hearing transcript - 14 august 2003 morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 14 August 2003 Morning

1/45

Hearing Transcripts

1 Thursday, 14th August 20032 (10.30 am)3 DR BRYAN WELLS (called)4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS

5 LORD HUTTON: Good morning.6 MR DINGEMANS: Dr Wells, can you give his Lordship your full7 name.8 A. My name is Dr Bryan Harry Wells. I should say for the9 avoidance of confusion I spell my first name with a Y,10 not an I.11 Q. What is your occupation?12 A. I am Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control13 at the Ministry of Defence, formerly the director of14 Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat in the15 Ministry of Defence. I am also the United Kingdom's16 Commissioner to the United Nations Monitoring,17 Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC. That

18 is not a Government appointment, that appointment is in19 the gift of the United Nations Secretary General.20 Q. If there were to be any conflicts between Her Majesty's21 Government and the United Nations, how do you resolve22 that in your employment?23 A. In my advice that I give to the executive chairman of24 UNMOVIC I am speaking in a personal capacity. That is25 understood by the executive chairman, until recently

11 Dr Hans Blix, now Dimitri Perricos and it is understood2 by my colleagues in UK Government.3 Q. Dr Kelly himself had a United Nations role as well, did

4 he not?5 A. Dr Kelly's role in relation to me was as special adviser6 to me as UNMOVIC commissioner; and in that role he7 advised me on the organisation of UNMOVIC, its plans for8 operations and its actual operations in Iraq.9 Q. And how long have you been at the Ministry of Defence?10 A. I joined the Ministry of Defence in September 1988.11 Q. What were you doing before that?12 A. I was a post-doctorate research scientist at Oxford13 University.14 Q. Not in Government?15 A. Not in Government, sir.16 Q. How long were you Dr Kelly's line manager?

17 A. Since August of last year.18 Q. And did you get to know him well over the period of19 time?20 A. I believe we did. We travelled to New York on many21 occasions for UNMOVIC commissioners meetings and we22 would obviously meet in the margins of that. We also23 had meetings obviously in London as well.24 Q. Right. And his particular speciality, I think we have25 heard, was in biological and chemical weapons. Was that

21 the only part of your job or did you have other duties2 as well?

3 A. My duties covered the full range of counter4 proliferation and arms control agendas. That includes


2/45

5 all of the nonproliferation treaties, nuclear as well as6 chemical and biological, and also the export control7 regimes.8 Q. Who was David Kelly's reporting officer?9 A. David Kelly's reports were written by Dr Richard Scott,10 director of DSTL.

11 Q. Although you were his line manager, he was reported on12 by someone else?13 A. That is correct. That is because Dr Kelly had a range14 of contacts across Whitehall within the Ministry of15 Defence and also within the Foreign and Commonwealth16 Office.17 Q. So he was managed by someone or reported on by someone18 who had no direct contact with him; is that right?19 A. I believe that the director of DSTL maintained contact20 with Dr Kelly. I can also say that the director spoke21 to me at regular intervals.22 Q. You may have seen some of the documents that I referred23 to on Monday, which related to complaints Dr Kelly had

24 made to DSTL; and I asked Mr Hatfield about that and he25 said I would have to speak with you or DSTL. Do you

31 mind if I speak with you about that?2 A. Please do.3 Q. Can I take you to MoD/3/140?4 This is a letter dated 17th April 2000 from Dr Kelly5 to Paul Taylor. Effectively the gist of this letter is6 that he was complaining, at the bottom of the page:7 "Pay and reward for my work has been a problem ever8 since."9 That was ever since his move from UNMOVIC. Were you

10 aware of any of those problems?11 A. I note that that letter is dated 2000, before I took12 over responsibilities. I have to say, in all the time13 that I knew David since August of last year, he did not14 raise any concerns with me.15 Q. Right. Would you have been the person he would have16 raised the concerns with?17 A. I would not have been surprised, if he had concerns, if18 he would have spoken to me.19 Q. Right. Can I take you to MoD/3/47? Again it is20 a letter, to be fair, that predates your appointment.21 Obviously you are the person now with responsibility.22 This is from Dr Kelly to Stephen Dettmar, human

23 resources manager at DSTL, 14th September 2001:24 "You know I have been unhappy with my management by25 DERA, now Dstl, for some time. I have finally decided

41 to write formally to Ms Hilary Brown ..."2 Do you know whether his complaints were ever3 resolved?4 A. I do not. It was only after the tragic events that5 I became aware of this correspondence.6 Q. The latest note that I can find is MoD/3/39; and this is7 to Dr Scott. It is from David Kelly again.8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You see the date of this?10 A. Yes.


3/45

11 Q. This is 17th March 2003.12 A. Yes.13 Q. First of all, were you aware that David Kelly had14 written this letter before his death?15 A. I was not.16 Q. And you were not aware of any unhappiness that he had

17 about terms and conditions?18 A. He did not communicate any unhappiness to me.19 Q. He was obviously dealing with DSTL for that, and he has20 obviously had a meeting with Richard Scott because he21 says:22 "Dear Richard,23 "I appreciated the opportunity to talk to you last24 Thursday.25 "In the course of our meeting you stated that you

51 considered I should have received a 6 per cent pay rise2 in October 2002 as a consequence of my promotion to

3 level 9 on 18th February 2002."4 And he talks about that. There is writing at the5 bottom of the page. Do you know whose writing that is?6 A. I do not.7 Q. And at the bottom it seems to say something like:8 "Please note 8 to 9 ..." which I imagine is level 89 to level 9 DSTL?10 A. Yes.11 Q. "... was not in October 2002 but previously (2001). Can12 you please check he has been treated in accordance with13 the rules."14 Have you been able to make any enquiry since15 Dr Kelly's death to ascertain whether or not he had been

16 treated in accordance with the rules?17 A. No I have not. As I say, I was not aware of this18 correspondence until last week.19 Q. And so if one is to pursue that, I infer from your20 answer that I really have to deal with DSTL on that?21 A. I believe so, sir.22 Q. Right. When was your first meeting with Dr Kelly?23 A. My first meeting was August 9th of last year. That was24 an introductory call, immediately before Dr Kelly went25 on leave and in the first week of my taking up the post.

61 Q. So a general discussion with Dr Kelly?

2 A. It was about half an hour.3 Q. Right. You had a meeting on 5th September with him?4 A. Yes.5 Q. And at that meeting you went to DIS. Can you just help6 us with what DIS means?7 A. That is the Defence Intelligence Service.8 Q. And what took place at that meeting?9 A. The DIS had arranged for me, given that I was new in the10 post, a presentation on their assessments on Iraqi11 weapons of mass destruction.12 Q. Right. So I mean their assessment on Iraqi weapons of13 mass destruction must have been fairly relevant to the14 issue of the dossier, which we know took place on

15 24th September 2002.16 A. Yes.


4/45

17 Q. Do you know whether there was any discussion of the18 dossier at that meeting?19 A. I cannot recall any discussion.20 Q. What was Dr Kelly's relationship with the personnel at21 the DIS who were at the meeting? Did he know them well?22 A. Yes, he did. He knew many of them well. He had been

23 colleagues with some of them for many years and he24 visited them on a regular basis.25 Q. Right. DIS is obviously an intelligence service.

71 A. Yes.2 Q. And Dr Kelly was not, but from that meeting, and no3 doubt from your other knowledge, would this be a fair4 characterisation: that Dr Kelly had strong links with5 members of the DIS?6 A. Yes. I would -- whether one says strong is a judgment,7 but links.8 Q. You choose your word.

9 A. I would say he had regular links.10 Q. Right. Was there any evidence of unhappiness or11 discussions at that time about any of the claims that12 were to be made in the dossier, that you were aware of?13 LORD HUTTON: Just tell me again if you would, please, what14 date was this, this meeting that you had with DIS?15 A. My Lord, it was 5th September.16 LORD HUTTON: 5th September. Yes.17 MR DINGEMANS: We know the dossier has been issued on the18 24th.19 A. Yes.20 LORD HUTTON: I beg your pardon, I interrupted you. Just21 put the question again. Was Dr Wells aware of any --

22 MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware of any unhappiness at that23 meeting amongst members of the DIS?24 A. To the best of my recollection this was not discussed.25 Q. You were not discussing the dossier?

81 A. No, it was a straight presentation on DIS assessment of2 the situation on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.3 Q. Was a 45 minute claim mentioned in that presentation?4 A. To the best of my recollection it was not; but I have to5 say that I was a few weeks in post and if it was, I am6 not sure that I would have picked up any significance of7 it.

8 Q. Right. It was effectively to brief you because you were9 new to the post?10 A. Exactly.11 Q. And to bring you up to speed as quickly as possible?12 A. That is a very fair characterisation, sir.13 Q. I think on 6th September you met with Dr Kelly,14 Hans Blix; is that right?15 A. That is right. Dr Blix was in London on other business16 but, as was quite often the case, if he was in London he17 would arrange to meet UK officials and sometimes18 ministers.19 Q. And after that initial interaction with Dr Kelly and20 indeed UNMOVIC contacts, what else did you have to do

21 with Dr Kelly to the close of that year, the close of22 2002?


5/45

23 A. I would characterise two things. The first was24 throughout the autumn there was a lot of work in the25 United Nations about a new Security Council resolution

91 giving UNMOVIC new powers in relation to inspections in

2 Iraq. That was eventually passed as Security Council3 Resolution 1441 in November of that year. So we were4 expecting that UNMOVIC would deploy into Iraq quite5 soon, and in fact it deployed at the end of November.6 We were doing -- we, sorry, UK Government were doing7 a lot of work to consider what we could do as8 governments to give UNMOVIC the best support we could.9 Q. Right?10 A. And David, given his knowledge of UNMOVIC, assisted in11 that process.12 The second issue was that we had an UNMOVIC13 commissioners meeting at the end of November. That was14 a commissioners meeting under Security Council

15 Resolution 1284, it happened every quarter. So we knew16 it was coming. But because it was at the end of17 November, a few days after UNMOVIC had first deployed18 into Iraq, it had very special significance for the19 commissioners.20 Q. And what was your relationship with David Kelly on these21 matters? He had obviously had a great deal of22 experience of United Nations inspections.23 A. Yes.24 Q. And you had taken up the post I think you say in August?25 A. David acted as my fount of knowledge on UNMOVIC.

10

1 Myself, and I think it is fair to say a number of2 colleagues, did not really know the structure of3 UNMOVIC, how it operated, how it was proposing to4 operate in Iraq until quite late in the autumn when we5 suddenly realised it was going to deploy into Iraq.6 David was an official in the Ministry of Defence who7 had that sort of knowledge; and so he was very important8 in briefing up the chain, as it were, on that.9 Q. After the UNMOVIC inspections had taken place, and10 indeed after the war in Iraq, were there any other11 involvements with Dr Kelly and inspections or proposed12 inspections?13 A. Yes. After the withdrawal of UNMOVIC from Iraq and the

14 subsequent military actions, the coalition forces15 started to think about how it would undertake the16 identification and subsequent destruction of any weapons17 of mass destruction or supporting material that it found18 in Iraq; and as a result of this the Iraq Survey Group19 was established. This was April/May of this year.20 Again the United Kingdom, having been a coalition21 partner, wanted to play a full role in this, and we drew22 on David's experience as a weapons inspector in23 formulating our thinking on how to assist in this; in24 particular, in relation to David's role to me, I was25 asked as part of the United Kingdom's efforts to recruit

111 a cadre of inspectors who could deploy to Iraq. Most of


6/45

2 these people, not all but most, were former UNSCOM3 inspectors who would therefore have had experience of4 undertaking inspections in Iraq.5 David, of course, was vital there in knowing who the6 individuals were, what their specialisms were, what7 their capabilities were. So he was the person who could

8 give us the contacts of people who might, in principle,9 be interested in doing this work.10 Q. How much time was Dr Kelly spending in London itself and11 how much time was travelling, if you had to put12 a percentage on it?13 A. I would say about 50 per cent of his time was in London.14 He did work quite a lot at home as well, as well as15 travelling.16 Q. And the other 50 per cent was travelling and working at17 home then?18 A. That is correct.19 Q. And when he worked in London was his office next to20 yours, another building?

21 A. He had an office close to my own, which he shared with22 two other people. I know he had, also, an office in the23 DIS although I do not know the details of that.24 Q. So he had an office in your building. Are you able to25 tell us where that is geographically?

121 A. Yes, it is in the Metropole Building in Northumberland2 Avenue.3 Q. Then he had an office in the DIS building?4 A. That is correct.5 Q. Did he have an office in the Foreign and Commonwealth6 office?

7 A. I do not believe he did, although he obviously went over8 and saw Foreign Office colleagues usually when he was in9 London.10 Q. When he was in London, we have about 50 per cent of his11 time was in London, how much time was he next door to12 you or nearly next door to you and how much time was in13 other offices?14 A. I would say it was about evenly split between the three.15 Q. It appears that Dr Kelly went to Kuwait on about16 19th May. Do you know that?17 A. Yes I do.18 Q. It also appears that there was some confusion with his19 visa and he was taken off the plane and deported the

20 next day. Do you know the circumstances in which that21 came to happen?22 A. I hope I can shed some light on this. I was not23 directly involved myself. I was in Washington at the24 time on totally unrelated business but I did speak to25 Dr Kelly afterwards.

131 What I understand happened is the following: on2 16th May, the Friday, I had a meeting with Brigadier3 John Deverell who had recently been appointed as the4 Chief of Staff to the Iraq Survey Group and he was also5 the most senior UK officer who would be deploying to

6 Iraq. I saw Brigadier Deverell along with David. David7 was very keen to go to Iraq to get a better


7/45

8 understanding of what sort of role inspectors would have9 when they were out there. This was important because we10 were still in discussions with potential recruits. If11 we could not really tell them what they were going to do12 then clearly we could only go so far in our discussions.13 Brigadier Deverell said he was happy for David to be

14 part of his team who were going out I think on Sunday15 the 18th as part of a familiarisation visit. So we are16 talking of a very short time to arrange things.17 Q. Yes.18 A. My understanding is that David had assumed that the19 military team running Brigadier Deverell's programme20 would arrange the entry for him; and the military team,21 knowing that David was a civilian and therefore did not22 have military identification, would arrange his own23 visa.24 Q. For whatever reason his visa was not arranged and he was25 deported back to the United Kingdom?

141 A. My understanding is that he landed first in Qatar and2 then flew on with Brigadier Deverell to Kuwait prior to3 going on to Iraq. At Kuwait it was found he did not4 have the right or the necessary papers for entry. He5 was given hotel accommodation and then returned to the6 United Kingdom at the earliest opportunity.7 Q. You say you discussed this with him after the event.8 What was his reaction to that?9 A. I would say two things. The first was a degree of10 embarrassment that this had happened; and a degree of11 frustration that he really wanted to learn how the Iraq12 Survey Group was working, that was denied him. I think

13 he also expressed a degree of unease at what had14 happened as well. I think he found it disturbing that15 he had been taken to a hotel and then put on a plane16 back.17 Q. Did it lead to any expressions of dissatisfaction with18 the Ministry of Defence as an employer or anything?19 A. No, it did not.20 Q. What did you know of Dr Kelly's contacts with the press?21 We have heard from Mr Hatfield about his permitted22 contacts and we have seen evidence of a whole range of23 permitted contacts, and we have also seen his appraisal24 form. Have you seen that appraisal form?25 A. I have seen his most recent appraisal form, yes.

151 Q. Which deals with media contacts being part of his2 duties?3 A. Yes.4 Q. Do you know whether he sought authority for contacts5 through the Ministry of Defence or through the Foreign6 and Commonwealth Office?7 A. At our introductory meeting he explained the8 arrangements for dealing with the press and that these9 would be through the Foreign Office. He would gain10 authorisation to do that. He did say that on certain11 topics, I think on smallpox and anthrax, he would go

12 through the Ministry of Defence press office.13 Q. Right.


8/45

14 A. If there was a major briefing he would inform me that15 this was happening and that it had been cleared. And16 this was presented to me as an arrangement of long17 standing.18 Q. And did he mention any briefings that he might give on19 behalf of the United Nations, in which case there would

20 be no UK Government authorisation?21 A. I do not recall that he did so.22 Q. When were you first aware of any press briefings that23 become relevant to the Inquiry?24 A. I believe the first one that I recall discussing with25 colleagues was the Observer article on 15th June.

161 Q. Yes.2 A. I saw that article -- this was concerning the mobile3 biological weapons facilities that had been discovered4 by the Iraq Survey Group.5 Q. Did you know whether or not Dr Kelly had a view on those

6 laboratories?7 A. Yes, I do. He did discuss it with me; and he was of the8 view that these were not biological weapons facilities.9 Q. And that followed -- had Dr Kelly actually got to Iraq?10 A. Yes. Sorry, I should have said that he did manage to11 get to Iraq between the 5th and 10th June to do the12 reconnaissance visit that had been earlier planned and13 in part of that he did see the mobile facilities.14 Q. He had formed a view, right or wrong, about the mobile15 laboratories?16 A. That is correct.17 Q. And he shared that view with you?18 A. He did.

19 Q. And then what drew your attention to the article in the20 Observer? First of all, what did the article say, or21 the gist of it?22 A. To the best of my recollection, the Observer article23 quoted a UK source who had seen the facilities -- now,24 that is a very few number of people -- and to the best25 of my recollection it said that that source believed

171 that the mobile facilities were not for biological2 weapons but for hydrogen production. I recall David3 expressing that view to me.4 Q. Did you receive any --

5 LORD HUTTON: Do you know, was that the view of other6 members of the United Kingdom Survey Group or were there7 differences of opinion?8 A. My Lord, there were differences of opinion. I did not9 have any discussions with any of the other members who10 had seen the facilities.11 LORD HUTTON: I see. But there were differences of opinion12 within the British team as far as you know?13 A. There was a spectrum of opinions, my Lord, yes.14 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.15 MR DINGEMANS: Were you contacted about the Observer16 article?17 A. The following morning at about 10 o'clock I believe

18 Martin Howard rang me about the article.19 Q. So if the article was published on Sunday 15th June,


9/45

20 that must be Monday 16th?21 A. That was the 16th.22 Q. He rings you at 10 o'clock. What did he say?23 A. First of all he asked me if I had seen the article and24 I confirmed that I had. Martin was of the view that25 David must be a candidate for being the source and he

181 wanted to discuss that with David.2 Q. Was Mr Howard aware of Dr Kelly's views on the mobile3 laboratories then?4 A. I could not say for certain.5 Q. Do not worry, we will ask him.6 LORD HUTTON: Just before we proceed, Dr Wells, may I ask7 you: if you could see the letter which Dr Kelly wrote to8 you on 30th June 2003, which is MoD/1/19, and at the9 third page of that letter, you see the passage there in10 the paragraph beginning "I should explain ...", then11 there is a sentence about six or seven lines down:

12 "Over the next ten years I undertook at the request13 of MOD, FCO, CBD Porton Down, and the especially the UN14 press office and UNSCOM/UNMOVIC press officer both15 attributable interviews and occasionally unattributable16 briefings. All such interactions were cleared by the17 appropriate authority. As my contact details became18 known it became inevitable that direct approaches were19 made and I used my discretion as [to] whether I provided20 information."21 Had you been aware that that had been Dr Kelly's22 practice?23 A. My Lord, I was personally not aware that he would have24 used discretion rather than reporting straight to the

25 appropriate press office.

191 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Well, have you any comment on the point2 he makes that as his contact details, in other words3 presumably his home and mobile telephone numbers became4 known, it became inevitable that direct approaches were5 made, "and I used my discretion"? Do you have any6 opinion on that as to whether that is an understandable7 approach in practice?8 A. My Lord, it would depend on the nature of the approach9 that was made. If it was, for example, to check some10 details of a briefing that had already been authorised,

11 then in the interests of swift reporting one can12 understand it. If it was a request for an entirely new13 briefing, then I would have expected that appropriate14 clearance from the press office would have been sought.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.16 MR DINGEMANS: Can I just, in that respect, take you to17 a document, CAB/1/115? This is a memo dated18 21st July 2003 from Patrick Lamb of the Foreign Office19 and towards the bottom of that page can I just ask you20 to comment on his analysis that the system which he had21 set up, which had been set up relating to press contact,22 "... ultimately relied on self discipline and judgment23 on all sides, worked well and provided the media with

24 expert background briefing", which suggested that in25 some respects Dr Kelly was left to make the decision on


10/45

201 his own; was that your understanding at the time?2 A. I think that is a fair reflection of my understanding of3 how the system worked.4 Q. Turning back to the Observer article, you are contacted

5 I think you tell us at about 10 o'clock by Mr Howard.6 What do you do as a result of that?7 A. I explain to Mr Howard that David is currently in8 New York but I would contact him to ask him to phone9 Mr Howard to discuss the issue of the Observer article.10 Q. Did you manage to make contact with Dr Kelly?11 A. I made contact at around 1500 London time.12 Q. What did you do, ask him to call Martin Howard?13 A. I said to David that Mr Howard wanted to discuss the14 Observer article. I recall that David said that he was15 not the source of that.16 Q. Right.17 A. And I said that I would want him personally to convey

18 that to Mr Howard.19 Q. What was your next contact with Mr Howard about press?20 A. My next contact was the Thursday, the 19th June. We had21 had a meeting that Mr Howard chaired on UK support to22 the Iraq Survey Group. And after that meeting,23 Mr Howard asked Tim Dowse of the Foreign Office and24 myself to --25 Q. Can you tell everyone what Tim Dowse's role is?

211 A. I apologise. He is the head of counter proliferation2 department in the Foreign Office. He is basically my3 Foreign Office opposite number.

4 Q. So you have a meeting with Mr Dowse and Mr Howard?5 A. That is right. Mr Howard says he wishes to have an6 interview with Dr Kelly to discuss recent contacts with7 the press. This is against the background of the8 Observer article but also it had -- I was told, for the9 first time, that Dr Kelly had told Foreign Office10 colleagues that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan.11 Q. So you are told on the 19th June?12 A. 19th.13 Q. That Dr Kelly had spoken to Andrew Gilligan?14 A. Yes.15 Q. And who told you that from the Foreign Office, Mr Dowse?16 A. Mr Howard told me that at the meeting that we had.

17 Q. He told you that at the meeting. And what was the18 outcome of the meeting?19 A. We agreed that the three of us should ask David to come20 in for an interview at the earliest appropriate time, to21 find out what he had spoken to Mr Gilligan about, what22 he had said, but also, given that this contact appeared23 not to be authorised, to remind him not to speak to the24 press without proper authorisation.25 Q. Right. And did the meeting on 24th June take place?

221 A. It did not.2 Q. And why was that?

3 A. At that time I did not know -- I did not know at the4 time, but there was, in addition to inquiries underway


11/45

5 about what I might call the 45 minute allegations, there6 was a parallel investigation involving the police about7 the leaking of a top secret document. David --8 Q. Was that the document that Mr Gilligan referred to about9 the absence of links or a reported absence of links10 between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden?

11 A. I do not have full details but I believe it was.12 Q. That Mr Gilligan I think had published in February 2003?13 A. I do not have the details of that.14 Q. So you were telling us why the meeting on 24th June did15 not go ahead?16 A. At that time David was being considered as part of that17 inquiry and the view was taken I was not party to this18 decision -- the view was taken that an interview with19 David about his links with the press might prejudice20 that other inquiry.21 Q. Did a time come when that other inquiry excluded22 Dr Kelly?23 A. I believe it did, sir, but I do not have the details of

24 that.25 Q. You were not involved with that?

231 A. I was not involved.2 Q. I will ask Mr Howard about that. Will he know?3 A. I believe he will sir.4 Q. I can always ask him, anyway.5 So you do come to have an interview with Dr Kelly?6 A. No. The meeting that was fixed for the 24th was7 postponed sine die. Mr Howard did not give a reason for8 that. I quite simply relayed the message to David that9 the meeting had been postponed. I did not know the

10 reason for the postponement so I could not tell Dr Kelly11 the reason.12 Q. And you then receive a letter dated 30th June 2003. Can13 I take you to that? That is MoD/1/19.14 When did you receive this letter?15 A. I received it late afternoon on 1st July, the Tuesday.16 Q. Had Dr Kelly told you it was coming?17 A. He rang me mid to late afternoon on Monday 30th June to18 say that he had written me a letter.19 Q. Did he tell you what the letter was about?20 A. He said that it was about his dealings with21 Andrew Gilligan. His attention had been brought to22 Mr Gilligan's evidence before the FAC and he had spent

23 the weekend searching his mind about whether he might24 have been the source of Mr Gilligan's quotes.25 Q. Did he say to you anything on the telephone about

241 whether he thought he had been the source?2 A. I do not believe he did.3 Q. Right. You then get the letter; and we can see the4 letter. Can I take you through that briefly? He talks5 about controversy raging over Andrew Gilligan's claims,6 he talks about his involvement in writing the three7 dossiers. Then over the next page he introduces his8 dealings with Andrew Gilligan. I have taken Mr Gilligan

9 through that, so I will not take you through that.10 At the bottom of page 20:


12/45

11 "I most certainly have never attempted to undermine12 Government policy in any way ..." and he says he was13 sympathetic to the war because he recognised from14 a decade's work the menace of Iraq. Page 21, he did not15 consider he was the source "... until a friend in RUSI16 said that I should look at the oral evidence ..."

17 Did you know who that person was in the Royal United18 Services Institute?19 A. I should say first of all it was not RUSI. David did20 from time to time mis-attribute the colleague. She was21 in Chatham House.22 Q. Someone had pointed out the similarity and that is what23 had prompted him to think about that?24 A. Yes.25 Q. "I should explain my 'unusual' interaction with the

251 media", he talks about that. His Lordship has just2 taken you to that passage so I will not go back to it.

3 The penultimate paragraph on page 21:4 "I have never served as a designated spokesperson5 for any organisation, never initiated the release of6 information on behalf of any organisation and never7 discussed a JIC report. I have never contacted any8 journalist to claim that a newspaper report was correct9 (or incorrect). I have never made a claim as to the10 timing of when any part of the dossier was included.11 I have never acted as a conduit to release or leak12 information. I have never discussed classified13 information with anyone other than those cleared so to14 do. I do not feel 'deep unease' over the dossier15 because it is completely coincident with my personal

16 views on Iraq's unconventional weapons capability."17 Having investigated and indeed having heard all that18 we have heard about Dr Kelly's contacts with the press,19 did you form a view about whether or not there had been20 any breach of the Official Secrets Act?21 A. On the basis of what Dr Kelly said in this letter and on22 the basis of the subsequent interview by23 Richard Hatfield on the 4th July we came to the24 conclusion that, on the face of this text, there had not25 been a breach of the Official Secrets Act.

261 Q. And now that you have heard or perhaps seen transcripts

2 of the tape, and you have heard evidence from Mr Hewitt3 about what he says was said and you have heard evidence4 from Mr Gilligan about what he said was said and you5 have seen Mr Gilligan's note, are you still of the same6 view?7 A. That is very difficult for me to answer. I have not,8 I confess, seen all of the transcripts. I would really9 have to look at those to come to a judgment.10 Q. Right. What did you do about this letter of 30th June?11 A. On 1st July in the morning, I had a meeting with12 a member of the Ministry of Defence security set up at13 their request; and this was the point at which I learnt14 that there was a parallel inquiry into the leaking of

15 a top secret document; and that, at that stage, David16 was being considered as part of that.


13/45

17 Q. Right.18 A. I, in turn, said that David had told me that he had19 written a letter to me outlining his dealings with20 Mr Gilligan. We came to a common understanding that it21 was possible that the letter that David had written22 might have implications for the inquiry into the leaking

23 of the top secret document. Clearly we could not come24 to that judgment until we saw what the letter said.25 Q. Yes.

271 A. So we reached an agreement that as soon as the letter2 arrived we would have a further meeting to look at what3 the letter said, to decide on the handling. The letter4 arrived, as I said, late on the afternoon of 1st July.5 I held a meeting with the Ministry of Defence security6 and subsequently with the police on the morning of7 2nd July.8 Q. Did you send the letter on to Mr Howard?

9 A. Yes, I did on the 2nd --10 Q. Can we look at MoD/1/23? Can you tell everyone what11 this is?12 A. Yes. This is a covering minute that I wrote to13 Mr Howard, formally forwarding a copy of Dr Kelly's14 letter to me to him. We had come to the decision in my15 discussions with Ministry of Defence security and the16 police that the letter did not have immediate17 implications for the leaking of a top secret document.18 Consequently, the best person up the chain, if you like,19 to receive this was Mr Howard given his responsibilities20 for looking into the allegations of the 45 minutes21 quote.

22 Q. You say at the end of that short paragraph:23 "You may wish to pass a copy to the leak inquiry24 personnel."25 A. That is the personnel looking into the leaking of the

281 top secret document.2 Q. From which subsequently Dr Kelly was excluded?3 A. From which he was excluded.4 Q. That is 2nd July. On 3rd July where were you?5 A. I was on leave. I believe I was in London on private6 business.7 Q. Right. We know from various other documents that on

8 that evening Mr Hoon called Mr Powell. Do you know how9 Mr Hoon came to be aware of the contents of the letter?10 A. I do not know, sir.11 Q. Did you interview Dr Kelly about the letter?12 A. I did not. On 2nd July I had intended to interview13 Dr Kelly at 1600 on 4th July.14 Q. Which would have been a Friday, is that right?15 A. That was a Friday.16 Q. Right.17 A. When I returned to office on Friday morning,18 Martin Howard rang me a little bit before 10 o'clock to19 ask me over to his office to discuss the letter.20 Q. Right.

21 A. And, at that point, Mr Howard said that it had been22 decided -- I am not sure if he said by whom, but it had


14/45

23 been decided that Mr Hatfield should conduct an24 interview with Dr Kelly at as early an opportunity as25 possible; and that I should have to organise that

291 meeting as quickly as I could.

2 Q. So it had been decided by someone else, not his line3 manager, that Mr Hatfield would come in and interview?4 A. That is correct.5 Q. Were you given any explanation of this?6 A. I believe -- I think Martin pointed to the seriousness7 with which the letter was being taken.8 Q. Was anything else said? Did he say anything else?9 A. I cannot recall. It was a very short conversation,10 because I knew that Mr Howard had another meeting at11 10 o'clock; and so it was a very short meeting to ask me12 to arrange the meeting between Dr Kelly and Mr Hatfield.13 Q. Right. So you then arranged the interview.14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. You had originally I think told us you were going to16 interview him at 1600 hours. When did the interview17 take place?18 A. The interview took place at 11.30. It transpired19 Dr Kelly was already in the Foreign Office that morning20 on other business, so I could arrange that meeting21 really quite quickly.22 Q. Do you know what other business he was on?23 A. I do not. It was quite routine for him to be in the24 Foreign Office when he came up to London.25 Q. I infer from your answer also quite routine for you not

30

1 necessarily to know what he was doing when he was on2 Foreign Office business?3 A. It would clearly be on matters of Iraq or on chemical4 and biological weaponry but I would not have expected to5 be told the details.6 Q. So who was present at the interview on 4th July?7 A. There were three of us: Mr Hatfield, myself and8 Dr Kelly.9 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/24? Do you recognise this?10 A. This is Mr Hatfield's notes of the meeting.11 Q. Can I take you, briefly, through those? I know you have12 also made some notes and I will take you through those.13 A. Yes.

14 Q. The interview begins at 11.30 and appears to end at15 about 1.15.16 A. That is my recollection.17 Q. And there was no break in between?18 A. There was no break.19 Q. How did Mr Hatfield begin the interview? If you look at20 paragraph 1, that might help you.21 A. The meeting was not a formal meeting in the sense that22 it was part of a process that might lead to a formal23 disciplinary action, and Mr Hatfield made that clear at24 the beginning, he said: this is informal, in the25 technical sense; but nevertheless in other senses of the

311 word it was a formal meeting.


15/45

2 Mr Hatfield sat on one side of his table, Dr Kelly3 sat on the other. I was sitting at one end. Dr Kelly4 had water provided. During the meeting he was offered5 coffee, but declined it.6 Q. Right. And we can see from the next couple of7 paragraphs that the objects in the interview were

8 explained. First of all, to form a view of whether9 there was evidence to suggest a sufficiently serious10 offence had been committed to warrant formal11 disciplinary action. And second, to establish if his12 meeting with Andrew Gilligan was likely to form the13 basis of Mr Gilligan's evidence to the FAC which had14 already taken place at this stage.15 A. That is right. Mr Hatfield made it very clear that the16 meeting was very much in two parts as you have17 described, sir.18 Q. Towards the bottom of that page Mr Hatfield said this,19 after Dr Kelly had explained in terms very similar to20 his letter of 30th June about his contacts with the

21 press; Mr Hatfield said this:22 "I asked why he consulted the FCO press office23 rather [than] the MoD. Dr Kelly said that his salary24 was paid by the FCO."25 Is that right?

321 A. That is a fair reflection -- that is a reflection of the2 facts. His salary is -- the Ministry of Defence is3 reimbursed for the costs of Dr Kelly's salary.4 Q. So Dr Kelly was paid for by the Foreign and Commonwealth5 Office, had you as a line manager in the Ministry of6 Defence, had an office with the defence intelligence

7 staff and yet reported back to the DSTL; is that fair?8 A. Yes, he had a number of contacts throughout Government,9 yes.10 Q. Right. Mr Hatfield said when Dr Kelly had said that:11 "I said that was irrelevant -- he was seconded to12 MoD" and appeared to suggest that all press contacts13 should go through MoD press office; is that right?14 A. That is what Mr Hatfield said.15 Q. Did you, at that stage, say: well, hang on Mr Hatfield,16 I had a chat with Dr Kelly about this back on17 9th August?18 A. No, I did not. I was taking notes in this meeting.19 Q. Right. But you were able to speak?

20 A. I was able to speak.21 Q. But did not?22 A. But did not.23 Q. "I asked [as in Mr Hatfield asked] who had given him24 authority to exercise his own judgment about contacts25 with journalists on defence related business, since this

331 was contrary to standing departmental instructions.2 Dr Kelly said that he had never read those instructions,3 nor sought to discover what guidance existed ..."4 Then he talked about how he regarded his discussions5 as a continuation of his role as UN expert. We see that

6 at the bottom of the page.7 A. Yes.


16/45

8 Q. Then over the page we can see that Dr Kelly was asked to9 summarise his contacts with Andrew Gilligan. I have10 taken Mr Gilligan through relevant passages of this so11 if it is all right, I will not take you through those.12 At the bottom of page 25:13 "At this point I asked Dr Kelly whether he was

14 confident that he had accurately reflected the meeting15 with Gilligan and whether there was anything he had16 omitted about this other meeting. I stressed that17 whatever the actual significance of anything he had said18 to Gilligan, their meeting could turn out to be very19 important in relation to the public dispute between the20 Government and the BBC about Gilligan's claims. It21 might become necessary to consider a public statement22 based on his account. Gilligan's reputation was at23 stake and he would be bound to challenge any24 inaccuracies -- and I reminded Dr Kelly of the25 possibility that he might have been tape-recorded.

341 Dr Kelly said that he understood this but stood by his2 account."3 Why did you understand that it might become4 necessary to make a public statement?5 A. (Pause). I was not part of any discussions on the issue6 of a public statement. That was the first that I had7 heard of it.8 Q. And did it surprise you?9 A. I did not take a view one way or the other on that.10 Q. You are a civil servant of some experience, you have11 told us, and you have told us when you joined the12 Ministry of Defence and your current position.

13 A. Yes.14 Q. Is it unusual for civil servants to be named in the way15 that Dr Kelly was named?16 A. That is a very difficult question for me to answer. My17 experience is that it probably is but we were not18 dealing with normal circumstances.19 Q. So when Mr Hatfield said to Dr Kelly: you might be20 named, you told us before you did not make any comment21 when Mr Hatfield had put a comment to Dr Kelly; did you22 make any comment at this stage?23 A. I did not.24 Q. And what did Dr Kelly do?25 A. He acknowledged that. He did not, to my recollection,

351 express any -- he certainly expressed in words no2 discomfort with that, and I do not recall any body3 language that expressed discomfort.4 Q. Having said that it might be necessary to make a public5 statement, Mr Hatfield then says he was prepared to6 accept the account in good faith and pointed out7 breaches of departmental instructions in relation to the8 contact. And that, I suppose, took the form or replaced9 the meeting that you were proposing to have on10 24th June, pointing out the instructions?11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And Mr Hatfield identified that he said that his contact13 with Gilligan was particularly ill-judged. This is


17/45

14 halfway through that paragraph. And Mr Hatfield said15 towards the end of that paragraph:16 "I would, however, write to him shortly to record my17 displeasure at his conduct. I went on to instruct him18 to familiarise himself with departmental guidance about19 dealings with the media, to report all contacts to his

20 line manager and never to agree to an interview without21 explicit authority. Finally, I warned Dr Kelly that any22 further breaches would be almost certain to lead to23 disciplinary action and the possibility of disciplinary24 action could of course be re-opened if further facts25 came to light that called his account and assurances

361 into question."2 How was Dr Kelly when this sort of version of the3 riot act was being read out to him?4 A. Dr Kelly was composed throughout. It is not5 a comfortable experience for anyone to receive that sort

6 of message from the personnel director of the7 organisation; and he looked -- he was somewhat8 uncomfortable, but I believe he was expecting the sorts9 of words that Mr Hatfield would have said.10 I should also say that Mr Hatfield set this out in11 a very measured tone. He did not raise his voice; and12 he wanted to make absolutely clear that Dr Kelly13 understood the points that he was making.14 Q. Mr Hatfield then went on in the note to say this, just15 below halfway down that page:16 "The second part of the interview was devoted to17 a more detailed comparison of Dr Kelly's interview with18 Gilligan's FAC appearance. I will summarise my

19 conclusions - my detailed analysis is appended ..."20 It is very difficult to reconcile the two accounts,21 that is the gist of his matter.22 Over the page, at page 27, he said this at the end:23 "If both Gilligan's and Kelly's accounts are24 essentially truthful, perhaps the most likely25 supposition is that Kelly appeared to provide broad

371 collateral for Gilligan's 'single source' claims about2 the dossier, although not for the specific allegations3 about political interference."4 Then a further reference to Mr Gilligan's evidence

5 to the FAC. At the end of this meeting, did you think6 that Dr Kelly was the source of Mr Gilligan's story?7 A. I did not, sir.8 Q. Did Mr Hatfield think that Dr Kelly was the source of9 Mr Gilligan's story?10 A. I do not believe he did. My recollection is that that11 final paragraph, which you have just quoted, is12 a summary of Mr Hatfield's views.13 Q. Can I then take you to MoD/1/30? Can you just tell us14 all what this document is?15 A. Yes. I said earlier that Mr Hatfield conducted the16 interview with Dr Kelly in two parts. The first was in17 relation to disciplinary or management action in

18 relation to his contacts with Mr Gilligan; and the19 second was to compare Dr Kelly's account of his meeting


18/45

20 with Mr Gilligan, on the one hand, with Mr Gilligan's21 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee of his meeting22 with the source on the other, to see where there were23 areas of overlap and where there were areas of24 divergence.25 Q. And this document, if one continues through it, is an

381 analysis of the various questions that were asked,2 question 511, 559, looking at Mr Gilligan's evidence and3 getting Dr Kelly's views; is that right?4 A. That is right. The meeting, at this stage, was5 essentially conducted by Mr Hatfield reading6 Mr Gilligan's answers to the various questions and then7 either asking Dr Kelly to comment or noting that8 Dr Kelly had already commented, in the earlier part of9 the interview.10 Q. Can I ask you to look at MoD/1/32, paragraph 17 of your11 note where you record that "Hatfield summed up."

12 Perhaps you can just read for us what the gist of his13 summing-up was.14 A. "There appeared to be consistencies between parts of15 Gilligan's testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee,16 and what Kelly says that he said to Gilligan. In17 particular, the meeting was set up at Gilligan's18 initiative, and Kelly had acknowledged that the19 statement that it was 30 per cent likely that there was20 a CW programme in the six months before the conflict was21 consistent with his views. But there were significant22 discrepancies. In particular, Kelly denied having any23 knowledge of the '45 minutes claim' until after the24 Dossier was published, and denied having any knowledge

25 of the process by which that assessment was included; he

391 also denied giving any opinion that the evidence that2 uranium had been sought from Niger was based on3 unreliable information. In addition, Kelly was not of4 the view that Iraq had not been able to weaponise5 chemical and biological weapons."6 Q. Then he deals with some minor discrepancies. Over the7 page, about three lines down, can you just read from8 "Hatfield said ..."9 A. "Hatfield said that overall, his judgment was that if10 there were a single source of Gilligan's information,

11 then it was not Kelly. Kelly's words may have been part12 of the background to Gilligan's stories, but on the13 basis of what he had testified, he was satisfied that14 Kelly was not the source of the most significant15 allegations."16 Q. After that interview had finished, where did Dr Kelly17 go, do you know?18 A. Mr Hatfield's office is close to Holborn and I walked19 with Dr Kelly back to my office in Metropole Building,20 that takes about 25 minutes.21 Q. Right.22 A. I then asked him into my office, after 10 minutes or so;23 and I said that he must obviously reflect and take on

24 board what Mr Hatfield had said, we must await the25 letter that Mr Hatfield said he would write and that


19/45

401 I would help him take through further any actions that2 were necessary at that point.3 Our discussions then turned to the forthcoming4 training that Dr Kelly and other weapons inspectors were

5 going to receive on Monday at RAF Honnington. I was6 going to deliver a short introductory speech there and7 we discussed the sort of things I might say.8 Q. Did you discuss with Sir Kevin Tebbit, the permanent9 undersecretary at the Ministry of Defence, the contents10 of the interview you had had with Dr Kelly?11 A. I did not.12 Q. Because on 4th July 2003 Sir Kevin Tebbit is writing to13 Sir David Omand. Can we look at MoD/1/34? This is14 a letter sent saying:15 "Dear David,16 "An official in the MoD has volunteered that he had17 a discussion with Andrew Gilligan on 22 May, one week

18 before Gilligan's allegation about the interference in19 the production of the September dossier and the20 '45 minute story'."21 He then goes on to give some reference to who that22 is without identifying Dr Kelly by name; and summarises,23 over the page, at 35, the interview. But at the top of24 this he says this:25 "My immediate reaction was that this must be the

411 'single source' to whom Gilligan referred to in his2 testimony ... Certainly, his comments to Gilligan could3 have been incorporated into Gilligan's 29 May story.

4 However, closer examination, following today's interview5 suggests that this would not necessarily be a reliable6 conclusion."7 Then he sets out a number of possibilities, and says8 over the page, at page 36, that the letter is being9 copied to Andrew Turnbull, David Manning, Michael Jay,10 Eliza Manningham-Buller and John Scarlett.11 Were you aware that the interview was being referred12 up, if I can put it that way, in this manner, at the13 time?14 A. I know that Mr Hatfield wished to prepare some material15 for Sir Kevin, but apart from that I was not aware of16 further details; and I know that because Mr Hatfield

17 asked me to prepare a few paragraphs that he might use18 as part of that.19 Q. And you were unaware, at this time, of any contact20 between Mr Hoon and Mr Powell?21 A. I was not aware of that.22 Q. 5th and 6th July, which we have now got to, Saturday and23 Sunday, what are you doing then?24 A. Saturday I am at home.25 Q. Right.

421 A. And on Sunday I travel up in the afternoon to2 East Anglia so that I can deliver an introductory talk

3 to a group of weapons inspectors who are shortly to4 deploy to Iraq.


20/45

5 Q. You travel to East Anglia; whereabouts in East Anglia?6 A. I was staying with my parents.7 Q. Where were you going to be on the Monday?8 A. RAF Honnington which is close to Bury St Edmunds.9 Q. Did you see or speak to Dr Kelly over the weekend?10 A. I do not believe I did.

11 Q. The meeting on 4th July appears to have finished on the12 basis that you are going get a letter telling you off13 and that appeared to be the end of it, at that stage; is14 that right?15 A. Yes, that was my reading.16 Q. If you read the text, that appears to be what was17 suggested; and that is why I have asked you to read the18 summing-up.19 A. Yes.20 Q. What happened in relation to Dr Kelly on the morning --21 Monday morning is 7th July, is it?22 A. Yes.23 Q. You are at RAF Honnington and you are going to give

24 a pep talk to the inspectors; is that right?25 A. That is right. I arrived at RAF Honnington between 8.30

431 and 9.00.2 Q. Was Dr Kelly there?3 A. Yes, he was.4 Q. Already there?5 A. He was already there. He had stayed in Bury St Edmunds6 overnight and had travelled with his inspector7 colleagues to RAF Honnington. There were five or six of8 them, I cannot remember the exact number, of which9 Dr Kelly was one. I delivered a 15-minute introductory

10 talk, essentially thanking them for agreeing to be part11 of this team and wishing them all the best for their12 deployment. There was a short question and answer13 session after that.14 Q. That was becoming part of a team and the team was the15 Iraq Survey Group; is that right?16 A. Yes, the team was the Iraq Survey Group.17 Q. Then they were going to be trained for two days; is that18 right?19 A. That is right. To the best of my recollection, it was20 essentially health and safety training for deployment21 into Iraq.22 Q. Did Dr Kelly complete his training without interruption?

23 A. No, he did not. I left RAF Honnington I believe24 somewhere between 9.30 and 9.45. I was in fact25 returning home as I was ostensibly on leave that day.

441 While I was travelling home Richard Hatfield called me,2 I cannot remember the time exactly, but during the3 morning.4 Q. On a mobile?5 A. On my mobile, to say that he had been asked to conduct6 a further interview with Dr Kelly and needed to do that7 as quickly as possible. Mr Hatfield did know that8 Dr Kelly was at RAF Honnington and so he realised there

9 would be something of a time delay before that meeting10 could be set up.


21/45

11 Q. Did you say to him why does he have to have a second12 interview, or why is there a second interview, or you13 just acted?14 A. I acted. I needed to be cautious on what I said on15 a mobile line.16 Q. Right. So did you call RAF Honnington and ask Dr Kelly

17 to come down, or drive back?18 A. I carried on travelling. I spoke to David and asked him19 to arrange the quickest method back to London, which20 I think was car to Cambridge and then the rail down.21 David was fairly confident that he could make a meeting22 in London at 4 o'clock and that is what we ultimately23 arranged.24 Q. So that interfered with his day's training?25 A. It did.

451 Q. Did you see him later on that day?2 A. I saw him -- I was present at the interview at 1600 --

3 Q. Right.4 A. -- with Mr Hatfield and also Mr Howard. After that5 interview Dr Kelly returned to Bury St Edmunds, stayed6 the night there. RAF Honnington I understand were able7 to reconfigure the second day's training for David so8 that he did not miss out on any of the essential items.9 Q. So he still managed to complete his training but what10 was his attitude on the Monday night or Monday11 afternoon?12 A. (Pause). I cannot recall exactly, but he did not appear13 anything other than composed.14 Q. Right. You then have the meeting. Who was at the15 meeting?

16 A. There were four people at the meeting. This took place17 in Mr Hatfield's office again. The participants were18 Mr Hatfield, Mr Howard and Dr Kelly, and I took notes.19 Q. So the person who has joined is Mr Howard?20 A. That is correct.21 Q. Although you did not speak on the mobile about why this22 second meeting had been called for the understandable23 reason you have given, no doubt when you were with24 Mr Hatfield you could have had that opportunity. Did25 you take it and ask why there was now a second

461 interview?

2 A. The choreography was that David and I, as I recall, met3 in my office first and then went up to Mr Hatfield's4 office and we then went in together for the meeting. So5 there was not the opportunity for me to speak to6 Mr Hatfield.7 Q. So you did not. Did anyone ever tell you why there was8 this second interview?9 A. It was explained at the meeting itself.10 Q. Can we turn to the notes of the meeting?11 LORD HUTTON: I wonder whether this might be a convenient12 moment to give the stenographers a five minute break.13 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, yes.14 (11.40 am)

15 (Short Break)16 (11.45 am)


22/45

17 MR DINGEMANS: I was asking you about the meeting on18 7th July, MoD/1/46, if I may. Mr Hatfield appears to be19 in the chair again and the notes reflect his role.20 A. That is correct.21 Q. He started by saying he wanted to cover two issues:22 "The first was to follow up the discrepancies

23 between Gilligan's account of the meeting with his24 source and Kelly's account of his meeting with25 Gilligan."

471 Had you not done that on 4th July?2 A. Yes we had. Richard explained that the Ministry wanted3 to be clear on certain areas of what Dr Kelly had said4 on the 4th; and that reflects the issues that were5 covered later.6 Q. And that was the reason he wanted to be clear about it.7 Did he explain why he wanted to be clear about it?8 A. He explained, to the best of my recollection, that it

9 was possible that the account, the Ministry of Defence10 account would -- or Dr Kelly's account would -- I am11 sorry, might have to become known to the Foreign Affairs12 Committee and might become known more widely to the13 public.14 Q. Yes. Continuing on:15 "The second issue was that MoD may wish to make16 a public statement, and he wished to discuss that with17 Kelly. The meeting was structured to follow ..."18 a comparative analysis that Mr Hatfield had carried out.19 So the first is to get more information about20 discrepancies with Mr Gilligan's account; is that right?21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And, second, so the Ministry of Defence might make this23 public statement?24 A. That is right. The vast majority of the meeting was25 concerned with the first of those two issues that you

481 have highlighted.2 Q. And I know you did not say anything about a public3 statement on 4th July. Did you on the 7th July?4 A. No, I did not. David noted that without comment.5 Q. Right. He noted it without comment. And how did he6 look about it?7 A. He was composed throughout this meeting.

8 Q. To continue through the document, he talks about his9 contacts with journalists, and some of these I put to10 Mr Gilligan, page 47, his involvement in the dossier,11 the meeting with Mr Gilligan, continuing to page 48, and12 the quotation specifically being put. At paragraph 1013 on page 48 we come to the 45 minute claim.14 Then we continue the interview, page 49, at15 paragraph 11, the discussions on uranium imports:16 "Kelly said that so far as he could recall it was17 not discussed in depth." He would only have noted the18 international observations.19 Then, talking about Mr Campbell's role:20 "Kelly replied that, as he had said in his letter of

21 30th June, Gilligan did raise the involvement of22 Campbell and Kelly said that he was unable to comment."


23/45

23 Then the source for the 45 minutes claim at24 paragraph 14. Then we continue to page 50, towards the25 end of the interview, Dr Kelly's assessments of

491 a chemical warfare programme, Iraqi weapons of mass

2 destruction; and at paragraph 17 Mr Howard asked if3 Dr Kelly was aware of anyone else who might have been4 a source.5 Then paragraph 18:6 "Mr Howard asked if anybody from the BBC, and in7 particular Mr Gilligan, had tried to contact Kelly since8 the meeting on 22nd May. Kelly replied that Gilligan9 had not tried to contact him. The only BBC person he10 could recall having contacted him was Susan Watts,11 a science editor."12 Could you just tell me this: was the issue of the13 Newsnight broadcast, which we know from other evidence14 the broadcasts were on 2nd and 4th June --

15 A. Hmm.16 Q. -- and this meeting is 7th July and the other meeting17 was 4th July, was that ever raised with Dr Kelly?18 A. Could I ask for clarification? The Newsnight broadcast19 was by?20 Q. Gavin Hewitt.21 A. It was not.22 Q. I am very sorry, Susan Watts. Gavin Hewitt did the23 News at 10.24 A. When Dr Kelly said that he had spoken to Susan Watts,25 that was noted without comment and was not pursued

50

1 further.2 Q. So it was simply not pursued?3 A. It was not pursued.4 Q. No-one asked: what about the broadcasts on 2nd and5 4th June?6 A. No, the focus of the meeting was on Dr Kelly's meetings7 with Andrew Gilligan. It was not pursued at all.8 Q. Nothing was asked that elicited anything about9 Gavin Hewitt?10 A. No, it was not.11 Q. So at the end of the interview, paragraph 19, can you12 just tell us how Mr Hatfield summed it up?13 A. Yes.

14 "Mr Hatfield said that it was likely that the15 department would need to make some public statement on16 Kelly's involvement with Gilligan. He passed Kelly17 a draft press release and Kelly confirmed that he was18 content with its terms. Hatfield said that although19 Kelly was not named in the press release his identity20 may become known in due course. Kelly replied that he21 acknowledged this: in his letter of 30th June he had22 said that a friend at RUSI had alerted him to the23 possibility of his being considered as Gilligan's24 source."25 Q. Right. Can I then take you to MoD/5/25? Can you tell

511 us what these are?


24/45

2 A. This is my contemporary notes of the meeting on3 7th July.4 Q. Right. Those run through to page 30. Do those notes --5 I am afraid I have had difficulty in reading them in the6 short time I have had them -- do those notes broadly7 accord with Mr Hatfield's formal -- the formal minutes

8 we have seen typed up?9 A. I am sorry, the formal meeting minutes that we have just10 been looking at were typed by me on the basis of these11 handwritten notes.12 Q. So those accord?13 A. Yes.14 Q. These were the source for the notes?15 A. Yes.16 Q. So how did you understand things were going to progress?17 A. Following that meeting, Richard said that he was content18 for David to return to RAF Honnington to complete his19 training.20 LORD HUTTON: Was that when Dr Kelly was there or was that

21 after the meeting?22 A. My Lord that was at the end of the meeting.23 LORD HUTTON: I see. So he said that to Dr Kelly.24 A. He said that to Dr Kelly. He also said that as we were25 planning for Dr Kelly to deploy to Iraq later in the

521 week commencing 7th July or possibly the Monday2 thereafter, he thought it was wise to postpone David's3 deployment until matters had sorted themselves out. But4 he was content to plan on the basis that David would be5 deploying to Iraq.6 MR DINGEMANS: What matters were going to sort themselves

7 out?8 A. There was uncertainty about the timing of the release of9 the press release, what may happen after that. And10 Richard thought it prudent not to send David to Iraq11 straightaway.12 Q. Right. And was there any discussion about why it was13 now necessary to have a press release?14 A. I do not recall that there was. This part of the15 meeting was really quite short. Mr Hatfield passed16 Dr Kelly a copy of a draft press release. Dr Kelly read17 it; and said he was content with it.18 Q. Right. Did he say: why are you making this press19 release?

20 A. No, he recognised -- he was perfectly content with it.21 Q. And you were not part of the decision-making process22 that led to the making of the press release?23 A. I was not, sir.24 Q. Can I just ask you: if someone had asked for a security25 style interview, would you have characterised the

531 interview that took place as a security style interview?2 A. No, I would not. The meeting was actually very friendly3 in tone. We wanted to be sure of certain aspects of4 David's account of his meeting with Mr Gilligan; and we5 wanted to help him explain, to elicit the details of his

6 story.7 Q. I do not know what a security style interview is but it


25/45

8 does not sound very nice. What does it mean to you?9 A. I have to say I am not aware of that formal term.10 Q. Can I take you to CAB/1/46?11 A. Yes, of course.12 Q. This is a note to Sir David Omand. It is dictated by13 John Scarlett. Can you tell us all John Scarlett's

14 role?15 A. He is chairman of the JIC, the Joint Intelligence16 Committee.17 Q. He says this:18 "Andrew Gilligan and the MoD single source.19 "I agree with Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday that20 the finger points strongly at David Kelly as Gilligan's21 source. I have been through the Gilligan/FAC transcript22 again. I attach copies of two pages in particular which23 seem to make it clear that Gilligan has only talked to24 one person about the September dossier. If he could25 have referred to any corroborating information he would

541 have done so. If this is true, Kelly is not telling the2 whole story.3 "Gilligan must have got the 45 minute single4 intelligence report item from somewhere, presumably5 Kelly. Conclusion: Kelly needs a proper security style6 interview in which all these inconsistencies are7 thrashed out."8 That is where I had got the phrase "security style9 interview". But that was not the nature of the10 interview you had on the 7th?11 A. This is the first time that I have seen this document.12 I would emphasise that the meeting was conducted in

13 a friendly style. I do not believe David felt any14 particular pressure at that meeting.15 Q. Can I take you to another document, MoD/1/44. This is16 a memo dated 8th July 2003, dictated by Dominic Wilson.17 Who is he?18 A. He is private secretary to Sir Kevin Tebbit, the19 Permanent Secretary.20 Q. You can see the date, 8th July 2003. He says, at21 paragraph 2:22 "What is now needed is a more intensive interview23 with Kelly."24 He identifies at the end of that paragraph:25 "The core issue in this respect is whether it was

551 Kelly who alleged that the 45 minute intelligence was2 inserted into the dossier against the wishes of the3 intelligence community ..."4 He says at paragraph 4 this, and you can see the5 date of the memo, 8th July.6 A. Yes.7 Q. "Against this background I understand that arrangements8 have been made for the further interview to be carried9 out by you and addresses ..." I imagine he means the10 people at the top?11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "... at 1600 today."13 Was a further interview ever carried out?


26/45

14 A. There was not. There was only two interviews, on15 4th July and 7th July. This minute was, in fact,16 conveyed orally to Mr Hatfield in advance of the meeting17 on 7th July. The meeting on 7th July was indeed at 160018 but did not, on the face of this, actually get typed up19 until the day after, so --

20 Q. So this is referring to the interview that took place on21 the 7th, is it?22 A. That is correct. There was no further interview.23 Q. And after the interviews had been completed, did you24 believe that Dr Kelly was the source of Mr Gilligan's25 story?

561 A. I continued to maintain that there were parallels in2 some areas of Mr Gilligan's story, that matched what3 Dr Kelly had told us; but there remained significant4 discrepancies; and, in my view, those discrepancies5 remained sufficiently significant for, if there was

6 a single source, it was still -- it was not Dr Kelly.7 LORD HUTTON: You say you continued to maintain that, was8 that in discussion with Mr Hatfield? It is just your9 use of the word "maintain", or do you mean by that that10 it remained your view?11 A. My Lord, it was my view on the 4th July following the12 first interview and it remained my view after the13 interview on the 7th July.14 LORD HUTTON: It was your use of the word "maintain".15 I thought that might convey that you had stated to other16 people --17 A. I am sorry, my Lord, I did not convey that.18 LORD HUTTON: It is just "remained"?

19 A. Yes.20 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.21 MR DINGEMANS: Do you know, for example, whether Mr Howard22 was of the same view?23 A. I do not know that.24 Q. A press release was made by the Ministry of Defence on25 this day. Can I take you to FAC/1/24:

571 "Full MoD statement on Gilligan meeting.2 "An individual working in the MoD has come forward3 to volunteer that he met Andrew Gilligan of the BBC on4 May 22.

5 "it was an unauthorised meeting ..." et cetera.6 It goes through various points that appear to have7 been extracted from Dr Kelly in the interview, that we8 have now looked at. What were your own feelings about9 the issue of the press statement?10 A. My thoughts were with David. David was comfortable with11 the notion of a press statement. He did not express12 unease; and my thoughts were really for what was the13 best for David.14 Q. Those were your primary thoughts, with Dr Kelly. But15 what were your thoughts about issuing a press statement?16 It seems to have been unprecedented, is that right?17 A. I could not say whether there was a precedent. As

18 I said earlier, sir, it is not normal, but equally we19 were not dealing with normal circumstances.


27/45

20 Q. Can I take you to a document, MoD/1/62? These are21 questions and answers. These were also drafted within22 the Ministry of Defence; and they have been called23 "Defensive Q and A". Were you aware that these were24 being drafted?25 A. I do not believe I was. I certainly did not have a part

581 in drafting them.2 Q. And you were not consulted then about those?3 A. I was not consulted.4 Q. Right. In which case I will come back to those with5 those who may be able to help.6 That is the 7th July. You have got to the end of7 the day. He has been interviewed and he has gone back8 to RAF Honnington. What is happening now?9 A. On 8th July I do not recall having any dealings with10 Dr Kelly or indeed the issues relating to Dr Kelly at11 all. On 9th July, I know that I had a few telephone

12 conversations with Dr Kelly throughout the day.13 Q. Where was he then?14 A. He was at home.15 Q. And were you given any documents to hand to him?16 A. Mr Hatfield's letter to Dr Kelly is dated 9th July.17 I believe I received it on the 10th.18 Q. Can I take you to that?19 A. Yes.20 Q. That is MoD/1/69. Let us just orientate ourselves.21 Monday is the 7th, Tuesday is the 8th when the press22 statement is made. So Wednesday is the 9th July?23 A. Correct.24 Q. Mr Hatfield is writing this letter to Dr Kelly. You get

25 it, you think, on Thursday 10th?

591 A. I believe that is correct.2 Q. Can I just take you briefly through the letter:3 "I interviewed you with your line manager ..." about4 the contacts with Andrew Gilligan. "I explained that5 your letter had serious implications ..." about6 unauthorised contact.7 He refers to the interview. At paragraph 3:8 "As I made clear, these are serious breaches of9 standard departmental procedure and you were unable to10 give me any satisfactory explanation for your behaviour.

11 Your contact with Gilligan was particularly ill-judged.12 Your discussion with him in May has also had awkward13 consequences for both yourself and the department which14 could easily have been avoided. I accept your assurance15 that these consequences were unforeseen and unintended16 and in particular that as you state in your letter you17 did not make any allegations or accusations about the18 preparation of the September 2002 dossier. I also19 concluded on the basis of your account that you had not20 divulged any classified or otherwise privileged21 information. On this basis, I have concluded that22 although your behaviour fell well short of the standard23 that I would expect from a civil servant of your

24 standing and experience, it would not be appropriate to25 initiate formal disciplinary proceedings. You should,


28/45

601 however, understand that any further breach of2 departmental guidelines in dealing with the media would3 almost certainly result in disciplinary action, with4 potentially serious consequences."

5 Then he talks about paragraph 4, being aware.6 Then paragraph 5:7 "I should also remind you that the possibility of8 disciplinary action could be reopened if any facts were9 to come to light which appeared to call into question10 the account and assurances that you gave to me."11 Now, when did you hand that letter to Dr Kelly?12 A. I handed it to him the next time I saw him, which was13 Monday 14th July.14 Q. So where was Dr Kelly on 9th July?15 A. Dr Kelly was initially at home and then received16 indications that the press were about to come to his17 home and so he left.

18 Q. Who did he receive those indications from?19 A. I do not know the precise sequencing because I believe20 he was contacted both by the press and also our press21 office. My involvement was that Dr Kelly rang me,22 I believe during the afternoon of the 9th, to say that23 Nick Rufford of the Sunday Times had appeared at his24 front door.25 Q. Can you time that for us?

611 A. I have tried very hard to do that. I know that I took2 a call from Dr Kelly at just before 15.30 on 9th July.3 To the very best of my recollection that was when he

4 told me but you will understand that I cannot be5 certain.6 Q. So the best you can do is it was about 3.30 in the7 afternoon?8 A. Yes. I may be wrong but that is the very best of my9 recollection.10 Q. He leaves his house as you understand it and where does11 he go?12 A. He did not tell me that evening. He rang me at about13 a quarter to 9 when I was at home. He said quite simply14 that he was going to the West Country. The following15 morning he informed me he had stayed in16 Weston-Super-Mare.

17 Q. That is 10th July. On 9th July, on the Wednesday, he18 has gone from his house, after a warning from the press19 office and perhaps a member of the press.20 A. Yes.21 Q. He spent Wednesday night at Weston-Super-Mare. What22 happened to him on the Thursday?23 A. On the Thursday morning he tells me he is travelling24 down to Cornwall.25 Q. Did you speak to him at all? Thursday is now the 10th,

621 is that right?2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Did you talk to him at all?4 A. We kept in contact Thursday and Friday, to the best of


29/45

5 my recollection. My interest really was to ensure that6 he was okay, and that he was not experiencing discomfort7 by the press interest.8 Q. Did you discuss with him at any time appearances before9 Parliamentary Committees?10 A. Yes, I did. I received a call from the private

11 secretary to Sir Kevin Tebbit.12 Q. That is Dominic Wilson, is it?13 A. That is Dominic Wilson.14 Q. When?15 A. I believe it was Thursday afternoon.16 Q. And what did he say?17 A. He said that the emerging view that would be put to18 ministers was that Dr Kelly should appear before the19 Intelligence and Security Committee.20 Q. Now, that meets in private, does it?21 A. That meets in private, but not before the Foreign22 Affairs Committee.23 Q. So that is an emerging view from whom?

24 A. I only assume that it is an emerging view from senior25 officials. I based that on the fact that it came from

631 Dominic Wilson but I do not know, sir.2 Q. Why was he going to go before any committee? Did you3 understand that? Did anyone tell you that?4 A. (Pause). I am searching through my memory. I believe5 I was told that he may have to go before Committees but6 I was not party to those decisions.7 Q. You were not party to the decision. Did anyone say: he8 has to go to the Committees for reason (a) or (b)?9 A. Because the Intelligence and Security Committee were

10 continuing their investigation into the conflict in11 Iraq, and there was interest from the Foreign Affairs12 Committee in its report, which recommended that the13 Government follow up Mr Gilligan's contacts.14 Q. Right. Can I just ask you about that? The Foreign15 Affairs Committee reported that they were concerned16 about the number of leaks that had been made by or17 appear to have been made from Ministry of Defence18 sources and asked that these be followed up. Did you19 understand that to mean that everyone should then end up20 in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee who had been21 followed up as a source?22 A. I did not give that consideration, sir.

23 Q. You were not part of that particular --24 A. I was not party to that.25 Q. Can I take you to a memo dated 10th July at MoD/1/75?

641 Who is this addressed to?2 A. That is addressed to the Secretary of State, Mr Hoon.3 Q. And if we look at page 76, who is it from?4 A. That is from Sir Kevin Tebbit, Permanent Secretary.5 Q. Going back to 75, he says this:6 "There have been requests to you for Dr Kelly to7 appear before both the FAC and the ISC (on the same day,8 15th July)."

9 I think you say you had become aware of that?10 A. Yes, I think I had.


30/45

11 Q. "2. We had already offered him to the ISC and I12 recommend that you agree to that request, although to13 avoid setting a precedent, you should stress that you14 only are content for such a relatively junior official15 to appear given the exceptional nature of the evidence16 that Dr Kelly could offer".

17 Do you know what the exceptional nature of the18 evidence that Dr Kelly could offer was?19 A. I was not party to this minute.20 Q. "As regards the FAC, however, I recommend that you21 resist, on grounds that the FAC inquiry is completed22 (their report finalised on 3 July, before we had been23 able to talk to Kelly ourselves) and that a separate24 session to question Kelly would attach disproportionate25 importance to him in relation to the subject of their

651 inquiry as a whole. The ISC, on the other hand, are2 only just beginning their work and are better placed to

3 ensure that Kelly's views are placed in the proper4 context (he is, after all, not the Government's5 principal adviser on the subject, nor even a senior6 one)."7 Is that analysis a fair analysis of Dr Kelly's role8 in biological weapons?9 A. I believe that Dr Kelly's role was adviser to me on Iraq10 issues.11 Q. Right.12 A. Could I please just correct, I said I was not party to13 this minute. I meant that I did not have a part in14 drafting it. But I see that I was copied it.15 Q. You were sent it, which is why I am asking you about it.

16 I had understood you in that context.17 "A further benefit of an ISC hearing is that they18 can more easily handle national security dimensions ...19 "3. A further reason for avoiding two hearing, back20 to back, is to show some regard for the man himself. He21 has come forward voluntarily, is not used to being22 thrust into the public eye, and is not on trial. It23 does not seem unreasonable to ask the FAC to show24 restraint and accept the ISC hearing as being sufficient25 for their purposes ..."

661 At paragraph 4:

2 "It will, of course, be important to ensure that3 views that Kelly may express are not necessarily taken4 to represent HMG's policy ..."5 They say that that can be dealt with.6 At page 76:7 "This line may not be sustainable in strict8 institutional terms: the FAC reports to Parliament,9 whereas the ISC, although drawn from Parliament, report10 formally to the Prime Minister ...11 "... I think it is worth a try at least. The12 individual himself is, I understand, prepared to appear13 before both bodies."14 Can we turn then to MoD/1/77. What is this

15 document? If you look at the bottom of the page you can16 see the name Geoffrey Adams.


31/45

17 A. This is a private secretary note from, I believe,18 Mr Hoon's private secretary --19 Q. Can we look at 78? That may help you.20 A. Yes, that is from Mr Hoon's private secretary to the21 private secretary of the Secretary of State of Foreign22 and Commonwealth Affairs.

23 Q. In paragraph 1 it records oral and written requests from24 the ISC and FAC.25 A. Yes.

671 Q. We will come to the circumstances in which those2 requests were made later on.3 A. Yes.4 Q. Perhaps you can just read the next paragraph?5 A. "The Defence Secretary has given the request from the6 Foreign Affairs Committee careful consideration. There7 are reasons for resisting this request:8 "The FAC have already completed their inquiry.

9 (Indeed, their report was finalised on 3rd July before10 MoD officials had interviewed Dr Kelly themselves.)11 "A separate session to question Dr Kelly would12 attach disproportionate importance to him in relation to13 the subject of the FAC's inquiry as a whole.14 "The ISC is better placed than the FAC to handle the15 national security dimensions should the question of16 intelligence material arise.17 "It is fairer on the man himself not to expect him18 to appear before the two Parliamentary Committees within19 the space of three hours."20 Q. Then over the page perhaps you can read, for balance,21 the next part?

22 A. "On the other hand:23 "It is not unreasonable for the FAC to feel that24 Dr Kelly's account may call into question the evidence25 that they were given by Andrew Gilligan and that they

681 should therefore have an opportunity to see him2 themselves. (It is conceivable that, having done so,3 they may decide to recall Gilligan).4 "Presentationally, it would be difficult to defend a5 position in which the Government had objected to6 Dr Kelly appearing before a Committee of the House which7 takes evidence in public in favour of an appointed

8 Committee which meets in private. Although the ISC has9 considered taking evidence in public before and might10 decide to do so on this occasion, this could set an11 unwelcome precedent for both the Committee itself and12 for us."13 Q. Then it goes on to say:14 "The Defence Secretary has, therefore, concluded15 that on balance we should agree to the FAC's request16 and. Given that Dr Kelly is a relatively junior17 official who played only a limited role in the18 preparation of the dossier, we should invite19 Donald Anderson to agree that the Committee will confine20 its questioning to matters directly relevant to

21 Andrew Gilligan's evidence. I understand that No. 1022 would be content with this approach."


32/45

23 Were you consulted on whether Dr Kelly should give24 evidence before both Committees?25 A. My role in this was to speak to Dr Kelly initially, as

691 I recall, on Thursday, to take his view on whether he

2 would be content to appear before the ISC and also the3 FAC. I explained to him that it was likely that he4 would have to appear before the FAC but, at that stage,5 there had not been a final decision on the FAC.6 David said that he would be content, in principle,7 to appear before both. He was fairly easy about8 appearing before the ISC. He expressed some concern9 about the publicity that would be surrounding an open10 interview before the FAC, but, as a Crown servant, he11 recognised that if called there would be an imperative12 for him to attend and on that basis --13 LORD HUTTON: He used words to that effect, did he,14 Dr Wells?

15 A. I believe he said: if I am asked, I will do it. That is16 to the best of my recollection, my Lord.17 MR DINGEMANS: You say he expressed some concern. This was18 a telephone conversation, was it?19 A. It was while he was still down in Cornwall.20 Q. It must have been concern you did not see visually.21 What words did he use to express his concern?22 A. I believe he said something like: there will of course23 be publicity associated with it.24 Q. When were you told that he was going to give evidence in25 front of both Committees?

70

1 A. I was told that on the morning of the 11th of July.2 Q. Right.3 A. It must have been 11.30 or so.4 Q. That is the Friday, is it?5 A. That is the Friday. I was told that by Dominic Wilson6 and asked to convey that to Dr Kelly.7 Q. What did Dr Kelly say when you told him that?8 A. He repeated the issue of the publicity that would9 surround the appearance before the FAC.10 Q. What do you mean he repeated it?11 A. He had mentioned he had some concerns when I spoke to12 him on Thursday; and he said, again: there is of course13 the issue of publicity.

14 Q. So that is Friday. Did you have any further contact15 with him on Saturday or Sunday?16 A. If I could just return to the Friday, if I may.17 Q. Of course. Sorry.18 A. When I discussed with David the fact that he would19 appear before both Committees, I told him that although20 I was due to be in the United States for the first three21 days of the following week, I had in fact cancelled that22 trip so that I could help him in his preparations before23 the Committee.24 Q. Right.25 A. David said that he -- he expressed regret that I had to

711 do that, but nevertheless thanked me for it.


33/45

2 Q. He was happy?3 A. Yes. On the Saturday I did not call David in Cornwall.4 I expected, because of the amount of publicity that this5 issue was generating, he might welcome a break from me.6 Q. Yes.7 A. I did call him on the morning of Sunday.

8 Q. And what did you say to him then?9 A. I asked him how he was feeling. He said he was tired10 but otherwise fine; and we then went on to discuss the11 media coverage that was in the Sunday newspapers.12 Between the two of us we had been expecting a surge of13 press reporting on the Sunday. In the event, in respect14 of what we might have been expecting, it was15 comparatively limited. David agreed but expressed16 I would say dismay at an article in the Sunday Times17 that Nick Rufford had written.18 Q. What did he say about that article?19 A. That article had a number of sentences in quotation20 marks, quoting Dr Kelly, and David denied to me that he

21 had indeed said those.22 Q. Right.23 A. I was clearly not party to what passed between David and24 Mr Rufford and so was not in a position to pass comment25 on that.

721 Q. So that is the Sunday. What happened on the Monday?2 What happens on the Monday?3 A. On the Monday I arrived in my office early. I had4 a clear diary because I was due to be in Washington; and5 I set about making arrangements for David when he came6 back. We had previously agreed that David would arrive

7 in my office at about 11 o'clock --8 Q. Right.9 A. -- in the morning. One of the first things I did was to10 make sure that David had available, at Ministry of11 Defence expense, accommodation for him to stay for the12 period in London and we made arrangements that he could13 stay anonymously at MoD expense in a nearby hotel. In14 the event David said he would prefer to stay with his15 daughter in Oxford and that was fine by me, if he felt16 happier. I also --17 Q. At this stage he was not staying at his house because he18 wanted to avoid the press; is that right?19 A. That is correct. I also set about making sure that the

20 administrative arrangements for David's appearance21 before the two Committees were properly sorted out. My22 ultimate objective in all of this was to ensure that23 when David came up to London, all he had to do was24 concentrate on his appearance before the Committees,25 that any administrative or other arrangements were being

731 taken care of by others.2 Q. Right. When he turned up in London, did you have3 a meeting with him?4 A. He came into my office to announce that he had arrived5 and this was around about 11 o'clock. I said that we

6 had also arranged a private office for him to be in if7 he wanted to be quiet. He said in fact he was happy


34/45

8 with his usual accommodation.9 Q. And how did he seem?10 A. He was composed. He was composed. He was smiling. We11 checked that he had lunch arrangements made; and I said12 that I had also prepared a checklist of the areas that13 I thought the Committees might wish to ask him and that

14 I would go through that with him at an appropriate point15 once he was ready.16 Q. Right. And did you do that?17 A. In the event, I received a call from Martin Howard,18 I cannot now remember the time of that, to say that he19 had been asked by Sir Kevin Tebbit to talk David through20 the likely lines of questioning from the two Committees21 and to assure himse

hearing transcript - 14 august 2003 morning

Documents