processing. Also, the propositionsmade by Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) and Zajonc {1980)are consistent with Berkowtiz's argument that affectivereactions can occur relatively automatically without an ac-tive role of higher-order cognitive processes. Zajonc hasargued that affect is precognitive in nature, occurring with-out any extensive perceptual and cognitive processes, andprecedes in time these higher-order processes. Hoch andLoewenstein propose that feelings of desire that consumersoften experience in shopping situations may "occur with theminimum conscious deliberation characteristic of automaticor mindless behavior" and "with little or no cognition"{Hoch and Loewenstein 1991, p. 498). However, the differ-ence between the propositions made by Zajonc and Hochand Loewenstein and by Berkowitz is that, rather thanstating that affect always precedes cognition, a view takenparticularly by Zajonc. Berkowitz proposes that affectivereactions can also arise in a relatively controlled, postcog-nitive manner from deeper higher-order processing of in-coming infonnation.

The model proposed by Berkowitz also seems to beconsistent with recent work by neuropsychologists {e.g.,LeDoux 1987, 1995, 1996; see also Lang 1993). In line withBerkowtiz {1993), LeDoux argues that on exposure to an

external stimulus, the following three events may occur: {1)"low-road" processes, centered in the limbic systems of thebrain, that occur rapidly and may give rise to low-roadaffective reactions; {2) "high-road" cognitive processes, in-volving the cortical systems of the brain, "systems believedto be involved in thinking, reasoning, and consciousness"{LeDoux 1996. p. 161). which strengthen or weaken low-road affective reactions; and {3) "high-road" affective reac-tions, arising from the outcome of high-road cognitive pro-cesses, that occur relatively slowly compared to low-roadaffective reactions.

Affective-Cognitive Model of ConsumerDecision Making

The models described in the previous section suggest thaton exposure to an alternative in a choice task, two processesmay occur. The first process is likely to occur in a relativelyautomatic manner and is likely to give rise to affectivereactions, which could vary in tenns of valence {positive ornegative) and intensity. Since the first process occurs rela-tively automatically, these lower-order affective reactionsare likely to be elicited even if processing resources are notallocated to the dec i si on-making task. The second process islikely to be relatively more deliberative and controlled thanthe first and is likely to engender cognitions about thealternatives. These cognitions could arise from stimulus-based as well as memory-based processes and could beeither favorable or unfavorable toward the alternatives inthe choice task. Further, since the second process is morecontrolled in nature, the generation of cognitions is morelikely to occur when processing resources are allocated bythe consumer to the choice task than when they are not.

Further, in terms of the impact of affect and cognitions onthe consumer's final behavior, the models described in theprevious section suggest that if the availability of processingresources is constrained, the consumer's behavior is likelyto be influenced primarily by the affective reactions elicitedby the task: {!) the consumer is likely to choose (reject) analternative if the affect elicited by it is positive {negative),and {2) the consumer is likely to choose (reject) the alter-native that elicits the most intense positive (negative) affect.Conversely, if processing resources are available, the con-sumer's behavior is likely to be influenced primarily by thecognitions arising from higher-order processes.

The discussion thus far suggests that a critical variablethat is likely to affect the relative impact of affective reac-tions and cognitions on choice is the availability of process-ing resotirces. a variable that has been central to variousother popular models such as the Elaboration LikelihoodModel (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). the Availability-ValenceModel {Kisielius and Stemthal 1986). and the Characteriza-tion-Correction Model (Gilbert, Pelham. and Kruil 1988).Two broad possibilities arise when one examines behaviorsacross different levels of this key variable: (1) affect andcognitions have the same valence, and {2) affect and cog-nitions have opposite valences. If affective reactions, whichtend to drive action tendencies when processing resources


are constrained, and cognitions, which tend to drive actiontendencies when processing resources are available, havethe same valence, then the direction of their impact onchoice is likely to be the same. Consequently, the probabil-ity of choosing an aitemative that elicits more intense andpositive (negative) affect is likely to be the same or higher(lower) when processing resources are available than whenthey are not. Conversely, if affective and cognitive reactionshave opposite valences, tben they are likely to act in oppo-site directions (one prompting choice, the other promptingrejection). As a consequence, the probability of choosingthe aitemative that elicits more intense positive (negative)affective reactions is likely to be attenuated (enhanced)when processing resources are available compared to whenthey are not.

Choosing on Impulse—Moderating Role ofPresentation Mode and Impuisivity

Rook (1987) characterizes impulse behavior as occurringwhen a consumer experiences positive affect spontaneouslyon confrontation with a product, which results in a suddenurge to choose the product eliciting these affective reac-tions. Also, impulse behavior is often seen as being associ-ated with negative consequences for the decision maker(Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Rook 1987). Stated differ-ently, in contrast to positively valenced affective reactions,the cognitions associated with impulse behaviors are morelikely to possess a negative valence (for an exception, seeRook and Fisher [1995]).

!n line with the above characterization of impulse buying.Icl us consider a binary choice context where one aitemative(say. chocolate cake) is superior on the affective dimension(i.e.. is associated with more intense positive atfect) but isinferior on the cognitive dimension (i.e.. is associated withless favorable cognitions) compared to the other aitemative(e.g., fruit salad). The affective-cognitive model suggeststhat when processing resources are constrained, choice islikely to be based primarily on the affective reactions en-gendered. As a consequence, under these conditions theprobability is high that the consumer will end up choosingthe aitemative that is superior on the affective dimension(i.e., chocolate cake). In contrast, when processing re-sources are available, choice is likely to be based more oncognitions than on affect. Since the aitemative that is supe-rior on the affective dimension is also inferior on the cog-nitive dimension compared to the other aitemative (i.e., fruitsalad), the probability that the former will be chosen islikely to be attenuated when the availability of processingresources is high compared to when it is low. However,rather than predicting that processing resources will alwaysaffect choice in the manner indicated above, we propose thatthis effect will be qualified by at least two factors—themode in which the altematives are presented (real vs. sym-bolic) and the consumer's personality (i.e., whether theconsumer tends to be impulsive or not).

Based on work by Mischel (Mischel 1974; Mischel andMoore 1973; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1992), Loe-

wenstein (1996) proposes that one factor that is likely tomoderate the intensity of the affective reactions is the natureof presentation of affect-laden altematives. The intensity ofthese reactions is likely to be higher when the presentationmode is real, that is, where real altematives are presented tothe decision maker, rather than when the presentation modeis symbolic, that is. where the consumer is exposed tophotographs and/or descriptions of the altematives. Accord-ing to Loewenstein (1996), a potential cause for the mod-erating role of presentation mode is that a real presentationenhances the vividness and, therefore, makes it easier tosense the gratification arising from consuming the aitema-tive compared to a symbolic presentation.

The above discussion suggests that the biggest impact ofpresentation mode is likely to occur when processing re-sources are low, which is when affect plays a major role indetermining choice. More specifically, when processing re-sources are constrained, choice of the affect-laden alterna-tive (i.e., chocolate cake) is likely to be higher when thepresentation mode is real than when it is symbolic. Incontrast, the effects of presentation mode on choice arelikely to be diminished when processing resources becomeavailable, resulting in a convergence of the preferences forthe affect-laden aitemative across different presentationmodes. Thus,

HI: The effect of restricted processing resources onthe choice of an affect-laden aitemative will bemoderated by tbe presentation mode, with theeffect being greater when the presentation is realthan when it is symbolic.

Further, based on Logan et al, (1997), Puri (1996). andRook and Fisher (1995). we propose that the effects ofprocessing resources on choice are likely to be moderatedby a personality variable related to consumer impuisivity.According to Puri (1996), one aspect that differentiatespeople who are high on consumer impuisivity ("impul-sives") and those who are low on this factor ("pmdents") isthe accessibility of cognitions related to impulse behaviors.Pmdents apparently spend more time thinking about theconsequences of engaging in sucb behaviors and, as a result,have more accessible cognitions compared to impulsives.This implies that when processing resources are low. indi-viduals low on consumer impuisivity should be able toovercome tbeir prepotent affective reactions by using highlyaccessible cognitions and, therefore, be less likely thanthose high on this factor to choose the option that is superioron the affective dimension (e.g., chocolate cake).

In contrast, when processing resources are available, ac-cessibility should play a diminished role in influencingchoice (see, e.g., Chaiken. Liberman, and Eagly [19891 forthe effects of accessibility under conditions of low vs, highavailability of processing resources). Impulsives shouldnow be able to put in the effort required to retrieve previ-ously stored cognitions from memory and, consequently,also should be able to overcome their prepotent affectivereactions. As a result, the choices of individuals high on


consumer impuisivity ought to converge with those who arelow on this factor. Thus.

H2: The effect of restricted processing resources onthe choice of an affect-laden aitemative will bemoderated by consumer itnpulsivity, the effectbeing greater with increased levels of consumerimpuisivity.

EXPERIMENT 1

The purpose of experiment I was to examine the effectsof spontaneously evoked affective reactions on consumers'preferences in a binary choice task when the processingresources available during the decision-making task arehigh versus low and to test the role of presentation mode inmoderating these effects (Hypothesis 1). The specific con-text examined in this experiment was one where one alter-native was superior on the affective dimension but inferioron the cognitive dimension, compared to the other aitema-tive. Experiment 1 used a two-factor (processing resourceswith two levels [high vs. low] and presentation mode withtwo levels [real vs. symbolic]) between-subjects design.

Procedure

One hundred and sixty-five undergraduate students wererandomly assigned across the four conditions. The experimentwas carried out in two different rooms. In the first room,respondents were provided with instmctions that stated that thestudy was about the effects of a change in environment onconsumers' memories for information, and that, as part of thestudy, they would be asked to go to another room. Respondentswere also told that they would be asked to memorize a numberon exiting the first room and recall it in the second room.Further, respondents were told that they would be providedwith a choice of snacks for participating in the study.

After the instructions had been read to the respondents, theywere requested to leave the room one person at a time. Onexiting the first room, each respondent was provided with asheet of paper that contained directions to the second room.This sheet of paper was also used to keep track of whether arespondent belonged to the high or the low processing-re-sources condition. Respondents were then instructed to walkover to a cart that was visible from the first room. Respondentswere told that they would find two snacks on display on thecart (which were not mentioned and which became visible onlywhen respondents stood in front of the cart) and that they wereto decide which snack they would like to have, choose a ticketfor a snack, and then proceed to the second room.

Before respondents proceeded toward the cart and to thesecond room, the processing-resources manipulation wascarried out by adopting a procedure that has been widelyused in the literature (see, e.g., Gilbert et al. 1988; Gilbert,Giesler, and Morris 1995; Swann et al. 1990; Trope andAlfieri 1997). One group of respondents (low processing-resources condition) was requested to memorize a seven-digit number; another group (high processing-resources

condition) was requested to memorizx a two-digit number.The numbers were printed on index cards that were put inenvelopes. When a respondent was ready to proceed to thecart and then to the second room, the experimenter openedan envelope, displayed the number briefly, atid closed theenvelope. Care was taken that respondents left the Hrst room(one at a time) only after the previou.s respondent had madehis/her choice of snack and had moved out of sight onhis/her way to the second room. This was to ensure thatrespondents could not see the number to be memorizedbefore their tum. Further, this procedure ensured that eachrespondent's decision was not influenced by another respon-dent's choice.

After respondents had picked up the ticket for their cho-sen snack, they proceeded to the second room, where theywere given a booklet in which they were first asked to recallthe number they had been asked to memorize. They thencompleted other measures described below. After complet-ing the measures, the booklet, the ticket that indicated therespondent's choice of snacks, and the sheet containingdirections to the second room (which served to keep track ofthe processing-resources condition that respondents werein) were collected and stapled together. At the end of eachexperimental session, the time of day when the session wascarried out was noted on all the completed booklets (thisvariable did not covary significantly with any of the depen-dent variables and hence will not be discussed further).

Stimuli and the Presentation-Mode Manipulation

Two snacks—a piece of chocolate cake with cherry top-ping and a serving of fruit salad^were on display in trans-parent plastic containers that were placed on a cart stationedbetween the two rooms. To control for the prices and thesupplier of these two snacks, a price sticker ($1) obtainedfrom a local grocery store was affixed to each of the con-tainers that were on display. The top of the cart was coveredon three sides to ensure that the snacks were not visible untilthe respondent stood in front of the cart. This was to ensurethat all respondents made their decisions only after they hadwalked up to the cart. The presentation mode was manipu-lated based on the work by Mischel and Moore (1973) andLoewenstein (1996), who suggest that presenting respon-dents with photographs of the alternatives, rather than thereal altematives. is likely to reduce the vividness of theoptions and hence the intensity of positive affect experi-enced by respondents. Consistent with these findings, thepresentation-mode factor was manipulated by presenting thereal snacks (chocolate cake and the fruit salad) to one groupof respondents and presenting photographs of the snacks toanother group. To be certain that the photographs werefaithful reproductions of the respective real snacks, a pretestwas carried out using respondents from the same populationas the main experiment.'

'Fifty-two respondents were randomly assigned to two experimentalconditions. One group of respondents rated two pieces of chocolate cake onone cart and two containers of fruit salad on a second can (the order was


Further, to assess if, as per our conceptualization, themode of presentation manipulated the vividness of the op-tions, another pretest was carried out using 38 respondentsfrom the same population as the main experiment. Somerespondents rated the real snacks; others rated photographsof the snacks (the stimuli were identical to the ones used inthe main experiment). Respondents were asked to rate thevividness of each of the two snacks, with the order beingcounterbalanced, on the following seven-point items: "noteasy to visualize consuming the cake/fruit-salad (l)/easy tovisualize myself consuming the cake/fruit-sal ad (7)," "noteasy to imagine myself consuming the cake/fruit-sal ad (1)/easy to imagine myself consuming the cake/fruit-salad (7)."and "not easy to picture myself consuming the cake/fmit-salad (!)/easy to picture myself consuming the cake/fruit-salad (7)." These items were adapted from Anand-Kellerand Block (1997) and McGill and Anand (1989). Cron-bach's alpha for these items measuring the vividness of thesnacks was .81 for the cake and .79 for tbe fruit salad, so theresponses were averaged to form one vividness-related vari-able for the cake and one for the fruit salad. A within-subjects ANOVA. with order of presentation and presenta-tion mode as the between-subject factors and type of snackas the within-subject factor, revealed a significant maineffect of presentation mode, and none of the other treatmenteffects were significant. Consistent with our conceptualiza-tion, respondents rated the real snacks as being rnore vivid(M = 6.30) than the photographs of the snacks (X = 5.13,F(l,34) = 16.55,/7 < .0003).

Measures

Respondents first recalled the number they had beenasked to memorize and then responded to the remainingmeasures. Except for the first (choice), second (thoughtprottK'ols), and the last (covariates) set of these remainingmeasures, the scales for all the other measures were adaptedfrom Hoch and Loewenstein (1991), Loewenstein (1996),Puri (1996). and/or Rook and Fisher (1995). First, choicewas measured by asking each respondent the following:"Just a moment ago you made a choice from two options,the cake and the fruit-salad. Plea.se indicate below the optionyou chose." Responses to this question were compared with

counterbalanced). Another group of respondents rated a piece of chiKolalecake and ii photograph of this piece of cake placed on the first can and acontainer of fruit salad and a photograph of this container on the secondcan (the order was counterbalanced). Respondents rated how similar theitems displayed on each of two carts were in Ienn.s of the ingredients andother features on two items anchored by "very different {l)/very similar(7)." and "don't look alike (l)/l(H)k alike (7)." The correlations betweenthe.se two items were 0.77 for the chocolate cake and 0.76 for the fruitsalad, so they were averaged to form one measure for the chocolate cakeand one for the fniit salad. A between-subjects ANOVA revealed that thesimilarity ratings were not different across the real and the photographconditions. The mean similarity rating for the photograph of the chocolatecake compared to Ihe real one (X = 6.24) was no different (roni that for thereal cakes (X = 6.36; Ff 1.50) - .2S:p> .20). Further, the mean similarityrating for the photograph of the fruit salad compared to the real one {X= 6.05) was no different from thai for the real fruit salads (X = 6.22; (f 1,50) = .42: /) > .20).

the tickets for the snacks that respondents had picked fromthe cart (across all respondents, the responses to the choice-measure matched perfectly with the snacks indicated on thetickets).

Respondents were then asked to describe, as completelyas possible, whatever went through their minds while theywere deciding between the two snacks. The instructions forreporting thought protocols were similar to those used in theliterattire (see. e.g.. Edell and Keller 1989; Shiv. Edell, andPayne 1997). The protocols were coded by two independentjudges for the total number of thoughts. Any statement thatrepresented evaluations or descriptions of the options/at-tributes, prior experiences, thoughts about the consequencesof choosing an option, or thoughts about the task was codedas a thought (all statements in the written protcKoIs fell intoone of these categories). Interjudge agreement was 95 per-cent, and coding discrepancies were resolved through dis-cussion. These thought protocols gave us an opportutiity tocheck if the prcKessing-resources tnanipulation was suc-cessful—a higher number of thoughts was expected to bereported in the high than in the low processing-resourcescondition.

Each respondent was then asked to indicate the basis ofhis/her choice on five seven-point items that were presentedafter the following statement: "My final decision aboutwhich snack to choose was driven by." These items wereanchored by "my thoughts (l)/my feelings (7)" (adaptedfrom Rook and Fisher [1995]), "my willpower (l)/my desire(7)" (adapted from Hoch and Loewenstein 11991]). "myprudent self (l)/my impu]sive self (7)'" (adapted from Puri[l996]), "the rational side of me (l)/the emotional side ofme (7)," and "my head (1 )/my heart (7)." (The appropriate-ness of these and other items as measures of the underlyingconstructs of interest was tested through discussions withmembers drawn from the same population as the mainexperiment.) The Cronbach alpha for these items measuringthe basis for respondents" decisions was 0.91. and, there-fore, the responses to the five items were averaged to forma single variable (Decision Basis).

Based on our conceptualization, the presentation-modefactor was expected to influence the intensity of affectivereactions elicited by the chocolate cake—the intensity wasexpected to be greater when the presentation mode was realthan when it was symbolic. In order to test if the manipu-lation of the presentation-mode factor was consistent withour conceptualization, respondents were asked to rate if thefollowing statements were apt descriptions of each of thetwo snacks: "I could sense a desire to grab it" (adapted fromHoch and Loewenstein 11991 ]), "I felt a strong, irresistibleurge to take it," "I felt an impulse to take it" (the last twoadapted from Rook 11987]), and "The emotional side of mewas aroused when I saw it." These items were anchored by"description not apt (] )/de.scription apt (7)." The order inwhich the respondents rated the two snacks was counterbal-anced (in the various relevant analyses, none of the treat-ment effects involving the order of measurement was sig-nificant, and hence this variable will not be discussedfurther). Cronbach's alpha for these items measuring the


affective nature of the two snacks was 0.97 for the cake and0.95 for the fruit salad, suggesting that the items could beaveraged to form one variable for the cake (Affect ake) andone for the fruit salad (Affect,-^|,).

An additional measure, derived from Crites, Fabrigar, andPetty (1994) and representing respondents' cognitions aboutconsuming each snack, was obtained on four seven-point itemsfor each of the two snacks (one at a time, with the ordercounterbalanced—again, none of the treatment effects involv-ing the order of measurement was significant in the relevantanalyses). The scales were anchored by "harmful (l)/beneficial(7)." "not good for health (l)/good for health (7)," "a fooHshchoice (l)/a wise choice (7)," and "useless (l)/useful (7)."Cronbach's alpha for these items was 0.88 for the cake and0.84 for the fruit salad, and, therefore, the responses wereaveraged to form one variable for the cake (Cog ,gj.p) and onefor the fruit salad (Cogfruj,)- Further, to ensure that the mea-sures related to Decision Basis. Affect, and Cognitions repre-sent different constructs, we carried out a factor analyses,which revealed that items represenfing the various constructsloaded uniquely on different factors.

Finally, respondents indicated their gender, whether theywere health-conscious individuals, and whether they werecake and fruit-salad fanatics (the last three measures wereobtained using seven-point items anchored by "seldomwould describe me/usually would describe me"). Thesemeasures were collected to serve as covariates in the variousanalyses. Of these measures only the last three covariedsignificantly with the dependent measures in this and thenext experiment.

Results

Maniputalion Checks. To ensure that we successfullymanipulated the processing-resources factor, we needed toshow that the number of thoughts reported in the protocolswas significantly higher in the high processing-resourcescondition compared to the low processing-resources condi-tion and that none of the other treatment effects weresignificant. Also, to provide evidence of success in manip-ulating the presentation-mode factor, we needed to showthat Affectj.jjj e (i.e., the intensity of affect elicited by thecake) was significantly higher when the presentation modewas real than when it was symbolic. As summarized inTable 1, between-subject ANCOVAs with processing re-sources and presentation mode as the independent variablesrevealed that the manipulations were successful.

Further analyses were carried out to ensure that the stim-ulus material had the desired properties; (1) the cake wasmore affective in nature compared to the fruit salad whenthe presentation mode was real and less so when it wassymbolic, (2) the presentation-mode manipulation influ-enced only respondents' ratings of the affective nature ofthe cake and not their cognitions about consuming the cake.

^Checks were first made to ensure that these covariates did not interactsignificantly with the independent variables, so that the assumption ofhomogeneity of regression slopes was met.

TABLE 1

INFLUENCE OF PROCESSING RESOURCES ANDPRESENTATION MODE ON MANIPULATION-CHECK AND

STIMULUS-RELATED MEASURES—EXPERIMENT 1

Totalthoughts

Affect , ,,

Affect,,uH

Cogcako

Low processing resources

Realpresentation

2.304.283.32

3.066.12

Symbolicpresentation

2.353.473.293.345.88

High processing

resources

Realpresentatior

3.54

4.153.113.245.94

Symbolio1 presentation

3.28"3.36* -3.12^=3.26"5.91"

NOTE.—Results-manipulation check measures: ^ significant main-effect ofprocessing resources (F(1, 160) = 29.9, p < .0001); other treatment effectsNS; "Sign^jcant main-effect of presentation-mode (F(1, 160) = 8.9. p< .003); X higher when the presentation mode is real than when it issymtxilic, both in the low and high processing resources conditions. Results-stimulijs properties: '^ significant type of snaok by presentation-mode inter-action (F(1, 160) - 4.5, p < -04). Affect is significantly higher for the cakethan for the fruit salad when the presentation is real, in the low (F(1, 160)= 6.71, p < .05| and high processing-resources conditions (F(1. 160)= 7.35, p < .05); if not different otherwise;'^ Significant main effect of type

ofsnack{F(1.158) = 325,p < .0001). Cognitions significantly less favorablefor the chocolate cake compared to the fruit salad, irrespective of the ievei ofthe processing-resources and the presentation-mode factors.

and (3) consistent with our conceptualization, cognitionsrelated to the cake were less favorable than those related tothe fruit salad. As indicated in Table 1, within-subjectANCOVAs, with processing resources and presentationmode as the between-subject factors, the type of snack asthe within-subjects factor revealed tbat all three require-ments related to the stimuli were satisfied.

Choice. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, a logistic regres-sion analysis revealed a significant processing-resources bypresentation-mode interaction (x^ = 3.72, p = .05), inaddition to a significant main effect of processing resources(X^ = 5.36, p = .02). As depicted in Figure 1. whenprocessing resources were constrained, changing the pre-sentation mode from real to symbolic by exposing respon-dents to a photograph of the altematives rather than the realalternatives resulted in a reduction in the choice of the cake(63 percent when the presentation mode was real comparedto 42 percent when it was symbolic; z = 1.96, p < .05).

Further, when the presentation mode was real, choice ofthe chocolate cake (superior on the affective dimension butinferior on the cognitive dimension compared to the fruitsalad) was higher (63 percent) when the availability ofprocessing resources was low than when it was high (41percent; z ~ 2.0, p < .05). Also, compared to the conditionswhere the presentation mode was real (the downward-slop-ing tine in Fig. 1), u^hen the presentation mode was sym-bolic, choice of the cake was not different across the twoprocessing-resources conditions (42 percent and 45 percentin the low and high processing-resources conditions, respec-tively; z = .21, p > .20).


FIGURE 1

EXPERIMENT 1—CHOICE AND DECISION BASIS AS FUNCTION OF PROCESSING RESOURCES AND PRESENTATION MODE

CHOICE70%-r

60%--

Choiceof 5 0 % - -

cake

40%-|-

30%

63%Presentation Mode Real

Presentation Mode Symbolic

Lo Hi

Availability of Processing Resources

5,0 -r

4,5

4 0 - -

35

3,0

DECISION BASIS

4.27

__ 163

Presentation Mode Real

Presentation Mode Symbolic

3.73

3.62

Lo Hi


,—Higher numbers In the Decision-Basis graph indicate that the decision was driven more by affect than by cognitions.

Decision Basis. The variable Decision Basis (highernumbers indicate that respondents' choices were basedmore on affect than on cognitions) served to ascertainwhether the decisions across the different conditionswere based on respondents" affective reactions or cogni-tions. As sbown in Figure 1. the pattern of results forDecision Basis mirrored that for choice. Consistent withour conceptualization, when the level of processing re-sources was low. respondents rated their choices as hav-ing been driven more by affect in the presentation-mode

real condition {X = 4^7) than in the presentation-modesymbolic condition (X = 3.63; F(U 158) = 4.34, p< .04). Further, when the presentation mode was real,respondents rated their choices as having been drivenrnore by affect in the low processing-resources conditioniX =^.27) than in the high processing-resources condi-tion (X = 3.62; F(l, 158) = 5.78,p < .02). Also, as withchoice, when the presentation mode was symbolic, themeans on Decision Basis were not different across thetwo processing-resources conditions {X ~ 3.63 and 3.73


in the low and high processing-resources conditions,respectively; F < 1).

Discussion

The results of experiment I indicate that, in a binarychoice context, where one aitemative (chocolate cake) issuperior on the affective dimension but inferior on thecognitive dimension compared to the other alternative (fruitsalad), choices are influenced by the level of processingresources allocated to the task and by the mode of presen-tation of the altematives. Choice of the chocolate cake washigher when processing resources were constrained (byhaving respondents memorize a seven-digit number) thanwhen the resources were not constrained (i.e., when respon-dents memorized a two-digit number). However, these re-sults were obtained only when real altematives were pre-sented to respondents. Also, in the low processing-re sourcesconditions, changing the presentation mode from real tosymbolic by having photographs of the altematives insteadof the real altematives resulted in a reduction in the choiceof the cake.

Support for our conceptualization was also obtained byusing a process measure. Decision Basis, which indicatedwhether respondents' choices were driven by their affectivereactions (i.e., their desires and feelings, their impulsiveself, their emotional side, and their heart) or by their cog-nitions (i.e., their willpower and thoughts, their prudent self,their rational side, and their head). Results for this Decision-Basis variable mirrored those for choice. Consistent withour conceptualization, respondents who were presentedwith the real altematives indicated that their choices hadbeen influenced more by their affective reactions whenprocessing resources were constrained than when they werenot. Further, when the presentation mode was changed fromreal to symbolic by having photographs of the altemativesrather than the real altematives, the impact of affect onchoice was reduced.

Finally, the results on respondents' affective reactionstoward the chocolate cake (Affectj,jj,jp) and the fruit salad(Affectfnjj,) and on Decision Basis provide an interestinginsight into the underlying psychological processes thatmight have occurred in the presentation-mode real, lowversus high processing-resources conditions. When realsnacks were presented, respondents in both the low and thehigh processing-resources conditions expressed similar af-fective reactions toward the chocolate cake (which weremore intense compared to the fmit salad). However, theresults on Decision Basis .suggest that these affective reac-tions influenced respondents' choices more when the avail-ability of processing resources was low than when it washigh. In other words, the results indicate that respondentswho could allocate more processing resources to the taskalso experienced affective reactions arising from the choc-olate cake but were better able to use their cognitions toavoid giving in to these affective reactions compared torespondents who were unable to allocate sufficient process-ing resources to the task.

EXPERIMENT 2The purpose of experiment 2 was to test Hypothesis 2

regarding the role of consumer impuisivity in moderatingthe effects of processing-resources on choice. The proce-dure, stimuli, and the measures that were used in experiment2 were similar to those used in the real presentation-modeconditions of experiment 1 (i.e.. all respondents in experi-ment 2 were presented with the real snacks), Sixty-ninerespondents from the same population as experitnent I wererandomly assigned to one of two processing-resources con-ditions.

In addition the individual difference measure related toconsumer impuisivity was included at the end of the questionbooklet. The items for this measure were based on Pud's(1996) Consumer Impulsiveness Scale. Respondents wereasked to rate how well the following adjectives describedthem: "impulsive," "careless," and "easily tempted." Theseitems were anchored by "seldom would describe me (1)/usually would describe me (7)." The midpoint was anchoredby "sometimes would describe me." The Cronbach alpha forthese three items was 0.77, so the responses were averaged toform one variable to represent the respondent's level of im-puisivity. To test the reliability of this measure, particularlygiven that it could have been contaminated since it was pre-sented alter choice in the experimental booklet, a test-retestprocedure was ased (see, e.g., Edwards 1966) with a separatesample of respondents drawn from the same population asexperiments 1 and 2. These respondents were presented withmeasures representing consumer impuisivity twice, witli fourweeks intervening between the two presentations. During thefirst phase of the test-retest procedure, respondents were pre-sented with a battery of different measures in which wereembedded those representing consumer impuisivity. Fourweeks later, these respondents engaged in the same procedureused in experiment 1; that is, respondents were assigned to oneof the four between-subject conditions, with the last set ofmeasures representing consumer impuisivity. The correlationbetween these measures obtained four weeks apart was high(0.79), suggesting that presenting the mea.sure of consumerimpuisivity after choice did not adversely affect the conclu-sions drawn from the results of this experiment.

Results

Manipulation Checks. The thought protocols, whichwere coded by two independent judges for the total numberof thoughts, served to examine if the manipulation of theprocessing-resources factor was significant (as in experi-ment 1, any statement that represented evaluations or de-scriptions of options/attributes, prior experiences, thoughtsabout the consequences of choosing an option, or thoughtsabout the task was coded as a thought; all statements in thewritten protocols fell in one of these categories). Interjudgeagreement was 92 percent, and coding discrepancies wereresolved through discussion. A between-subjects ANCOVArevealed tbat significantly more thoughts were reported inthe high processing-resources condition (X = 4.19) com-


FIGURE 2

EXPERIMENT 2—CHOICE AND DECISION BASIS AS FUNCTION OF PROCESSING RESOURCES AND CONSUMER IMPULSIVITY

84.2% CHOICE

80%'

70%-h

Choiceof 6 0 % +

cake

50%-I-

40%

30%

Impulsives *

Prudents

- _ 38%

Lo Hi


6.0

5.0 - - 4.80

40

3.0 - - 2.85

2.0

DECISION BASIS"

Impulsives

Prudents

Lo HI


NaTt.—"Consumer impuisivity has been dichotomized using a median split. "Higher numbers indicate that the decision was driven more by affect than bycognitions-

pared to the low processing-resources condition (X = 2.91;F(\, 61) = 16.26, p < .0002), and none of the othertreatment effects were significant. These results suggest thatthe processing-resources manipulation was successful.

Choice. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, a logistic regres-sion analysis with processing resources (categorical) andconsumer impuisivity (continuous) as the independent vari-ables revealed a significant processing-resources by con-sumer-impulsivity interaction (x" = 7.20, p = .007), apart

from a significant main effect of processing resources (x^= 5.36, p = .02). As depicted in Figure 2, when theavailability of processing resources was constrained, choiceof the chocolate cake was lower for individuals low onconsumer impuisivity (38 percent) than for those high onthis factor (84.2 percent; z = 2.82, p < .05; note thatconsumer impuisivity has been dichotomized in Fig. 2 usitiga median split for a better exposition of the results). Further,for individuals high on consumer impuisivity. choice of the


chocolate cake was higher when the availability of process-ing resources was low (84.2 percent) than when it was high(40.0 percent; z = 2.68, p < .05). Choice of the cake wasnot different across the two processing-resources conditionsfor individuals low on consumer impulsivity (38 percentand 37 percent in the low and high processing-resourcesconditions, respectively; z = .06, p > .20).

Decision Basis. The variable Decision Basis served toascertain whether the decisions across the different conditionswere based on respondents' affective reactions or cognitions.The pattern of results for Decision Basis mirrored that forchoice—a between-subjects ANCOVA revealed a significantinteraction between processing resources and consumer impul-sivity (F(l, 62) = 11.31, p < .001). As depicted in Figure 2,when the level of processing resources was low, individualshigh on consumer impulsivity rated their choices as havingbeen driven more by affect {X = 4.80) compared to those lowon this factor (X = 2.85; F(l, 62) = 9.31, p < .003).Further, individuals high on consumer impulsivity ratedtheir choices as having been driven more by affect in thelow processing-resources condition (X = 4.80) than in thehigh processing-resources condition {X = 2.93; f ( l , 62)= 7.46, p < .008). Also, as with choice, the means onDecision Basis for those low on consumer impulsivity werenot different across the two processing-resources conditions(X = 2.85 and 2.80 in the low and high processing-re-sources conditions, respectively; F < 1).

Discussion

The results of experiment 2 indicate that, in a binarychoice context where one alternative (chocolate cake) isassociated with more intense positive affect but with lessfavorable cognitions compared to the other alternative (fruitsalad), choices are not only affected by the level of process-ing resources allocated to the task but also by a personalityvariable, consumer impulsivity. For respondents high onthis individual-difference factor (i.e., for impulsives),choice of the chocolate cake was higher when processingresources were constrained (by having respondents memo-rize a seven-digit number) than when the resources wereavailable (i.e., when respondents memorized a two-digitnumber). Further, when processing resources were con-strained, individuals low on consumer impulsivity (i.e.,prudents) were less likely to choose the chocolate cakecompared to impulsives.

Support for our conceptualization was also obtained byusing a process measure that indicated whether respondents'choices were driven by affect or by cognitions. Results forthe Decision-Basis variable mirrored those for choice. Con-sistent with our conceptualization, impulsives indicated thattheir choices had been influenced more by their affectivereactions when processing resources were constrained thanwhen they were not. Further, consistent with our conceptu-alization, when the processing resources were constrained,tbe impact of affect on choice was attenuated for prudentscompared to impulsives.

GENERAL DISCUSSION1

Summary of Findings

The purpose of this article was to examine tbe influenceof spontaneously evoked affect and cognitions arising frommore deliberative processing on consumer choice acrosssituations where processing resources are available versusconstrained. Based on prior work by Berkowitz (1993),Epstein (1993), and Leventhal (1984), the primary proposi-tion was that under conditions where the consumer does notallocate processing resources to a decision-making task,s/he is more likely to choose based on affect rather than oncognitions. As a consequence, the consumer is more likelyto choose the alternative that is superior on the affectivedimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension. In con-tra.st, when tbe consumer does allocate processing resourcesto the decision-making task, the choice is likely to be basedprimarily on cognitions, resulting in a reduced likelihoodthat such an alternative will be chosen. Two additionalpropositions were made to qualify our primary proposition,one relating to the mode of presentation of the alternatives,and the other relating to a personality variable related toconsumer impulsivity. The impact on choice of processingresources and, hence, affect compared to cognitions, wasexpected to be stronger (I) when the presentation mode wasreal (i.e., when real alternatives were presented) than whenthe presentation mode was symbolic (i.e.. when photo-graphs of the alternatives were presented), and (2) when thelevel of consumer impulsivity was high than when it waslow.

The above propositions were tested in a binary choicecontext, wbere one alternative (chocolate cake) was superioron the affective dimension but inferior on the cognitivedimension compared to tbe other alternative (fruit salad).Findings from two experiments supported our propositions.Consistent with our conceptualization, choice of the choc-olate cake was higher when the availability of processingresources was low than when it was high but only whenrespondents were presented with real alternatives and whenthe level of consumer impulsivity was high. In contrast,when the presentation mode was symbolic (i.e., respondentswere presented with photographs of the alternatives), orwhen the level of consumer impulsivity was low, choice ofthe chocolate cake was the same irrespective of the avail-ability of processing resources for the task.

Theoretical and Managerial Implications

Our work, together with recent empirical research byGarbarino and Edell (1997) and Luce (1998), cleariy pointsto the importance of examining the role of task-inducedaffect in consumer decision making. Previous empiricalwork in this area suggests that consumers' decisions can beinfluenced by affect arising from higher-order processessuch as making trade-offs between attribute values (Luce1998) and from having to expend high cognitive effort. Ourwork extends previous work by demonstrating that consum-


ers' decisions can also be influenced by affect arising in arelatively spontaneous manner from the stimulus, with littleinvolvement of higher-order cognitive processes.

Our work has implications for the literature on impulsebehavior as well. It extends previous work in this area byproviding empirical evidence for the role of stimulus-induced affect in such behaviors, the role of processingresources in determining the relative influence of affect andcognitions on choice, and the moderating role of the modeof presentation of alternatives and of an individual differ-ence variable related to impulsivity. In doing so, our workopens pathways to the next phase of research in this topicarea, research that is aimed at building the edifice on analready strong foundation laid by Rook (1987) and by Hochand Loewenstein (1991).

Our findings bave tremendous implications for marketersas well. The core finding related to the effects of constrainedprocessing resources on the choice of affect-laden alterna-tives suggests that any factor that reduces the availability ofprocessing resources in the shopping environment is likelyto increase impulse buying by consumers. Marketers ofaffect-laden products could therefore benefit from actionsdesigned to constrain processing resources such as havingdistracting music or displays in the shopping environment.Another tactic that derives from anecdotal evidence that weobtained from a local grocery-store manager is to reduce thecheckout time so that consumers deliberate less about whatis in their shopping carts and end up leaving the store withproducts they chose on impulse.

The findings related to the mode of presentation of thealternatives also have tremendous implications for market-ers. The growing popularity of the Internet and cybershop-ping suggests that more and more shopping situations arelikely to involve presentation modes that are symbolic (i.e.,alternatives being presented as digital photographs and/or asdescriptions), which in turn is likely to result in choicesbeing based less on affect and more on cognitions. This willparticularly affect products that are currently being pur-chased for their hedonic rather than utilitarian value. Mar-keters of such products will need to consider ways ofobviating this presentation-mode effect. One possibility thatarises from the literature on mental imagery is to encourageconsumers to vividly imagine themselves using the productso that the sensory processes that result from such imageryare no different than actual product usage.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The conclusions in this article are made with the usualcaveats of dec is ion-making experiments that are conductedin controlled environments. Even though the experimentsu.sed real alternatives rather than scenarios, they were con-ducted in a binary choice context and in a nonshoppingenvironment with food products that were in plastic con-tainers to control for factors such as aroma and with astudent population. In other words, the propositions arisingfrom our affective-cognitive model were tested in a contextthat was devoid of much of the richness that surrounds real-

world brand choices. It is quite possible that as research inthis topic area moves closer to reflecting how consumersbehave in the real world, further refinement to the theorizingand conclusions presented in this article will be needed.Delineated below are several promising research directionsthat arise from examining our findings and the traditionalview of impulse buying in the context of actual marketplacebehaviors.

The traditional view of impulse behavior as being irra-tional has bad a long history, dating back to as early as theturn of the twentieth century, with work in psychoanalysis(Freud 11911] 1959), a view that is still being shared bycontemporary researchers (e.g.. Rook and Fisher 1995). Onequestion that future research needs to address is. How doconsumers view impulse behaviors, and How do their viewstranslate to impulse buying? Preliminary results from ourfollow-up work suggest that, in contrast to researchers'views of impulse behavior, consumers do not seem to viewimpulse behavior as normatively inappropriate, at least im-mediately after the behavior occurs. In an experiment thatwas similar to the ones reported in this article, respondentswho had been subject to cognitive load were asked, imme-diately after they had indicated their choices, how satisfiedthey were with their decisions, and whether they would liketo change their mind about the snack that they chose. It isinteresting that as high as 90 percent of cake pickers statedthat they would not change their minds, a percentage thatwas no different than that related to fruit-salad pickers—allthis despite cognitions about consuming the cake beingunfavorable, as reported in this article. More research isneeded on this topic area, one area of which might be toexamine consumers' postdecision processes that would ac-count for discrepancies that we have found between deci-sion satisfaction and cognitions about affect-laden products.

The above discrepancy between researchers' and con-sumers' views on impulse buying may partly account for apuzzling real-world phenomenon that also behooves us toinvestigate further: Why do we continue to observe con-sumers who, for example, know more about the importanceof nutrition than ever before and yet struggle with efforts tocontrol their weights and cholesterol levels? An answer to apiece of this puzzle might lie in processes that consumersengage in after impulse behaviors—immediately after pur-chase consumers may rationalize, resulting in tbe view thatthe bebavior was appropriate, but after a period of time theymay experience pangs of guilt, leading to attempts at self-control.

Another, rather trivial, answer to the above puzzle arisingfrom our affective-cognitive model is that consumers oftenmake decisions mindlessly, without allocating sufficientprocessing resources to access cognitions related to affecl-laden options. A more plausible answer to the puzzle maycome from expanding our affective-cognitive model to ac-commodate higher-order affective reactions as well. Torefresh the reader's memory, this article focused on lower-order affective reactions that are elicited in a rather auto-matic fashion. The work by Berkowitz (1993) and LeDoux(1995, 1996) suggests that impulse behavior, prompted by


affective reactions to options, can also arise as a conse-quence of bigher-order processing, that is, when consumersallocate processing resources to the decision task. One pos-sible direction for future research, which will not onlyprovide answers to the above puzzle but also help infusesome of the richness of Hoch and Loewenstein's (1991)framework into our affective-cognitive model, is to examinesituations where respondents make delayed choices of al-ternatives that are presented to them. For example, insteadof having respondents make their decisions immediately (asin experiments 1 and 2), they could be asked to wait in tbepresence of tbe two options before tbey make their choices.Here, since processing resources are available, based on thefindings of our study, respondents may initially decideagainst the affect-laden option. But the more respondentsdeliberate while waiting in the presence of tbe options, themore they might feel deprived at not being able to consumethe affect-laden alternative, resulting in the respondentsyielding to their temptations and choosing this option.

More research also is needed to assess the reliability ofthe variable Decision Basis that we used in our research.Until then, researchers planning to use this variable needto do so with some degree of caution. The basic assump-tion underlying the use of this variable is that consumerscan access their mental processes leading to a decision.However, this assumption has been called to question byseveral researchers (see. e.g.. Nisbett and Wilson 1977).Although it is quite possible that respondents in ourexperiments did have retrospective access to their mentalprocesses when responding to the Decision-Basis mea-sure, another possibility could also account for the resultson this process measure. An alternative account could bethat respondents simply inferred the bases of their deci-sions from their choices—a respondent choosing the cakemay have inferred that, since cake is often associatedwith affective decision making, the choice was basedmore on affect than on cognitions. As a consequence, insituations where the choice of the chocolate cake washigh (low), the results on Decision Basis were also high(low), yielding similar patterns of results on this variableand choice.

Finally, from a theory-building perspective, future re-search needs to follow up on recent advances in neuropsy-chology on emotions (e.g., LeDoux 1996). For example,one direction could be to examine neurological and physi-ological changes that occur when consumers are behavingon impulse and to assess how well the measures of affectthat have been used by us and other experimental psychol-ogists, including Luce (1998) and Garbarino and Edell(1997), correlate with neurological and physiological mea-sures. Research in this direction will serve to integratepsychological and biological approaches to understandingaffect, a strategy that is being advocated by a number ofre.searchers (see, e.g., Isen 1990; Lang 1993) to increase"our understanding of all these phenomena and the pro-cesses that contribute to them" (Isen 1990, p. 89).

CONCLUSIONAs indicated by eminent researchers such as Bettman,

Hoch, Holbrook, and Loewenstein. the characterization ofthe consumer in previous decision-making research as a"thinking machine," driven purely by cognitions, is a poorreflection of reality. Moreover, the work by Dickson andSawyer (1990), examining how consumers actually makedecisions in various shopping contexts, suggests that con-sumers are more often mindless rather than mindful deci-sion makers. This article was an attempt to integrate thesetwo broad themes with the hope that it will infuse more lifeand realism into an already exciting area of research inconsumer decision making.

[Received June 1998. Revised May 1999. Robert G.Bumkrant .served as editor, and Joel Huher served as

associate editor for this article. ]

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heart and mind in conflict: the interplay of affect and ...heart and mind in conflict: the interplay...

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