Proposal for a Thesis in the Field of History

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Master of Liberal Arts Degree

Harvard University Extension School

February 19, 2006

Ian Lamont

31 Arlington Road

Waltham, MA 02453

(781) 373-1887

ianlamont@yahoo.com

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I.

Tentative Title:

“Chinese Policy Toward Vietnam during the Deng Xiaoping Era: Understanding the

Views of Beijing’s Leading Nucleus through a Content Analysis of the New China News

Agency”

II.

Research Problem

China under Deng Xiaoping (1977-1993) had a difficult relationship with Vietnam.

Relations between the two countries in the first 11 years of the Deng era were dominated

by several contentious bilateral and multilateral issues, including the “boat people”

tragedy, the Kampuchean conflict, and Hanoi’s close relationship with Moscow. In 1979

and 1988 the military forces of China and Vietnam engaged in pitched battles in remote

border areas and the South China Sea. By the early 1990s, and until Deng’s retirement in

1993, however, the relationship had entered a cooling-off period, as Vietnam’s direct

involvement in the Kampuchean conflict ended and Soviet influence waned.

These developments have been documented and subjected to analysis by scholars of

modern Chinese and Southeast Asian history, international relations experts, military

analysts, and journalists. Yet their understanding of China’s attitudes toward and policies

involving Vietnam during this period are largely defined by qualitative research, based on

the two countries’ shared history, statements of Chinese diplomats, military deployments,

bureaucratic actions, events, treaties, official documents, and other sources. Many

evaluate Sino-Vietnamese relations by focusing on single issues — territorial disputes,

the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, Soviet support for Vietnam. This type of

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research makes it difficult to gauge the relative importance to the Chinese leadership of

various foreign influences on issues concerning Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Is there any other way to study Chinese attitudes toward Vietnam? Can an empirical

methodology be applied, in order to better understand the various factors that were

important to China during this period? If so, what Vietnam-related issues will be seen as

most important to China at various points in time, and which countries or other

international groups does China associate with these issues?

I intend to employ a computer-assisted text analysis of the English-language wire

service operated by the state-run New China News Agency to evaluate these questions

about Sino-Vietnamese relations. I will measure, in aggregate, NCNA’s coverage — and,

by extension, China’s interest in — those Vietnam-related issues that China associated

with other Indochinese countries, the two superpowers, and two prominent international

bodies, the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. I aim to

provide an empirical basis for understanding China’s complex relationship with Vietnam

as it involved these countries and organizations during the Deng era.

My hypothesis holds that of these countries and organizations, issues relating to

Kampuchea dominated China’s views of Vietnam from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. I

hypothesize that Vietnam receded in relevance to the Kampuchean conflict after

Vietnam’s 1989 troop withdrawal from its neighbor, just as China came to see the United

Nations as an important player in the Kampuchean conflict. My hypothesis also finds that

the Soviet Union was not seen by China as a dominant factor in issues touching Vietnam

or the Kampuchean conflict, with the exception of the first five years of the Deng period.

Further, Chinese concerns regarding Soviet influence faded in the last five years of the

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Deng period. My study confirms that, in China’s view, issues relating to the United

States, Laos, or ASEAN were seldom viewed by China as important factors relating to

Vietnam or the Kampuchean conflict.

The significance of my research is twofold. First, it will provide an empirical basis for

understanding official Chinese attitudes toward Vietnam during the Deng era. Second, I

intend to publish my findings in a professional journal about modern Chinese history,

which may encourage others to use the vast amounts of Chinese media data now being

gathered in electronic form to study Chinese history and development.

III.

Definition of Terms

“NCNA”: The New China News Agency is the office state-run news agency of the

People’s Republic of China. In my thesis it will be referred to by name, or by the

abbreviation NCNA.

“NCNA English service”: One of several foreign-language wire services of the

NCNA External Department (Xinhuashe Duiwaibu), which is responsible for

disseminating news abroad about developments in China. While some content is

translated from the agency’s domestic Chinese service, many dispatches are written by

NCNA reporters in English, or gleaned from other sources, including Chinese

newspapers, foreign newspapers, NCNA reporters stationed in the provinces, government

press releases, memos from government ministries, NCNA correspondents stationed

overseas, and Western wire services.

“NCNA news item”: Any feature, commentary, report, dispatch, caption, brief,

summary, or statement broadcast over the NCNA English Service. It is the sampling unit

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for my survey. Those items that contain any one of the content variables listed below (V,

K, L, S, U, I, A) are the recording units.

“Deng Xiaoping”: A senior Chinese Communist Party official. Officially, he was

never head of state or head of the CCP, but was China’s de-facto leader. Political titles

included member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, chairman of the

CCP’s Central Military Commission, vice-chairman of the CCP, and vice premier.

“The Deng era”: Establishing the start and end dates of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership

of China is difficult. His post-Mao leadership influence is regarded as starting with his

post-Gang of Four rehabilitation by the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central

Committee in July 1977 to Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, Vice-Premier of the

State Council, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff

of the People’s Liberation Army.1 He was dubbed “paramount leader” in 1978.2

According to another source, the 3rd session of the Eleventh Central Committee in

December 1978 is “commonly reported as the start of Deng’s supreme and de facto

leadership.”3 There is no consensus on the end date of his rule. He stepped down from his

official state and party posts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but had influence on state

and party affairs until his death in 1997. For the purpose of this study, I will consider

Deng’s de-facto leadership role ending in March 1993. After 1992 Deng was in frail

health, seldom seen in public, and presumably unable to actively manage the country’s

1 “Key Figures: Deng Xiaoping.” China Daily, updated June 25, 2004. Available from

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/25/content_342508.htm.

2 John King Fairbank. China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1992), 406.

3 “Leaders of China (People’s Republic of China).” Zárate’s Political Collections(ZPC), Roberto Ortiz de Zárate, 1996-2003. Available fromhttp://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/china.htm.

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affairs, although he certainly had some degree of influence. Additionally, March 27,

1993, was the date Jiang Zemin, China’s next paramount leader, was officially elevated

to President of the People’s Republic of China.

“Leading Nucleus”: The high-level state and party officials, who, along with China’s

paramount leader, are responsible for making decisions about China’s foreign affairs.4

“Vietnam”: A country in Southeast Asia.

“V”: The content variable consisting of any one of three terms in any NCNA news

item corresponding to Vietnam or issues related to Vietnam. Any NCNA news item with

this term will be counted as 1 V item.

“Kampuchea”: A country in Southeast Asia.

“K”: The content variable consisting of any one of nine terms in any NCNA news

item corresponding to Kampuchea or issues related to Kampuchea. Any NCNA news

item with this term will be counted as 1 K item.

“Laos”: A country in Southeast Asia.

“L”: The content variable consisting of any one of three terms in any NCNA news

items corresponding to Laos or issues related to Laos. L search terms are “Laos” or

“Laotian” or “Vientiane,” but during L searches, an additional six terms are excluded to

screen out NCNA news items that mention Chinese writer Lao She and Chinese

philosopher Lao Zi. Any NCNA news item with this term will be counted as 1 L item.

4 Ning Lu, “The Central leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council,Ministries, and Party Departments,” in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreignand Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,2001), 41.

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“Soviet Union”: Officially known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The

former Communist superpower consisting of Russia and 14 other Soviet Socialist

Republics in Europe and Asia. Dissolved December 1991.

“Russia”: The country officially known as the Russian Federation, which inherited

the mantle of Soviet power following the official demise of the USSR in 1991.

“S”: The content variable consisting of any one of 12 terms in any NCNA news item

corresponding to the Soviet Union or Russia or any Soviet Union or Russia-related

issues. Any NCNA news item with this term will be counted as 1 S item in the survey.

“United States”: The country officially known as the United States of America.

“U”: The content variable consisting of any one of eight terms in any NCNA news

item corresponding to the United States or U.S.-related issues. Any NCNA news item

with this term will be counted as 1 U item in the survey. “America,” “American,” and

“U.S.” are not included in U search terms (see VI: Limitations of Research)

“United Nations”: The international organization that aims to provide a forum for

international diplomatic discourse and action based on international law.

“I”: The content variable consisting of any one of 16 terms in any NCNA news item

corresponding to the United Nations or any U.N.-related agency or issue. Any NCNA

news item with this term will be counted as 1 I item.

“Association of Southeast Asian Nations”: The international organization established

to provide a forum for Southeast Asian nations to promote economic development,

security, and social progress.

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“A”: The content variable consisting of either of two terms in any NCNA news item

corresponding to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN-related issues.

Any NCNA news item with this term will be counted as 1 A item.

IV.

Background

China’s relations with Vietnam were tense during most of the Deng era. 1977, the

first year of my study, was a time of transition for both countries. China had a new

political landscape. The Cultural Revolution was over, and paramount leader Mao

Zedong was dead. The Gang of Four had been vanquished and Deng Xiaoping had re-

emerged as a contender for leadership of the country. Vietnam was also undergoing

change. Communist North Vietnam had forced reunification with the South less than two

years previously, and the country was attempting to rebuild itself while shutting down the

capitalist system that dominated the South. Hanoi and Beijing were nominal allies. Both

governments were Communist, and China had sent a great deal of military aid to North

Vietnam during the civil war, and was preparing to follow up with economic assistance.

Nevertheless, a series of crises soon emerged that turned China against Vietnam and

strained the relationship to the breaking point. The crises included the widespread

persecution of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam beginning in 1977; Vietnam’s invasion

and occupation of Kampuchea in late 1978; and Hanoi’s increasingly cozy relationship

with Moscow. The breaking point occurred in early 1979 when China invaded Vietnam

and briefly occupied Vietnam’s northern provinces. Relations were hostile until the late

1980s. Border skirmishes took place regularly, and in 1988 China launched an attack on

disputed islands in the South China Sea and wrested them from Vietnam’s control. Yet

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the following year signs of a thaw began to appear, as Vietnam withdrew from

Kampuchea and Soviet power began to disintegrate. By the time Deng stepped down

from his last official post in 1993, a few sticking points remained — most notably

overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea — but the two sides were actively

pursuing reestablishing cross-border trade and transportation links.

I believe a computer-assisted content analysis of NCNA news items can help explain

China’s evolving views of Vietnam during this period. The research will touch upon five

areas: specific issues relating to Sino-Vietnamese relations; Chinese foreign policy in the

context of regional and geopolitical trends; international relations theory; Chinese media

and its role reflecting the views of China’s leaders; and content analysis methodologies.

Literature on Sino-Vietnamese relations tends to view the relationship through the

prism of one or two of the issues named above. Other issues are downplayed or ignored.

Such is the case with studies of Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese population by Ramses Amer

(1991)5 and Chang Pao-min (1982),6 as well as the numerous studies of China’s territorial

claims in the South China Sea, including Lin Wei-Zen (1999),7 Marwyn Samuels

(1982),8 and those collected by Bob Catley and Keliat Makmur (1997).9 Charles

5 Ramses Amer, The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations

(Kuala Lumpur: Forum, 1991).

6 Chang Pao-min, Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese (Berkeley, CA: Instituteof East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1982).

7 Wei-Zen Lin. The Transformation of Hainan’s Historical Geography: From 110 BCEto 1949. Ph.D. diss. (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1999), 218-219.

8 Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982).

9 Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, eds., Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea(Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1997).

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McGregor (1988)10 recognizes the complicated, interlocking nature of the multiple

regional and geopolitical issues impacting Sino-Viet relations, but neglects to include

Vietnam’s persecution of ethnic Chinese as a major factor. McGregor also places Soviet

economic and military support for Vietnam as being of crucial importance to Beijing

from the mid -970s until 1988, and sees ASEAN as being of crucial importance to

China’s plans for Kampuchea. Neither idea is fully supported by the NCNA data.

Stephen Morris’ 1999 study11 of Sino-Viet relations is the most inclusive in terms of the

variety of factors considered. He concludes that issues relating to Kampuchea were the

main sticking points in relations between China and Vietnam. This is confirmed by the

NCNA data I have gathered. Morris also explores in detail additional historical,

ideological, geopolitical, regional, and military issues that impacted the relationship. My

research can clarify the data relative importance of some, but not all, of these factors. Of

these researchers only one uses empirical data: Ramses Amer, who cites statistics from

the U.N., national censuses, and other sources to describe the humanitarian disaster that

affected Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese population in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

As for international relations theory, Marxism and realism are often used to describe

Chinese foreign policy during the Deng era. Steven Levine (1994) examines the role of

Communist ideology in influencing Chinese foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism/Mao

Zedong Thought was not rendered irrelevant after Mao’s death in 1976. Rather, it was

continuously “refashioned and reinterpreted by the Chinese Communist Party leadership

10 Charles McGregor, The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union

(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988).

11 Stephen Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture And TheCauses Of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

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to suit its current needs.”12 Moreover, Levine notes the importance of Marxism-Leninism

in shaping the socialization, values, and assumptions of Chinese Communists working in

foreign policy-related jobs. This may be the case, but not explain why China viewed with

such hostility the Communist leadership in Hanoi for much of the Deng period.

Realism seems to be a more likely theoretical model to explain Sino-Vietnamese

relations during the Deng period. Data gathered from my NCNA content analysis support

the idea that Chinese policy toward Vietnam during the Deng era was indeed firmly

grounded in China’s realist goals in the region, and Marxism as a guiding principle for

Chinese foreign policy was dead, despite the fact that the governments of Vietnam,

China, and the U.S.S.R. were based on Communist systems. Other observers of Chinese

foreign policy have also embraced realism. Jack Snyder (2004) observes that China’s

foreign policy is based upon “realist ideas that date back millennia.” 13 Elizabeth

Economy (2001) charts China’s rise from an insular state to a prominent player in global

affairs. She notes that in 1977 China was a member of 21 international governmental

organizations, but by 1997 belonged to 52.14 Nonetheless, she says, China viewed these

groups with suspicion, seeing them as a front for other states attempting to exercise

power internationally. The NCNA data suggests that when it came to issues involving

12 Steven Levine, “Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in DavidShambaugh and Thomas W. Robinson, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 32.

13 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, November/December2004 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 55.

14 Elizabeth Economy, “The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese ForeignPolicy Making: Broadening Perspectives and Policies, But Only to a Point,” in David M.Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 230.

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Indochina, China under Deng preferred to involve United Nations agencies more than

ASEAN, especially regarding issues relating to Kampuchea after 1989.

David Shambaugh (1994) examines China’s relations with the United States during

the Deng period. China was suspicious of Washington’s and Moscow’s geopolitical

ambitions, and struggled to adjust to U.S. policies under different presidents, as well as

the dominant role of the United States in the international order following the failure of

the Soviet system. A question that I asked myself when reading Shambaugh’s analysis

was if China was indeed suspicious of geopolitical ambitions of the two superpowers, did

it see issues relating to Vietnam as an extension of that crisis, or more of a regional issue

tied in with China’s own bilateral relations with Vietnam? My own NCNA research

demonstrates that China treated issues relating to Kampuchea and Vietnam with more

prominence than issues relating to the Soviet Union and Vietnam. There was relatively

little correlation in NCNA news items between issues relating to the United States and

issues relating to Vietnam during this period.

There is a large body of research relating to China’s media and how it serves the

state. For my study it is particularly important to establish the connection between the

foreign policy bureaucracy and the mission of the New China News Agency.

Lu Ning’s 2001 analysis of China’s foreign policy bureaucracy notes the multiple

agencies involved in carrying out foreign policy. However, he finds a top-down control

structure in which “ultimate decision-making power has been retained by the paramount

leader or the leading nucleus.” This leading nucleus is responsible for determining the

basic orientation of Chinese foreign policy, as well as decisions relating to military

operations that involve actual or potential conflict with other countries, decisions

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regarding regional and national policies toward key world powers, and decisions

concerning “sensitive” countries and issues.15

Who was in the leading nucleus in the late 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s? By Lu’s

logic, certainly Deng Xiaoping, and a handful of top-level ministers, Communist Party

leaders, and PLA commanders. However, the Foreign Ministry, Politburo, and PLA had

limited power over foreign policy, Lu says.16

How does the New China News Agency fit into this centralized power structure?

There is a very direct line of communication. NCNA during the Deng era reported to the

Chinese Communist Party Department of Propaganda (Xuanchuanbu), which in turn

reported to the CCP Central Committee,17 the key party leadership body of which Deng

was vice chairman. This is a crucial connection: My hypotheses assume that NCNA

English service has an important mouthpiece role propagating the policies and positions

of China’s leadership nucleus to other countries. As noted by Robin Porter, a former

editor for NCNA’s English service in the late 1970s, “Occasional errors of syntax in

English translation would get through [the editing] process, but errors of line almost

never did; the [NCNA External Deparment] carried responsibility for ensuring that

15 Ning Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State

Council, Ministries, and Party Departments,” in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making ofChinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 2001), 44.

16 Lu, 52-61.

17 Chang Won Ho, Mass Media in China: The History and the Future (Ames: IowaState University Press, 1989), 195.

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China’s policies were understood overseas, and political errors were unacceptable.”18

NCNA can therefore be viewed as a reliable barometer of official views of Vietnam.

The foreign policy/NCNA connection aside, using state-run media to better

understand PRC policy is not a new concept. Nor should it be surprising, considering the

close relationship between Chinese media and the Chinese Communist Party. Lenin

articulated the three purposes of journalism, namely, to disseminate propaganda, agitate

the people, and further the goals of party organization.19 These ideas were held very dear

by Mao Zedong himself: Much of his early party work involved writing articles for party-

affiliated publications.

Among Western scholars, the use of the Chinese press has long been recognized as an

authoritative source of the policies and attitudes of the Chinese leadership. Roger Garside

(1981) recognized this in the crucial transition period following the 1976 death of Mao

Zedong, noting that Beijing residents — Chinese and foreign — paid close attention to

official press reports: “Small changes in emphasis, the reformulation of a set phrase, the

appearance of a new slogan or the quiet dropping of an old one occurred only by design

and reflected a political development whose meaning one must search for.”20 Garside’s

views, however, are based on the selective use of Chinese press reports.

Quantitative research on Chinese press sources tends to study journalism and media

theory as it relates to current affairs, as opposed to historical research. Still, the methods

used in such studies are useful. For instance, Yu Xinlu (1996) conducted a content

18 Robin Porter, Reporting the News from China (London: Royal Institute of

International Affairs, 1992), 6.

19 J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy (White Plains,NY: Longman Publishing USA, 1995), 211.

20 Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after Mao (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981), 3.

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analysis on English-language reports submitted by Chinese state-run television to CNN

before and after the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Yu found an increase in

political news and a decrease in negative news in the Chinese television reports

immediately after the crackdown, but by 1994 the tone and subject matter in the reports

had largely returned to pre-1989 levels.21 Hugh Culbertson (1997) conducted content

analysis of coverage in the English-language China Daily newspaper relating to rural

development in the mid-1990s and found it closely adhered to the official line on rural

development policies.22 While instructive, these studies are different from my research in

several respects. First, their units of analysis — television news segments, and newspaper

articles — are sampled. My study uses the entire census of NCNA news items. Second,

Yu and Culbertson code for specific issues (political news, land reform, etc.) and/or

editorial slant (positive, negative, neutral). My methodology counts all issues relating to a

specific country in aggregate, and does not code for editorial slant. Third, I am using

computer programs to perform most coding tasks, as opposed to the mostly human

coding techniques used by Yu and Culbertson. Machine coding has its own problems (see

VI: Limitations of Research) but it lessens the chance of coder bias and human error.

This brings us to the literature pertaining to content analysis. Manual and automated

content analysis of media sources has been a staple of media studies and international

relations for decades. A groundbreaking content analysis was carried out by Harold

Laswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool (1954) at Stanford University. They were

21 Lu Xinlu, “What Does China Want the World to Know: A Content Analysis of CNN

World Report Sent by the People’s Republic of China,” Gazette: The International Journal forCommunications Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 58 (1996), 17.

22 Hugh M. Culbertson, “‘China Daily’ Coverage of Rural Development: A BroadWindow, or a Small Peep-Hole? Gazette: The International Journal for CommunicationsStudies (Leiden, Netherlands) 59 no. 2 (1997), 106.

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interested in analyzing phrases (which they called “themes”) in political communications

as a tool to better understand the factors at work in international relations:

When it is desired to survey politically significant communications for any historical periodon a global scale, the most practicable method is that of counting the occurrence of keysymbols and clichés. Only in this way can the overwhelming mass of material be reliably andbriefly summarized. By charting the distributions in space and time, it is possible to show theprinciple contours of … political history.23

To carry out their study, they employed a rigorous manual coding regimen and

statistical techniques (calculated using primitive machine tabulation) to gather data and

perform their analyses. In the 1960s, researchers began to use computers to automatically

code linguistic information found in texts.

Since these early studies, the techniques of thematic content analysis have been

refined and can be applied to the study of totalitarian regimes. For instance, in 1991

William Harvey performed a text analysis on the speeches of Fidel Castro and concluded

that the dictator was attempting to create a “culture of martyrdom” based on the

frequency of death references. 24

More recently, researchers have employed computer-assisted text analysis (CATA)

that greatly speed data collection and analysis, and reduce human error and coder bias.

Kimberly Neuendorf (2002) describes many of the pitfalls that can befall CATA studies,

ranging from inappropriate statistical methods to overly complicated multivariate

analyses. She also notes that the online news database LexisNexis was never intended to

23 Harold D. Laswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of

Symbols: An Introduction. Hoover Institute Studies, Series C, No. 1 (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1954), 16.

24 Daniel Riffe, Stephanie Lacy and Frederick Fico, Analyzing Media Messages UsingQuantitative Analysis in Research (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005), 8.

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be used for academic content analysis of news content.25 While this certainly explains

some of the more frustrating limitations of the tool that I encountered, no other database

of NCNA news items that I have access to is as complete or goes back as far LexisNexis.

V.

Methodology

My methodology has two stages. The quantitative stage — already completed —

involved searching the LexisNexis news database for every news item published by the

NCNA English Service for each month from January 1977 to December 1993. I then

assembled seven lists of terms corresponding to Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos, the Soviet

Union/Russia, the United States, the United Nations, and ASEAN. The Vietnam,

Kampuchea and Laos lists were run through the LexisNexis database alone (e.g., V), with

each other (e.g., V+L), and with the other superpower and international organization lists

(e.g., V+K+U, V+K+A) for each month in 22 permutations and entered into an Excel

spreadsheet. Using simple math I was able to determine an additional 23 values based on

exclusion of variables (e.g., V+K-S). I also determined frequency counts relative to either

the monthly NCNA news item total or other variables. For some variables, I calculated

ratios (e.g., the ratio of V to L items in January 1981 was 5.20:1). These calculations

allowed me to compare the single variables and variable combinations with each other.

This methodology of the quantitative stage treats all issues relating to a country

variable in aggregate. For instance, the issue may be mentioned in an insignificant and

neutral context (in a news item about a diplomatic banquet, the Kampuchean ambassador

is mentioned in the fifth paragraph) or important and critical (a news item about the

25 Kimberly A. Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook (Thousand Oaks, CA:

Sage Publications, 2002), 76.

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United Nations debating the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea). But their inclusion

in an NCNA news item is not by accident, or NCNA journalists simply writing about the

events of the day. The fact that an issue is mentioned reflects the concerns of the Chinese

leadership. Measured in aggregate by country, they serve as indicators of China’s views

and priorities regarding Vietnam, other countries in Indochina, the two superpowers, and

the two international organizations.

The qualitative stage of my research involves analyzing this data in light of events

relating to the seven variables, as well as known Chinese policy issues, as discussed in

the literature above. I have already charted timelines of the variables in Excel in order to

perform preliminary analyses in support of my preliminary hypotheses. Samples are

attached (See “Vietnam with 1 Var, Yearly % of All Vietnam Items,” and “Vietnam,

Kampuchea and Laos Items.”)

VI.

Limitations of Research

There are several limitations relating to the quality of data I have gathered.

Transferring data from the LexisNexis interface to the Excel spreadsheet is a manual

process, and I have to assume that at least a handful of the approximately 5,000 search

results were incorrectly entered in the spreadsheet.

Search terms were also problematic for some of the content variables. I attempted to

use all of the terms that corresponded to the country or organization in question without

returning false results. This entailed trying out dozens of terms for each content variable

— country names, adjectives, the last names of politicians, capital cities, etc. — to see if

they generated good results (i.e., news items that were about U) without including bad

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results (i.e., news items that are not about U, but turned up because the term in question

happens to have another meaning). Terms relating to the United States were particularly

problematic, for several reasons: First, LexisNexis does not recognize punctuation or

capital letters, so “U.S.” is treated the same as the pronoun “us”. Second, “America” and

“American” could not be used, because these terms also correspond to North America,

Latin America, Central America, South America, and non-U.S. countries within those

regions. Third, “Congress” and “Senate” are used in stories about non-U.S. countries

(including China). Fourth, a news item that mentioned an American company by name

but not any other term related to the United States could not be counted automatically,

because there are too many American companies and no way to build a list of them

without manually reviewing NCNA news items. Therefore, I have to assume that U items

were undercounted during the entire survey period. It may be possible to estimate how

much of an effect this had on the U totals via a manual review of these terms in a random

sampling of months, and then applying the average to U item totals for all 204 months of

the study. This was not a problem for the other content variables under study.

Using NCNA news items as a gauge of Chinese views and policies can be

problematic if China turns off the flow of NCNA coverage of a certain issue. For

instance, there were few NCNA news items concerning the Tiananmen demonstrations in

1989, until blanket foreign media coverage forced the Chinese leadership to acknowledge

the crisis to the rest of the world. However, issues that are important to Beijing yet not

covered by NCNA tend to be sensitive domestic issues that China does not want to

acknowledge abroad. These are quite different from sensitive issues involving foreign

countries, in which China wants its views to be known to the rest of the world, not only to

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influence other countries and international opinion, but also to counter critical publicity

from foreign governments or press reports.

Lastly, I unable to read Chinese or Vietnamese. This will lead to bias in my review of

research and analysis conducted by others, all of which is in English.

VII.

Tentative Schedule

Submission of proposal for revision ………………………………………. March 1, 2006

Proposal accepted by research advisor ……………………………………………. April 1

Thesis director assigned …………………………………………………………. May 15

First draft completed ……………………………………………………………. August 1

Thesis director returns corrected first draft …………………………………. September 1

Revised draft completed …………………………………………………….. November 1

Thesis director returns corrected revised draft ………………………………December 15

Final text submitted to thesis director and research advisor …………… January 15, 2007

Bound copy approved…………………………………………………………... March 15

Graduation ………………………………………………… November 2007 or June 2008

VIII.

Bibliography

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Amer, Ramses. The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations. KualaLumpur: Forum, 1991.

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Catley, Bob; Keliat, Makmur, eds. Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea.Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997.

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Lu, Xinlu. “What Does China Want the World to Know: A Content Analysis of CNNWorld Report Sent by the People’s Republic of China.” Gazette: TheInternational Journal for Communications Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 58(1996): 173-187.

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Neuendorf, Kimberly A. The Content Analysis Guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: SagePublications, 2002.

Porter, Robin. Reporting the News from China. London: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, 1992.

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Shambaugh, David. “Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations.” In DavidShambaugh and Thomas W. Robinson, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory andPractice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories.” Foreign Policy (November/December 2004):53-62. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Works Consulted:

Aronson, Elliot and Anthony Pratkanis. Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use andAbuse of Persuasion. New York: Henry Holt, 2001. This book summarizes recentresearch and theory regarding propaganda, and how it is manifested in massmedia.

Gutmann, Ethan. Losing the New China: A Story of American Commerce, Desire, andBetrayal. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004. Guttman, an American whoworked in Beijing as a media and public relations advisor, examines the ethicalpractices of American companies operating in China, and discusses Chinesemedia coverage of events relating to foreign countries.

Harrison, Henrietta. China: Inventing the Nation. London: Arnold, 2001. Harrisonexplores the rise of nationalism in China, finding that the rise of literacy and apopular press has been instrumental in creating the modern Chinese national

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identity. She notes the importance of issues relating to foreign countries inbuilding nationalist sentiment.

Huang, Chengju. “Transitional Media vs. Normative Theories: Schramm, Altschull, andChina.” Journal of Communication, September 2003. Philadelphia: InternationalCommunication Association/Annenberg School of Communications (Universityof Pennsylvania). Huang finds that propaganda-based theories of press systems inCommunist countries are inadequate for describing the recent development ofChinese journalism, largely owing to social and economic factors.

Riffe, Daniel, Stephanie Lacy, and Frederick Fico. Analyzing Media Messages UsingQuantitative Analysis in Research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005. Theauthors describe content analyses of various mass media sources. Many casestudies and appraisals of different content analysis techniques are included.

Roberts, Carl, ed. Text Analysis for the Social Sciences: Methods for Drawing StatisticalInferences from Texts and Transcripts. Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997.This is a collection of text analysis using mass media sources. There are sectionson thematic, semantic, and network text analyses, and an introduction tocomputer-assisted text analysis (CATA) techniques.

Stone, Robert. “Speaking to the Foreign Audience: Chinese Foreign Policy Concerns asExpressed in China Daily, January 1989-June 1993.” Gazette: The InternationalJournal for Communications Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 53 (1994): 43-52.Stone performed a content analysis of an English-language newspaper in China todetermine China’s foreign policy priorities in the last years of the Deng era.

Works to be Consulted:

Finkelstein, David M. and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds. China’s Leadership in the 21stCentury: The Rise of the Fourth Generation. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003.

Meisner, Maurice. The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of ChineseSocialism, 1978-1994. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996.

Unger, Jonathan, ed. The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang. Armonk, NY:M.E. Sharpe, 2002.