The European Think Tanks Group is a network of European independent think tanks working on EU international cooperation for global sustainable development.www.ettg.eu

● Inviewofexpectedclimate-changeimpacts,theEUshouldaimfor1.5°C-compatibilitythroughoutitsdomesticandexternalaction.ThisrequirestheEUtodefineclearguidelinesfor1.5°C-compatibleactionineachcountrycontext,togetherwithcountrypartners,andtodevelopalistofdevelopment-cooperationactivitiesthatwouldneedtostopaltogether.

● TheEUwillneedtoallocateadequatefinancingforclimateaction,wellabovethecurrentlyproposed25%shareofexpenditureintheupcomingMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF),andtoensure1.5°C-compatibilityofallfinancing.Financialsupportshouldconsidercountries’developmentpriorities,needsandresourcesandboosttheirconfidenceforhigherclimateambition.Privatesectorcontributionscouldbefurtherstimulatedthroughexistingand new programmes.

● Sofar,climatefinancingfromtheEUandelsewherehasbeendisproportionatelychannelledtowardsmiddle-incomecountriesandmitigation.Whilemiddle-incomecountriesofferhigherpotentialforemissionsreductions,moredirectsupportshouldbegearedtowardsadaptationandresilienceinhighlyvulnerableleast-developedandlower-middle-incomecountries.

● TheEUshouldstrengthenitsclimatediplomacythroughnewandimprovedbilateral,triangular and multilateral partnerships for development cooperation. These should foster knowledgeexchangeanddialoguetoadvancepolicycoherenceandinnovation.

● Policycoherenceshouldbeimprovedinternally,throughbettercoordinationbetweentheEUandEU-memberstates(vertically),EU-levelinstitutions(horizontally,differentareasofaction),andwithinspecificareasofEUexternalaction(sectorally).

● EUclimatecommitmentsneedtobeunderpinnedbycommensuratedomesticpoliciesandadequatelyambitioussubmissionsoftargetsandlong-termstrategiestotheUNFCCC,inlinewithcarbon-neutralityby2050andsendingclearsignalsforinternationalclimatefinanceand support.

KEY MESSAGESBy Gabriela Iacobuta, Mariella Di Ciommo, Niels Keijzer, Hanne Knaepen, Lola Vallejo, Steffen Bauer

Theviewsexpressedinthispaperare those of the authors.

October 2019

Harnessing EU external cooperation to boost

ambitious and coherent climate action

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1. INtrODUCtIONThe EU has always considered itself a leader in globalclimate governance, although its influence in climatediplomacy has varied over time.1 The EU reaffirmed itsintent to continue to exert climate leadership – both athome and internationally – in its long-term strategy ‘ACleanPlanetforAll’,aEuropeanstrategiclong-termvisionforaprosperous,modern,competitiveandclimate-neutraleconomy,releasedintherun-uptotheKatowiceclimate-changeconference(UNFCCCCOP24)in2018:

thatregardapriorityonitsagendaforthesecondhalfof2019.3 Lastbutnot least, theEuropeanCouncil’s ‘ANewStrategic Agenda 2019–2024’ sees building a climate-neutral Europe as a key approach in addressing anincreasinglycomplexandunsettledworld.4

Yet, atCOP24 in Katowiceand subsequently, EU climateaction is perceived as having fallen short of its leadership aspiration.5 Most notably, EU mitigation commitmentsare not commensurate with the objectives of the Paris Agreementand,inparticular,theimperativetohaltglobalwarming at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, as is calledfor in thepertinent IPCCSpecialReportofOctober2018.6 In fact, recent analyses show the EU’s current mitigationeffortsasonlymeetinga3°C-pathway.TheEU’semissions-reduction targets are therefore considered insufficientlyambitious.7RecentmeetingsoftheEUheadsofstatefailedtoadoptadatebywhichtheEUshouldbecarbon-neutral,andthe7May2019EULeadersSummit inSibiu,Romania,did not go beyond conveying the EU’s commitment tocontinueworkingwithotherstofightclimatechange.8

WhileUrsulavonderLeyenhaspledgedbefore theEP tomaketheEUcarbonneutralby2050,itisstillunclearhowsheintendstoseethisthrough.Forthetimebeingandinviewofglobaltrendsandpoliticaldevelopmentsinkeycountriessuchas theUSandBrazil, theEU’s failure towalk the talkismetwithgrowingconcernbydevelopingcountries,civilsocietyandresearchers.

Againstthisbackground,howtheEUapproachesclimatechange in its development cooperation and how well it manages to align practices with principles bear the potential to either improve the EU’s image as a climate leader or tomake its credibility wither further. Moreover, given thestrong interlinkages between climate and sustainable development, we argue that climate action should beat the core of the incoming Commission’s agenda fordevelopmentcooperation. In thispolicybrief,wepresent

1. HerreroCangas,A.,Knaepen,H.2014.Run-upto2015:AmomentoftruthforEUexternalclimateaction?BriefingNote67.Maastricht:EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement

2. EuropeanCommission.2018.ACleanPlanetforAll.COM(2018)773,p.213. PresidencyoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion1July–31December2019.SustainableEurope–SustainableFuture.Finland’sPresidencyProgramme.EU2019.FI4. EuropeanCouncil.2019.Anewstrategicagenda(2019-2024)5. SWP.2019.AftertheKatowiceClimateSummit.BuildingblocksfortheEUClimateAgenda.SWPCommentNo.9February6. IPCC.2018.SpecialReportonGlobalWarmingof1.5°C7. ClimateActionTracker.2019.EuropeanUnion-CountryProfile.AccessedSep20198. EuropeanCouncil.2019.TheSibiuDeclaration.Pressrelease335/19,05May

The EU must therefore promote worldwide uptake of policies and actions toreversethecurrentlyunsustainableemissionstrajectory,andtomanage

anorderlytransitiontoaworldwidelowcarbon future. The EU should continue leadingbyexampleaswellasfostermultilateralrule-basedcooperation.2

The imperative to get serious on climate leadership has also been widely interpreted as the central take-homemessageoftheEUParliamentaryElectionsofMay2019.Itsresult necessitates that at least three of its political factions formacoalition,andthechangedbalanceofmandateswithintheEuropeanParliament(EP)reflectscallsforhigherambitioninEuropeanclimateaction.ThiswasdulyechoedbythedesignatedPresidentoftheEuropeanCommission,UrsulavonderLeyen,asshewooedtheEPforitssupport.Thecurrent FinnishPresidencyof theCouncilof theEuropeanUnion has also made climate action and EU leadership in

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our case for the imperative of 1.5°C-compatibility in allEUmeasures, theneed forclearguidelinesandfinancialresourcestosupportthis,andforagenerallystrengthenedEUclimatediplomacy.

2. CLIMAtE-DEVELOpMENt INtErLINKAGES AND tHE IMpErAtIVE tO COMMIt tO A 1.5°C pAtHwAYThe EU demonstrates climate leadership in its externalcooperationandhasfrequentlystateditsdesiretoleadbyexample,alsoinrelationtoitscommitmenttoadvancingmultilateralsolutions,asenshrinedintheEUTreaty.Yet,theEU could leverage much more effective climate action through its engagement abroad if it consistently andconcurrentlyalignedwiththeParisAgreementandthe2030Agenda.Given the highly transformative and interlinkednature of both agendas, ensuring policy coherencefrom a climate perspective, horizontally across theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and verticallythrough levels of governance, is key. This pertains toactions intended to mitigate climate change as well as adapt to it. Indeed, EU development cooperation hasmade some progress in this respect through the NewEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment:

9. EuropeanCouncil,representativesofEUmemberstates’governments,EuropeanParliament,EuropeanCommission.2017.ThenewEuropeanconsensusondevelopment-‘Ourworld,ourdignity,ourfuture’,p.22

10. EuropeanCommission.2019.ReflectionPaper.TowardsasustainableEuropeby2030.COM(2019)22

TheEUanditsMemberStateswillintegrate environment and climate

change throughout their development cooperationstrategies,includingby

promoting a sound balance between mitigationandadaptation.Theywillimplementthe2030AgendaandtheParisClimateChangeAgreement

through coordinated and coherent action,andwillmaximisesynergies.9

Notwithstandingexpressedpoliticalcommitment, the factthat the EU does not have an implementation strategyfor the2030Agendafouryearsafter itsadoptionseverelyhampersitscredibilityintheinternationalarena.AspartoftheoverarchingEU reformdebate launched in2017,andin response to thecalls of the EuropeanCounciland theEPtoprepareanimplementationstrategyforAgenda2030anditsSDGs,inlateJanuary2019theEuropeanCommissionreleasedaReflectionPaper:‘TowardsasustainableEuropeby2050’(‘ReflectionPaper’hereafter).Thisaimstoprovideguidance for the development of a comprehensive strategy,coveringbothinternalandexternalaction,bytheincomingEuropeanCommissionof2019.10

ThisReflectionPaper identifiesandelaboratesonfourkey‘policyfoundationsforasustainablefuture’:fromlineartocircular economy; sustainability from farm to fork; future-proof energy, buildings and mobility; and ensuring asocially fair transition. Strikingly, it does not afford climatechangeasectionofitsown.Rather,itseekstomainstreamclimate across all four policy foundations, taking note ofsome climate-development interconnections as well asthe importanceofclimatecompatibility throughout.Suchmainstreaming of climate change is commendable in principle,consideringthatclimatechangeandclimatepolicyarelikelytoaffectmostareasofsustainabledevelopmentandviceversa.However,thepervasivescopeofclimatechangewarrants explicit attention as it requires a comprehensivevision and strong coordination. A lack of such focus couldhinder both the achievement of the Paris Agreementobjectivesandofthe2030Agendaasawhole.

Moreover, the Reflection Paper is not comprehensive inits grasp of climate change and climate-policy issues. ItfailstocoveranumberofareashighlyrelevanttoclimateactionandtheSDGs,notablyforestryandbiodiversity,anddoesnotdiscussall interactionswith thepresentedpolicyfoundations.Bynottakingintoaccountthefullmultitudeofinterlinkagesbetweenclimatepolicyanddevelopment, itrisksoverlookingtrade-offsthatarecrucialtoanymeaningfuldevelopment strategy. This has also been acknowledgedin the Council Conclusions of 9 April 2019, wherebythe European Council calls for climate neutrality and

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11. EuropeanCouncil.2019.TowardsanevermoresustainableUnionby2030.Councilconclusions.8286/19,p.312. IPCC.2018.SpecialReportonGlobalWarmingof1.5°C.Chapter5,p.44713. Brandi,C.,Dzebo,A.,Janetschek,H.2017.ThecaseforconnectingtheimplementationoftheParisAgreementandthe2030AgendaforSustainable

Development.BriefingPaper21/NDC-SDGConnectionsTool:www.ndc-sdg.info14. EuropeanCommission.2017.BetterRegulationGuidelines.ChapterIII.GuidelinesonImpactAssessment.SWD(2017)350

underlines that the successful implementationofthe2030Agenda

intheEUrequiresthatalltheseprocesses [including inter alia the ParisAgreementandAddisAbabaActionAgenda]moveinthesamedirection in a coherent manner.11

Measures presented by countries in their nationallydetermined contributions (NDCs) under the ParisAgreement to address climate change are ultimatelysustainable development actions with a broad coverage of the SDGs, andmany require international support tocarry them out.13 This is not surprising, given the broadscope of climate action and its impacts in various areas. Whiletheimpactsofclimatechangeitselfwillhindertheability toachievea largenumberofSDGs (for instance,through pressure on water or food security), action toaddress these impacts and to mitigate the release of greenhousegas (GHG) emissions go hand in handwithsustainabledevelopment.Earlyactionforclimate-changeadaptation and mitigation can reduce severe losses due to climate-change impacts. Moreover, an appropriateintegration of climate-changemitigation into countries’development strategies can ensure maximisation ofsynergies(suchas jobcreation,air-quality improvement,energysecurity, increasedcompetitiveness)andreduceconflicting interactions (such as an increase in energypoverty,orlossofjobsorofaccesstonaturalresources).Alltheseinteractionsshouldmakeclimateactionacentralconsideration indevelopmentcooperation,witha viewtoensuring100%compatibilitywith theParisAgreementanda1.5°C-pathway.

3. NEED fOr CLEAr DEfINItIONS AND GUIDELINES ON COMpAtIBILItY wItH tHE pArIS AGrEEMENtThe imperative of 100% Paris-compatibility of all internaland external action, with the objective to halt globalwarming at 1.5°C, requires adequate mainstreamingthroughout the policy cycle. While the EU BetterRegulation Agenda aims to mainstream the SDGs, wearguethatit iscurrentlyunsuitedforthispurpose,aswellas for mainstreaming climate change. In their currentform, the impactassessmentguidelinesmentionclimateonly briefly, as a potential impact among many othersfrom which the assessment could choose those that are most relevant to the initiative at hand.14 In view of full

[l]imitingglobalwarmingto1.5°Cratherthan2°Cabovepre-industrial

levelswouldmakeitmarkedlyeasiertoachievemanyaspectsofsustainabledevelopment,with

greater potential to eradicate povertyandreduceinequalities.12

Forthisreason,wearguethatanyoverarchingsustainabledevelopmentstrategyshouldstronglyandexplicitlyanchorclimate-changeactionandtherequirementforallactiontobe100%compatiblewiththeParisAgreement.

Onbalance,theReflectionPaperisnotonlyvagueontheprofound challenges of climate change, but also overlypositiveontheEU’sprogressonclimateaction.Moreover,it all but neglects the imperative to halt global warming atamaximumof 1.5°C (onlymentioned in theannexedrecommendation from the Multi-Stakeholder Platform),which will be crucial for climate-vulnerable developingcountries. Thisappears inconsiderate inviewof the IPCCSpecialReporton1.5°C,whichelucidatestheimportanceof every tenth of a degree and concludes with ‘highagreement’ that

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Paris-compatibility, the impact-assessment guidelinesarenotadequatetoensurethatnewprojectandpolicyproposals are explicitly assessed on climate-relatedrequirements.Moreover, impactassessmentsarewrittenwithinsufficienttimeandresources.Potentialimpactsarepredominantlyassessedbasedonstakeholderinputsandavailable research evidence, which is typically biasedtowards the economic dimension rather than social and environmental dimensions.

Moreover,toachievecompatibilityofbothexternalanddomesticactionswith theParisAgreementanda1.5°Cpathway, the EU requires clear and universally applieddefinitions of what actions qualify as Paris-compatibleand, along those lines, of what actions should bestoppedaltogether.Yet,suchoverarchingdefinitionsaremostlylacking.Forastart,theEUcouldresorttorequiringall short-term actions subscribe to Paris-compatibilitythroughalignmentwith recentlydeveloped taxonomiesfor sustainable financial investments. These taxonomieswere releasedwith a call for feedback in June by theHigh-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance andinclude guidelines on contributions to climate-changemitigation and adaptation.15 However, while thesetaxonomiesonlyrefertosustainablefinancialinvestment,the EU would need to ensure that all future actions are Paris-compatibleandthatotherinvestmentsdonotworkagainst the objectives of the Paris Agreement and amoreambitious1.5°C-pathway.

Thatsaid,forfullParis-compatibilityofall itsactions,theEU needs not only a ‘green list’ of actions that shouldbe encouraged, but also a ‘brown list’ of actionsthat should no longer be implemented. In a report on1.5°C-compatibility,theClimateActionTrackerprovidesasetof tenessentialfirststepstobetaken intheshort-termacrossalleconomicsectorstoensurethefeasibilityof meeting the more ambitious long-term climatetarget.16 These indicate the need to divest from certain activities completely, and recommend, for instance, ahalt in thebuildingofanynewcoal-firedpowerplants

and of net deforestation in the 2020s. The EU shouldconsider short-term recommendations of this kind anddevelop a ‘brown list’ to clearly define its own policyguidelines forclimate-compatibilityof investmentsbothat homeandexternally. Suchclarityand transparencywouldenhancetheEU’scredibilityinclimatediplomacyand could support other countries in developing their own1.5°C-compatiblestrategies.

4. EffECtIVE CLIMAtE fINANCE IN DEVELOpMENt COOpErAtIONAnticipating the end of the current period up to2020, the EU is negotiating the Multiannual FinancialFramework (MFF), which will define budget prioritiesfor the period 2021–2027, with long-term sustainabledevelopment in mind. However, the proposed shareof 25%ofall expenditures tobeallocated toclimateaction was deemed unambitious as it would onlyrepresent a minor increase compared to the current budget period (2014–2020) target of 20% climateexpenditure.17Moreover,theproposedEuropeanFundforSustainableInvestmentsPlus(EFSD+)doesnothaveanyclimatetarget,unlikethecurrentfund,whichhasa target of 28%. In contrast, European banks suchas the European Investment Bank and the EuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopmentarealreadycommitted to much higher shares of their portfolio for climateaction,renderingtheEFSD+proposalevenlessconvincing.18

TheEP,inturn,suggestedashareof30%oftotalexpenditureintheMFFtobededicatedtoclimateaction.FranceandGermanyproposeda40%shareandfullParis-compatibilityof EU development cooperation, while other memberstates suggested going even further. The European EconomicandSocialCommittee(EESC)alsocalledfora40% share in the European Fund for Strategic Investmentand40%of theEU’sMFF2021–2027globalbudget tobespent on climate action.19

15. EUTechnicalExpertGrouponSustainableFinance.2019.TaxonomyTechnicalReport16. ClimateActionTracker.2016.Thetenmostimportantshort-termstepstolimitwarmingto1.5°C(policybrief)/Kuramochietal.2018Tenkeyshort-term

sectoralbenchmarkstolimitwarmingto1.5°C.ClimatePolicy18(3):287-305(peer-reviewedjournalarticle)17. EuropeanCommission.2019.SupportingclimateactionthroughtheEUbudget.AccessedSep201918. Bilal,S.2019.LeveragingthenextEUbudgetforsustainabledevelopmentfinance:TheEuropeanFundforSustainableDevelopmentPlus(EFSD+).Discussion

PaperNo.243.Maastricht:EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement19. EuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee.2018.EuropeanFinance-ClimatePact(own-initiativeopinion).NAT/735-EESC-2018-01241

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Onexternalaction, specifically,aclimate input targetofat least 25% is considered for the MFF Neighbourhood,Development and International Cooperation Instrument(NDICI), which was proposed in June 2018. NDICI is amerger of several existing external financing instrumentswith a budget of nearly EUR 90 billion for the 2021–2027period,someofwhichwillfundtheEFSD+.20Nevertheless,inadditiontosuchmainstreaming,moreeffortsareneededtoidentifyandcurbanyclimatetrade-offsrepresentedbyotherpolicypriorities.Oneparticularexampleconcernsthestrongprioritygiven to jobcreation,and investmentandtheroleoftheprivatesectorindevelopingcountries.Inthatregard,possiblecountryframeworkdocuments,envisionedbythenewlyproposedNDICIregulation,couldhelpclarifyEUprioritiesforeachpartnercountry.ThiswouldmakeEUactionmorestrategicandenhancepolicycoherence,forexampleintradenegotiationsorenergyprocurement.Tothatend,thejointprogrammingpreference(jointplanningofdevelopmentcooperationandexternalactionby theEU,itsmemberstatesandnon-EUpartners)couldimprovecollaborationonclimate,includingonnationaldiplomacyandfinancing.

Foramoretargetedexternalclimateactionandstimulationofclimateambition,theEUneedstounderstandtheneedsofpartnercountriesanddevelopstrategiesaccordingly.Forinstance, of theactivities envisaged in theNDCsand theNationalAdaptationPlans(NAPs)ofmostAfricancountries,two-thirds relate to climate change adaptation andmitigation in the agricultural sector.21 This clear focus should prompt the EU to give priority to this area in its financialsupport and to ensure coherence between these cross-sectoralplansandtheNationalAgriculturalInvestmentPlansfor respective countries. To ramp-up ambition in the nextroundofNDCs tobe submittedbycountries in2020 (andagainin2025),itisessentialthattheEUmatchesandsecuresplanned climate-relevant external cooperation financing

soastoprovidedevelopingcountrieswiththeconfidencethat more can be done. To concomitantly advanceimplementationinpartnercountries,theEUcouldcapitalisefurtheronmajorinitiativesliketheNDCPartnership.22

Despite the emphasis on the need to address climate adaptation and mitigation equally through financialsupport(asisreflectedinthemandateoftheGreenClimateFund),thefocussofarhasbeenonmitigation,whichwasassigned69%ofglobalclimatefunds in2017.23 WhiletheEU had a more balanced distribution, a lion’s share of59%ofclimate fundingwas still allocated tomitigation.24 Yet,adaptationisexpectedtobecomeahighlypressingneed in thecontextofclimatechangeandcontinuouslydecreasing resourcesunder increaseddemand for food,energyandwatersecurity.25

As pointed out by the EU Task Force on Rural Africa(see footnote 21), EU climate-adaptation fundingin Africa could be used in particular for adaptationand environmental protection in agriculture and the integration of sustainable management of resources in policies and programmes. Looking beyond EU funding,the Task Force argues for a fixed share of the GreenClimate Fund to be allocated to agriculture in Africa,given the high vulnerability of the continent to climatechange.TheEUalsoaspirestoexertleadershipinmattersofclimate-changeadaptationandresilience,especiallyin its cooperation with climate-vulnerable developingcountries.Indeed,theseissuesaregrowinginimportanceand urgency in multilateral processes. In response togrowingdemand, theEUcouldcapitaliseon itsexistingGlobal Climate Alliance for Adaptation (GCAA) toincrease ambition in this action area.

Whilesupportforclimateadaptationandresilienceismostcritical in climate-vulnerable least-developed countries

20. Castillejo.C.etal.2018.FinancingEUexternalaction–understandingmemberstatepriorities.Brussels:EuropeanThinkTanksGroup21. EuropeanCommission.2019.AnAfrica-Europeagendaforruraltransformation.ReportbytheTaskForceRuralAfrica22. Already,theEUCommissionandtenEUmemberstates(includingUK)arecountrymembersoftheNDCPartnership,soaremanyofitspartnercountriesin

Africa,AsiaandtheAmericas23. OECD.2018.Climatefinancefromdevelopedtodevelopingcountries:2013-17publicflows.Paris:OECDPublishing24. EuropeanParliament.2018.TheEUspendingonfightagainstclimatechange.PolicyDepartmentofBudgetaryAffairs.DGforInternalPoliciesoftheUnion.

PE603.83025. OverseasDevelopmentInstitute(ODI),EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement(ECDPM),GermanDevelopmentInstitute/DeutschesInstitut

fürEntwicklungspolitik(DIE).2012.EuropeanReportonDevelopment.ConfrontingScarcity:ManagingWater,EnergyandLandforInclusiveandSustainableGrowth.EuropeanUnion.ISBN978-92-79-23161-2

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(LDCs), climate mitigation efforts could be most cost-effectively directed towards middle-income countries(MICs) and to incentivise the private sector. Mitigationefforts inMICswould address rapidly growing emissionsin the short-term and facilitate leveraging additionalfunds within these countries. As a large proportion ofEU external climate funding is disbursed toMICs (58%),and in particular upper-MICs (34%),26 the EU needs to ensure that these funds are used most effectively andtap into domestic leveraging potential. Moreover, theEU could strive to leverage additional funds not onlythrough public–public partnerships but also throughpublic–privatepartnerships, as it currentlydoes throughtheGreenEnergyEfficiencyandRenewableEnergyFund(GEEREF), through AgriFI (EU-funded blending facility intheagriculturalsector),andthroughadequateincentivesfor financial institutions and domestic governments. Inaddition to the MFF, private investments are needed,aspublicfundingalonewillbeinsufficienttohandlethechallenge of climate change. Through the EU ExternalInvestmentPlan, the EUhas thus farallocatedEUR1.54billion of climate-relevant investments in sectors suchas sustainable energy, agriculture, land use, urbandevelopment and green businesses.27

5. StrENGtHEN EU CLIMAtE DIpLOMACY

TheEU’sforeignpolicyofficiallyrecognisesclimatechangeas a ‘threat multiplier’ that would enhance pre-existingchallenges to meeting the SDGs, including peace andsecurity (e.g. fuelling resource-basedconflicts or causingdisplacement through extreme weather events).28 The February 2019 Council Conclusions thus underlined theneed to ensure that the full range of climate challenges are addressedandcallsforcommensurateclimatediplomacyatalllevels:

26. DiCiommo,M.,Thijssen,S.,andSayósMonràs,M.2018.Theiceisbroken,what’snext?HowtheEUandmiddle-incomecountriesworktogetheronclimatechange.Maastricht:EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyandManagement

27. EuropeanCommission.2019.InternationalCooperationandDevelopment.Investinginclimateisinvestinginourfuture.29April28. EuropeanUnion.2016.EuropeanUnionGlobalStrategy.SharedVision,CommonAction:AstrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’s

ForeignandSecurityPolicy29. EuropeanCouncil.2019.ClimateDiplomacy–CouncilConclusions6153/19,p.8

Political dialogues at all levels and joint action plans need to

encompass climate action. The High RepresentativeandtheCommission

are encouraged to give the necessaryconsiderationtoclimateaction in the future programming of financialandtechnicalcooperationwithpartnercountries,including

underthenextMultiannualFinancialFramework.29

In view of this urgency, the new EP and the incomingCommission should harness both the EU External ActionService (EU-EAS) and development cooperation policyto support ambitious climate diplomacy. Among otherstrategicpartnerships,theEUcantakeitsclimatediplomacyfurtherthroughitscooperationwiththeAfricanUnionanditsmemberstates,aswellaswithsmall islanddevelopingstates in the Caribbean and Pacific. These groups werealready instrumental in forming the ‘High AmbitionCoalition’withtheEUandothersduringthenegotiationoftheParisAgreementin2015.Thereareseveralwaystobuildonthisencouragingexperience.

Notably, climate action is not only about short-terminvestments needs and policy choices, but also aboutprojecting a vision for long-term development that canbecomealodestarfortoday’sactions.Beyondsupportingdevelopingcountriesincraftingtheirmedium-termclimate

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plans (NDCs), the EU needs to ramp up its support forcountriestodeveloplong-termstrategies,involvingthekeydevelopment and cooperation providers (both bilateral andmultilateral)ineachcountry.Suchlong-termstrategiescanactas‘investmentplans’fordevelopmentcooperationthat is aligned with the countries’ vision for development and the Paris Agreement. It can usefully support thecoordination of EU and member states’ development cooperation institutionswithinanational context, aswellas those of other non-EU/multilateral partners. Such anapproach could also cover the EU’s growing interest in triangularcooperation(usuallyinvolvingamiddle-incomecountry) and South–South cooperation to leverageadditionalhuman,technologicalandfinancialresources30 and to ensure coherence of action in the country. TheStrategic Partnership for the Implementation of the ParisAgreement(SPIPA)–encompassingG20countries,exceptTurkey,plus Iran– isagoodexampleofan initiative thatsupports dialogue between countries and aims to turn this exchangeintoconcreteaction.

Tofacilitatethedevelopmentandimplementationoflong-termclimateplans,theEUcouldadditionallydisseminatelessonsandtechnicalknow-howfromitspolicyexperienceonclimateandenergylegislation.Forinstance,lessonsfromtheEUEmissionsTradingSystem(ETS)areveryrelevantatatimewhenmanycountriesarelookingintosettingupcap-and-trademechanismsorsomeformofcarbonpricing.Asacase inpoint,ChinahasbenefitedfromEUexperienceinthedevelopmentof itsETSandcouldmoreeasilybuildits own demand for and production of clean technologies (seefootnote26).

Thatbeingsaid,cooperationrelatedtopolicylearningandtechnologytransfershouldbeamatterofexchangeratherthanaone-waystreet. It is intheEU’sstrategicinteresttofoster new forms of cooperation, especially with majoremerging economies, to support rapid decarbonisationand low-carbon development outside its borders. Thiscooperationcouldincludetheexplorationoftechnologicalbreakthroughs. Throughmutual exchangewithemerging

economies the EU could generate new opportunities for low-carbon technology transfer and innovation and todevelopnewclimate-friendlymarkets.

Additionally, the EU needs to consistently demonstrateclimate leadership across multilateral political forums and corresponding financial engagements. Here,the G20 stands out as a particularly important player,concerningitsglobalshareofroughly80%eachofGHGemissions, population, aid and trade respectively. Forinstance,theEUcouldpushforG20memberstoconsidera common carbon tax, applied at source, to reduceG20carbonemissions,whileat thesametimecurtailingcompetitivenessbetweenitsmemberstates.Accordingly,G20countriescouldstrivetowardscommonstandardsfortradedproducts,takingintoaccountcompletelife-cyclefootprints. The EU and its member states have been leading theG20intermsofcompliancetoclimatecommitmentsat home and are well positioned to drive higher ambition on climate action and sustainable development among G20 member states.31 Pushing to raise ambition and streamliningclimateconsiderationsshouldsimilarlyapplyto trade agreements and other multilateral institutions in which the EU carries political clout.

Likewise, EUclimatediplomacy hasa key role toplay intapping the potential of non-state climate action. Asnon-state and subnational climate action is increasinglyunderstood to boost confidence and results on theground, the EU should strive to increase their capacityand tohelpclose theNorth–Southgap innon-stateandsubnationalclimateaction,especiallyinpartnercountrieswhere political support and implementation capacities are still limited.32 Through its strongengagementabroad,the EU could effectively invest in leveraging more non-state commitments on climate adaptation and mitigation indevelopingcountriesby focusingoncapacitybuildingandadaptingthenon-stateengagementmodelathometotherespectivelocalcontexts.33 This will also help partner countriestogainconfidenceandraisetheircommitmentsaswellastoadvancetheimplementationofpertinentSDGs.34

30. Caballero,E.S.2018.TheNewShiftintheCooperationoftheEuropeanUnionwithMiddleandUpper-Middle-IncomeCountries.InternationalRelations6(8):456-468

31. Bauer,S.,Berger,A.,Iacobuta,G.2019.Withorwithoutyou:HowtheG20couldadvanceglobalactiontowardsclimate-friendlysustainabledevelopment.Bonn:GermanDevelopmentInstitute/DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik(GDI/DIE)

32. MarrakechPartnership.2018.YearbookofGlobalClimateAction2018.Bonn:UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange33. Chan,S.,Bencini,J.2018.Boostingnon-stateclimateactionintheEuropeanUnion.Bonn:GermanDevelopmentInstitute/DeutschesInstitutfür

Entwicklungspolitik(GDI/DIE)

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Internally,foritsclimate-relateddevelopmentcooperationtobemostefficientandeffective,theEUandEUmemberstates’ institutions need to ensure appropriate coordination andcoherenceofexternalaction. Initiatives suchas theGreen Diplomacy Network, a network of staff from theEU and member states who coordinate external actionon climate change, could help enhance coherence ofaction. Initiatives suchas theGreenDiplomacyNetwork,a network of staff from the EC andmember states whocoordinateexternalactiononclimatechange,couldhelpenhance coherence of action. Yet, coordination is verylimitedbetweenEUmember statesandEU-levelexternalaction (vertical), between EU institutions (horizontal),aswell as betweendistinct strands of EUexternal action(internal).35 Evident challenges of coordination and coherenceinclimate-relatedFranco-Germancooperationare exemplary for this situation. Here, lack of coherenceat least partially results from attributing responsibilities toministrieswithdifferent logicsandcompetencies, i.e. theMinistry for Economic Cooperation and Development inGermanyand theMinistry for Europeand ForeignAffairsinFrance.36ExampleslikethismakethecaseforenhancedEU climate diplomacy even more compelling. Undercapacity constraints for coordination, the developmentof clear country guidelines, such as the planned NDICIframeworks,could serveasa stepping stone toguideallinvolvedEUandEU-memberinstitutionstowardsimprovedpolicycoherence.

Not least, strengthening the EU’s climate diplomacyrequires ensuring its domestic goals are ambitious andcredible. Ultimately, climate policies will have to bemainstreamed to reach net zero emissions by 2050. Tokeepthemomentumofglobalclimateaction, inspiteofrollbacksinmajoremittingcountriesliketheUSandBrazil,and to foster its leadership ambition, the EU must walkthetalkbyacceleratingdomesticclimateactionandbyraisingglobalambitioninlinewiththeParisAgreement.

The time is now: Parties to the Paris Agreement areexpectedtoupdatetheirNDCs to2030 ‘by2020’; theyare also encouraged to submit long-term low-emissiondevelopment strategies (LT-LEDS) to2050. If theEU is tounderpin itsassertedclimate leadership, the substanceandtimingoftherevisedNDCsandtheLT-LEDSmatter.Already, the opportunity has been missed to revivethe political momentum of the Paris Agreement byprovidingbothdocumentsaheadofthe2020deadline.Submitting them in early 2020 would be the next bestthing. Regarding content, while the Commission haslaidoutaclearvisiontoreachnetzeroemissionsforallgreenhousegasesby2050(seefootnote2),thisproposalhassofarmerelybeen‘welcomed’bytheCouncil.Yet,theobjectiveofclimateneutralityby2050will need tobe formally adopted as a decision to give it sufficientweight at the EU level and to be submitted to the United NationsinamoreambitiousNDC.

Ataminimum,therevisionofvariousdirectivesinJune2018meansthattheEUcouldmechanicallyenhanceitsambitionfrom -40% to -45% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030relativeto1990levelswithoutanyadditionalpolicyeffort.37 Yettoexertmeaningfulleadershipandtobeconsistentwitha1.5°-pathwayand theexplicitgoalofclimateneutralityby2050, theEUwouldneed toaimevenhigher: -55%by2030,inlinewithwhattheEPrecommendedandwhatwasproposedbythedesignatedPresidentoftheCommission,UrsulavonderLeyen.Whilesuchheadlinenumbersmatterpoliticallyontheinternationalstage,itisevenmoreimportanttoputeffectivepolicypackagesinplacetodeliveronthetoutedtargetsacrossthekeysectorsfordecarbonisation.Tobecredible,thesesectoralpolicieswillneedtobeproposedand supportednot justat theEuropean levelby theDGsCLIMAandDEVCO,butby thewholeCommissionand incoordination with member states.38

34. ClimateSouth.2018.CooperativeClimateAction:GlobalPerformance&DeliveryintheGlobalSouth.PreliminaryfindingsoftheClimateSouthProjectfortheGlobalClimateActionSummit.AfricanCentreforTechnologyStudies(ACTS),theBlavatnikSchoolofGovernmentandGlobalEconomicGovernanceProgrammeattheUniversityofOxford,theGermanDevelopmentInstitute/DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik(DIE),TERIUniversity

35. Gerhard,C.2017.‘TheProblemofCoherenceintheEuropeanUnion’sInternationalRelations’inChristopherHill/MichaelSmith/SophieVanhoonacker(eds).InternationalRelationsandtheEuropeanUnion.

36. Krüger,L.T.,Vaillé,J.2019.TheTreatyofAachen:OpportunitiesandChallengesforFranco-GermanCooperationinDevelopmentPolicyandBeyond.Bonn:GermanDevelopmentInstitute/DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik(DIE)incooperationwithInternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopmentandInternationalRelations(IDDRI).DiscussionPaper8/2019

37. Sartor,O.2018.TheEUgetssettoincreaseitsParisClimatepledge.Paris:InstituteforSustainableDevelopmentandInternationalRelations(IDDRI).02Jul38. Sartor,O.2019.etal.RaisingandstrengtheningEUclimateambition:Prioritiesandoptionsforthenextfiveyears.Paris:InstituteforSustainableDevelopment

andInternationalRelations(IDDRI)

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©GermanDevelopmentInstitute/DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik(DIE),EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement(ECDPM),theInternationalAffairsInstitute/IstitutoAffariInternazionali,TheInstituteforSustainableDevelopmentandInternationalRelations(IDDRI)andtheOverseasDevelopmentInstitute(ODI),2019.

The views presented in this publication are those of the authors and do notnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheorganisationsthatmakeuptheEuropean Think Tanks Group.

Readersareencouragedtoquoteorreproducematerialfromthisreportfortheirownpublications.DIE,ECDPM,IAI,IDDRIandODIrequestdueacknowledgementandacopyofthepublication.

6. tHE wAY fOrwArDIn this policy brief, we argued for the imperative to haltaverage global temperature increase at 1.5°C andthe need to accordingly enforce 1.5°C-compatibilitythroughout all EU domestic and external action. Giventhe transformative and wide-reaching requirements ofthis imperative,climatechangeneeds tobeadequatelymainstreamedintoalldevelopmentstrategies.Weproposea set of actions that the EU should consider in order to harness its development cooperation to further raise its climateambitionandtoexertcredibleclimateleadershipinachallengingglobalcontext.

Asafirststep,theEUwillneedtoproduceclearandrobustdefinitionsof‘Paris-and1.5°C-compatibility’.Tothatenditneeds to develop guidelines on appropriate climate action and sustainable development in view of its cooperation withpartnercountries,aswellasa‘brownlist’ofactivitiesthat should no longer be implemented. Without suchclarity,anydecisionsonParis-compatibilityoronpertinentbudgetshareswill remain inconsequential.ToensurethatParis-compatibility is taken forward in all EU action andpolicymaking,EU’sBetterRegulation impactassessmentsshould incorporate explicit climate-related requirementsthatconsistentlyapplysuchdefinitions.

To adequately harness the potential of developmentcooperationforincreasedclimateambition,theEUwouldneed to leverage its multiple assets, such as expertise,financingandtheopportunitytoworktogetherwithmemberstatestocounterbalanceitsowncapacityconstraintsandthefragmentationof itsaction.Realismsuggests that theEU will be selective in its engagements and in setting clear countrypriorities.Tothatend,thepreparatoryworkgoingintoamorestrategicprogramming,andcountryguidancethroughcountryframeworkdocumentssuchasenvisionedby the NDICI regulation, are steps in the right direction.Moreover,financingshouldadequatelymatchthisplanningand be better targeted to the needs and capabilities of partner countries. For instance, the availability of small-scale resources for countries that have graduated from bilateral EU assistance under the current budget could leverage additional funds for strategic purposes, e.g. topilotnationalinitiativesinsupportoftheNDCs,forblending

or to support national climate champions. On the otherhand,adaptationfinancingshouldbedirectlychannelledto least-developed and most-vulnerable developingcountries,inlinewiththeirnationalprioritiesanddemands.Finally, financial incentives should also be extended toclimate-related public–private partnerships to increasetheir impact.

EUdiplomaticefforts have traditionallyachievedgoodresults for multilateral climate governance, notablybuilding bridges between the North and the South insupportofprogressivecoalitionsforclimate.Yet,EUpolicycoherence for development has shown mixed resultsandneedstobeimprovedatalllevels.Mostimportantly,to strengthen itsclimatediplomacyand tounderpin itsaspiration tobeaglobalclimate leader, theEUneedstowalk the talk.Asa rolemodel forambitious climateaction,itneedstopursueadequateclimatetargetsandcommensuratepolicypackages,bothdomesticallyandinternationally, and send clear and credible signals forinternationalfinancingandsupport.