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HALESHANDFULUPFROMTHEASHES:TheForgingoftheSeventhAirForcefromtheAshesofPearl

HarbortotheTriumphofV-JDayby

PeterS.H.Ellis,Major,USAF

TABLEOFCONTENTS

ContentsTABLEOFCONTENTS

AbouttheAuthor

Dedication

Acknowledgments

Abstract

Illustrations

Chapter1Introduction

TheSubjectanditsRelevance

ApproachandMethodology

ReviewofLiterature

Organization

Conclusion

Chapter2BeginningsTheforgingofSeventhAirForce

TheHawaiianAirForce

TheEstablishmentofSeventhAirForce

EarlyOperations

TheBattleofMidway

MajorGeneralWillisH.Hale

EarlyCommandandControlRelationships

Chapter3TheEarlyCampaigns:TheGilbertsandtheMarshalls

Introduction

TheCampaignfortheGilbertIslandsOperationGALVANIC

Planning,Organizing,andPreparing

BomberOperationsinSupportofOperationGALVANIC

TheDevelopmentofCloseAirSupport(CAS)intheGilberts

CASProceduresatAttu

CASProceduresintheGilberts

ConclusionsfromOperationGalvanic

TheCampaignfortheMarshallIslandsOperationsFLINTLOCKandCATCHPOLE

Planning,Organizing,andPreparing

LifeintheForwardArea

Bombing/StrikeOperationsintheMarshalls

TheBomberCrisisToughcombat,ToughDecisions

TheTideTurns

CloseAirSupportintheMarshalls

ConclusionforSeventhAirForceOperationsintheGilbertsandMarshalls

Chapter 4The Later Campaigns: Neutralization of the Carolines, the Marianas Campaign, Iwo Jima andOkinawa

Introduction

TheNeutralizationoftheCarolines

EarlyEfforts

TheRaidsonTruk

TheCommandIssue

TheMarianasCampaign

PlanningandPreparation

SupportChallengesintheForwardArea

BombingOperationsintheMarianas

CloseAirSupportintheMarianas

Saipan

Tinian

Guam

CASinthePalaus

CircularLetterAL11

TheAssaultonIwoJima

Planning

PreliminaryStrikes

CloseAirSupportonIwoJima

TheCaptureofOkinawa

Planning

CloseAirSupportonOkinawa

Epilogue

Chapter5Conclusion

BroadConclusions

SpecificFindings

PersonalitiesMatterUpToaPoint

ServiceCulturesMatterUpToaPoint

UniqueChallengesMatterInnovationandTheWilltoOvercomeThemIsthePoint

REQUESTFROMTHEPUBLISHER

Bibliography

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

Major (LieutenantColonelSelect)PeterS.H.Ellis receivedhiscommission in1986and was an honor graduate of both Officer Training School and the Personnel OfficerTechnicalSchool.MajorEllis has served in avarietyof field and staff tours.Hewas aSectionChiefintheMilitaryPersonnelFlight(MPF)atOffuttAFB,Nebraska,andservedasExecutiveOfficeratLindseyAirStation,Germany.Then,MajorElliswasChiefoftheQuality ForceBranch atHQAMCScottAFB, Illinois, followed by a tour as theMPFChiefatOsanAB,Korea,andthenwastheChiefoftheCommandersActionGroupattheAir Force Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas. Major Ellis was selected as theOutstandingPersonnelOfficerintheAirForcefor1994,andhisMPFatOsanAB,Koreawas selected as the Best in theAir Force that same year.Major Ellis has a bachelorsdegreefromTexasLutheranUniversity,amastersdegreefromWebsterUniversity,andhewasaDistinguishedGraduateoftheAirCommandandStaffCollege.MajorEllishas

been selected to command the 52nd Mission Support Squadron, Spangdahlem AB,GermanyupongraduationfromSAAS.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated tomyDad, ShermanK. Ellis, Jr., whowas a naval aviatorflyingPB2Y-4CoronadoSeaplanesoutofSaipaninWorldWarII.MyDaddiedwhenIwasyoung,soInevergot tohearstoriesofhiscombatexperiencefirst-hand.However,myMomsharedwithmethat,formonthsafterthewarifsheaccidentallynudgedhiminhissleep,hewouldboltuprightinbed,reachingforapistolthatwasntthere.ThatwasthegenesisofmydesiretolearnmoreaboutthenatureofcombatexperiencedbyUSforcesintheCentralPacificinWorldWarII.

Inanoldscrapbook,alongwithpicturesofthehuge,4-engineCoronadoSeaplanesmyDadflew,thereisaletterhewrotetomyMomin1945discussingsomeofwhathedid,sincebythenthewarhadjustendedandcensorshiphadbeeneased.OurdestinationwasSaipanandourmissionwasantisubmarinepatroltokeepthesealanestoOkinawaopen.Fifteen hour flights, each one covering over a hundred thousand squaremileswith oursearch radar. Not a single ship of the huge invasion and supply convoys was sunk ordamagedbyaJapsubinthisareaduringthetimewepatrolledit.

Unlike some naval personnel discussed in this thesis, I think my Dad would haveunderstoodthenatureofthecombattheSeventhAirForcebombercrewsenduredintheCentralPacificduringWorldWarII.Isuspect,though,thathewouldhavebeenquicktoaddthatheandhisNavybuddiesdiditbetter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Iwould like to acknowledge several peoplewho have been a tremendous source ofguidanceandencouragementinaccomplishingthisstudy.Fromthebeginning,mySAASThesisAdvisor,Dr.JamesS.Corumhadaclearvisionofwhatthisthesiscouldbe,andhehelpedkeepmemotivatedandfocusedthroughouttheprocess.MySAASThesisReader,Dr. Harold R. Winton, is a superb editor and organizer who had his hands fulltroubleshootingmynaturalinclinationtowardliterarymeandering.Iamgratefultothemboth.

IwouldalsoliketothankMr.ThomasBuellandCaptain(Retired)AlexanderMonroeforprovidingmewithvaluable insights into the interrelationshipsamongNavy,Marine,Army,andArmyAirForceleadershipintheCentralPacificTheaterduringWorldWarII.Additionally,Dr.JamesMowbrayoftheAirWarCollegeisconductingextensiveresearchtowriteacomprehensiveoperationalhistoryof theSeventhAirForce inWorldWar II,andheprovidedinvaluableinsightintothevariouscommandandcontrolrelationshipsoftheSeventhAirForcethroughoutthewar.

Finally, there are two acknowledgements Iwould like tomake of a personal nature.First,duringthewritingofthisthesis,friendsofourfamily,Mr.DanLoringandhiswifeMarycametovisitusontheirwaytoFlorida.DanwasaB-25MitchellpilotintheChina-Burma-IndiaTheaterinWorldWarII,andduringtheirstaywithushesharedsomeofhiscombatexperienceswithmeevidentlygoinginlowandfastwith12.50calibermachinegunsonfullcouldreallytearupsomestuff!ListeningtoDangavemeanappreciationofwhat itmusthavebeenlikefor theSeventhAirForceMitchellpilotsgoinginlowoverMaloelapintheCentralPacific,anditgavemerenewedmotivationforthisworkwhenIreally needed it. Lastly, I want to thankmyMom, who has been a constant source ofencouragement throughout this tough but rewarding year at SAAS. I simply could nothavedonethisworkwithouthersteadfastsupport.

ABSTRACT

This studyanalyzes theevolutionofSeventhAirForces joint commandandcontrolrelationships aswell as thedevelopmentof jointoperationalprocedures anddoctrine intheCentralPacificduringWorldWarII.AsthiswasarguablythemostjointtheaterinWorldWarII,therearemanylessonsaboutthechallengesofjointcommandandcontrolandthedevelopmentofjointcombatproceduresthatarerelevanttocontemporaryairmen.

TheSeventhAirForcewasestablishedintheaftermathoftheattackonPearlHarbor.Itwas initially a defensive and training oriented commandprotecting Hawaii from apossible attack by the Japanese and training replacement crews for units in the SouthPacific.However, in the summer of 1943, the SeventhAir Force became an offensive,mobilecombatcommandthat,alongwitheachoftheotherservices,playedamajorroleintheisland-hoppingcampaignofWorldWarII.MajorGeneralWillisH.HaleservedasthecommanderoftheSeventhAirForceduringthistransitionperiod.Thisstudyuseshimasa lens to explore the unique challenges his commandmet and overcame. Additionally,since thePacificTheaterwas on the tail end of the EuropeFirst resupply policy, theSeventh Air Force was chronically under-manned and under-equippedhence themonikerHalesHandful.

Thisstudyasks threequestions inexamining thedevelopmentof jointcommandandcontrol and operational procedures in the Central Pacific. The first question is towhatextentdidpersonalitiesdrivetheevolutionofcommandandcontrolrelationships,anddidthey have an effect on the effectiveness of combat operations? This question takes onsignificanceasthisworkexploresGeneralHalesratherstormyrelationshipwithhisnavalsuperior, Vice Admiral John H. Hoover. Along similar lines, the second question is towhatextentdidserviceculturesaffectcommandandcontrolandthedevelopmentofjointdoctrine. Finally, this thesis asks to what extent did this theaters unique geographicchallengesaffectinterservicefrictionandtheeffectivenessofcombatoperations?

This thesis concludes that all three issues influenced the development of, andeffectivenessof,jointcommandandcontrolandcombatproceduresintheCentralPacific,thoughnotalwaysinnegativeways.Ontheonehand,serviceculturetendedtoaggravateanalreadystormyinterpersonalrelationshipbetweenGeneralHaleandAdmiralHoover.Ontheotherhand, theseverityof theuniquechallengesintheCentralPacific tendedtoamelioratepersonalityconflictsandserviceparochialismastheserviceslearnedthatonlythroughteamworkcouldthechallengesbeovercome.

Despiteharsh lessonsandearlysetbackssuchas thecostlyvictoryatTarawa,by the

end of the war the three services air forces developed a level of interoperability andshareddoctrinethatwedonothavetoday.Additionally,thisstudyfoundthatinterdictionandCASwereeverybit as important as strategicbombing to the successof the island-hopping campaign.While theCentral Pacific inWorldWar II is not the only timeUSforceshavehadtorelearntheimportanceofCAS,thisexamplestandsasamodelofinter-serviceairpowerthatcanbeusefultoairmentoday.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure1.ThePacificTheater

Figure2.OPCON,HawaiianAirForce,Mid-1940and1941

Figure3.OPCONSeventhAirForce,1942ThroughSummer1943

Figure4.OPCON,SeventhAirForce:TheGilberts,Fall1943

Figure5.OPCON,SeventhAirForce:TheMarshalls,Early

Figure6.OPCONSeventhAirForce:TheMarianas,Summer

Figure7.OPCONSeventhAirForce:Okinawa,Spring1945

CHAPTER1INTRODUCTION

TheSubjectanditsRelevance

TheSeventhAirForcegrewoutof theashesof theattackonPearlHarbor,andwasinitiallyestablishedtoprovidedefensefortheHawaiianIslandsandtoserveasafeedercommandtoorientincomingtroopstothetheater,thendistributethemtoothercombatantcommands. However, despite chronically low manning and equipment shortages,beginninginthesummerof1943,theSeventhAirForcetransitionedfromadefensiveandtraining oriented command to an offensive, highly mobile combat command. HalesHandful, as the initially small Seventh Air Force came to be known, took on thechallengesofstrategicbombing,islandairdefense,andcloseairsupport(CAS)aspartoftheUSforcesdrivethroughtheCentralPacifictheater.

The story of Seventh Air Forces contribution to combat operations in the CentralPacificduringWorldWarIIismorethanjustachronologyofbattlesandmissionsflownin support of the famous, and often written about island-hopping campaign whichultimatelyledtothedefeatofJapan.Itisalsothestoryofauniquecommand,facingandsurmountinguniquechallengesinitsquestforvictorychallengesthatstillexisttoday.

Forexample,thePacificTheaterwasaNavy-dominated,Navy-ledtheater.Therefore,whentheSeventhAirForcebegansustainedoffensivecombatoperationsinthesummerof1943,GeneralHale(Commander,SeventhAirForce)workedfor,andhisaircraftwereunder the operational control of a Navy admiral (Vice Admiral John H. Hoover).[1]AccordingtoSamuelEliotMorison, inhismulti-volumeHistoryofUnitedStatesNavalOperationsinWorldWarII,thecommandstructureofArmyAirForcesunderanAdmiralwas old news in the South Pacific were it worked beautifully.[2] However, inMorisons opinion owingto certain personalities, it did notworkwell in theCentralPacific.[3]Thisandothersourcesnotedinthisstudywilllendcredencetothenotionthatpersonalitiesdomatter.

However, apart frompersonalities, therewere significant differences in thenatureofthecombatbetweentheCentralPacificandtheSouthorSouthwestPacific thataffectedthewayinterservicetensionsandinterserviceproceduresdevelopedintheCentralPacific.[4]Forexample,thedistancesbetweenobjectiveswerefargreaterintheCentralPacificthan in the Southwest Pacific. In the Southwest Pacific land-based air could usuallysupport all but the longest advances of the campaign. However, in the Central Pacificvirtually all pre-bombardment had to be unescorted (often pushing the bombers to thelimitsof their range), andcarrier air had toprovide close support to the troopsuntil an

airfield could be captured and land-based fighters brought forward to help.[5]Understandably,thedevelopmentofjointproceduresforclosesupportoperationsevolveddifferentlyintheCentralPacific,basedontheuniquechallengesinherenttothattheaterofoperations.

Additionally, objectives in the Southwest Pacificwere occasionally large enough forplanners to find an undefended beach to use as a springboard for amphibious assault.However, in the Central Pacific, the objectives were so small that they were defendedvirtually always.[6] With both unescorted pre-bombardment missions and amphibiousassault landings that were highly contested, it is also understandable that interservicetensions could run high if results from or support for these operations were eitherineffectiveorcostly.

Finally, the ability to sustain combat operations in the far-flung Central Pacificpresented supply, logistic, andmorale challenges that demanded a joint, team effort toovercome.Therewereproblems,tobesure,buttherewasalsoagooddealofcooperationand ingenuity both within and between services in successfully sustaining the drivethroughtheCentralPacific.

InordertounderstandairpowerintheCentralPacific,boththenandnow,itishelpfultounderstandthechallengesfacedbythemenoftheSeventhAirForceinWorldWarII,andtoseehowthosechallengesaffectedthedevelopmentofjointcommandandcontrol,and combat procedures. While combat capabilities and technologies are significantlydifferent today than inWorldWar II, many of the challenges dealt with then are stillimportantoperational considerations today, inwhat remainsahigh-priority internationaltheater.

ApproachandMethodology

This thesiswill explore themajor challengesmet and overcome by the SeventhAirForce in combat operations in theCentral Pacific inWorldWar II. In approaching thissubject,thepaperwillproceedchronologically,outliningthemajorcampaignsofthedrivethroughtheCentralPacific.Within thecampaigns, theworkwilladdress jointplanning,preparationandsupportissues,bombingandstrikechallenges,anddevelopmentsinCloseAir Support of the amphibious operations. This study will focus especially on jointleadership interactions, command and control issues, and the development of jointoperationalcombatprocedures.

In examining joint command and control and leadership interactions in the CentralPacific, there are severalquestionshelpful in exploring these issues.Forone,was it allaboutpersonalities,asSamuelMorisonimplied?Clearly, inreviewingseveralsources itcomesasnosurprisethatGeneralHaleandAdmiralHooverdidntgetalong.First,thedistinguishedauthorThomasBuelldescribedAdmiralHooverasdour,ill-humored.[7]Additionally,Captain(ret)Monroe,relatedthathisfather,whoservedonboardtheU.S.S.CURTISS with Admiral Hoover, stated that he remembered Admiral Hoover, AKAGenial John, as a pretty stern dose of medicine.[8] On the other hand, newspaperaccountsofGeneralHaleindicatethatwhileherarelylosthistemper,hecoulddeliverathoroughdressingdowninnothingmorethanconversationaltones.[9]However,itshouldcome as no surprise that people who have risen to the flag level might have forceful,dynamicpersonalities.Moreover,whileitisaxiomatictopointoutthatpeoplewhohaverisentogeneralofficerstatusarenotusedtobeingwrongveryoften,thepointisrelevantinthiscasebecauseAdmiralHooverandGeneralHalehadfundamentaldisagreementsonthemosteffectivewaytoemployairpower.

Thisleadstothenextquestion:werethechallengesandfrictionintheCentralPacificafunction of different service cultures? As will be explored in more depth later, afterGeneralHaleearnedhiswingsin1923,virtuallyallhisexperiencewasinheavybombers.[10]Accordingly,GeneralHalewasinclinedtosubscribetomassedformations,flyingathigh altitude, employing precision bombing techniques, as espoused at the Air CorpsTacticalSchool,fromwhichhegraduatedin1928.[11]

Ontheotherhand,AdmiralHooverwasanavalairofficerwhowasmoreinclinedtoadvocate the effectiveness of low-level, single-file bombing runs as practiced by navaldive-bombers.[12]Whiletheseareonlytheopinionsoftwomenoperatinginatheaterofwar together, they also reflect differences in the cultures of their services as well. For

example, the Navy was understandably concerned about fleet safety from Japanesesubmarines andbombers (and laterKamikazes).Accordingly, theywere also concernedaboutclosesupportfortheMarines,andadvocatedhell-for-leather tacticsthatmeantaquick exit for Navy carriers from the threat of Japanese submarines during the islandassaults.[13] The Army, conversely, tended toward a more methodical advance afterintensive artillerypreparation.[14]These tactics also lent themselvesmore to theArmyAirForces(AAFs)preferenceforindependent,massedbombingofdeepertargets.Withtheseculturalproclivitiesandalignments,itappearsthatsomeofthefrictionexperiencedin theCentralPacifichasculturalanddoctrinal rootsandalso, that theservices in theCentral Pacific did not understand and/or appreciate the nature of each others combatchallenges.

Finally, another question that must be asked is: were the challenges faced by theservicesincombatintheCentralPacificuniqueinandofthemselves,leadinginevitablytofriction? As noted above, even a cursory comparison of the differences between theCentral Pacific to the Southwest Pacific theaterswould tend to argue an answer in theaffirmative.The unique nature of the challenges faced by the SeventhAir Force in theCentral Pacific also added to the lack of understanding between services, as will beexploredingreaterdepthlaterinthiswork.

Major GeneralWillis H. Hale was Commander, Seventh Air Force from the periodJune1942throughApril1944,andthenservedasCOMAIRFORWARDthroughtheendof1944.Accordingly,itwashisleadershipthatdroveSeventhAirForcestransitiontoanoffensive,mobilecombatcommand,anddirectlycontributedtothesuccessofSeventhAirForcethroughthemajorityoftheisland-hoppingcampaigns.Therefore,thisstudywilluseGeneralHaleasalenstoexploretheuniquechallengeshiscommandmetandovercameintheCentralPacific.

ReviewofLiterature

ThestoryoftheSeventhAirForceinWorldWarIIhasnotbeencoveredinmuchdetailin published works. Kenn C. Rusts Seventh Air Force Story provides a fairly shortoperationalhistoryoftheSeventhAirForce,whileWesleyFrankCravenandJamesLeaCatesTheArmyAirForcesinWorldWarII,Volume4,ThePacificcoverssomeSeventhAirForceoperationsinageneralmanner.Nevertheless,thesewereimportantsourcesforoutliningthechronologyandhistoricalaccountsofsomeoftheeventscitedinthispaper.Additionally, E. B. Potters Nimitz, Thomas Buells The Quiet Warrior, and SamuelMorisonsHistoryofUnitedStatesNavalOperationsinWorldWarII,VolumesSevenandEight,served toprovide aNavyperspectiveonoperations in theCentralPacificduringWorldWarII.Thesesources,aswellaspersonalcorrespondencewithThomasBuellandCaptain(ret)AlexanderMonroe,alsoprovidedvaluableinsightsintotheinterrelationshipsamongNavy,Marine,Army,andArmyAirForceleadershipduringthisperiod.

Finally, little has beenwritten about the development of command relationships andjointoperationalprocedures involving theSeventhAirForce in theCentralPacific.ThemostdetailedaccountingofSeventhAirForcecommandrelationshipsisfoundinCravenand Cates The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume 4, The Pacific, and thepreviouslycitedworksbyRust,Buell,andMorisonaddimportantinsightsintothecontextof these relationships. In addressing joint operational procedures, the previously citedworkbyCravenandCatepresents themost information, followedby theworkbyRust,though neither work is comprehensive in this area. Much of this work has reliedextensivelyonoriginalsourcedocumentsfoundattheUnitedStatesAirForceHistoricalResearchAgency(USAFHRA),especially indetailing thedevelopmentofclosesupportoperationsandSeventhAirForcedoctrine.

Additionally,sourcedocumentsfromtheUSAFHRAprovidedmostoftheinformationregarding General Hale, as well as providing insights into the nature of combat forSeventhAirForce in theCentralPacific.AddinganArmyperspective to thecontextofjointoperationsintheCentralPacificwasareportofatripthroughtheCentralPacificbyColonel Claudius H.M. RobertsMarshall Islands Japanese Defenses and BattleDamage, found in the US Army Center for US Military History, Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania.[15]

Organization

ChapterTwowilldiscuss theearlyyears inwhich theSeventhAirForcewas forgedfrom the Hawaiian Air Force in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7December 1941. It will highlight the defensive nature and training roles played by theSeventhAirForceuptoitsparticipationintheBattleofMidway.TheBattleofMidwaywillbeexamined in-depth,because itprovides insight into thesourceofagooddealoffriction between the Navy and the AAF in general, and specifically among the seniorleadersinSeventhAirForcesdirectoperationalchainofcommand.Thenthechapterwillfocus on the background and character of Seventh Air Forces commander during thisperiodMajor GeneralWillis H. Hale. Chapter Two closes with a brief outline of thedevelopmentoftheoperationalcommandandcontrolrelationshipsforSeventhAirForcefrom1940-1945.

ChapterThreeprovidesanin-depthtreatmentofSeventhAirForcesroleintheearlyisland-hoppingcampaignsthroughtheGilbertandtheMarshallIslands.TheGilbertandMarshallcampaignswillbediscussedseparately,andwithineachcampaigntherewillbeseparate sections focusing on planning and preparation, bomber operations, and closesupportoperations.Figure1(onpage9) isamapof thePacificTheatershowingall themajor island groups in the Central Pacific. Additionally, this chapter provides someexamplesoftheuniqueandharrowingnatureofcombatSeventhAirForcesenduredintheCentralPacific,examplesnotwidelyknownsincetheSeventhAirForcedidnotreceivemuchpressascomparedtotheexploitsofnavalforcesinthisNavydominatedtheater.Infact, combat in the Pacific Theater, in general, received less coverage than the combatexploits inEurope.[16] Regardless, these examples serve to highlight a general lack ofunderstandingofthenatureofSeventhAirForcescombatespeciallybytheNavy.

ChapterFourwilloutline theroleofSeventhAirForce in the latercampaignsof theCentralPacifictheneutralizationof theCarolines, theMarianasCampaign, theassaultonIwoJima,andtheattackonOkinawa.Inaddition,thischapterwillexaminecloselytheeventsandissuessurroundingthedecisiontohaveGeneralHalerelinquishcommandofthe Seventh Air Force in order to assume command of Task Force 59 asCOMAIRFORWARDoperationallycontrollingallshore-basedairpowerintheforwardarea. This chapter also highlights the emergence of mature Close Air Support jointproceduresthatweretestedinthelargestandfinalbattleoftheCentralPacificOkinawa.ChapterFourcloseswithanassessmentoftheSeventhAirForcesuniquecontributioninproviding very-long-range fighter escort and fighter strikemissions from Iwo Jima and

OkinawaagainstmainlandJapan,andKorea.

ChapterFiveclosesthisstudywithadiscussionofbroadconclusionsderivedfromtheevidencepresented in this thesis.Additionally, specific findingsaddressing theeffectofpersonalities, service cultures, and the unique challenges of the Central Pacific on thedevelopmentofjointcommandandcontrolandoperationalprocedureswillbediscussed.

Conclusion

Despitetheirsignificance,theaccomplishmentsoftheSeventhAirForceintheCentralPacific inWorldWar II have largely gone unsung. Itwas the first air force to feel theweightoftheenemy,atPearlHarbor,whereitwasalsothefirsttodrawenemyblood.[17]OutoftheashesofPearlHarborgrewasmallcommand,mostlyfocusedondefenseoftheHawaiianIslands,andasatrainingcommandforreplacementstotheSouthwestPacific.Whileitwouldneverrelinquishtheseduties,theSeventhAirForcewouldsoongoontheoffensive,developing intoahighlymobile,combatcommandwithchallengesunique toanyother theaterofcombat. It flewdistances incombat longer thananyotherair force,andnootherairforceemployedawiderrangeofaircraftorperformedawiderrangeofmissions.[18]

GeneralHaleandhismenwouldstartwithablanksheetofpaper,andultimatelytheywouldevolvejointcommandrelationsandoperationalproceduresthatwouldhelpwinawar.However, in the process of carving out its new role in aNavy dominated theater,thereweregrowingpains,friction,andevengreatpersonalsacrifices.GeneralHalewouldultimately have to give up command of the Seventh Air Force in order to secure fulloperationalcontrolofairassets,especiallyheavybombers,intheforwardarea.

Moreover, despiteNavydominanceof theCentralPacific, this theater represents theonlytheaterinwhichtheNavy,theArmy,theArmyAirCorps,andtheMarinesallplayedmajor,vital roles in thecombat thatwon the island-hoppingcampaign inWorldWar II.WhilehavingfourmajorplayersintheCentralPacificunderstandablygeneratedfriction,interservice cooperation gradually improved as the services learned the value of jointcooperation in combat. The greatest example of this growing cooperation lies in thedevelopmentandemergenceofmaturejointproceduresforeffectiveprosecutionofCloseAirSupportintheCentralPacific.

Intheend,thisworkisintendedtoprovideanenhancedunderstandingofinterserviceleadershipandcommandandcontrolrelationshipsintheCentralPacificinWorldWarIIwherealltheservicesplayedindispensablerolesincombat.Inourever-increasinglyjointenvironment today,andwithourair forcesservingunderNavycommandas recentlyasoperationsinKosovo,thechallengesandlessonsoftheSeventhAirForceinWorldWarIIareclearlyapplicabletocontemporaryairmen.

Figure1.ThePacificTheater

CHAPTER2BEGINNINGSTHEFORGINGOFSEVENTHAIRFORCE

Andwedidntfly2,000milestokillfish!MajorGeneralWillisH.Hale

TheHawaiianAirForce

TheHawaiianAirForce,activatedon1November1940,wasthedirectpredecessorofthe Seventh Air Force.[19] It was also the first command of the US Army Air Corps(AAF)toseecombatinWorldWarII,whenJapanesecarrierplanesbombedandstrafedHickamandWheelerFieldsandPearlHarboron7December1941.[20]

The tremendousnaval loss from the attack atPearlHarbor iswell known10 shipssunkorputoutofcommission(includingfivebattleships)and8othershipsdamaged.[21]Lesswellknown is that theAAF lostoveronehundredplanes, abouthalfof theentireHawaiianAirForce,andtheNavylost80planesaswell.[22]Theonlycompensationtotheselosseswasthatapproximately35HawaiianAirForceplanesofalltypesmanagedtoget airborne, and in the combat that followed they shot down10 enemyplanes, againstfourAAFplanesdowned.[23]

AftertheattackonPearlHarbor,whatwasleftoftheHawaiianAirForcewasputonconstantalertagainstanotherJapaneseattack,while itsbomberandfightergroupswerereequippedandbroughtbackuptostrength.[24]TheHawaiianAirForcealsounderwentreorganization, starting with the appointment of a new commander, Brigadier GeneralClarence L. Tinker, on 18 December 1941 (promoted to Major General early January1942)[25] On 1 January, 1942, then Brigadier General Willis H. Hale, who had been

servingunderGeneralTinkeras3rdAirForceChiefofStaffatMacDillAirForceBaseFloridawhenPearlHarborwasattacked,wasbrought toHawaii toassumecommandofVIIBomberCommand.[26]

Interestingly, that same day, 1 January 1942, VII Bomber Command flew its firstoffensivemissionfortheHawaiianAirForce.AsoloB-17stagedthroughMidwayIsland,refueled,thenflewoverWakeIsland(whichhadfallentotheJapanesetheweekbefore),tookphotosandreturnedtoOahuviaMidwayIslandanover4,000milemissionthatlefttheplanewithonly fifteenminutesof fuel upon return.[27]Thatmissionwasprescientindeed in termsof theoffensivespirit,and thenatureof thecombat intowhichGeneralHalewouldsoonleadtheSeventhAirForce.

TheEstablishmentofSeventhAirForce

The Hawaiian Air Force was redesignated as the Seventh Air Force on 5 February1942, under the command of Major General Clarence L. Tinker.[28] The primarycommandscomprisingtheSeventhAirForceatthattimeweretheVIIFighterCommand(Commander: Brigadier General Howard C. Davidson), VII Bomber Command(Commander: Major General Willis H. Hale), and VII Air Force Service Command(Commander:BrigadierGeneralWalterJ.Reed).[29]

EarlyOperations

ThenewcommandbeganwiththesamebasicmissionasitspredecessordefenseoftheHawaiianIslands.[30]GeneralHalebestdescribesthoseearlydays:

AfterthefirstshockoftheJapattack,theimmediatereactionwastothroweverythingintothedefenseofHawaii.

Grounddefensesdugin.Ourfightersandbombersweremarshaledforairdefense.Theislandsbeingsituatedas they

are,thepatternofdefenseasfarasaircraftwasconcernedconsistedprincipallyofsearchmissionswithouralertforces

alwayspreparedtostrike.Dailymissionswereflowncoveringtheareaaroundtheislandsforaradiusofmorethan800

miles.Thismeantflightsofmorethan1,800miles,becauseaplanedoesnotflystraightoutandstraightback;itfliesa

zigzagpatterninitssearchsector.

Oursearchmissionsstressedtheobviousvalueoftrainingthemeninover-waterflights,withthedirectresultthatthenavigatorbecamethekeymanofabombercrew.Thenavigatorstrainingaswellasthepilotswassteppedup.Werealized, however, that these search missions did not provide complete training. For that reason we started makinground-tripflightstoJohnstonIsland,atypicalsmallcoralatollsome714nauticalmilessouthwestofOahu.TherearenootherlandmarksaroundJohnston.Youeitherhititoryoudont,andtheresultswereverytangible.Inorderthatthemenwouldgetcomplete training,wesent themdownin thedaytimeandhad themflybackatnight.Thuswe trainedourover-waterflyersthepracticalway.[31]

In addition to this practical approach of marrying training to real-world missions,joint Army-Navy-Marine exerciseswere also implemented in January 1942 in order toimprovethecoordinationofallarmsforthedefenseofOahu.[32]Intheseexercises,VIIBomber Command bombers, escorted by Navy and Marine fighters, would attackHawaii,whileVIIFighterCommandfighterswouldtrytobreakuptheattackanddefendthe islands.[33] Additional training exercises focused on interception, escort, attack,gunnery,bombing,rocketfiring,andsupportofgroundtroops.[34]Theseskillsandjointcoordination capabilitieswould become increasingly crucial starting in the fall of 1943when these unitswould begin participating in the island-hopping campaign through theCentralPacific.

Unfortunately, the Seventh Air Force was seldom the beneficiary its own excellenttrainingprogramsduring theearlyyears.Forasidefromthe lowprioritysufferedbyallPacificforcesduetotheEuropeFirstpolicy,theSeventhAirForcelargelyservedasareplacementpool for theFifthandThirteenthAirForces.[35]Forexample,between thesummerof1942andthefallof1943,theVIIBomberCommandneverhadmorethanonegroupofheavybombersonhand,andthesegroupseitherwereinexperiencedandbeingtrained for service somewhere else, or battle-worn outfits sorely in need of rest.[36]Likewise, during the same period Seventh Fighter Command supplied Thirteenth Air

Forcewithtwofullfightersquadronsandagroupheadquarters,inadditiontosupplyingtrained fighter pilots to Thirteenth and FifthAir Forces at a rate of 25 permonth.[37]Overall, high personnel turnover coupled with chronic shortages in equipment andsuppliestriedthepatienceoftheSeventhAirForcecommanders,andthemonotonousjoboftheSeventhAirForceintheearlydayswasdiscouragingtosaytheleast.[38]

TheBattleofMidway

WhenNavalintelligencelearnedtheJapanesewerepreparingtostrikeatMidway,theSeventhAirForce sent 15B-17FlyingFortresses and fourB-26Marauders forward toMidwayon30May1942tohelptheNavyrepulsetheenemyfleet.[39]TheB-17sbeganflyinglongover-watersearchesfortheenemyfleetwithNavyPBYson31May1942,andtheactualBattleofMidwaybeganon3June1942.[40]

TheOfficeof InformationServices, in itsBriefHistoryofSeventhAirForce, 1940-1945, stated that in the course of the three day battle (3-6 June 1942) the SeventhAirForcescored22directhitsand6probablesonJapaneseships.[41]However,thisturnedoutnottobethecase.ItisinterestingtocomparethespecificclaimsmadebySeventhAirForceina13June1942lettertoGeneralArnold,andtheactualresultscitedbyKennC.RustinhisbookSeventhAirForceStoryInWorldWarII[42].Inhis13June1942letter,GeneralDavidson(actingSeventhAirForcecommanderonthatdate)statedthatinactionon3June1942,9B-17sscoredfivehits,oneprobablehit,andfournearmissesleavingtwoenemyvesselsaflame.[43]Rustpointsout,however,thatonlynineofthe36bombsreleasedfellneartheenemytransportships,andnohitsweremade.[44]

Likewise,inoutliningtheactionon4June1942,GeneralDavidsondetailedtheresultsof several flights of B-17s, highlighting no fewer than a dozen hits and an enemydestroyersunk.[45]Additionally,herecountedamissionoffourB-26s,armedwith2000-poundtorpedoes,scoringtwohits,butatalossoftwoB-26s.[46]Again,Rustpointsoutthatwhile this B-26missionwas the first torpedo attack byArmyAir Force planes inhistory,andthecombatwasharrowingindeed,nohitswerescored,andtwoB-26swerelost.[47]Similarly,RustpointsoutthatthebesttheB-17swereabletodoon4June1942wasputsixbombswithin100yardsasternandfivebombswithin200yardstostarboardof the enemycarrier Soryu.[48]Finally,Rust states the finalB-17missionon6 June1942claimed thesinkingofaJapanesedestroyer that turnedout tobeaUSsubmarine,whichfortunatelydivedquicklyandwasnothit.[49]GeneralDavidsonsletterof13June1942 did admit the mistaken attack on the friendly submarine.[50] Overall, GeneralDavidsonclaimed22directhitsinhis13June1942letter,againstlossesoftwoB-17sandtwoB-26s.[51]However,Ruststates that the lackofanyhitsobtaineddemonstrates theextremedifficultyofheavybombershittingmaneuvering ships at sea. [52]On theotherhand,RustarguesthattheSeventhAirForcemadeasignificantcontributiontotheBattleofMidway,bywearingdowntheenemydefensessothatNavydive-bomberscouldfinishoffthefourvirtuallyundefendedJapanesecarriers.[53]

TheexaggeratedpressreportsensuedbecausetheAAFbomberswerethefirsttoreturntoHawaii fromtheBattleofMidway,andfrankly, they took thecredit.[54]On12 June1942,onedaybeforethenavaltaskforcesreturnedtoPearlHarbor,theNewYorkTimespublishedanarticlewiththeheadline:ArmyFliersBlastedTwoFleetsoffMidway.[55]Theproblem,itseems,wasthatarmyaviatorswerenottrainedinassessingbattledamageatsea,andat theheight theywereflyingitwas impossibleaccurately todetermineshiptypesortotellahitfromanearmiss.[56]

While censorship rules of the timemayhaveplayed a role in theNavynot publiclydisputingAAFclaims,E.B.Potterpointsout thatNimitzrecognizing that theaviatorsmade up in gallantry what they lacked in aim and damage-assessment, declined tocontradict the Armys extravagant pretensions.[57] Even after the battle had beencarefully analyzed and it was clear they had not scored so much as a hit, Nimitz stilldeclinedtodisputetheaviators,releasinginsteadastatementthroughhisspokesmanthatMidway was truly a victory of the United States armed forces and not of the Navyalone.[58]

However, this apparent graciousness can also be seen as a kill themwith kindnessstrategy, and the Navy was not the only one employing it. In an undated message toGeneralArnold,GeneralMarshallhighlightsanavalflyerwhowhilelaudingtheworkofcarrier-basedaircraft inapressinterview,alsoreiteratedthatnotonemajorshipinthiswarhasbeensunkbyhorizontalbombing.[59]GeneralMarshallsguidance toGeneralArnoldisstrikinglysimilartothetacktakenbyNimitz:

WarDept.policyhasbeen tomakeno repeatnocommentpubliclyandnot repeatnot tomention thematter toNavyofficialsonthegroundsthattheindiscretionissogrossthattheinitialmovesforcorrectionshouldcomefromtheNavy.Thisyourconfidentialinformationtowarnyouagainstcomments,andtohaveyousuppresspossiblecommentsbyyourpeople.IndiscretionsofthisnaturewillonlydoharmatthismomentandwillweakenourpositionwhereasIbelievethatgoodwillcomeoutofthematterbecauseofthehighlyembarrassingpositioninwhichtheNavyDepartmenthasbeenplaced.[60]

Whileitappearsboththesemenweregenuinelyactingwithgraciouscivility,itisclearthatregardlessofmotivations,theservicesdidnotwanttoairinterservicedisputesinthepublicarena.

Unfortunately,ViceAdmiralRaymondA.Spruance (whowould soon be inSeventhAirForces direct operational chainof command)wasnot as understanding asAdmiralNimitz,andheneverforgavetheAAFforitsexaggeratedclaimsattheBattleofMidway.[61] General Hales (soon to be commander of the Seventh Air Force) receipt of the

DistinguishedServiceMedal for his bombingmissions atMidway probably aggravatedthis tension, and Admiral Spruances attitude did nothing to help the already difficultinterservicerelationshipbetweenGeneralHaleandhis(soon-to-be)immediateoperationalboss,ViceAdmiralJohnH.Hoover.[62]

Additionally,thesuccessoftheNavydive-bombersversustheapparentlackofsuccessof the AAF heavy bombers established a paradigm in some naval officers minds(especially Admiral Spruance and Admiral Hoover) of what effective bombing shouldlooklikei.e.lowerequalsbetter.[63]Thisparadigmisattheheartofwhatappearstobea fundamental misunderstanding and/or lack of appreciation on the part of these navalofficers for the nature of combat of land-based heavy bombers in the Central Pacific.Therewillbemoretosayonthisissueinthenextchapter.

Meanwhile,on the lastdayofbattle atMidway,6 June1942, thecommanderof theSeventhAirForce,GeneralTinker, led fourLB-30bomberson anightmission againstWake Island, hoping to catch some of the retiring Japanese fleet there.[64] GeneralTinkers planebecame lost, crashed into theocean, andno tracewas ever foundof theplane or the crew.[65] Brigadier General Howard C. Davidson served as the interimcommanderofSeventhAirForceuntilMajorGeneralWillisH.HaleassumedcommandoftheSeventhAirForceon20June1942.[66]

MajorGeneralWillisH.Hale

MajorGeneralWillisH.Halewasbornon7January1893inPittsburg,Kansas,wherehe attended public schools and Kansas State College.[67] He left school in 1912 andbecame an instructor at CulverMilitary Academy, and later at the New YorkMilitaryAcademy.[68]

In 1913, as a Third Lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary (composed of nativetroopsandwhiteofficers),GeneralHalefoughtintheOtocampaignandatPanayIslandagainst the outlawsreceiving the campaign ribbon.[69] He was commissioned in the

regulararmyin1917,servingwiththe15th InfantryinChina.Then, in1918,hewenttoFrancewiththeAmericanExpeditionaryForce(AEF),servingasaidetohisuncle,Major

General Harry C. Hale, Commander of the 84th Division.[70] With typical self-deprecation,GeneralHale reported thathedistinguishedmyself inWorldWar Ibynotdistinguishingmyself.[71]

GeneralHaleearnedhiswingsfromadvancedflyingtrainingatKellyField,TexasinDecember 1923, and was transferred to the Air Service in November 1924.[72] Hegraduated from the Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, Va. in June 1928; theCommandandGeneralStaffSchool,FortLeavenworth,Ks.inJune1934;andtheArmyWarCollege,Washington,D.C. in June 1937[73]. Following a tour of duty at GeneralHeadquarters,Air Force,WashingtonD.C., hewas serving asChief of Staff,ThirdAirForce at MacDill Field, Florida when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.[74] On 1January1942GeneralHaleassumedcommandofVIIBomberCommand,andon20June1942 he took command of the Seventh Air Force.[75] General Hale was in heavybombardment for virtually his entire time in theAirCorps, and sowas one of the fewseniorofficerswhohadgrownupwiththeAAFsstrategicweapon.[76]Hewasaleaderfrom the front, personally leading bombing missions during the Battle of Midway asCommander,VIIBomberCommand.[77]

InApril1943,asCommander,SeventhAirForce,hegotthegreenlightfromAdmiralNimitz to lead the firstbombingstrikesagainst thevaluablephosphateworksonNauruIslandandthefirstmissionagainstTarawa.[78]Thesemissionswerecombinedintoone,becomingoneofthelongestover-watermissionsinAAFhistoryat thetimeoverninethousandmilesflyingfromHawaiistagingthroughbasessuchasFunafuti.AfterthestrikeonTarawa,withtheJapanesealreadyretaliatingwithstrikesoftheirownagainstFunafuti,GeneralHalequickly ledhis bombersback toHawaii, inwhathedescribed toGeneralArnold as the longest and fastest retreat inmilitaryhistoryitwasover 3,300miles.

[79]GeneralHalesubsequentlyreceivedtheNavyCrossforthis.action.[80]Later,whilehe understood the subsequent order prohibiting senior officers from flying combatmissions,heregrettedthathecouldnotleadmissions.

GeneralHalehadatendencytotoywithhistortoiseshellglassesduringconversations,buthewasalwaysquietandattentive.[81]Herarelyswore,almostneverlosthistemper,andhissubordinatesclaimedthatevenduringadressingdownhisvoiceneverroseaboveaconversationaltone.[82]Ontheotherhand,hisstaffnotedthathecouldcurlthepaintoffaLiberatorwithawhisperearninghimthemonikerwhisperingWillis.[83]

GeneralHalewasextremelyconcernedaboutthemoraleofhismen.[84]Heinsistedona policy of returning flying personnel to themainland after 30 combatmissions in theheavybomberswhichinearly1944gavethemenaboutafifty-fiftychanceofsurvival.[85]HealsoinsistedonpresentingdecorationstohismenassoonastheywereawardedapolicyonlyrecentlyrestoredintodaysAirForce,referredtoaspinemwhereyouwinem.[86]Additionally,he instituteda twoweek rest schedule forhis forwarddeployedbombercrewsafter15missions,andallowedtheentirecrew(officersandenlisted)toR&Rtogetherincreasingtheteamworkandcamaraderieofhiscrews.[87]

General Hale smoked incessantly, had a poor memory for names, had no knownsuperstitionsand,likeallAirCorpsofficers,hadapsychopathichatredofpaperwork.[88]GeneralHalewasfondoftheyoungmeninhiscommand,andwhenhecouldchoosehealmostalwayswasfoundintheircompany.[89]Herarelysoughttheassociationofolderofficers, but found his ability to canvas his far-flung command curtailed by the almostdailyconferencesneededtocoordinatethejointoperationsoftheCentralPacific.[90]

Ingeneral,whileoneformsanimpressionofGeneralHaleasamanwhowasquietandunassuming,onecanalsoseeinGeneralHaleamanwhowasuncompromisingonissuesabout which he held deep convictions. Having grown-up in bombers and havingexperiencedfirst-handtheharrowingnatureofcombatinbombersintheCentralPacific,GeneralHalehadstrongconvictionsabouttheproperemploymentofhisbombers.Notsurprisingly,hewouldbelessthanreceptivetosuggestionsfromhisnavalsuperiorsthatwouldplacehiscrewsinevenmorejeopardythantheyalreadywere.Therewillbemoretosayaboutthisissueinthenextchapter.

EarlyCommandandControlRelationships

WhentheHawaiianAirForcewasactivatedin1940,itsoperationalchainofcommandwasstraightforwarditreceiveditsoperationalordersthroughLieutenantGeneralDelosC.Emmons(USArmy),CommandingGeneraloftheHawaiianDepartment.[91]However,when Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was designated as Chief, Pacific Ocean Area(CINCPOA)on30March1942, theNavy exercised operational control ofSeventhAirForce under the concept of unified command of the Pacific.[92] While this seems assimilarlystraightforwardasthecommandrelationshipenjoyedbytheHawaiianAirForce,in reality itwas farmore complex, and the command and control relationship betweenSeventhAirForceandtheNavycontinuallyevolvedthroughoutthewar.

TheearlyyearsoftheSeventhAirForce(1942throughsummer1943)serveasagoodexampleof thecomplexityofcommandandcontrol relationships in theCentralPacific.Duringthisperiod,GeneralHale,asCommanderoftheSeventhAirForce,servedasairofficeronGeneralEmmonsHawaiianDepartmentstaff,andinalladministrative,supplyand servicesmatters the SeventhAir Forcewas a subordinate echelon of theHawaiianDepartment.[93]Similarly,VIIFighterCommand,withitsprimarymissionatthattimeofdefense of the Hawaiian Islands, fell under the Hawaiian Department for operationalcommand and control.[94] However, VII Bomber Command fell under the direct andcompleteoperationalcontroloftheNavy,throughtheNavysPatrolWing2(Patwing2).[95]

In order to simplify matters, this work will focus on the operational command andcontrol relationshipsof theSeventhAirForce, andFigures2-7onpages21-23providenotionalgraphicdepictionsofthevariousoperationalcommandandcontrolstagesoftheSeventh Air Force from 1940-1945. Figure 2 (page 21) shows the straightforwardoperationalcommandrelationshipenjoyedbytheHawaiianAirForceasdescribedabovein1940and1941.Figure3(page21)displaysthesplitoperationalcommandandcontrolofVIIFighterCommandandVIIBomberCommandbetweentheNavyandtheArmyasdescribedabove,from1942throughmid-1943whenplansforthelaunchingoftheisland-hoppingcampaignwoulddrivetheforgingofnewoperationalcommandrelationships.

Figures 4, 5, and 6 (pages 22 and 23) depict the operational command and controlschemesforSeventhAirForceduringthethreemajorisland-hoppingcampaignsthroughtheGilberts,theMarshalls,andtheMarianas.Theevolutionofoperationalcommandandcontrolduringthisperiodliesattheheartofthiswork,asthisiswhenGeneralHalewasmostcloselyassociatedwiththeforcesoftheSeventhAirForceeitherasCommanderof

SeventhAirForce, or asCOMAIRFORWARD (CommanderofTaskForce59).Duringthistimeframe,GeneralHaleagitatedforandeventuallygainedfulloperationalcontrolofallshore-basedairassets.Ironically,itwasonlyafterGeneralHalerelinquishedcommandof theSeventhAirForce thathewasable togainfulloperationalcontrolofallSeventhAirForceassetsinadditiontoNavyandMarineshore-basedassets.[96]

Finally, Figure 7 (page 23) represents the operational command and controlrelationshipsduringthelastmajorcampaignofWorldWarIIthebattleforOkinawa.Bythe spring of 1945, the ranks and assets of the SeventhAir Force had swelled beyondanything reminiscent of the old moniker the Seventh Air Force had earned during theisland-hopping campaignHales Handful. So much so, in fact, that a Tactical AirForce, commanded by aMarine air general was established onOkinawa, operationallycontrollingVII Bomber Command, aswell as SeventhAir Forces P-47N fighters.[97]The rest of VII Fighter Command was operationally controlled by Army Air Forces,PacificOceanArea (AAFPOA),whichhadbeen activatedon1August 1944under thecommand of LieutenantGeneralMillard F.Harmon.[98]GeneralHales Task Force 59was disbanded on 6 December 1944, whereupon General Hale served as the DeputyCommanderforOperations,AAFPOAthroughtheendofthewar.[99]

Figure2.OPCON,HawaiianAirForce,Mid-1940and1941

Figure3.OPCONSeventhAirForce,1942ThroughSummer1943

Figure4.OPCON,SeventhAirForce:TheGilberts,Fall1943

Figure5.OPCON,SeventhAirForce:TheMarshalls,Early1944

Figure6.OPCONSeventhAirForce:TheMarianas,Summer1944

Figure7.OPCONSeventhAirForce:Okinawa,Spring1945

CHAPTER3THEEARLYCAMPAIGNS:THEGILBERTSANDTHEMARSHALLS

Justonedamnedislandafteranother!PilotsandGroundCrewsoftheSeventhAirForce

Introduction

Thesummerof1943marksthetransitionofSeventhAirForcefromadefensiveandtrainingorientedcommandtoanoffensive,highlymobilecombatcommand.[100]Whiletraining and service support to other commands would continue, as well as FighterCommands charge to provide for air defense, Seventh Air Forces energies becameincreasinglydevotedtosupportofitsownoffensiveoperationsintheCentralPacific.[101]InJuly1943,SeventhAirForcereceiveditsfirstmajorcombatassignmentwhentheJointChiefs of Staff issued orders for operation GALVANICa joint amphibious assaultagainst theGilbertIslands,markingthebeginningofadrivethroughtheCentralPacificbyArmy,Navy,MarineandAirForces.[102]GeneralHalebestdescribesthesignificancetohiscommand:

July 1943 marked the end of the defensive phase of our operations. Plans for theCentralPacificoffensivewererevealedtous.NolongerwouldweflyfromstaticdefensepositionsinHawaii,withoccasionalraidsfromourscatteredbases.Wepreparedtotakeourbomberstobaseshundredsandeventhousandsofmilesawaywherewewouldclosewiththeenemyanddrivehimback.[103]

UnitsofVIIBomberCommandwouldcontinuetofaceall thechallengestheycopedwith when previously deployed to the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) during theSolomons Campaignand more: extreme distances, no escorts, the need for pinpointaccuracy, joint command and control, and logistical nightmares. While creativity andtechnologicaladvancementsovercamesomeofthesechallenges,oftenitwasjustpuregritanddeterminationthatgotthejobdone.

UnitsofVIIFighterCommandwoulddeploy to forwardstagingbases toprovideairdefense,thenwouldembarkonawidevarietyofmissions,oftenjoint,inpreparationforand execution of the amphibious assaults that were the hallmark of the island-hoppingcampaigns across theCentral Pacific. The challenges theymetwere also extraordinary,and the solutions they devisedwere likewise often highly innovative.However, just asoften,thepriceforsolutionswaspaidforinbloodespeciallyinthedevelopmentofjointCloseAirSupport(CAS)proceduresanddoctrine.

ThischapterwillhighlightthemajorobstaclesandchallengesmetandovercomebytheSeventhAirForceduringthecampaignsfortheGilbertandMarshallIslands,focusingonplanningandpreparations,bomberoperationsanddevelopmentofCloseAirSupport.

TheCampaignfortheGilbertIslandsOperationGALVANICPlanning,Organizing,andPreparing

PlanningfortheoffensiveintheCentralPacifichadalwaysenvisionedoccupyingtheMarshall Islands in preparation for subsequent operations against positions in theCarolinessuchasPonapeandTruk.[104]However,closerstudyarguedforoccupationoftheGilbertIslandspriortooperationsintheMarshallIslandsforseveralreasons.First,theGilberts had enemy airstrips at Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama, which were easilyreinforcedfromtheirmainbaseatTrukintheCarolineIslands,andsorepresentedathreatto operations in the Marshalls. Second, taking the Gilberts would enable sustainedreconnaissance and bombing operations against the Marshalls that American bases atFunafutiandCantonweretoofarawaytosupport.Additionally,seizingtheGilbertsfirstwouldallowU.S.forcestoadvancealonganestablishedlineofcommunicationsjoiningthe Central and South Pacific, and would allow Admiral Nimitzs forces to testamphibious methods/equipment against less centrally defended islands than in theMarshalls. Finally, occupying the Gilberts would mean acquiring atolls with airfieldsalready built on them, andwould effectivelywiden theSolomons front so that surfaceforcescouldbeusedineitherorbothareas.[105]

FinalplansforOperationGALVANICintheGilbertscalledfortheseizureofTarawa,Makin,andApamamabyamphibiousforces.TarawaAtoll(composedofseveral islandson a reef twenty-twomiles long) was themost important and best-defended objective,havingbecomethemainJapaneseairbaseintheGilberts.[106]MakinandTarawaAtollswereassaultedsimultaneouslyon20November1943,andtheassaultonApamamabeganon26November1943.[107]

To accomplish Operation GALVANIC, Admiral Nimitz created the Central PacificForce, United States Pacific Fleet, commanded by Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance,consistingofafastcarrierforce,ajointexpeditionaryforce(forlandings),andaforceforoperationalcontrolofshore-basedaircraftandthebasesfromwhichtheyoperated.[108]Allshore-basedaircraftcameunderoperationalcontrolofTaskForce57,commandedbyViceAdm.JohnH.Hoover.GeneralHalesSeventhAirForceprovidedAdmiralHooverwith bombers and fighters.Thebomberswere organized as a strike group (TaskGroup57.2)underGeneralHalescommand,whilethefightersbecamepartoftheElliceDefenseandUtilityGroup (TaskGroup57.4), commandedbyBrig.Gen.L.G.Merritt,USMC.[109]

SevensquadronsofbombersandthreesquadronsoffightersoftheSeventhAirForce

supported Operation GALVANIC from five islandsCanton, Funafuti, Nukufetau,Nanomea,andBaker.Ofthese,onlyCantonandFunafutihadbeendevelopedpriortothefallof1943.[110]TheSeabeesandaviationengineersworkedhardtohewairstripsoutofthe dense covering of coconut palms on the other three islands prior to D day, and inSeptember, 19P-40Ns of theSeventhAir Force flew fromCanton toBaker to providelocalprotectionfortheengineers.[111]

However, despite herculean efforts in readying these fields for use in OperationGALVANIC, the challenges in providing service andmaintenance on islands up to twothousandmilesfromtheHawaiianAirDepotwereequallyprodigious.Sincegroundcrewswouldaccompanytheflightpersonnelof theirbomberandfightersquadrons,squadronscould provide their own first and second level maintenance; but third and fourth levelmaintenance in the forward area were too much to expect. In fact, the only thingapproachingstandardmaintenancefacilitiescouldbefoundatCanton,whereasub-depotandAirBaseSquadronwerelocatedafterJuly1943.[112]

Accordingly,tomeettheneedonovercrowded,smallislandsintheforwardarea,VIIAirForceServiceCommanddevelopedanewconceptlean,compactmobileunitscalledAirServiceSupportSquadrons(ASSRONS).[113]Thesestrippeddownunits,asidefrombeing thinlymannedwere also required to provide a variety of services,with duties toinclude:

repair, supply, evacuation, sanitation, construction, transportation, traffic control, salvage, graves registration,burials, quartering, training of service units, estimation and supervision of funds, and other activities as may berequired.[114]

Inreality,thedutiesoftheASSRONSwereevenbroader.InboththeGilbertsandtheMarshalls,whenoccupyingbasescapturedfromtheenemy,theyactedasinfantryduringemergencies,formedburialteamsforthedispositionofenemydead,andsuppliedthebulkof the stevedore labor for unloading on the beaches.Additionally, they supplied detailsthat cleared away debris and undergrowth from areas to be occupied and helped inconstructingbuildingsandairfields.[115]

TheASSRONwasashort-livedphenomenonborninpartfromtheneedtofindawaytooperatewiththechronicpersonnelshortagessufferedbytheSeventhAirForceduringtheearlyyearsofthewarinthePacific.BeforetheendofthecampaignfortheMarshallIslands, theASSRONconceptwasabandoned in favorof standard servicegroups.[116]DuringtheirshortlifeASSRONStookalotofcriticism,someofitjustified.Oneproblem

stemmedfromcommandersusingdeploymenttotheASSRONSasanopportunitytogetridoftheirundesirabletroopsoneASSRONunithad14outof32menwhohadcourt-martialrecords.[117]Anotherproblemstemmedfromtheunconventionalnatureandhastyformation of the ASSRONS themselvesleading to inefficient performance fromuntrainedtroopsperformingunprecedented tasks.However, there isampleevidence thatthese creative outfits performed credibly, with later ASSRONS benefiting from theexperiencesofthosethatcamebefore.[118]

BomberOperationsinSupportofOperationGALVANIC

AjointbomberstrikeagainstTarawawaslaunchedinSeptember1943inanattempttoneutralizetheairfieldthere,therebypreventinginterferencetotheengineersbuildingtheairfields on the three Ellice Islands previously mentioned (Nukufetau, Nanomea, andBaker).RearAdmiralCharlesA.Pownall,commanderofTaskForce15wassuppliedasquadronofSeventhAirForceB-24s,whileBrigadierGeneralTrumanH.LandonoftheSeventhAirForceoperatingoutofCantonhadsixNavyPBYsinadditiontohisB-24s.Additionally,BrigadierGeneralHaroldD.Campbell,USMC,of theFunafutiAirGroupboastedB-24s,PBYs,andPV-1sfortheraid.[119]Inanefforttoimmobilizetheairstripforthecarriers,B-24swerelaunchedonthenightof18September1943andbombedthe

airfieldonTarawa.ThecarriersairpowerworkedoverTarawaonthemorningofthe19th,followedbyadditionalB-24sfora final reconnaissanceandbombingrun.TheJapaneseanswered with antiaircraft fire, and sent up fifteen to twenty Zekes to intercept thebombers, shooting down one B-24 and damaging 10 others. While the photographsprovidedmuchneededintelligence,theyalsoshowedthatTarawahadnotbeenknockedout,noteventemporarilyominoustidingsindeedfortheupcomingassault.[120]

SustainedbombingoperationsbyB-24sandNavyplanesinpreparationforOperationGALVANICbeganon13November1943(Dminus7).[121]Onthatday,eighteenB-24s

of the 11th Group took off from Funafuti and dropped 126 x 20-pound fragmentationclusters and 55 x 500-pound GP (general purpose) bombs from 8,500 and 15,000 feetrespectivelyreturning crews could see the fires burning up to 60 miles away.[122]StrikesofsimilarforcebyB-24swerelaunchedagainstTarawaonDminus6,Dminus3and D minus 1. Both Tarawa andMakin got even heavier pounding from D minus 4throughDminus1fromcarrierplanes.

However, for Seventh Air Force planes, enemy bases in the Marshalls that couldinterfere with Operation GALVANIC also required considerable attention. In theMarshalls, themajor enemy air threats to copewithwere fromKwajaleinAtoll, Jaluit,

Mille, and Maloelap. Therefore, B-24s struck Mille and Tarawa on D minus 6 (14

November1943), Jaluit andMilleon the15th,KwajaleinandMaloelapon the16th,and

Tarawa andMille again on the 17th and 18th. Understandably, on the 19th (Dminus 1),SeventhAirForceB-24s,Navyplanes, andcarriergunfirepounded theprimaryassaulttargets,TarawaandMakin.[123]

During the raids on the Marshall Islands, while the overall enemy response wasrelativelyineffective,eachoftheattacksmetwithantiaircraftfireofvaryingintensityandaccuracy,andatJaluit,KwajaleinandMaloelapJapanesefighterscameuptointerceptthebombers.[124]Additionally, the enemy struck backwith raids againstNanomea on thenightof11NovemberandagainstFunafution13and17November.[125]

BythetimetheMarineswentashoreonTarawaon20November1943,theSeventhAirForceheavybombershadflown141sorties,dropping116.5tonsofGPbombsand5,63420-pound fragmentation bombs directed primarily against Japanese fortifications.[126]Whileconductingtheseraids,aerialengagementsresultedinthedestructionoffiveenemyplanes,withfiveothersprobablydestroyed,andtwomoredamaged.[127]FiveB-24shadbeen lost on missions, with two more destroyed on the ground by the Japanese, andpersonnellossestotaledsixdead,nineteenwounded,andelevenmissing.[128]

Despitetheseefforts,afterdaysofbitterfightingthatcost3,301casualties,theMarineshad reason to believe that the pre-invasion bombardment of Tarawa had beenwoefullylacking.Onepossiblereasoncouldbethattoomuchemphasishadbeenplacedonsurfacebombardmentover 80 percent of the fire on Tarawas defenses had been from navalguns,withonly10percenteachcomingfromtheB-24sandcarrieraircraft.[129]As theJapanese positions onTarawawerewell dug in, the flatter trajectory of the naval gunswere probably less effective in destroying bunkers and fortifications than bombardmentfromaircraft.[130]Anotherpossibleproblemmayhavebeentheallocationof theB-24sthemselves. Since there werent enough B-24s to neutralize all the surrounding enemybases in theMarshalls, perhaps it would have been better to concentrate the B-24s onTarawa,and relyon thecarriers toprotect theassault forces.[131]However, thisoptionwasnotacceptableinaNavy-centrictheaterwheretherewasconsiderableconcernaboutthesafetyofthecarriersfromoutlyingenemybases.Regardless,theineffectivenessofthepre-invasionbombardmentwasnttheonlyproblemwiththeoperationsintheGilberts.

TheDevelopmentofCloseAirSupport(CAS)intheGilberts

Asnotedintheintroduction,whentheUnitedStatesenteredthewarin1941,noneofthe serviceshadanyseriousexperience inclose supportofground troops, andcloseair

supporthadthelowestpriorityofallairoperations.[132]However,thiswouldchange,andclosesupportmissionswouldbecomeamajortaskinPacificamphibiousoperations,andthelessonslearnedalongthewaywouldbepaidforinblood.[133]

Also as noted earlier,militaryoperations in theCentralPacific differedgreatly fromthose in the South or Southwest Pacific (SWPA), especially in regard to the distancesbetweenbasesandobjectives,andthenatureoftheobjectivesthemselves.[134]Thegreatdistances involved in the Central Pacific operations usually meant that close supportduring the assault phase would come from the carriers, with land-based air support tofollow once an airstrip had been captured.[135] This contrasted with operations in theSouthwestPacificwherebaseswereusuallycloseenoughtoamphibiousobjectivestouseland-based air support throughout the duration of the operation. Additionally, whereasplannersforSouthwestPacificoperationscouldusuallyfindanundefendedbeachtolandon,thesmallersizeoftheislandsandatollsintheCentralPacificmeantthattheJapanesecouldmaintain defensive garrisons practically everywhere, so that landings usuallymetwithstiffresistance.[136]ThismeantthatCASintheCentralPacificwasfarmorecriticalto the success of amphibious operations than in the Southwest Pacific, and lack ofeffectivenessimmediatelytranslatedtolostAmericanlives.

Understandably, CAS in the Central Pacific developed quite independently from itsevolution in the Southwest Pacific; and eventually CAS procedures in the SouthwestPacific came to parallel those developed in theCentral Pacific,with a few differences.[137] However, prior to launching the Central Pacific drive, the only CAS proceduresavailableasmodelswere thosegained from theamphibiousexperiencesatGuadalcanalandNewGeorgiaintheSouthPacificandatAttu,intheAleutianIslands.[138]SincethelandingsonGuadalcanalwereunopposedandtheNewGeorgialandingwassupportedbyland-basedair,therewaslittleintheseoperationstooffertoearlyoperationsintheCentralPacific.However,whiletheoperationatAttuwasalsolargelysupportedbyland-basedair,anaircraft carrierparticipatedandanaval systemof controlwasexplored that lookedfeasible.[139]

CASProceduresatAttu

Inessence,thecriticalelementsofthecontrolprocess:thecommandersupportaircraft(CSA), theaircontroller (AC),andair liaisonparties (ALPs)werealldevelopedduringthe Attu operation, and would be integral to the CAS process throughout the CentralPacificdrive.[140]

AtAttu,thecommanderofthenavaltaskforce(CTF51)controlledallairsupportuntil

command passed to the land commander ashore.[141]Controlwas exercised through aNavycommandersupportaircraft(CSA)onboardthebattleshipPennsylvania,anArmyAirForce(AAF)aircoordinator(AC)airborneovertheisland,aMarineassistantCSAonboardthecarrierNassau,andair liaisonparties(onenavalofficer,oneAAFofficer,andtwo enlisted AAF men) serving with the landing force commander and each battalionashore.[142]Onlyone radio circuitwasused to support communicationsbetween theseparties, although twoVHF and twoHF frequencieswere available on this circuit.[143]However,thebottomlinewasthatonlyonecircuitwasavailabletosupportairrequests,airdirection,andintelligencetransmission.[144]

In theevent,poorweather, lackofavailablecircuits, andcomplicatedpanelmarkingprocedures, among other problems, resulted in poor quality CAS at Attu.[145] Theseproblems, whether undigested or unheeded, would contribute to the coming debacle atTarawaintheGilberts.

CASProceduresintheGilberts

ThefirststepofOperationGALVANICwasthecaptureoftwosmall,flat,coralatolls,in the Gilbert Islands groupMakin and Tarawa. Since these atolls were over onehundred miles apart, the assaults on these atolls were considered separate; and navalforces,includingthecarriers,weredivided.[146]

TheplanforthesystemofcontrolwassimilartothatusedatAttuintheAleutians,andhighly joint. One commander support aircraft (CSA) for the whole operation wasappointed(anArmyAirForceofficer,ColonelWilliamO.Eareckson),whooperatedfromthe battleship Pennsylvania, off Makin. Two additional CSAs (North and South) wereappointedunderColonelEareckson,oneonthePennsylvania,offMakin,andoneontheMaryland,offTarawa.Twoaircoordinators(ACs)weretobeairborneovereachatoll,andair liaison officers (ALPs) were assigned to each landing forcewith enlisted assistants(MarineCorpscommunicationspersonnel).[147]

AsatAttu,oneradionetwithalternatingfrequencieswasdedicated to theoperation,butwithtwowidelyseparatedatollsandover18stationsonthenet,thiswasarecipeforfailure at critical moments. Additionally, the time-honored naval tradition of using abattleshipas thecommandandcontrolshipwasfollowed,servingnot justas thehubofcommunications for CAS, but for the entire operationand neither battleship wasadequatelyequippedforsuchoperations.Worse,thebattleshipswere,ofnecessity,alsoapartofthebombardmentforce,andwitheverysalvofiredfromtheobsoleteMarylandatTarawa,theconcussionknockedcommunicationsoutforminutesatatime.[148]

Theplan for themorningof the landings (20November1943) called for all torpedobombers,anyfightersnotneededforcombatairpatrol(CAP),andasmanydivebombersaspossibletoattacktheatolls(antiaircraftguns,buildings,etc.)for30minutespriortothefinalnavalbombardment.Then,afterthefinalnavalbombardment,fighterplanesweretostrafe the beaches, gradually moving inland, and ceasing when the first boat touchedshore.Aftertroopswereashore,allrelievedfightersweretoreporttotheCSAforstrafingmissionspriortoreturningtotheircarriers.Generally, theCSAwouldreleasecontroloftheflighttotheALPashoreiftheALPwasabletodirectthestrike.[149]

Duringthelandings,airoperationsatlightlydefendedMakinwereconductedbasicallyasplanned,whileairoperationsatheavilydefendedTarawawerenot.CommunicationsatTarawaweresofrequentlyinterruptedbothashoreandafloatthatwhenplanesforthefirstairattackwere30minuteslate(forunknownreasons),theCSAdidntevenknowaboutit.Asaresult,coordinationforairandnavalgunfirewashopelesslyoutofcontrolfromthevery beginning.Theworst result of the air operationswere incidents of friendly fire,fromstrafingourownMarinestobombingfriendlytanks(theJapanesehadnotanksonMakin).AccordinglytoDr.JoeG.Taylor,authorofCloseAirSupportintheWarAgainstJapan,USAFHistoricalStudy#86, theseconditionsarose frompoorcommunications,dependence upon panels to mark front lines, and sheer carelessness on the part of thepilots.[150]

ConclusionsfromOperationGalvanic

It should be noted that criticisms of air support in Operation GALVANIC wereapplicable to virtually every phase of operations in the Gilberts and delivered thefollowingjudgement:

Planning was poor; equipment was inadequate; naval gunfire and the preliminary air bombardment wereinsufficientandpoorlydirected;andthecommunicationstroublewhichplaguedairsupporthamperedallphasesoftheoperation.[151]

Onemajorlessonlearnedwasthatusingaconventionalbattleshipforacommandpostwasanutterfailure,andnewcommandandcontrolships(AGCs)wereimmediatelymadebyoutfittingtransportswithelaboratecommunicationssystems.ThesefloatingcommandpostswerereadyforthenextdrivethroughtheMarshalls.Additionally,operationsintheGilbertshighlightedtheneedforbetterCSAcontrolofsupportaircraft,theneedforstrictradiodiscipline,andtheneedforenhancedcoordinationbetweenairandnavalgunfire,soastominimizefriendlyfireandtoensureplaneswereavailablewhenneeded.[152]

Asubsequentreport,writtenbyColonelClaudiusH.M.RobertsafteratripthroughtheGilbertsandMarshallsin1944toevaluatemunitionsfortheUSArmy,reinforcedsomeoftheseconclusions.[153]WhileColonelRobertspointsoutthatthequalityoftheconcreteused by the Japanese in their pillboxes and shelters was poor, they were nonethelesspreparedtoresiststrongattacksfromtheseaorairatTarawa.[154]Therefore,oneofhisprimary conclusions was that adequate intensity and proper use of aerial, naval, andartillerybombardmentmustbemadetodestroyresistanttargets,crateranddemolishfieldfortifications,andclearfoliageandundergrowthtoopenfieldsoffireandreduceenemyconcealment.[155] If nothing else, this report served to indicate that there wasconsiderableinterestacrossalltheservicestoensureeventsatTarawawerenotrepeated.

On thepositivesideof the ledger, theair liaisonparties (ALPs)hadperformedquitewell, to the point where they were often the only means by which higher-levelcommanders could get good intelligence. Additionally, while the basic elements of thecontrolsystemforclosesupportthecommandersupportair(CSA), theaircoordinator(AC),andtheairliaisonparties(ALPs)couldbemademoreeffective,theydidnotneedtobeabolishedinfavorofredevelopingaCASprocessfromscratch.[156]

Operation GALVANIC had been a laboratory for amphibious operationsunfortunately,Tarawamadeitaverybloodyone.However,ultimatelyTarawawasstillanexpeditiousoperationdespiteheavycasualties,whileMakinwassecuredinonedaywith186casualtiesandoperationsatApamamametnooppositionatall.[157]

TheCampaignfortheMarshallIslandsOperationsFLINTLOCKandCATCHPOLEPlanning,Organizing,andPreparing

Operations in the Gilberts had always been considered as preliminary to a drivethrough the Marshall Islands, which would secure critical staging bases for either anassaultagainstthegreatbastionofTruk(intheCarolines)or,asfinallydecided,tosupporta drive into the Marianas Islands.[158] Operation FLINTLOCK, code name for theplannedassaultofKwajaleinandMajuroAtolls,hadatargetdateof1February1944setby the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Operation CATCHPOLE, code name for the subsequentassaultofEniwetokAtoll,wasplannedtobeginthreemonthslater.[159]Intheevent,theease and speed at which operation FLINTLOCK was executed allowed operationCATCHPOLEtobelaunchedimmediatelyafterward;andby19February1944,Eniwetok(northwestern-mostof theMarshalls)was secure.[160]However,while valuable lessonslearnedfromtheGilbertssurelycontributedtoeasierassaultoperationsintheMarshalls,the drive through the Marshalls would exact a high price from Seventh Air Forcesbombersandcrews.

For thedrivethroughtheMarshalls, theSeventhAirForceremainedpartofAdmiralHoovers Task Force 57, which in turn remained part of Admiral Spruances CentralPacificForce.[161]GeneralHalecontinued tocontrol the land-basedstrikeforce,but intheMarshallshealsocontrolledthefightersaspartofthatstrikingforceaswell.[162]

While air operations from the Gilberts through theMarshalls continued non-stop intheir intensity, the Seabees and Seventh Air Force aviation engineers were laboringintensely to prepare newly won bases in the Gilberts for use.[163] Development ofairfields onTarawaAtoll took precedence, and just as soon as the fighting stopped theSeabeesstartedtoworkonairfieldsonBetioandBuotaIslands.Whencompleted,Betiohadonecoralrunway(6,450feetX300feet),parkingfor72heavybombers,hardstandsfor 100 fighters, and service facilities. When finished, Buota boasted two airfields,dispersalareasfor76bombers,servicefacilities,andboundarylightsandfloodlightsfornightoperations.[164]AtMakin,SeventhAirForceengineersquicklycompletedworkonan airstrip consisting of a seven thousand foot runway (with steel matting), dispersalability for 78 fighters and 24 heavy bombers, and third-level maintenance facilities.Finally, while progress at Apamamawas slower, its airfield eventually consisted of aneight thousand foot coral runway, dispersal for 72 heavy bombers, lighting for nightoperations,andlimitedmaintenancefacilities.[165]FightersandbombersoftheSeventhAir Force were deployed forward into the Gilberts just as fast as these fields became

available,whileairoperationscontinued.BythefirstweekinJanuary1944,GeneralHalehadmovedhisADVONSeventhAirForce,alongwiththeforwardcommandelementsofVIIBomberCommand andVIIAFSC (Air Force ServiceCommand) fromFunafuti toTarawaintheGilberts.[166]

LifeintheForwardArea

Themen of theSeventhAir Force lived andworked in theGilberts under primitiveconditions.[167] First, in the aftermath of the brutal fighting and heavy bombardment,most of the islands were a mass of stripped and/or uprooted coconut palms, withsmashed/burned-out blockhouses filled with the heaped-up corpses of rotting, stinkingdead.[168]Further,intheaftermathoftheassaultonTarawa,evenaftertheSeventhAirForceplaneshadarrivedandbegunoperations,thedugouts,despitetheunbearablestench,still contained a few fierce, fighting Japanese who would charge or shoot at anyonehappeningnearby.[169]

Themen lived on seemingly everlasting field rations,with very little drinkingwaterandnoentertainment.Lifequicklybecamemonotonousonthesetinyatolls.[170]Asoneofficergrimlynoted, itwasflies in theday,mosquitoes atnight, anddysenteryall thetime.[171]

Bombing/StrikeOperationsintheMarshalls

AiroperationsintheGilbertsandMarshallswerecontinuous,andsteadilyincreasedinboththeirintensityandtheirjointflavor.InadditiontoimportanttargetsintheMarshallssuchasMille,JaluitandMaloelap;Nauru,tothewestoftheGilberts,constitutedathreattoSeventhAirForces forward bases.This base consisted of an airstrip and the largestphosphateworks in thePacific.Therefore, one day after the landings onTarawa,NavyPB4Ys and Seventh Air Force Liberators conducted joint daylight photo and bombingstrikesonthatIsland.[172]

ThroughouttherestofNovemberandDecemberof1943,SeventhAirForceLiberatorscontinued topoundNauru,Mille, Jaluit andMaloelap,both toprotectoperations in theGilbertsandtoprepareforOperationCATCHPOLEintheMarshalls.[173]AsbasesintheGilbertswerecapturedandprepared,SquadronsofB-24s,B-25s,A-24s,P-39s,andP-40sweremovedforward,resultinginincreasedairstrengththatcouldbebroughttobear.Theprimary consequence of this build up was that the heavy bombers would no longershouldertheentireloadfortheever-increasinglistoftargets.[174]Forexample,startingin December 1943, the neutralization of Mille and Jaluit, the closest of the MarshallIslands, was turned over to the A-24s (Dauntless dive-bombers), P-39s, and P-40s.

Usually the A-24s would be escorted by AAF P-39s, P-40s, or Navy F6Fs.[175]Sometimes,NavySBDs(theNavyversionoftheA-24dive-bomber)wouldgowiththem.In addition to escorting the A-24s, the P-39s and P-40s flew a variety of missions:bombing, strafing, attacks on shipping and combat patrol.[176] Overall, 367 bombingsortieswere flown againstMille and Jaluit from 18December 1943 andD-day for theassault on Kwajalein Atoll, 31 January 1944.[177] Additionally, the fighters flewcontinuousdaylightcombatpatrolsoverMillefromD-minusonethroughD-plusoneforoperationCATCHPOLE.[178]

TheBomberCrisisToughcombat,ToughDecisions

Despitetheincreasedairstrengthintheforwardarea,lifedidnotgeteasierforeithertheheavy (B-24), or for themedium (B-25) bombers.First, for eachnew forwardbaseestablished, new, ever deeper targets would appear from over the horizon, such asEniwetok(northern-mostoftheMarshalls)andPonape(northwestofNauru,nearTruk).Accordingly,themajorityofmissionsfortheheavybombersremainedunescorted,andatthe very limits of their operational endurance. Second, after the amphibious warfareexpertscandidlyanalyzedtheirmistakesintheGilberts,oneofthemajorlessonslearnedwas that preliminary bombing had not been sufficiently intense, nor of long enoughduration. Therefore, pre-assault bombardment would now last for 3 days, instead of 3hours as it had at Tarawa.[179]Accordingly, as the assault onKwajalein (Majurowasexpectedtobetakenwithlittleopposition)neared,HalesHandful,astheshort-handedSeventhAir Force came to be called, launched amaximum effort at Kwajalein,Mille,Jaluit,Maillot,Wotje,andNaurumaintainingvirtualround-the-clockpoundingofthesebases.[180] While these efforts were supplemented by decisive strikes by AdmiralMitscherscarriers,itwastheLiberatorsoftheSeventhAirForcethatcarriedtheheaviestburden.[181]

InalettertoGeneralHapArnold,ChiefoftheArmyAirCorps,of29December1943,GeneralHaledescribedat lengthsomeof theproblemsdevelopingduring the transitionfromtheGilberttotheMarshalloperations:

FromthetimeofourfirstmissiononNovember13th,preparatorytotheGilbertIslandsassault,wehavebombed

Japbasesalmostdaily33daysinatotalof47days.Andwhatmissions!Theyhaveaveraged1600milesovernothing

butwater,andthrougheverykindofweatherexceptsnow.Ourbasesarehastilyconstructedsinglestripsonsmallatolls.

Average gross loads over 62,000.Communications have beenundependable andweather information almost useless.

The Jap bases arematured,well developed andmodern.At firstmy losseswere negligible; now they aremounting

rapidly.TheJapsareheavily reinforcing theMarshallson thegroundand in theair.TheirA/Ahas improvedgreatly.

About50ZerosinterceptedyesterdayatMaloelapandshotdowntwoB-24s.TheirA/Adidthesametotwoplaneson

the26thandtwomoreafewdaysbefore.Ourdistancesaresogreatthattheheaviesneverhaveanyfightercover.Some

ofmycrewsarebeginningtocrack,butIbelievewecancontinueatourpresentrateforaboutonemoremonth100

hourspermonthof combat flying is rather tough. InFebruary Iwill probably slowdownon theheavies and let the

mediumstakeovertheburden.Theyhadtheirfirstmissionyesterday.ItwasagainstMille500footceiling,rainand

A/Atheywentinat40feetwith50sand75sonfull.

AscomparedtoflyingoverEurope,thecrewsofdisabledplanesknowtheirparachutesareuseless,sointothe

oceantheygoandwehavefailedtorecoverasingleman.Islandsarefarapartandinenemyhands.

Notwithstanding these grueling flights, lousy living conditions, field rations, no amusement or recreation, no

hopeifdisabled,nofightercover,yetoutthego,onceeverythreeorfourdays,theircontinuedwillingnessandguts

unshaken. Iknowofnootherplace in theworldwhereourAirForce is fighting in factsof similar to thoseoutlined

above.

IammovingmyheadquarterstofamousTarawatomorrowandwillremainonthatAmerican-Japgraveyardat

leastuntiltheconclusionoftheMarshallIslandsoperations.

HappyNewYear.[182]

GeneralArnoldsresponseof19January1944toGeneralHale,whileunderstandablynot offering solutions yet developed or manpower yet available (in keeping with theGermanyfirstpolicy),doesofferunderstandingandencouragementitreadsinpart:

Willis,weareallawareoftheproblemsyouarebeingcalledupontosolveandyoumaybesurethatnoeffortwillbesparedtogiveyouwhatyouneedtodothe jobIknowtheSeventhAirForcewillagaindistinguish itself in thecomingshow.[183]

However, the consistently intense opposition the heavy bombers met on raids overMaloelappromptedGeneralHaletoacceleratehisdecisiontoshifttheburdenmoretotheB-25Mitchells.FromDecember1943throughearlyJanuary1944theSeventhAirForceLiberators had claimed 54 enemy planes destroyed, 61 probable, and 55 damaged incombatoverMaloelap,withlossesof11LiberatorsenoughforGeneralHaletoswitchhisLiberatorstonightattackseffective2January1944.[184]

Themedium bombers (B-25Mitchells), for their part continued unescorted daylightstrikes against Maloelap throughout December 1943 and January 1944sometimesdrawingasmanyasfiftyenemyfightersuptointercept them.[185]During theMarshallcampaign, theMitchells specialized in low-levelbombing, cannonading, and strafingof

both shipping and shore installations.[186] These techniques gave them certain tacticaladvantages such as avoidance of radar, added precision in bombing, and the ability tostrafe targets effectively with bothmachine guns and cannon.[187] On the other hand,thesekindsofoperationswouldalsoprovecostly.[188]

CombatintheMitchellsandLiberatorsduringtheMarshallscampaignwasharrowing,andtalesaboundofheroism,ingenuity,andsometimesjustuncannygoodluck.TakethecaseofLt.AllenH.CobbsMitchellcrew;membersof themostexclusiveserviceclub,the Society of TropicalDrips, including only those airmen rescued from crashes in thedrink:[189]

ReturningfromMaloelaponeafternoon,theMitchellbecameacripple,henceastraggler.Withoneenginegone,

the fuselageandwingsshot to ribbons, theMitchell foughtoff thirty-nineenemy fighters for fortyminutes, shooting

down three for certain and five probably. In all that harrowing, uneven action, broken off only when both sides

exhaustedtheirammunition,nocrewmemberwasevenhit.Thenearestwaswhenamachine-gunbulletcreasedtheheel

ofaGIshoewornbyTSgt.OliverS.Koski,radiooperatorandwaistgunner.Anotherbursttooktheseatoutfromunder

SSgt.FredKirchoff,ofSanAntonio,Texas,withoutinjuringthesergeant.Lt.BernardJ.McKenna,thenavigatorrisked

hisheadintheastroglassasmalldometopsidefromwhichcelestialobservationsaremadetocalltheattacks.While

hecalled,hefingeredhisrosarybeads.Weprayedheroutofit,Iguess,saidMcKenna.Afterwelanded,everyman

toldmehehadbeenpraying.ThebattleuseduptheMitchellsentiresupplyofammunition,3700rounds,withouta

singlegunstoppage.LieutenantCobb,moreover,racedhisonegoodenginetwentyminutes,althoughthetechorderssay

itshouldhaveburnedoutinmuchlesstimethanthat.

Earlyintherunningfight,twootherMitchellpilots,Lt.JamesBlairandLt.RobertL.Cecilstayedbehind,forminga tight formationwithCobbsship. Itwouldhavebeensuicidefor themtofly longatCobbsreducedspeed,so they

were forced to cut and run, not, however without giving him valuable help. That was another example of the 7thssolidarity.WhentheMitchellfinallygaveup,Cobblandeditonthesea.Theliferaft,which,almostmiraculously,had

notbeenhit,inflatedperfectly.DuringthethreehoursbeforerescuebyaNavycrashboat,fightersofthe7thtookturnsflyingcoverforthedriftingcrew.[190]

Then,theresthecaseoftheTexasBelle,aB-24thattookalotofleadoverMaloelap:

TheTexasBelle,commandedbyLt.CharlesF.Pratte,hadjustcomethroughaninety-milerunningbattlewith

thirtyZekes,which,bybadfortune,hadinterceptedtheLiberatorsovertheirtarget.Acripplefelloutofformationand

thesecondflight,commandedbyCapt.JessE.Stay,droppedbehindtoprotectit.Prattesshipdrewmostoftheenemy

fire.Two20-mm.Shells pierced his rightwing, a shell tore through the horizontal stabilizerwithout exploding, and

thirty7.7-mm.Bulletstracedadottedlinealongthefuselage.Happily,theJapgaveupaboutthistime,havinglosteight

Zekes.

PrattewishedtolandontheTarawastrip,whichhadrecentlybeenoccupied.RestoredtousebytheSeabees,the

striphadnotbeenenlargedsufficientlyforheavy-bomberlandings.Nevertheless,Prattehadnochoice.Heknewthat,

without brakes, he would overrun the strip into the piled coral and ocean that lay ahead. As he throttled down for

landing,oneenginecutoutbecauseofabulletinthefuelline.Regainingflyingspeed,heagaincircled.Meanwhile,he

hadworkedoutaplanfordiminishinghisspeed.

Asthewheelstouchedthecoralsurface,Prattehadthreeparachutesflungintothebreeze.Oneeachwasmade

fast towaist-gunmounts, the third to fuselagebracings in the tail.Thechuteswentout simultaneously,billowedand

held,andtheTexasBelleguidedtoastoponlyadozenfeetshortofthedrink.Thecrewestimatedthatthelandingspeed

hadbeencutbythirtytofortymilesanhour.

Thelandinghadalargeaudience;aNavyfighterbeingduetomakethefirst landingontheTarawastrip.Pratteinadvertentlygainedthehonor.Asfarasisknown,theTexasBelleisthefirstheavyplaneinhistorytomakeaparachutelanding.Gen.H.H.Arnold,ChiefoftheAAF,certifiedtheunusualnatureofthefeatwhen,inalettertoGeneralHale,hecalleditunique,asfarasIknow,inoperationalhistory.[191]

Then,therestheheroicenduranceofLieutenantKnickerbockerGeneralHaletellsitbest:

MalcolmKnickerbocker,ofCincinnatus,NewYork,theco-pilotonamediumbomber,wasbadlyshotapartby

anexplosiveshellwhileoveratarget.Theshellcarriedawayhisrightlegatthehipsocket.Therewasnowaytoapplya

tourniquet.He administeredmorphine, and crewmembers used sulfa and plasma transfusions, but the flowof blood

couldnotbestopped.Theshipwasmorethan300milesfromitsbase,withnomedicalattentionnearerathand.

Knickerbockerremainedathispost,givingallassistance.Hissmilewasunfailing;periodicallyheliftedhishand

intheinternationalmanualsignforO.K.forthebenefitofhisanguishedcomrades.Justasthebombersettledtoearth,

Knickerbockersheadslumpedforwardandhedied.Asthecrewliftedhisbodyfromtheplane,theysobbed.

WhenIheardthestory,Itoo,brokedownandshedatear.[192]

Between28December 1943 and12February 1944, a total of seventeenB-25swerelost,inadditiontosufferingdamageon114sorties.ThatwasenoughforGeneralHaletoswitch the B-25s to medium altitude bombing attacks, greatly reducing the number ofaircraftdestroyedanddamaged.[193]

GeneralHalesdecisiontoswitchtheheaviestonightmissionsandraisethealtitudeoftheMitchell missions likely did not sit well with his Navy bosses (especially AdmiralSpruance),althoughat least thedecisionon theMitchellswasmadeafterD-day for theassault on Kwajalein and Majuro. On the one hand, the 3,000+ Marine casualties of

Tarawawerestillfreshineveryonesmind,andevenGeneralHale(ina1944newspaperinterview) suggested that AAF sacrifices were the price that had to be paid for moresuccessful amphibious operations in the Marshalls.[194] on the other hand, it is notunreasonable to infer from these decisions that General Hale reasoned effective resultswith fewer losses could be achieved with a more cautious approachalbeit, perhapsrequiringmoretimetoachievethem.

However,AdmiralSpruances visionof the lessons learned fromTarawawas that toseizeislandswithaminimumofcasualtiesrequiredviolent,overwhelmingforce,swiftlyapplied.[195] In his mind, there were two major impediments to achieving swift,overwhelming forcethe US Army, and the Army Air Force.[196] First, the Armybelievedinslow,methodicaladvanceafterintensiveartillerypreparation,whileprotectingtheflanksandkeepingthelineofadvanceintact.TheMarines,tothecontrary,believedinpushingaheadhell-for-leather,overrunningenemypositionsandmoppinguplater.TheMarines felt that winning quickly brought fewer casualties than the Army tactics; andAdmiralSpruancenaturallysidedwiththeMarines,especiallysincethatmeantreducingthetimehisshipshadtostayonstationtosupporttheassault.[197]

Asnotedearlier,theNavywasnaturallyconcernedaboutlimitingitscarrierstimeonstationduringtheseassaultssincethelongertheyloitered,themorevulnerabletheywereto attackby Japanese submarines.TheArmy,understandably,was less concernedaboutthe safety of the Navy carriers and more concerned about support for their assaultingtroops. Clearly, these perspectives did not lend themselves to an understanding and/orappreciationofthenatureofthecombatbetweenthesetwoServices.

Additionally,asfarastheAAFwasconcerned,AdmiralSpruanceneverforgaveitfortheinflatedclaimsoftheBattleofMidway,andhisassessmentofitsperformanceintheCentral Pacific only served to reinforce his prejudice. [198]Admiral Spruance, whoadverselycomparedthestraightandlevel,highaltitudebombingoftheAAFtotheNavysdive-bombingtactics,concludedthat theAAFsaccuracywasaspoorand itsclaimsforsuccesswereexaggerated.[199]

Moreover,whilecontrolofthebombersandfightersthatsupportedAdmiralSpruancesoffensives ran throughAdmiral Hoover to General Hale, Admiral Hoover andGeneralHaledidnotgetalongpersonally,andtheyfrequentlydisagreedontacticsanddoctrine.[200]AdmiralHooverpushedforlowerlevelbombingrunstoachieveincreasedaccuracy,butHalerefusedbecausehispilotswereskittishaboutantiaircraftfireandwantedtoflyabovetherangeofenemyguns.[201]Further,GeneralHalewantedtomasshisbomber

formations,whileAdmiralHooverbelievedthisnettedmediocreresults.[202]Infact,aftertheGilbertcampaign,GeneralHalecomplainedtoGeneralRichardson,commanderoftheArmyforcesintheCentralPacific,whointurnseverelycriticizedAdmiralHooversuseofAAFforcesinalettertoAdmiralNimitz.[203]

WhiletherewillbemoretosayabouttheinterplaybetweenAdmiralHoover,GeneralHaleandGeneralRichardson,noimmediateactionseemstohaveresultedfromGeneralRichardsonsletter.AdmiralSpruancespositionwasthatheneededthoseAAFaircraft,inspiteoftheirshortcomings,andwhilehecouldtrustAdmiralHoovertoberesponsivetohis orders, General Hale might not be.[204] The bottom line was, as long as AdmiralSpruancehadasayinit(andinaNavydominatedtheater,hissaywasconsiderable)anadmiral(Hoover)wouldremainincontrolofArmyAirForcesand,inturn,beaccountabletohim.[205]

TheTideTurns

Asmentionedearlier,themissionsagainstMaloelaphadbeenunescortedandtendedtogeneratethestrongestenemyfighterresistance.ThepatternoftheJapaneseresponsewasto wait until after the bombers had attacked and intercept them as they turned towardhome,harassingthemtoapointtheydeemedtobebeyondtherangeofSeventhAirForcefightersbeforeturningback.[206]Then,on26January1944,acombinationoftechnologyand innovation (the development of belly-tanks for the P-40s) enabled the SeventhAirForce to spring a surprise on the enemy, causing their previously successful tactic tobackfire.[207]

After a flight of nine B-25s attacked Maloelap that day, approximately two dozenenemyfightersinterceptedthemontheirwayhome.Thistime,however,twelvebelly-tankequippedP-40sof theSeventhAirForcewerewaitingfor themabove thecloudsat thepointtheenemyfighterswouldnormallyturnbacktoMaloelap.Whenthewave-hoppingMitchellsarrivedatthatpoint,theP-40sdiveddownfrom12,500feetandsprangthetrap.In three shortminutes theybroke thebackof the Japanese fighters in theMarshalls byshootingdown10 enemy fighters,with another threeprobable.[208]While eight of theMitchells were damaged, all made it home, and they accounted for another 4 enemyfightersdestroyed.[209] Two days later,when theB-25s attackedMaloelap again, onlyfiveenemyfighterscameuptochallengethemandtheywerethelastenemyinterceptorsencounteredintheMarshalls.

Additionally,on29January1944,inpreparationfortheupcomingamphibiousassaultonKwajalein andMajuro, over 700 aircraft from the twelve carriers of Task Force 58

dealt such a devastating blow to Kwajalein,Wotje andMaloelap that there was not asingleoperationalenemyaircraftremainingeastofEniwetok.[210]On30January1944,thecarrierplanesandSeventhAirForceplanesstrucktheMarshallsagainatKwajalein,Wotje, Maloelap, Jaluit and Millesetting the stage for the landings of OperationFLINTLOCKon31January1944.TheseheavilysupportedlandingssawamuchhappierendingthanatTarawa;andKwajalein, thelargestatoll intheworld,wassecuredbyUSforces ina fewshortdaysat a costofonly332MarineandArmysoldierskilledwhileMajurowastakenunopposed.[211]

CloseAirSupportintheMarshalls