hacienda lusita full digest

8/10/2019 Hacienda Lusita Full Digest

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G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI)

Vs.Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)

FACTS:

IN 1958 , the Spanish owners of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas(Tabacalera ) SOLD Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac ,the sugar mill of the hacienda, TO the Tarlac Development Corporation(Tadeco ), then owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. TheCentral Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a dollar loanfrom a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor ofTadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale, with the condition that the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and wheneverconditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the LandTenure A ct. Tadeco however did not comply with this condition.

ON MAY 7, 1980 , the martial law administration filed a suit before the ManilaRTC against Tadeco , et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the thenMinistry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmersat cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not havetenants, besides which sugar lands of which the hacienda consisted are notcovered by existing agrarian reform legislations (PD 27-rice and corn). TheManila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender HaciendaLuisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.

ON MARCH 17, 1988 , during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino , the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG) moved towithdraw the governments case against Tadeco , et al. The CA dismissed thecase, subject to the PARCs approval of Tadecos proposed stock distribution plan(SDP) in favor of its farmworkers. [Under EO 229 (Sec10) and later RA6657(Sec31), Tadeco had the option of availing stock distribution as analternative modality to actual land transfer to the farmworkers.] On August 23,


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1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation , herein petitioner HLI, asvehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose,Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares )and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI

shares of stock.ON MAY 9, 1989 , some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries ( FWBs )complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989,the SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualifiedFWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodiedthe basis and mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventually approved by thePARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989,

in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares inHLI.

As may be gleaned from the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are:(a) production-sharing equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales fromthe production of the agricultural land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends orincentive bonus ; and (b) distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to family-beneficiaries . The production-sharing, as theSDP indicated, is payable "irrespective of whether [HLI] makes money or

not ," implying that the benefits do not partake the nature of dividends, as theterm is ordinarily understood under corporation law. (5,117 out of 5315 =shares; 132 = land distribution)

Prior to approval, DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago proposed that theSDP be revised, along the following lines:

1. That over the implementation period of the [SDP], [Tadeco]/HLI shall ensurethat there will be no dilution in the shares of stocks of individual [FWBs];

2. That a safeguard shall be provided by [Tadeco]/HLI against the dilution ofthe percentage shareholdings of the [FWBs], i.e., that the 33% shareholdings ofthe [FWBs] will be maintained at any given time

November 21, 1989 - the PARC, under then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, issuedResolution No. 89-12-2, approving the SDP of Tadeco/HLI.


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From 1989 to 2005, HLI claimed to have extended the following benefits to theFWBs:

(a) 3 billion pesos (P3,000,000,000) worth of salaries, wages and fringebenefits

(b) 59 million shares of stock distributed for free to the FWBs;

(c) 150 million pesos (P150,000,000) representing 3% of the gross produce;

(d) 37.5 million pesos (P37,500,000) representing 3% from the sale of 500hectares of converted agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita;

(e) 240-square meter homelots distributed for free;

(f) 2.4 million pesos (P2,400,000) representing 3% from the sale of 80 hectares

at 80 million pesos (P80,000,000) for the SCTEX;(g) Social service benefits, such as but not limited to freehospitalization/medical/maternity services, old age/death benefits and nointerest bearing salary/educational loans and rice sugar accounts.

Two separate groups subsequently CONTESTED THIS CLAIM of HLI. (the petitions/protets)

ON AUGUST 15, 1995 , HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land

of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use , pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA6657. The DAR approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject topayment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and toHLIs continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among otherconditions.

ON DECEMBER 13, 1996 , HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc. ( Centennary ), ceded 300hectares of the converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the

entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million

to Luisita Industrial Park

Corporation ( LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial complex. Fromthis area was carved out 2 parcels(180 has and 4 has), for which 2 separatetitles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation ( RCBC) in payment ofLIPCOs PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC(dacion en pago). LIPCOstitles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC.


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The other 200 has was transferred to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in twoseparate transactions in 1997 and 1998, both uniformly involving 100 hectaresfor PhP 250 million each.

Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway ( SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectaresremained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI .

Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of 2003. THE FIRST WAS FILED BY THE SUPERVISORY GROUPOF HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, inthe alternative, its revocation. THE SECOND PETITION , praying for therevocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the landsin the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ngHacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force(STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After RA 6657 despite theimplementation of the SDP, AND RECOMMENDED. On December 22, 2005, thePARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking theSDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated landacquisition scheme of the CARP.

From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration . Its motionnotwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light ofwhat i t considers as the DARs hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARPeven before PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration. PARCwould eventually deny HLIs motion for reconsideration via Resolution No.2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.


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ISSUES:

(1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLIs SDP?

(2) [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)] Is Sec. 31 of RA6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer,unconstitutional?

(3) Is the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid? [Did PARC gravely abuse itsdiscretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPscompulsory acquisition and distribution scheme?]

(4) Does the non-impairment clause bar the court from reviewing the validityof a partially implemented SDP

RULING:

HLI: PARC has no authority to revoke the SDP; it has the power to disapprove, butnot to recall its previous approval of the SDP. It is the court which has jurisdictionand authority to order the revocation or rescission of the PARC-approved SDP

(1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLIs SDP under the doctrine ofnecessary implication.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 , as implemented by DAO 10, the authority toapprove the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongsto PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLIs posture, PARC also has the power torevoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARCwith the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority ,however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of NECESSARYIMPLICATION , a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.

Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that theconferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of theagricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revokeor recall the approval of the plan.


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To deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agencyof CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by thecorporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority toimpose sanctions for non-compliance with it.

HLI: the parties to the SDOA should now look to the Corporation Code, instead ofto RA 6657, in determining their rights, obligations and remedies. The Codeshould be the applicable law on the disposition of the agricultural land of HLI.

SC: NO! the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA embodyingthe SDP are primarily governed by RA 6657. It should abundantly be made clearthat HLI was precisely created in order to comply with RA 6657, which the OSGaptly described as the "mother law" of the SDOA and the SDP. It is, thus, paradoxical for HLI to shield itself from the coverage of CARP by invokingexclusive applicability of the Corporation Code under the guise of being acorporate entity.

(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refusedto pass upon the constitutional question because it was not raised at the earliestopportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longerone of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.]

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM,composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure tochallenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 as early as November 21,1989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within areasonable time thereafter, and why its members received benefits from theSDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 yearsafter approval of the SDP that said plan and approving resolution were soughtto be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its members, but bypetitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the

constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flawsand gaps in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the publicrespondents, as represented by the Solicitor General, did not question theconstitutionality of the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 membersformerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only onMay 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it


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took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before itchallenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late inthe day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted benefitsfrom the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec.

31 upon which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded intoresolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of along period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and activities whichresulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must bethe very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is notpresent, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution ofthe case. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without

touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally takenby AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged) and theSupervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions ofthe SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis motais whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered therecall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couchedand implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To

be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into theconstitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into theunderlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that isinvalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the SDPthat is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 ofRA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the stockdistribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700provides: [T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall belimited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition . Thus, for allintents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657is no longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether ornot it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.


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(3) YES, the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid. [NO, the PARC did NOT gravelyabuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the haciendaunder CARPs compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme.]

The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics andtimelines of HLIs stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimumindividual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as aresult of the use of man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers ; (2)the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec.11 of DAO 10 prescribes.

In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines

of stock distribution, We find that it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par.3 of the SDOA states:

3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY[HLI] shall arrange with the FIRST PARTY [TDC] the acquisition anddistribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on the basis of number of daysworked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 sharesof the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently owned and held bythe FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 sharesshall have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.

[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualifiedbeneficiaries at the time of the approval of the SDP, suffered from wateringdown of shares. As determined earlier, each original FWB is entitled to18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and distributionof the HLI shares were based on man days or number of days worked by theFWB in a years time. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for atleast 37 days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. Ifit falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at yearend. The number of HLI shares distributed varies depending on the number ofdays the FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI hiredfarmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated inthe Compliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the totalnumber of farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these


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farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out ofthe 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the totaloutstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocationof each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use

of man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers.Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providingfor a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangementcontrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for theimplementation of the approved stock distribution plan within three (3)months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan byPARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock inthe names of the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and transfer

books and must be submitted to the SEC within sixty (60) days fromimplementation.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical,for the three-month threshold. Remove this timeline and the corporatelandowner can veritably evade compliance with agrarian reform by simplydeferring to absurd limits the implementation of the stock distribution scheme.the reason underpinning the 30-year accommodation does not apply tocorporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified

beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued in a much shorter period of time.Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARCshould be upheld [because of violations of] DAO 10. It bears stressing thatunder Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to issue rulesand regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be dulycomplied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP.Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989approving the HLIs SDP is nullified and voided.

(4) Non-impairment clause DOES BAR the court from reviewing the validityof a partially implemented SDP

A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relationsbetween or among parties is deemed read into the contract and itsimplementation cannot successfully be resisted by force of the non-impairment


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guarantee. There is, in that instance, no impingement of the impairment clause,the non-impairment protection being applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing theintention of the parties . Impairment, in fine, obtains if a subsequent law changes

the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenseswith those agreed upon or withdraws existing remedies for the enforcement ofthe rights of the parties .100 Necessarily, the constitutional proscription wouldnot apply to laws already in effect at the time of contract execution , as inthe case of RA 6657, in relation to DAO 10, vis-- vis HLIs SDOA. As held inSerrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.:

The prohibition [against impairment of the obligation of contracts] is alignedwith the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective

operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, asto laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts anddeemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10,Article II [of the Constitution] is limited in application to laws about to beenacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts byenlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the partiesthereto .101 (Emphasis supplied.)

Needless to stress, the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 is not the kind of

issuance within the ambit of Sec. 10, Art. III of the Constitution providing that"[n]o law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

Parenthetically , HLI tags the SDOA as an ordinary civil law contract and, assuch, a breach of its terms and conditions is not a PARC administrative matter ,but one that gives rise to a cause of action cognizable by regularcourts .102 This contention has little to commend itself.

The SDOA is a special contract imbued with public interest, entered into andcrafted pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657. It embodies the SDP, which

requires for its validity, or at least its enforceability, PARCs approval. And thefact that the certificate of compliance 103 to be issued by agrarian authoritiesupon completion of the distribution of stocks is revocable by the sameissuing authority supports the idea that everything about the implementationof the SDP is, at the first instance, subject to administrative adjudication.
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Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBswere said to have received from HLI salaries and cash benefits, hospital andmedical benefits, 240-square meter homelots, 3% of the gross produce fromagricultural lands, and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare

converted land and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI shares totaling118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. On August 6, 20l0, HLI and private respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave theFWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or remain as HLIstockholders, and as a matter of fact, most FWBs indicated their choice ofremaining as stockholders. These facts and circumstances tend to indicate thatsome, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue as HLI shareholders. A matter best left to their own discretion.]

THE DISSENTS IN THE JULY 5, 2011 DECISION

The dissents of the minority justices were on the other fine points of thedecision.

Chief Justice Corona dissented insofar as the majority refused to declare Sec.31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional. The provision grants to corporate landownersthe option to give qualified FWBs the right to own capital stock of thecorporation in lieu of actual land distribution. The Chief Justice was of the viewthat by allowing the distribution of capital stock, and not land, as compliancewith agrarian reform, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 contravenes Sec. 4, Article XIII of theConstitution , which, he argued, requires that the law implementing the agrarianreform program should employ [actual] land redistribution mechanism . UnderSec. 31 of RA 6657, he noted, the corporate landowner remains to be the ownerof the agricultural land . Qualified beneficiaries are given ownership only ofshares of stock, not [of] the lands they till. He concluded that since anunconstitutional provision cannot be the basis of a constitutional act, the SDP

of petitioner HLI based on Section 31 of RA 6657 is also unconstitutional. Justice Mendoza fully concurred with Chief Justice Coronas position thatSec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional. He however agreed with the majority thatthe FWBs be given the option to remain as shareholders of HLI . He also joinedJustice Brions proposal that that the reckoning date for purposes of justcompensation should be May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed by


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Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs. Finally, he averred that considering that more than10 years have elapsed from May 11, 1989, the qualified FWBs, who can validlydispose of their due shares, may do so, in favor of LBP or other qualifiedbeneficiaries. The 10-year period need not be counted from the issuance of the

Emancipation Title (EP) or Certificate of Land Ownership Award CLOA)because, under the SDOA, shares, not land, were to be awarded and distributed.

Justice Brions dissent centered on the consequences of the revocation of HLIsSDP/SDOA. He argued that that the operative fact doctrine only applies inconsidering the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute or arule issued by the Executive Department that is accorded the status of a statute.The SDOA/SDP is neither a statute nor an executive issuance but a contractbetween the FWBs and the landowners; hence, the operative fact doctrine is

not applicable. A contract stands on a different plane than a statute or anexecutive issuance. When a contract is contrary to law, it is deemed void abinitio . It produces no legal effects whatsoever. Thus, Justice Brion questionedthe option given by the majority to the FWBs to remain as stockholders in analmost- bankrupt corporation like HLI. He argued that the nullity of HLIsSDP/SDOA goes into its very existence, and the parties to it must generallyrevert to their respective situations prior to its execution. Restitution, he said,is therefore in order. With the SDP being void, the FWBs should returneverything they are proven to have received pursuant to the terms of theSDOA/SDP. Justice Brion then proposed that all aspects of the implementationof the mandatory CARP coverage be determined by the DAR by starting with aclean slate from [May 11,] 1989, the point in time when the compulsory CARPcoverage should start, and proceeding to adjust the relations of the parties withdue regard to the events that intervened [thereafter]. He also held that the timeof the taking (when the computation of just compensation shall be reckoned)shall be May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed by Tadeco, HLI and theFWBs.

Justice Sereno dissented with respect to how the majority modified thequestioned PARC Resolutions (i.e., no immediate land distribution, give first theoriginal qualified FWBs the option to either remain as stockholders of HLI orchoose actual land distribution) and the applicability of the operative factdoctrine. She would instead order the DAR to forthwith determine the area of


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Hacienda Luisita that must be covered by the compulsory coverage andmonitor the land distribution to the qualified FWBs.

Erroneous interpret ation of the Courts decision

The High Tribunal actually voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY thepetition of HLI and to AFFIRM the PARC resolutions. This is contrary to mediareports that the Court voted 6-4 to dismiss the HLI petition. The five (n otfour) minority justices (Chief Justice Corona, and Justices Brion, Villarama,Mendoza, and Sereno) only partially dissented from the decision of themajority of six (Justice Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo,Abad, and Perez). Justice Antonio Carpio took no part in the deliberations andin the voting, while Justice Diosdado Peralta was on official leave. The 14th and15th seats in the Court were earlier vacated by the retirements of JusticesEduardo Antonio Nachura (June 13, 2011) and Conchita Carpio-Morales (June19, 2011).

Another misinterpretation came from no less than the Supreme Courtadministrator and spokesperson, Atty. Midas Marquez. In a press conferencecalled after the promulgation of the Courts decision, Marquez initially used theterm referendum in explaining the High Courts ruling. This created confusionamong the parties and the interested public since a referendum implies thatthe FWBs will have to vote on a common mode by which to pursue their claims

over Hacienda Luisita. The decision was thus met with cries of condemnationby the misinformed farmers and the various peoples organizations andmilitant groups supportive of their cause.

Marquez would later correct himself in a subsequent press briefing. But sinceby then the parties had already filed their respective motions forreconsideration, he called upon everyone to just wait for the final resolutionof the motion[s], which is forthcoming anyway. The resolution of theconsolidated motions for reconsideration came relatively early on November

22, 2011, or less than five months from the promulgation of the decision.

hacienda lusita full digest

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