hamas rule in gaza: three years on

8/9/2019 Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On

1/9

Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years OnProf. Yezid Sayigh

More than a year after Israels Operation Cast Leadagainst Gaza, and with the crippling siege well intoits fourth year, the rule of the Islamic Resistance Movement/Hamas over the narrow strip of territory looks set to endure.Fortuitous circumstances and the mistakes of others, ratherthan the coherence of its own policies, played a major role in

the early consolidation of the de facto government headedby Hamas prime minister Ismail Hanieh; but a stable systemis emerging nonetheless: one that often proceeds through trialand error, but which also shows considerable adaptability anda marked learning curve. Much of the governments success inbuilding a functioning public administration is due to its close,in some respects seamless relationship with Hamas, but thatrelationship also brings unexpected dilemmas and challengesin its wake. Above all, Hamas fears repeating the mistakes of

its rival, the long-dominant Fatah, with respect to its symbioticrelationship with the Palestinian Authority: Fatah, it believes,was drawn by the mundane needs of governing daily life andthe desire to preserve power into compromising on nationalgoalsand Hamas sees Fatah and the PA as so closely boundtogether that the fate of the one determines the fortunes of theother.1

The relationship between Hamas and the Hanieh government is a complexone. The assertion of exclusive control over Gaza in June 2007 left Hamas

with a clear opportunity to press ahead with its Islamic agenda and to wage

March 2010

No. 41

Judith and Sidney Swartz DirectorProf. Shai Feldman

Associate Director

Kristina Cherniahivsky

Assistant Director for ResearchNaghmeh Sohrabi, PhD

Senior FellowsAbdel Monem Said Aly, PhDKhalil Shikaki, PhDYezid Sayigh, PhD

Henry J. Leir Professor of theEconomics of the Middle EastNader Habibi

Sylvia K. Hassenfeld Professorof Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies

Kanan Makiya

Senior Fellow on the Myra andRobert Kraft Chair in Arab PoliticsAsher Susser, PhD

President of Brandeis UniversityJehuda Reinharz, PhD


2/92

Yezid Sayigh is Professorof Middle East Studies atKings College Londonand Senior Fellow at theCrown Center from 2009-2010.

The opinions and findings expressed in thisessay are those of the author exclusively, anddo not reflect the official positions or policiesof the Crown Center for Middle East Studiesor Brandeis University.

unremitting armed resistance against Israeland with no good reason notto do either, as the collapse of the short-lived national unity government withFatah removed any ostensible constraint. Since then, Hamas has found itself ina subtly ambiguous relationship with respect to its own government: It is not areal oppositionat least in the way opposition is commonly understoodyet itimpedes the normalizing tendencies that accompany being in power. For its partthe Hanieh government is caught, like many other governments in the regionbetween the practical exigencies of governance, on the one hand, and attemptingto neutralize internal challenges by upholding both the militant political discourseand the Islamist social ideology of its core constituency, on the other. It seeks todemonstrate a viable model of Islamic government, to which Hamas contributesby empowering its public administration; but nuances and tensions may bediscerned in how the Hanieh government and Hamas respectively approach othersocial and political actors, the desired Islamization of society, and the task ofmanaging the informal, cash-based economy of Gaza.

Constructing a Functioning Public Administration

Gaza ministries and agencies display enviable levels of coordination, information

sharing, and mutual support. Their official websites are active and regularlyupdated; many offer portals enabling user access and submission of servicerequests, and reveal a remarkable range of ongoing training and institutionaldevelopment.2 In many instances the work of ministries and agencies iscomplemented by the grassroots organizations of Hamas: its Mass ActionApparatus, its neighbourhood reconciliation committees, and its Dawa (religiousproselytization) arm, as well as its security apparatus and its military wing, theIzzedin Qassam Brigades.3 Local experts confirm that the Shura Council of Hamasin Gaza, which is selected through periodic internal elections (most recently heldin 2008), acts as a shadow government, ensuring that government policies arein harmony with the broader agendas of Hamas and overseeing the conduct ofinternal political debates.4

It is largely thanks to this dovetailing that Hamas succeeded in monopolisingcontrol of governance functions in Gaza, including security, economics, welfareand the public infrastructure, within six months of its takeover in June 2007.Even so, it would not have been ready to assume the full burden of governmentwere it not for several significant advantages.

First was the decision by the rival West Bank government of Prime MinisterSalam Fayyad to order the 70,000 Palestinian Authority employees in Gaza to stayaway from work, on penalty of losing their salaries.6 Paradoxically, this liberatedHamas as much as it burdened it. The tenth and eleventh Palestinian Authority

governments headed by Hanieh in 20067 had been severely handicapped bythe substantial refusal of the Fatah-dominated civil service and security sectorto comply with cabinet instructions. Since then, Hamas has enjoyed exclusiveand uncontested control over the executive branch of government in GazaFurthermore, the no-show policy enabled the Hanieh government to replacethousands of schoolteachers and other public sector employees with Hamasmembers and sympathizers, thereby considerably expanding the scope of theIslamic social agenda and the pace of its implementation. Both were boosted bythe decision of most local judges to adhere to the Supreme Judicial Council basedin the West Bank, in response to which the Hanieh government created its ownad hoc judicial framework and hired its own judges, many of them from Shariacourts.7


3/9


4/94

do not yet amount to a sustained campaign, however: anumber of NGOs that refused to comply have not sufferedsanctions. It is not clear, however, if police intervention onseveral occasions to restore NGO premises or equipmentseized by unidentified gunmen reflects the governmentscommitment to upholding the law, its inability to imposeits will on Hamas militants, or a covert division of rolesintended to intimidate independent NGOs.13

The restriction of political space on the part of the Haniehgovernment is driven by two main concerns: to pre-empt ordefeat armed challenges, whether from Fatah or from anyother domestic opponents, and to exercise political tit fortat in response to arrests, beatings, and NGO closures inthe West Bank. This is borne out by the monthly reports ofthe highly respected Independent Commission for HumanRights: One hundred ninety-five complaints of arbitrarydetention were lodged against Palestinian Authoritysecurity agencies in the West Bank during January 2010,for example, and were met with a parallel increase in the

Gaza Strip, where 72 complaints were lodged. Attacks byGaza security agencies on peaceful assembly have targetedactivities organized by Fatah-affiliated associations, whileimpromptu public displays of political support for Fatahare swiftly, and harshly, suppressed.14

Authoritarian tendencies may transition into a drive forwider political hegemony. Even the secular, leftwingPopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, officiallyaligned with the resistance discourse of Hamas,complained at the start of February of the repressivemethod that dominates Hamas thinking. Only twonewspapers have enjoyed completely free circulation inGaza since June 2007: Felesteen, published by Hamas, andal-Istiqlal, published by Palestinian Islamic Jihad.15 Notably,however, this is once again a fortuitous result for theHanieh government of the policies of other actors: In itsfirst year, the Hanieh government occasionally preventedthe distribution of the West Bank and East Jerusalemdailies al-Ayyam, al-Hayat al-Jadidah, and al-Quds when itobjected to specific content, but since mid-2009 it is Israelthat has prevented Palestinian newspapers from enteringGaza. In any case, with an estimated local Internet access

rate in Gaza of 70 percent, online editions of all papers arereadily available to readers.

Erdogan or Taliban?

The Islamization of society, a long-held goal of Hamas,has accelerated in reaction to a domestic challenge, thistime posed by Salafist groups. This explains the concertedeffort since June 2007, whether by the Hanieh governmentor by Hamas directly, to control Islamic infrastructurewhether that has meant asserting control over mosques,

training and appointing their own preachers, taking overzakat (Islamic tithes) committees, or tolerating the growthof the radical but unarmed Hizb ul-Tahrir al-Islami whileclashing increasingly frequently with Salafist groups forcontrol over their mosques.16 On August 14, 2009, thepolice moved against one such group, Jund Ansar Allah,when it declared an Islamic emirate in the southerncity of Rafah, leaving twenty-five dead, including thegroups leader and five officers. Other Salafist groups weretargeted in February 2010, amidst government accusationsthat former Fatah members had joined them to seekrevenge against Hamas.17

More worrisome for the Hanieh government, however,and more difficult to confront, is Jaljalat, an amorphousnetwork of armed militants believed by Fatah intelligenceofficers to number some 2,500-3,000, many of themmembers of the Qassam Brigades.18 Jaljalat seeks greaterIslamization of society and fears that, by taking on themundane tasks of government and public service delivery,

Hamas has jeopardized its nationalist and Islamic purityand its commitment to armed resistance against Israel.19This fear has a long legacy, framing debates within Hamasabout appropriate policies with respect to participationin the Palestinian Authority or in the general electionsfor the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1996 and 2006.20Jaljalat has attacked several Internet cafs, and one of itsleaders was reportedly arrested on February 10, 2010 onsuspicion of responsibility for a dozen bombing attackson Hamas vehicles and security offices over the precedingfive weeks.21

A complex power play may be at work here. A letterpurportedly written by Qassam commander Ahmad al- Jabari in early March accused Minister of Interior FathiHammad, whom it described as close to the Dawa armof Hamas, of losing control over internal security, and ofbuilding a personal executive force by co-opting Qassammembers in northern Gaza.22 Northern Gaza was alsothe main area of activity of radical cleric and universityprofessor Nizar Rayyan, a senior Hamas decision-makerwho doubled as liaison officer with the Qassam Brigadesand as Jaljalats mentor until his death in Operation Cast

Lead. The suggestion that Jaljalat was at least partly apower base used for internal struggle within Hamas isclear, as is the threat to the unity of both Hamas and theQassam Brigades.

It is partly to contain this challenge that the Hamasleadership has promotedand in some instances, evenencourageda broad-based discourse among Hamassrank and file, in its broadcast media, and on the Internet,championing the effective Islamization of Gaza society.23

This campaign presumably aims to assure the rankand file that engagement in the mundane demands


5/95

and privilegesof government has not tarnished theleaderships Islamist credentials. So although the Haniehgovernment nominally upholds existing laws that assurefreedoms, other bodies, such as the Dawa arm of Hamas,assertively promote Islamist social and religious agendas.Their activism came to the fore in summer 2008, whenthey vehemently denounced the United Nations Reliefand Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) forrunning mixed-gender youth summer camps and organizedtheir own, segregated program in direct competition.24

Maintaining neat distinctions is proving difficult, however,as individual government officials or agencies periodicallyissue new Islamization guidelines. In the summer of 2009,for example, Minister of Interior Fathi Hammad launcheda campaign to impose a proper dress code on women;separated unmarried men and women on the beach; andbanned women from riding motorcycles.25 In early February2010, he called for Dawa efforts to reach all institutions,not just mosques, signaling an intent to systematically

Islamize government agencies, starting with his own.26Moreover, it is likely that civil servants who are notthemselves beholden to a strict Islamist ideology propose,or seek to implement, Islamization measures as a wayof ingratiating themselves with senior, Hamas-affiliatedofficials and thereby climbing further up the bureaucraticladder.27 When certain measures cause an outcry, such asrequiring female lawyers to wear the hijab in court, thegovernment retreats and takes public steps to controlthe damage; but this does not end other, more discreetmeasures. For example, the Internal Security agency hasnotified NGOs that conducting joint activities involvingboys and girls will incur an automatic fine.28 Governmentofficials insist that they do no more than advise orrecommend with respect to desired modes of behavior ordress, but many people acquiesce to avoid troubleas wellas the constant attention of Hamass Dawa arm and mosqueimams.29

Government pressure may sometimes be subtle orincremental, but the cumulative effect on many is stifling.It may also be true that the generally observant societyof Gaza is receptive to Islamization, at least passively so;

but the trend is at least as much a function of prolongedisolation from the outside world, going back to the early1990s, as it is the outcome of a Hamas-inspired campaign.As with authoritarian tendencies generally, prolongation ofthe status quo is the critical factor in ongoing Islamization.Furthermore, some Islamizing measures, such as thereliance on reconciliation committees affiliated withthe Association of Ulema to deliver judicial services,derive directly from the severe disrepair of the criminal justice system under the outgoing Palestinian Authoritygovernmentand were already very much in evidence longbefore Hamas came to power.30 These developments are

not all the result of predetermined official policy, thereforeand the Hanieh government appears to chart its course onIslamization relatively gingerly, through a process of trialand error.

Making Ends Meet

Nowhere is trial and error more obvious than in relation toeconomic and financial management. Gaza has developeda unique economy based on a combination of threemain inputs: smuggling (through the tunnels dug underthe border with Egypt at Rafah); monthly subventionsworth $65 million from the Fayyad government to payits employees and operate Gazas power plant; and theservices and salaries provided by international NGOs andespecially, UNRWA.

These inputs relieve the Hanieh government of aconsiderable burden, much as a considerably greater scale

of foreign aid relieves the Fayyad government. At $540million, the Hanieh governments declared budget for2010 is a fraction of the $2.78 billion budget of its WestBank counterpart; but with only 32,000 employees to thelatters 145,000, its costs are far lower.31 Even so, the Haniehgovernment is believed to collect no more than $5 milliona month in local revenue, or even less, if its own informalfigures are to be believed.32 It has avoided taxing the tunneltrade in civilian goods entering from Egypt, with the resultthat commodity prices have dropped since the start of2010.33 The bulk of government income derives insteadfrom foreign sources: contributions from the Muslim

Brotherhood International (Hamass mother organization)collections from zakat committees, and a portion of theassistance believed to reach the Hamas leadership inDamascus from Iran.

Foreign aid does not allow significant investment inpublic works or infrastructure; but it is sufficient tocover the governments monthly budget of NIS96 million($25.5 million): a salary bill of NIS70 million, operatingcosts of NIS20 million, and NIS6 million in municipalsubventions.34 The government has constructed a fiscally

sound administration in the midst of terrible economicdevastation and international boycott, according to oneopinion.35 This judgment appears to be borne out by, forexample, its avoidance of runaway recruitmentthe baneof the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authorityand by itsability to hire substitute teachers when faced with a Fatah-instigated strike at the start of the 20089 school year; toguarantee jobs to university graduates; and to recruit 1,000extra policemen in February 2010.


6/96

Regularizing the Informal Economy

Ironically, Gazas markets and cash flow have actuallygrown since Operation Cast Lead, despite the failure ofthe international community to deliver the $4.5 billionin post-war reconstruction aid pledged at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference in March 2009. This is entirely owingto the tunnel trade, which accounts for the largest portionby farperhaps as much as 80 percentof the territoryscivilian imports. As a result, local bankers estimate, theTunnels Authority of Hamas earned $150$200 millionin 2009. Hamas also benefits from its monopoly over theimport and retail sale of cigarettes, as well as from thenewly established al-Multazim insurance company, whichwas awarded the contract to insure all government cars.The revenues from these various activities and enterprisesaccrue to Hamas, not to the government treasury.

The new economy evolving in Gaza bears an uncanny

resemblance to Algeriawhere, [b]enefiting from anincrease in return on investments, the informal economy,held for the most part by the Islamists, has been organizedinto networks and monopolies compensating for thedysfunction of the administered economy. Since the endof the civil war, Hamass Algerian counterparts have alsotaken over part of the state apparatus and also part ofparliamentary and political forms of representation andhave developed ties with political parties, the parliament,the courts, the army, the police force, etc. . . . In otherwords, the informal economy has integrated itself into thesystem.36 The Hanieh government faces a similar challengein Gaza: to regularize an informal economy while ensuringa steady flow of capital.

At a minimum, the Hanieh government needs to providethe means for the safe deposit and investment of thelarge amounts of cash in circulation. The tunnel trade hasgenerated a huge demand for U.S. dollars and Jordaniandinars, the currencies favored by Egyptian suppliers andincreasingly used to pay salaries, and as a result left Gazawith an over-supply of New Israeli Shekels.37 However,with the Palestinian banking system carefully monitored by

the Palestinian Monetary Authority headquartered in theWest Bank, Hamas has been unable to launder revenue.38Attempts by the Hanieh government to create a parallelbanking system have failed completely; Hamas membersand tunnel entrepreneurs deposit their earnings in thenewly formed Islamic Bank, but owing to the PalestinianMonetary Authority firewall in place, this bank is littlemore in reality than a local ATM network. In the absenceof a legal means to transfer or invest money abroad, Gazahas experienced a significant shift of investment into realestate, resulting in a sharp rise in land prices.

The opportunities for corruption in a cash-based economyare clearly substantial. Hamass detractors claim thatsenior officials in the movement have amassed vast fortunesrunning into hundreds of millions of dollars, derived inpart by acting as silent partners for tunnel operatorssome, it is alleged, were implicated in a Ponzi/pyramidscheme uncovered in early 2009. Yet, local bankers andbusinessmen who do not sympathize with Hamas arguethat its tight organization and internal discipline havegreatly limited the scope and scale of irregularities. Theymoreover confirm that local businesses are not subjectto extortion or protection rackets imposed by Hamasmilitants, in contrast to the predations of Fatah-affiliatedmilitias and security agencies that they experienced priorto June 2007.39 It is difficult to ascertain the veracity of anythese claims, but independent analysts note that allegationsof Hamas corruption appear to come almost exclusivelyfrom senior leaders in Fatah, and are not yet substantiatedor widely believed.

Nonetheless, a new elite does seem to be emergingcomprising senior Hamas figuresincluding governmentministers, members of Parliament, and key administrativeor political personnelalong with some 5,000 tunnelowners.40 While elements of the business communitybuffeted or driven into bankruptcy by the ongoing siegesince 2006resent this development, many have becometied to the tunnel economy in their attempt to adaptand survive, and they may also benefit from favors andfacilitation extended by Hamas. What is certain is that thenew economy enables Hamas to look after its own. Withmembers and supporters constituting a high proportion ofthe 32,000 government employees, another 40,00050,000people working in or around the Hamas-regulated tunneleconomy, and a network of Hamas-associated Islamiccharities and zakat committees complementing sociawelfare, the movement can rely on a substantial and loyacore constituency.

Time to Recognize the Green Elephant inthe Room?41

Having toyed initially with the illusion that Fatah couldspearhead a forceful takeover of Gaza, building onsupposed mass discontent with Hamas, some quartersof the Israeli political and security establishment and itsWest Bank Palestinian counterpart now expect the Haniehgovernment to crumble under the weight of the continuoussiege. However, it is highly doubtful that anybody else stilbelieves that the relentless pressure of sanctions will movethe 1.5 million inhabitants of Gaza to open opposition toHamas rule and trigger its collapse from within.42 For thatto happen, the siege would have to attain truly medieval


7/97

proportionscutting off all supply of food, water, andmedicinesan option belied by the obvious acquiescenceof all parties in the continued flow of civilian goods fromEgypt into Gaza. That said, none of the main parties tothe siegethe Government of Israel, the West BankPalestinian Authority, the United States, the EuropeanUnion, and Egyptis likely to be the first to break theformal status quo.

This leaves Hamas in a strategic predicament. It gambleson time to impose a new political reality by means of itssuccessful governance of Gaza, but any expectation thatexternal actors will seek to lift the siege before Hamasundertakes unambiguously to end violence against Israelis no more realistic than the expectation that the siege willeventually force it to capitulate.43 The Hanieh governmentmay declare its desire to open up to the world, but it isunable to grasp, or at any rate endorse, the key requirementfor attaining that end.44 Until then, Gaza remains one hugeprison, with massive unemployment and crushing poverty.

Hamas has the wherewithal and the stamina to endureas a movement, but it runs the risk that, in promotinga discourse of armed resistance and martyrdom and inencouraging the Islamization of societyas a means bothof containing dissent and of deflecting internal pressureto resume active hostilities with Israelit inadvertentlyencourages its core constituency to defect to moremilitant Salafist groups that it does not control, and whichincreasingly vie for recognition by al-Qaeda as its localaffiliates.

The Salafist threat should not be exaggerated, however:Hamas does not perceive itself to be so threatened as tocompel it to afford external actors meaningful leverage.More to the point, Islamic radicalization poses no lessa threat of blowback to Israel, and to neighboring Arabstates. Hamas has demonstrated its ability not merely tosurvive, but also to rebound and even innovate, keepingitself at the heart of Palestinian national politics anddecision-making. Whatever other policy options there maybe for dealing with Hamas, the siege of Gaza has run itscourse: If anything, it helps Hamas consolidate itself as aruling party and exercise increasingly effective government.

Endnotes

The author wishes to thank the following for their comments on variousdrafts of this paper: Lori Allen, Beverley Milton-Edwards, Mouin Rabbani,Geoffrey Aronson, Khalil Shikaki, Fakhr Abu-Awwad, Shai Feldman, andNaghmeh Sohrabi.

1 The debate is cogently summarized by Wisam Afifeh in HasHamas Succeeded in Combining Government with Resistance?

Filasteen AlMuslima 28, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 4849.2 Links to all ministries are posted on the CabinetSecretariat website at: http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=41%3A2009-04-16-06-31-14&Itemid=81, and to other agenciesat: http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=42%3A2009-04-16-06-31-32&Itemid=81.3 Complementarity is evident from joint activities and fromvisits reported by various ministries, including Interior, IslamicEndowments and Religious Affairs, Youth and Sports, andInformation, and was confirmed by interviews conducted by theauthor in Gaza in January 2010.4 The Hamas Politburo, headquartered in Damascus, exercises

veto power over key issues, such as the negotiations over Israeliprisoner Corporal Gilad Shalit.5 Beverley Milton-Edwards, The Ascendance of Political Islam:Hamas and Its Consolidation in the Gaza Strip, Third WorldQuarterly 29, issue 8 (2008), 1591.6 Medical staff were exempted from the decision in the publicinterest, and judges were allowed to continue issuing decisionsand presiding court cases, but not to implement them.7 Nathan Brown, Palestine: The Schism Deepens, WebCommentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,August 2009, p. 8.8 According to former Fatah security officers interviewed by theauthor in Gaza and Ramallah in January 2010.9 For a critical assessment of the West Bank security sector, seeYezid Sayigh, Fixing Broken Windows: Security Sector Reformin Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen, Carnegie Paperno. 17, October2009.10 This has been confirmed by human rights activists, secularnationalists, and former Fatah security officers interviewed bythe author in Gaza and Ramallah in January 2010.11 Thus, for example, Ahmad Yousef, as interviewed by theauthor in Gaza on January 9, 2010; and in Dr. Yousef: We canlearn a lot from the experience of Turkeys Islamists, Felesteen(Gaza), February 12, 2010.12 Hamas abducts 166 Fateh cadres and closes 42 associations,confiscates governorate and political offices in Gaza Strip, al-Hayat al-Jadidah, July 27, 2008. The Ministry of Economy, whichregisters many NGOs, ordered many of the closures and hinted atprocedural deficiencies. Former Hamas cadre interviewed by theauthor in Gaza in January 2010.13 Following a series of attacks the Gaza Criminal InvestigationDepartment announced the arrest of a man who confessed torobbing thirty-eight NGOs and shops. Felesteen, February 19,2010, 14:29 GMT; available at: http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1838.14 On suppression of peaceful assembly, successive IndependentCommission for Human Rights reports are accessible at: http://www.ichr.ps/etemplate.php?id=12.15 The Ramallah-based daily al-Ayyam was allowed to resumedistribution in Gaza in mid-February 2009, ending a seven-month ban; but it is not distributed regularly.
http://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=41%3A2009-04-16-06-31-14&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=41%3A2009-04-16-06-31-14&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=41%3A2009-04-16-06-31-14&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=42%3A2009-04-16-06-31-32&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=42%3A2009-04-16-06-31-32&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=42%3A2009-04-16-06-31-32&Itemid=81http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1838http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1838http://www.ichr.ps/etemplate.php?id=12http://www.ichr.ps/etemplate.php?id=12http://www.ichr.ps/etemplate.php?id=12http://www.ichr.ps/etemplate.php?id=12http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1838http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1838http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.felesteen.ps/?action=showdetail&nid=67211http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24051http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=42%3A2009-04-16-06-31-32&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=42%3A2009-04-16-06-31-32&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=42%3A2009-04-16-06-31-32&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=41%3A2009-04-16-06-31-14&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=41%3A2009-04-16-06-31-14&Itemid=81http://www.pmo.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_weblinks&view=category&id=41%3A2009-04-16-06-31-14&Itemid=81http://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.php


8/98

16 Milton-Edwards, The Ascendance of Political Islam,1586,1595; Khaled Hroub, Salafi Formations in Palestine: The Limitsof a de-Palestinised Milieu, in Global Salafism: Islams New ReligiousMovement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2009), p. 236.17 Reports citing Ministry of Interior spokesperson IhabGhussein, in Filastin al-An, February 14, 2010, available at: http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/read.php?news_id=108111 14/2/2010;and in Felesteen Online, February 14, 2010, available at: http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1644. A posting

attributed to the Fatah Directorate of Information and Cultureon February 13, 2010 claimed, to the contrary, that action againstSalafi groups was motivated by Hamas efforts to control allmosques in Gaza, available at: http://www.fatehmedia.ps/atemplate.php?linkid=49444. A senior former Fatah securityofficer, however, interviewed by the author in Gaza in January2010, confirmed that arms have been covertly transferred by somelocal Fatah members to Salafist groups.18 Active and former ntelligence officers interviewed bythe author in Gaza and Ramallah in January 2010. A recentstudy that takes note of Jaljalat is Yoram Cohen and MatthewLevitt, with Becca Wasser, Deterred but Determined: Salafi-

Jihadi Groups in the Palestinian Arena, Policy Focus, no. 99,Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2010but

the authors emphasize three other groups.19 Hasan Jabr, Jaljalat awaits the conduct of a large operationin allegiance to al-Qaeda, al-Ayyam (Ramallah), July 11, 2009.20 Discussed in detail in Azzam Tamimi, The Political Implicationsof the Hamas Electoral Victory from the Islamist Perspective, ConflictsForum Monograph, Conflicts Forum, 2007, pp. 10, 12, and 22.21 Hamas arrests the most prominent leader of Salafi groups inGaza, al-Quds al-Arabi (London), February 11, 2010.22 The letter (which is on file with the author) was addressedto Hamas Politburo chief Khaled Meshal. An attachment liststhirty-one attacks since November 2009, many of them onQassam members. It is also commented on in Abdullah Awad,Hamas is Fateh with a beard, al-Ayyam, March 7, 2010.23 Hassan Mneimneh, Convergence? The Homogenization of

Islamist Doctrines in Gaza, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 9, 16(December 2009).24 Extensive details of every aspect of the Hamas camps areposted on the website of the Ministry of Youth and Sports at:http://www.mys.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=10&id=32&Itemid=92.25 Rory McCarthy, Hamas patrols beaches in Gaza to enforceconservative dress code, guardian.co.uk, October 18, 2009.26 News item posted on Ministry of Interior website, February7, 2010; available at: http://www.moi.gov.ps/?page=633167343250594025&Nid=14349.27 This is the assessment of analyst Mouin Rabbani, in e-mailcorrespondence with the author in February 2010.28 Confirmed by the head of a major NGO with a branch in

Gaza, interviewed by the author in Ramallah in January 2010.29 According to Ministry of Interior officials interviewed by theauthor in Gaza in January 2010. Assessment of acquiescence isfrom leading Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki, interviewed bythe author in Ramallah on January 5 and 12, 2010.30 Palestine Ulema resolves 10,140 disputes in 2009, FelesteenOnline, March 4, 2010.31 Rizek Abdel Jawad, Gaza Hamas rulers approve $540million budget, Washington Post, Saturday, January 2, 2010.32 Gaza banker interviewed by the author in Gaza, January2010. Deputy Minister of Finance Ismail Mahfouz is quotedas confirming that the Hanieh governments domestic revenuerepresents a mere 5 percent of annual expenditures of NIS1.1bn

($322mn at current exchange rates in mid-February 2010).Cited by Fayez Abu-Shamaleh in Where Is the Peoples Money,Hamas? posted on the Government Media Office websiteon November 4, 2009. This estimate of annual spending issignificantly less than the approved 2009 budget of $425 million,though the reasons for the discrepancy are not clear.33 Avi Issacharoff, Illegal Gaza tunnel owners suffer asHamas economy grows, Haaretz, February 17, 2010. There issome confusion over who levies VAT and other fees, such asoperating licenses, but it appears that it is Hamas rather than the

government that collects the VAT, and the Rafah municipalitythe licensing fees. (Source: interviews with local bankers,businessmen, and government officials conducted by the authorin Gaza in January 2010.) The municipal license fee may havebeen cancelled in late 2009: See Heather Sharp, Smuggling fuelsGazas stalled economy, BBC News, December 31, 2009 (lastupdated at 9:52 a.m. GMT); andErin Cunningham, Hamaslevies a value-added tax of 14.5 percent on every item that comesthrough, local shop owners say, Christian Science Monitor, August17, 2009.34 Raed Abu-Jarad, Mahfouz: The government does notsuffer a financial crisis and salaries are available, al-Resalah Net,February 18, 2010. Breakdown of costs from Abu-Shamaleh,Where Is the Peoples Money, Hamas?

35 Brown, Palestine: The Schism Deepens.36 Daho Djerbal, Integration of the Islamist Movement: TheCase of Algeria, Arab Reform Brief, Arab Reform Initiative,February 15, 2010.37 The Office of the Quartet Representative welcomes Israelsdecision to allow the transfer of 282.5 million excess shekels outof Gaza, February 19, 2010. Document on file with author.38 Details from the Governor of the Palestinian Authority, Jihadal-Wazir, and from a leading banker, interviewed by the authorin Ramallah and Gaza, respectively, in January 2010.39 Independent analysts interviewed by the author in Gaza andRamallah in January 2010.40 Harriet Sherwood, Palestinian tunnel tycoons feedingdemand for banned goods, The Guardian, December 15, 2009.

41 This borrows from Nathan Brown, The Green Elephant inthe Room: Dealing with the Hamas Party-State in Gaza, WebCommentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June2009.42 This was not the overt aim of the siege, but it was a widelyheld assumption regarding its real purpose. See discussions byRiad al-Astal, Where are we heading? What is the future of thePalestinian political system in light of Gaza events?, al-Hayatal-Jadidah, September 14, 2007, andMartin Kramer, Israels Gazastrategy, January 4, 2009.43 This assessment is expressed in Wisam Afifeh, Has HamasSucceeded in Combining Government with Resistance? FilasteenAlMuslima 28, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 4849, and in al-Astal,Where are we heading?

44 Quotation from Prime Minister: We Seek to ImplementSuccessful Diplomacy to Open Up to the World, alRay(government weekly newsletter), no. 42, February 28, 2010, p. 2.
http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/read.php?news_id=108111%2014/2/2010http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/read.php?news_id=108111%2014/2/2010http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1644http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1644http://www.fatehmedia.ps/atemplate.php?linkid=49444http://www.fatehmedia.ps/atemplate.php?linkid=49444http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=116467&date=7/11/2009http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=116467&date=7/11/2009http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=116467&date=7/11/2009http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=116467&date=7/11/2009http://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=135200&Date=3/7/2010http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=135200&Date=3/7/2010http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=135200&Date=3/7/2010http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=135200&Date=3/7/2010http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.mys.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=10&id=32&Itemid=92http://www.mys.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=10&id=32&Itemid=92http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-codehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-codehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-codehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-codehttp://www.moi.gov.ps/?page=633167343250594025&Nid=14349http://www.moi.gov.ps/?page=633167343250594025&Nid=14349http://www.felesteen.ps/index.php?page=details&nid=2485http://www.felesteen.ps/index.php?page=details&nid=2485http://www.felesteen.ps/index.php?page=details&nid=2485http://www.felesteen.ps/index.php?page=details&nid=2485http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/02/AR201001020=0876_pf.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/02/AR201001020=0876_pf.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/02/AR201001020=0876_pf.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/02/AR201001020=0876_pf.htmlhttp://www.gmo.ps/ar/?page=news_det&id=1774http://www.gmo.ps/ar/?page=news_det&id=1774http://www.gmo.ps/ar/?page=news_det&id=1774http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1150440.htmlhttp://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1150440.htmlhttp://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1150440.htmlhttp://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1150440.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8435066.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8435066.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8435066.stmhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/14/palestine-israel-smuggling-in-gazahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/14/palestine-israel-smuggling-in-gazahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/14/palestine-israel-smuggling-in-gazahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/14/palestine-israel-smuggling-in-gazahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://sandbox.blog-city.com/israels_gaza_strategy.htmhttp://sandbox.blog-city.com/israels_gaza_strategy.htmhttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://www.fm-m.com/2010/jan/9-2.phphttp://sandbox.blog-city.com/israels_gaza_strategy.htmhttp://sandbox.blog-city.com/israels_gaza_strategy.htmhttp://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=1&id=51245&cid=1781http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23225http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/14/palestine-israel-smuggling-in-gazahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/14/palestine-israel-smuggling-in-gazahttp://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article2842http://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://www.alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=7722http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0817/p09s01-wome.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8435066.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8435066.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8435066.stmhttp://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1150440.htmlhttp://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1150440.htmlhttp://www.gmo.ps/ar/?page=news_det&id=1774http://www.gmo.ps/ar/?page=news_det&id=1774http://www.gmo.ps/ar/?page=news_det&id=1774http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/02/AR201001020=0876_pf.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/02/AR201001020=0876_pf.htmlhttp://www.felesteen.ps/index.php?page=details&nid=2485http://www.felesteen.ps/index.php?page=details&nid=2485http://www.moi.gov.ps/?page=633167343250594025&Nid=14349http://www.moi.gov.ps/?page=633167343250594025&Nid=14349http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-codehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-codehttp://www.mys.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=10&id=32&Itemid=92http://www.mys.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=10&id=32&Itemid=92http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gazahttp://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=135200&Date=3/7/2010http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=135200&Date=3/7/2010http://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://www.alquds.co.uk/qfi/index.asp?fname=today\10z45.htm&storytitlehttp://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://conflictsforum.org/2007/the-political-implications-of-the-hamas-electoral-victory-from-the-islamist-perspective/http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=116467&date=7/11/2009http://www.al-ayyam.ps/znews/site/template/article.aspx?did=116467&date=7/11/2009http://www.fatehmedia.ps/atemplate.php?linkid=49444http://www.fatehmedia.ps/atemplate.php?linkid=49444http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1644http://www.felesteen.net/index.php?page=details&nid=1644http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/read.php?news_id=108111%2014/2/2010http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/read.php?news_id=108111%2014/2/2010


9/9

Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On

Prof. Yezid Sayigh

Recent Middle East Briefs:Available on the Crown Center website: http://www.brandeis.edu/crown

Nader Habibi, The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Arab Countries: A Year-EndAssessment, December 2009, No. 40

Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, The Obama Presidency and the Palestinian-IsraeliConflict, November 2009, No. 39

Naghmeh Sohrabi The Curious Case of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, November2009, No. 38

Yusri Hazran, The Shiite Community in Lebanon: From Marginalization to Ascendancy,June 2009, No. 37

Vincent Romani, The Politics of Higher Education in the Middle East: Problems andProspects, May 2009, No. 36
http://www.brandeis.edu/crownhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB40.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB40.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB40.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB40.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB39.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB39.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB39.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB39.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB38.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB38.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB38.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB38.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB37.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB37.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB37.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB37.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB36.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB36.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB36.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB36.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB36.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB36.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB37.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB37.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB38.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB38.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB39.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB39.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB40.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB40.pdfhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown

hamas rule in gaza: three years on

Documents