hansen seeing the body

8/8/2019 Hansen Seeing the Body

1/32

Seeing with the Body: The Digital Image in PostphotographyAuthor(s): Mark B. N. HansenSource: Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 54-84Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566429

Accessed: 09/04/2010 11:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Diacritics.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566429?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhuphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhuphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1566429?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/32

SEEING W I T H T H E B O D YTHEDIGITAL MAGEINPOSTPHOTOGRAPHYMARKB. N. HANSEN

In a well-known scene from the 1982 Ridley Scott film Bladerunner,Rick Deckardscans aphotographntoa 3-D renderingmachineand directsthe machine o explorethespace condensed in the two-dimensionalphotographas if it were three-dimensional[see fig. 1].FollowingDeckard'scommands o zoom in and to pan rightand left withinthe image space, the machineunpacksthe "real" hree-dimensionalworldrepresentedby the two-dimensionalphotograph[see figs. 2-3]. After catching a glimpse of histarget-a fugitivereplicant-reflected from a mirrorwithinthespace,Deckard nstructsthe machine to move around behind the object obstructing the two-dimensionalphotographic iew of thereplicantand to framewhat t sees [see figs. 4-5]. Respondingto the printcommand issued by Deckard,the machinedispenses a photographof thereplicantwhich is, quiteliterally,a close-up of an invisible-indeed nonexistent-partof the two-dimensionaloriginal[see fig. 6]. Andyet, following thefantasyof thisscene,this impossible photographs-or would be-simply the image of one particulardatapointwithin the data set comprisingthis three-dimensional ataspace.As fascinatingas it is puzzling,this scene of an impossiblerendering-a renderingof two-dimensional ataasathree-dimensionalpace--can berelated o thecrisisbroughtto photographyby digitizationin two ways. On the one hand,in line with the film'sthematicquestioning f photographys a reliable ndexof memory, his sceneforegroundsthe technicalcapacityof digital processingto manipulatephotographs. n this way, itthematizes the threatposed by digital technologies to traditional ndexical notions ofphotographicealism.On the otherhand, nwhathas turnedoutto be a farmorepropheticvein, the scene presentsa radicallynew understanding f the photographic mage as athree-dimensional virtual"pace.Such anunderstanding resupposesa vastlydifferentmaterialexistence of the photographic mage:insteadof a physical inscriptionof lighton sensitivepaper, hephotographhasbecome a data set thatcan be renderedn variousways and thus viewed fromvariousperspectives.The firstposition corresponds o the argumentsmadeby William Mitchell in hisnowclassicbook, TheReconfiguredEye.Ina comprehensiveanalysisof thetechniquesandpossibilitiesof digital maging,Mitchellconcentrates ndemarcatinghe traditionalphotographic mage fromits digitaldoppelgdinger.While the specterof manipulationhas always hauntedthe photographic mage, it remains the exception rather han therule: "There s no doubt that extensive reworkingof photographic mages to produceseamless transformations nd combinations s technically difficult, time-consuming,andoutside the mainstream f photographicpractice.When we look at photographswepresume,unless we have some clearindications o thecontrary,hattheyhave not beenreworked"[Mitchell 7]. To buttressthis claim, Mitchell sketches three criteriaforevaluatingtraditionalphotographic mages: (1) does the imagefollow the conventionsof photographyand seem internallycoherent? 2) does the visual evidence it presents

54 diacritics 1.4:54-84


3/32

Figs. 1-3. Stillsfrom Blade Runner(RidleyScott, 1982), courtesy of WarnerBrothersHome Video.RickDeckardnavigatesa two-dimensionalmageas a three-dimensionalpace.


4/32

Figs. 4-6. Stillsfrom Blade Runner(RidleyScott, 1982), courtesy of WarnerBrothers Home Video.RickDeckardnavigatesa two-dimensionalmageas a three-dimensionalpace.


5/32

supporthecaptionor claimbeingmadeabout t? and(3) is this visualevidenceconsistentwithotherthingswe acceptas knowledge[43]?Clearly,with thedevelopmentof digitalimaging techniques, these criteria and the constraint imposed by the difficulty ofmanipulationose theirsalience.Theresult,according o Mitchell,is a "newuncertaintyabout the status and interpretation f the visual signifier"[17] and the subversionof"ourontological distinctionsbetween the imaginaryand the real"[225].These conclusions and the binaryoppositionon which they arebased need to bequestioned.Beyondthe morassof difficulties nvolved n anyeffort o affirm heindexicalpropertiesof the traditionalphotograph,we must evaluate the adequacyof Mitchell'sconceptionof digitization.Tothisreader,Mitchell'sdepictionof digitalphotography smanipulation f apreexisting mageimposesfar too narrowaframeon whatdigitizationintroduces.We might do betterto describe digital photographyas "synthetic," incedigitizationhas the potentialto redefinewhat photography s, both by displacingthecentralityaccorded he statusof thephotographicmage(i.e., analogor digital)andbyforegrounding heprocedures"throughwhich the image is produced n the firstplace"[Manovich,"Paradoxes"]. Digitalphotography,hat s, usesthree-dimensionalomputergraphicsas a variantmeans of producinganimage:"Ratherhanusingthe lens to focusthe imageof actualrealityon film andthendigitizingthe film image (ordirectly usingan arrayof electronicsensors),we can ... construct hree-dimensional eality nside acomputerand then take a pictureof this reality using a virtual cameraalso inside acomputer" 4]. Inthiscase, thereferentof the "virtual" icture akenby thecomputer sa dataset, not a fragmentof the real.Moreover, heperspective romwhichthe pictureis takenis, in relation to humanperception,wholly arbitrary: Thecomputerization fperspectival onstructionmadepossiblethe automatic eneration f aperspectivalmageof a geometricmodel as seen from an arbitrarypoint of view-a pictureof a virtualworldrecordedby a virtualcamera" Manovich,"Automation" ].Withthis deterritorialization f reference,we reachthe very scenariopresented nthe scene from Bladerunner-the moment when a computer can "see" in a wayprofoundly iberated rom the optical,perspectival,andtemporalconditions of humanvision.' Withthematerial ruitionof the form of computervision imagined n this scene,in otherwords,we witness a markeddeprivilegingof theparticular erspectival mageinfavorof atotalandfullymanipulable raspof theentiredataspace, hewholerepertoireof possible images it could be said to contain.

What s fundamentalhereis theradicalresistanceof this dataspaceto any possiblehuman negotiation.Thus, one way of making sense of this negotiationwould be tounderstandhis dataspaceas a form of radicalanamorphosis,n which thecumulativeperspectivaldistortionsthatlead to the final image do not mark a "stain" hatcan beresolved romthestandpoint f another ingleperspective however echnicallymediatedit maybe). UnlikeHolbein'sTheAmbassadors,where anoblique viewinganglerevealsthepresenceof a skullwithin anotherwise ndecipherableblob, andunlikeAntonioni'sBlow-Up, wherephotographicmagnificationdiscovers a clue initially invisible in theimage, what we confronthereis a multiplydistorted echnicalmediationthatrequiresthe abandoningof any particular erspectivalanchoring or its "resolution."Thistransformativeperationurnishesacasestudyof whatKateHayleshasdubbedthe OREOstructureof computermediation:an analog input(the originalphotograph)

1. Indeed,Manovich scharacterizationfautomated ight urnisheswhatis, in act, a whollyapt depiction of this scene: "Now the computer could acquire full knowledge of the three-dimensional worldfrom a singleperspectivalimage!And because theprogramdetermined heexactposition and orientationof objects in a scene, it becamepossible to see the reconstructedscenefromanotherviewpoint.It also becamepossible topredicthow the scene wouldlook roman arbitraryviewpoint" "Automation"15].

diacritics / winter 2001 57


6/32

undergoesa process of digital distortion that yields an analog output (the close-up)[Hayles]. If we are to understand he impactof this complex transformation,we mustnot simply attend to the analog outsides, but must deprivilege our modalities ofunderstanding nough to allow the digital middle to matter.Paradoxically, hen, theimperativeto find ways of "understanding"he digital middle becomes all the moresignificant as computer vision parts company with perspective and photo-opticsaltogether. ndeed,the apotheosisof perspectivalsight marks the very moment of itsdecline: due to the intrinsicunderdeterminationf theimage,vision researchersquicklyrealizedthattheperspective nherent o photographic pticswas anobstacleto thetotalautomation f sight,andtheywent on todevelopother,nonperspectivalmeans, ncluding"range finders" such as lasers or ultrasound, as the source of three-dimensionalinformation.2No one hasexpressedthe culturalsignificanceof thisunprecedentedmomentmore

pointedlythan art historianJonathanCrary,who cites it as the very motivation or hisreconstruction f the technicalhistoryof vision:

Computer-aideddesign, synthetic holography, light simulators, computeranimation, robotic image recognition, ray tracing, texturemapping,motioncontrol, virtual environmenthelmets, magnetic resonance imaging, andmultispectral ensors areonlyafew of thetechniques hat arerelocatingvisionto aplanesevered roma humanobserver... Mostof thehistorically mportantfunctions of the humaneye are being supplantedby practices in whichvisualimagesno longerhaveany reference o theposition of an observer na "real,"opticallyperceivedworld.If theseimagescan be said to referto anything, t isto millionsofbitsof electronicmathematical ata. [Crary1-2, emphasisadded]

The workof the cultural heorist-like that of the new mediaartist-begins atthe verypointwherethehuman s left behindby visionresearchers;heapotheosisof perspectivalvision calls for nothing ess than a fundamental econfiguration f humanvision itself.

Machinic Visionand HumanPerceptionIna recentdiscussionof what he calls "machinicvision,"cultural heoristJohnJohnstoncorrelates hedigitalobsolescence of the image withthemassive deterritorializationfinformationexchange in our contemporary ulture.In a world of global, networkedtelecommunications ssemblages,Johnstonwonderswhetherwe canstill meaningfullyspeakof the imageas having any privilegedfunctionat all:

Unlike the cinematic apparatus, . . . contemporary telecommunicationsassemblages compose a distributed system of sentience, memory andcommunicationbasedon the calculation(andtransformation) f information.Withinhesocial space of theseassemblages .., theviewingor absorptionofimages constitutesa generalform of machinic vision .... As a correlativetoboth these assemblages and the distributedperceptions to which they giverise, the image attains a new status, or at least must be conceived in a newway. . . . In the circuits of global telecommunicationsnetworks, .. . the2. See in thisregard,Kittler'srecentdiscussionof thedigitalimagein "ComputerGraphics:A Semi-Technicalntroduction." discussKittler'sposition inmy essay "TheAffectiveTopology

of New MediaArt." Thisdiscussiondoes not appearin the revised versionof the essay,namelychapter ofNewPhilosophyorNewMedia.)

58


7/32

multiplicity f imagescirculating.. cannotbemeaningfullysolatedas materialinstancesof cinema(or television)andbrain.Manyof theseimages,of course,are perceived, but their articulation occurs by means of another logic: theincessantcoding and recodingof informationand its viral dissemination.Theimage itselfbecomes ust oneform that information an take. [Johnston46]

For Johnston,the informational nfrastructure f contemporaryculturequite simplynecessitatesaradicaldisembodiment f perception.As he presents t,thisdisembodimentfollows uponand extends the disembodiment o which Gilles Deleuze (in his studyofthe cinema) submits Bergson's conception of perception as the selective filteringperformedby an embodied center of indetermination. Forthose to whom this is lessthan familiarterritory:n the firstchapterof Matter and Memory,Bergson sketchesamonist view of matterandmemoryaccordingto which perceptionwould involve notsomething in addition to matter[such as idealist positions maintain],but rather thesubtractionor "diminution" rom the universe of images as a whole precisely thoseimages which are relevant for a given perceiving body. Accordingly, perception[orperceivedmatter]would be itself a partof matteras a whole. Furthermore,Bergsongoes on to insist thatperception s always mixed with affection and memory,bodilyfaculties thatmark hepositivecontribution f thebodyto the processof perception. nCinema1, Deleuze appropriatesBergson's conceptionof perceptionqua subtraction sanaltogether ptdescription f how the cinematic rameworks; norder o do so, however,he is compelled to disembodythe center of indetermination, uch that the process ofsubtraction s no longer mixed with the contributionof the body, but is instead thefunction of a purely formal, technical agency--the camera.3)For us, the interestofJohnston's xtensionof Deleuze's disembodiment f Bergsoncomes at theprecisepointwhere it diverges from Deleuze: namely, where the disembodimentof perceptioniscorrelatedwith the contemporary chievementof automatedvision. Not only does thiscorrelationbringto material ruition he universal lux of images thatDeleuze claims todiscover n the cinemaof thetimeimage,but tmarks heveryculmination f theimage'sfunction as a privileged vehiclefor perception.Reconceivedin the context of today'sglobal telecommunicationsassemblages,the imageis said to comprise

theperceptualcorrelativeof actions in and reactions to a milieu (Bergson),buta milieunowdefinedbya varietyofagentsandsubagents nhuman-machinesystems. WhileDeleuze never explicitlydescribes this new machinicspace,nor thespecifickindof vision it elicits, both are anticipated n his Bergsonianstudyof the cinematic mage,where the vieweris always alreadyin the image,necessarilyandinevitablypositionedwithinafield of interacting mages,withno means to stepback,bracket heexperience,and assume a criticaldistance.... [O]nce the brain no longerconstitutesa "centerof indeterminationn theacentereduniverseof images,"as it did or Bergson,and is itself decomposedinto distributedunctions assumedby machines,perceptioncan no longerbesimplydefinedin terms of therelationshipbetweenimages. [57]

JohnstonpartscompanywithDeleuze fromthemoment hathe correlates hedigitizationof the imagewith the technicaldistribution f cognitionbeyondthe humanbody-brain:as functionsformerlyascribedto it "have been autonomized n machinesoperatingaspartsof highly distributed ystems,"the brain has become a "deterritorializedrgan"

3. I exploreBergson's onceptionf perceptionndDeleuze's ppropriationf it atgreatlength nthestudyromwhich hisessay s excerpted, ewPhilosophyorNew Media.



8/32

[45].Theresult s a"generalized ndextended onditionof visuality"-machinicvision-inwhichthe taskof processing nformation,hat s, perception, ecessarilypassesthrougha machinic ircuit 45].4In thisposthuman erceptual egime, he selectionof informationis no longer performedexclusively or even primarilyby the humancomponent(thebody-brainas a center of indetermination).It is hardlysurprising, hen,thatwhatJohnstonrefersto as the "digital mage"canonly be "perceived"by a distributedmachinic assemblage capable of processinginformationwithout he distance hat orms he conditionof possibility or humanvision:". .. for thedigital imagethere s no outside,only the vast telecommunications etworksthatsupport t and n which it is instantiated s data" 39].Thedigitalimagehas only an"electronicunderside"which "cannotbe rendered isible"preciselybecause t is entirelywithout correlation to any perceptual recoding that might involve human vision.Accordingly, hedigitalimage is notreallyan"image"atall: farfrombeing a correlateof the imaginarydomain of sense experience,it designatesthe "objective" irculationof digital data-Kittler's endless loop of infiniteknowledge5-emancipated from anyconstrainingcorrelationwithhumanperceptual atios.

Despite his professed commitmentto machinic vision as resolutely posthuman,however, Johnston's analysis is significant, above all, for the (perhapsunintended)contributiont makes oward econfiguring umanvisionfor thedigitalage. Specifically,Johnston'smachinicvision mustbedifferentiatedrom he automation f visionexploredabove, andthe humanmustbe resituated n the space of this verydifference: whereasvisual automationseeks to replacehumanvision tout court, machinic vision simplyexpandsthe rangeof perceptionwell beyondthe organic-physiological onstraintsofhumanembodiment.One way of understandinghis expansion(Johnston'sway) is tofocus on its transcendenceof the human;another,more flexible approach,however,would view it as a challenge to the human, one that calls for nothing less than areconfiguration f the organic-physiologicalbasis of vision itself. Takingup this latterperspective,we can see that machinic vision functions precisely by challengingthehuman oreorganizetself.In thissense,machinicvision can be understood sprofoundlyBergsonist, inceit occasionsanexpansion nthescopeof theembodiedhuman'sagencyin the world,a vast technical extension of "intelligence."Inanother ense, however,machinicvision wouldappearo ignore he coreprincipleof Bergson's heoryof perception-the principle hat herecanbe no perceptionwithoutaffection:

4. Perceptionquamachinic vision thus requires"anenvironment f interactingmachinesandhuman-machineystems"and "afieldof decodedperceptionsthat,whetheror notproducedbyor issuing rom thesemachines,assumetheir ull intelligibilityonly in relationto them"[27].5. Kittler conceives of the digital condition as one of medial convergenceor technicaldedifferentiation:

Thegeneraldigitization f channels ndinformationrases he differences mongindividual edia. ound ndmage, oiceand extare educedosurfaceffects,knownto consumers s interface. enseandthe senses turn ntoeyewash. . . Inside hecomputershemselvesverythingecomes number:uantitywithoutmage, ound,or voice. Andonceoptical ibernetworksurn ormerly istinctdata lows into astandardizederiesofdigitized umbers,nymedium anbetranslatedntoanyother.Withnumbers, nything oes.Modulation,ransformation,ynchronization;elay,storage,ransposition;crambling,canning,mapping-atotalmedia inkonadigitalbasewillerase heveryconcept f medium.nstead fwiring eopleand echnologies,absolute nowledge illrunas anendlessoop. Kittler, ramophone,ilm,Typewriter1-2]

60


9/32

... we mustcorrect,at least in thisparticular,our theory ofpure perception.Wehavearguedas thoughourperceptionwerea part of the images,detached,as such,from their entirety,as though, expressing the virtual action of theobjectuponourbody,orofourbodyupon heobject,perceptionmerely solatedfrom the total object thataspect of it which interests us. But we have to takeinto account the act thatour body is not a mathematicalpoint in space, thatits virtual actions are complicatedby,and impregnatedwith,real actions, or,in otherwords,thatthere s noperceptionwithoutaffection.Affectionis, then,thatpartor aspectof the inside of ourbody which we mix with the imageofexternalbodies; it is what we must irst of all subtract rom perceptionto getthe imagein itspurity.[Bergson,MatterandMemory58, emphasisadded]

ForBergson,any"real"act of perception s alwayscontaminatedwithaffection-bothas a factordetermining he selection of images and as a contribution o the resultingperceptualexperience.What this means,of course, is that theresimply can be no suchthing as "machinicperception"-unless, thatis, the humanplays a more fundamentalrole in it thanJohnstonwants to acknowledge.Thus,what Johnstondescribes as a new"machinic pace"shouldbe understood ess asanexpansionof the domainof perceptionitself thanas avast ncrease ntheflux of information romwhichperception anemerge.Ratherthan demarcatinga new deterritorialized egime of perception-a "gen-eralizedconditionof visuality"-what thephenomenonof machinicvision foregroundsis theurgentneed,at this moment n ourongoing technogenesis,fora differentiation fproperlyhumanperceptual apacitiesfromthe functionalprocessingof information nhybrid machine-humanassemblages, of vision properfrom mere sight. Only such adifferentiation an dojusticeto theaffectivedimensionconstitutiveof humanperceptionandto the active roleaffectivityplaysin carryingout the shift froma mode of perceptiondominatedby vision to one rootedin those embodiedcapacities-proprioception andtactility-from which vision mightbe saidto emerge.Precisely such a differentiationand an altogetherdifferentunderstanding f theautomationof sight informs the aestheticexperimentationwith computervision andimage digitizationthatis my focus here.For today's new media artists,the historicalachievementof so-called "visionmachines"6omprisesnothing f notafelicitouspretextfor an alternativenvestment n thebodily underpinnings f humanvision. At the heartof this aestheticapproach o the automationof sight is anunderstanding f the visionmachine as the catalyst for a "splitting"or "doubling"of perception nto, on the onehand, a machinic form, mere sight (roughly what Lacan, and Kittlerfollowing him,understand s the machineregistrationof the image') and,on the other,a humanformtied to embodimentandthe singular orm of affection correlatedwith it, vision proper.Such a splittingof perceptions simplythenecessaryconsequenceof the vast differencebetween the computerand humanembodiment:whereas"vision machines" ransformtheactivityof perceiving nto a computationof datathat s, for all intentsandpurposes,instantaneous, umanperception akesplacein a rich andevolving field to whichbodily

6. The term is Paul Virilio'sand, in accord withmydistinctionhere between "vision" and"sight,"wouldbetterbe renderedas "sightmachine."7. Lacandevelopshismaterialistnotionof consciousnessinSeminar I.Kittlerappropriatesit in his understandingof the technicalproperties of computergraphics: ". .. in a 'materialistdefinition'of consciousnessany 'surface' ufficeswherethe refractionndexbiuniquely ransfersindividualpoints in thereal to correspondinghoughvirtualpoints in the image.So-calledMan,distinguished by his so-called consciousness, is unnecessaryor thisprocess because nature smirrorscan accommodatethese typesof representationust as well as the visual center in theoccipital lobe of the brain"[Kittler,Literature 31].



10/32

modalities of tactility, proprioception, memory, and duration-what I am callingaffectivity-make an irreducibleand constitutive contribution.As the pretextfor analternative nvestmentof theembodied basis of humanvisual perception, his splittingis fundamental or anyaestheticredemptionof the automationof sight.While theoristslikeDeleuzeandJohnstonmiss the call forsuch aninvestment,newmediaartistsdirectlyengagethebodilydimensionsof experiencewhichsurface,as it were,inresponse o theautomationof vision. Their work can thus be said to invest the "otherside" of theautomationof vision-the affective source of bodily experiencethat is so crucial toreconfiguringhumanperception n ourcontemporarymediaecology.

ReembodyingPerceptionTo contextualizethis aesthetic investmentof the body, we would be well advised torevisittheworkof Frenchmedia criticPaulVirilio-the theoristof the"visionmachine"as well as the proximate argetof Johnston'scritique.Morethanany othersource,it isVirilio's criticalinsightinto the basis for automation-the technificationof perceptualfunctions traditionallybound up with the body-that informs what I would call the"Bergsonistvocation"of aestheticexperimentationswith embodied vision.Far rombeingthenostalgichas-beenof Johnston'smagining,Virilioshows himselfto bejust as attentive o the advantagesof technificationas he is to its humancosts. Inthis sense,his evolving analysisof the vision machinecan be saidto pursue wo equallyimportantends. On the one hand, it functions as a critiqueof the disembodyingofperceptionthat informsthe historicalaccomplishmentof what Viriliohas termed the"logisticsof perception," he systemic technicalrecodingof formerlyhuman-centeredperceptual atios.Buton the otherhand,Virilio'sanalysisforms the basis for an ethicsof perceptionrooted in a defense of the body as an ever-evolving perceiving form.Accordingly, hevery positionfor whichJohnstonberatesVirilio-his refusal o abandonthe phenomenology of the body-takes on a newfound and decisively positivesignificance:as the"victim," o to speak,of thelogisticsof perception, hebodybecomesthe site of a potentialresistance to-or more exactly, a potentialcounterinvestmentalongside of-the automationof vision. ContraJohnston,Virilio's concern is not thebody as natural,but the body as an index of the impactof technological change:thebodyas it coevolves withtechnology,andspecifically,as it undergoesself-modificationthrough ts encounterwith automatedvision.GivenVirilio'ssensitivity o thebodilycosts of technification,t is hardlysurprisingthathis positionstronglyresonateswith ourunderstanding f the transformationf theimage.As the culminatingmoment of a fundamental ransfigurationn the materialityof the image, the vision machine instantiatespreciselywhat is radicallynew about thedigital image: the shift in the "being"of the image from the objective supportof atechnical frameto the impermanent"mentalor instrumental"orm of visual memory.Withthis new materialstatuscomes a profoundshift in the scope of the technologicalrecodingof perception: rom this point forward, t is the timeof perception tself, andnot its materialsupport, hatforms the "object"of technical nvestment:

Anytake(mentalor instrumental)beingsimultaneouslya time take,howeverminute, exposure time necessarily involves some degree of memorization(conscious or not) according to the speed of exposure .... Theproblemofobjectivisationof the image thus largely stops presenting itself in terms ofsomekindofpaperor celluloidsupport urface-that is, in relation oa materialreferencespace. It now emergesin relationto time,to the exposuretime thatallows or edits seeing. [Virilio,VisionMachine61]

62


11/32

To this shift in theobjectof technical nvestmentcorrespondsa profounddisplacementof the humanroleinperception. n contrast o earliervisualtechnology ike thetelescopeand the microscope (not to mention cinema itself), which function by extendingthephysiological capacities of the body, contemporary vision machines bypass ourphysiology(and ts constitutiveimits)entirely.What s importants not ustthatmachineswill takeourplace in certain"ultrahigh-speed operations,"buttherationale nformingthis displacement: hey will do so "notbecauseof our ocularsystem's limiteddepthoffocus ... but becauseof the limiteddepth of time of ourphysiological 'take"'[61]. Inshort,whatwe face in today's vision machinesis the unprecedentedhreatof our totalirrelevance:because our bodies cannotkeep pace with the speedof (technical)vision,we literallycannotsee what the machine can see and are thusleft outof the perceptualloop altogether.Thus when he pronounces he imageas nothingmorethan an "emptyword,"Viriliobringshomejust how profoundly ntertwined he body's epochi is withthe digitalobsolescence of the image.8

What most critics-Johnston included-fail to appreciate s that Virilio's analysisdoes not culminate with this bleak diagnosis of our contemporary ituation.Not onlydoes he repeatedly nvoke the necessityfor anethicscapableof addressing hesplittingof perception,buthis intellectual rajectorywitnesses anincreasingattentiveness o theviolence of thevision machine'srecodingof embodiedhuman unctionsas disembodiedmachinic unctions. n so doing,Viriliomanages o raisehisanalysisof thevision machineabove the limiting binary-human versus machine-that he is so often accused ofreinscribing.For in the end, what is at stake in his analysis is neither a resistance tohumankind'sallintotechnologynoran embraceof aradical, echnicalposthumanization,but somethingmore like the possibility for a technically catalyzedreconfigurationofhumanperceptionitself: a shift from a vision-centeredto a body-centeredmodel ofperception.Nowhere is this potentialperceptualreconfigurationmore clearlyon displaythanin the incisive analysisaccorded he virtualcockpitin Open Sky.HereViriliopinpointsthe fundamental radeoffof visual automation:embodimentfor efficiency.A hi-techhelmet that functionsin the place of the instrumentpanel and its indicator ights, thevirtualcockpitcombines thesuperiority f machinicprocessingwiththe drive to recodecomplexly embodied capacities as instrumentalvisual activities, entirelypurifiedofanybodilydimension:"sinceth[e]typeof fluctuating real-time)optoelectronicdisplay[offeredby the virtualcockpit] demands substantial mprovement n humanresponsetimes, delays causedby hand movements are also avoidedby usingboth voice (speechinput)andgaze direction(eye input)to command he device,piloting no longer beingdone 'byhand'but 'by eye,'by staringat different realor virtual)knobs andsaying onoroff . .." [OpenSky93]. Examples ike this lend ample testimonyto Virilio'scomplexinterest n the dehumanizingeffects of automation: arfrombeing simple momentsinan inexorablyunfolding logistics of perception,technologies like the virtualcockpitserve above all to expose the concretecosts of visual automation. ndeed,in Virilio'shands,suchtechnologiesare shown to functionprecisely by mountinganassaulton thedomainof embodiedperception; hey therebyexpose just how much the recodingofhumanvision as an instrumental unction of a larger"vision machine"stripsit of itsown embodiedbasis.9

8. "Don'tforget,"he remindsus, "that'image' sjust an emptyword... since themachinesinterpretationhas nothingto do with normal vision (to put it mildly!).For the computer, heoptically active electron image is merelya series of coded impulseswhose configurationwecannot begin to imaginesince, in this 'automationof perception,' mage feedback is no longerassured"VisionMachine 3].9. "Ophthalmologyhus no longer restricts tself topracticesnecessitatedby deficiencyordisease; it has broadened ts rangeto includean intensiveexploitationof thegaze in whichthe



12/32

Thisconcernwith thecorrelationbetweenautomation ndtherecodingof thebodyseems to have motivateda subtleyet significantshift of emphasis n Virilio'sresearch,a shiftthatcentersaround he role tobe accorded he invisible or the"non-gaze."For f,in Warand Cinemaand The VisionMachine,Virilio tends to assimilateblindnessto thevisionless sight of the vision machine, in OpenSky,he begins to speak instead of a"right o blindness."Rather hanyet one moredomainfor machiniccolonization-the"latestand last formof industrialization:he industrialization f thenon-gaze"[VisionMachine73]-blindness becomes thebasis for anethicsof perception:"it wouldsurelybe a good thingif we ... askedourselves about the individual'sreedomof perceptionand the threatsbroughtto bearon thatfreedomby the industrialization f vision ..Surelyit would thenbe appropriateo entertaina kindof rightto blindness . ." [OpenSky 96]. More than simply a right not to see, the right to blindness might best beunderstoodas a rightto see in a fundamentallydifferentway.Forif we now regularlyexperience a "pathologyof immediateperception" n which the credibilityof visualimages has been destroyed,isn't the reason simply that image processing has beendissociatedfrom thebody,fromthe very sourceof ourvisual sensibility [90]? Doesn'tthe all-too-frequent ontemporary redicament f "notbeing able to believe youreyes"in fact compel us to find other ways to groundbelief, ways that reactivate the verybodily modalities-tactility, affectivity, proprioception-from which images acquiretheir force and their"reality"n the firstplace?'0

ExpandedPerspectiveNew media artistscan be said to engage the very sameproblematicas machine visionresearchers,hough omarkedlydifferent ffect.As interventionsntoday's nformationalecology,bothexploitthehomologybetween humanperceptionandmachinicrendering;yet whereastheprojectof automationpushesthis homology to its breakingpoint,withthe result that t bracketsout the humanaltogether,new media artexploresthe creativepotential mplicitwithinthereconceptualizing f (human)perceptionas an active (andfully embodied) renderingof data. In a recent discussion of the digitization of thephotographic mage,GermanculturalcriticFlorianR6tzerpinpoints hesignificanceofthis rathersurprising onvergence:

depthoffield of humanvision is being progressivelyconfiscatedbytechnologies n whichmaniscontrolledby the machine.. ." [93].10. In his brilliantanalysis of the "nobilityof vision," Hans Jonas shows how touchandotherbodilymodalities"conferreality"onperception:Realitysprimarilyvidencedn resistance hich s an ngredientntouch-experience.Forphysical ontact s more hangeometricalontiguity:t involves mpact.n otherwords, ouch s thesense,andtheonlysense, n which heperceptionf qualitysnormally lendedwith heexperiencef force,whichbeingreciprocaloesnot et thesubject epassive;hus ouchs thesense n which heoriginal ncounter ithrealityas reality akesplace.Touchbrings herealityof its objectwithin heexperiencefsense n virtue f thatbywhich texceedsmere ense,viz.,the orce-componentn itsoriginalmake-up.hepercipientnhispart anmagnifyhiscomponentyhisvoluntarycounteractiongainstheaffectingbject.For hisreasonouch s the rue estofreality.[147-48]

Jonas'sanalysisormsthe basis or myconsideration fvirtualrealityenvironmentsn "EmbodyingVirtualReality."

64


13/32

Today, eeing theworld is no longerunderstoodas aprocess of copyingbutofmodelling, a renderingbased on data. A person does not see the world outthere, she only sees the model created by the brain and projected out-wards .... This eature of perceptionas constructionwas... unequivocallydemonstratedby attempts omechanically imulatetheprocessof seeing... inwhich theprocessing. .. has to be understoodas a complexbehaviorsystem.In thiscontext,notonlydoes theprocessing stage moveintothe oregroundasagainst the copy, but [so too does] thatorganismonce taken leave of in theeuphoriccelebrationof photographicobjectivity,an organismwhose visualsystem constructs an environment which is of significance to it. ["Re:Photography"17-18, emphasisadded]

Ri~tzer's laim underscoresthefunctional isomorphismbetween machine vision andhumanperception hat formsthe foundationof contemporary ision researchas well astheimpetus or artistic ngagementswithvisualtechnologies.At issueinboth s aprocessof construction rom"raw"data nwhichrulesinternal o themachineorbody-brainareresponsible orgenerating rganizedpercepts-"data packets"nthe case of themachine;"images" n thatof the human.Of particularnteresthere is the inversion to which Rdtzersubjectsthe trajectoryfollowed by vision research: or him, what is central s not how the humanprefiguresthe machinic,but ratherhow the mechanicalsimulationof sight recursively impactsuponourunderstanding nd ourexperienceof humanvision. Itis as if theverycapacityto simulatesightfurnished he impetusfor a reconfiguration-indeed, a reinvention-of vision itself. Beyond its contribution to our understanding of the materialtransformationf theimage,Raitzer'snalysis huspinpoints hepotentialor the machinicparadigm o stimulateartisticpractice. By revealingthat embodiedhumanbeings aremore like computer-vision machines than photo-optical cameras, the functionalisomorphismbetweenmachinicsightandhumanperceptionunderscores heprocessuralnatureof imageconstruction.Rather hanpassively inscribing nformation ontained nour perceptual ields, we actively constructperspectival mages throughrules internalto ourbrains.We must bear inmind, however, hatthishomology between humanandcomputer"perception"ecomes available oraesthetic xploitationonly inthe wakeof thesplittingof visionintoproperlymachinicandhuman orms.Accordingly,f ourperceptual rocessis like thatof the computer n the sense thatboth involve complex internalprocessing,the type of processinginvolved in the two cases could not be moredifferent:whereasvision machinessimplycalculatedata,humanvision comprisesa "brain-body chieve-ment."Not surprisingly,his differenceholds significance orthe aesthetic mportof thehomology as well: whereas machine-visionsystems abandonperspective entirely infavor of a completely realized modelization of an object or space, aestheticexperimentations with human visual processing exploit its large margin ofindeterminationnot to dispense with three-dimensionality ltogether,butexpresslytomodify ourperspectival onstructions."It is precisely such modificationthat is at issue in much recent experimentationwiththeimpactof digitizationon thetraditional hotographicmage-perhaps the mostdevelopedfield of new media artpractice.By openingextravisualmodes of interfacingwith the digital information encoding the digital (photographic) image, suchexperimentation oregrounds hespecificityof humanprocessesof imageconstruction.

11. In his treatment f digital design,architectBernardCache nsiststhatdigitallyacilitatedtopological spaces should not be opposedto Euclideanspace-as theyso often are-preciselybecauseof theirexperientialdimension,thatis, theircapacityto be experiencedby us [Cache].



14/32

Fig.7. Tamdas aliczky,he Garden1992).Computer-generatednimation epicting "synthetic"world roma child's viewpoint;compelsthe viewer to adopta "waterdrop"erspective.Inso doing,it pitshuman mageconstruction gainst heanalogprocessof photographicrendering,husdrawingattention o the central oleplayedbyembodied human) raminginthecontemporarymediaenvironment; tthe sametime,it underscores he fundamentaldifference between human and computer processing by deploying the latter as aninstrumentor the former.This doublevocationexplains heapparent aradox f aestheticexperimentationswith thedigital nfrastructuref thephotograph:he fact thatexploringthe "image"beyond its technical framing(that is, as the photographicor cinematicimage) necessarily involves some significant engagementwith the technical (thatis,with thecomputerandits constitutivemode of "vision").In so doing, this double voca-tion manages to introduce the concrete Bergsonist imperative motivating suchexperimentation: he imperativeto discover and make experientiablenewforms ofembodiedhumanperspectivalperceptionwhichcapitalizeon theperceptual lexibilitybroughtout in us throughourcouplingwith the computer.Consider, orexample,new media artistTamaisWaliczky'sThe Garden[see fig. 7].This computer-generated nimationdepicts a "synthetic"world oriented around thefigureof a child who plays the role of pointof view for the cameraandthus anchors hispointof view,and also thatof thespectator,withinthespaceof theimage.As she movesaroundin the image space, the child remains the same size, while the objects sheencounters change size, angle, and shape in correlation with the trajectoryof hermovementsthrough he space. By identifyingthe viewer'sperspectivewith that of thechild,Waliczkycompelsthe viewerto deterritorialize erhabitualgeometricperspectiveand assume what he calls a "waterdropperspective" in a waterdrop,as in a bubble,spaceis curved arounda centralorientingpointof view). Thus,The Gardenplays withthe flexibility of perspective n a way specificallycorrelatedwith humanembodiment,andindeed,in a way designedto solicit an activeresponse.As one commentator utsit,

66


15/32

the work "setsthe viewer a task thatprovesto be hardto grasp--to adopta decenteredpoint-of-view"[Morse28]. By disjoiningthepointof view of thespaceit presents romour habitualgeometricviewpoint,TheGarden n effectchallengesus to reconfigureourrelation o theimage;andbecausethe act of entering nto thespaceof theimageoperatesa certain alienationfrom our normalexperience, it generatesa pronouncedaffectivecorrelate.We seem tofeel the space morethan to see it. Moreover,because it seeks toreproduce he "sphericalperspective"of a child's viewpointon the world,TheGardenactivelyforgesconcreteconnectionsto othermodes of perception-for example,to the"egocentric" iewpointcharacteristic f children-where seeing is grounded n bodilyfeeling. As a form of experimentationwith our perspectivalgrounding,The Gardenthusaims to solicit a shift in perceptualmodalityfrom apredominantly etachedvisualmode to a moreengaged,affectiveandproprioceptivemode.In his recent work on hypersurfacearchitecture, ultural heoristBrianMassumigraspsthe far-reaching mplicationsof such an alternative,hapticandprehodologicalmode of perception:

Depthperception s a habitof movement.Whenwe see one objectat a distancebehind another,what we are seeing is in a very real sense our own body'spotential to move between the objectsor to touch them in succession. Wearenotusingoureyesas organsofsight,ifby sightwe meanthecognitiveoperationof detecting and calculating forms at a distance. We are using our eyes asproprioceptorsandfeelers.Seeingat a distance is a virtualproximity:a direct,unmediatedexperience of potential orientings and touches on an abstractsurface combiningpastness andfuturity.Visionenvelopsproprioceptionandtactility. ... Seeing is never separatefrom other sense modalities. It is bynature synesthetic, and synesthesia is by nature kinesthetic. Every lookreactivatesa multi-dimensioned, hifting surface of experience rom whichcognitive unctions emergehabituallybutwhich is not reducible o them.[21]

Not only does Massumi broadenperceptionbeyond vision, in orderto encompassallthe sensorymodalitiesof bodilylife, but he also suggeststhattheperspectival lexibilitywe areexploringhere is a consequenceof theprimordiality f suchbodily "vision."Onthe accounthe develops,opticalvision derives fromproprioceptive ndtactile"vision,"as a particular imitationof its generativevirtuality.We might thereforesay thatnewmedia arttapsinto the domain of bodily potentiality or virtuality) n orderto catalyzethe active embodied reconfiguringof perceptual experience (or, in other words, to"virtualize" hebody).

Haptic SpacePreciselysuch a transformation f what it means to see informsthe work of new mediaartistsengaged in exploringthe consequencesof the digitizationof the photographicimage. In divergentways, the work of Waliczky,MiroslawRogala, andJeffreyShawaims to solicit a bodily connection with what must now be recognizedto be a material(informational)luxprofoundlyheterogeneouso theperceptual apacitiesof the(human)body.By explicitlystaging he shiftfrom hetechnical mage(forexample, hephotographorthecinematic rame) othehuman raming unction, he worksof these artists iterallycompel us to "see" with our bodies. In this way, they correlate he radicalagendaof"postphotography"with the broaderreconfigurationof perceptionand of the imagecurrentlyunderway n contemporary ulture.With their investmentof the body as a



16/32

quasi-autonomousite forprocessing nformation,hese worksgive concrete mbodimentto the fundamental hift underlyingpostphotographicpractice,what pioneeringnewmedia artist Roy Ascott glosses as a "radicalchange in the technology of image-emergence,notonlyhow themeaning s announcedbut how it comes on stage;notonlyhow the world is pictured,or how it is framed,but how frameworksare constructedfromwhich mage-worlds anemerge, nopen-endedprocesses" 166].By foregroundingthebodilyunderpinnings f vision,the worksof Waliczky,Rogala,andShaw transformthe digital photograph nto the source of an embodiedframingprocess that specifiespreciselyhow information an be transformed nto experienceable mage-worlds.UnlikeWaliczky'sTheGarden,MiroslawRogala'sLoversLeapdoes notpresentavirtualmagespace,but s firmlyrootedwithin he tradition f photo-optical erspective.12Itjoins together wo large-screenvideoprojectionsof thebusyMichiganAvenuebridgein downtownChicago displayedaccordingto a perspective system thatRogala calls"Mind's-Eye-View." wophotographsakenwitha fish-eye lens areprocessedtogetherintoa 360' "pictosphere"hatallowsexploration longa spectrum anging romstandardlinearperspective whentheangleof viewingtendstocoincide with theangleof filming)to a circularperspective whenthe two angles standat 180? rom one another) see fig.8]. Within he spaceof the installation, hetwo video screensdisplayviews of thesameimage space fromoppositeorientations.Caught nside the strangespace of the image,the viewer-participantnteractswith the imageby moving around n the installationorby standing till [seefig. 9]. Bodilymovement ngagesfloor-mounted ensors hat riggershifts in the 360' image and that determinewhetherthe shifts are abruptor gradual,while stasis triggerseither an animatedsequenceof the city corresponding o a givenlocation along the spectrumof the image or a randomlyselected video sequence ofdaily life in LoversLeap,Jamaica.The installation hus combines elements of chanceandviewercontrol: heviewer-participant's ounting ense of control hroughmovementmightbe said to be undercutby the random umpcuts to virtualscenes of otherplaces.As Rogala explains:"When he viewer enters the place, one becomes awarethat one'smovementsoractionsarechangingtheview but won't realize how. This meansthattheviewer is not really in control,but simply aware of his or her complicity. . . . As theviewer'sawarenessof the controlmechanismsgrows,so does the viewer'spower" qtd.in Morse95]. Still, as MargaretMorseobserves,the viewer remainspowerlessto selectthe contentof the experienceand can only modify its manner: he viewer chooses "notwhatis seen, but how it is viewed"[Morse 95]. And, we mightfurthermore dd,whatperforms he selecting is not the viewer's rational aculties,butherbodily affectivity,which henceforthbecomes the link between her mentalexperienceandthe spaceof theimage.In this sense, Rogala's installation might be said to recast the experience ofperspectivenot as a staticgraspingof an image, but as an interactiveconstructionofwhatTimothyDruckrey alls an"event-image."n thework, hedigitized magebecomes"thepointof entry nto anexperiencebasedon theability orender urvilinear erspectiveas process"[Druckrey 5]. Effectively, heimagebecomes an "immersivegeometry" nwhichperspective oses its fixity andbecomesmultiple.Theresult s a kindof playwithperspective n whichthe viewer'sgesturesand movement riggerchangesin the imageandthereby econstructheimageas ahapticspace.Rogalaexplains:"movementhroughperspectives a mental onstruct; ne thatmirrors ther umpsanddisjunctive ssociationswithin thethoughtprocess" qtd. n Morse94]. Moreover, t is the brainwhich functionsto "link" though, importantly,not to "unite") he physical locality in which the user-participantinds herselfwiththevirtualdimension."Thegoal"of theinstallation,Morse

12. Documentation of Lovers Leap can be found at www.rogala.org.

68


17/32

Fig. 8. MiroslawRogala, LoversLeap(1995). Twovideo screens display viewsof a 3600 "pictosphere";viewers'physical movementwithin thespace triggersmovementof image.

Fig. 9. MiroslawRogala, Lovers Leap (1995). Close-up of 3600 pictosphere of downtownChicagotakenwith 'fish-eye" lens.


18/32

concludes,"is to externalizeaninternal magein themind,allowingthe viewer to standoutside andperceiveit" [96]. Not only does LoversLeapthussuggesta new relation othephotographic mage-since, as Druckreyputsit, "theusefulness of thesingle imagecan no longerserve as a recordof an event"[75]--but it foregrounds he shift from anoptical to a haptic mode of perceptionrooted in bodily affectivity as the necessaryconsequenceof such a shift in the image's ontology andfunction.'3WhereasRogala'sworkmanages o uprootperspective rom ts photo-optical ixitywithout abandoningEuclidean space, Waliczky's work embraces the flexibility ofcomputermediation and, ultimately,computer space itself in order to confront theanthropomorphic asis of perceptionwith the catalyst of the virtual image.14 In TheWay, or example, Waliczkyemploys whathe calls an "inverseperspectivesystem":asthreedepictedfiguresrun towardbuildings,these buildings,rather hangettingnearer,actuallymovefarther way[seefig. 10].In TheGarden,as we've already een,Waliczkyemploysa "waterdrop erspectivesystem"whichprivilegesthepointof view notof thespectator,as in traditionalperspective,butratherof the child, or more exactly,of thevirtualcamera,whose surrogate he is. And in Focusing,Waliczkydissects a 99-layerdigital image by making each of its layers available for investigation by the viewer.What one discovers in this work is thateach partof the image explored yields a newimagein turn, n a seemingly infinite,andcontinuouslyshifting,processof embedding[seefig. 11 . Indeed,Waliczky'sworknotonlyfurnishesaperfect llustration f Deleuze'sclaimthatany partof thedigitalimagecanbecomethe link to the next image,'5butalsoforegrounds hebodily activityof the viewer as the filtering agent:whatit presents s atruly nexhaustiblevirtual mage surfacethatcan be actualized n an infinitenumberofways through he viewer's selective activity.Waliczky'suse of computer space to unsettle optical perspectivetakes its mostinsistent formin a workcalled TheForest.Initiallyproducedas a computeranimation,The Forestuses two-dimensionalelements(a single black-and-whitedrawingof a baretree)to create heimpressionof athree-dimensionalpace.To makeTheForest,Waliczkyemployed a small virtualcamerato film a series of rotatingcylindersof various sizesonto whichthedrawingof the tree has beencopied.Because the camera s smaller hanthesmallestcylinder, he viewer sees anendless line of treesin staggeredrows,when inactuality he trees are mountedon a setof convex surfaces[see fig. 12].As AnnaSzepesisuggests, Waliczky'swork combines vertical movement(the movementof the trees),horizontal movement (the movement of the cylinders), and depth movement (themovement of the camera).This combination,argues Szepesi, produces movementsrunningin every direction.The result is a thoroughtransformation f the Cartesiancoordinatesystem, a replacementof the straightvectors of the x, y, and z axes with"curved ines thatloop back on themselves"[Szepesi 102].And the effect evokedis asense of limitlessspacein which the viewercan find no way out.Szepesi explains:"Thebaretrees revolveendlessly around heir own axis, like patterns n a kaleidoscope.Theresultingillusion is complete and deeply alarming: he infinity of the gaze leads to atotal loss of perspective" 103].

YetTheForestdoes notpresenta "posthuman oint-of-view," s Morseclaims;nordoes it restore he conventionsof Euclideanvision within a non-Euclideanmage space.13. As if to reinforcethis shift, the work includes a "distorted,circularimage,"a kindof

anamorphicstain--"eerie fish-eye images that look like a ball with buildingsgrowingout ofthem"[Morse 95, citing CharlieWhite]-that does not resolve itself into a photo-opticimage,butrathercalls intobeinga "mental onstructof the omniscientgaze madevisible"[Morse95].14. Documentationof Waliczky'swork can befound at www.waliczky.com.15. SeeDeleuze,Cinema2, Conclusion.I discussDeleuze'sremarkson thedigital imagein"CinemabeyondCybernetics."

70


19/32

Fig. 10. TamdsWaliczky,TheWay(1996). "Inverse erspectivesystem"causes objectsto diminish n sizeas thedepicted igures runtowardthe viewer

Fig. 11. TamadsWaliczky, ocusing(1998). Interactive,ninety-nine-layerdigital image; illustrates thepo-tential or anypart of imageto generatea new image.


20/32

Fig.12. TamdsWaliczky,heForest 1993). Two-dimensionalrawinged throughirtual amera ieldsillusion faninfinitehree-dimensionalpace.Rather,by embeddingexperientiablevantagepointswithinwarped mage spaces, TheForestopens alternatemodes of perceivingthat involve bodily dimensions of spacingand duration-modes that, n short,capitalizeon theflexibilityof thebody,andindeed,on the cross-modal or synesthetic capacities of bodily affectivity. In this way, itexemplifies the mechanismdrivingall of Waliczky'swork:namely,the inversionof anormalviewing situation,such that the image becomes the stable point of referencearoundwhich thebodymightbe said to move. Morsediscernssomethingsimilar n TheWay:"Astationary iewercaninterpret is or herownforeground ositionto bemoving.The result s puzzling,anenigmathat n anycase suggestsan ironicordysphoricvisionof motioninto whatis usuallyassociatedwith the futureor thepathof life" [Morse311].We mustinsist, moveover,thatwhatoperatessuch an "interpretation"r "suggestion"is precisely the capacity of the installation to tamperwith our ordinaryembodiedequilibrium: n a reversal of the paradigmof cognitive linguistics (where meaningschemata an be tracedbackto embodiedbehavior),what s at stakehere s amodificationat the level of embodiedbehavior hatsubsequentlyriggers onnotationalonsequences.16These two distinctengagementswithphoto-opticalperspective--one moredirectlyalignedwithtraditional hotography,he otherwith the virtual mageof computervisionresearch-come together in the work of Jeffrey Shaw. Consider, for example, hiscoproduction,with Waliczky,of an interactive nstallationversionof The Forest. Theaim of this installation is to expand the interface between the human viewer andWaliczky'sanimatedvirtualworld:to open it not simplyto the viewer'sinternalbodilyprocessing,but to her tactile and spatialmovement. To this end, Waliczky'sworld ismadenavigablevia the interface f an advanced lightsimulator; singajoystickmountedon a moving seat, the viewer is able to negotiateher own way through he infinitely

16. For the notionof embodiedschematain cognitivelinguistics,see Johnson.

72


21/32

Fig.13.Jeffrey hawand TamdsWaliczky,nstallation ersionf TheForest1993). EmbedsTheForemwithinlightsimulatornterface;ouplesllusion finfinitehree-dimensionalpace opossibilities fbodmovement.recursivevirtualworldof TheForestandto experienceher ourneythrough hephysicalsensationsof movementthattheflight simulatorproduces nher own body [see fig. 13].Ineffect,theprocessof mappingmovementonto thebodyfunctions o frame he limitless"virtual" pace as an actualized mage.Morefirmlyrooted n the traditionsof past image technologies,Shaw'sownrecentworksdeploymultiple,oftenincompatiblenterfacesasnavigationdevices for the virtualimagespaceshis workspresent.17By employingthenavigation echniquesof panorama,photography, inema,and virtualreality,he makes theirspecificityboth a theme and afunction of his work. Rather than collapsing the technologies into some kind ofpostmodernGesamtkunstwerk, haw layers them on top of one another n a way thatdraws attentionto the materialspecificity distinguishingeach one. The effect of thisjuxtapositionof incompatiblemedia frames or interfaces s to foreground he "framingfunction"of the embodiedviewer-participantn a more direct and insistentway thaneither Rogala or Waliczkydo. Rather thanpresentingthe viewer-participantwith aninitially destabilizing nteractionaldomain,Shawempowersher as the agentin chargeof navigatingmediaspace: t is theviewer-participant'sodilyactivity-and specifically,her synesthetic or cross-modalaffectivity-that must reconcile the incompatibilitiesbetween these diverse interfaces.Thus, as the viewer-participant raduallydiscoversthe limits of the immersive environment,and correspondinglyof her own affectiveprocessingof thisenvironment, hegainsa reflexive awarenessof her own contributionto theproductionof the"reality ffects"potentiallyofferedbythe interfacepossibilities.As exhilaratingas it is deflating,this awarenessserves to place the viewer-participantwithin the space of the image, althoughin a mannerthat,by constantlyinterrupting

17. My book New Philosophyfor New Media devotes an extended discussion to Shaw'scareeras theexemplaryneo-Bergsonistnew mediaartist[chapter2].

diacritics winter2001 73


22/32

immersion,draws attention o the active role playedby bodily affectivity n producingandmaintaining his experience.In two strikingnstances, his uxtaposition f competingvisual traditions oncretelyexploits the contrastbetween thephotographic mageas a static(analog)inscriptionofa moment n time and theimageas a flexible dataset. InPlace: A User'sManual,Shawdeploys the panorama nterface in its traditional orm-as a photographic mage-precisely in order to defeat its illusionist aim. By giving the viewer control over theprojection, heframe,andthe spaceit depicts,andby foregroundinghereversibilityofthe screen(which allows the panorama o be seen from the outside),Shaw opens thephotographic pace of illusion to various forms of manipulation-all involvingbodilymovement-which serveto counteractts illusionisticeffects [see fig. 14].Photographyis thus transformed nto the "condition .. of anothermovement, thatof movementwithin virtual space" [Duguet 41]; it becomes the pretext for a movement that issimultaneouslywithin the viewer's body and the virtualspace and that is-on bothcounts-supplementary to the static photographic mage. This effect of introducingmovementinto the photograph rom the outside-and its inversionof theconventionsof the traditional anorama-is madeall the morestrikingbythe contentof thepanoramicimageworlds:desertedsites or sites of memorythat, n starkcontrast o the touristsitesfeaturednthenineteenth-centuryanoramas, rethemselveswhollydevoidof movement[seefig. 15].In TheGoldenCalf (1995), Shawdeploys the photographic mage as the basis foran experience that reverses the movement foregrounded n Place and, by doing so,invertsthe traditionalpanoramicmodel itself. The work features a white pedestalonwhich is placed an LCD color monitor connected to a computervia a large five-footcable.Themonitordisplaysan imageof thepedestalwith a computer-generatedmageof agoldencalf on top. By movingthemonitoraround he actualpedestalandcontortingher body in variousways, the viewer can examine the calf from all possible angles-above, below,and from all sides [see fig. 16]. The monitor husfunctionsas a windowrevealinganimmaterial, irtualobjectseeminglyandparadoxicallyocatedwithinactualspace [see fig. 17].Yet,because thecalf's shinyskin hasbeen"reflection-mapped" ithdigitized photographsof the room that werecapturedwith a fish-eye lens, this virtualobjectalso becomes the projectivecenterfor a virtualpanoramic epresentation f thespace surroundingheviewer,andone, moreover,hatbrings ogetherpast mages (again,photography's ntologicalfunction)with thepresentexperienceof the viewer.Whereasin Place the actualpanoramic mage becomes the pretextfor an explorationof virtualspace, both within the viewer's body and within the image itself, here the panoramicimageis itself the result of a virtualprojection, riggeredby the imagesreflectedon thecalf's skin and "completed"by the embodiedprocessing of the viewer. Ratherthanenactingthedeterritorializationf thephotographicmageintoa kinestheticspace,thisworkdeploys photography s an interfaceonto three-dimensional pace.In this way,itunderscores he fundamental orrelation inkingphotographyn its digitizedformwiththe "reality-conferring"ctivityof the viewer's embodied movement n space and theaffectivity t mobilizes.If theviewer feels herselfto be in thepanoramicmagespace,itis less on account of the image's autonomous affective appeal than of the body'sproduction,within tself,of anaffective,tactilespace, something hatwe mightliken toa bodily variantof Deleuze's notion of the "any-space-whatever."'8 oreover, f this

18.Deleuzedefinesthe "any-space-whatever"ncontradistinctiono aparticulardeterminedspace: "It s aperfectlysingularspace,whichhasmerely ost itshomogeneity,hat s, theprincipleof its metric relationsor theconnectionof its ownparts, so that the linkagescan be madein aninfinitenumberof ways.It is a space of virtualconjunction,graspedaspurelocusof thepossible.... Space itselfhas leftbehind ts own co-ordinatesandits metricrelations.It is a tactilespace"[Cinema 109]. I discussDeleuze'sconceptin relation to newmedia art in "AffectiveTopology."74


23/32

Fig. 14.JeffreyShaw,Place: A User's Manual 1995). Interfaceplatformcombininga 3600panorama with

Fig. 15. JeffreyShaw,Place:A User's Manual (1995). Close-up of panoramicphotographof deserted siteof memory.


24/32

Fig. 16. JeffreyShaw,TheGoldenCalf (1995). Inverts raditionalpanoramicmodelby requiringviewer toalign virtualimage of goldencalf sculptureon a pedestal inphysical space.

Fig. 17. JeffreyShaw,The Golden Calf (1995). Close-up of monitordisplaying mage of goldencalf sculp-ture.


25/32

penetration nto the image necessarily involves a certain fusion between actual andvirtual mage space, it foregrounds he brain-body'scapacityto suture ncompossibleworldsin a highertranspatial ynthesis.In sum,the digitalenvironmentsof Rogala,Waliczky,andShawforeground hreecrucial"problems" osed by thedigitizationof the technical(photographic)mage:theproblems, respectively, of processural perspective, of virtual infinitude, and of theindifferentiationof virtual and actual space. In all threecases, what is at stake is aneffortto restore hebody's sensorimotor nterval-its affectivity-as thesupplementarybasis for an"imaging"of thedigitalflux. Rogala'sdeformationof photo-opticalnormsrendersperspectiveas process andmaps it onto the body as a site of a varianthapticpointof view.Waliczky'sperturbationf perceptual quilibrium oregrounds he activerole of the body required o frame virtualspace as a contingentactualized mage.AndShaw'sdeconstruction f theillusionary ffects of photographic epresentation ighlightsthe bodily basis of humanperceptionand the infraempirical unction that allows thebody to conferrealityon actualandvirtualspace alike.EmbodiedProstheticsAll of these aestheticexperimentationswith the digitizationof photography xemplifythe Bergsonistvocationof new media art: n variousways, they all channelperceptionthroughthe computer,not as a technical extension beyondthe body-brain,but as anembodied prosthesis, a catalyst for bodily self-transformation. n so doing, they allforeground he body as the agentof a sensorimotorconnection with information hat,unlike the sensorimotor ogic inscribed nto the movement-image,must be said to besupplementary.Insofarat it defines the creativemarginof indeterminationonstitutiveof embodiedframing, this supplementarysensorimotor connection is precisely what defines theBergsonist vocation of new media art. We can understand t to be the result of acontemporary refunctionalizing of the two productive dimensions of Bergson'sunderstandingof the body: throughit, the subtractive unction of the body and thesingularizingcontributionof affection andmemoryarebrought o bear on what is, ineffect, an entirely new world-a universe not of images but of information.As theprivilegedvehicle for thisrefunctionalizing, ew mediaart acilitatesabodily negotiationwith the processural nvironment hatis simultaneouslya reconfiguration f thebody:abroadeningof its functionas centerof indetermination. y wideningthecorrelation fbody andtechnologywell beyond anythingBergsoncould have imagined,new mediaartworksvastly expandhis theory of embodied prosthetics:'9ndeed, the experiencetheybroker osters heinterpenetrationf technologyandperceptionandthereby xtendsthe scope of thebody's sensorimotor orrelationwith the universeof information.Newmedia artmightthusbe saidtocreate,orrather ocatalyze he creationof, new modalitiesthroughwhich the body can filter-and indeedgive formto-the flux of information.ArchitectLarsSpuybroek rasps heprofoundmpactof this new model of embodiedprosthetics or ourunderstanding f the body:

[T]hebody's nnerphantom asan irrepressibleendencyoexpand, ointegrateevery sufficientlyresponsiveprosthesisinto its motorsystem, its repertoireofmovements,and make it runsmoothly.That s whya car is not an instrument19. In line with this theory,newmedia art wouldcomprisean instanceof theaugmentationof experiencethrough ntelligencethatBergson, in CreativeEvolution,associatesgenerallywithtechnology.



26/32

or piece of equipment that you simply sit in, but something you mergewith. ... Movementscan only befluent if the skinextends as far as possibleover theprosthesisand into thesurrounding pace, so thatevery actiontakesplacefromwithinthebody,whichno longerdoes thingsconsciouslybutreliestotallyonfeeling. ... [E]verythingstartsinside thebody,and rom thereon itjust neverstops.Thebodyhas no outerreference odirect tsactionsto,neithera horizonto relate to, nor any depthof vision to create a spacefor itself Itrelatesonly to itself. There s no outside: there s no world inwhichmyactionstake place, the body forms itself by action, constantly organizing andreorganizing itself motorically and cognitively to keep "inform." ["MotorGeometry"49, emphasisadded]Rather hanextendingoursenses outward,as the dominantunderstandingwouldhaveit, embodied prostheses impact experience because they augment our tactile,proprioceptive,andinteroceptive elf-sensing or affectivity:

[E]very prosthesisis in thenatureof a vehicle,something hat addsmovementto the body,thatadds a new repertoireof action. Ofcourse, the car changesthe skin into an interface,able to change the exterior into the interiorof thebody itself The openness of the world would make no sense it if were notabsorbedby my body-car Thebodysimplycreates a haptic ield completelycenteredupon itself in whicheveryouterevent becomesrelatedto thisbodilynetworkof virtualmovements,becomingactualizedinform andaction. [49]As a "vehicle" n precisely this sense, new media artconfiguresthe body as a hapticfield, therebyallowing it to exercise its creativeproductivity.Because of the crucial role it accords the computeras an instrumental nterfacewith the domainof information, owever,new mediaart ransformshishapticprostheticfunction nto thebasis for a supplementaryensorimotor onnectionwiththedigital.Inthe process, it helps unpackwhat exactly is at stake in the shift from an ontology ofimages to anontology of information, rom a worldcalibrated o humansense ratiostoa worldthatis, following Johnston'sandKittler'sdistinct butcomplementary nsights,in some sense fundamentallyheterogeneous o thehuman.Followingthis shift,we canno longerconsiderthe body to be a correlateof the material lux, and its constitutivesensorimotor ntervalcan no longerdefinetheimageas thebasicunitof matter.Rather,precisely because it is heterogeneous to the flux of information, the body and itssensorimotor ntervalcanonlybe supplemental o thisflux-something introducedntoit or imposedon itfrom theoutside, rom elsewhere.Putanotherway,the sensorimotorintervalcanno longerfurnish he basis fordeducing hebodyfromthematerialuniverse,but insteadnowdesignatesa specificfunctionof thebody tselfas a systemheterogeneousto information.20Thebody, n short,hasbecomethecrucialmediatorbetween nformationandform(image): hesupplemental ensorimotornterventiontoperates oincideswiththe process throughwhich the image(whatI am calling the digital image) is created.Once again, architectLarsSpuybroekpinpointsthe profoundsignificanceof thistransformation n the haptic prosthetic function.2'As an embodied prosthesis, the

20. Inthis ense, canagreewithDeleuzehat herehasbeena breakwith hesensorimotorlogic of the movement-imageithoutendorsinghis rejectionof the body.Simplyput, thesensorimotoronnectionsnolonger nternalo the mage,butratheromethinghat s imposedthroughheprocessofframingnformationand huscreatingmages).21. Virilio nticipateshisbreak n his characterizationf theshift romnaturalighttolaserdelivery f light:

78


27/32

computer ets us perceive movement itself in a way thatfundamentallyalters what itmeansto see: thecomputer,Spuybroekmaintains,"is an instrumentorviewingformintime."Whenwe see through hecomputer,"we no longerlook atobjects,whetherstaticormoving, but at movement as it passes through heobject.Lookingno longerimpliesinterrupting he object to release images in space. Today looking has come to meancalculatingrather handepictingexternalappearance."Lookingnow meanscalculatingwiththebody,andtheimagethatgets"released" esignates omething ike itsprocessuralperception:"we build machines .. notjust to connectperceptionandprocess,butmoreimportantlyo internalize hese and connectthemwiththe millionsof rhythms ndcyclesin our body" [Spuybroek,"Motorization"]. nsofaras it employs the computeras aprosthetic"vehicle" o transform he basis andmeaningof vision, new media artcan bethoughtof as anapparatusorproducingembodied mages. Itresponds o theeclipse ofthe sensorimotorbasis of vision by fundamentally einvesting hebody's sensorimotorcapacities, and indeed by resituatingthe sensorimotoritself, transposing t from thedomainof vision to thatof affectivity!In this respect,the automationof vision can beseen to exertan impacton artthat is similarto its impacton (human)perceptionmoregenerally: ust as perception s compelledto rediscover ts constitutivebodily basis, sotoo must artreaffirm ts bodily originand claim the imageas its properdomain.

TheAestheticSupplementOurexplorationof thesupplementaryensorimotormperativeof new mediaartreturnsus, once again, to the topic of the image and its reconfiguration n the context ofcontemporary"digitalconvergence."Tobringourexplorationof the "digital mage"toaclose, letusnowcorrelate urpictureof thetechnicalbasis forcontemporary erceptionwith anaccountof the aestheticconsequencesof the Bergsonistvocation of new mediaart.To this end, we would do well to invokeRaymondBellour's insightfulmeditationon thecomputer mage,where theproblemof the (digital)obsolescence of the imageisrecast in terms of thecontinuedpossibilityfor artisticdivergenceor a new "will to art"(Deleuze)-the possibility,thatis, for an aesthetic ntervention nto whatJohnstonhasdubbedthe technical"underside" f the image.Bellour'smeditation ucceeds nsuturinghetechnicalhistoryof imaging echnologywith the historyof artin the age of its technicalreproducibility.n the very processofdescribingthe technical "de-differentiation" f the image currentlyunderway n ouremergentdigitalculture,Bellourgives us a meansto appreciate he aesthetic stakes ofthe automationof vision. Specifically,Bellourhelps us graspexactly why oursituationis unprecedented.With the computer mage, he tells us, the ontology of the technical"image"becomes radicallyautonomousfrom the perceptualanalogy to which it hadbeen bound(since the invention of photography) n the form of a "doublehelix."22

Facedwith hissudden mechanizationf vision,"nwhich hecoherentight mpulseof alaserattemptsotakeover rom hefundamentallyncoherentightof thesunorofelectricity,emaywellaskourselves hatstherealaim, heasyetunavowedbjective,of such nstrumentation-of kindof perception o longer implyenhanced y thelensesofourglasses .. butbycomputer.s itaboutmprovingheperceptionfrealityor s itabout efiningeflex onditioning,o thepointwhere venourgrasp fhowourperceptionf appearancesorks omes"underhe nfluence"?VisionMachine 4].

Ifwesupplement hispicturewiththescenarioofdirectstimulationof theopticnerve,weconfronta situationwhere visionoccurs in the total absence of light.22. The "doublehelix" structureof the image concerns the intertwiningof twoforms ofanalogy specific to the technicalera.As Bellourputs it, thedouble helix



28/32

Bellourbeginshis provocativeaccountof thecontemporary tatusof the imagebyconfronting hefollowing paradox:n a cultureas image-saturated sours,we no longerknow what an imageis. As he sees it, theproliferation f images-the sheervarietyofdifferentkinds of image and,we mightadd, the almost total flexibility brought o theimageby digitization-does not tell us more aboutthe image, but becomes a problem,an impediment o ourgraspof the image. Thereare, says Bellour,"fewerImages,as aresult of the virtually nfinite proliferationof images, which are characterizedby thefissuresandcombinations thevagueness)between theirdifferent orms rather hanbytheir ntrinsic ecundity" 173-74]. Inthetrulyremarkable nalysis hat ollows,Bellourcorrelates his breakdown n the divide betweenthe imageandwhat is not image, andthedisappearance f whathe calls "Images,"withthe transformationperatedby video,and subsequently,by the computer.Video materializes the power of the image as apurelytechnical dimensionof the image; andthe computerrenders he deploymentofthis power technically autonomousfrom all correlation with humanperceivers andperceptualprocesses.For Bellour, the video image marksa wholesale revaluationof the image: videoincorporates he power of analogy,previously limited to the static or moving image,directly into the materialityof the image. Due to its "natural"acility at destroying(external)analogy,video is able to bringanalogymore ntimately nto theproductionoftheimage:"for he firsttime,"notesBellour,"thebodiesandobjects n theworldbecomevirtuallydisfigurable andhencerefigurable)according o a powerwhich, in real timeor barely prerecordedime . .. transforms he representationshatthe mechanicaleyecaptures" 181]. Put anotherway, this powerof video involves a certainparadox,onethat arisesdirectlyfrom video's correlationwith time: "video has grippedanalogyin apairof pincers:on the one hand, t increases ts powertenfold,andon theother, t ruinsit. In effect, video extendsthe analogydirectlyfrom movementto time; instantaneous,real time . . ." [181]. If this correlationwith time means that the video image "canappear o be born as a new image that cannot be reducedto the one thatprecededit"[181-82], the reason is that video materiallysubsumes all of the analogies formerlyexpressedin the divergencesbetweenthe arts: "capableof attracting,absorbing,andblendingall theprevious mages of painting,photography, ndthecinema, .... [video]reducesall thepassagesthathadfunctioneduntilthenamongartsand turnsthepassagecapacity both into what characterizesit in relation with each one of them and whatdefinesit (positivelyand negatively)withrespectto theconceptof art"[182, emphasisadded].Video thus marksa fundamentalpunctuationn Bellour's accountof the imagein theage of its technicalmateriality:nsofaras it becomes the"passagecapacity" tself,thevideo imagesubsumesdivergence-and hence the functionof art tself-within thetechnicalcapacityof the image.If the video imagematerializes he powerof divergenceat the level of the image'stechnicalconstruction, he computer mage could be saidto autonomize his powerby

doeshomageo theextensionfnatureoreseen yscience.... Above ll, tunderscoresthe extentof theconnection etween he twoimportantormsaccordingowhich heanalogy s constantly hreatened nd refashioned.The first form has to do withphotographicnalogy,hewayin which heworld,objects,andbodiesseemto bedefined alwayspartially, nd ustroughly)n referenceo natural ision,a certainfixedstateof natural ision,which mplies esemblancendrecognition. hesecondformconcernsheanalogypeculiaro thereproductionf movement. hosearethetwo orceswhich, eparatelynd ogether,reatstake ndaremisusedna filmwheneverthe magehasatendencyowards istortionnd he ossofrecognition,r tsmovementisdiverted,ongealed,nterrupted,rparalyzedythebrutalntrusionfphotography.... [180]

80


29/32

decoupling t fromall ties to perceptionandtheperceptualbasisof analogy.23 ow thatvision takesplace in a formradicallyheterogeneouswith humanperceptualmodalities-as the nonperspectivalprocessing of data-the technical (digital) infrastructure fthe"image" oses all intrinsicconnectionto theanalogdomain.Insofaras it imperils heverypotential orart o produce"divergence"-the potential, hat s, forart o introducea divergencebetween the "seizure[of the world as such] and its seizure as an image"[179]-the computer mage destroys,once andfor all, the double helix structure f theimage:parting ompanywithallpreceding mages (including hevideoimage),it breaksthroughboth "edges"of the double-helixstructure, enderingperceptionautonomousfrom naturalvision andsubsuming hereproduction f movement nto thepresentationof time.24

With this diagnosis of the computer mage, Bellour's analysisnot only convergeswith theprojectof automationanalyzedabove,butdoes so in a way thatforegroundstsspecifically aesthetic significance.For as Bellour sees it, the radicalautonomyof thecomputer mage necessitatesa fundamental econfiguration f analogy:a realignmentof analogywithembodiedreceptionoutsideorbeyondthedoublehelix structure f themoderntechnical image. Put anotherway, the computer mage raises a challenge toanalogicalunderstandinghat s unprecedentedn thehistoryof Western rt.By redefiningthe"image"as a nonperspectivaldataset, computervision marks he momentwhen theontology of the technical image becomes radically autonomous from the perceptualanalogyof natural ndcinematicvision.No longercan theretreat ntoontologicalanalogyfunctionto provokea new divergence rom the technicalembodimentof perception,asit did in the aestheticavant-garde rom at least Cezanneto Warhol,25or the simple

23. In schematicterms,we might say that the historical realizationof the vision machinebreaksthe "isomorphism"which had long boundtogetherthe technical basis of the imageandperceptual analogyand whichthereby nsuredthepossibility or artisticdivergence.24. Intended to register somethinglike an immanentmaterial dialectic of the image, thedouble helixforegroundsthe tenuous correlation between the twoproperlytechnical orms ofanalogy:photographicandcinematicanalogy.As Bellourexplains n thepassage citedin ootnote25, both orms constantly hreatenand refashionanalogy,whichmightbe understood o exist inthe divergencebetweenthem,between natural and automated vision. Respondingto such animmanentdialectic of the image, art is caught betweentwo extremes,bothof whichthreaten twith irrelevance: n the one case (photography), he immanentcorrelation withnaturalvision,from which art (painting)has traditionallydrawnits privilege,appears to be at an end; in theothercase (cinema), heveryfunctionof analogy(andwith t thepossibilityfordivergence)appearstobe inperil, insofaras theimagetends toescapeall correlationwith naturalperception na bidfor its own self-sufficiency.25. Bellour'sunderstanding fart in theage of its technicalreproducibilityakesoff romhispostulation of a newform of divergencespecificallycorrelated with the mechanizationof theimage.This orm ofdivergencesdevelopedwithin hedomainofpaintingfromCUzanneo cubism:"Itwas as if perceptiveanalogy,whichhadfirst beenpushedto thefore byphotography,couldnot burrow nto itselfand hollow itself out to thepoint of eliminating tself infavor of a sort ofmentalanalogy,until it had, on thecontrary,expandedspectacularlyby winningtheanalogy ofmovement ver to itsside.Thus heontologicalanalogy underlyingheperceptualanalogybecamedivided in a waythat had never occurredbefore" [179]. Photography'saestheticsignificanceisthus boundup with the challenge itposes topainting,and the subsequentreaction it catalyzes;moreover,becauseof its technicalnature-or moreexactly,its capacityto operatea "passage,"a leveling of the difference,between the imageand the world-photography provokespainting(i.e., art) to "retreat" o the mentaldomain, to subsumeperceptual analogy into ontologicalanalogy.Aprotractionof this samedialectic can be seen to informartinitspostwar developments.At each stage, as technologicalmediationthreatensartby reducing hedivergence,art respondsbyseizingback thepowerof analogy,or moreprecisely, by placing thepower of analogybeyondthescope of the technicalimage.Yet,at the momentwhentechnologymanagesto incorporate hepower of analogy directly ntothe image,thisdialecticcomes toan end.Subsequently,hesource



30/32

reason hat heontologicaldomainat issue here s onetotallywithoutrelation o analogic(human)perception.If, nonetheless,we can still speakof the "image" n relationto the computer, t isbecausethe very flexibilitythe computerbringsto the imagealso possesses a potentialaestheticfunction that mustfrom now on be seen not as a facet of the materialityof the(technical) magebut ratheras a reactionto the automationof vision on thepartof the(human)viewer-participant.orallof itstechnicalautonomy,hecomputermageretainsthe trace of its originin embodiedperception,as Bellourexplains:theveryideaofa calculated mageobtainednotthrough ecordingbutthroughmodels, according to a form of expressionwhich,over and above language,has dispelledthedoubtsaboutmeaningand resemblance,does awaywith thequestionsof analogy.... But,on the otherhand,there is still theeye: thereareimages, quasi images, what one sees, and what oneforesees. The computerimage salwaysconnectedwithwhat trepresents, omatterwhatthe conditionsfor the ormationand appearance of the representation re. ... [183]26

In short,the image names the demarcation rom computervision of a supplementaryaesthetic igure:nolongerafunctionof thetechnical nterface,heimage s itselfproducedfrom,and indeedin, theprocessingof computerdataby an embodiedhumanperceiver.Andit will remainrelevant-to recur o thequestionthatopenedouranalysis-so longas the computerremainscorrelatedwith humanperception.When it is contextualized nrelation o aestheticconsiderations,whatthe specterof"machinicvision" helps us to realize, then, is just how bound up the contemporaryimage is, in all of its variousforms,with our embodied(human)capacities,on the onehand,to projectmental mages,and on theother, o embody imagesthrough nteraction.In fact, these conditionscould be said to redefinethe imageas an aestheticsupplementof computervision itself:

By programming imitedsegments of nature, thus opening an access to theinvisible,andby recording hisinvisibilityn the collectedtimeof naturalvision,such imagesshow thatthecomputer mageproposes the ollowing paradox:avirtualanalogy.In otherwords,an imagethatbecomesactual and thereforerealfor eyesightto theextent hat t is, aboveall, realfor thespirit,inan opticswhich,in the long run,isfairly close to whathappenedwhenperspectivewasinvented,unless it is precisely the optics that is relativized.Theeye becomessecondarywith respectto the spirit that contemplates t and asks the eye tobelieve it.But it is also because, inorder or the imageto be simulated,as wellas to be seen (that is itsfunction as a spectacle, which remains), t has to betouchedand handled(thatis itsproperlyinteractiveeature). [185]

of artisticdivergencemustcomefrom outside the technicalhistory of the image: that is,fromareinvestmentn the humanbasis of imaging.26. Not surprisingly,hissupplementaryesthetic dimensionof thecomputer magederivesfroma similar dimension n the videoimage,which,Bellourstates, "is still connected,even in itsdigital transformations, ith heanalogyoftheworld..." [182]. Howeverradical tsincorporationof the image,the video image(and its digital remediation)remainsboundby what now must bethoughtof as thepredominantly esthetic(ratherthantechnical) unctionof analogy, ollowingtwopossible trajectories:"either he imageis transported nd immediately eaches thelevelof amentalanalogy... ; or thedigitalcarries theanalogicalinsideitself evenif it is as thedivergencebetween whatthe imagedesignatesand what it becomes..." [183].

82


31/32

Viewed in relation to digital art productionof the last decade, Bellour's stress on a"spiritual" ision and a tactile interfacecan only appear(retrospectively27)rophetic,announcingwhat have now clearly established themselves as the two fundamentalcharacteristics f contemporarymediationsof the image:on the one hand,the passagefrom interactivity to dynamic coupling with the image, and on the other hand, afundamental hift in the "economy"of perception rom vision to bodily affectivity.And with the more general notion of an aesthetic supplement,Bellour graspspreciselyhow the computer mage calls thebody into play in a mannerunprecedentedin the historyof artin the age of technicalreproducibility.Now that the "image"hasachievedtotal flexibility (any point within the image, as Deleuze remindsus, formingthe potentialpoint of linkage for the next image), what serves to enframe nformationinto the form of the image can no longerbe understood o be a functionbuilt into thetechnical nterface.Computers, s we havebeensayingallalong,do notperceive mages;theycalculatedata.In Bellour'sterms,this situationnecessitatesa fundamental hift inhow we situate heoperation f analogy artisticdivergence): o longerafunctiondirectlylinkedwiththespecificityof aparticularechnical rame,analogymust nsteadbederivedfromthe embodieduser-participant'snteractionwith the work. Such a supplementaryconnectionof the image with the form-givingpotentialof humanembodimenthas, insum,becomea necessarydimensionof ourexperienceof contemporarymedia:with thetotal flexibility of information (Kittler's "digital convergence") in today's globaltelecommunications etworks, t is nowonlythereactionof theembodiedhumanuser-or morebluntly,the constraintof humanembodiment-that gives form to information.Thatis why we must follow the leadof new media artists n reinvesting hebody as thevery originof the image in all its forms.

WORKS CITEDAscott,Roy. "Photography t theInterface."ElectronicCulture:Technology nd Visual

Representation.Ed. T. Druckrey.New York:Aperture,1996. 165-71.Bellour,Raymond."TheDouble Helix."Trans.J.Eddy.ElectronicCulture:Technologyand VisualRepresentation.Ed. T. Druckrey.New York:Aperture,1996. 173-99.Bergson,Henri. CreativeEvolution.Trans.A. Mitchell.New York:HenryHolt, 1911.- .MatterandMemory.Trans.N. M. Paul andW. S. Palmer.NewYork:ZoneBooks,1991.

Cache,Bernard."APleaforEuclid,"www.architettura.it/extended/ep07/ep07en_03.htm,accessed 4/14/01.Crary, onathan.Techniques f the Observer:OnVisionandModernityn theNineteenth

Century.Cambridge,MA:MITP, 1990.Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Trans. H. Tomlinson and B.Habberjam.Minneapolis:U of MinnesotaP, 1986.- . Cinema2: TheTime-Image.Trans.H. Tomlinsonand R. Galeta.Minneapolis:Uof MinnesotaP, 1989.Druckrey,Timothy. "LoversLeap."Artintact2. Karlsruhe:Zentrumftir Kunst undMedientechnologie,1995.

Duguet,Anne-Marie."JeffreyShaw:FromExpandedCinema o VirtualReality." effreyShaw:A User'sManual-Eine Gebrauchsanweisung.d. M. Abel.Karlsruhe: KM,1993. 21-57.

27.Bellour's ssayoriginally ppearedn1991.



32/32

Hansen,Mark."TheAffectiveTopologyof New MediaArt."Spectator(Winter2002):40-70.-. "Cinema beyond Cybernetics, or How to Frame the Digital-Image." Con-figurations 10.1 (Winter2002): 51-90.- . "EmbodyingVirtualReality:Touch and Self-Movementin the Work of CharDavies."CriticalMatrix(Fall 2001): 112-47.-. New Philosophy or New Media.Cambridge:MITP,2004.Hayles, N. Katherine."VirtualCreatures,"CriticalInquiry26 (Autumn1999): 1-26.Johnson,Mark.TheBodyin the Mind:TheBodilyBasis of Meaning,Imaginati

hansen seeing the body

Documents