Haïti in Crisis: The U.S. Occupation of Haïti 1915-34 and its Effects on Economic and Social Development

Tyson LuneauMassachusetts College of Liberal Arts

November 2011HIST 310: Latin America & The U.S.

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Haiti is perhaps one of the most unique nations in the entire span of human history. As

the only democratic nation formed as a direct result of a slave revolt in 1804, the nation is unlike

any other not only in its formation, but in its history of political, social, and economic turmoil.

Haiti, considered today to be the western hemisphere’s poorest nation, has suffered from a

variety of political and economic ailments, derived from both internal and external sources.

While problems of both natures have played critical roles in shaping its history, Haiti’s economic

and political downfall is largely the result of foreign actions toward the nation, most notably

those of the United States from 1915-1934. The sporadic responses of the United States to

certain events in Haiti, as well as its lack of response to other events, have left Haiti at a great

disadvantage. Like many other Latin American nations during the twentieth century, Haiti served

as a pawn in the United States’ quest to exert its political and economic influence over the

western hemisphere, and is ultimately paying the price today.

To understand how these foreign interventions have affected the development of Haiti, or

lack thereof, one must obtain a basic understanding of how the nation came to be. Haiti is

perhaps the most unique of all of the Latin American nations, both in its culture and its history.

Unlike the other various states of Latin American, the Republic of Haiti is the result of a slave

revolt that succeeded in 1804 in the French colony of St. Domingue. As the first sovereign nation

in the Caribbean region, Haiti was already set apart from the rest of the soon-to-be sovereign

nations in Latin America.1

Haiti’s linguistic and cultural traditions also play a large role in separating it from the rest

of Latin America. Unlike its Latin American neighbors, Haiti is not a Spanish-speaking nation;

its primary languages are French and Haitian Creole, a language that is essentially compromised

1 Matthew Smith, “An Island Among Islands, Haiti’s Strange Relationship with the Caribbean Community,” Social and Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (September 2005): 176, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27866434 (accessed November 27, 2011).

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of a mixture of French and various indigenous African languages. Also, its inhabitants are

primarily the descendents of Africa rather than of Europe or indigenous American societies.

There are a great number of factors stemming back to Haiti’s colonial days that have led

to its current status as the poorest nation in the western hemisphere. Sidney W. Mintz, in her

1995 article “Can Haiti Change?,” notes that “while the United States began its sovereign career

with the highest percentage of college graduates of any country in the world, Haiti began its

national life with most people illiterate…”2 In addition to their intellectual disadvantages,

geography also posed a serious problem for the Haitians. Mintz noted the following on that issue:

Haiti began its national life…with nowhere to expand except Spanish Santo Domingo – and indeed they tried that – and with limited natural resources other than land…In the United States, on the other hand, land resources seemed utterly inexhaustible, as long as there were Indians to pen up. Expansion into new lands was feasible, and large numbers of newcomers were readily attracted from elsewhere.3

Haiti has also been the target of foreign disapproval since the beginning of its sovereign

history. Throughout the last 200 years, Haiti has been continually looked down upon by not only

its Caribbean neighbors, but from numerous western powers. Mintz summed up this view quite

nicely in her article, stating that “Haiti has never been forgiven by the West for refusing to

tolerate the social and economic structure European intentions had installed in what was at the

time a supremely profitable, seventeenth-century French colony.”4 In his article entitled “Haiti’s

200-Year Ménage-à-Trois: Globalization, the State, and Civil Society,” historian Mark Schuller

explains some of these prejudices in the following passage:

2 Sidney W. Mintz, “Can Haiti Change?,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 80, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047020 (accessed November 27, 2011).

3 Mintz, 80.4 Mintz, 74.

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Missionaries (Haitians as well as foreigners) promote the idea that the “voodoo” is the source of all of Haiti’s evils…In this characterization by many missionary groups, development workers, or people with experience in hierarchal relationships with them, Haitian people lack a sense of responsibility, a sense of civic consciousness, and are, in short, a backward and fatalistic people whose future is hopeless, expressed by the phrase, se pa fòt mwen (it’s not my fault).5

In addition to prejudice, Haiti has been the target of foreign intervention and aggression

throughout most of its sovereign history. The slave revolt led by Toussaint L’Overture and Jean-

Jacques Dessalines that ultimately led to Haitian independence from France did not come

without consequence. Although France lost military control of the colony, it still maintained

various forms of economic control over Haiti. In order to receive official recognition of

sovereignty from France, Haiti was required to grant French merchants a 50% reduction of

import and export duties.6 Prior to France’s official recognition of Haiti in 1825, the European

power had planned, but never carried out, violent military invasions to reclaim Haiti as a colony

of France. Another one of its conditions for the recognition was for Haiti to pay France

150,000,000 million francs in indemnities, an economic setback that would cripple newly

sovereign Haiti for the next century.7

This hostility did not just come from France. The United States was also very hesitant to

recognize the sovereignty of Haiti, and did not formally do so until 1862. The idea of a large-

scale slave revolt frightened some Americans. In “Can Haiti Change?,” Mintz identified this

sense of uneasiness, stating that “in 1825, 21 years after Haitian independence, Senator Robert

Y. Hayne of South Carolina whispered that Haiti’s freedom could not even be discussed in the

5 Mark Schuller, “Haiti’s 200-Year Ménage-à-Trois: Globalization, the State, and Civil Society,” Caribbean Studies 35, no. 1 (January-June 2007): 144, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25613094 (accessed November 13, 2011).

6 Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control: 1915-1930 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931), 10.

7 Robert Fatton Jr., “Haiti: The Saturnalia of Emapcipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 117-18, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017663 (accessed November 26, 2011).

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United States, so as not to disturb “the peace and safety of a large portion of our union.”8 The

United States at this time contained the world’s largest population of slaves, and feared that

recognition of a nation formed from a slave uprising could trigger similar movements in the

southern U.S. Formal diplomatic relations did not occur between the United States and Haiti

until after slavery was abolished in the U.S. in 1865.9 Unfortunately for the Haitians, diplomatic

relations with the United States would only make matters worse.

Eighteenth-century Haiti was a place of constant political turmoil. Facing political,

economic, and militaristic pressure from nations like France and the United States, as well as

from its neighbors in the Caribbean region, Haiti had little choice other than to begin a program

of militarization. Historian Robert Fatton Jr., in an article written for Third World Quarterly, had

the following to say about Haiti’s shift toward militarization.

It [militarization] contributed to the development of a predatory system in which those not born into wealth and lacking weapons were systematically repressed into marginalization. For men with limited means, however, military service provided an avenue for social and material advancement; it also provided them status, access to land ownership, and arbitrary authority.10

This predatory system of government could hardly be considered a democracy by

American standards. Despite some significant gains in foreign relations made by Haitian

president Jean-Pierre Boyer, who served from 1818-1843, Haiti still struggled with outstanding

debt, lack of sustainable economic resources, and militaristic turmoil. Boyer managed to pave the

way for Haiti’s international legitimacy, gaining Haiti recognition from nations like France,

Spain, Colombia, and the United States. However, Boyer’s twenty-five year rule was ended in

1843. In response to an 1842 earthquake that crippled much of the nation and Boyer’s inability to 8 Mintz, 78.9 Emily Greene Balch, “Something of the Background,” Occupied Haiti, ed. Emily Greene Balch (New

York: The Writers Publishing Company, 1927), 13.10 Fatton, 118.

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handle the situation properly, an uprising led by Major Charles Herard ousted Boyer, who

formally resigned from office in March of 1843. A provisional government headed by Herard

abolished the concept of “presidency for life” which was a part of the original Haitian

constitution.11 While in democratic theory, this was a major progressive success, it would

ironically lead to a turbulent series of Haitian presidents that would greatly upset the small level

of stability that Haiti had experienced under the rule of Jean-Pierre Boyer.

The beginning of the twentieth century marked a brief period of extreme political turmoil

in Haiti. In 1910, Haitian President Antoine Simon began a pattern of negotiations with foreign

investors in an attempt to improve the infrastructure and economy of a struggling Haiti. While

acting with good intentions, Simon was investing beyond his means and his actions resulted in an

even greater indebted Haiti. This financial burden of these economic ventures is estimated to

have cost the Haitian people around eight million dollars.12

After Simon’s failure to stabilize the Haitian economy, he was driven out of the country.

Between 1911 and 1915, Haiti saw a series of violent coups that enabled the ascendance and

departure of six presidents in just four years. However, as Paul H. Douglas noted in his 1927

analysis of the occupation, the Haitians took extra measure to avoid the possibility of American

intervention. In his article, “The American Occupation of Haiti I,” Douglas noted the following.

During this period however, as at all previous times, both governmental and revolutionary forces were careful, because of their fear of intervention, not to kill or molest foreigners. The revolutions in Haiti were therefore domestic wars which did not menace the safety of foreign lives. The Haitians, in their anxiety to prevent the foreign powers from intervening, were also careful to keep up the interest payments on the foreign debt…13

11 H.P. Davis, Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1967): 115-18.12 Paul H. Douglas, “The American Occupation of Haiti I,” Political Science Quarterly 42, no. 2 (June

1927): 230-31, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2142787 (accessed November 13, 2011).13 Douglas, 232

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Despite the attempts of the revolutionaries to keep the United States out of Haiti,

intervention was almost inevitable. After a series of military coups that occurred between 1911

and 1914, the United States, France, and Great Britain occupied Haiti in order to restore order to

the nation. Though the three nations entered together, France and Great Britain’s official

occupation would not last more than a year, where after the United States assumed control of the

region. However, even after order was restored to Haiti, the American military did not withdraw

from Haiti.

After the restoration of political order in Haiti in 1915, a presidential election was set to

be held. The leading candidates for the presidency were Dr. Bobo, an important leader of the

recent Haitian revolutions, and Sudre Dartiguenave, the president of the Haitian Senate. The

United States, backing Dartiguenave, proceeded to directly interfere with the process and

outcome of the election. Douglas’ analysis of the occupation provided the following account of

the 1915 Haitian election:

On the day of the election, American troops surrounded the place of assembly of Congress and only those possessing cards signed by Senator Dartiguenave or the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies were admitted. The justification offered for this was the fear that Bobo and his supporters would try to coerce Congress into electing him…It seems undeniable therefore that the election took place in a setting where the American military force could exercise a strong and perhaps predominating influence in favor of Dartiguenave.14

Not surprisingly, the election was a landslide victory for Dartiguenave. For the next

several years, Dartiguenave would essentially act as a puppet leader. While the United States

would consult Dartiguenave on most of its actions in Haiti, this was more often than not a mere

formality, and Dartiguenave’s opinion was by no means definitive or effective. Historian Arthur

14 Douglas, 243.

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C. Millspaugh, in his book Haiti Under American Control, offered the following perspective on

the role of the Haitian President

Representatives of the United States were instructed on many occasions to obtain the “consent” of President Dartiguenave before adopting some new line of action. His consent was usually forthcoming, and some of the measures taken by Admiral Caperton were on Dartiguenave’s request. In many cases, his request or consent was a formality; in some cases it was not given; and American seizure of the customs houses was publicly protested by the Haitian President.15

The United States proceeded to design a treaty that would place numerous portions of the

Haitian government directly under American control. Included in this treaty was the American

appointment and control of a Financial Adviser, Haitian constabulary, and the direct control of

all Haitian public services. The Haitian government, despite its limited power and influence,

expressed direct opposition to the treaty. However, the United States refused to recognize the

Haitian government until the ratification of said treaty.16

After utilizing economic and military pressure, the United States was able to convince the

Haitian President to approve the treaty on September 16, 1915. However, the Haitian Congress

was still in direct opposition of the treaty and refused to ratify it. On November 9 of that same

year, U.S. Secretary of State Daniels issued the following statement to Admiral Caperton, who

was to repeat the statement in an address to the Haitian Senate:

…there is a strong demand from all classes for immediate ratification and that treaty will be ratified Thursday. I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment in this matter, and I am confident that if the treaty fails of ratification that my government has the intention to retain control in Haiti until the desired end is accomplished, and that it will forthwith proceed to the complete pacification of Haiti so as to insure internal tranquility necessary to such development of the country and its industry as will afford relief to the starving population now unemployed.17

15 Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931): 60.

16 Douglas, 244-46.17 Douglas, 247.

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Through the use of rigged elections and threats of military force, the United States was

able to impose its control over Haiti and establish a puppet government that would do its

bidding. While the United States claimed that it was acting both in the best interest of the people

of Haiti and in the interest of foreigners living in Haiti, there was another ugly side to the

American occupation. Many of the so-called “goals” of the occupation simply were not met, and

the country was in some ways left in a worse condition than before the Americans arrived.

One area that suffered immensely in Haiti was public education. According to the second

half of Paul H. Douglas’s analysis of the occupation, public education was largely ignored by the

American-appointed Financial Adviser. In his analysis, Douglas wrote the following on the state

of public education in Haiti in 1927:

From all the estimates which I can make, it seems probably that there are not more than 36,000 children in school out of a total population of from two and a quarter to two and a half millions. The quality of instruction offered can be inferred from the fact that the prevailing salary for country school teachers is $6 a month, or only sixty percent of the money pay of a private in the gendarmerie while the latter secures board, room, and clothing in addition.18

Douglas’s analysis also uncovered the case of Joseph Jolibois. Jolibois, the editor of a

small newspaper called Le Courier Haïtien, was a well known critic of the American occupation.

After making harsh accusations against General Russell and other members of the U.S. State

Department through his publication, Jolibois was arrested and imprisoned without trial. Although

he was released shortly after, he was imprisoned several more times, each without proper trial. In

18 Paul H. Douglas, “The American Occupation of Haiti II,” Political Science Quarterly (September 1927): 371, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2143127 (accessed November 13, 2011).

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Douglas’s words, “he has not yet faced a jury. The right of trial by jury has therefore not been

granted to political opponents of the government and the American Occupation.”19

How can a nation that expresses the importance of the right to a trial by jury and due

process of law deny these very same principles to an area which it is governing? This hypocrisy

was met with two so-called justifications. According to General Russell, if tried under the

Haitian courts, Jolibois would likely be found innocent simply because of their position against

the occupation. Russell also suggested that if members of the Occupation were permitted to sue

Haitians that the inverse would be theoretically possible, and the occupation would therefore fall

under the control of the Haitian courts. In response to these two justifications, Douglas offered

the following opinion.

Anglo-Saxon countries have been striving to guard against such arbitrary power since the days of the Magna Charta. It is humiliating to find Americans careless of individual liberty and of the right to a fair trial in a country which the United State has virtually conquered.20

A similar perspective of the American occupation of Haiti came from NAACP

representative James Weldon Johnson. In March 1920, Johnson was assigned to investigate

reports of American brutality in Haiti. The broad impression given by Johnson’s report is

summed up quite nicely in the words of Leon D. Pamphile, author of “The NAACP and the

American Occupation of Haiti,” when stating that “He demonstrated in the first place that

contrary to the official version from Washington, the marines did not intervene to restore

peace…He charged that the American government had failed to redeem any of its promises to

aid in developing Haiti financially, educationally, or otherwise.”21

19 Douglas, “The American Occupation of Haiti II,” 374.20 Douglas, “The American Occupation of Haiti II,” 374.21 Leon D. Pamphile, “The NAACP and the American Occupation of Haiti,” Phylon 47, no. 1 (1st Quarter,

1986): 93, http://www.jstor.org/stable/274698 (accessed November 14, 2011).

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Johnson’s report also touched on the role of American businesses in the occupation of

Haiti. He noted figures such as Roger L. Farnham, Vice-President of the National City Bank of

New York, who asserted control of the Banque Nationale d’Haïti, the only banking institution of

Haiti. Farnham’s monopoly over the Haitian economy served not in the interest of the Haitians,

but only to build the funds of his own institution.22

There were also congressional investigations into the abuses that occurred during the

American occupation of Haiti. The Select Committee on Haiti and Domingo published a report

on April 20, 1922 contained the following excerpt uncovering some of the abuses in Haiti at the

hands of the United States and the American-controlled Haitian government.

The charges laid before the Committee were the forcing of a new Constitution upon Haiti, twice driving out the members of the Haitian Congress because they opposed the Constitution, the use of forced labor in road-making, and connected abuses, atrocities committed by marines and gendarmes, prison abuses, martial law, and restrictions of the press.23

Violent resistance to the American occupation continued through the 1920s into the early

1930s. However, the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt would mark the beginning of the end for

the occupation. While he was to some extent bound by treaty, in a 1933 letter to President

Vincent of Haiti, Roosevelt stated that “except for this obligation, upon which the bondholders

are entitled to insist, my Government would be only too glad to discontinue at once its

connection with financial administration in Haiti.”24

The official withdrawal of American troops began in 1934, and would last through the

rest of that decade. Roosevelt’s opposition to the occupation, combined with the pressures of the

22 Pamphile, 93.23 Emily Greene Balch, “Charges of Abuses in Haiti,” Occupied Haiti, ed. Emily Greene Balch (New York:

The Writers Publishing Company, 1927): 123-24.24 Ernest Gruening, “The Withdrawal from Haiti,” Foreign Affairs 12, no. 4 (July 1934): 678,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/

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Great Depression and the onset of World War II of Europe were likely the main factors in the

United States’ withdrawal from Haiti.

But exactly what was the justification for the American occupation of Haiti in the first

place? As some of the sources presented thus far have argued, it was (perhaps falsely) claimed

that the main goal was to restore political, economic, and social order in the struggling nation. As

Johnson and the NAACP pointed out, the real reasons behind the occupation were more likely

rooted in American interests. However, foreign policy precedents also would play an important

role in the U.S. justification for the occupation.

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, an important staple of American foreign policy toward

Latin America, was used as a partial justification for the American occupation of Haiti in 1915.

According to former West Virginia Governor William A. MacCorkle’s interpretation of the

Monroe Doctrine, Haiti’s instability threatened the possible intervention of European nations, as

stated in the following excerpt from his article, “The Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to

Haiti.”

The island is a land of despotism and wicked government, which is increasing and not decreasing in its terror…A number of times, by reason of this situation, war has been almost precipitated between the Haitian government and the European nations. The action of the German government is fresh in the minds of our people, and the warships of Great Britain and France are only too frequent in the harbors of Haiti, protecting their subjects, demanding redress for grievances and saving human life. This means, sooner or later, that the irresponsible government of the Republic of Haiti will commit the act which will involve us, under the first clause and original application of the Monroe Doctrine.25

The departure of American forces in the mid-to-late 1930s was not followed by stability

in Haiti; rather, it was followed by the same chaos and political turmoil that existed prior to and

25 William A. MacCorkle, “The Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (July 1914): 41-42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1012569 (accessed November 19, 2011).

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during the American occupation from 1915-1934. The level of chaos reached new heights with

the rise of the Duvalier dictatorship, a regime that would remain in power for twenty-nine years.

Supported politically and economically by the United States, Duvalier and his son would

contribute to Haiti’s continual social, economic, and political downfall.

Duvalier’s decision to vote against Cuba’s inclusion in the Organization of American

States would solidify U.S. support for the dictatorship due to the Cold War mentality of

containing communism. Even after Duvalier’s death in 1971, the trend of American support for

the dictatorship continued in what is known as “Duvalierism without Duvalier.”26

The United States’ continued support of the Duvalier dictatorship would have unrelenting

negative effects on the economy of Haiti. Mark Schuller addresses the abuses of Duvalier’s son

and the United States in the following excerpt from “Haiti’s 200-Year Ménage-à-Trois…”

Upon Duvalier père’s (the father) death in 1971, the U.S. military helped to secure the transition of power to Duvalier fils (the son) by keeping people – notably exiled professionals – out of Haiti. During the reign of Duvalier fils, the U.S. government’s development plan starved Haitian peasants and swelled Haiti’s cities with very low wage laborers for export processing zones in a blueprint of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Later, responding to an outbreak of swine fever, the U.S. government killed off Haitian pigs, de-facto bank accounts, replacing them with high-maintenance pink U.S. pigs, amounting to Haiti’s “great stock market crash.”27

The U.S. support of the Duvalier regime also led to a distortion of Haitian political and

social ideas. The Duvalier regime helped in creating a harsh, unproductive society divided by

race and social class. With no economic incentives for labor, Haitians were either condemned to

a low-quality life based on poor agriculture and low-wage manufacturing, or were forced to seek

other, destructive means of advancement. In his article, Robert Fatton Jr. expressed this idea with

26 Schuller, 150.27 Schuller, 150

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the term La politique du ventre, or “the politics of the belly”. He describes this idea, which was

greatly reinforced during the Duvalier years, in the following passage.

La politique du ventre represents a form of government based on the acquisition of personal wealth through the conquest of state offices. It is a logical consequence of the material scarcity and unproductive economy that have marked the history of Haiti. Given that poverty and destruction have always been the norm, and that private avenues to wealth have always been rare, politics became an entrepreneurial vocation, virtually the sole means of material and social advancement for those not born into wealth and privilege. Controlling the state turned into a fight to the death to monopolize the sinecures of political power.28

Today, Haiti is still struggling with many of these same issues. After a brief second U.S.

occupation in 1994 which restored the power of President Jean Bertrand Aristide, a leader who

had the potential to make great changes in Haiti. Elected in 1990, Aristide promoted an idea of a

state that grew from the bottom up, challenging the traditional hierarchal structure of Haitian

society. In an intervention entitled “Operation Uphold Democracy”, 20,000 marines were sent

into Haiti to restore the exiled president to power. While Aristide’s ideas may have been

beneficial to Haiti, the need for U.S. intervention “demonstrated that violence remained decisive

in Haitian politics, and” explained Robert Fatton Jr. in his article, “represented the only viable

means of ending re-dictatorialization…The result was a change of regime rather than the creation

of a new state.”29

Haiti post-1994 has essentially reached a stagnant point in terms of both economics and

politics. As the western hemisphere’s poorest nation, there is little hope for Haiti, at least in its

current condition. The United States’ decision to take advantage of the Haitian people and the

nation’s natural resources during its 1915-1934 occupation of Haiti has left the nation starved of

the necessary means for growth. From the U.S. seizure of La Banque Nationale d’Haïti to the

28 Fatton, 123.29 Fatton, 123-24.

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reinforcement of the Duvalier dictatorship, the extent of the negative American impact on Haiti

extends beyond the first American occupation of the nation. In her article, “Can Haiti Change?,”

Mintz summed up the current Haitian crisis, stating the following:

In today’s world, even the reconstruction of Haitian society on a peasant basis cannot restore the country. Haiti’s rulers have siphoned off surpluses for two centuries without contributing even minimally to the education of the people or the growth of new sources of income…Unless there is to be some investment in Haiti’s human capital, real change will prove impossible.30

Whether or not this change can or will occur is certainly debatable. It is clear that direct

U.S. intervention in Haiti has failed. While the Haitian people, and most notably the Haitian

rulers, have not helped the situation at all, the nation has been exploited since its time as the

French colony of St. Domingue. Much like some other nations in Latin America, it is struggling

to see social or economic change because the leaders of these nations do not see the need for

change on a personal basis. In the words of Mintz, “rulers who profit from stasis are disinclined

to risk change.”31

30 Mintz, 86.31 Mintz, 86.

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