gushan zhiyuan: interpreting the buddha- nature of...

Gushan Zhiyuan: Interpreting the Buddha-Nature of Insentient Beings through the Notions of Mind-Inclusion and Mind-Contemplation

Shuman Chen

Abstract

Using textual analysis, this paper examines Gushan Zhiyuan’s interpretation of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. In the Jin’gangpi xianxing lu, a commentary on Zhanran’s Jin’gangpi, Zhiyuan deems the concepts of inclusion and contemplation, closely associated with the mind, as prerequisites for justifying the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. The mind, as an agent, possesses and includes all the three thousand dharmas; the mind, as a thinking being, can contemplate its own three thousand dharmas of/in/as one moment of thought. Because all dharmas are included in the all-pervasive minds of sentient beings who have Buddha-nature, it is valid to suggest that insentient beings also have Buddha-nature.

Zhiyuan, however, underscores that insentient beings per se cannot engage in spiritual practice or attain Buddhahood because they have no minds. This view of Zhiyuan’s, I argue, contradicts Zhanran’s philosophy, for Zhanran does imply in the Jin’gangpi that insentient beings can attain Buddhahood. I suggest that, by considering the Buddha-nature of insentient beings completely contingent on the mind, Zhiyuan, to some extent, denies their Buddha-nature. This paper

Shuman Chen is the Abbess of Pukai Meditation Center, Taichung Branch of Chung Tai Chan Monastery, Taiwan.

《禪與人類文明研究》第一期（2016）International Journal for the Study of Chan Buddhism and Human CivilizationIssue 1 (2016), 83–112

84 Shuman Chen

challenges Zhiyuan’s implication that sentient beings’ Buddha-nature possesses insentient beings, which differs from Zhanran’s assertion that insentient beings themselves really possess Buddha-nature.

Keywords: Buddha-nature, mind-inclusion, matter-inclusion, mind-contemplation, three thousand

Gushan Zhiyuan: Interpreting the Buddha-Nature of Insentient Beings 85

Introduction

In the Song dynasty, a series of intense debates occurred between the thinkers of the Shanjia 山家 (home-mountain) and Shanwai 山外 (off-mountain) traditions within the Tiantai School.1 Scholars tend to regard these debates as a sectarian event.2 Indeed, their sectarian element

1 The Shanjia-Shanwai debates occurred in the late 10th century and continued into the early 11th Century. The term “Shanjia,” originally representing the Tiantai School, was later used by Zhili’s descendants to clothe themselves in Tiantai orthodoxy. The term Shanwai is not a designation that “Shanwai” thinkers used to label themselves, and instead was coined by Shanjia thinkers to stigmatize their “heterodox” opponents. Such schism recalls the contrast between Mahayana and “Hinayana” Buddhism.

2 Scholars have suggested that the Shanjia-Shanwai debates were also a sectarian competition with other schools. Examining the internal debate in the broader historical context of the Song dynasty, Wu Zhongwei proposes that the intense literary debates are a result of a Tiantai response to other contemporaneous traditions. Both Shanjia and Shanwai thinkers were aware of an urgent need to revitalize the Tiantai Perfect Teaching; they, however, responded with different approaches. Shanjia attempted to reveal for example, the evils in the Expedient, while Shanwai limits Tiantai Buddhism to a teaching of the mind. Wu concludes that Shanjia attempted a genealogical association by means of extremely evil-inclusive (cunmei 存魅 ) repentance practices, whereas Shanwai adopted the study of the mind with evil-exclusive (qumei 袪魅 ) approaches associated with good. Wu Zhongwei 吳忠偉 , Yuanjiao de weiji yu puxi de zaisheng 圓教的危機與普系的再生：宋代天台宗山家山外之爭研究 (The Crisis of the Perfect Teaching and the Rebirth of Lineages: A Study of the Dispute between Shanjia and Shanwai in Song Tiantai Buddhism) (Changchun: Jilin renmin, 2007), 4–12. Wu seems to disprove Zhili’s “extreme” approach. However, Wu ignores the Tiantai position by identifying the extreme and the middle (jibian er zhong 即邊而中 ), and the Expedient and the Real (jiquan er shi 即權而實 ). Zhiyi states that, in the Perfect Teaching, the extreme is identical to the middle and everything is a Buddha Dharma. T33.n1716.697a. If one takes into account the Tiantai principle of identity, Zhili’s use of a seemingly extreme approach is understandable. Note: T refers to Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 [A standard collection of the East Asian Buddhist canon], edited by Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次朗 and Watanabe Kaigyoku 渡邊海旭 , et al., 100 vols. Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankō kai, 1924–1932. CBETA

86 Shuman Chen

cannot be rejected, for both sides of the Tiantai thinkers who participated in the debates claimed to be faithful to the authentic Tiantai teachings. Although the debates might seem heated, if one only views them through a sectarian lens, the signifi cance of a doctrinal clarifi cation would be missed.3 As contemporary Tiantai thinker Shi Huiyue comments, the debates helped the Tiantai teaching reach its apex in the Song dynasty.4 Indeed, the debates do entail signifi cant, doctrinal values.

In the doctrinal context of the Shanjia-Shanwai debates, most scholars allude to the contradictions between mind-inclusion (xinju 心具) and matter-inclusion (seju 色具) and between the pure mind (zhenxin 真心 ) and the deluded mind (wangxin 妄心).5 Gushan Zhiyuan 孤山智圓

(Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection Cross-platform Version), 2011 edition. Cited by volume (T) followed by text number (n), page, and register.

3 It is not always easy to pin down the real intentions of the participants in any Dharma debate, since the debate might be about politics or a fi ght for true teachings. The late Buddhist scholar and monk, Yinshun, for example, in his critique of the confl icts between the “Southern” and the “Northern” sects in the 8th century Chan School suggested that Shenhui’s 神會 (668–760) eagerness in recognizing Huineng 慧能 (638–713) as the 6th patriarch showed his passion for the Dharma, and his efforts to defend the teachings of the Southern sect should not be seen as a purely sectarian fi ght. Yinshun印順 , Zhongguo Chanzong shi中國禪宗史 (History of the Chan School of China) (Jiayi, Taiwan: Yinshun, 1975), 295. In like fashion, Shanjia and Shanwai thinkers took the real essence of Tiantai teachings very seriously and felt a need to clarify them. Thus, it would be more appropriate to view their debates from a doctrinal perspective, rather than merely from a political one, for the main concern was correct interpretation of Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597) and Jingxi Zhanran. I argue that, by identifying the key points Shanjia and Shanwai thinkers emphasize and deemphasize, their seemingly contradictory arguments may reveal their main interests and thus, the spirits of their persistence can be reevaluated and appreciated.

4 Shi Huiyue 釋慧嶽 , Tiantai jiaoxue shi天台教學史 (The History of Tiantai Teaching) (Taipei: Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 1993), 253.

5 Scholars tend to label Shanwai as the sect embracing the contemplation of the pure mind (zhenxin guan 真心觀 ), and Shanjia as the sect embracing the contemplation of the deluded mind (wangxin guan 妄心觀 ). This classifi cation, however, is only partially correct. Shanjia thinkers, such as Wu’en 晤恩 (912–986) and Yuanqing 源清


(976–1022), the representative of the Shanwai tradition, privileges the mind, arguing that the entirety of the universe is passively included in the mind. In contrast, Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960–1028), representing the Shanjia tradition, contends that matter also actively includes the mind and all other elements. In terms of the quality of the mind, observed in the practice of mind-contemplation, Zhiyuan argues that the objectifi ed mind is true, in the sense of the unity of truth and falsehood/delusion (zhenwang hehe 真妄和合). Zhili, although acknowledging the oneness of truth and delusion, singles out the deluded quality of the mind as the object of meditation. In this article, I attempt to extend this scholarship to expound upon the Shanjia-Shanwai disagreement, in terms of how to justify Jingxi Zhanran’s 荊溪湛然 (711–782) theory of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings.

The notion that all sentient beings (alone) possess Buddha-nature is widely accepted in Mahayana Buddhism. Zhanran, in contrast, enthusiastically contends that insentient beings also have Buddha-nature. His last work, the Jin’gangpi 金剛錍 (the Diamond Scalpel), is dedicated to defending and articulating the logic of his unconventional thought. A careful reading of the text suggests that the scope of insentience ranges widely, from the natural to the man-made, and to the

(d. c. 1000), do highlight the pure mind or pure nature. In contrast, Zhiyuan fi nds a middle ground between the pure mind and the defi led mind. Shi Huiyue was correct in pointing out that Zhiyuan views both types of contemplative practices as extreme. Shi Huiyue 釋慧岳 , Zhili 知禮 (Taipei: Dongda, 1995), 39. Indeed, in the Xianxing lu, Zhiyuan emphasizes the identity between truth and delusion, stating that the true and the deluded cannot be separated, that the ignorant mind is identical to the three truths, and that the conscious, defi led, and diseased mind becomes the inconceivable object in the practice of mind-observation as it is taught in the Mohe zhiguan 摩訶止觀 . X56.n935.532c. Note: X refers to Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 卍新纂大日本續藏經 (卍新纂續藏 ) [The continued East Asian Buddhist canon], edited by Maeda Eun 前田慧雲 and Nakano Tatsue 中野達慧 , 88 vols. Tokyo: Kokusho kankō kai, 1980–1989. CBETA, 2011 edition. Cited by volume (X) followed by text number (n), page, and register.

88 Shuman Chen

intangible, invisible, and formless element. As Zhanran has explained, all types of existence, including walls, rocks, fl ora, dust, fi bers, colors and scents have Buddha-nature.

Zhanran’s rationale for articulating the Buddha-nature of insentient beings may be summarized in the following points. Because all-pervasiveness (bian 遍 ) is Buddha-nature’s primary quality, Buddha-nature includes all types of beings without exception. The non-duality between sentience and insentience, and between mind and matter, eliminates their absolute distinction. Also, because body and land are identical (ji 即 ),6 the bodies and lands of Buddhas are interfused with those of the dwellers in other realms. Mutual inclusion (huju互具 ) reveals a reciprocal relationship between the sentient and the insentient, thereby allowing for the possibility of reversing the positions of the subjective observer and the objective phenomenon. Furthermore, insentient beings possess all three of the inseparable causal aspects of Buddha-nature (sanyin foxing 三因佛性 ): (1) the cause proper (zhengyin 正因 ) is the objective character of the truth to be realized in Buddhahood; and, (2) the conditioning cause (yuanyin 緣因 ) and the revealing cause (liaoyin 了因 ) are the experiential and behavioral concomitants of that realization.7 Accordingly, insentient beings can achieve liberation.

In the main, Tiantai thinkers embrace this particular theory of Zhanran’s yet interpret it from different perspectives. Four Tiantai thinkers, in the Tang and Song dynasties, wrote commentaries on the Jin’gangpi: (1) the Jin’gangpi lun siji 金剛錍論私記 by Mingkuang

6 The Tiantai notion of identity (ji) teaches that two polarities, on the one hand, are not different, and, on the other hand, remain distinct. The sameness and difference on the one hand, are not different and, on the other hand, remain distinct. The sameness and the difference do not make two opposites contradict each other. On the contrary, the concept of (experienced) identity entails the simultaneous intersubsumption between two seemingly contrasting entities.

7 The cause proper, the conditioning cause, and the revealing cause constitute the threefold Buddha-nature. These three aspects operate as three distinct kinds of causes of Buddhahood.


明曠 (dates unknown), a direct disciple of Zhanran’s; (2) the Jin’gangpi xianxing lu 金剛錍顯性錄 by Zhiyuan;8 (3) the Jin’gangpi lun yijie 金剛錍論義解 by Shanyue 善月 (1149–1241), which survives in partial form; and, 4) the Jin’gangpi lun shiwen 金剛錍論釋文 by Shiju 時舉 (dates unknown) in the Song dynasty.9 Among the four commentators, Zhiyuan is the only Shanwai thinker, and Shanyue and Shiju are in the Shanjia tradition. Analyzing Zhiyuan’s commentary on the Jin’gangpi allows one to examine Zhanran’s theory from a Shanwai perspective.

Zhiyuan interprets the Buddha-nature of insentient beings purely from the angle of the mind (of sentient beings, particularly human beings), neglecting the agency of matter/material. He contends that only because of mind-inclusion can the concept of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings be validated. This contradicts the view of Zhili’s, who insists that the mind does not necessarily engender the notion of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings, but instead, matter per se has Buddha-nature. As Zhiyuan contends, insentient beings that have no minds lack dynamism or agency. I argue that Zhiyuan’s affi rmation of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings is another way to suggest that Buddha-nature possesses and includes insentient beings, but not that insentient beings possess and include Buddha-nature. In the following pages, I will draw out Zhiyuan’s understandings of mind-inclusion and mind-contemplation, which he uses to explain Zhanran’s theory of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings and to denounce the Shanjia notion of matter-inclusion.

8 The text was completed in the third year of Jingde景德 (1006). Hereafter, the Xianxing lu.

9 In addition to these four commentaries, Congyi從義 (1042–1091), in his sub-commentary on the Zhiguan yili 止觀義例纂要 , comments on the Jin’gangpi. Shanxi 善喜 (熹 ) (1127–1204), a non-Tiantai thinker, also writes a brief commentary on the Jin’gangpi. Shanxi might be a disciple of Shihui 師會 (1102–1166) of the Huayan School. The fact that his commentary is an attack on the Jin’gangpi reveals his sectarian views.

90 Shuman Chen

Mind-Inclusion

The theory that insentient beings have Buddha-nature presented by Zhanran, as Zhiyuan understands it, is valid only in the context of inclusion and contemplation. Inclusion is the theoretical basis of contemplation, which in turn is a practice that actualizes the notion of inclusion. As prerequisites for justifying the Buddha-nature of insentient beings, these two concepts of inclusion and contemplation are closely associated with the mind. The agency of the mind leads to its possession and inclusion of the (seemingly external) three thousand dharmas.10 The thinking capability of the mind leads to the contemplation of its own three thousand dharmas within. The primary principle of the three thousand (dharmas) of/in/as one moment of thought (yinian sanqian 一念三千 ) is inclusion, which reveals the relationship between the “internal” mind (neixin 內心 ) and “external” phenomena (waifa 外法 ). The doctrine of yinian sanqian describes a dynamic subject-object relationship, as the mind observes and contemplates the three thousand. Zhiyuan’s main concern seems to be this unidirectional relationship between the mind and phenomena. It needs to be pointed out that the doctrine of yinian sanqian, in the context of mutual inclusion, is also related to the web of interdependence, or the interrelationship between

10 The term “three thousand” represents myriad dharmas, i.e., a matrix composed of dharma realms, suchnesses, and worlds. A dharma realm is a habitat of living beings. According to the Avataṃsaka Sūtra (Huayan jing 華嚴經 ), there are ten dharma realms in total. T10.n279.199c–200a. Each of the ten realms of sacred and profane beings includes the other nine in itself, i.e., the notion of mutual inclusion of the tenfold dharma realm. Accordingly, there are one hundred realms altogether. Each of the one hundred realms possesses ten suchnesses (shi rushi 十如是 ) stated in the Lotus Sutra. T09.n262.5c. Therefore, there are one thousand suchnesses. In each of these one thousand suchnesses, the three worlds of existence—the sentient world, the world of the fi ve aggregates, and the insentient world—taught in the Dazhidu lun 大智度論 are seen. T25.n1509.546b–c. As a result, there are three thousand worlds in total.


all forms and beings in the world. However, Zhiyuan seems to ignore such a multidirectional relationship between the mind and the three thousand, and of the three thousand dharmas themselves.

The foundation of Zhiyuan’s conception of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings is deeply rooted in the notion of mind-only.11 His emphasis on the mind is conspicuous in the Xianxing lu, as he alters the statement in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra12 that tiles and stones have no Buddha-nature into his proclamation that “tiles and stones merely hinge on my mind-nature.”13 It is important, for Zhiyuan, to understand that insentient beings can never exist outside, or apart from, the mind. His adaptation of the teaching of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra seems to imply that all elements in the world depend on the mind of the human being, the subject, connoting anthropocentrism. Zhiyuan further writes, “The environment and the organism are nothing but Buddha-nature.14 How can

11 By underscoring mind-only, Zhiyuan has singled out the particularity of the mind. As Wu Zhongwei points out, Shanwai thinkers explain and emphasize Buddhist teachings from the perspective of “mind cultivation” and recognize “the rectifying of the mind and the reinstating of the nature” (zhixin fuxing 治心復性 ) as the only effective practice. Wu Zhongwei, Yuanjiao de weiji yu puxi de zaisheng, 66. This Shanwai emphasis is valuable and effective, for since the very beginning of the establishment of Buddhism, the mind has been the center of many forms of Buddhist practice. According to the Tiantai Perfect Teaching, however, mind cultivation is never the only effective way and the pure nature of mind is not the main focus, if one takes into consideration the many types of only-ness (e.g., matter-only, sound-only, and scent-only) and the doctrine of the inherent evil of Buddha-nature.

12 Hereafter, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. 13 X56.n935.515a. Emphasis added. In contrast, Zhili categorically defi nes “mind-nature”

(xinxing 心性 ) as the nature of the (deluded) consciousness of the ordinary being. T46.n1936.835a. The term xinxing can also be read as mind’s nature, mind and the nature, mind/nature, and the-nature-as-the-mind. See Brook Ziporyn’s analysis of various possible renderings of the compound xinxing. Brook Ziporyn, “Mind and Its ‘Creation’ of All Phenomena in Tiantai Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37, no. 2 (2010): 156–180.

14 I use “the organism” (not in the traditional sense so as to include plants) to refer to the

92 Shuman Chen

it be that [one] still insists on the notion that insentient beings exist outside the mind?”15 Here, Zhiyuan directly links Buddha-nature with the mind, which seems to imply that only the mind has Buddha-nature and that Buddha-nature cannot be found outside the mind. Also, it is not that insentient beings are, on the one hand, the refl ection of the mind and, on the other hand, existent. Zhiyuan argues that the three thousand are included in a fl eeting moment of thought. This very moment of thought that has Buddha-nature pervades everywhere and all things, including tiles and stones. One can thus infer that these insentient objects also have Buddha-nature. Zhiyuan, therefore, underscores that insentient beings per se have no Buddha-nature, but that because insentient beings are included in the mind (that has Buddha-nature), naturally they also have Buddha-nature.16

Zhiyuan’s views of the mind differ from Zhanran’s. The doctrine of mind-only, as Zhanran presents it, has to be understood from the

direct retribution (zhengbao 正報 ), i.e., sentient beings, and “the environment” refers to the secondary, circumstantial retribution (yibao 依報 ) of sentient beings. Thus I use the phrase “the environment and the organism” to translate the compound yizheng

依正 . 15 X56.n935.536a.16 Zhiyuan is not the fi rst Tiantai thinker who highlights the importance of the principle

of mind-only. In the commentary of Mingkuang, one sees his inclination to stress mind-only, although not to as great a deal as Zhiyuan’s. To pick but one example, in the Jin’gangpi, Zhanran poses 46 questions, among which one is concerned with the Buddha’s land and body: “Are the Buddha-land and the Buddha-body one or distinct? If they are the same, then there is no subject-object or creator-created [dichotomy]. If they are different, then it is like an ordinary being whose land and body are different.” T46.n1932.784a. The 46 questions can be grouped into nine categories, and this question is in the category of Buddha land, irrelevant to the notion of mind-only. However, Mingkuang annotates this question as follows, “Bodies and lands are mind-only. Who can separate body and land into subject and object?” This also means that the mind cannot be divided into subject and object. X56.n932.499a. Mingkuang might have inspired Zhiyuan with respect to the interpretation of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings through the lens of mind-only.


perspective of nature-inclusion, or inherent inclusion/entailment (xingju 性具 ). Nature-inclusion means that all is inherently included in the nature of every dharma or of the mind. It cannot be denied that Zhanran does use mind-only to defend the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. Nevertheless, mind-only, according to Zhanran’s interpretation, does not glorify the supreme power of the mind, which gives rise to all things. Instead, the mind also includes, rather than merely engenders, all. As Chinese Buddhist scholar Yu Xueming points out, the Huayan conception of mind-only is associated with the pure suchness (zhenru 真如 ), which separates not only matter and mind but also sentient and insentient beings.17 For what is produced by the mind is never part of the real essence of the mind, which remains “pure” in the sense of non-differentiation and transcendence. In contrast, mind-only, associated with nature-inclusion, acknowledges both the mind and the nature of all things, including insentient beings. This is why insentient beings also have one of the “natures” of the mind, i.e., Buddha-nature.

Moreover, Zhanran seems to cautiously distance himself from the notion of pure mind-only. In the Jin’gangpi, he poses two questions on the relationship between the mind and phenomena: “Mind-only refers to the mind [as a creator]. Is the created not the mind? Is the created just the mind? Both answers are problematic.”18 These questions underscore the identity between the mind and all dharmas (created by the mind). It would be a mistake to propose that the created is precisely the same as the mind or that the created is completely different from the mind. What is created by the mind is not only mind and not only non-mind; it is both, mind included in object and object included in mind, reduced fi nally to neither side. The same can be said of the creating mind itself: it is not just mind or just non-mind; each is the three thousand, which

17 Yu Xueming 俞學明 , Zhanran yanjiu: Yi Tangdai Tiantaizong zhongxing wenti wei xiansuo 湛然研究 : 以唐代天台宗中興問題為線索 (A Study of Zhanran: A Clue to the Issue of the Revival of the Tiantai School in the Tang Dynasty) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2006), 191–92.

18 T46.n1932.784a.

94 Shuman Chen

means that each is both mind and non-mind. Clearly, Zhanran is trying to avoid holding a one-sided position. Nonetheless, his second question, which like the fi rst one is a rhetorical question, seems to go beyond a pure negation of an extremist view. Rather, it implies that the created is not just the mind. If the created were just the mind, the statement that insentient beings have Buddha-nature would merely mean that the mind has Buddha-nature.

Let me use a hypothetical scenario to describe this logic. A boy greets his friends at his house party, saying, “Welcome to my house!” Technically, the boy does not own the house; it is his father who, in reality, owns the house. Yet, because they have a blood relationship and live under the same roof, it is not incorrect for the son to consider the house his. (None of the boy’s friends can claim, “This is my house,” since they have no blood or inheritance relationship with the owner of the house.) When the son says, “This is my house,” he implies that “this is my father’s house.” This is similar to Zhiyuan’s position. When he asserts that insentient beings have Buddha-nature, he really means that the mind (or sentient beings who have minds) has Buddha-nature. It is due to the creation of the mind that the created insentient beings have Buddha-nature not that they themselves technically have Buddha-nature.

Zhiyuan’s and Zhanran’s views differ not only on the concept of mind-only, but also on the notion of all-pervasiveness. Zhiyuan’s proclamation that insentient beings, contingent upon the mind, are included in the all-pervasive Buddha-nature leaves us with the impression that he considers the concept of all-pervasiveness tantamount to the notion of inclusion, or more precisely, mind-inclusion. This would mean that the all-pervasiveness of Buddha-nature has to be comprehended through the concept of inclusion. Also, the all-pervasiveness, as Zhiyuan understands it, would only refl ect an inward retrospection, rather than outward examination. The mind subsumes all and is the center where all is contained. For Zhiyuan, the Buddha-nature of sentient beings actively pervades all beings. In contrast, the Buddha-nature of insentient beings is not all-pervading and, instead, is only


passively pervaded by the mind. I believe Zhiyuan’s views contradict Zhanran’s because all-pervasiveness in Zhanran’s writing means intersubsumption, i.e., all-pervadingness as all-pervadedness.

It is clear that Zhiyuan reserves “the all-pervasiveness of Buddha-nature” in the sense of all-pervadingness for sentient beings, and all-pervadedness for insentient beings. He cites the Nirvāṇa Sūtra to contend that the Buddha-nature of sentient beings is as pervasive as empty space. In addition, the Mohe zhiguan 摩訶止觀 states that when a mind gives rise to a thought, all the three thousand are completely included. Zhiyuan believes that grass and trees defi nitely have no minds, and thus the all-pervasiveness of their Buddha-nature is in fact that of sentient beings.19 In other words, Zhiyuan is suggesting that, when speaking of the all-pervasiveness of Buddha-nature, Zhanran in fact has the Buddha-nature of sentient beings in mind. Also, by proposing that insentient beings have Buddha-nature, Zhanran reveals that external phenomena are identical to the mind (of the sentient being). Zhiyuan, therefore, questions the idea that each blade of grass or tree has its own Buddha-nature and is subject to the principle of causality.20 Zhiyuan’s inner logic can be summarized as follows: The mind of the sentient being is not confi ned inside the physical body, and therefore, the mind includes all types of beings. Since all is included in the all-pervasive minds of sentient beings that have Buddha-nature, it is permissible to propose that insentient beings also “have” the Buddha-nature (of sentient beings).21

I have shown that Zhiyuan examines Zhanran’s theory through the lens of mind-inclusion, in conjunction with the notion of mind-only, according to which, all “external” phenomena can never exist outside, or

19 X56.n935.523a.20 Ibid.21 The Buddha-nature of sentient beings is all-pervasive, and therefore, all is included in

their Buddha-nature. Since all is included in the all-pervasive minds of sentient beings that have Buddha-nature, it is reasonable to contend that insentient beings also have Buddha-nature.

96 Shuman Chen

apart from, the mind. In the next section, we will see that Zhiyuan rejects the subjectivity (or activity) of matter and emphasizes the objectivity (or passivity) of matter. Consequently, he asserts that Buddha-nature is only passively included in matter.

Objection to Matter-Inclusion

Denying the agency of the insentient being, Zhiyuan is critical of the concept of matter-inclusion, which suggests that an insentient being per se can include the three thousand. In this section, I will point out Zhiyuan’s belief in matter as a pure creation of the mind, leading to his conclusion that matter can never be observed alone without any reference to the mind. Also, although Zhiyuan postulates for the same essence of matter and mind, for him, matter is mind, yet mind is not matter. Accordingly, matter-inclusion is simply an alternative way of uttering the concept of mind-inclusion; matter cannot actively include anything. Simply put, for Zhiyuan, there is no matter but mind, matter is not purely matter, and matter is just mind. In other words, the nature of matter is mentally derivative and dependent.

Zhiyuan laments some Tiantai thinkers’ incognizance of the concept that the three thousand are included in the mind and opines their ignorance of the truth that “matter and mind have the same essence” (sexin ti yi 色心體一 ). As a result, they mistakenly insist that grass, trees, and land per se include the three thousand. Terminologies, such as matter-only, scent-only, and “no dharma but matter” (sewai wu fa 色外無法 ), prevent their correct understanding of the doctrine of inclusion.22 Zhiyuan’s point is that the nonduality of matter and mind hinges on the doctrine of mind-inclusion. Given that all phenomena are included in the mind, phenomena and the mind cannot be separate, and hence nondualistic. When Zhiyuan writes that matter and mind have the same “essence” (ti 體 ), it seems that he also means, as the literal meaning of

22 X56.n935.522b.


the words suggest, that these two have the same “body” (ti 體 ). This is not to suggest that matter and mind, together, share a substantial body. Rather, since all dharmas are included in one moment of thought, the loci of all dharmas and the locus of the mind are simply one. Put differently, precisely where a thought arises, the three thousand are found. Dharmas are not located outside the mind, and hence matter and mind are (and have) one essence and one body. All dharmas and the mind are one, for dharmas are embodied in the mind. Thus Zhiyuan adamantly maintains that merely the mind per se has the three thousand, not that any entity (outside the mind) itself, alone, has the three thousand.

Zhiyuan’s stress on the passivity of insentient beings is seen in his emphasis on Zhanran’s statement that “matter is created by the mind, and the entirety of matter is the mind (quan se shi xin 全色是心 ).”23 Zhiyuan thus insists that matter is simply something created and is always the included aspect of the mind. He writes, “The nature of the mind as the creator originally includes the three thousand … and freely integrates created phenomena, for the entirety of the created is the nature of the mind creator.”24 The “nature” (xing 性 ) in this context refers to the quality of the mind, as a subjective agent, which can create and include other things. Zhiyuan uses the water/wave metaphor to explain the mind-matter relationship. He writes, “The entirety of the created wave is the wetness of water as the creator.”25 Waves are made of water, and therefore, waves are water (and wet). In the mind-matter relationship, matter is made by the mind. One should not mistake that it is the nature of the mind, rather than the mind, that is tantamount to phenomena. Nor is it that the wetness (i.e., nature) of water, rather than water, amounts to waves. Instead, Zhiyuan often uses the mind and the nature (of something) interchangeably; the same is true of water and

23 T46.n1914.460a; X56.n935.516c; X56.n935.537c.24 X56.n935.533c.25 Ibid.

98 Shuman Chen

wetness. The distinction between mind and mind-nature, and the distinction between water and wetness, is wholly effaced here. To wit, mind/nature, symbolized by water/wetness, is considered principle, while all types of matter, symbolized by waves, are considered phenomena. Thus, the entirety of each phenomenon is principle (quan shi shi li 全事是理 ).26

As dharmas are created by the mind, and the entirety of each dharma is the mind, Zhiyuan states that each form, color, scent, or the like includes all dharmas (jufa 具法 ). This is so because matter-inclusion is really mind-inclusion.27 In terms of mind-inclusion, Zhiyuan seems to make a distinction between the creating mind and the created dharmas. In other words, dharmas are always something created and included, i.e., the included dharma (jufa); they do not have any function or activity of creation. By adopting Zhanran’s terminology of jufa, which literally means “to include dharmas” or “the included dharma,” Zhiyuan deliberately adapts the active tone of “including” into a passive one of “being included.” While Zhanran writes that each form and scent includes dharmas, Zhiyuan suggests that forms and scents are dharmas included (in the mind). This sense of inclusion, for Zhiyuan, implies the sense of integration (she 攝 ). Therefore, the concept that the mind includes all dharmas is commensurate with the notion that the mind integrates all dharmas (insentient beings included). Simply put, for Zhiyuan, it is never that all the three thousand are included in any insentient being. When speaking of inclusion, all (sentient and insentient existences) are passively included in the mind.

Moreover, Zhiyuan’s objection to matter-inclusion is implied in his interpretation of the phrase “bibi sanqian 彼彼三千 ,” found in Zhanran’s Mohe zhiguan fuxing chuanhong jue 摩訶止觀輔行傳弘決 .28 The original passage goes:

26 X56.n935.534a. This is reminiscent of the Huayan doctrine of “non-obstruction between principle and phenomena” (li shi wuai 理事無礙 ).

27 X56.n935.522c.28 Hereafter, the Fuxing, a commentary on the Mohe zhiguan.


A practitioner may know that one’s mind includes all the three thousand

dharmas. Yet, if he neither recognizes that one’s mind pervades the three

thousand, nor [further acknowledges that] those [three thousand] and

those three thousand are mutually all-pervasive, he would go with the

conventional thinking and develop the view of [polarizing] the inner and

the outer.29

It is plausible that the mind includes the three thousand dharmas, meaning that the three thousand are found within the mind. However, it would be diffi cult for most people to realize that the mind pervades the three thousand, i.e., the mind can be found in those three thousand. Not to mention that the three thousand actively and mutually pervade each other, i.e., the three thousand can also be found in other three thousands. Put differently, each dharma is found in other dharmas; all dharmas are found in any dharma. This direct relationship between two insentient dharmas reduces the importance of the mind (associated with the sentient). This would suggest that Zhanran does not purely prioritize the mind as Zhiyuan does.

Rejecting the subjectivity or activity of the insentient dharma, Zhiyuan interprets the above passage from the perspective of the sentient. He parses the phrase “bibi sanqian” as the three thousand of the Buddha and the three thousand of sentient beings in order to make a contrast to the three thousand of the mind of the practitioner, i.e., I. My mind includes the three thousand. The mind and land of the sentient being and those of the Buddha include their three thousand, respectively. Note that Zhiyuan uses mind and land, instead of body and land, which Zhanran uses in the Jin’gangpi. This subtle adaptation demonstrates Zhiyuan’s inclination to favor the mind over the non-mind. Zhiyuan further says that “my three thousand pervade their three thousand” (emphasis added) and that these three groups of three thousand—the

29 T46.n1912.290a. Another possible translation of the third line in its Chinese original is: “That [being] and that [being] in the three thousand mutually pervade each other,” meaning that all of the three thousand dharmas pervade one another.

100 Shuman Chen

Buddha’s, others’, and mine—do not differ.30 Although disagreeing with Zhiyuan with respect to his opposition to the subjectivity of the insentient, I think he is correct in bringing in the non-differentiation to the I, the Buddha, and other sentient beings.

The notion that the mind, the Buddha, and the sentient are not different, as stated in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, appears at the end of the above-mentioned passage in the Fuxing. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the context, which emphasizes the notion of inclusion. Zhanran says that mind-contemplation is common in “Hinayana” and Mahayana, while inclusion-contemplation (guanju 觀具 , i.e., the contemplation of the doctrine of inclusion) only exists in the Tiantai Perfect Teaching (yuanjiao 圓教 ). The experienced object during the contemplation is the provisional (jia 假 ) dharma, which is also identical to emptiness (kong 空 ) and the middle (zhong 中 ).31 Any type of dharma can be the object of contemplation, and it must be understood to be an instantiation of the Tiantai three truths. The object in meditation can be sentient or insentient. Put another way, the object should not be arbitrarily categorized as being sentient or insentient. This is why I interpret the phrase “bibi sanqian” as “those [three thousand] and those three thousand” or “that [being] and that [being] among the three thousand dharmas (and the three thousand entailed by it in each case).” Since Zhanran does not specify what he means by “that,” any possible dharmic experience can be qualifi ed as the “that.” In short, Zhiyuan’s analysis prioritizes the mind, along with the self, the Buddha, and the sentient being, (which suggests that he pays more attention to sentient beings although he also recognizes the Buddha-nature of insentient beings). I instead suggest that the three thousand (sentient and insentient beings included or unspecifi ed) are the key to the notion of inclusion.

It is undeniable that the term seju, or matter-inclusion, does not appear in the Jin’gangpi; nevertheless, the concept is found in the Lotus

30 X56.n935.519a.31 T46.n1912.289c.


Sutra, the primary text of Tiantai Buddhism. Chapter 19 of the Lotus Sutra enumerates the merits one can create by means of upholding, reading, reciting, explaining, or copying the Lotus Sutra. One of the many merits is the purity of the Lotus Sutra practitioner’s body, which is as pure and bright as lapis lazuli and which mirrors all realms and the sentient beings residing in them. Right in one’s own body, one sees all sentient beings in the trichiliocosm (sanqian daqian shijie 三千大千世界 ), their experiences of birth and death, and all the mountains constituting the universe.32 Not only the six mundane realms but also the four sagely realms are revealed. As the Lotus Sutra depicts it, all Buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, and śrāvakas who are teaching the Dharma appear in the body of the Lotus Sutra adherent.33 To borrow Zhanran’s words, we may say that the bodies and lands of all the ten realms are included in the body of a sincere Lotus Sutra follower. This exemplifi es well the concept of matter-inclusion, for a physical body is a material object. Some might disagree and insist that a physical body has to be considered sentient; accordingly, this passage of the Lotus Sutra cannot be used to justify the concept of matter-inclusion. Even if we regard a body as sentient, however, the Lotus Sutra makes it explicit that it is the body, not the mind, in which all realms are refl ected, included, and seen, since the same chapter has a separate section discussing the merits and powers of the practitioner’s mind as such. This passage should suffi ce to validate the concept of matter-inclusion, although in this context, matter is specifi cally limited to a sentient physical body, instead of any other type of matter.

Zhiyuan seems to be unaware of the notion of matter-inclusion depicted in the Lotus Sutra and argues that the meaning of inclusion has to be understood through arising, meaning that all phenomena arise from the mind. When a thought arises, all phenomena arise, too; therefore, all

32 The body as a microcosm of all dharma realms and their inhabitants is reminiscent of Indra’s net, depicted in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra. All jewels (and the entire net) are refl ected in each jewel in the net.

33 T09.n262.49c.

102 Shuman Chen

are included in the mind. The key point of Zhiyuan’s argument is “arising,” which indicates the dynamics and priority of the mind. The mind has to act fi rst, and then all (passive) others, dependent on the mind, follow it to come into being. If a land, independent from the mind, includes the three thousand in its own right, then plants and stones should be able to engage in the activity of thought-arising. Zhiyuan intends to assert that because insentient beings lack any dynamic mental mode, they do not include the three thousand in their own right. Zhiyuan, seeing the passivity and dependence of insentient beings, insists that it would be a mistake to argue for matter-inclusion.

Although objecting to the notion of matter-inclusion, Zhiyuan argues for the identity between matter and mind, which is nonetheless built upon his belief in the inclusion of matter within the mind. Although professing the idea that matter is identical to the mind, Zhiyuan seems to deny that the mind is identical to matter. The identity between matter and mind, for Zhiyuan, is thus not a reciprocal one because the mind is defi nitely superior to matter. It is similar to the argument that a son looks exactly like his father, but not that a father looks like his son. For, it is always that a father begets a son, not that a son begets a father. The unilateral identity that Zhiyuan presents confl icts with Zhanran’s thinking of reciprocal identity. Zhiyuan would only say that “like father, like son,” while Zhanran might agree that it is also true to say that “like son, like father.” Zhiyuan’s attempt to prioritize the mind along with mind-inclusion and to negate matter-inclusion implies that insentient beings do not really have Buddha-nature and that their Buddha-nature is merely a corollary or a “by-product” of the inclusive nature of the mind. One might infer that although Zhiyuan supports the concept that insentient beings have Buddha-nature, to some extent, he implies that only sentient beings have it. If sentient beings have no Buddha-nature, then insentient beings do not, either; yet, the reverse is not true.


Mind-Contemplation

Next to the doctrine of mind-inclusion, mind-contemplation is the other key concept Zhiyuan adopts to justify Zhanran’s theory that insentient beings have Buddha-nature. In the practice of mind-contemplation, one observes one’s own mind. Since all the three thousand are included in one’s mind, when observing one’s mind, one is simultaneously observing the three thousand. Zhiyuan’s emphasis on this type of meditation seems to aim at glorifying the mind’s capability of contemplation and to invalidating the contemplative capacity of the insentient world. In other words, while highlighting the subjective, active mind of the sentient being, he underlines the objectivity and passivity of the insentient being that lacks contemplative awareness. Thus, although insentient beings have Buddha-nature, they do not engage in any activity, do not have delusion or affl iction, and cannot practice meditation toward liberation. In the following pages, we will again see Zhiyuan’s favoring of the sentient mind over the world of insentience and non-mind.

Inspired by the opening of the Jin’gangpi, Zhiyuan suggests that one should comprehend the Buddha-nature of insentient beings from the perspective of contemplation. The text opens with Zhanran’s decades-long meditation on the meaning of Buddha-nature, a fact that leads Zhiyuan to put more weight on contemplation than doctrine. In contrast, doctrine and contemplation are equally important in Tiantai Buddhism. Nonetheless, Zhiyuan emphasizes contemplation over doctrine when commenting on the Jin’gangpi. (Still, we have to keep in mind that, as a Tiantai descendent, Zhiyuan undoubtedly professes the importance of keeping a balance between doctrine and contemplation.)

In the process of Tiantai meditation, the three thousand are the object of contemplation and, according to Zhiyuan, have to be examined under the umbrella of mind-inclusion. The validity of the three thousand completely hinges on mind-contemplation. Zhiyuan insists that one has to accept that the three thousand are included in the mind, prior to contemplating the three thousand. Contemplating external phenomena,

104 Shuman Chen

followed by the recognition that all are included in one’s mind, would be ineffective.34 Zhiyuan believes that a contemplation that precedes the knowing of mind-inclusion would suggest a separation of mind (i.e., the internal) and phenomena (i.e., the external). It also implies that one meditates on external phenomena, instead of the phenomena inside one’s own mind. In order to avoid a separation of mind and phenomena, or the internal and the external, Zhiyuan opines that one has to accept the doctrine of mind-inclusion before partaking in contemplation. Put another way, if one has perfectly understood the notion of mind-inclusion, one will naturally and immediately practice meditation.35 Because the three thousand are included in the mind, the contemplation of dharmas is done internally. One’s mind should not wander outward to search, observe, or examine any putatively external dharmas, for the so-called external dharmas are, in fact, included and located in the mind alone. Thus, the practice of contemplation is a type of inward retrospection, which is a thorough, mindful investigation of the dharmas within.

It is the meditative relationship between the mind and the three thousand that makes the Buddha-nature of insentient beings possible. Zhiyuan borrows Zhanran’s own words to support his argument:

The [Jin’gangpi] states, “... one should contemplate the inconceivable

object .... Now, I propose that the essence of sentient beings’ cause

proper is all-pervasive.” It also says, “It is precisely because you have

never been good at completely holding cause and effect, self and other,

the environment and the organism, nor contemplating the equality of the

mind [, the Buddha, and the sentient being].” It further says, “If one

34 Both Shanjia and Shanwai traditions insist on a correct understanding of mind-inclusion before embarking on contemplation. But, in contrast to Zhiyuan, who emphasizes inner observation, Zhili also talks about outer observation. When observing an external phenomenon, one needs to have a correct understanding of matter-inclusion. T46.n1936.837a.

35 X56.n935.521a.


believes in mind-only inclusion, yet doubts the existence [of the

Buddha-nature of insentient beings], then it is similar to doubting the

existence of [Buddha-nature in] one’s own mind.” Also, “For those who penetrate the mind-only and fully understand the essence-inclusion,

there is neither difference nor sameness [between insentient beings’ and

sentient beings’ Buddha-nature], is there?” Even the 46 questions are

posed to demonstrate that insentient beings have Buddha-nature, a

concept that is contingent upon the principle of mind-contemplation,

which completely includes the three thousand.36

Here, Zhiyuan enumerates six points of the Jin’gangpi that he believes are associated with mind-contemplation. Indeed, these points seem to be more or less relevant to the doctrines of mind-only and mind-contemplation. One point—“the essence of sentient beings’ cause proper is all-pervasive”—at first glance seems irrelevant to the mind or contemplation. Yet, if one considers that only sentient beings have minds, one can understand why Zhiyuan links it to mind-contemplation. This, however, might be used to argue against Zhiyuan, as it seems to imply that insentient beings do not have the cause proper. Also, a few of Zhanran’s points seem not entirely related to mind-contemplation. The 46 questions posed in the Jin’gangpi are such an example, for only the last six questions are contemplation-related. Zhiyuan is unable to imagine that, without the mind, it is still possible to justify the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. Insentient beings are created by the mind and do not stand on their own or stay outside the mind. Since these objects are created, they are, more or less, unreal as refl ections and mirages.

Zhiyuan speculates that Zhanran’s theory of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings was inspired by the Mohe zhiguan, an essential text on meditation in Tiantai. Zhiyuan relates the text and Zhanran’s thinking as

36 X56.n935.520a. For Zhiyuan, it is essential to accept the doctrine of mind-only, along with the doctrine of mind-inclusion. These two doctrines result in the theory that insentient beings have Buddha-nature. X56.n935.534b.

106 Shuman Chen

follows: after having fully grasped the Mohe zhiguan, Zhanran meditated on its kernel—the inconceivable object of meditation is a moment of thought that includes all the three thousand dharmas—and concluded that insentient beings have Buddha-nature.37 (Here again, we see Zhiyuan’s assertion that the doctrine of mind-inclusion precedes the practice of mind-contemplation.) The meditation object seems not to be directly relevant to the notion of Buddha-nature; however, one cannot deny that a mind has Buddha-nature. Textually, the Mohe zhiguan inspires the Jin’gangpi; doctrinally, the principle of one thought including the three thousand leads to the theory that insentient beings have Buddha-nature. How can such a conclusion be inferred? It is by contemplation, says Zhiyuan, since both texts emphasize the practice of contemplation.

It is necessary to clarify that the literary source Zhanran uses to defend his theory, in fact, is Zhiyi’s remarks that “each color and each scent are nothing but the Middle-way,” a statement found in all three major works of Zhiyi’s. This contradicts Zhiyuan’s argument that Zhanran’s theory results from the concept of mind-inclusion. Instead, Zhanran uses colors and scents as examples of insentient beings to argue for their “Middle-way as Buddha-nature” (zhongdao foxing 中道佛性 ).38 He does not initiate his theory by starting with the mind or the doctrine of mind-inclusion. Mind-inclusion is merely one of many doctrines Zhanran uses to defend his theory in the Jin’gangpi. In addition, the doctrine of mind-inclusion appears in the text only after Zhanran has discussed the concepts of all-pervasiveness, threefold Buddha-nature, mutual inclusion, etc. It would be farfetched to assume that the Mohe zhiguan is the textual inspiration of Zhanran’s theory, as Zhiyuan has

37 X56.n935.522a.38 Ng Yu-Kwan identifi es three key features of the Middle-way as Buddha-nature: “ever-

abidingness,” “meritorious function” and “embracing various dharmas,” in Zhiyi’s own terms. Ng Yu-Kwan, T’ien-t’ai Buddhism and Early Mā dhyamika (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 1993), 63. Following Zhiyi, Zhanran deems the Middle-way and Buddha-nature as identical.


suggested. This purported textual evidence might be a product of Zhiyuan’s preference for the mind that takes precedence over any other principles or conditions.

Zhiyuan’s emphasis on the doctrine of mind-only has led him to deviate, moderately, from Zhanran’s thinking. In the Jin’gangpi, although using the doctrine of mind-only to defend the Buddha-nature of insentient beings and to equate suchness with Buddha-nature, Zhanran does not go further to claim that mind-only is synonymous with Buddha-nature. Zhiyuan does. He writes, “One should know that consciousness-only is synonymous with Buddha-nature. Since the environment and the organism are merely the transformations of consciousness, it is not permissible to suggest that Buddha-nature is only found in the bodies of sentient beings.”39 In this context, consciousness-only is mind-only. By equating mind-only with Buddha-nature, Zhiyuan justifi es his position that the theory of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings is just a different way of stating the doctrine of mind-only. In other words, the Buddha-nature of insentient beings (wuqing foxing 無情佛性 ) is tantamount to the mind-only of insentient beings (wuqing weixin 無情唯心 ), meaning that insentient beings exist only because of the mind.

Yet, the close relationship of the three elements—mind-only, Buddha-nature, and the insentient being—does not lead Zhiyuan to further suggest that insentient beings themselves have minds. Zhiyuan is adamant about the declaration that everything (the object) is created by and included in the mind (the subject). Possessing Buddha-nature, in Zhiyuan’s view, is unidirectional. Where the mind as the possessor is ontologically primary and independent, the insentient being as the possessed is secondary and dependent. The mind (of the sentient being) possesses insentient beings, but insentient beings do not possess the mind. When affi rming the Buddha-nature of insentient beings, Zhiyuan is essentially saying that (sentient beings’) Buddha-nature possesses insentient beings, but not that insentient beings have Buddha-nature.

39 X56.n935.538a.

108 Shuman Chen

In terms of mind, Zhiyuan sees differences between the sentient and the insentient: the (sentient being’s) mind has insentient beings, whereas insentient beings have no mind. Zhiyuan writes, “Sentient beings differ from trees and stones. [The Mohe zhiguan] says that when a fl eeting moment of thought arises, the three thousand are completely included. The three thousand equally include the environment and the organism, without exception. Thus, [we] say that the essence of the cause proper [of Buddha-nature] is all-pervasive.”40 Zhiyuan sees the passivity of insentient dharmas and rejects the idea that they can meditate or have any active engagement. In contrast, sentient beings have minds; whenever a thought arises, the three thousand dharmas are completely included. It should be mentioned here that Zhanran, in the Fuxing, states that from the perspective of phenomena (shi 事 ), the sentient and the insentient are distinct, whereas from the perspective of principle (li 理 ), they do not differ.41 However, Zhiyuan seems to neglect Zhanran’s statement of the non-differentiation between the sentient and the insentient. Instead, Zhiyuan holds onto their differences in terms of the possession of mind. In short, Zhiyuan reinforces that only sentient beings who have minds can meditate, while insentient beings cannot. Thus, when speaking of the three thousand, only the mind of the sentient being includes them, whereas insentient beings do not include any of the three thousand.

Admittedly, Zhiyuan does not deny the non-differentiation between sentience and insentience, yet their non-differentiation is again, merely, appropriated by the mind. Because the mind cannot be divided into subject and object and because the environment and the organism are located in the mind, sentient and insentient beings cannot be separated.42 Zhiyuan even remarks that the organism can transform into the environment, and the latter can transform into the former. Again, this is

40 X56.n935.522a–b.41 T46.n1912.152a.42 X56.n935.533a.


so only because of the notion of the three thousand in the mind.43 Furthermore, the fact that the organism can turn into the environment is justified because the physical body is composed of the four great elements—earth, water, fi re, and wind—which are also components of grass and tiles. So, the sentient body can be considered insentient. That the environment can turn into the organism is due, for Zhiyuan, to the doctrine of mind-only: all insentient beings have the nature of peace and joy (anle xing 安樂性 ), i.e., Buddha-nature, which for Zhiyuan is equated directly with mind; therefore, from this perspective, they can be seen as sentient.44 Namely, without the mind, the mutual transformation between sentience and insentience is impossible.

Moreover, because insentient beings do not have minds, they lack the capacity to develop contemplative practice. Still, Zhiyuan affi rms the Buddhahood of insentient beings, which becomes possible once again, dependent on the mind. In other words, when Zhiyuan cites the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, which states that those who have minds will attain Buddhahood, he seems to imply that insentient beings, without minds, cannot perform good deeds so as to become Buddhas.45 He further contends that the Buddha never assures the future Buddhahood of tiles and stones and that the Bodhisattva Never-disparaging, in the Lotus Sutra, prostrates himself in front of sentient beings only.46 By glorifying sentient beings, Zhiyuan’s remarks signifi cantly devalue the importance of insentient beings.

43 X56.n935.539b.44 X37.n662.516c.45 X56.n935.522b; T12.n374.524c.46 X56.n935.522b. Zhiyuan writes that Never-Disparaging kowtows to sentient beings.

Indeed, in the Lotus Sutra, Bodhisattva Never-Disparaging pays homage to the saṅgha constituents of bhikṣus, bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas and upāsikās. Yet, the reader is not told that the bodhisattva also bows down before non-Buddhists, animals, bugs, or spirits. See T09.n262.50b–51c.

110 Shuman Chen

Conclusion

Although following Zhanran’s contention and defending the Buddha-nature of insentient beings, Zhiyuan is reluctant to validate it outside the context of mind. Zhiyuan argues that the minds of the Buddha and all sentient beings create all phenomena that can be perceived as imaginative refl ections of the mind. Phenomena are always “inside” the mind of the Buddha and any sentient being. Because all phenomena are included in and inseparable from the mind, they also have Buddha-nature.

Zhiyuan, however, underscores the points that insentient beings do not include the three thousand as sentient beings do; that their possession of Buddha-nature is entirely dependent on the condition that they are included in the mind; and that insentient beings lack minds and spiritual practice. In so doing, Zhiyuan prioritizes sentience over insentience, mind over lack-of-mind, and sentient beings’ Buddha-nature over insentient beings’ Buddha-nature. As a result, in contrast to Zhanran, who proposes the theory that insentient beings have Buddha-nature along with an implication that they can attain Buddhahood, Zhiyuan maintains that insentient beings that have no minds cannot become Buddhas in the experiential sense.

In sum, Zhiyuan’s interpretation of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings results from his emphasis on mind-inclusion and mind-contemplation. The theory that insentient beings have Buddha-nature can never stand alone if the all-pervasiveness of the mind and the Buddha-nature of sentient beings are not taken into account. Zhiyuan believes that for the Tiantai thinkers who deemphasize the supremacy of the mind, spiritual achievement would be as difficult as searching for phoenixes in a nest of vultures or attempting to catch whales in a well. However diligently they try, they will never succeed, for they are searching in the wrong place.47

47 X56.n935.523b. The Xinwenfeng reprint version of the Zokuzōkyō 卍續藏經 has the


Bibliography

Maeda Eun, and Zō kyō Shoin 前田慧雲, 藏經書院 , ed. Zokuzōkyō 卍續藏經 . Vol. 100. 1905–1912. Reprint, Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1994.

Ng Yu-Kwan. T’ien-t’ai Buddhism and Early Mā dhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 1993.

Shi Huiyue 釋慧岳. Zhili知禮 . Taipei: Dongda, 1995.

—. Tiantai jiaoxue shi天台教學史 (The History of Tiantai Teaching).Taipei: Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 1993.

Wu Zhongwei 吳忠偉. Yuanjiao de weiji yu puxi de zaisheng: Songdai Tiantaizong shanjia shanwai zhi zheng yanjiu 圓教的危機與譜系的再生 : 宋代天台宗山家山外之爭研究 (The Crisis of the Perfect Teaching and the Rebirth of Lineages: A Study of the Dispute between Shanjia and Shanwai in Song Tiantai Buddhism). Changchun: Jilin renmin, 2007.

Yinshun 印順. Zhongguo Chanzong shi中國禪宗史 (History of the Chan School of China). Jiayi, Taiwan: Yinshun, 1975.

Yu Xueming 俞學明 . Zhanran yanjiu: Yi Tangdai Tiantaizong zhongxing wenti wei xiansuo 湛然研究：以唐代天台宗中興問題為線索 (A Study of Zhanran: A Clue to the Issue of the Revival of the Tiantai School in the Tang Dynasty). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2006.

Ziporyn, Brook. “Mind and Its ‘Creation’ of All Phenomena in Tiantai Buddhism.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37, no. 2 (2010): 156–80.

word “swallow” (yan鷰 ), instead of “vulture” (jiu鷲 ). Maeda Eun and Zō kyō Shoin 前田慧雲 , 藏經書院 , eds., Zokuzōkyō 卍續藏經 , vol. 100 (1905–1912; repr., Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1994), 513.

孤山智圓：從心具和觀心的向度詮釋無情佛性思想

釋見額

釋見額，中台禪寺台中分院普開精舍住持。

《禪與人類文明研究》第一期（2016）International Journal for the Study of Chan Buddhism and Human CivilizationIssue 1 (2016), 83–112

摘　要

本文採用文本分析的方法，旨在探討宋朝天台宗學人孤山智圓對於

「無情佛性思想」的觀點與詮釋方法。在他的〈金剛錍顯性錄〉裏，智

圓指出唯有透過「心具」和「觀心」這二個向度，才能正確瞭解湛然所

提出的無情佛性思想。智圓認為，心是一切之主，心具三千諸法，

眾生因為有心故能思慮，故能思惟己之一念三千。因為萬法皆含具

在眾生之心中，又因為眾生有佛性，所以吾人才能說無情萬法也有

佛性。

然而，智圓進一步強調因為無情無心，所以無情本身並沒有能

力修行，無法成就佛道。筆者認為，智圓這個看法有違湛然的本

意，因為湛然在他的〈金剛錍〉一文中，明確提出無情也能成就佛道

的論點。筆者認為，如果吾人一味地從「心」的角度來闡釋無情佛性

思想，就某種程度而言，等於否定無情也有佛性。本文即試圖證明

智圓的論點猶如在闡揚「眾生的佛性有無情」，和湛然的「無情有佛

性」的觀點大相逕庭。

關鍵詞：佛性、心具、色具、觀心、三千

gushan zhiyuan: interpreting the buddha- nature of...

Documents