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Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence GovernmentRepressionAuthor(s): Emilie M. Hafner-BurtonSource: International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer, 2005), pp. 593-629Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877810 .

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TradingHuman Rights: HowPreferentialTradeAgreementsInfluenceGovernmentRepressionEmilie M. Hafner-Burton

Abstract A growing numberof preferential radeagreements(PTAs)have cometo play a significant role in governing state compliance with human rights. Whenthey supplyhardstandards hattie materialbenefitsof integration o compliancewithhuman rights principles, PTAs are more effective than softer human rights agree-ments (HRAs) in changing repressive behaviors. PTAs improve members' humanrightsthroughcoercion,by supplyingthe instrumentsand resources to changeactors'incentives to promote reformsthat would not otherwise be implemented.I developthreehypotheses:(1) statecommitmentto HRAs and (2) PTAssupplyingsoft humanrights standards not tied to marketbenefits)do not systematically produce improve-ment in humanrightsbehaviors,while (3) statecommitmentto PTAs supplyinghardhumanrights standardsdoes often producebetterpractices. I draw on several casesto illustrate the processes of influence and test the argumenton the experience of177 states duringthe period 1972 to 2002.

Humanrightsviolations arepervasive.!As a substantialpercentageof statesrepresstheir citizens, an increasingly dense set of formal treaties, conventions, and pro-tocols have been designed to protect the inalienable rights of human beings-humanrightsagreements HRAs). These agreementsare differentthan other formsof international cooperation designed to overcome collective action problemsand to internalize cross-border externalities. HRAs are designed to regulate sov-

I would like to thank Mike Colaresi, Dan Drezner,David Lake, Lisa Martin,WalterMattli, JohnMeyer, MarkPollack, ErikVoeten,Jim Vreeland,andtwo anonymousreviewers for their detailed andthoughtfulcommentson various drafts of this manuscript,as well as the many otherpeople who havehelped me by askinghardquestionsalong the way. I would also like to thankMichael Barnett,CharlesFranklin,ndJonPevehouseoradviceduringhe dissertationesearchhatsupportshisarticle,andAlexander H. Montgomeryfor assistance in data management.All faults are my own. For generousassistance in the collection of data,I thank the National Science Foundation(SES 2CDZ414 and SES0135422), John Meyer, and Francisco Ramirez.For supportduringthe writing of the article, I thankNuffield College at Oxford University, and most importantly,Lynn Eden and Stanford'sCenter forInternationalSecurity and Cooperation.1. Last year, Amnesty Internationaldocumented humanrights abuses in 151 countries and territo-ries. Amnesty InternationalReport 2003.InternationalOrganization59, Summer2005, pp. 593-629? 2005 by The IO Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818305050216


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594 InternationalOrganization

ereign governments' behaviors toward individuals, and a great many scholarsof international aw and politics believe they are a valuable source of domesticpolicy change, encouraging repressorsto change their practices.2In the face ofsuch optimism,however, many scholars are unconvinced.HRAs, scholarsremindus, lack the engines of compliance that drive many other areas of internationallaw; they supply no apparentmaterial incentives to conform, and no superiorpower is authorized to compel observance of the law.3The debate is heated andunresolved.YetHRAs are no longerthe only alternative or internationalegulationof domes-tic humanrightspolicy.Few realizethatthegovernancemenu has recentlyexpandedto include a growing numberof formal institutionsthat embed humanrights stan-dards4 nto rulesgoverningmarketaccess-preferential tradeagreements(PTAs).5PTAs are a rapidlygrowing class of international nstitutionsthat govern marketaccess between member states of an economic region.6 Semi-autonomousfromthe global structureof the World TradeOrganization(WTO),7PTAs frequentlyregulatespheresof social governancethatincreasinglyinclude humanrights stan-dards. Some, such as the Euro-MediterraneanAssociation Agreements, supply"hard"standards hat tie agreementbenefits to membercompliance with specifichuman rights principles. Others, such as the West African Economic and Mon-etary Union, supply "soft"standardsthat are only vaguely tied to market accessand unconditional on memberstates' actions.8My argumentis a simple one about institutionaldesign and influence. In thearea of humanrights,hard aws areessential:change in repressivebehavior almost

2. See Rosati 2001; Lutz and Sikkink2000; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Koh 1998; and Franck1988. Hathaway2002 arguesthat leading perspectives on international aw assume that states intendto comply with their internallegal commitments.This assumption,commonly applied to HRAs, hasbeen widespreadamong international awyers and scholarsbut seldom tested.3. See Hafner-BurtonandTsutsui2005; Hathaway2002; and Donnelly 1986.4. A standard s an acknowledged behavioralcriterionestablishedby authority,custom, or generalconsent as a modelor example.See Merriam-Webster nabridgedonline Dictionary,availableat (http://www.m-w.com/cgr-bin/dictionary) accessed 6 may 2005.5. I define PTAs in the broadest sense possible to include preferentialtrade instrumentsof manykinds, including unilateralpreferentialschemes, bilateral and regional agreements,and reciprocalandnonreciprocalagreements.6. See De Melo and Panagariya1993; Mansfield 1998; Mattli 1999; and McCall Smith 2000.7. WTOmembersparticipating n PTAs arerequired o meet a set of preferential radingconditionsdefined in the text of GATTArticle XXIV,Ad Article XXIV, and its updates,which include the 1994Understandingon the Interpretation f Article XXIV of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffsand Trade,as well as the text of GATSArticle V. Note thatmany PTAs are not notified to the WTO.8. Abbott andSnidal 2000 identify variation n internationalegalization:hard aws arelegally bind-ing obligations that are precise and that delegate authority or interpretingand implementingthe law;while soft laws are those that deviate from hard along several dimensions. The use of hard and softlaw throughthe remainderof this article invokes Abbott and Snidal's attentionto variationbut simpli-fies by identifying one primarydistinguishingcharacteristic: onditionality.HardPTAstandardsestab-lish enforceable conditions for integration, while soft standardsappeal to voluntary principles ofcooperationthatdo not requirebehavioralchange to receive marketaccess benefits.Abbott and Snidal2000, 421.


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PreferentialTradeAgreements and GovernmentRepression 595

always requires legally binding obligations that are enforceable.9HRAs, on thewhole, do not supply adequateenforcement,but there are strongreasons to expectthat a growing numberof PTAs with hardstandardsnow govern statecompliancewith internationalhuman rights principles, with considerable potential to influ-ence states'behaviorstowardcitizens. Indeed,these agreementsmay often be moreeffective than HRAs in changing the basic conduct of repressive governmentstowardgreaterprotection or some fundamental ights.CertainPTAsenforcemanyprinciples of international aw thatmost HRAs cannot. I offer three hypotheses.First,most HRAs are not likely to effectively reduce violationsmost of the time.As I will elaborate in this article, HRAs are principally soft: they influence gov-ernments'humanrightspracticesthroughpersuasionrather hancoercion, supply-ing weak obligations.10Persuading repressive actors to change their preferencesfor behaviorrequiresa supply of convincing argumentation,a long-time horizon,simultaneoustargetingof multiple actors, andaccess to the targetabusers.HRAs,unfortunately,do not supply many of these conditions.Second,PTAsaredesignedto enforcevoluntarycommitments o coordinatemar-ket policies at a transnational evel. PTAs accordingly supply different mecha-nisms of influence, and they sometimes are designed to influence humanrights.As I shall show, when PTAs supply soft human rights standards,they offer nocapacityfor coercive influence. Like HRAs, these agreementsare at best designedto supply weak tools of persuasionand are unlikely to have any stronginfluenceon governmentrepression.Third,when they implementhardstandards,PTAs influence throughcoercion:they providemembergovernmentswith a mandate o protectcertainhumanrights,while they supply the materialbenefits and institutionalstructures o rewardandpunish members'behavior. As I shall show, coercing repressive actors to changetheir behaviors requiresa conditional supply of valuable goods wanted by targetrepressors.It does not requirechanging deeply held preferencesfor humanrightsand is likely to take place in a shorter time horizon. These agreements accord-ingly improvemembers'humanrights by supplyingthe instrumentsand resourcesto change repressive actors' incentives to promotepolicy reforms that would nototherwise be implemented.In the following sections, I elaborate this incentive-basedtheory of compliancewith the principles of internationalhumanrights.At issue is the nature of institu-tional effects ex post of statemembership n agreementsthatadoptvarioushuman

9. This view stands in sharpcontrastto the belief that coercion is unnecessaryor counterproduc-tive: thatgovernmentsoften conformto global humanrights laws out of concern for legitimacy, evenwhen laws are powerless to enforce compliance; and that coercion necessarily producesadverse con-sequences on the enjoyment of human rights. See Goodman and Jinks 2004; Johnston 2001; Payne2001; Price 1998; Helfer and Slaughter 1997; Finnemore 1996; Koh 1996-97; Franck 1990; Henkin1979; as well as Bossuyt 2000. For an exception, see Martinand Sikkink 1993.10. HRAs, as with PTAs, vary in their degree of institutionalization,and exceptions to this claimare discussed in later sections of the article.


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rights standards,hard and soft. I seek to explain the consequences of PTA mem-bershipon states'humanrightbehaviorsand not the initial formationof the agree-ments.11 n order to do so, I introduceandanalyze new institutionaldata on PTAs,HRAs, and states' human rights practices. Several cases demonstratethat manyPTAs now adopt hard humanrights standardsand sometimes are effective moti-vatorsof reform.Cross-nationalanalysesfrom 1972 to 2002 providemore system-atic evidence thatagreementswith hard standards an and often do motivatebetterprotectionof humanrights.

A Matter of Influence: How Institutions ChangeGovernments' BehaviorsFor the betterpart of the past century,intellectuals from many disciplines arguedthat international aws are powerless rules thatnations seldom obey and that can-not be readily enforced; and that international nstitutions are not likely them-selves to influence the behavior of states.12 Today, most scholars of institutionstake strongexceptions to these views.Some scholars view institutionsas instrumentscreatedto overcome variouscol-lective action dilemmas to solve a varietyof substantiveproblems.13 In this view,state defection from the rules is an ever present threatmotivatedby rationalcal-culations of gains from unilateral action. Sustainedcompliance with institutionsthatchallenge domestic preferencesfor behaviorthusalmost always requiressomemeasureof coercion.14The fact that states are regularlyobserved to comply withinternationalrules without coercive enforcement,scholarsargue, is likely an arti-fact of state selection into institutions that often require only the most modestchanges in behavior.'5Indeed, international nstitutionsare not always designedto change behavior,and when they are, compliance with the rules usually requiressome coercive mechanism of influence to make the costs of defection higher thanthe costs of conformity.This view has now come to stand in sharpcontrastto the belief that "almostallnations observe almost all principles of international aw and almost all of theirobligations almost all of the time."16 Scholarshave elaboratedmany variationsofthis argument,establishingthat states can be persuadedwithout coercion to com-

11. I nonetheless ddresshequestion f formationn somedetail n thepagesto come n order oconsiderhepossibilityhatPTAnfluences determinedy self-selection.12. SeeAustinandAustin1861;Krauthammer989;andMearsheimer994/1995.13. Martin 992,1993.14. See Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; and Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1997.15. Downs et al. 1996. This finding is nicely articulated n the case of humanrights by Moravcsik1995, who shows that Europeanhumanrights regimes are likely to have little effect on those statesthat are not already disposed toward transformation, namely newly developing states.16. See Henkin 1979; and Koh 1996-97.


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ply with rules thatrequiresubstantialbehavioralchanges, often motivatedby con-cerns for legitimacy rather hanfear of sanctions.7 Scholarsof humanrightshavelong recognized thathard rules to enforce humanrights are important,yet a greatmany make the case that, in the absence of enforcement, even soft internationallaws can influence domestic policy."8In this view, internationalhuman rightsregimes influence states' behaviors by providing rules and organizationalstruc-tures to determinethe appropriateconstraintson national sovereignty in a givenissue-area. These regimes also provide the justification and forum for action thatcan shape states' political interests and beliefs about appropriate ctions.19 Statesare thus actively encouragedto obey international aws througha continual andinteractive process of rationalization and communication: through persuasiontoward belief change.20When state actors defect from the rules, their behavioris frequentlymotivatedby domestic bureaucratic ailure, shapedby the vaguenessand indeterminacyof treaty law, the restrictedcapacity of the states themselves,or unmanageable social or economic changes taking place inside the nation.21Others go so far as to argue that coercion is often ineffective and at timescounterproductive.22This debate over institutional nfluenceis at the foundationof the argumentpro-posed here. As I argue, trade agreementsare designed to solve a different set ofproblems than humanrights agreementsand supply differentpropertiesof influ-ence. PTAs with hard standardscan be more effective in influencing compliancewith humanrights principlesthanmost HRAs; when PTAs supplycoercive mech-anisms of influence that HRAs lack, they tie complianceto substantialmarketben-efits. Consider the logic of the argument n stages.TheProblemof HumanRights ComplianceThe problemof humanrights compliance (see Figure 1)23 is thatmany sovereigngovernments domestically abuse a set of principled deas proffered nternationallythroughglobal laws and networks of advocates. This behavior is almost alwayscausedby purposefuldisobedienceby actorswho choose defection fromthe rules.

17. See Kratochwil 1989; Franck 1995; Finnemore 1996; and Meyer et al. 1997.18. See note 9.19. For the general argument,see Chayes and Chayes 1990, 1993, and 1998. For applicationstohumanrights, see Goodman and Jinks2004; Koh 1996-97; Franck1990; and Henkin 1979. For appli-cations to environmentalpolicy, see Mitchell 1993; and Young 1994.20. See Goodman and Jinks 2004; Bulterman and Kuijer 1996; Petersmann1997; and Price 1998.21. Chayes and Chayes 1998.22. Humanrights critics of economic sanctions, for example, contend that sanctions often fail toproduce humanrights compliance and, worse, cause furtherviolations. See Rai and Eden 2001; andHelson and DeVecchi 2000.23. Figure 1 describesthepercentageof all states n the worldsystemreported o employrepression-throughacts of political terroror by violating civil liberties-and thathave ratifiedeitherthe Conven-tion on Tortureor the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights. All data are described indetail in the pages to follow.


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100Repress civil liberties100 - Political terror- - - Humanrightsagreements80-.

Y0eS40 /

20

YearFIGURE. Humanrights behaviors: Percentage of states that repressand thatratifyhumanrights agreements

Noncompliance in the area of human rights-especially for the most egregiousviolations-can rarely be explained by bureaucratic ailure. Human rights lawsare not vague aboutprohibitionson torture or indiscriminatekilling, and difficultsocial or economic changes take place inside states that do not repress their citi-zens. Humanrights violations are by and large calculated acts taken by differentactors that expect some form of gains from repression.A powerful constituency of states and advocates aroundthe world hold strongandwell-articulatedpreferences o make all statesaccountable or violations.Theyseek to influencerepressivegovernments'behaviors o become compliantwithrulesprotectingthe inalienablerights of all people. Internationalagreementsgoverninghumanrights are accordingly charged with the difficult task of changing repres-sive governments'behaviors inside the sovereign territoryof the state.24Therearetwo principalkinds of violators they must address.First, elites working in some repressive governmentsmay hold preferencesforhumanrightsthatthey cannot self-enforce at home. This problemis perhapsmostcommon to newly establisheddemocracies,whererecentlyelected leadersarelikelyto have stronginterestsin consolidatinghumanrights,while at the same time facesubstantialdomestic oppositiontowardimplementation,now and into the future.25Second, other repressive governments may be ruled by decision makers with noidentifiableincentives for humanrights, or with strong incentives for repression.The vast literatureson repressionsuggest thatelites ruling autocraticgovernmentsoften gain substantialpolitical and economic benefits from tyranny-benefits that

24. Steiner ndAlston1996.25. Moravcsik000.


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rangefroma stronghold on politicalpowerto substantial conomic wealth.26Elitesfacing political competition by armedinsurgent groups are also among the mostlikely to hold strong incentives for occasional to systematic use of repression tomaintainpolitical control, which is a highly valued good.If the problemto be solved is to sway an assortmentof repressors o conformtointernational principles of human rights laws, the solution is to design inter-nationalinstitutionswith the capacity to influenceelites operatingunderdifferentdomestic political situationsto transform heirbehaviors.

Mechanismsof InfluenceIt is well establishedin the theoretical iteratures hatinternational nstitutionscaninfluence governments'humanrights actions throughtwo principalmechanisms:coercion and persuasion.As I have noted above, scholars of internationalorgani-zation and law disagreestronglyaboutwhich formof influenceshouldbe the mosteffective. Although the majority of human rights scholars believe that coercionmay be a useful tool of domestic policy influence, many remain optimistic thatinternational nstitutions lacking coercive authoritycan nonetheless bring aboutcompliance with law. I now turn to consider both mechanisms more carefully asthey apply to humanrights.Persuasionis "the active, often strategic, inculcation of norms."27When theypersuade, international nstitutions actively influence human rights by supplyingtargeted nformation o convince or teachrepressiveactorsnew ideas thataremoreconsistent with the principles of international aws.28Persuasionis a process ofchanging actors'preferencesandunderstandingsof appropriate ocial behaviortocreatenew social facts.29 As a process, it works over time, changingbeliefs aboutlegitimate behaviorthroughmany stages of diffusion andinternalization.30n thissense,, a government has been persuaded when its decision-making elites havereplaceda previous set of beliefs abouthumanrights with a new set of principledideas.Coercionis "thethreator act by a sendergovernmentor governmentsto disrupteconomic exchange with the targetstate, unless the targetacquiesces to the artic-ulated demand."31When they coerce, institutions can influence target govern-ments' repressivebehaviorsby increasingthe rewardsof compliance or the costsof defection through material rewards and punishments.32Coercion influences

26. See Kirkpatrick1979; Howard and Donnelly 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; and Hen-derson 1991.27. Goodmanand Jinks 2004, 10.28. Finnemore 1996.29. See Ruggie 1998; and Payne 2001.30. See Finnemoreand Sikkink 1998; and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.31. Drezner2003, 643.32. See Goodmanand Jinks 2004; and Downs et al. 1996.


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human rights behavior by changing actors' calculations of the price of adoptingcertainbehaviors over others. Unlike persuasion,an actor can be coerced to com-ply with basic principlesof humanrightslaw andsimultaneouslyhold preferencesfor repression, if the benefits of compliance are perceived to outweigh the costs.Moreover, coercion can influence human rights behaviors short of implementa-tion. As the literatures on economic bargaining suggest, effective cases of coer-cion are often likely to end with threatof punishmentrather hanimplementation.Compliancebefore sanction avoids the costs associated with sanctioningfor bothtargetand sender and is thus more efficient.33Threatis often enough.34

InfluencingComplianceThere are four main reasons to expect that persuasion,alone, is unlikely to pro-vide strong incentives to change most repressive actors'behaviors. First, persua-sion requires changing actors' preferences for repression, and these preferencesare likely to be highly valued. Repression is often used as a strategyto gain ormaintainpolitical power or to accumulatewealth or redistribute esources.In 2003alone, Amnesty Internationaldocumented dozens of instances where ruling elitesemployed acts of terror o maintainpower and suppress opposition, includingtar-geted killings of political challengers and terrorizingvoters. Repressive oppo-nents, such as armed nsurgentgroups, competingelites, or low-rankingmembersof the civil or militaryservices, are also documented to use repression, extractingconcessions and side payments from a wide range of targetedpopulations.35 nboth cases, the gains from repression were likely to be highly valued and to bestrongly preferredby the repressors. Strongly held preferences are likely to beharderto change than weakly held preferences.Second, when persuasionoccurs it is likely to be a slow acting form of influ-ence, takingplace over a long-timehorizon.To persuade,an institutionmust mobi-lize informedadvocates o convincerepressiveactorsthattheircurrentlyheld beliefsand habits are no longer appropriate.However, beliefs rarely change over night,but areoften sticky.This "perseverance ffect" has been confirmed n a wide vari-ety of settings: individuals frequently adhere strongly to their beliefs even afternew and better informationhas been presented.36Moreover,when belief changedoes take place, it often happensin stages, as individualspass through ntermedi-

33. See Drezner2003; and Eaton and Engers 1999.34. The Organization or Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD) concludes, for exam-ple, that the GeneralizedSystem of Preferencesreview process createsanindependentandstrong ncen-tive for improving labor rights conditioned by the agreement, short of the imposition of sanctions.Recipient states have an economic stake in receiving a positive review, both to avoid sanctions, butalso to encourage potentialinvestment. See OECD 1996; and Cleveland 2001b.35. Amnesty InternationalReport2003.36. See Anderson 1989; and Slusher andAnderson 1996.


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ate periods of acceptance and rejection of new information.37Persuasion takestime.Third, persuadedactors may not be consistent across time. New leaders maycome to power, and new opponentgroups may form with preferencesfor repres-sion. Successful persuasionof a governmentthus requiresthat each new repres-sive actor is persuadedto change their beliefs about the appropriatenessof theirbehavior.Few repressive governments,however,areruledconsistentlyby the sameelite or face the same set of repressiveopponentsfor periodsthatare long enoughto enact and achieve strongbelief change. Leaders of repressive states are regu-larly overthrownor voted out of power, while domestic humanrights opponentscome and go.Finally, persuasionrequiresrepeatedaccess to target repressors.Some repres-sive actors may be intimatelyinvolved in the decision-making processes of inter-nationalinstitutionsdesigned to influence humanrights. Chief executives or theircabinetmembers and staff areamongthe most likely to participate n the repeatedinteractionsorganizedthroughinternational nstitutions. Otherrepressive actors,however, are likely to be marginalizedfrom participation n these institutionsandremain solated from activeprocesses of norm inculcation.Armedinsurgentgroupscontesting the government or vigilante civilians targeting ethnic minorities, forexample, are not apt to be representedat the United Nations (UN) or to partici-

pate in the decision-making processes of most institutions.Contrary o the belief that institutionscan best influencewithoutcoercion, thereare several reasons to expect that coercion is likely to provide stronger ncentivesagainst repressionthan persuasionunder some conditions, and that coercion andpersuasionmay effectively influence humanrightswhen they aresuppliedtogether.First, coercion is likely to be more effective than persuasion (alone) because itdoes not requirechangingactors'deeply held preferencesfor repression,but ratherincreasesthe costs of employingrepressionand the gains of adoptingbetterhumanrights practices.A coerced actor can simultaneouslyhold preferences for humanrightsandchoose to curbrepressivebehaviors n exchangefor otherformsof gainsfrom international ooperation.They are likely to do so when those gains aremorevaluable than the benefits of repression.Reforms can be a side payment.Second, coercion can take place in a much shortertime horizon than persua-sion. If an institution supplies valuable goods under the condition that targetedrepressors make human rights policy changes now or in the short term future,repressorsare morelikely to reactin the short termto adoptnew practices.Imma-nentsanctionson valuablegoods provide strong ncentivesforreforms n thepresentratherthanrepressivebehavior into the future.

Third, coercion can change a variety of different repressive actors' behaviorswhen they value the gains of cooperation more than the gains of repression. Infact, any domestic opponentto humanrightswith strong preferencesfor the goods

37. See Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; and Schwitzgebel 1999.


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achieved through cooperationcan, under certain conditions, be coerced into sup-porting humanrights reformsthey would not otherwise select.38 Moreover,coer-cive instrumentsthat successfully institutionalize new benefits can influence thepreferences of future leaders with incentives for repression. In principle, theseinstrumentscan do so under the condition that institutionalizationof the coerciveinstrumenthas led to new gains, now perceived to be valuable by the incominggovernment,that are greaterthan existing incentives to use repression.39Fourth, coercion does not require direct and repeated access to target repres-sors. It only requiresthat targetactors are informedof the coercion trade-offandvalue the benefits of internationalcooperationmorethanthey value the gains fromrepression. No repeated institutional contact between the actors governing inter-nationalinstitutionsandthe repressorsthey are tryingto influenceis, in principle,necessary. In practices, coercion and persuasion may take place simultaneouslyand are often compatibleprocesses of influence.

A Matter of Design: How HRAs and PTAs ChangeGovernments' BehaviorsIn the preceding section, I have arguedthat the problemof humanrights compli-ance is to influence repressive governments' domestic behaviors and that inter-national nstitutionscan influencehumanrightsthrough wo mechanisms.Althoughmany scholars are optimisticthat HRAs lacking hard standardsare still capable ofsubstantialinfluence on domestic policy, I argue the contrary:coercion is muchmore likely than persuasion (alone) to be effective. In the following section, Iapply these claims to HRAs and PTAs, respectively, and develop three positiveexpectations about influencinghumanrights behaviors.

HumanRightsAgreementsThe internationalhuman rights regime is championed by a growing number oftreaties and instrumentsdesigned to protect identifiable groups, such as womenandchildren,as well as to protectall people againstparticulargovernmentbehav-iors, such as torture.At the heart of this regime are the UN Charter(Article 55)and seven internationalagreementsthat define a set of global regulations.Almostall states in the world have ratifiedone or more of these instruments.

38. These conditions requirethatbenefits gained from adoptingunwanted reforms are greaterthancosts of adoption;hatno credible lternativeupplyof thegoodsareavailablewithouthuman ightsconditions; and that target actors hold incentives for the goods achieved through integration. Also seeMoravcsik 2000 for a similarargument n the Europeancontext.39. For a discussion of handtying throughcrediblecommitment,see Martin 1998 and2000; Abbottand Snidal 2001; and Kahler and Lake 2003. I would like to thankan anonymousreviewers for help-ing me to clarify this point.


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This architectureof international aw was principally constructedto influencethrough persuasion:to identify and classify which rights are globally legitimate,to provide a forum for the exchange of informationregardingviolations, and tosway governmentsandviolators thatlaws protectinghumanrights areappropriateconstraintson the nation-state hatshouldbe respected.Over the years, the regimehas proven increasinglycompetentin supplyingthe instrumentsnecessary to col-lect andexchange informationon humanrightsviolations, andto disseminatethatinformationon a global scale.40Despite this substantialcapacityto classify and disseminate humanrightsnormsandestablishmonitoring nstitutions,most agreementswere not designed to influ-ence throughcoercion, and those that were often fail to be effective: they remainquite soft.41Most HRAs supply no formal enforcementmechanisms42 o provideor disruptvaluable exchange with a targetstate.43They offer no material rewardsin exchange for betterpractices,andthey cannotdirectlypunishviolatorsby with-holdingvaluablegoods.44 At theirbest, most HRAs influenceby mobilizinghumanrightsadvocates and supplyingrepressorswith informationandlegitimatingmoti-vations to internalizenew norms of appropriatebehavior.There are therefore good reasons to be skeptical that most HRAs directly orfrequentlypersuaderepressiveactors to changetheirhumanrightsbehaviors,espe-cially amongthosewho valuerepressionhighly.HRA'ssupply strongtools of moralsuasion but offer few valuable incentives for repressors to change their beliefsaboutappropriate ehaviors.They identifyandlobby target ndividuals andgroups,but they are often limited to accessing repressorsthat consent to be targetedto

40. The major treaties furnish UN committees that formally provide a reporting and oversightfunction.41. There is today only one majorexception to this claim: the Europeanhumanrights system sup-plies a unique set of instrumentsto enforce the Council of Europe's commitment to uphold HRAs.Almost all membershave adoptedthe Convention for the Protectionof HumanRights andFundamen-tal Freedoms into national law, obligating national courts to enforce the agreement's provisions. TheEuropeanCourt of HumanRights is the superiorarbitrator f disputesconcerningnoncompliancewithhumanrights standardsunderthe Convention, acting as a subsidiaryto national enforcement n casesof failure. Europe,however, is exceptional. The vast majorityof HRAs provide softer standards hatare voluntary and weakly enforceable at best. See Cleveland 2001b. The Organizationof AmericanStates (OAS) offers the closest comparison.The Commission monitors observance of treaty obliga-tions for all statescommittedto the AmericanConvention on HumanRights, while the Courtmonitorscompliance under the Convention for states that have also recognized the compulsoryjurisdiction ofthe Court. Yet OAS political bodies routinely fail to supportor enforce the recommendationsof theCommission or the judgments of the Court, and humanrights standardsremain effectively soft. SeeDulitzky 1999; and Davidson 1997.42. Small steps towardlegal enforcementhave only recently begun at the global level throughtheformation of the InternationalCriminalCourt (ICC), as well as at the regional level throughcourtssuch as the EuropeanandInter-AmericanCourts of HumanRights, and the state level throughthe twoInternationalCriminalTribunals n the FormerYugoslavia and Rwanda. These institutions signal animportantstep towardmanagementof humanrights,but they neverthelessremainextremelylimited intheirjurisdiction and in their effectiveness to provide repressive states with the incentives to protecthumanrights.43. See Cottier2002; and Goodmanand Jinks 2004.44. Donnelly 1986.


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receive information.The exchange of information,once it begins, usually takesplace over many months, if not years, and repressive actors inside the targetedstate may well have changed during this time. What is more, there is no singleHRA effectively able to punish perpetrators f even the most egregious violationsof humanrights.45The best case study evidence to date supports the argument.Risse and col-leagues show thatinfluencethroughpersuasiondependscruciallyon the establish-ment of sustainablenetworksof advocatesamongdomesticandtransnational ctors;thatpersuasionhappensthroughseveral stages over time; andthatthe inculcationof new normsamong the worst abusersoften requiressome coercive processes ofinstrumentalbargaining,at least in the beginning.46Because repressorsvalue thegains from repression highly, they often use repressive acts to effectively outlawor restrictdomestic humanrights mobilization.All told, HRAs rarelycreate the conditions necessaryfor statecompliance withhuman rights because they are soft: persuasion, alone, is a weak mechanism ofinfluence that does not supply strong enough incentives or commitment instru-ments to outweigh defection.HI: State commitment o HRAs does not systematicallyproduce improvement nhumanrights behaviors after commitment.47

Preferential TradeAgreementsTradeliberalizationis today regulatedby multilateral nstitutions.At the heart ofthis system of liberalizationis the 1947 GeneralAgreement on Tradeand Tariffs(GATT)andthe WTO.This movementtowardthe globalizationof tradehas takenplace in the context of regionalism, as a growing numberof states commit to reg-ulate tradethrough preferentialagreements.48These institutionsestablish macro-economic measuresthatprohibitor restrictaccess to nationalmarketsof productsand services imported from other partners, and they prescribe legitimate tradeactions and decision-making proceduresthat states should take to comply withtheircommitments.PTAs exist alongside the WTO agreementsand theirprescrip-tions for the liberalizationof tradein goods and services are organizedvertically,so that states achieve market liberalizationat the nationallevel, voluntarily.PTAs were not principallydesigned to solve problemsof humanrights compli-ance.They aredesignedto resolve collective actiondilemmasandinternalizeexter-

45. See Cleveland 2001a and 2001b.46. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.47. It follows from the logic of the argumentthat the Europeancase is a unique exception to therule. Because various Europeanhumanrights instrumentsprovide harderstandards han most HRAs,we should expect commitmentto these instruments o producemore compliantbehavior.48. For a discussion of the relationshipbetween the world tradesystem and preferentialtrade,seeFrankel,Stein, and Wei 1996; andWinters 1996. For a discussion of preferential radestatistics at theworld level, see Gretherand Olarreaga1998.


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nalities that cross state borders. The instruments of preferential trade chieflyinfluence through coercion: they coordinate mutually beneficial rules of marketaccess between statesand limit defectionthrough hreatsoracts to disruptexchangewith violating members. Not all PTAs are likely to supply the same degree ofcredible coercion; some may provide more valuable benefits and greaterwilling-ness to enforce the rules than others.All PTAs are nevertheless likely to supplysome degree of valuable economic incentives (and thus the potential to changerepressors' ncentives to supporthumanrights throughthreatto withdrawgoods).Many supply mechanismsof persuasion coupled with coercion.A growing number of PTAs provide member governments with a mandatetoobserve humanrights (see Figure 2). These agreementsfall into two main catego-ries. In the first category are a great many PTAs that provide member govern-ments with soft standards o managetheirpolicy commitments(thatis, agreementbenefits are unconditional on member states' actions). PTAs do so by incorporat-ing humanrightsprinciplesandlanguageinto the tradecontract,"affirming," rec-ognizing," or "declaring"member states' commitments to various human rightsprinciples in the preambleof the contracts,or making reference to specific inter-national humanrights laws. The benefits of integration,however, are not condi-tional on the observation of these principles.An example is useful, and there are many from which to choose. Article 6 ofthe Common Market for Eastern and SouthernAfrica (COMESA)Treatyarticu-lates the "recognition,promotionand protectionof humanand people's rights inaccordance with the provisions of the African Charteron Human and Peoples'Rights; accountability, economic justice and popular participation in develop-

7060- Hard50- [ Soft

S4030-2010

YearFIGURE. Preferentialtrade agreementswith humanrights standards


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ment; [and] the recognition and observanceof the rule of law"49 These principlesare soft because the agreement provides no active mechanism to sanction or tothreaten sanctions against COMESA members that do not respect these rights.Indeed, recent acts of terror n memberstateZimbabwehave been formally unob-served by the agreement.These agreements supply similar human rights influence properties as mostHRAs: a set of principled ideas legitimating appropriateand accepted behavioramong a communityof states. Because the standardsare soft-agreement benefitsareunconditionalon humanrights behaviors-this class of institutionsupplies nocoercive mechanisms of influence. If these organizationsinfluence humanrightsat all, they influence throughpersuasion,and one shouldnow expect thatthey areunlikely to change most repressorshumanrights beliefs or practices.H2: State commitment o PTAs supplying soft human rights standards does notsystematicallyproduce improvementn humanrightsbehaviorsafter commitment.

OtherPTAs provide membergovernmentswith "harder"nstitutional channelsto manageandenforce theirpolicy commitments(thatis, benefits that are in someway conditional on member states' actions).These PTAsdo so by placing the lan-guage of humanrights in an enforceable incentive structuredesigned to providememberswiththe economic andpoliticalbenefitsof variousforms of marketaccess.These benefits are suppliedunder conditions of compliance with the protectionofhumanrights principles or laws identifiedin the agreement.Behavioral change isa side payment for marketgains, enforced throughthreat (direct or tacit) to dis-rupt ntegrationor exchangeunless a tradepartner omplies with theirhumanrightscommitmentsspecified in the contract.A list of PTAs offering standards,hard orsoft, is available in the Appendix 1.The Lom6 andCotonouAgreementsarestrongexamplesof these types of PTAs.Cotonou provides the new institutional structure or the EuropeanCommunity's(EC) largest financialandpolitical framework or cooperation,offering nonrecip-rocal tradebenefits for certainAfrican,Caribbean,andPacific (ACP)states,includ-ing nearly unlimited entry to the EC market for a wide range of goods. Theagreement, which replaced successive Lom6 Agreements, commits "Parties [to]undertaketo promoteand protectall fundamental reedoms and humanrights, bethey civil and political, or economic, social and cultural"50These principles aresupportedthrougha political dialogue designed to shareinformation,to cultivatemutualunderstanding,and to facilitate the formationof sharedpriorities,includ-ing those concerningthe respectfor humanrights(Article 8). Obligationsare bind-ing on recipients. They are supportedby a review mechanism established in theconsultationproceduresof Article96, whichrequirehabitualassessmentsof national

49. Article6 (d), (e), (f), and(g).50. Articles9, 13,and26.


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developments concerning human rights.51Alongside the agreement are condi-tionalfinancialprotocolsallocatingresourcesavailableto eligible countries hroughthe EuropeanDevelopment Fund (EDF). When membersare perceived to violateagreementterms, a variety of differentactions can be taken to influencebehavior.These include the threator act of withdrawal of membershipor financialproto-cols, as well as the enforcement of economic or political sanctions. Cotonouthussupplies strongelements of both coercion andpersuasion.This second category of agreement supplies coercion mechanisms of influencethat most HRAs and all soft PTAs cannot supply.PTAs with hard standardscan,undercertainconditions,influencethroughcoercionby changingrepressiveactors'costs and benefits of actualizing their preferences for repression.Consider againthe abusive elite with strongpreferencesfor repression.Wherepersuasionalone islikely to fail, hardstandards an influencetheproblemof compliancewithoutchang-ing actors'preferences.They provide an economic motivationto promotehumanrightspolicy reforms thatwould not otherwisebe implemented,andthey do so ina relatively shorttime horizon. When institutionalizedPTAs create new andvalu-able gains, hard agreements can also commit future elites with preferences forliberalization o humanrightsreformsthey would not otherwise select. While influ-ence through persuasionrequires leveling a campaign to change a new leader'spreferencesfor repression, nfluencethroughcoercion requiresonly thatthe leadervalue the gains of integrationmore than the gains of repression.PTAs, moreover,may increasethecosts of repression or anydomestic actorsthat favorliberalization.Hard PTAs are not a panacea for repression.They are likely to be much lesseffective in influencing armedopposition groups or governmentsunder insurrec-tion, where preferencesfor liberalizationare low or absent among opponents.Tobe sure,not all leadersarelikely to be influenceby all agreements.Severely repres-sive elites thatreap extensive benefits from repressionthat they value more thanintegrationare apt to defect from agreementsthat offer only small gains or thatrequirelarge-scale political upheaval.Moreover,target repressorsthat can securean alternativesupply of the goods achieved throughcooperation without condi-tionalityarelikely to rejectmembership n PTAsthatrequirehumanrightsreforms.Exclusive of these conditions:H3: State commitment o PTAssupplyinghard humanrights standardsdoes sys-tematicallyproduce improvement n humanrights behaviors after commitment.

Experience and Practice: Cases of PTA InfluenceThe expectation that hard PTAs can influence repressive states to change theirbehaviors is open to the charge of endogeneity. It may well be the case that only

51. Lom6 IV provided a similarhard standard n Article 366a.


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70- -Repress civil liberties60-

------Political terror50-

40 -30-20-10-

1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000Year

FIGURE3. Membership in preferential trade agreements standards: Percentrepressive

states that protect humanrights or that hold preferencesto improve their humanrights practices will join these agreements in the first place. It is thus crucial toestablish whetherstates only join those PTAs that are consistent with their statusquo behaviors. Do repressive states become membersof hardPTAs, and how dothese agreementsinfluence them to change behavior afterjoining?

MembershipStatesincreasinglycreate andjoin hardPTAs,and for the past twentyyears, repres-sive governmentshave been among their many members.In 2002 nearly 30 per-cent of all states in the international ystem belonged to a hardagreementof somekind. Figure 3 shows that 40 percent of all agreementmembers were reportedbyAmnesty International o employ frequentacts of repression-political imprison-ment, execution and other forms of political murder,detention without trial, andotheracts of terror.Sixty percentof all members were reportedby FreedomHouseto represscivil liberties. In both cases, the percentageof repressive members hasgrown substantiallyover time.52

52. Data on repression,including coding rules, are describedin the following section.


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Hafner-Burton53as studiedthe selection process for hardagreementsmore sys-tematically, controllingfor domestic political institutions,economic development,and social movement mobilization across the period 1976 to 2002. Multivariateanalyses of membershipselection show thatrepressorsare no more or less likelythanprotectors o select agreementswith hard standard.Violators oin these agree-ments almost as often as protectors.Rather,selection is driven strongly by levelof institutionalizeddemocracy and economic development. Poor democratizingstates in need of economic resource are most likely to select hard agreements.These states are often but not always repressive.Moreover,there is no systematicdifference between repressivestates' selection of hardcomparedto soft standards.

InfluenceThere is strong evidence that PTAs have influenced their repressive members'humanrightsbehaviorsby direct coercion-where contractobligations have beenceased with a targetabuser,a set of demands for policy change have been issued,and new behaviors have consequently been adopted.54A refugee massacre inRwandaafterthe genocide is one such case.Rwanda was a nonreciprocal radememberof the EC underthe Lom6IV Treaty,which containeda humanrights clause guaranteeingmember commitmenttowardthe improvement of basic human rights as a fundamentalcondition of marketaccess.55In reactionto the genocide in 1994, the EC halted Lome benefits to theRwandangovernment.56 lthoughthe agreementwas in no way equipped o addressthe causes of genocide and remained inactive duringthe period of extreme vio-lence, it became influentialonly in the postgenocide period. Lom6 earmarked22million ECU for reconstructionunderconditions thatthe new governmentrespectbasic humanrights and operateunderrule of law.57Before the first transferof resources could take place, the Rwandanarmyevac-uated a refugee camp, violating the rights of many people. In directreaction, theCommission suspendedpaymentandEC ministersappealedto the Rwandangov-ernmentto investigate the massacreand to arrestand detain the perpetrators s apreconditionfor payment. Resistance by the governmentto impose sanctions on

53. Hafner-Burton004.54. See Fierro 003;andHazelzet 004 fordetailed xamplesn theEuropeanontext,as well asEuropean ouncil 003.55. Therehavebeenatleastelevencasesof active uspensionf benefitsupplied ytheECagree-mentswiththeACPsince1996alone.56. ECaction n theRwandan ase waschallenged y unilateralctionon thepartof theFrenchgovernment, hichchoseto circumventhefinancialanctions ttheCommunityevelbycontinuingto supply heRwandanovernment ith aid.See King1999.57. TheEU-Rwandanelationshipnterednto tsthirdphase n 2000 with he 8thEDF, ransition-ingfrom ehabilitationolong-term evelopment ithmore han20 millionEuros llocatedorprojectssupportingoodgovernancend ustice.SeetheEC'sDevelopmentvailable t(http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/).ccessed10 March 005.


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members of the armyled to the unconditionalwithholdingof funds until sanctionswere implemented.In 1995 the governmentagreedto prosecutethose responsible,and the Commission conditionally reinstatedpayments under Lome.58Influencewas direct and actively coercive.59In two similarcases, humanrights reforms were initiatedin bothTogo andFijithroughdirect coercive measures enacted under a hard PTA with the EU. In thecase of Togo, following unsuccessful political consultations,the EC enactedArti-cle 366a-the suspension clause of the Lom6 IV Convention-in reaction to vio-lation of democratic and humanrights principles enshrinedin the PTA, includingserious irregularities n the applicationof political and civil rights.60CooperationunderLom6was reinstatedonly afterthe governmentdemonstratedignificantstepshad been taketowardcompliance with reforms identifiedby the EC, includingtheestablishment of a new electoral code and new elections.61Cooperationwas sim-ilarly suspended n the case of Fiji after the overthrowof the democraticallyelectedgovernment and the repeal of the constitution.Threateningto impose sanctionsand invoking the human rights clause under Cotonou (Article 96), the EC post-poned financingof investmentprojects under the 9th EDF until political reformswere undertaken o secure democracyand respect for humanrights.62Evidence also shows thatPTAs have at times been influencedby threatof sanc-tion withoutimplementation.Pakistan s one such case. The Pakistanigovernmenthas long had trade relationswith Europe.The EC's generalized system of prefer-ences (GSP) establishes protective labor conditions with Pakistan on the importa-tion of certain industrial and agriculturalproducts.63Respect for worker's rightswas established as a condition for tariff preferences. In 1995 the Trades UnionConfederationmobilized against the government'suse of forced child labor, andthe European Parliamentrequested an immediate investigation of the miscon-duct.64Althoughthe EuropeanCommissiondeliberateda banon importsto coercenew policies on child labor, it ultimately did not implement a ban. Rather, theCommission chose to pursue influence throughthe threatof a ban coupled with

58. See Riedel and Will 1999; and EuropeanCommission 1998b.59. Coercion in Myanmardemonstrates a similar process of influence. In 1996 the human rightsclause of the GeneralizedSystem of TradePreferences(GSP) was also successfully applied againsttheUnion of Myanmar or alleged use of forced labor.See Brandtnerand Rosas 1999.60. The Council decision was adoptedin December 1998. See EuropeanCommission 1998a.61. See Bulterman1999; and Fierro2003.62. EuropeanCommission 2000a.63. The GSP is a unilateralpreferential nstrumentas comparedto bilateralPTAs such as Lom6 andCotonou. There are currentlytwo forms of standardsregulated throughthe GSP,recognized in Regu-lations 3281/94 and 1256/96. The firstis a negative provision:if a beneficiarycountryfails to provideinternationallyrecognized workersrights, the countrymay be deprived, unilaterally,of GSP eligibilityfor selected articles. The second is a positive provision known as the "special incentives arrange-ments":developing countries can apply for furtherpreferencesif they can demonstrate he completeimplementation of standards in ILO Conventions combating forced labor and child labor, and protect-ing the freedom of association, the right to collective bargainingand nondiscrimination n employ-ment. Note thatPakistan s not a member of the special arrangement.64. EuropeanParliamentResolution, 14 December 1995.


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positive incentives for Pakistan's active participationin the InternationalLaborOrganization's(ILOs) programfor the eradication of child labor (IPEC). Duringthe proceedings, which continuedinto 1997, Pakistanintroducednationallegisla-tion outlawing child labor as a direct response to the investigation, and sub-sequently suppliedthe Commission with regularinformationof the government'sefforts to implementthe new humanrightspolicies, which remainproblematicbutare underreform.65Brandtnerand Rosas (1999) identify a Commission statementthat reveals theCommunity'sstrategyin this case:

The overridingobjective of the procedure,duringwhich contractsare estab-lished withthe authorities f the countriesconcerned, s to bringaboutprogresson the groundby encouragingthe countries concernedto pursuea qualitativesocial development,a process the Communitybacks up with complementaryschemes. Preferences are withdrawn as a last resort, if the first two stageshave come to nothing.66Humanrights reforms have similarly been initiated in the Comoros Islands andNiger underthreat to enact measuressuppliedby a hard PTA. In both cases, sus-pension of marketaccess underLome was threatenedby the EC following mili-tary coups leading to human rights violations. Substantial reforms by eachgovernmentto comply with the EC's demands were initiatedand cooperationwasconditionallyreinstatedduringconsultations in lieu of suspension.67Still othercases offer evidence that some PTAs influencethroughcoercion cou-pled with persuasion.Slovakia is a strongcase.68At the 1993 CopenhagenEuro-peanCouncil,theEC adopteda numberof politicalcriteria or accessioncandidates,including"HumanRightsand the Protectionof Minorities."Article 49 of the Treatyon the EuropeanUnion established that accession must be approvedby unani-mous vote of the Council and an absolute majority of the Parliament,with theOpinion of the Commission playing an importantrole. Early on, the EuropeanCommissionexpressedthe opinionthatSlovakiadid not qualifyfor accessionnego-tiations, citing the government'sfailure to fulfill the democraticand humanrights

65. Brandtnerand Rosas 1999. In a related case, tradepreferencesunderthe GSP were suspendedwith Burma in 1997 because of the existence of forced labor.66. Ibid., 717. It is during this period that the Commission began negotiations with Pakistan toconclude a Third GenerationCooperationAgreement, containing ever-strongerobligations to protecthumanrights. In 1999 signaturewas delayed repeatedlyas a directresult of Pakistan'snucleartestingandhumanrights abuses, while a furtherset of conditions were imposed for membership.Signatureofthe new agreement,which is nonpreferential, ook place under the new governmentof PresidentPer-vez Musharraf n 2001, but has not yet entered into force. The EC's ExternalRelations is available at(http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/pakistan/intro/index.htm). Accessed 28 March2005.Note that in the wake of the terroristattackson 11 September2001 against the United States, the EUgrantedPakistan an inclusive package of tradepreferences.67. See EuropeanCommission 1999a; and EuropeanCommission 1999b.68. Otherrelated cases of successful coercion towardcompliance with humanrightsnormsincludethe EC's tradepolicy towardcertain countries of the formerYugoslavia.See BrandtnerandRosas 1999.


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elements of the Copenhagen criteria, and in particular,respect for minorities.69Several precise violations were formally articulatedover several years, includingrecommendations or changes in nationallaws and policies concerningthe rightsof the political opposition, limitations on the power of the executive, the activitiesof police and secret service, and repressionof Hungarianand Roma minorities.70In the subsequent phases of negotiations, the Commission cites substantialimprovementsin respect for civil and political rights in Slovakia, including sup-port for civil society organizations and protection of the rights of minorities.71These improvementswere requiredin order to be considered eligible for acces-sion, giving Slovakia'srulers considerable ncentives to changetheirdomesticpol-icies. In 1999 the Commission determinedthat Slovakia had taken the necessarysteps to fulfill the basic Copenhagen political criteria,althoughthe report identi-fied furtherareas of human rights policy for reform.72By 2003 the governmenthad ratifiedall of the humanrights legal instrumentsunder the justice and homeaffairsacquis, andthe Commission was of the opinion that Slovakia was continu-ing to meet the humanrights requirementsof accession and taking positive stepstowardimprovement.73C8te d'Ivoire's trading relationshipwith the United States demonstratesa sim-ilar process of influence through coercion, although influence has been limitedand confined to workers' rights in the export sectors. The African Growth andOpportunityAct (AGOA)of 2000, which is an autonomousU.S. trade instrumentsigned into law as Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000, providesconcrete market ncentives for certain Africanstatesto liberalize their economies.The agreementaims to increase trade and investmentin the region, while pressur-ing governments hrough he implementationof hardstandardso promote he basicobservance of humanrightsas a fundamentalprincipleof trade,with specific atten-tion to workers'rights.C8te d'Ivoire has been a candidategovernmentsince 2000,although the government (brought to power by military coup), was repeatedlydenied trade benefits by the U.S. trade representative,"largely because of con-

69. See Bulterman,Hendriks, and Smith 1998; and Nowak 1999. Humanrights abuses were alsoidentified in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, although violations did not technically violate theCopenhagencriteriafor suspensionof negotiationstowardagreement.The Commission, throughcom-prehensiveannualevaluations,nevertheless articulatedhumanrightsreforms to be undertaken n bothcountries. See Fierro2003, 142. Negotiations toward accession have been stoppedin the case of Tur-key as well, whereviolations of humanrightshave long been the primaryobstacleto further ntegration.70. See EuropeanCommission 1997 and 1999c.71. It is important o rememberthatnegotiations over EU membershiprepresentthe best instancesof PTAinfluence. The EU is a PTA in the rareform of an economic union, offering a wide range ofbenefits that far exceed almost all other forms of preferentialtrade (such as free trade agreements,customs unions, and common markets). Nevertheless, negotiationsover accession to the EU provide aprime example of PTAinfluence at its best.72. EuropeanCommission 1999c. The central formof coercion in this case was enactedthrough hesuspensionof negotiationstowardan accession agreementrather hansuspensionof the existing EuropeAgreement,which also contained a hard humanrights standard.73. EuropeanCommission 2003.


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cerns related to rule of law, human rights, political pluralism, and economicreform."74Although violations of civil andpolitical rights were a serious problemin bothrebel and government areas of control, the United States recently granted C6ted'Ivoire membershipin exchange for several minor advances towardprotectionof workers'rights. Specifically, the government agreed to supporta protocol ini-tiated by the U.S. Chocolate ManufacturersAssociation to address forced andhazardouschild labor in the cocoa sector, which is one of the largest agriculturalsectorsand,togetherwith coffee, accountsfor threequartersof the country'sexportearnings.The governmentalso began drafting egislation to conform to ILO con-ventions, as requestedby the U.S. traderepresentative.75Reforms, althoughlim-

ited, have taken place to gain trade membership.C6te d'Ivoire's exports underthe agreementwere valued at roughly $50 million in 2002, representing13 per-cent of the country's total exports to the United States. While the United Statesused marketaccess to press for reforms of labor rights, the EU opened consulta-tions under Article 366a of Lom6 to press for improvements n civil and politicalrights.The Commission recognizes thatprogresshas been minimal but graduallyimproving.76These cases show clear instanceswhere an agreementwith hard standardsnflu-enced a repressive government to improve specific human rights practices afterjoining.77The cases show various forms of influence across various actors facingdifferentkinds of humanrights problems, in differentregions of the world. Theyalso show that there is significantvariationacross hardPTAdesign, and thuseffec-tiveness in influencingcompliance.78 t is regrettablydifficult, however, to collectevidence from all existing PTAs with hard standards.So many agreements arenew, are in the process of being institutionalized,or have yet to take actionsbasedon theirhumanrightsstandards.Moreover, ew agreementsoffertransparenteport-ing mechanismsthatreveal theirhumanrights actions and most do not yet supplyassessments of theirinfluence on standards.The cases selected here thus focus onagreementswith Europeor the United States precisely because these PTAs offersome degree of transparencyand substantial nstitutionalhistories of using stan-dards.Nevertheless, several hardagreementsnow coordinatetrade among states

74. Officeof theUnitedStatesTradeRepresentative001 and2002,85.75. Officeof theUnitedStatesTradeRepresentative003.76. European ommission001a.77. Formoreexamples, ee Hazelzet 001. Inmanycases,coercionhastakenplaceduring egoti-ations owards heformationf a hardPTA.Negotiationsoward he formationf a PartnershipndCooperationgreementetweenheECandBelarus,orexample,weresuspendedollowing he1996deteriorationf human ightsandmadeconditional ponreforms. ee Fierro 003.78. Thereareseveral xampleswherePTAswithhard tandardsave ailed o bringabout ompli-ance withhuman ightsnorms, itherbecause he targetgovernmentaschosen o forgosidepay-ments nexchangeorreforms, s inthecaseof Zimbabwe,rbecause hesupplieracks hepoliticalresolve oeffectively oerce,as inthecasesof China ndRussia.See Miller2004 forexamples.Appli-cationof hard tandardss selectiveandmeritsa separate nalysis.


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outside of Europeor NorthAmerica. Thereis at presentno strongcase studyevi-dence to either supportor reject the propositionthat these PTAs influence mem-bers' human rights practices, and further research into these new cases will becrucial in the next few years.Moreover,humanrights conditionalityis by no means without its critics. Sev-eral lessons have emergedfromtheses cases that suggest limits to PTAcapacitytoshapehumanrights.79PTAinfluence is almost always limited to "firstgeneration"human rights protecting civil and political liberties and securing freedom fromtortureand violent repression.8oThe United States is one of the only countriestoprioritizeworkers'rights over the rights of all people, and in fact, to acknowledgereforms in workersrights while ignoring violations of civil andpolitical rights, asin the case of the COteD'Ivoire. Implementationof trade coercion measureshashistoricallybeen selective, while influence s partialand sometimessectoral.81 TAsare not designed to transformgovernmentsfrom serious repressorsinto commit-ted protectors,but rather o provide the incentives for small and often incrementalchanges in some policies. Sometimes this process shouldfail, as policy implemen-tationrequiresa high degree of conceptual clarity in an agreement'shumanrightsmandate,as well as the commitmentby agreementshareholders hat violation willbe punishedby reducingor ceasing tradeagreementbenefits.82Failure on the partof memberstates to enforce the humanrightsconditionsof the contractcan effec-tively reduce the credibility of future threats of enforcement and weaken theorganization's ability to tie the hands of local elites to accept human rights-relatedtradepractices.83

Quantitative EvidenceTo test these theoretical implications more systematically,it is importantto con-sider the domestic political and economic characteristics hat are thoughtto influ-ence repressionof humanrights. I begin by estimatingthe following model:

79. See Crawford1998; and EuropeanCommission 2000b and 2000c.80. Bandtner ndRosas1999.81. The United States, for example, routinely dismisses or postpones country petitions under theGeneralizedSystem of Preferencesfor violation of labor rights (OECD 1996), while various memberstates of the EC have shown clearlimitationsof political will to enforcenegative PTAmeasures towardseveral formercolonies. King 1999.82. This article proceeds under the working assumptionthat hard PTAs supply a positive degree ofcrediblehreats ndmaterialncentives.However, TAsmayactually ary ntheir upplyof credibil-ity and ncentives,uggestinghe use of a weighting cheme o sort nstitutions. lthough esirable,such a weighting scheme is hard as a practical matter,and as other scholars of organizationshavenoted, there is little extant theory to guide the effort (Oneal and Russett 1999). Furtherresearch intohow PTAs vary in their incentives and credibilitywould be extremelyuseful, but is beyond the imme-diate scope of this article.83. See EuropeanCommission 2000d and 2001b.


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REPRESSIONit= a + 01REPRESSION(1)it-_+ P2REPRESSION(2)j,1+ 03 REPRESSION(3)it-1+ 34REPRESSION(4)it_1+ 1PsDEMOCRACYit-1 + 36DURABILITYit-1+ P7DENSITYit-1+ I3sTRADEitI+ ,89INVESTMENTi-1 + PopcGDPit-1 ++11HRAsit-1+ P12PTAsoftit-l + f13PTAhardit-1 + eit (1)

DataThis study follows an increasing numberof humanrights scholars in the use ofdatameasuringpolitical terror.The dependentvariable,REPRESSIONit,ffers infor-mation about murder, orture,or other cruel, inhuman,or degradingtreatmentorpunishment;prolonged detention without charges; disappearanceor clandestinedetention;and other flagrantviolations of the right to life, liberty, and the secu-rity of the person. I draw on two existing data sources. Poe and Tate offer dataon 153 governments'reportedlevels of repression (or political terror)from 1976to 1993.84 Gibney offers repression data from 1980 to 2002 across a differentsample of 141 states and territories.85Data were collected in both cases throughcontent analysis of annualhumanrights reportsissued by Amnesty International.I combine informationfrom the two data sets to createrepressionindicatorson atotal sample of 176 states over twenty-six years, 1976 to 2001. The observedvalue of REPRESSIONits ordinal,ranging across five levels of behavior.86The first set of independent variables, REPRESSION(1)it_1, REPRESSION(2)it_1,REPRESSION(3)i,t-1, REPRESSION(4)i,-1,

arebinary ndicatorsmeasuringa state'spre-vious level of repression.They areincludedin place of the standard agged depen-dent variable to account for dependence across the categories of the dependentvariableover time.87It is importantto control for three independentvariables that captureelementsof the domesticpoliticalcontext.First,DEMOCRACYit-1easuresPolity IVd regimecharacteristics,coded by Jaggers and Gurr.The well-known variable takes on

84. Fordetails,see Poe and Tate1994. Data areavailablerom(http://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/poetate.htm.) ccessed10 March2005.My thanks o StevenPoe andhis teamat theUniversity fNorthTexas orsharingheirdata.85. Dataareavailable rom(www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney.html).ccessed10 March2005.My thanks o MarkGibneyand his teamat the university f University f NorthCarolina-Ashevilleorsharingheirdata.86. Coding ulesaredescribedntheAppendix .87. BecauseREPRESSIONits treated s a nonlinear ependentariable,t is notappropriateo con-trolforautocorrelationhroughhestandardreatmentf REPRESSIONit-1s a lagged ineardependentvariable.The inclusionof fourdummyvariables s a nice alternativeo the problem f correlatedcategories f repression ithina stateacross ime.


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TABLE. Descriptive statistics and associations, 1972-2002

Dependent variables: Percentage distribution over time

REPRESSIONit IMPUTEit CIVILLIBERTYitValues (i = 176, t = 1976-2002) (i = 181, t = 1976-2002) (i = 185, t = 1972-2001)24.37 24.39 13.3130.07 29.8 14.4626.35 26.33 12.1213 13.56 12.516.2 5.92 18.85

17.0411.72

Independentvariables Minimum Mean MaximumREPRESSIONit-1 1 2.47 5IMPUTEit-1 1 2.47 5CIVILLIBERTYit-1 1 4.07 7DEMOCRACYit- -10 0.19 10DURABILITYit-1 0 22.51 192DENSITYit-1 0.20 3.76 8.55TRADEit- 2.43 4.30 6.11FDIit- 2.30 2.44 3.94PCGDPit-1 4.45 7.53 10.87TREATYit-1 0 0.85 2PTASOftit-1 0 0.14 1PTAhardit-1 0 0.28 1

values ranging from 10 (most democratic) to -10 (most autocratic).88Second,DURABILITYit-1ounts the numberof years since a state has undergonea struc-turalregime transition,defined as a movement on the Polity scale of three pointsor more. Previous research has shown that state level of institutionalized democ-racyhas an important ffect on governmentrespectfor humanrights-democraciesare less likely to commit humanrights violations than autocracies.89Regime tran-sitions may also affect level of repression inside a state. It is thus importantto control for domestic political institutions to isolate the influence of inter-national institutions. Consistent with the literature, I expect the estimates on

88. Jaggers and Gurrconstructa democracy index from five primary nstitutional features. For adetailed explanationof the data, see (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/). Accessed 10 March2005.89. See Henderson 1991; Poe et al. 1999; and Cingranelliand Richards 1999.


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DEMOCRACYit_1and DURABILITYit_1 to be negative.Third,DENSITYit-1 mea-sures statepopulationdensity (perkilometer),collected by the WorldBank. Schol-ars are concerned that populationpressurecan exacerbateresource scarcity andincrease the likelihood that a government will use repression to control civilviolence.90It is equally importantto control for three independentvariables that captureelements of the domestic economy. TRADEit_1 nd INVESTMENTit_1ontrol for thepossible effects that international inancialand markettransactionsmay have onhumanrights,independentfromthe internationaleconomic institutions.Past stud-ies provide evidence that global economic flows shape governmentrepressionofhuman rights, either encouraging governments to improve protection of humanrights, or promotingrepression.91 drawon datafrom the WorldBank in order tomeasurethese flows in the broadest sense possible. TRADEit-1measures the sumof a state'stotal exports andimportsof goods and services measured as a shareofgross domestic product.INVESTMENTit-1measures the sum of the absolute valuesof inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment recordedin the balance ofpaymentsfinancialaccount.92The indicator s calculatedas a ratioto gross domes-tic product (GDP) converted to international dollars using purchasing powerparities.93Finally,pCGDPit_1measuresGDP per capita in constant US dollars. Many stud-ies on humanrightspracticesexamine the effects of economic development.Mitch-ell andMcCormickprofferthe "simplepovertythesis,"a commonly acceptedviewthatlack of economic resourcescreatesfertile groundfor politicalconflict, in manycases promptinggovernments to resort to political repression.94 n an advancedeconomy where people are likely to have fewer grievances, political stability isoften achieved more easily, reducing the likelihood of humanrights violations.95All three measures are logged in order to reduce the skew of their distributions.Iexpect the estimate of PCGDPit_1o be negative.I analyze the effects of state commitment to HRAs and PTAs by introducingthree core variables. In order to test Hypothesis 1, I consider state commitmentto implementhumanrights agreements,HRASit-1.Specifically, I consider ratifica-tion, succession, and accession to two treatiesdesigned to influence political ter-ror and civil rights, and thus directly related to the dependent variable: theInternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights and the ConventionAgainstTorture.HRASit-I. is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 2, derived from the

90. See Henderson 1993; and Poe and Tate 1994.91. See Cingranelliand Richards 1999; and Richards et al. 2001.92. This measureincludes equity capital and reinvestmentof earnings, as well as other long-termand short-termcapital taken into considerationby a variety of humanrights scholars.93. In both cases, I include alternativemeasures of trade and investment as a check on robustness.See Hafner-Burton orthcoming.94. Mitchell and McCormick 1988.95. See Pritchard1989; and Henderson 1991.


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total number of the two treaties that a state i has ratified into national law intime t.96Next, I consider state commitmentto tradethroughPTAs offeringhumanrightsstandards.Coding state membershipin PTAs is not as straightforward s codingstate ratificationof humanrights law. Of the more than 200 regional agreementstoday in effect, many states belong to several agreementssimultaneously.In con-trast to internationalhumanrights law where all states in the internationalsystemareeligible tojoin, PTAs also limit potentialmembership o a core economic regionof states. All states are thus not eligible to belong to all agreements,and all PTAsdo not incorporatehumanrights standards.Consequently,I test Hypotheses 2 and3 using two binarymeasures of statemembership n PTAs with humanrights stan-

dards.97 PTASOftit-1measures state membershipwith PTAs supplying soft stan-dards:state i in year t takes on a value of 1 if that statebelongs to any soft PTA.PTAharditl measuresstatemembershipwith PTAs supplyinghard standards: tatei in year t takes on a value of 1 if that state belongs to any hardPTA.I coded each policy outcome using contentanalysis of all PTA formalcontracts,including treaties, protocols, and other forms of amendments.For each agree-ment, I assigned yearly values measuringmembershipof all states in the inter-national system, the explicit98 adoptionof humanrights language and principles,and whetherthe benefits accordedby the contractformally dependon those prin-ciples (benefits can be withheld for violation). I then transformedthe data intostate-yearsand assigned a single binary value for each outcome. Finally, eit is astochastic errorterm.

Statistical ResultsColumn (1) of Table 2 reportsorderedlogit estimates of the parameters n equa-tion (1). AlthoughI propose several unidirectionalhypotheses, I reporttwo-tailedtest statistics for all parameters.State commitmentsto comply with HRAs andsoft PTAs do not systematically lead to decreasingrepressivebehaviorin the fol-

96. Inorder o control orthepotential ifferencesn effectbetween atification,n the onehand,and uccession ndaccession, n theotherhand, compute second oding f thisvariable,HRAS_ratit-1thatcountsonlyratifications.nordero control orthepossibilityhat heeffectsof ratificationo nottakeplace mmediately,utrather ver ime,I compute third odingof thisvariable,HRAS_yearsit-,thatcountscumulativeearssinceratificationf thetreaties. report ny discrepancies iththe esti-matesof HRASit-In thefootnotes.97. A statewithmultipleagreementsut minimalhuman ightsstandardsmaybe more ikelytoshirk heirhuman ightscommitmentsssociatedwithmembershipf theycangainthe benefitsoftradeassociationhroughthermembershipshatdo not mpose onditionality.alsocompute ropor-tions n order o consider state's ommitmento PTAswithhuman ights tandardselative o theiroverall commitmentto PTAs.98. Explicit here refers to those documents using the word "right"or "rights" o refer to human,worker, women, children, migrant,civil or other rights codified by the United Nations humanrightslegal regime. I do not include intellectualpropertyrights or otherusages of the terms that do not referto one of the above categories.


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TABLE2. Estimatesof the effects of internationalhumanrights agreementsand preferential trade agreementsonrepression,1972-2002

(1) (2) (3)Variables REPRESSIONit IMPUTEit CIVILLIBERTYitINVESTMENTit-1 -0.633 -0.616 0.262(0.36) (0.35) (0.27)TRADEit-1 -0.483*** -0.450*** 0.078(0.13) (0.12) (0.10)PCGDPit- -0.162** - 0.160** - 0.264***(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)DEMOCRACYit- 1 -0.031 ** - 0.028** - 0.080***(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)DURABILITYit- 1 - 0.006* -0.007* -0.005(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)DENSITYit-1 0.091 0.090* 0.017(0.05)* (0.04) (0.03)HRASit-1 0.082 0.078 0.029(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)PTASOftit-1 -0.265 -0.210 -0.197(0.16) (0.15) (0.14)PTAhardit-1 -0.255* -0.273** -0.303**(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)X2 1033.23*** 1054.57*** 1273.75***Log likelihood -2026.06 -2135.31 -1594.92N 2244 2359 2423Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified. The numbers inparenthesesarepanel-corrected tandard rrors.All models include binaryvariablesfor each level of the dependentvariable (excluding the most repressive category),lagged. The estimates are not reportedto save space: they are all negative and sig-nificant at 5.001.*** p 5.001; ** p -.01; * p -.05.

lowing year.Quitethe contrary,HRASit-1andPTASOftit-1 ave no significanteffectson the likelihood of repression.99When PTAs contracthard human rights stan-dards, by contrast, member states are systematically more likely to decreaserepression.I computepredictedprobabilitiesof REPRESSIONito interpretheseresults.Table3displays the probabilities,given Model (1), that a state employing repression intime 1 will employ differentlevels of REPRESSION n time 2. For example, the firsttwo rows presentsthe probabilitiesthat a statewith a REPRESSIONitevel of 5-anextreme abuser-will remainan extremeabuser or reformbehaviors (to be a level4, 3, 2, or 1) in the following year. The first of these rows shows probabilities

99. The finding on HRAs is consistent with recent empirical work by Hafner-Burtonand Tsustui2005; and Hathaway2002.


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TABLE. Predictedprobabilities of repressionacross time: Hardpreferentialtrade agreements,1972-2002

Predicted robability f repressionn TimeRepressionat Time1 Pr(y=lx) Pr(y=2lx) Pr(y=3lx) Pr(y=41x) Pr(y=5lx)Pr(y=51x):PTAhardit= 0 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.45 0.47

PTAhardit=1 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.49 0.40Pr(y=4 x):PTAhardi, = 0 0.00 0.05 0.39 0.46 0.09PTAhardit 1 0.00 0.07 0.44 0.42 0.07Pr(y=3lx):PTAhardit= 0 0.02 0.31 0.55 0.11 0.01PTAhardit 1 0.02 0.36 0.51 0.09 0.01Pr(y=21x):PTAhardit 0 0.11 0.65 0.22 0.02 0.00PTAhardit= 1 0.14 0.67 0.18 0.02 0.00

Note: The predictedprobabilitiesare computed using the orderedlogit estimates in column (1) of Table 2. REPRES-SIONangesfrom most extreme (5) to absent (1). Codingrules are listed in Appendix2. Confidenceintervals for eachpredictionarecalculated n the replication ile availableat (http://www.stanford.edu/-emiliehb/). Accessed 28 March2005.

calculated when a state belongs to no hardPTAs, while the second shows proba-bilities calculated when a state belongs to at least one hardagreement,all else atthe mean.100The probabilitiesshow quite simply that states belonging to hard PTAs have alower probabilityof repressinghumanrights than states without memberships.Alevel 4 abuser,for example, is 6 percent more likely to reduce repression in thefollowing year if they belong to a hard agreement, and 2 percent less likely tobackslide into more abuse. Repression,however, is sticky, and changes arepartialratherthan absolute. States are likely to hold to status quo behaviors over time,and when they do reform, repressive states are most likely to move to the nextcategory of REPRESSIONit from a 3 to a 2), rather han to skip categories (froma 5to a 1).Further ConsiderationsIt is important o consider the robustnessof the dependentvariableby consideringdifferentsamples and sources. To this end, I offer two additional measuresof thedependentvariable andreestimate ordered ogit models in columns (2) and (3) of

100. PTASOfts held at0.


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Table 2. IMPUTEit imputes missing values of REPRESSIONit or 114 state-years dur-ing which Amnesty Internationaldid not produceannualreports.This variableisa robustness check against possible bias in Amnesty International'sselection ofstate-years o report.Data were imputedfor missing yearson repressiondatacodedfrom the U.S. State Departmentannualreportsof political terrorand several par-tisan variables in orderto control for possible bias from the State Department-suchas UN GeneralAssembly voting agreementwith the UnitedStates.1o0MPUTEitoffers informationon 181 states duringthe period 1976-2002.

CIVILLIBERTYit offers informationaboutrepressionof civil rightscollected annu-ally by Freedom House. Civil liberties include the freedom of expression, assem-bly, association, education,and religion, protectedby an equitable system of ruleof law, as well as freedom from political terror.Each countryis assigned a valuerangingacross seven levels of behavior,from strong protectionto extremerepres-sion. The variable offers informationfrom 1972 to 2001, on a total sample of 185states.102The substantive indingsare robust acrossboth alternativemeasures:hardPTAs encourage better humanrights practices, while soft agreementsand HRAsdo not exert a stronginfluence on behavior.Table4 offers three additional robustness checks. Column (1) tests for a Euro-pean influence. Only 12 percent of states belonging to a hard PTA do not alsobelong to tradeagreementswith the EU, andthe best informationaboutthe waysin which hardagreementsinfluence humanrights comes from EU case studies. Itis thuspossible that PTAinfluenceis a Europeanphenomenonrather hana globalone. States with stronger nstitutionalizedtradeties to the EU may be more likelythan states with weak ties or with no ties to be influenced by hard PTAs. Thelimitations of the statistical data make it impossible to analyze the effects of theseagreementspast 2002, andseveralPTAs have adoptedsome measureof hard stan-dards since this time. However, I control for this possibility to the best extentpossible by including a new variable.EUit1 measuresthe degree of tradeintegra-tion between a state i in year t and the EU, coded by the numberof sharedPTAs.The findings show that the influence of hardPTAs is not drivenby tradeintegra-tion with the EU alone, althoughthe EU is certainly the largest supplier.Column (2) controls for fixed-timeeffects, which do not changethe substantiveresults for hard PTAs. Fixed-time effects are useful because they allow one toconsider the possibility that time is drivingthe result;thata normof humanrightshas emerged and developed and spreadduringthe past thirty years that accountsfor why statesmoreandmoresign contractswithhumanrightsstandards ndimple-ment betterpractices.The results, however, show us that the institutionaleffects

101. The mputed alueswere estedby randomlyliminating 50Amnesty coresand hencorre-lating heimputed alueswith the truevalues,at a correlationf .91.I thankErikVoetenor under-taking hese mputationsnd orsharing is data.102. Dataandcompletecoding nformation reavailable rom(http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm).Accessed 10 March 2005.


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TABLE. Additional Robustnesschecks: Estimatesof the effects of EU traderelations and time effects on repression,1972-2002

(1) (2) (3)EU trade relations Fixed-timeeffects Economic leverageINVESTMENTit-1 -0.689 -0.788* -0.611(0.40) (0.40) (0.37)TRADEit-1 -0.525*** -0.516*** -0.505***(0.15) (0.14) (0.13)pcGDPit-1 -0.126* -0.142* -0.122(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)DEMOCRACYit-1 -0.036*** -0.034** -0.031**(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)DURABILITYit-1 - 0.008** - 0.006 - 0.006*(0.00) (0.01)* (0.00)DENSITYit-1 0.092 0.090 0.087(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)HRASit-1 -0.007 - 0.005 - 0.078(0.08) (0.09) (0.07)PTASOftit-1 -0.193 -0.292 -0.226(0.15) (0.16) (0.15)PTAhardit-1 - 0.241* - 0.345** 0.527(0.12) (0.12) (0.66)EUit-1 -0.015(0.01)PTAhardit-1 * DENSITYit-1 0.079(0.09)PTAhardit-1 * pCGDPit-1 -0.148(0.08)X2 1309.86*** 1396.24*** 1161.89***Log likelihood -2123.23 -2003.63 -2023.97N 2244 2244 2244Note:All estimates re orderedogits.The numbersn parenthesesrepanel-correctedtandardrrors.All modelsincludebinary ariablesoreach evelof thedependentariableexcludinghe mostrepressiveategory),agged.Theestimates renotreportedo savespace: heyareallnegative ndsignificantt-.001.***p 5.001; **p 5.01; * p 5.05.

are not simply time-dependent.Controlling or every yearin the sample,hardPTAshave the expected effect.103Finally, column (3) considers the issue of economic leverage. PTAs influencebecause they coerce actorsinto adoptingbehaviorsthey mightnot otherwiseadopt,providingeconomic incentives to actors thatvalue them. Testingeconomic lever-age directly,however, proves to be a difficulttask.As a preliminarystep, I includetwo interactionterms between PTAhardit-1ndthe GDP andpopulationvariables,under the logic that the gains from integrationare likely to be more significantfor

103. In order to more systematically addressconcerns of endogeneity, I calculate two-stage least-squares estimates assuming PTAhardit as endogenous. Coefficients remain consistent in sign andsignificance.


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smaller and poorer nations.104The interaction between hard standardsand GDP,surprisingly, s negative. The results,however, are ratherhard to interpretbecauseof extremely high collinearity (above 0.95) between the interactionvariable andhardstandards,clearly inflatingthe standarderrors.The interaction with popula-tion has no clear or significanteffect. Although it is beyond the scope of this arti-cle to derivebettermeasures of economic leverage, the issue is of clear importanceto research on PTAinfluence and deserves serious furtherconsideration.105

ConclusionWhen do states comply with internationalrules governing human rights? It hasbe

hafner-burton trading human rights 2005

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